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Failure Analysis Rept 98-005,Failure Analysis of 2HV9305 Motor Starter
	ML20217Q616
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	04/05/1998
From:	Riddle J, Schutter H, Strom W; SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20217Q561	List: 05000361/LER-1998-003, LOCA Evaluation of Safety Significance of Failure of Emergency Sump Valve Linestarter (LER 1998-003); ML20217Q556; ML20217Q616;
References
	98-005, 98-5, NUDOCS 9804130049
	Download: ML20217Q616 (88)
	v • d • e

_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _- . _ .

April 5,1998 A. Mosaddegh S. Genschaw

Subject:

Failure Analysis Report 98-005 Failure Analysis of the 2HV9305 Motor Starter BACKGROUND ISEG/RCG received a 2BE motor control center (MCC) mechanical interlock from reversing motor starter 2BE35 that had been found failed on February 5,1998 during scheduled maintenance. This MCC cubicle provided power to containment isolation valve 2HV9305.

The subject mechanical interlock is part of the motor starter assembly that includes the contactors and auxiliary contacts (Figure 1). The two contactors on the motor starter assembly allow the motor driven actuator on the valve to operate in either the open or closed direction. As three phase motors can be operate in either direction by the simple expedient of reversing any two of the three phase leads, the contactors are wired in such a way as to accomplish this. However, due to this wiring arrangement, if both contactors were energized simultaneously a phase to phase short would exist. To preclude this from happening, there are two redundant levels of interlock protection.

The first level involves the auxiliary electrical contacts, which are mechanically coupled to the contactors. When one contactor is energized, its auxiliary contact opens the circuit to the coil of the other contactor preventing both from being simultaneously energized. The second level of protection is the mechanical interlock (Figure 2). This mechanism, through the use of sliding cams and a shuttle arm, physically inhibits both contactors from closing a the same time. This combination of protection devices virtually eliminates the possibility of a phase to phase short occurring in the motor starter cubicle. The mechanical interlock in question was observed to be jammed, with the "right hand" sliding cam in the down position. During normal operation, both of the sliding cams would be expected to be in the neutral, or up, position with both contactors

' deenergized. With the interlock Jammed in this position, further operation of the valve

. motor operator would not have been possible.

1 9Bo413oo49 9904o7 PDR ADOCK o5o00361 G_ PDR.

o EVALUATION Visual observation of the interlock assembly revealed that the back side had localized i accumulations of what looked like fine sand or dust. This substance was later identified i as a tan colored abrasive compound composed primarily of silicon, aluminum, and calcium with traces of iron, chromium, magnesium, and titanium, and henceforth referred to in this report as grit. This grit had adhered to virtually all of the stationary and moving parts of the interiock assembly. Higher concentrations of the grit were located around the four openings at the bottom of the mounting plate and lesser amounts were found on the top sides of most of the components. This deposition pattern indicated that the interlock was mouried in the normal installed position when !

the grit was deposited. Since the heaviest acamulations were around the four l openings, it appears that the grit entered throuch those openings as an aerosol or dust, as opposed to entering though the open sides of the backing plate.

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j The interlock was dismantled and it was noted that both sliding cams moved with difficulty on their respective guide posts. Previous experience with mechanical interlocks from Root Cause Evaluation (RCE)95-013, has never shown this type of )

binding. Both the metal guide posts and the Delrin plastic sliding cams showed accumulations of grit. The parts were then taken to a local laboratory for further analysis.

One of the sliding cams was cut into pieces to more easily reveal the inside bore j surface. Examination in the scanning electron microscope (SEM) showed a buildup of i smeared or " galled" plastic that had closed up the clearances to the guide post and )

prevented the sliding cam from freely moving (Figure 3). Within this galled plastic was an accumulation of grit that was identified using Energy Dispersive X ray Spectroscopy (EDS) as containing primarily silicon, aluminum, calcium. Traces of iron, chromium, l magnesium and other metallic elements were also noted (Figure 4). The cut surface of the plastic was analyzed for comparison and only carbon and oxygen were present (Figure 5). One of the guide posts was looked at next (Figure 6). It contained clearly j visible accumulations of grit on the surface that were identified as being primarily silicon, aluminum and calcium (Figure 7). The size range of the grit particles was in the I range of 10-100 microns. The post itself was identified as being made of iron (steel) 1 with a chromium hard coat (Figure 8). Next, some of the grit laying on the bottom of the backing plate was examined. Using EDS, this also showed the same basic elemental 2

composition as the grit on the cam and the post (Figure 9) that is, primarily silicon, aluminum and calcium. Some of the grit was also analyzed using Fourier Transform Infrared Analysis (FTIR). Strong silica and silicate peaks were present (Figure 10).

Following the failure of the 2BE35, several more working interlock assemblies were removed from MCC 2BE. One of the interlocks removed was from 2BE27 and had been replaced in 1993 under a Maintenance Order (M.O.). This interlock was compared with 2BE30, one of the interlocks supplied during original construction. 2BE30 was noted to have a surface layer of grit, whib 2BE27 was clean (Figure 11). Cam guide posts and sliding cams were analyzed and compared between the two interlocks using the SEM and EDS. The parts from 2BE30 were found to be contaminated with the same type of grit found on the 2BE35 interlock, while the grit was entirely absent from the 2BE27 interlock (Figures 12 - 21). Another interlock was then removed from MCC 2BY cubicle 2BY16. This interlock had been installed in 1995 as a replacement in response to the findings of Root Cause Evaluation (RCE) 95-13, " Failure Analysis of Square-D Linestarters." This interlock was also completely free of any grit (Figures 22 -

25). A summary of the condition of all the examined interlocks can be found in Table 1.

