ML20203K914
| ML20203K914 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1998 |
| From: | Burda D, Rausch B SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203K553 | List: |
| References | |
| J-SPA-269, J-SPA-269-ROO, NUDOCS 9803050275 | |
| Download: ML20203K914 (52) | |
Text
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ENCLOSURE 9 ESFAS ItADI ATION MON 110R SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS 9803050275 980002 l PDR ADOCK 05000361 1 P PDR l 1
4 Southern Caftforn6a EWoon Ccaipany CALC.NO.
[gtU CCN NO. F 707 1 PAGE8 gg INTERIM CALCULATION sAst CALC REV. UNIT CHANGE N0flCE (ICCN)/ CCN CONVERSION : CALC REV.
0 2&3 CALCULATION CHANGE CCH NO. CCN.
NOTICE (CCN)
CALCULATION
SUBJECT:
l ESPAS Radiation Monitoring Single Failure Analysis COVER PAGE CALCULATION CROS$4NDEX ENGNEERING SYSTEM NVMBER / PRIMARY STATION SYSTEMO DEslGNATOR CLASS f
b CONTROLLER) PROGRAM OR O""**** DATAsisE ACCORDiNo tO PROGRAM / DATABASE NAME (S)
'VER$10N/ RELEASE NO.(S)
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1.BRtEF DE SCRIPTION OF ICCN l CCN:
This is a complete document ICCN. The following are the changes:
- 1. Provided references to J. SPA 279. FHIS Radiation Monitor Software Mode Failure Evalua Radiation Monitor Software Common Mode Failure Analysis to explain the inter relationship between these documents.
- 2. Revised the FMEA TatWes to reflect the most current vendor documenta*Jon and plant test results.
3.
Verified and updated Ca%iation Cross-Index and Reference redslon numbers.
4 Upr*Med the Fundional BlocA Diagrams to refled the current design.
S.
Reformatted document to start each major Sedion on a separate page and correded as. minor tyr
- 6. Mowd the Results/ Conclusions sedion from Sed!on 8.0 to Section 4.0; renumbered remaining sedions.
RECENEDCDM FEB 0 41998 S!TEFILECOPY iNmATING DOCUMENT (DCP, FCN. OTHsR)
DCP 6926.01SJ (a AR 970600653) Rgy, 0
- 2. OTHi;R AFFECTED DOCUMENTS (CHECK AS APPLICABLE FOR CCN ONLY):
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OTHER AFFECWD DOCUMENTS EXIST AND ARE IDENTIFIED ON ATTACHED FOR
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Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev. O CALCULATION CROSS-INDEX CC' ~ -
ccucom oonan Calculation No_ f-SPA-269_ ESFAS P=d;-*H Manitorina Sande Failure A,-.' i h of 50 ccm no. cces-w ,. N N
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~2lGf16 l Calc No. J-SPA-179 O SO123-60S-1-104 3 SO122-606-1-167 shts.1,2. & 3 5 SO123-606-1-166 4 SO123-606-1-180 '
2 SO123-606-1-175 shts.1 & 2 5 SO123-606-1-174 4 SO123-606-1-359 1 SO123-6t.6-1-354 1 .
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Southern California Edison J SPA 269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 1
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 S U M M A RY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S of 50 2.0 P U RP O S E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S of 50 3.0 O BJ E CTIVE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 of 50 4.0 '
RESULTS/ CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B of 50 6.0 INPUTS / ASSUMPTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 of 50 6.0 RE FERENC E S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 of 50 7.0 GENERAL EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 of 50 7.1 Containment Airbcrne Radiation Monitor Channels.
2(3)RE7804G1,2(3)RE7807G2, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 14 of 50 7.2 Fuel Handling Building Airborne Monitors,2 2(3)RE7823G2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. ..... (3)RE7822G1, . . . . . 15 of 50 7.3 Control Room Intake Air Monitors 2/3RE7824G1,2/3RE7825G2.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 of 50 8.0 SINGLE FAILURE A*lALYSIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 of 50 8.1 Functional Block Diagrams. . . . . . . . . . . . , . . , . . . . , . . 18 of 50 8.2 Equipment Locations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 of 50 8.3 System Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 of 50 8.4 Tabulated Failure Modes and Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 of 50 3 of 50
i Southern California Edison J SPA 269 Nuclear Engi 4eering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F 707 LIST OF TABLET Tcble 8.1 Containment Airborne Monitor Channels Single Failure Evaluation . . . . 23 Table 8.2 Fuel Handling Building Monitor Single Failure Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Table 8.3 Control Room Monitor Single Failure Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 of 50
Southem California Edison J SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 1.0
SUMMARY
Design Chanpe Package, DCP 2&3 6926.01SJ, changes the radiation monitors used in Engineered Safety Featured Actuation Systems (ESFAS) from a totally analog design to a predominantly digital design. This Failure Evaluation has been performed to support the required 10CFR50,59 safety evaluations to the DCP and any associated Affected Section Changes (ASC).
The approach used in this evaluation was to analyze a series of single failure scenarios. No common mode failure was assumed. A software common mode failure analysis of all the ESFAS radiation monitors is addressed in J-SPA-28g, ESFAS Radiation Monitor Software Common Mode Failure Evaluation", A software common mode failure of the FHIS monitor only is addressed in J. SPA 279, FHIS Radiation Monitor Software Mode Failure Evaluation **,
Hardware, individual software functional modules, communications and power losses were considered in all cason, whether by fall safe mechanisms or redundancy, the safety function wiil be initiated or maintained as necessary to mitigate safety analysis accident conditions.
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Southern California Edison J SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 2.0 PURPOSE.
The purpose of this document is to perform a single failure evaluation on the safety related radiation monitoring channels being replaced by DCP 2&3-6926.01SJ, This failure evaluation will aid in determining the impact of these changes on plant safety and determining whether there are any unreviewed safety questions.
This document is also intended to confirm that the radiation sensor portion will respond in a similar manner as shown in the system level UFSAR Section 7 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Tables as revised by DCP 2&3 6926.01SJ, Sof50.
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Southem Califomia Edison J-SPA 269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F 707 3.0 OBJECTIVE.
The objective of this evaluation is to assess the impact of sing!e failures on the ESFAS radiation monitoring systems and to demonstrate that the protective functions of these systems are not lost as a result of thes,e railures.
The objectives are met by using the following methods:
- 1. Identifying single mode failures to each sub-system of the replacement radiation monitor ESFAS.
- 2. Analyzing how each failure affects an individual channel operation and identifying how this failure is identified to the operator.
- 3. Showing how system function can be maintained with a single failure.
There are ten (10) radiation monitors with a combined total of fourteen (14) channels that form part of the ESFAS and Containment Leak Detection system.
The evaluation is limited to these replacement monitors, The fourteen (14) channels are:
- 1. Containment Airborne Radiation Monitor channels; 2(3)RE7804G1, 2(0-)RE7804P1,2(3)RE7807G2 and 2(3)RE7807P2
- 2. The Fuel Handl:ng Building Monitor Radiation Monitor channels; 2(3)RE7822G1 and 2(3)RE7823G2
- 3. The Control Room Intake Air Radiation Monitor channels; 2/3RE7824G1 arid 2/3RE7825G2 This document is not intended to supersede any of the FMEA Tables contained in the UFSAR. (Tables 7.3-20,7.3 22,7.3-23).
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Southem Califomia Edison J SPA 269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 4.0 RESULTSICONCLUSIONS.
4.1 The Containment Air monitor configuration has the most number of components; the configurations of the Fuel Handl.'ng Building and the Conteel Room monitors are essentially subsets of the Containment Air monitor. Each control function has a fully redundant monitor performing the identical function. The redundant monitors are powered from altemate power sources and therefore, are not subject to common mode
' power losses. The failure of any single monitor does not prevent the control function from being performed.
4.2 Testing of prototype monitors has shown that the electronica are not susceptible to electro-magnetic interferonces. Where shleiding failures occur, EM! can cause communication failures. The communications software is designed such that if a communication message fails because of EMI, the re-transmission of the message will automatically occur.
Unless the EMI is continuously broadcast, the re-transmission of the message will be successful. Where continuous failure of the communications occur, the operator will be alerted, via the annunciator panel, that the safety channel has failed.
4.3 If a detector input signal cabling has faulty shleiding, EMI generated in this location could cause an increase in the count rate measured at the input. It is expected that, during surveillances, the measured concentrations in each redundant detector would differ. If the EMI effects were sufficiently large to cause an alarm, an isolation or alarm action would take place erroneously on a single train. While this incorrect action may be inconvenient, it would be conservative from a safety standpoint.
4.4 The ESFAS FMEA tables listed in the UFSAR have been modified by DCP 2&3-6926.01SJ, The results from this single failure evaluation are consistent with the mocified UFSAR FMEA Tables (Section 7) as they refer to the sensor entries. I 8 of 50 m _ o
i Southern California Edison J-SPA 269 Nucinar Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 5.0 INPUTS /ASSUMPTlDNS, 5.1 Section 3 of IEEE 279-1971" requires design bases for each ESFAS radiation monitor. The design bases for these monitors are contained in document DBD SO23 600"5 5.2 Each monitor is examined primarily based on the input and output failures of each functional block (Ref. Figures 8.1, 8.2, 8.3) within the n..11 tor system. Tests have shown that the equipment is not susceptible to l
Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI)". In the instances where the operation of a monitor coul1 be affected by external EMI as a result of failures, these failures have been limited to pulso counting and communication interferences. The basis for this assumption is that the probability of cable shielding becoming defective is much higher than tha loss of shielding integrity within a condstive metal housing.
