ML20086M169

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Ro:On 840111,facility Outside Design Basis,Rendering High Pressure Safety Injection Trains Inoperable for Approx 25 Minutes.Incident Reviewed by Station Mgt.Analysis of Occurrence Discussed W/Nrc Resident Inspector
ML20086M169
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 02/10/1984
From: Haynes J
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
References
NUDOCS 8402160386
Download: ML20086M169 (2)


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_. 4 Southern California Edison Company ,C,5W SAN ONOFRE NUCLE AR GENER A TING ST ATION P.O. SOM 128 S AM CLEMe!NTE. C ALIFORNI A .2672 J. G. H A YN E S TatspwoNs ST ATION M ANAGE A {734)492-7700 February 10, 1984 i

l' U.- S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l i~ Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 I

Dear Sir:

Subject:

Docket:No. 50-361 Ja nua ry 11, 1984 Immediate Notification

_ San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B), an immediate notification was made shortly af ter midnight on the morning of January 11, 1984'. That notification reported that Unit 2 was outside its-design basis in that both High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) trains-were considered inoperable for approximately twenty-five . (25) minutes. - Upon further evaluation i on January 11,.1984, it was established that the notification was unnecessary.in that only one train of HPSI had been rendered

' inoperable, as permitted by Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO),' Action Statement 3.5.2(a), and at no time was Unit 2 in a condition that was outside the design basis.

The-immediate notification was originally made by considering the Train "A" HPSI to be inoperable when the Train "A" Diesel was removed from service. Since the Technical Specifications specifically_do not require emergency power sources to be operable in order for equipment served by such emergency power sources to be considered operable . Train "A" HPSI should not l have been considered inoperable. The Train "A" 1E Bus which provides normal power to Train "A" HPSI remained energized and offsite power remained available.

l The incident was reviewed in detail by Station Management on January ll, 1984. In addition, our analysis of the occurrence p has been discussed with the NRC Resident Inspector.

~ihe shift and staff personnel responsible for making-immediate notifications to -the- NRC have been instructed to err on the

! conservative side and make a notification, even if there may be some doubt as to the applicability of 10CFR50.72 or the validity

.of the initial information. In this case, such notification was /t/

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February 10, 1984 made and subsequently.determ!,ned to be unnecessary. Consequently, no 10 CPR 50.73, " Licensee Event Report System", report will be made. If_you have additional questions or comments regarding_this event, please contact me.

Sincerely, s

^

N1 J. G. HAYNES STATION MANAGER' P

PACroy:2405u:dkd cc: J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, Region V) .

A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)

J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Unitsi2.and.3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

. Office of Inspection and Enforcement Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) s.