As the data indicates that deposition of the grit found on some older interlocks was not a problem after 1993, intensive steps were undertaken to locate an earlier source of the grit. Samples were taken from numerous Unit 2 locations in the rooms where the motor control centers were located, as well as from some of the MCC cubicles. The external locations included the floor, walls, various components, and the inside of the ventilation duct (by removing portions of the duct lining). Samples were also taken from a Unit 3 MCC bucket. Additionally, samples of intact and crushed glass beading shot, gypsum (plaster), lime, and "structo-lite" were obtained for comparison. Many of these samples were analyzed using SEM and EDS (Figures 26 - 51). Only samples from internal MCC locations exhibited a significant match to the grit samples found on 2BE35, with the exception of a sample from the top of MCC 2BE. None of the samples from other areas of the rooms exhibited a significant match to the elemental analysis and/or the visual appearance of the grit found on the interlocks. It was then decided to look outside of the rooms. A sample of the gunite hillside stabilization coating, which is tan in color, was removed with a hammer and crushed for analysis. The gunited hillside areas are outside the plant Protected Area and several hundred feet from the building containing the rooms where the cubicles are located. When analyzed visually under a microscope, in the SEM, and elementally using EDS, the gunite was considered a '

3

reasonable match for the grit fourid in the interlocks (Figures 52 - 54). It was therefore concluded that the most likely source of the grit in tho interlocks was from fine particles distributed in the air during hillside stabilization activities using sprayed on gunite. Due to the passage of time, however, it cannot be definitely concluded that this is the source of the grit. A summary of the findings of this analysis is found in Table 2.

Based on the fact that the gunite like grit is found only in the motor control centers (MCCs) themselves, and was not clearly identified on any other components in the switchgear rooms, including the ventilation ducts (except as a trace elemental or visual signature), it can be postulated that the introduction of the grit occurred during the plant construction phase (circa 1980). It may have been deposited either prior to the installation of the MCCs into the switchgear rooms, or prior to the closure of those rooms. As the hillsides were continually being modified during the construction of Units 2 and 3, there was considerable use of gunite to stabilize the slopes. This premise is supported by the absence of the grit of newer replacement interlocks. Inter!ocks installed after 1993 and during the 1995 change out have shown no traces of the grit.

Additionally, interlocks that were cleaned and greased (this occurred only prior to the 1995 issuance of RCE 95-13) do not have any of the grit. As the Grease would readily collect any airbome particles of the grit, this absence of grit on the grease also shows that the deposition of the grit is not an ongoing problem.

Another significant finding that can be deduced from the lack of grit on parts installed in the post construction environment is that the grit, once deposited, does not migrate. In spite of being installed in MCC buckets that had other components with varying degrees of grit, no traces of the grit have been found on any of the new, or cleaned and greased, interlocks. Supporting this observation is the fact that the grit was found to cling to both the interlock frames and posts. Samples of the grit had to be scraped or rubbed off for analysis. The gri+ was also found clinging to the posts in spite of many cycles of operation where the sliding cams had slid over the post surface.

Once the cause of the failure of 2BE35 was determined to be due to the introduction of an abrasive grit, there was concern that the jamming problem found with 2BE35 could have potentially affected many other older interlocks over only a few more demand cycles. In order to address this concern, three interlocks from MCC 2BE, each containing visible amounts of the grit, were each tested for 50 open/close cycles (100 interlock strokes). These interlocks had been removed from 2BE26,2BE31, and 4

ll 2BE47. All three interlocks completed the test cycles without any deficiencies. This l test confirmed the fact that although the grit was present, the 2BE35 interlock was unique in having a sufficient amount of the grit deposited on the moving parts to " gall" the plastic sliding cams and thus jam the interlock.

A second concern that developed during the preparation of this FAR was that previously identified wear related failures of interlocks (RCE 95 013) were actually mis-identified grit related failures. Subsequent examination of the SEM photos used in that RCE as well a examination of components stored after analysis revealed that, although some of the grit was present in small but visible quantities on the frame, it was not a contributing factor in the failures analyzed for that report .

As to concerns about other components in the MCCs being degraded by possible l introduction of the abrasive grit, a review of all other components has shown them sa be enclosed, where the interlock is essentially an open frame device. Breakers, auxiliary contacts, and starter contactors are all enclosed such that airborne particles of the grit of the size range observed would be unlikely to enter in quantity. As the grit particles are fairly tenacious in adhering to whatever surface tbay contact, it is unlikely that they would do much to these other components besides settling on the outside surfaces.

Addition-'ly, of all the MCC components, only the interlocks are " low force" devices.

Relatively low spring pressures are used to return the sliding cams to their neutral position, whereas contactors, breakers, etc. have strong energizing or closing forces. !

The moving parts in these devices are also made of metal or Bakr :s plastic and these materials are much less likely to gall in the presence of small amounts of abrasive as did the soft Delrin parts of the interlocks.

CONCLUSIONS The conclusions of this report are summarized in the following findings:

1) The grit found on the interlocks can conservatively be concluded to consist of gunite particles in the size range of 10-100 microns. There is a match on color, visual appearance, and elemental makeup.