5.3 Software failures are considered to be undefined design deficiencies that occur under circumstances not covered during Validation and Verification (V & V) Testing. The V & V tests, developed in accordance with methods described in References 6.22 and 6.23, are intended to eliminate systemic failures. Single failure evaluation is therefore restricted to l indwidual software functional modules where failures will not produce errors in each redundant monitoring channel.
5.4 The outputs from a failed digital device can be either high er low. Falleo analog device outputs (radiation sensors) can be low, open, shorted or in limited cases, fall b!gh. The bases for using these Einalog states are determined fr6m a review of the circuitry and components used in these measuring channels.
5.5 Access to chango software critical parameters is password protected.
Only personnel with the correct level of authorization can access and change these parameters it is assumed that this protection process will limit the possibility of a failure from being introduced either deliberately or inadvertently at the first three levels of access.
5.6 Sample pump motor power for monitors 2(3)RE7804G1, 2(3)RE7804P1, 2(3)RE7807G2,2(3)RE7807P2,2(3)RE7822G1 and 2(3)RE7823G2 is supplied from a Class 1E Motor Control Center (MCC) (Ref. 6 2 Table 2.5). I 9 of 50
Southem California Edison J SPA 269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F 707 5.7 Instrument power for monitors 2(3)RE7804G1,2(3)RE7804P1, 2(3)RE7807G2,2(3)RE7807P2,2(3)RE78'?G1 and 2(3)RE7823G2 is supplied from the vital bus inverters (Ref. 6.2 Table : 5).
5.8 Instrument power for monitors 2/3RE7824G1 and 2/3RE7825G2 is supplied from the vital busses (Battery back up) (Ref. 6.2 Table 2.5). No MCC pnwer is required since these monitors have no sample pumps.
5.9 None of these monitors are required to operate in a harsh environment and therefore will not be subjected to excessive integrated radiation doses, high temperatures and pressures or caustic spray conditions.
5.10 The equipment has been successfully seismically testea to design bases limits"8 Based on this qualification, the equipment is assumed not to fall as a result of a seismic event at the plant.
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Southern California Edison J-SPA 269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 6.0 REFEREISCES.
6.1 SO123 606-1 12 Rev.2, Radiation Monitoring and Sampling System Replacement Supplier Scope of Work.
6.2
' DCP 2&36926.01SJ Rev. O, Obsolete Equipment: Radiation Monitoring Systems Replacement Project.
6.3 IEEE Std 2791971 *lEEE Standard Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations'.
l 6.4 IEEE Std 379-1988'IEEE Standard Applications of the Single Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems".
6.5 MGP Document No. 45254BA Rev. O, RMS General, pages 32-61.
6.6 MGP Document No. 45504EA Rev. O, Radiation Monitoring Systems, pages 35-M.
6.7 SCE VPL No. SO123-606-1-164 Rev. 3, DRMS Skids 7804,7807 P&lD.
6.8 SCE VPL No. SO123-606-1-167 Shts 1,2, & 3 Rev. 5, DRMS Skid 7804, 7807 Wiring Diagram.
6.9 SCE VPL No. SO123-606-1-166 Rev. 4, DRMS Skid 7804,7807 Power Distribution & Control Panel Electrical Schematic.
6.10 SCE VPL No. SO123 606-1 180 Rev. 2, DRMS Skid 7822, 7823 PalD.
6.11 SCE VPL No. SO123-806-1-175 Shts 1, & 2 Rev. 5. DRMS Skid 7822, 7823 Wiring Diagram.
6.12 SCE VPL No. SO123-606-1-174 Rev. 4. DRMS Skid 7824,7823 Power Distribution & Control Panet Electrical Schematic-6.13 SCE VPL No. SO123-606-1-354 Rev.1 Nuclear Environmental Qualification Test Program on a Digital Radiation Monitoring System.
6.14 SCE VPL No. SO123-606-1-359 Rev.1, Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Test Report on the Radiation Monitoring System.
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Southem California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 6.15 SCE VPL No. SO123-606-i 118 Rev. 4, DRMS In-Duct & Non Intrusive 4
Liquid JB Wiring Diagram.
6.16 SCE 3rawing No. 31213 Rev.16, Elementary Diagram CPIS Train A.
6.17 SCE Diswing No. 31214 Rev.16, Elementary Diagram CPIS Train B.
6.18 SCE Drawing No. 31394 Rev.17, Elementary Diagram CRIS Train A.
! 6.19 SCE Drawing No. 31395 Rev.16, Elementary Diagram CRIS Train B.
6.20 SCE Drawing No. 31428 Rev.15, Elementary Diagram FHIS Train A.
i 6.21 SCE Drawing No. 31429 Rev.14, Elementary Diagram FHIS Train B.
6.22 IEEE Std 730.1-1989 Standard for Software Quality Assurance Pit '
6.23 lEEE Std 10121986 Standard for Software Verific.ation and VCidation Plans.
- 6.24 SCE Loop Drawings 2(3)RE7804G1 & 2(3)RE7807G2 Rev. O.
6.25 SCE Loop Drawings 2(3)RE7822G1 & 2(3)RE7823G2 Rev. 0 1
6.26 SCE Loop Drawings 2/3RE7824G1 & 2/3RE7825G2 Rev. O.
6.27 SCE Drawing No. 40170A Rev.19, P & I D Containment HVAC System.
6.28 SCE Drawing No. 40177A Rev.17, P & I D Misc. Ventilating System (Fuel Handling Building).
2 6.29 SCE Drawing No. 40173A Rev.17, P & I D Control Room Complex HVAC.
6.30 San Onofre Units 2 & 3 Operating Licenses No. NPF-10/15 Rev.132/121.
6.31 San Onofre Units 2 & 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Rev.11 12 of 50
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Southern California Edison J SPA-26g Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F.707 6.32 SCE Abnormal Operating instruction SO2313 20 Rev.1 TCN 1-17,
- Refueling Accidents.
i 6.33 SCE Abnormal Operating instruction SO23-13-14 Rev. O TCN 0-15, Reactor Coolant Leak.
6.34 SCE Operating Instruction 3023-5-1.8 TCN 3-32, Shut Down Operation (Mode 5 & 6).
l 6.35 Design Bases Document DBD-SO23 690 Rev.1, Radiation Monitoring Systems.
6.36 R.G.1.45, Reactor Coolan' Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems, May 1973.
6.37 SCE Calculation N-4072-001 Rev. 4, Fuel Handling Accident inside the Fuel Handling Building - CR & Offsite Doses.
6.38 SCE Calculation N 4072-003 Rev. 2 Fuel Handling Accident inside the Containment - Control Room and Offsite Doses.
6.39 SCE Calculation J-SPA-179 Rev. O, Control Room / Fuel Handling Building Monitor Setpoints.
6.40 SCE Document J-SPA-279, Rev. O, FHIS Radiation Monitor Software Mode Failure Evaluation.
6.41 SCE Document J-SPA-28g, Rev. O, ESFAS Radiation Monitor Software Common Mode Failure Evaluation.
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Southem California Edison J-SPA 269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F 707 7.0 GENERAL EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION.
7.1 Containment Airborne Radiation Monitor Channels,2(3)RE76040.',
2(3)RE7807G2,2(3)RE7804P1 and 2(3)RE7807P2.
The Containment Airborne monitors perform multiple functions. The ESFAS function assigned to these monitors is the alarming and closure of the Containment Purgo suoply and exhaust valves for both Main and Mini purges under accident conditions.
The Containment Airborne monitor has both Noble Gas and Particulate detectors. Only the Noble Gas detector is used as the ESFAS protection sen=or. The function of the Particulate is Reactor Coolant System (RCS) lormage detection.
A sample of the Containment air is extracted from the Containment. Prior to the sample entering a 7.825 liter sample chamber, Particulate and lodine activities are removed. The Noble Gas detection system uses a Sc S:'m lodide scintillator coupled to a photomultiplier to generate electrical pulses at a rate proportional to the containment sample activity disintegration rates.
The photomultiplier detector operates with a high voltage (~1000 volts) power supply. The gain of the photomultiplier is sensitive to changes in high voltage. High voltage control is maintained using the output of an embedded standard Am-241 source in the Sodium lodide crystal. The output from this source can be measured separately and used to adjust the high voltage in order to maintain a constant gain value.
The detector output electrical pulses are shaped, discriminated and counted in registers for predetermined time intervals. The accumulated counts per time Interval will statistically vary with constant Noble Gas concentration. A software module averages these values and produces average count rates in counts per second.
Other softwaro modules convert the averaged count rate into Noble Gas concentrations using stored calibration values for this conversion. The output is given in pCi/ml. When trip set points are exceeded, alarm status bits are set. The concentration and status are serially communicated to both the Local Display Unit (LDU) and to the Remote Display Unit (RDU).
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Southern California Edison J-SPA 269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 The particulate channel consists of a Passivated Impregnated Planar Silicon (PIPS) detector located close to the filter area used to trap the airborne particulate matter contained in the incoming air stream. The detector is powered with a low voltage bias supply (<25 volts). The activity build up on Gw filter increases with time until an equilibrium state is reached with the decay of the short lived isotopes. The resulting count rate is proportional to the leak rate of the RCS into the Containment.
A secondary PIPS detector measures gamma activity induced from the background field present around the detector. The count rate values collected from this particulate detector are subtracted from the primary detector count rates to compensate for gamma background count contributions.
The detecto output electrk.al pulses are shaped, discriminated and counted in registers for predetermined time intervals. The accumulated counts per time interval will statistically vary for a constant filter activity.
The same software module averages these values and produces average count rates in counts per second.
The LDU performs the function of locally displaying Noble Gas concentration values and alarm st,tus. The RDU has the same functions as the LDU except for operating reinotely, in addition, the RDU operates relays used to actuate the Containment purge valves.