2) There is no conclusive evidence of any significant quantities of the grit in or around other switchgear room components, nor can any evidence of it be found 5

in the fiberglass inner liner of the ventilation ducts.

3) Based on the evidence gained from the location of clean components, it can be concluded that the introduction of the grit occurred prior to 1993, and most likely prior to plant startup (based on conclusion 2), and is not ongoing problem.

4) The grit affected the 2BE35 interlock, rather than other components in the MCC because the interlocks are unique among MCC components in having unenclosed structure and " low force" moving parts.

5) As grit deposition is not ongoing and evidence indicates that the grit, once deposited does not migrate, replacement of the affected interlocks, completed on March 24,1998, will solve the subject problem. Routine cubicie cleaning and parts replacement will eventually eliminate most traces of the grit.

6) The presence of the grit, by itself, is not a sufficient reason to conclude that a given interlock is inoperable. No interlock, except for the one in cubicle 2BE35, has been found to have been rendered inoperable due to abrasion caused by the grit. This conclusion is based on field evidence and laboratory testing.

7) Based on the " fine dust" appearance of the grit to the naked eye, it is not reasonable to expect that this problem could have been identified by a prudent individual examining the cubicles using industry accepted QA inspection techniques. Indeed, during the preparation of RCE 95-013, some of this grit was present, but it appeared to be only a layer of common dust and was not j present on the examined (SEM and EDS) wear surfaces nor was it a contributor l

to the fal.ure mechanism of the interlocks analyzed in 1995. The unique nature of the grit cannot be differentiated from normal dust accumulation without using optical microscopy or SEM and EDS.

6

Howard C. Sct[

Senior Root Cause Engineer I

f~ ddAb Jptiles B. Riddle Root Cause Engineer

./ hL W. W. Strom, Supervisor Independent Safety Engineering Group HCSchutter cc: J. Fee R. Bockhorst G. Gibson J. Leavitt 1 D. Breig R.C. Clark ISEG Files CDM 7

TABLE 1 INTERLOCK STATUS INTERLOCK GRIT IDENTIFIED? NOTES 2BE09 YES Minor dust 2BE15 YES Removed in 1995 2BE26 YES Moderate dust 2BE27 NO Replaced in 1993 (Figs.11,13,14,16,17,18, 20) 2BE30 YES (Figs.11,12,13,14,14,15, 17,18,19,21) 2BE35 YES Initial failure for this FAR (Figs. 3-10,54) 2BE48 NO Cleaned & greased (no grit) 2BY16 NO New (bik) interlock (1995)

(Figs. 22-25) 2BJ47 YES Stuck w/ manual op in lab 2BE45 NO Cleaned & greased (no grit) 2BE47 YES 2BE44 NO

TABLE 2 DIRT SAMPLES MATERIAL SAMPLE GRIT IDENTIFIED? NOTES 2BE35 Interlock N/A Baseline sample (Figs. 3 - 10 & 54)

Tr A Test panel bracket NO Tape sample - Lots of dirt (Fig. 27)

Tr A Siren Panel NO Tape sample (Figs. 28 & 43)

Tr A 2BE Back Panel NO Tape sample (Fig. 45)

Tr A 2BE South Support NO Tape sample (Fig. 46)

Tr A 2BE13 Cubicle NO (Figs. 26 & 36)

Tr A Wire Fire Lagging NO (Fig. 42)

Tr A Structure Fire Coat NO (Fig. 41)

Tr A Vent Duct 1.D. Insul. NO (Optical Microscopy) Large sample - no dirt Tr B Test Panel Top NO Tape sample (Fig. 48)

Tr B Test Panel Rear Brkt NO (Fig. 49)

Tr B NI Channel Switch NO Tape sample (Fig. 44) 2BRB12 Cubicle TRACE (?) Cotton swab sample (very (Fig. 34) small amount) 2BRB12 Frame NO Tape sample 2BRB12 Interlock NO Tape sample 1

MATERIAL SAMPLE GRlT IDENTIFIED? NOTES 2BRB12 C P Transformer NO Tape Sample 3BE13 Stab Insulator YES Tape sample (Fig. 38) 3BE13 Interlock (Fig. 39) YES Tape sample 3BE13 C. P. Transformer YES Tape sample (Fig. 40) 2BE15 Contactor Wires YES Tape sample, parts from (Fig. 37) 1995 RCE MCC 2BJ Top (Fig. 29) TRACE Cotton swab sample 2BS21 Cubicle (Fig. 30) YES Cotton swab sample 2BQ16 Cubicle (Fig. 31) TRACE Cotton swab sample 2BZ05/41 Cubicle (Fig. 32) NO Cotton swab sample 2BY18 Cubicle (Fig. 33) YES Cotton swab sample 2BE34 Cubicle (Fig. 35) TRACE Cotton swab sample 2BE13 Cubicle (Fig. 36) TRACE Cotton swab sample 2BE31 Cubicle TRACE Tape sample (Figs. 27 & 47)

Blown Sand (Fig. 50) NO Found in plant Crushed Blast Media NO Tape sample,looks like (Fig. 51) broken glass Lime NO (Optical Microscopy) New material Gypsum NO (Optical Microscopy) New material Structo-lite NO (Optical M!croscopy) New material Gunite (Figs. 52,53 & 54) YES Broken off of hillside 2

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On l n _

2 Pu C a _ _

5 o R m

Nc S .

1 O 2 a 1 4 P 1 S7 i 8 I8 S 0 -

9 R1 l 0 9 B A g 0 1 E n M 1 . .

- D Z 1 0 .

b : e -

e 0= F _

F 3t 0

- Er C

9 Be - _

2V ( _

A.

~

ss cc +._ I g ee -

7 ss = 6

= 03 07 :- 19 02 1 91 1 - 1 .

0 1

w _

8 I

=

= d ;

=

te _

O es -

sp _ l ea e 1 7 a

_ rl F r _

PE e g _

F e _

t n

6 I r I

_ C r

C V

5e 1 k 0

1 3 V 2

= K 4 .

p 0 s 0 '.

1 1 i 2 D h=

=

5 s 3e 5 t 1

g

n n 2 u a 3 o R

c 2 2 1 9 1 5 i 8 8 S 0 9 T1 0 9 S 0 1 O 1 .

- P I 0 b : e _

e 7= F l F 2t rI

- Er C 9 Be -

2V (

l Figure 17

., ..[,. . 32* .

d f.f369 : , ,'" ,

- .1,. a ,

p 2: >c , . . . .~: ;, ': ...

^ n: .(. ..r - + .d :1:. ., ,,

v. - . : cc.,p,

. ~2~ -

w p m'v El!$}y;g~;3M'V urc .

2BE30 Sliding Cam et

.os egg;y$, $~

.:;3y,,,,

(;; ' ~ > ,

+;' , ,. -

_ k ?Y' 1

r 2BE27 Sliding Cam

i Figure 18

{

4 --

5.

)

l

. /

2BE30 Sliding Cam 1.D. surface (Note imbedded grit at arrows)

~' ' ~

- [ .I' i; 2BE27 Sliding Cam 1.D. surface

$!E ss cc ee wl >9 4

ss -

._ 8 08 03 01 1

w91

. __ l 13 0

1 8

=

m.l

=

=d te O

~

es

~ sp l ea 7 a _

rl PE w.

1 r

g e

e t n

6 I -

l 1

V K

0 F&,l -

5e V

0 3

2 2 M= a 4 .

Ap 0 Cs i a CW 1 1 GD C N _

I K '-

=

5 Ds 3e 4 It + 1 g

Ln 1 n _

4 Su C a 0 o R

- : Nc S 2 O' 2

_ 1 4 1 S6 i 8 I8 S l 0

_ 9 R A 0 9 B g 0 1 E M 1 .

- D n I 0 b : Z e 0= 0 F 3t

- Er (

9 Be C l

\ -

2V (

1

.lllll i'

$$8 ss cc .

l

>3-ee t 9

ss 8 Zn A..; 01 06 10 01 g 911 .

1 1 u 0 n 1

=

Zf .

I 8

=

= d ,.

te

, O es sp c l ea 7 a rl 1

r PE g e

_ )

l e

p m

F e

&. s; 6

1 I

t n

a -

s V

K 0

d t

e s+

e-5e 1

V k

2 a 0 1 o 3 c 2 M= 4 .

Ap d 0 Cs l 1 1 i o GD g N (

I =

4 Ds 3e d

1 g

4 It

Ln P n 1 Su a 2 o R

Nc u 2 O A 2 1

1 1 S8 .

8 I7 0 0

9 9

R1 B 0 -

1 E " 1 .

- D 2 1 O b :

e 7= 0 F 2t

- Er h 9 Be C l 2V (

ll,l;

Figure 21 i

,, e - . u.

'mmu . (. -* n g,p., rf..x-s .,. j. L3y.nwwng A4 .

k 739 m r 9 q.e em 3,;.

.,3 yig e > A. -

q p,M, , . _ .; ,;g 4 t, , ?s j-r,* We, g Q,q,,,% ; ,

< , 4lvM mgs

~ ap.y:a . p Q c ('[Q

. .. . c.3 f Glc ,3 [g?

. ' m.c gg.Qiy 9 _

% ': 3 'v.

a g

, ,.c % .,v

%. ,'.M. ,;1 c fsh.41ggs.s ...,9 rr s glq -

,.y f p p p . .,* ;; '.'t %}pp fy , ',l:.4i j ,

g>,, }:

i

u. c ,3 ,

f' 3 ,

. .. 4 -

+ms#1q n

. < a., y )3.z;o<:s,_-

.: s e .s

.u s ,c ,

p ,'.;,,t, 4 4

-(,, .A - ,

s y - -. .

g -- r qt . syn j -

,'M .

Mihh,. dh# . ' ' h 'W h . Mh.U X

' 'sw

,e

.. p r

'U-....' ,O .

$~: t' t..*Ai

.'g . . '

' t.O - i

&. 4

.. ; . U

,},;i[ .. 'w,.e,[u y,t,,4L}g,..

5..

L_

n.qasc'wzs *(.4 .

s s ; ,,.

p1 * @Q,g ,s e.7 f, y;;q.

~

{ h ,f ~

.l . 'l .A 1 ENlr % G N .; f #.h

'h;N r w: ,y .

t . m ..

.h9 N.

2 B410 .4 l ' .. - *- .o-4, ~ a

( M .~

~

g

'[..I

1. ^

o- . v ~,p d.

.f

-' ~

- 9 g

s u s ,. .

+n

3. .

.%g .