7.2 Fuel Handling Building Airborne Monitors,2(3)RE7822G1, 2(3)RE7823G2.
The Fuel Handling Building monitors perform an isolation function. The ESFAS function assigned to these monitors is the alarming and switching of the Fuel Handling Building flow path into a closed loop under accident conditions. Outside air is restricted from entering and all the contained air in the building is recirculated through a filtra' ion system.
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Southern California Edison J SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.0 lCCN F-707 The Fuel Handling Building monitors consist of Noble Gas detectors.
This detector is used as the ESFAS protection sensor. This detector
- operates by measuring samples of the air at the exit of the building, f rior to the sample entering a 300 milliliter sample chamber, Particulate and lodine activities are removed.- The Noble Gas detection system uses a Passivated impregnated Planar Silicon (PIPS) detector. This detector uses a low voltage bias voltage (<25 volts). The output of this detector produces pulses proportional to the Fuel Handling Building sample activity disintegration rates.
' A secondary PIPS detector measures gamma activity induced from the bar kground field present around the detector. The count rate values collected from this detector are subtracted from the primary detector count rates to compensate for gamma background count contributions.
The detector output electrical pulses are shaped, discriminated and counted in registers for predetermined time intervals. The accumulated counts per time interval will statistically vary for a constant concentration.
A software module averages these values and produces average count rates in counts per second.
Other software Wules convert the averaged count rate into Noble Gas concentratir ting stored calibration values for this conversion. The output is give, i pCl/ml. When trip set points are exceeded, alarm status bits are set. Le concentration and status are serially communicated to both the Local Display Unit (LDU) and to the Remote Display Unit (RDU).
The LDU has the function of locally displaying Noble Gas concentration values and alarm status. The RDU has the same functions as the LDU except for operating renuely. In addition, the RDU operates relays used to actuate the Fuel Handling Building isolation valves.
7.3 Control Room Intake Air Monitors,2/3RE7824G1,2/3RE7825G2.
The Control Room Intake Air monitors perform an air flew path switching function. The ESFAS function assigned to these monitors is to switch from a normal single source, recirculated air flow configuration to a redundant, highly filtered, recirculating, emergency mode flow path.
Postulated accidents have releases that are drawn into the Control Room air system. The monitors are located in the incoming air ducting.
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Southern Califomia Edison J-SPA 269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 The Control Room Intake Air monitors consist of Noble Gas detectors. -
- The detectors operate by directly measuring the air activity in the duct at the entrance to the Control room. The Noble Gas detection system uses a Sodium lodido scintillator with a photomultiplier. The output of this detector produces pulses proportional to the inlet duct activity disintegration rates.
The photomultiplier detector operates with a high voltage (-1000 volts) r power supply. The gain of the photomultiplier is sensitive to changes in high voltage. High voltage controlis maintained using the output of an embedded Am 241 standard source in the Sodium lodido crystal, The output from this source can be measured separately and used to adjust the high voltage in order to maintain a constant gain value.
The detector output electrical pulses are shaped, discriminated and counted in registers for predetermined time intervals. The accumulated counts per time interval will statistically vary with a constant concentration. A software module averages these values and produces average count rates in courts per second.
Other software modules convert the averaged count rate into Noble Gas concentrations using stored calibration values for this conversion. The output is given in pCi/ml. When trip set points are exceeded, alarm status bits are set. The concentration and status are serially communicated to both the Local Display Unit (LCU) and to the Remote Display Unit (RDU).
The LDU has the function of locally displaying Noble Gas concentration .
values and alarm status. The RDU has the same functions as the LDU except for operating remotely, in addition, the RDU operates relays used to actuate the Control Room Air path valves and dampers.
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Southem California Edison J SPA 269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.0 lCCN F-707 8.0 SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS, 8.1 Functional Block Diagrams.
Figures 8-1, B-2 and 8-3 show the block diagrams for each ESFAS mon'. tor in the system. Functional block diagrams for each of the ESFAS menitors were derived from wiring and loop diagrams (Refs. 6.8, 6.11, 6.15, 6.24, 6.25, G.26).
l The failure modes for each monitor are determined, in part, by failures in
' the inputs and outputs from each funct%n block. Failures and their effect on the system are tabulated in Section 8.4. The analysis is limited to major components of each monitor.
8.2 Equipment Locations.
LPUs, LDUs and skid assemblies (where provided), are located at the process measurement points (Containment Air samples, Fuel Handling Building outlet air ducts, Control Room intake air duct). The RDU is located in the Control Room Area. Annunciator windows that are initiated from High and Fail alarms, are located within the Control Room.
8.3 System Response.
No credit is taken for the isolation of CPIS and FHIS. Analysis has shown that without isolation, accident dose levels to the public will not exceed 10CFR100 limits '2' . Therefore, the response times of the ESFAS radiation monitors used to provide isolation are not considered in this analysis. The CRIS radiation ESFAS monitors are required to isolate within 3 minutes **. Analysis has shown that these monitors will respond in less than ? minutes.
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Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organizat!or Rev.O ICCN F-707 8.4 Tabulated Failure Modes as ' Effects.
Failures for each ESFAS system are identified in Ta'>les 8-1, B-2 and 8-3.
Included in these tables are:
- 1. The function of each monitor sub-assembly
- 2. The failure mode of the subessembly. This is the manner in which i the failure presents itself.
- 3. The failure mechanism of the sub-assembly. This is the reason for the occurrence of the failure mode.
- 4. The effect of the sub-assembly / component failure on the system.
- 5. The method of identifying the equipment failure.
- 6. The indication to the operations staff of the sub-essembly/
component failure.
- 7. The overall effect on the individual channel function.
- 8. The overall effect on the ESFAS sy3 tem function.
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Southem California Edison J-SPA 269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev. O iCCN F 707 i ?
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C
. . . . . . . . . . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . ......O.NTROL ROOM AR_E..A..
d 4
^A
.:.,L:
v o S100 LOCATION i
I L i
' t L 2.
e Lou l _ J-BOX :
I I I I 6*
E I ,)
,%mj ---m-m .m . _ m .m. .
,m-%m ry,mg l ['
LPU1 LPU 2 (
l
, _ _ _i _ _
l l I l
. i ! !
I SKID COMPONENTS
.................:.-m-- -
Figure 8-1 Block Diagram - Containment Airborne Monitor l
l 20 of 50
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organizatbn Rev. 0 lCCN F 707 I
RDU 3 4
i
.--a .-a SL 1
.. v i a SL 1/561] 3 I r LDU : ~~
B J-BOX I
mm 5 I p e _- 1 = .
__ _ ---w-,w,,g ,
~
d d LPU 5 5 I I A
i : -
2 SKID COMPONENTS
.-...............~.K.<. -
=-- l Figure 8-2 Block Diagram - Fuel Handling Building Noble Gas Monitor 21 of 50
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F 707 1
RDU l uma ras ,masu,xa SL1 s,
LDU ", - nd, J-BOX -
j
_ _ _,m i
d d LPU
! i 5
- s INDUCT DETECTOR !
..-..y...__ . . . . . ...g Figure B-3 Block Diagram-Control Room Noble Gas Monitor 22 of 50
Southem California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineenng Design Organization Rev.0 ICCN F-707 NOTE:
The Containment Airbome radiation monitor consists of Noble Gas and Particulate channels. Only the Noble Gas channel will initiate a Containment Purge isolation Signal (CPIS). Therefore, Table 8.1 will only address those co6verein,i failures that have the potential to affect the Noble Gas channel 1
Table 8.1 Containment Airbome Monitor Single Failure Evaluation i Companord Fisictkm Fanure Felhow Effect an System Egdynweneuthedor opussens Enact on Efpoet en Identulcat!on Modos Mmeensom Feewe Detecean Fosse Inecasen Channed CPts System CPf3 Furemen Funceen
- 1. NotWe Gee Noble ges fur Off 1.Open Cbcut No Netle Gee or Detector LPU seness detector Inastesord Feset Loos of efteesed None- i concentration 2. Short Circuit Porteidete conceMreuen Ioes etesinen.
2(3)RE780eG1 Tg3;R6aUiG2 sW 3. Detector tus inecesan et ROU cr Detector tagine U2fU3 seSTR FAILuendow&
cherver ESFAS sostaceae 80secuted channel
& Leur LDU. No st@y a s'arnt Model No.
htScuted by: MDU ond of henceert funcsonal Pareculate
- 1. Carmacean les Opergte.
RMS 9116.SR concentregon 4 2. Laos et cot-les signal Pereculate Ele induced FeuRy eNeed Pasutte hips or kictnoct rh W nelse - h Poestle U2fu3 Possete oftected tenne-irdo signal Nolde Gas concerteenn An>241 regerence
'2 CORE 7004P1 cetne CONTAteENT charmel W. RediedmW t
ineceenne.P m posit, Wien coed tout RAD M admdeur ciennoi 2(3)RE7907P2 sierm or trip. we fel.
- Model No. & RDU Mt eierci. Ibnceanut !
RMC4064 Compummeh fedunded cht.nnot t eme . ;
Pergculute FAerinAs Tom er toshan 8--- thWiaample High or four AP faut. DAS elum & A5ected NG None-Fuer paper. nowwisernenne f Fio neesna. nDu tema. chorous ener a m need Femed ette con mune i Indomie Ngh. channel !
mechardent Patculate cordeminseen FW i tre gas eengte chmneer 23 of 50 i,
i Southern California Edeson J-SPA-269 :
Nuclear Engineering Design Orgaruzation Rev.O ICCN F-707 4
Table 8.1 Containment Airborne Monitor Single Failure Evaluation Coveponard Function FaRure Fasise Eliset en System E1pdomont nessied of C 3 -- Efketon Eshct on aderescusion wades nee @eniern Feewe Duesteen Famwe k=sr=sh= Channet CPts System CPIS F cnon F.een i
- 2. LPU #2 SerfulLink #1 Fat OW 1. Open Circut Fated serimi CanumsdoseenIsik kuutnriese Fat at Laos of ariscoed Nene.