~ . .

q ,

.. M ., s 4

g 'A nj

~

b f '

' f{

. . . 74: ".2 T, .

ovo 3

e h . + o il e t o so o,-

Optical 40X (top) and SEM 500X (bottom) photos of the grit from the 2BE30 interlock.

These photos are typical of the grit referenced throughout this report.

Figure 22 d

g { "C 7" 5 M T F ? P [ " ? P ' Q Q % 371 l

!"NhQ@W5D%f _ . . .

s. - et +

w,. '

r-o t ;. - *"

.' ', ';'t 2..o,, [/t j.

.c. :.

?<

.. . , ., . .:.< \ y '

.:. m c m. x c'yz e ;vy- x, :m-

,T> $Q'/;{ d'f < Q 'i'^ &' y sl.,l . ;, , *, _ &a.-Q > ?.;, g c .

- ". - * ; * ,e

~ '

. . ,,, [ 1 .'. 1..

4,. '

,a

_m ' [ . W..

9" ..;,

l,\

... y -, ..

..,, v .

g, .t i

~ '

"% ., . , . . . ( ,

. +g

. t.

. W- 4, to Showing the clean condition of a sliding cam from the 28Y16 interlock installed in 1995.

l l

1 I

~

$c3 0 ss _ .

cc _I

_ )8 ee 3 ss 7 09 0

s._ .

91 06 17 _

1 ._1 .

_._ 0 1

_ 8 "

l

=

= d _.

O te es sp _ _ l ea ) _ 7 a rl e _

1 r

PE l g p .

e m _

t a n s 6 I d

w-1 2

e -

t a : V o -_

5e c -

1 k d -

0 1 l 3 o

V 2 .

= K g 4 .

m Cp ( 0 Es 0 1 1 Ci 2 AD F _

R .= 3e

= _

2 Us -

1 g

5 St _

n n m 2 Mu a 4 Ao R

Cc u 2 A 2 1 G4 1 N5 .:

8 I3 0 9 D2 .n 0 9 I =

0 1 L - 1 .

- S I 0 b

F e

6=

1t 0 k. .

- Yr '

9 Be C -

2V (

\

Figure 24 li"q , .;;i.: , -

%$}W%.?;5%4f?gC ;< ,; y: . ; ."". :

. . , ; .c <

.-~ .g.

.:.m. : = w .

I f

.* [3 r b -'- "

f-

, $8 ,, '@ e %',' " , r" '

a

j Y g. , 'W ir _'~'Q. f f : . .

. & A, . *

- ] . ; . ' , ' ,Y .

.t y

1

e.,

Fh..+,.Mt n> . ,

o z si - 70 or 0017 Showing the clean condition of a guide post from the 2BY16 Interlock Installed in 1995.

l l

a-

~

$$N ss

- cc .

I >7 ee _

0 ss . 1 04 02 14 02 .

91 1 . 1 .

0 1

8 _

l

=

= d t e_ O es sp l -

ea e 1 7 a rl F r PE e g

_ F e -

i t -

n 6 I '

r 1 n

C r

C V 5e I k r - 0 1 -- 3 V 2

= K 4 .

p 1 0

s 0 1 i 2 D

=

1 s 3e 4 t 1

g

n n 6 u a 3 o R

c 2 2 1 9 i 1

_ 3 8 1 S 0

_ 9 T1 0 9 S ,

0 1 O 1 . _

P 0

_ - I b : e F

e 6=

1t Yr F

C r k, .

9 Be ,

2V (

l l

1 l

l l

Flaure 26 t 77mm~nymw ::

"' ' l "E.L.'.? ~

ypxn.g;ymrmy&m.eg,-7 ~

.Oi'liN~

y-

m. {

o,, y '

u p! :, --

. c 'f ML1Nf m y &_ <

J1.40' u }M qs ~ % em r.

,'t, d,5 - _ . .j 4

i W D -Q:f ' 3' j '

< w q e n x

< .a w s) 3 i.

, . . . . , A' L.

h y .

k wp)i i.!:'

, $q}

w

,,y

. y .l "g 42 :. m. -.

W;l d..Mlt j d .,

sw ) a n:)

% Q^.lB .f., . ; . :. p uj '

. ,%w-]. .. sp:$a U.. >

')

. ,%,,, ,'; '!, . ; l. . -f.'5 ly 7, ;, , , ;; .

R, 4,,. h.-

g

\ \ ?. ~f :

. f l '?

f.: -

n ,'; ;

y:

.: x; mg a_7 .:q,w ;gy:,m.:

nny:p ;;~ ;> . ; ; , A w . - ;9,'..g4:y.

w .y, @j . 5 , ;l rs

.L. !N;hy' &Y ~ . b,y hl , z. ff ;hk

' fu 2Rf ['" ,

yJ .nv+. , ;f" ,q.y.l% QR fi ' fy . ..y q.

p.y ., , w v.~

a g' w.; g y (

gggg-.

w , g;g, y a

J a b Naik.msZdt O.

40X optical photo of the dirt from the back of MCC 2BE

. W i W W 'I T.W p N S 3MK p@b hk. .id N d[' M f N.f..p[G ......

N. ,

P' ' ,w . V [twW[mj;,h..

E .

>;c. .3 .

h[FC y.. . .s . . ,

g,.

'r .r ." .- c.

W'p p,. s. .<., ,s

,~

.-, . . . <. ' _ - ; .;t w .y 7.y_:. . 9;, f,L w;

< - . , 4.