2(3)RT7804G1 1 Short Ckm2 cm snunisseenmeh maschdog tend. U2PJ3 WesTR channelESFAS fledmiemed 2(3FtT7807G2 Rt J #2.
Mods No. FAstueresour & preescene chersius ROU end of Asidien. knetenet Re4S-9042-SR Opersen.
EAS kulueed Four;eNeed. Degraded earter Semuere mutedag Nime None None poenwnent> esmmedessen een cenumrocesan RDu ez ce-ekame==ecuer Irdamenese. '
ven. w.msn.
EMIInduced Fondly eNelit Fafed earter Commerecomen hik retnspient Fat at Laosofefteded h (Carenuous) communicagon udge watchdog faut. U2fU3 INSTR chewiel ESFAS Re6undant RDU 82. FAlldupour & goetecthe channel !
ROU end of funcSest funcsonmL O"*
P j'
Serial Unk #2 Fat Off 1. Open CWcat Feind certal CommunicssunIr* !
OAS alarm & None None j z short C=eue e m enh une@doOI nd. RDU mewe Sout.
LDU. Lees oflocal ineeseen.e seeiend sierms.
Ehe W Fauty eNukt Degredad serial Sofhiese maschdog M None '
Boone peemenent) coaumsdessen meh conneseceman !
LDU. check ^ ' -5 ,
}
inteles
- i tronominelart 24 of 50 '
Soutnern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.1 Contais,ent Airborne Monitor Single Failure Evaluation cow Fisiction Fahare FoEure Eftet on Sysesm Egapmerd naused at Nwone E9ect si Emmet on ldereincellon Medes neschersom Fatwo Detachari Femme kustmilari Channel CPtS System CPIS FwicSen Funesen
- 2. LPU 82 Serier Link 82 EMI Induced Featy ersati. FeBed esstal CommuniceRom tr* DAS elarm & None None (continued) (contd) (Corenuous) conviumicamen vuei unichdog fed. ROU slave faut LDU. Leonsllacal buscenari,cererW and samms Deledor Sion Fs0ON 1.Open Creum Lees of h sipist Lees of counto tuut. DAS elarm & Loom of spected None-Power Supply 2. Short Circut No Nolde Gee irtemmi Posser RDU sieve fed. cfunnet ESFAS Redundant concer*esen sm rvonesetest e preesco chenr s
%. smut. nsneson. suncennet Degraded Cortres Cired Posseite dopoduson an Intemel Ptwer DAS mtmmi & Lene of mNected None.
tea riessured ouipe dureg siepervoampe test RDG eleve fed. charmetESFAS Reesutant r
seeme eemne. tem. preescove cr w sendman. asicsonal Posser Supply 12Dvec 1 OpenCbcut Loseof m ip s al Commurecomen t* U2*J3 ANected channel CPt3 c m to fofure. 2. Short Ched No Nette Gee must$idaglaut. Lose CONTAgdMENT tHp. ActueRan.
LPU, LDU & concertulian kusceson. of counto faut. Total RAD H usindsor ROU) RDU cortW seley fuAure of the LPU. & RDU Hi Alemt.
changen seses earn CLOSED to OPEN.
i a
25 of 50
Southem Califomia Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Er@ine ing Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.1 Cedainment Airborne Monitor Sangle Failure Evaluation Jomponert g
' Funcuan Fesure TeAure Diect on System Egdymert Mathed of Operubens Elled on E %cten {
khnurceNon Madse Mechersom , Feewe % r eswe hacemen ChannelCPts System CPf3 i Fwiceum Fwomen
- 2. LPU F2 M J_b Preorg m ar Hardusere No concentreMart Lose of conste fed. DAS elarm & Laos of effected 4 None.
(cortiriusd) & fatwo truscelson. RDU elous fed.
- c*iennelESFAS fledwidert escrimmator preteeve chemisi fmE PJncelort twicsonal.
j Timers fat Herthmorer 4
s N efutre Courh ist i Sofhuere Solhuere fat se medido fmRe Memory EPROM, Honesserer Pm LPU feBwe. CRC 16 W DAS storm & Lees of spected Nene-EEPROM, Solhuere fesure test fed. RDU sieve 1tull channelESFAS Redundarit Flesh feRure preescere channet furttlert funcuenot RAM fat Hanfuseret Pm LPU fesure. RAM test fueA.
Sofhuere falmre Operusen eierm et LPU.
W elchdog Timer feaure Hansumerer NoIndicehon of needule Seaware cesck OAS oform & Possess teos of None.
timer sotheore fusure feswes weh anensees feum elemt ROU messe faut. eNetted channel Redwusert main endbaareloop & real ESFAS channed the r preescove P.riesenet Suncilort M Of M
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev 0 ICCN F-707 Table 8.1 Containment Airborne Monitor Single Failure Evaluation Corrperwrrd Famebon Facure Freuro Elfed on Syenem Eqdpment Mafiod of Operatione Effect on ENed on Identfesson Moden Mechardom Fagure Detection Fagwe inecation Channel CPts System CPiS Funer.on Funcfon 3.RDO#2 h __:. Fedth Hertswerer Noirwarn inn or Watctwfag timer dab derm a Loos ofe9ected None-2(3)RsC7804G1 Softwere softveeret Software fagure conceresson er identflos e RDU fault. chamel ESFAS Redundant 17807G2 component carrynunicatier.4. i -- _ . , faut. prossenve channel 2(3)RCH7804G fasure.
1/7807G2 ~~
funchon. Aancsonst 2(3)RSA7804G Senor Unk #1 fab 1, Short Ckcut FaBod seJ C.... , R M 117837G2 instrumert Fa8 at Loos of affected None-
- 2. Open circut cortununication with veutchdog fsta. D'oM INSTR channel ESFAS Redundert 2(3)RSL7804G 3. Software LPU #1, LPU #2, and FAllsulnoow &
1/7807G2 protective channel future LDU. Loos of remose RDU otA of Model No. AmcGir:. Sinceonet contrtdof sedd Ope use RMS-9009 SR cornponente kom RDU.
- EMIInduced Fauty SNeid Degraded serimi Software watefulog None None None C.L. A r, commurscation mah commurdescon LPU #2. diedt autorvieticefy .'
hitteles'e-trener91estort EMIInduced Fauty Shield Faced serial Corrynurdcaelon Ink Instrurnert Fed at Loos of spoeled None-(Continuous) communtention weh watchdeg fedt. U2113 INSTR channed ESFAS Redtswinnt LPU #1, LPU F2. and FAlt.7hdow & prole % e channel LDU. Loos of remote RDU cutof ftanctiert funcestmet carmelof sidd Operale componarde from RDO.
27 of 50
Southern California Edison .I-SPA-269 Nudear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.1 Containment Airborne Monitor Single Failure Evaluation Component Ftriction Folkre ' Fedure E#ect on System Equipment Mothed of Operemons ENect art EfFocton ldereficatxxi Mates Mechenism Fesure Desection Fesure indiesson Channel CPtS Syesem CPIS Furvavt Funcuan v
- 3. RDU #2 High Rosetton Fats coil 1. Short circuit Alarme/ControlweNeo None Pedode testing Loss of erfected None-(cordnued) Alarm Relay energized. 2. Software fed cannot actuate (24 rnorths) chamel ESFAS Redundret protec9ve channot function. funceonet.
Fede col 1. Open Circuit Alarme/Coreal vePwee Rear contacle U2M3 Affected channel CPIS de-energtred 2. Solhvere feu et" . " .1 actuated. change stole $om CONTAINMENT trip. Actusson CLOSED to OPEN. RAD H1 whdow
& RDU Hi Alarm.
Power 120vec 1. Open circus Loos of power to High Relay cordects U2/03 Affected channel CPIS failure 2. Short circut Rede6on Alarm Reley. change see from CONTAfNMENT trip. Actuallon CLOSED to OPEN RAD HIvnndow
& RDU HI Alemt
- 4. Sample Activity Loss of 1. Open circuit Loss of semple flow. Low semple floor DAS eierm & Loos of effected None-Pirnp semple flow pump power. 2. Short Circuit Noble ges detector faut. RDU faut. channel ESFAS Redundant 2MP7804-1 continues to measure protecttve channa 2MP7807-2 Irwelid reeldualgas h functiert funcennel semple chamber Reelricted 1. Blocked inlet Degraded sorryle flow Low semple flow DAS eierm & Lees of e9ected % .e-flow. line (Vocuum unf5 semplepumptrip laut. RDUfeti channel ESF*.3 Redundant switch) on low sucilon preestre ,
pr e we channel
- 2. Blocked or high decharge funceanst l funcean-oimetune preneure. i (Pressure sw)
I 28 of 50
Southem California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.1 Containment Airbome Monitor Single Failure Evaluation Component Function Fedure Facure Effect on System Equipmart Method of Operemons Effed on ENect en lderencahon Modes Mechensom Fedwo % Fagure in1icaten Channel CPIS System CPIS FuncGon FtecHon S.LDU Serl.1 Unk #1 Fe8 Off 1. Open circuit Faged eartel CommunicmEen b* DASstorm & None None P(3)RUIC7804- 2. Short circadt communicatm mIWi welchdog fault. RDU stove feudL 1/7807-2 LPU #1 and LPU #2.