. puu ..g ;_pp . : ' 3 9 y ' ..(y-4.~

3

~.

.w, ; a. . ..

'~

.r./ fgg

. ;. ,pu,g? .,s

g

. ,l p A.

i s .

' l . ,',

l6 j l W. '}"

fy[. . .

m .7 .

...... <. 4 . . . x c

&f ^ j.. ., ,

-# si. ~

8

>..,s

' e' .y 3 rg.

v. .s .. . ..

., ,.:~l' r~s g . . . , ,, iw h'; .

y . .

F,',.. W < g: - ,g ) . ',

4g s.g,4.; g.Q.,

+% i.

r X - .-

f <piig gyg, #.

-;) . - 1,,,.

.pa 4 g -

e 4.

hl< 2c:y Y

. x, y.. . .

[hf v-khik? 5 .,

~

t

. r,, p,.m%_ d[i ... ,, ?

.s 9 g;yv

-: n

, 9y.e.q: . . cf . . . 4 i- 8 '

L' ,

nm.

u

.. , ,G qa -~ a ,., j:w.(1.L:pyQ

.-. s, A;.

~.

ro ,s n-s So y..- 5G Jh ' y,. .

u .a m t e ve a-. a w awm ..

40X optical photo of the dirt from under the south end of MCC 2BE

Figure 27 m m ,,.~. yc m ,.,

W.yy,[w', .,,,,. , psm. . ,. s., ,

u id n,-.. .A,#A.9,-*g'f.

$.thm ,.y;W.x.r. (,',, ,w ./: ' .e f , , ; n '.

Q , .%gh ,-.

,9 .

-c a m.. ..,:3-.q-5 .<+,, .

a- .e,m o & ,c -

p..e-

.( .<. ..3 p ) .. g ; . . =

e

',' . . (y ;-- 8? 4 4 j lO }s l;:Y, j)4 .1. yp,.l*gkl" p

' a } ~ }/ lgl f l Q .

"f ~

%, ypr @g.,

. :kp ';f a

.. $7 3;%c,n%l,&(' }

(63 fk;{, ^4x;w fl l}gw, -& :

s.m, ,u x.

.t, .ngm, 3 , ..o

b. .. n-3..1 . , w.,, . 3g.i 7. ,e e.g .-

a hh, . iff. T,;l

~

,kll, , 'N w a,:g y m % agc. w:aMy ., % ; y. Q. , ; '..,

gDu.

g e: n. .gx., . u n ;;- - .

gg .4;.p.. 7f4 % 9-

,. e Oy,,,4 y 7 3, s ,.

g

?N ic f;;' q]wrh.f y;f ;I ,, - ;,;, m <v Q*:l @$ - ; ?r; r

.y : # ,7 .3 ,, m m 5 5 e,, . Q- ,

m ~

-;T .y< *. ..g so -}' . L

..\ ,

e-.. ' s.- ~s n V,, rq ,, l;,g' d

(?('

1;r. .,f,,

,- s s ^' '

,x. ,

s b,kl#

f,'fqQ,D["_]%

g[ ' e f 4 @ .. s y y ' :.w.

. .kn. ,., ,.:u . a x. x

.nm.mu jgww ~ a: u ~ w.

40X optical photo of the dirt from the bottom of the 2BE31 bucket

,l f y r , " y c ~. g f , wr,xt g ga, , ,, c .

M .na;' .1s.L mc@.?9?h , A ," .

pg= -

, ,. ( v

4. j,y.m , . yy., aqi,ye,4.

y. 9. .g p 9.;

y i,,y),,g...

(

6, y ;,4;,n,cn.v. . qq%q: -

A ;;;%

.. . . ; . 3;+:w,g.e k,,r $ A. . .

(q.

h,; L.,3

- p- .

87s N.?

,z .

4 .-,7 %.;l. a,

b:

~

f .h% -

. .. .. a a

*J e

k A. r ,, g .h

-;. f.ly ,!v 0

.w 4 y. e g, s b:. .M f 40X optical photo of the dirt from the Unit 2 Train "A" test pr. ,el bracket

Figure 28 i

$MR s..;fqc.q... : - 3. 4 , . :. ..

-%R},;;}.744fN f.y4 MD 7. .

Q 7 - %[..?.[.

p gg .. # f

@1 s, s R<1y,'%2V; V.39....g;

,. ,c.g'**.-.'y s.i

- , / ,

y. _

' '" ) ,. ~ ' ? ' W. , * , s.<' sy UR J . .,, _ '

.. % L. l.. . ..

.: -:: ,f;$ h t'$, y%}$,w$

i'- L '.

h.tt$J:.714 g F..

~

..- . . m . , . o, - r .

,/ . 2,' '

, l T.

e 0 ,

. . ..n* <g c.,

.g p-i' (.. r. ;' ,-

., ' g- f 4,

- N.

d .. . . . L.

{p. 1 ~

4 J

',y'.;':-l L': .-

r.' 'Q&p%y%Q

.r -

:, , DJ.[ ),,&.,

, n ~ f' f f . '*; 6:'* \ '"r- -

-l'.

r**f(, . ,,

.. . y " asc

~,

l(6

t. N.: i#oQj(jify.{

,;.~ . ;

.,9,3,.,;

d. .

93, @WQ.1 u.