+
Madei No. Lees oflocalirusceuon, RMS 0003 SR conkel and alarme.
EMIinduced Faully shleid Degraded serial Software watchdog None None None (Interrnillent) communication udlh communiceuen LPU #1 arms LPU #2. check automaticagy inbietes re-trenerreesion j EMIInduced Faulty Shield Feeed eertal Communicomon Ink DAS alarm & None '
None (Continuous) communicallon with watchdogfaut. RDU faut.
LPU #1 and LPU 92.
Laos or seasi nunceaan, contre and sierme.
29 of 50
- - - - ' ^
. _ _ _ . ..- - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - = - - = - - - -
s
'2 Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization . Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.1 Containment Airt,orne Monitor Single Failure Evaluebon i
Component Function Fahre Fatwo Epud on System EM Masted of Operamens ENed on EWect on Identlecation Modse Mechanism Fedue DetecSon FeAwe Indeeson ChannelCPl3 Syalam CPIS Fisingen Feenoten 5.LDU Sert.1 Linit #2 Faf Off f. Open circuit FeRed serluf Cemr2ydoston Ardt Inskument Fee et piene None (continued) (conrd)
- 2. Short circut communicogen wei umschdng feud. U2PU3 INSTR RDU #1 and RDU #2. FAILwindow &
Laos of somete corarolof R OU ond of eidd congionendeIWern Operate RDU.
EMIInduced Fadly oNeed Depeded eerfoi Selhuom welchdog piene peone peone (Intermittent) communicamon uth communiceman
' DU #1 ene LDU #2.
_ check automescopy ,
InIIslao re- j frenandesien. l EMI true-=re Faulty SNeed FeNed eartel CommamiceWon Erdt Instumord Fag at None None (Cordnuous) conrnunteeSan wth tueldidag Sout. U2PJ3 INSTR ROU #1 and RDU #2. Fall. window &
Lees of somete controlof ROU end of sted componenlo tem Operate RDU.
Memory EPROM, Heninerer Poseedslose oflocal CitC16 diodesum DA8 elems & None None EEPROM, Sonwere feture inecemon,cordreiand test leidt. ROU einse fondL Flash failure eierms.
RAMf4 Hansnaref PoesAdo toes oflocal RAM test fois.
Sofhuere fegure irwarmann, conhol and Oposeen alumi.
esenne.
4 .
Southern Califomia Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 s
Table 8.1 Containment Airborne Monitor Single Failure Evaluation Corrponent Function FaAse Fesure Effect on System Equipment Method of Operations Effect on Effect on kfentification Modes Mechentem Fakse Detodion Fehat Indicahon Charmel CPIS Syalem CP1S
, Funchen Functon 5.LDU Watchdog Timer fedure Hardware / No N of module SoAware chec* DASalarm & None None (Continued) Timer Sofhwere fedure fegures wei incEcates fout alarm. RDU sieve faut.
main sonwereloop a real l 1kne ,E- . , .
Poselbie loss oflocef indication, control and storms.
Processing FauRin Herdnere/ Noindicalkrie of Welchdog Smer DASeierm & None None SoRwere soewere/ Software fafure. concentration or identIRee a RDU slave fou't.
w,~.mi4 communicellene. Loos prooseehg faAure.
failure oflocallncdcegon, control and sierme.
- 6. Skid Activity Loes of 1. Open circuit Loos of powerto LPU, CaJ. ,wnication Onk Instrument Fs5 at Loos of effeded None- '
2(3)RU78041 sample power. 2. Short circuit LDU & semple pump. watcf#3fouR. Low U2/U3 INSTR channel ESFAS Redundant 2(3)RU7807-2 musurement senya Row fault. FAlt,windour & protodive channel RDU out of function. fisictional Operate Te .e Loss of 1. Open circuit No gain correchen for LPU seneseloss of DAS alarm & Affected NG Ncrie-me : nent sensor Irvut. 2. Short circuit temperature swings. Input. RDU fault channelodpd Rh may be cmennes inaccurale. Trip fundional.
function sta avsmate 31 of 50
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.1 Containment Airborne Monitor Single Failure Evaluation Component Function Fedure Feture Effect on System Equ$ ment MeWiod of Operations iffect on Effect on klenttfleetion Modes Mechenism FeAure Detecten FeEure indication Channel CPIS Syelem CPIS Funchon Ftsidica
- 6. Slo 1 Sample Ine Presouro Hardware Loos of semple Sow due Low semple now DAS esarm & Loos of effected None-(Continued) outset pressure switch fens feistse. to semple pump trip. faut. High preestse RDU fout. channel ESFAS Redunderd measurement open. Sault. protecit.*- channnel func81on funcSonst Proesure Hardware Loos of semple pump tr5 None None Nans '
Portodic toesnD switch fais feture. protection on bkdeed Q4 rnonths) cioned. oumet now.
l Sample Nne Vacuum Hardware Loos of semple flow due Sample Ilow fault. DAS elarm & Loos of effected None-Inlet vacuum switch fede feeure. to semple pump trip. High wecuum faut. RDU faut. channel ESFAS Redundant l measurement opes protoceve channnet function. funchonet '
Vacuum Hardware Loos of semple pump 1rtp None Perlo Sc teseng None None switch fails feNure. protection on W G4 rnonths) closed. Infot flow.
l 32 of 50
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev. O ICCN F-707 Ole 8.1 Containment Airborne Monitor Single Failure Evaluati'a Component Fin; son raNure Fauure Effect on System Equipmert Method of Operations Effect on Effect on identreation Modes MedwJom ranure Detocson FaRure Indcamon Channel CPIS System CPIE Fan more Furiction
- 6. Skid F8ter AP Hgh AP Hardware incorredlyindicales AP faut. fiter fedt. DAS alarm & Loos of affecter 9 None.
(Cont!nued) rnessuremerd swNch faEs fehJre. bloclead fMer. Sample and semple Aow RDU fault. channel ESFAS Re W opert pump slope and funer faut. protoceve charn>
a&ences funcean. functioner.
High AP Hardware Faer paperwel not None Pedade feeling None- None ownch fade fesure. automsecany advance Q4 monthe) Icos or degraded dosed. when required due to pardoulete high AP. channel hscanonorer.
Low AP Hardware incorrecuy heceles tom AP faut and fuler DAS alarm & Loos of affected None-ownch fois fauure. or broken ARer. Semple faut. RDU faus. channet ESFAS Redmdent open- Purrp stops and filter protoceve channel advances, functiert fundional Low AP Hardware Futer paper wel not None Periodic testing None- Ncne ,
swtch falls faNure. autometcagy advance Q4 months) loss or degraded i closed. when required due to partculate I low AP. channel indica'Jon enfy.
33 of 50 L ._ _ _ - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ .
Southern California Erlison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.0 '
ICCN F-707 Table 8.2 Fuel Handling B :"+0g Monitor Single Failure Evaluation Component Function Fel!ure Fe#ure Effect on System Method of Fopure Opereuone Feeure Effect on Effed on identinestlan Modes Mechanism Dalectkri Irverman Channel FHIS System FHIS FuncMan F e cHon
- 1. Not** '.,es Notde gas Fan Off 1.Open Cin:ut No Nolde One LPU eenose detector Instrument Fee et Laos of eMected None-Detec.v concentration 2. Short Circuit concentregon Irwarean lose et counts. U2fU3 INSTR chamel ESFAC Redunderd 7(3)RE.61 signal. 3. Detector feR st RDU or LDU. No Detector fagure FAfLwhdow & protectwe channel 2(3)RE7823G2 Low abNity to sierm. Indscated try: ROU out of IImcelert funcsonst
- 1. Coea ist Operate Model No. 1 t.ses of counto RAS-9087-SR fault EMIInduced Faulty shield Por% high or tf noise oogected h Poselbie U2M3 Pooelbis effeca ed None-Into signal incorrect Noldo Gee Am-241 reference FHS RAD HI channel trip. Rededent cable concordration peek. thwicount test stem. window & channel indicottons Poeotdo wlE fell RDU HI elemt fedional.
elprm or trip. Compare wth redundant ebennet raierming 2.LPU Serial Link #1 Fed Off 1. Open Circuit FeBod eartel Communiceuen link Instrument Foi et Loos of effected ' None-2(3)RT7822G1 2. Short Circuit comrnunication with watchdog fault. U2M3 INSTR channel ESFAS Redunderd
/G2 RDU. FAllw%dow & protecGuo channel Model No. RDU out of function fechonal RMS-9042.SR Operate EMIInduced Faulty shiekt Degraded serial Sofhmte Wcedog None None None ;
(Intermittent) communicellan with communice50n l RDU. check etdomsticeny I insistee re ;
tronominatort i l
+
34 of 50 t
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 -
Table 8.2 Fuel Handling Building Monitor Single Failure Evaluation i Component Function Falure Fa#ure Effed on System Method of Fatwo OperaNons Femure Effset on Effect on identif! cation Modes Mechanism Detecuan truscason ChannelFHIS Syuemm FHIS Fisicean Funchen 2.LPU Serini Link #1 EMIInduced Feuey shised. Fated eartel Communiceman ank Instrument Fas at Laosof anscted None-(conhnued) (cont'd) (conthiuous) communicallon wRh wuschdog fed. U2M3 INSTR channel ESFAS Redwusert
'f RDU. FAlt,windoor & protecIlve channel i RDU w er functicri. funceannt.
~
Operate sonst unk #2 Fair off 1.open circuit Fened serial communiceman enk DAS almen & RDU None - None 2.short circuit commwecanon wah waschdog smult sieve tsum.
LDU. Loosoflocal indcation, control and sierm EMIInduced FauAy shield. Degraded sortal Sofhuere amichdog None. None None ,
(insermment) comenuniceman wah communicsson LDU. check edomoucany inumans m.
tronomission.
EMIInduced Faidly shield. Famed eartel Commur*= man Enk DAS miurm & RDU None None (contmuous) communice onwah wuschdog few. samme few.
LDU. Laosoflocal Indicalfsn,controland asarms.
l i
L h
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Tcble 8.2 Fuel Handling Building Monitor Single Failure Evaluation Ccmponent Funegon Fagure Faikre Enocion Syelem Method of Fature - Operemons Faswo Effect on ENect on Identificat% Modes Mechanism Deteccan % Channel FHIS System FHIS Ftncilon Funceen 2.LPU Detector Blas Fad off 1. Open Circuit Loss of detector signal Loos etcounts fed. DAS alarm & RDU Loosof aNocted None-(conunued) Pcmer Supply 2. Short Circum No Notdo Geo internal Power sieve imuR. channet ESFAS Redundant concentremon Supply vasings test presseeve channes indicamens fmust funcoon sunemoner Degraded Control C& cut Poseble degradallon in InismulPower DAS storm & RDU Laos of effected None-felt mesoured culput during Supply votegelost eleve fad. dennel ESFAS Redundant sisedy state. fondL protedhe channel herten. suncuanet Power Supply 120vec 1. Open Circum Loos of doesctor signet Communicadon Ink U2M3 FHS RAD Affected channel FHIS (Common te faeure. 2. Short Circuit No Noble Gas watchdog fed. Loos HIstorm window & Trip. Actuanort j LPU, LDU & concentregon Indication of counts fouR. Total RDU HI Alemt i' RDU) and controlroter. RDU fusure of the LPU.
contraireser cheness state from CLOSED to OPEN.
Acquisition Preampteer Hardware No concentration Loos of counts fad. DAS alarm & RDU Loss of anoded None-
& folkre incEcstion. eleve faust channel ESFAS Redundert discrirmnetor prefeceve channel fee funeson hecuanet Timers fa8 Hardwarer software %Jro.
Courders feB Sofhvere Software failure module faNo l 36 of 50
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.2 Fuel Handling Building Moniter Single Failure Evaluation Componerd Functkm Failure FeMure Effect on System Method of Fagwe Operemons Fabure Effect on Effect on identdication Modes Mechenism DetecNon % Channel FHIS Syeesm FHIS Functhn Function 2.LPU Memory EPRCil Hardware / PoseltWe LPU fanure CRC 16 checksum DAS elarm & RDO Loes of effected None-(Continued) EEPROM, SoRwere faNure lost fault eleve fatdt. channel ESFAS Redundant Flash failure proloceve channel funcUon fundlonel RAM faa Hardware / Poseth LPU feBure. RAM test faut.
Sofhvore feture Operation alarm at LPU.
Watchdog Timer fesure Hardware / Noindicagon of modufe Sofhvore chetAc DAS elarm & RDU Poselbieloss of None- j timer Softwere failure failures semelmand wth Indicates faut eJerm. eleve foulL aNected channel Redundant moln softwareloop & ESFAS channet realtime processang protec9ve functional function 3.RDU Processing Fault in Hardware / NoincScadon of Welchdog timer DAS eierm & RDU toes of effected Norm 2(3)RIC7822G1 Software soGwere/ Sollware feRure. concertrJion or ident!fles a fout. channel ESFAS Redunde1 2(3)RCH7822G cornponent communiceuons processing fogure. protoceve channel 1 failure. fundion. finchonal.
2(3)RSA7822G 1
2(3)RSL7822G Senal Link #1 Fei 1. Short Circut Failed serial CommuniceMon unk Inmirwnent Foi at Loos of effected None-1 2. Open circun communication with watchdog faut. U2A13 INSTR channel EEFAS Redundant 2(3)RIC7823G2 3. Software LPU & LDU. Loos of FAllwindow a protective channel 2(3)RCH7823G feEure remote contmlof oldd RDU out of function. funedoned 2 corriponents from RDU. Operate 2(3)RSA7523G 2
2(3)RSL7823G EMIInduced Faulty Shloki. DeOnrJed serial Software welchdog None None None 2 (Intennittent) commerJcation wth communloalkm Model No. LPU & LDU. check automsNeaty RMS-9009-SR srullales re-trenomission.
37 of 50 l .. _ .
1 Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.0 -
ICCN F-707 i
Table 8.2 Fuel Handling Building Monitor Single Failure Evaluation Comprment Funct!on Fa#ure Fagure Efftet on System Method of Fakre Opermuone Falkre Effect on Effect ort Idertf6 cation Modes Mechanism Detec8cn Indicahon ChannelFHIS Syelem FHIS Function Furdkn
- 3. RDU SeM Unk #1 Ew induced Fatsy Shiekt Faced serial Communicanon Ir* Instrument Fm8 et Loos of spected None-(corenued) (cont'd) (Continuous) commurdcation wth watchdog faut. U2U3 INSTR channel ESFAS Redadent LPU & LDU. Loosof FAE.vnndow & protective c.*tennel ;
remote controlof skid RDUout of funceori. funcsonal.
cargonents from RDU. Operele High Radletion Fene cod 1. Short circut Alarme/ Control None Penode tooling Lose of affected None.
Alarm Relay energtred. 2. Sorswere fan Dempero cannot (18 rnanth petiod) channel ESFAS Redundant actuale. protecttwo channel funeson. funceenst FaNo cou 1. Open Circuit Alarms /Contred Roleycontacts U2/U3 FHB RAD Affected channel FHIS d++nergtzed 2. Software fas Dempers -- 'y change ttste from Hiaimrm window & trip. actuelen. I actuated. CLOSED to OPEN. RDU Hi Alarm.
Power 120 vac 1. Open circut Laos of power to High Reiny coniecte U2/U3 FHB RAD Affected channel FHIS fanure 2. Short circuit Redmeon Alarm Reley. cfienge stee from Hf simmtwindow& trip. ectuatori CLOSED to OPEN. RDU Hi Alarm.
t 38 of 50 ;
i t
i t
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.2 Fuel Handling Building Monitor Single Failure Evaluation Component Functum Fouure Folkre Effecton Syesem Method of Falure Operatene Folkre Effect on Effect on idenl1ficot!on Modes Mechanism Detection kt% Channel FHIS Syster 'HIS Function Fa]-
- 4. LDU Serial Unk #1 Feil Off 1. Open circut Faged serial Communicadon Enk DAS eierm & TDU None ik,'
2(3)RUIC7822 2. Short ekcut communiceton se welchdog faut. eleve faut.
G1 LPU. Lees oflocal 2(3)RufC7823 indicehon, control and G2 eiermo.
Model No.
RMS-9003-SR EMIInduced Faulty sheid. Degreded certal Solheers welchdog None None None (Intermttent) communication with communicallon LPU check mulomancopy k*istee re-tronomission.
EMIInduced Faulty shield. FeNed senal Communicagon Ink DAS storm & RDU None None <
(Cortinuous) communication wth welctidog faull stove !but. I LPU. Lees oflocei ,
Indication, corset and j eiermo.
Serial unk #2 Fed Off 1. Open circuit Failed serial CommuniceNon Ir* Instrument fee et None Ncne
- 2. Short circut communication wth welchdog fault. U2/U3 DISTR RDU. Loos of remote FAllwindove a contrdof theoldd RDU out of componerde from Wie Operole RDU.
53 of 50
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.2 Fuel Handling Building Monitor Single Failure Evaluation component runcean ranur.
k$ent'ficadon Modes ranure Mechanism Eriect on System usehod of r.ieur.
Deteogon operamon. resure Errect on Env.ct on l indicaban Channet FHIS Syssem FHIS
, Fundson Function
- 4. LDU Serial Link #2 EMIInduced Fauty shield. Degraded serlei SoAware watchdog None None None (continued) (cont'd) (Intermitterd) communication'4th cornmunics50n RDU. check automalleafy init ses re-transmisolon.
EMIInduced FauRy shield. Falled sertal Communics:lon Ink Instrument Fad at None None (Cont'.nuous) communication with watchdog fedt. Ud' V3 INSTR RDU, Loos of remote FAllwhsow &
controlof theeldd RDU out of components from the Operale RD8J.
Memory EPROM, Hardware / Posebleloss of local CRC 16 checksum DAS eterm & RDU None None EEPROM. Software fature indicanon, control and test fedt. slave fM Flash failure alarme.
RAM fail Hardware / Possetse loss oflocal RAMtool fault Software failure indication, control and Operation alarm alarms.
Watchdog Timer faNure Hardwarer No indications of Software check DAS alarm & RDU None
- Timer Software failure module fagures indicales fault alarm. slave fault associated with main softwareloop & real the pmemino Possible loss oflocal indicason. control and alarms.
40 of 50 L_________ _
- ~
.~ _
Southern Califomia Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.2 Fuel Handling Building Monitor Single Failure Evaluation Componard Function Fedwe Fadure EEect on System Meenod of Fature Opereuors Fagure ENect on ENect on l l IdentRestion M: des Mechanism Deledlen buscocon Channel FHtS System FHIS l Funceen Funceen l
- 4. LDU Processing Faut in 54ardware/ No % of Watchdog Nmer DAS alarm & RDU None None (Cert $1ued) Software sofheere/ Sonwere %Aure concentrallon er usertiens e eleve tout.
component communkmWone. Loos peccessing feture future oflocal1% l centrol and storms. '
I
- 5. Sample Acthdy Loos of 1.Cpenekcut Lose of esmple Hew. Imr semple now instrumert Fog et Loss of ePoceed None.