};.l glp L . O . O ,l ;. , ; W r . Y : . j f G. T ,. % ; .. V,_. &yh a n*"&

sk

.;gh. I:.{';;; . . " i U wl qA,c3wf . g. . ~g%w-o L;lw' s m.k ,v9y f.fw% .1(f. ,4>hw@. y.W. .

,g.a.{tr m wc . .. ,v, o.

y

.u;a ;y y?

u.ulkibsuA.Mah2. - pVsdw'Eir.ka AL.u.a.ankru aa *,.c '

fa c.va .~4 LiLMuuL ;a ng at .; xg. i.

40X optical photo of the dirt from the top of the Unit 2 Train "A" stren panel bracket t

1

Figure 29 Vtlc'C , IBJ. Y

i T"O P .

e e

* \ =

, .., .g 4

) ' . ,. . ,

d.. .

.p t * .r* .. y J sj j# - m

, ., ... A

-. f f ~

r- ,

2 0 F O 25FX Y OF 0001 PhotoMet 1.3-Feb-1999 07:08:17 TOP OF MCC, 2BJ Preset- '

100 secs Vert- 4724 counts Disp- 1 Elapsed- 54 sees O Ce Si Fe 20 KV S

Ne Zn Al C1 f

C Ms Ca Fe K Fe A " '

Wh wk 11 l2 13 14 15 l6 I7 18 19

(- 0.000 Range. 10.230 kev 10.030 ->

Integral 0 = 592294 Dirt samples from the top of MCC 2BJ

Figure 30

~ ' '

-2BS. ~

,i

> gr -

. f . . - w

~

, ..3 a

. . . , c :

s. , , p. S -

4

f..

M-AS - 'a '

'gf

- s.

i f ,

4. . 4 g a' .- ,

.t ,

i[ ,' ,

,d Ih L_ _20FU 0 2 5 k :x: 40 0 F' 0008 PhotoMet 13-Feb-1998 08: 49:11 28S21 Preset. 100 secs Nert= 1119 counts Disp. 1 Elapsed = 62 secs g, l 20 KV 0 Fe 5

t b Al Cl Na Ca Zn Ti C K Fe tiy .

y h '

Zn

] Zn wk 11 12 13 14 15 16 I7 18 19

(- 0.000 Range = 10.230 kev 10.030 ->

Integral 0 = 132450 Dirt samples from cubicle 2BS21

Figure 31

,3 .

3 g... -

e e ,

% 9 I . ,. ., .

m ,

2_0 ) it 0 25F>; 40 OP 0007 PhotoMet

/

13-Feb-1998 08:41:49 2B016 Preset. 100 secs Vert. 1568 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed. 69 secs St 0

Al 20 KY Zn Cl Na Ca I

S Zn C Mg ,

K Fe Fe Zn

-p. ,

w& 11 12 -l 3 14 15 16 17 18 19 4- 0.000 Range = 10.230 kev 10.030 -6 Integral 0 - 175846 Dirt samples from cubicle 2BQ16 l

Figure 32

,[ p'

2 8 Z O,5 / G 4 w

% ,c g e , 'e..g.,

P ^

($ . A y '6" $?,,'NY

.g > 'j g

9. .

- p. .

o ,a . ,- '

. . s* a g,$

r.

Y 2 0 F 81 0. 2 5 F ::: 40 0F 0006 PhotoMet 13-Feb-1998 08:30:14 2B205/ 9/ Preset. 100 secs Vert. 1760 counts Disp. 1 Elapsed. 46 secs Si 20 KV C1 Ca Al 0 Zn fla S Fe H K, Ca C, Fe Zn

= J. _ = - .

wx5 11 12 13 14 15 I6 17 18 19

(- 0.000 Range = 10.230 kev Integral O =

10.030 -)

118970 Dirt samples from 28Z05/41

Figure 33

&o ~'

4 . . y

a e

,9 e a .

..d

, qp ,

)= ,' .

- y,s. *

,~ . ' , -

, A'u' .h

[ ' .,

,1

g > +p '

M r

', g ,.3 g.3 ,

en 2 0 F IJ 0 2: 5 F- ; : W O F' 0005 PhotoMet 13-Feb-1998 07:50:34 2BY18 Preset- 100 secs l Vert = 1269 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed- 59 sees l

Si 20 KV O C1 Na l Zn Mg l Ca

)

C S Fe Kl Ca Ti Zn w& l1 12 l3 14 15 I6 I7 18 19

(- 0.000 Range = 10.230 kev 10.030 ->

Integral 0 - 100789 Dirt sample from cubicle 2BY18

Figure 34 2 Eg R B 12 P-

, 9e' Y

% N

~ , :

A , ,

g

=

a ef .-

.% p % -

i t ii $ 2 '=, t :': O t' 0004 PhotoMet 13-Feb-1998 07:44: 55 2BRB12 Preset. 100 secs Vert- 2988 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed = 100 secs O

Si j 20 KV i Ca S Cl l

"l Na Al 1

C f j' V lig Cd Ca Fe Cr Fe r- -:~

wi 11 12 13 14 15 l6 17 18 19

(- 0.000 Range = 1^.230 kev Integral 0 =

10.030 ->

310323 Dirt se.mp:> from cubicle 2BRB12

Figure 35 t , s .- -

' 2 B E .s -

%- .. 4 g *

.. ~ 0 .

f,

,s

, ' y ,- - <

- s a . .T . .

. w's, * -4 . .