Pump sarrple Row pump power 2. Short circut Notde Gee h fed. U2tU3 INSTR channel ESFAS Rh 2(3)MP7822 conunuse to meeswo FAllwindow & pru.x5we channel 2(3)MP7823 Inveled residualgas in RDO cad of functic ~ funceanal.
sempee dumber operas.
Restricted f. Blocked kilot Depeded earnple Sow Lowsemple flow instument Fe5 et Lose of esecwd None-now une(vecuum unes semple pump trip foull U2tU3 INSTR channet ESFAS Redundert owmeh) cniow uceanm fan.wndow & preeective channes
- 2. Blocked orhign discharge RDU out of funcuen. funceanal.
auset erw preeeure operate (Procoure sw) 41 of 50
e Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.2 Fuel Handling Building Monitor Single Failure Evaluation Component Funcaksi Fei!ure Fedure Effed on Syelem Method of FeAure Opereuone Feeuro Elved on EWeet on Identrfication Modes MecherWom Detection indknllon Channel FMIS System FHIS Function Fwiegen
- 6. Stud ActMty Loos of 1. Open circult Loos of powerlo LPU, Communicagon t* Inmirument Fe5 et Lees of eMecaed None.
2(3)RU7822-1 semple power. 2. Short cLuilt LDU & semple pump. weldidag foull Low U2/U3 INSTR choreisi ESFAS RedJndent P 2(3)RU7823-2 me nurement compie tiow feed. FAR. window & protoceve channel
} RDU ett of functiert fundlonet Opwm Temperature Loos of 1. Open ciredt. No gain correction for LPU senees toes of DAS eierm & RDU Affected NG None-meneurement sensor input. 2. Short circuit. ternporeture swings. Input faut. cw cupJt Redundant may be channel anuocurele Trip functionet funceen eUE eveRoble semple une Pressure Hardware Loes of esmple flow Low compio How DAS storm & RDU Loos of eMected None-outlet pressure switch tems failure. due to semple pump fault. Hign pressure faut. channel ESFAS Redundant measurement open. trip. fedt. protec5ve channel l functort functional !
Pressure Hardware Lose of semple pump None. Periodic tesP5g None None swtich feDe feture. trip protecton on (18 months) ciose:. woened auset now.
42 of 50 1
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organiza* ice Rev. O ICCN F-707 Table 8.2 Fuel Handlirig Building Monitor Single Failure Evaluation Componerd Functkn Feiture FeAure Effect a. Systere MethMof FeBere Operatiere FeAure EWeet on Efted on klerefiestkn Modse Moc'ersom Detecean m Channut FHIS Systern FHis FunsWort FtencSen S. Skki Sample Ano Vacuum Hanteere Laosofesmple Aow Leursemple flour DAS storm & RDU Laos of epoceed None.-
(conthusd) inlet vacuum onech fogo Iseure. due to sempio pump fatA. High vacuum saut. channel ESFAS Reshmdent measuremert eport trip. seuiL praesethe channoi funcson. funemonel Vacuum Hentware Loos of semple pump None Penoec testmg None None saects feBe feeure. tripprdecton on (18 month:)
closed. W bJet flour.
L, I b
43 of 50
_.__.m_._- _m
1 Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.3 Control Room Monitors Single Failure Evaluation Cceponent Function FeBure Femurs Effect on System Method of Fahne Operseone Fesure Ef'ect on Effect on !
MontRah Modes W em Detection incaceGon Channel FHIS Syeesm Th1S
- Functon Function j 1. Noble Gee Noble gas Fed Off 1. Open Circuit No NatWe Gee LPU senses detector Insensmont Fe8 et Loos of eNected None-1 Detector concentracon 2. Short Circup concentration Indiceeon loss of counts. U2'J3 INSTR channel ESFAS Redundant
! 2/3RE782401 signet 3. Detector faa et ADU or LDU. No Detector falure FAllwindow & protoceve enannel 2/3RE7825G2 Low abnity to alarm. hdicated ty: ROU out of functiert fw ruonal
- 1. Connection fas Operate Model No. 2. Loss of ecuits SAS-4'29 SR fault EMI induced Faulty shield Poselbie high or l' noise coBected in Poselble U2/U3 PoesitWe effected None.
Into eagnet incorrect NotWe Gee Am-241 reference CONTROL channel trip. Redindent cable concentration peak,then count test ROOM RAD HI channel IndiceNons Possible wtB fa8. eta m window & func6aret eierm or trip. RDU HI slarm.
Compere with redundant channel KsW 2.LPU Serial Link #1 Fe# Cff 1. Open Ckcut Fosed certal CommuniceGon Enk Instrument Fe4 et Loss of enected None-2/3RT7824G1 2. Short Circuit cornmuniceflon with watchdog faut. U2/U3 INSTR chenr of ESFAS Redundert 2/3RT7825G2 RDU. FAllwindow & protective channel RDU otd of function. functional Model No. Operate.
P.MS-9042-SR EMIinduced Fatdy shleid. Dog'aded earlof Softwo e watchdog None None None (Inte rnittent) commurdcetion with communice6on RDU. check auto'natically inmates re-tranwriesen 1:
44 of 50
_ _ . _ . _ _ _ Aa
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.0 ICCN F-707 Table 8.3 Control Room Monitors Single Failure Evaluation Component Ftmetion Fadure Fagure Effect on System RAsshed of fad.ee Operufens Fagure Effect on Effect on k$entificaten Modes Mechariam Detecean hteellon Channet FHIS Syelem FMIS Funteen fi m 2.LPU Sertaf Lir* #1 EMI enduced Fauty sNekt. Failed serial Commwdestion Enk Instnmeert Fat at Loos of affeded None-(wdinued) (conrd) (Cordnnuous) communicationwith undehdog feull U3tOINSTR channelESFAS Redundant RDU. FAILwhdeura pt,Ascsve channel RDU od of funcean. functionet Operate.
i
, Serrat Link #2 Fa5 Off 1. Open Circuit Fated serful Communicallon Ir* DAS aler.fi & RDU None None
- 2. Short Circuit comrpunicahon wilh watchdog faut. slave totAt.
LDU. Lossoflocal inescahon and slerms.
EMilnckJeed Faulty sNefd. Degraded eerW Sofhuere melsdag None None None (freermdtent) communication wi!h commwiles5an LDU. check sunar, messy inmuses re-transmisolert EMIinduced Fauty shield. r-end serial CommunicssonInk DAS alenn & RDU None None (consnumre) nicauanweh wechdog fault aseve foun.
I w oflocal i i alarms.
45 of 50 o - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev. O ICCN F-707 Table 8.3 Control Room Monitors Single Failure Evaluatson Component Function Fesure Feture Effed on Syelem Moemdof FoEure Operesens Fogure Ef9ect on Effect on identrfication Modes Mechanism Detecdon Intecation Channel FHIS System FH!S Fuicson Furicton 2.LPU Detector Bios Fad Off 1.Open Orcut Loos of detector signet Laos of counts faut. DAS aienn & ROU Loos of eNected None-(condnued) Power Supply 2. Short Circut No Noble Gas kilomel Power eleve fault diennet ESFAS Redunderd coneontreson supper vanagetest prd cevo cannnel ;
Inecamens. thist. funceert funcsonst '
Degraded Cor*cl Circut Poesitie W in treamel Power DAS storm & ROU Loss of enacted None-felt mesoured odput during Supplyvenope tout eleve fouR. channel ESFAS Redundant stoody efele. fast. protec5ve diennel suneson punceanut Power Supply 120 m 1. Open Circut Loos of detector signal. Communkanon link U2fU3 CONTROL Affected channet CRIS (Common to failure. 2. Short Circut No Noldo Gee waschdoginut. Losa ROOM RAD Hf Trip. Actus'Jort -
LPU. LDU S concentremon % of counts fault. Total storm window & 1 RDU) andcontrolreley. ROU foAure of the LPU. RDU HI Alemt !
cardrolreser changes state from CLOSED to OPEN.
Acquisition PreempBlier Hardware No concentration Loos of counts fundL DASelorm &RDU Loss of eNected None-
& feNure indice6ce- einve feut. channel ESFAS Redundert decriminator posodive channel fall funceert funceonel Timere fet Hardwaraf software faRure.
Counters feR Software Software failure module falls 46 of 50
Southern Califomia Edison J-SFA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.3 Control Room Monitors Single Failure Evaluation Component Funcuon Fedure FeNure Effect ca System Mediedof FeEure Operstone FeMure Effect on Effect on idenbficesion Modes Mechanism Detection Indication Channel FHis Syeesm FHIS Function Function
- 2. LPU Memory EPRO,', Hardware / Possible LPU fafure. CRC 16 chedesum DASeierm & RDU Loos of effected None.
(ConHnued) EEPROM. Software feaure . test faut. eleve faut. channelESFAS Redunderd Flesh feaure protective channel func4en. flmctional RAM fes Hardware / Possible LPU fegure. RAM test faut.
Sofhwu fuNure Operellon eierm at LPU.
Watchdog Tener failure Hardware / Noindicadon 6. nodule Software check DAS elarm & RLU Posedste lose of None-flmer Software failure failures secociatedwith incScales faut eierm. alswo faut. effected channel Redunderd main software loop & ESFAS channel redtir procesa% protoceve funcuonot functiert a ROU Processang Feu! tin Hardware / No indicellon of Welchdog timer DAS eierm & RDU Loss of effected None-2/3RIC7824G1 Softworra so8tware/ Solhvore failure. coex:entration or idenlWies a foull channel ESFAS Rediedent 2/3RCH7824G c~ .,~.a 4 communicellons, processing feNure. protective channel 1 failure. func9an. Funcilonet 2/3RSL7824G1 2/3RIC7825G2 2/3RCH7825G Serial Unk #1 Fail 1. Short Ciret.A Failed serial Communiceuen gr* Instrumard Fe5 et Laos of effected None-2 2. Open circuit s~..n.ii.L., with welchdog fault. U2/U3 INSTR channet ESFAS Redur*nt 2/3RSL732SG2 3. Software LPU & LDU. FAILwindow & protec5ve channel failure RDU out of funcbon. funcuonal Model No. Oper*
RMS-9009-SR EMI Mduced Foully Shisid. Degraded serial Soffwere watchdog None None None (intermatont) corrsnunicsson with mmmunicagon LPU & LDU. check automouceNy Intietee re-tronomwion.
47 Of 50
\ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
Southern California Edison Nuclear Engineering Design Organization J-SPA-269 Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.3 Control Room Monitors Single Failure Evaluation CL:w mi Func8cn FeRure Fedure Effect on System Moemd of FeAure Identification Operatene Foaure Effed on Effect on Modes Mechanism Detection Indication Channd FHIS System FHl9 Furection Function ,
- 3. RDU Sortal Link #1 EMIIndrad Faulty SNehf. Feded serial Comrnuniceuoninic Instrumert Fea et (contrued) (cott'd) Loes of effected None-(Centinuous) communicellonwith watchdog rault. U2fU3 tNSTR i
channel ESFAS Redundant LPU& LDU. FAllwindow & protaceve channer RDU out of . function. funcWonal.
Operate High Radletion Fees cos 1. Short circuit AlarmalControl ^ N Periodlu techng Lees of eflected None-Atarm Refoy energized. 2. Solbere fell Dempero cannot (to month period) channel ESFAS Redundert actuate protec5vo channel funcekn functional Fe.1s co8 1. Open Circuit Alarms / Control Relay or . :ts de4nergtzed U2if3 CONTROL Affected channel CRIS
- 2. Software fe8 Dempero automatically change Je fiorn - ROOM RAD Hi trip. ectuatiort edueled CLO3ED to OPEN. sierm window &
RDU Hi Alarm.
Power 120voc 1.Open circus Loos of powerto High Relay contacts U2/U3 CONTROL Affected charrel fesure 2. Short circuit CR1S R=amaan Alarm Reley. change siete from ROOM RAD Hi try. ectuatkn CLOSED to OPEN. sierm window a RDU HI Alarm.
2 i
48 of 50 i
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.3 Control Room Monitors Single Failure Evaluation Cc.iv, a Function Feiture Fesure Effect on Syelem Mulhedof Fesure OpereWons Facure LL,.;L1 L. Modes Effect on Effed an Mechanism Detedfon IndiceNon Channes FHIS Syalam FHIS Function Funceton
- 4. LDU Seriet Link #1 fen Off 1. Open circui Felled serial Communicalkm Ink DASeierm & RDU None 2/3RUIC7824G 2. Short circuit None 1
communicehon with welchdog Isult. eleve fd LPU. Loos oflace:
2/3RUtC78250 indiceNon and eierme.
2 Model No.
RMS-9003-SR EMilnduced Faulty shield. Degraded serial Software watchdog None None None (Intermittent) communication wNh communiceNon LPU. check automeNceNy inelates re-tronomiselon.
EMIInduced FouRy shield. Fseed eartel CommuniceNon Onk DAS eierm & RDU None None (Conhnuous) communiceeen with welchdog faut. sieve fault LPU. Loss oflocal hdication and mierme.
Serial Link #2 Fail Off 1. Open circuit Felled serial CommunicationIhk instrument Feilet None None
- 2. Short circut communiceNon with watchdog fault. U2/U3 INSTR RDU. FAllwindow &
RDU out of Opemie.
EMIIrdsced FeuNy shleid. Degraded serial Sofheers welchdog None None None (Intermitlent) communicetkn wilh corr.rnunicallon RDU. check ^^ "%
Indlelse re-iransmission.
l 49 of 50 l
I c_
Southern California Edison J-SPA-269 Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Rev.O ICCN F-707 Table 8.3 Control Room Moicors Single Failure Evaluebon Component Funcuon Folture Fegure Effect on System Method of FeBure Operssons Fogure Effed on Effect on identification Modes Mechanism Delection Indcegon ChannelFHIS System FHPS FuntSon Fundlon
- 4. LDU Serial unk #2 EMIInduced FatAty shield. Faced eertal Communlesson Enk kwtrument Fe5 et None None (Conunued) (cont'd) (Condnuous) commutation with matchdog faull U2/tn INST't RDU. FAllwindow &
RDU out of Operale Memory EPROM, Hardwaret Poestleloss ofloosi CRC 16 cWan DAS mierm & RDU None None EEPROM, Software fesure Indicenon and eierms. test fadt. =teve fault.
Flash femure RAM fee Herdeers/ Poeotie loss of.ocol RAM test faut.
Software future indcotion and eierms. Operation eierm l
Welchdog Timer failure Hardware / No indications of Sofhvoro check DAS sierm & RDU None None Timer Software feaure module fogures indicales faut eierm. eleve fotAt.
essociated wth main sonwereloop & reat Ume p _ _ _ _' 4 Poesetelose oflocal indication and eierms.
Pim _2 s Fault in Hardwarer Noindications of Watchdog timer DAS eierm & RDU None None Software softwaret Software failure concentregon or identilles e eleve faut.
componert communications. Loos ,w---- _ ,fagure fmRure oflocalIndicellon and alarms.
50 of 50 l
i l __ _--
ENCLOSURE 10 NUCLEAR CONSOLIDATED DATAB ASE SELECTED DOCUMENTS Documents include:
Loop 21T0202 Rev. I Loop 2FT0212 Rev.1 Loop 2FT1011 Rev. O Loop 2iT102i Rev. O Field Change Notice Loop 2LTI113-1 Sheet 1/ Rey. I (FCN) F5596J Rev. O Loop 2LTIi13 2 Sheet 1/Rev. I Loop 2LTIi13-3 Sheet 1/Rev.1 Lcop 2LT 1113-4 Sheet I/Rev. I Loop 2LTI1231 Sheet 1/Rev. I Loop 2LTI123 2 Sheet 1/Rev.1 Lxp 2LTl123-3 Sheet 1/Rev. O DCN ABG-7982 Rev. O Loop 2LTl123-4 Sheet 1/Rev. O DCN ABG-7983 Loop 2LT 58531 Rev. I Loop 2LT 5853 2 Rev. 2 Loop 2LT9386-1 Rev. I FCN F6846J FCN 51403 Loop 2LT9389-2 Rev. 2 FCN 7052J Loop 2PT1013 1 Sheet 1/Rev. O Loop 2PT1013 2 Sheet 1/Rev. O Loop 2FT1013-3 Sheet 1/Rev. 0 Loop 2PT1013-4 Sheet 1/Rev. 0 Loop 2PT1023-1 Sheet 1/Rev. 0 Loop 2f41023-2 Sheet 1/Rev. O Loop 2PT1023-3 Sheet 1/Rev. O Loop 2PT1023-4 Sheet 1/Rev. O Loop 2RE7820-1 Rev. O Loop 2RE7820-2 Rev. O Field-generated Interim Design Change Notice (FIDCN) J 5825 Loop 21u37820-2 Rev. O BEFORE Loop 2RE7820-2 Rev. O AFTER Loop 2RE7828C Rev. O Loop 2RE7845 Rev. O Loop 2RE7848 Rev. O Loop 2RE7850 Rev. O Loop 2/3RE7851 Rev. O Loop 2RE7865A1 Sheet 1/Rev. O Loop 3FT0202 Rev. I Loop 3FT0212 Rev. I Loop 3fT1011 Rev. O FCN 56731 Rev. O Loop 3FT102i Rev. O FCN 5676J Loop 3LTl113-1 Sheet 1/Rev. I Loop 3LT 1113-2 Sheet 1/Rev I Loop 3LTl113-3 Sheet 1/Rev. I Loop 3LTl113 4 Sheet 1/Rev. I Loop 3LTl1231 Sheet 1/Rev.1 Loop 3LTl123-2 She c 1/Rev.1 Loop 3LTI123-3 Sheet I/Rev. O DCN ABG-7990 Rev. O Loop 3LTll23-4 Shwet 1/Rev. O DCN ABG-7991 Rev. O Loop 3LT5853-1 Rey, I Loop 3LT5853-2 Rev. I FIDCN J-5598 Loop 3LT9386-1 Rev. I FC!1 F6849J FCN F51481 Loop 3LT9389-2 Rev. 2 FCN F7054J DCN NT 2 Loop 3f41013 1 Sheet 1/Rev.0 Loop 3PTiu13-2 Sheet 1/Rev. O Loop 3PT1013-3 Sheet 1/Rev. O Loop 3PT1013-4 Sheet 1/Rev. O Loop 3PT1023-1 Sheet 1/Rev. O Loop 3PT1023 2 Sheet 1/Rev. O Loop 3PT1023 3 Sheet 1/Rev. O Loop 3f41023-4 Sheet 1/Rev. O Loop 3RE7820-1 Rev. O Loop 3RE7820-2 Rev. O FIDCN J-5826 Loop 3RE7820-2 Rev. 0 BEFORE Loop 3RE7820-2 Rev. O AFTER Loop 3RE7828C Rev. O Loop 3RE7845 Rev. O Loop 3RE7848 Rev. O Loop 3RE7850 Rev. O Loop 3RE7865A1 Sheet 1/Rev. O Wiring Diagram-Control Building-PPS Cabinet 2L&3LO32 (31541 Sheet 9/Rev. 6).
I 1 1
s OVERSIZE ,
DOCUMENT
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