~

- g ,. p AT .* ): f: e p s ,

r S-s , -

g -

g . .$ <

- ' - ,% e

~

EP 4-

~

W _

m el. - 6 =

' ~

,s / 'e j ,

2 0 f.U 0 ' 2 5 F: >: 40 0 F' 0003 Phq,t;qMet 13-Feb-1998 07:36:12 2BE34 Preset. 100 secs Vert. 4892 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed = 100 secs St Ca 0 20 KV Al I

Fe l

Ha K ZnM S C1 Ca C Fe f .

. n. . .

w& 11 12 13 14 15 l6 17 18 19

(- 0.000 Range. 10.230 kev Integral 0 .

10.030 -

44873 Dirt sample from cubicle 2BE34

.i l

l 4

Figure 36 e p. -

, y n :. , . '"

,.-p p

,[k,,, (,. [3 ' 4*

..*~ ,

e . .., - g ,. - .

A _ g .,e .1 )

,4 ~

G. .

,E ,

'.* ) .

sp &_ % -

k, _ gi Y. .a .

,N <, ~ s .if-

. / ;h . L' *p , .

4 $ . . .

si 3

. . h's ,

h' '

~

~ ' ' , ' '4 ,

'. g

-[

t . t s~

$ W '[ ['p*.3

4, % *; . .'. f

da 20FU 0 25kX_40 O t' 0002 PhotoMe+

13-Feb-1998 07:17:08 2DE13 Preset. 100 secs Vert = 1794 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed- 77 secs 51 Ca 0 20 kV 1

1 Na Cl l Jn Al S i l'

L \

C Mg K Ca Fe Zn

--s e ,_

wk 11 12 13 14 15 16 I7 18 19

(- 0.000 Range. 10.230 kev 10.030 ->

Integral 0 = 163377 Dirt sample from cubicle 2BE13

Figure 37

p. ..

2BE15 WIRES ' ~ '

. 4j _

~

. ~ pp a e~

. g .. ,..-

, s.

. ,~; -

~

, / ( . % ** .

w ?. ;w : ._

}

, D ,

k'-+ ' #% . s '[ b . [

y V.-, q.,ff :. i Q ; 4 f g

c3. R.f _i'E.-

. .. ; . r ;4

~

~4 s

g '

1 h a'. *(,

o% - * <? C'. -

~'

r lR6 % .' e sA

-~*'

", , g * 'g ' "

... . , r l .~

^

~ o.

h'i ' f. .

p _ -u 20FU 0 .' 2 5 k >: 40 Ot' 000? PhotoMet 13-Feb-1998 12:36:08 2DE15 WIRES Preset- 100 secs Vert. 1728 counts Disp = 1 Elepsed- 50 secs O St Ca 1

l Cl S

Na Zn I K

C f.Mg Ca I

] Fe Zn V

T1 d . m. . . , _ _ , . A .__. _

l1 12 13 14 I5 16 17 I8 19 I

(- 0.000 Range = 10.230 kev 10.110 4 Integral 0 - 181340 Sample of grit from the wires on a contactor removed from 2BE15 in 1995.

- - - - - - . I

Figure 38 8BE1k

~

OP OF, STABS .

I

~<

4.

g? y.

., : ?'. R ~

.-i

- ~

~

l V ~

.s s '

. k,% : 20kU 0 2 5 K ): 40 O t>

0010 P h ci t ci M e t 13-Feb-1998 12:55:59 3BE13, TOP OF STABS Preset. 100 see:

Vert- 1693 counts D.sp. 1 Elapsed = 45 secs Si O

20 KV Al Cl Ca C Na Sk Zn Mg P ,

K Ca Zn LQ -.._r_- --

h Ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 ._._I8 I9 I

(- 0.000 Range. 10.230 kev 10 =

l '

Grit samples from the top of the stabs on the bucket from 3BE13

Figure 39

., .g ~, - .- .

3BE1 ~ J N Tf R K

_-[8

. p; ;' .- . . A. , , n

{' #*

,.m

.s r,

o A d > *.

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s

...=.%. .

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n . r . Y . , ,* + f " - : . l r 3a,gg , f .,2 n j 4 - -m .s.-

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., M *,'*i ;.

f ,.

b,-

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'* ' = ,' $ ..

.y a r 1 ,, n .# \

i -

j< ; 4 .-

?.

. \

20F U 'O 25VX 40 OF 0008 PhotoMet l 13-Feb-1998 12:39:52 3BE13 INTERLOCK Preset. 100 secs Vert. 2933 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed- 48 secs Ca 20 KV O

Si l

2n Na A C Mg S Cl Ca i K Fe Zn f --

__.--_ ._r ._____m_--- -

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 I8 19 I

(- 0.000 Range = 10.230 kev 10.110 ->

Integral 0 = 179035 Grit sample from the back of the interlock in the 3BE13 bucket

Figure 40

$ hkP4 9 ..

ms s;wy Ac e .w- -

. ~ .

. %,. ~ - g .

7: . M -9

.v.

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y sd .' .'% $* ~ e . W ~ 'W _

20FU 0 25KX 40 0F 0009 PhotoMet 13-Feb-1998 12:42:32 SBE13 CPXFMR, TOP Preset. 100 secs Vert = 1951 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed = 47 secs Ca Si 20 KV O

b l

, Zn S l

Na Al Cl C Ng K Ca l

Fe Zn

. _. -- s : . =-_- __

b,,_ .~_

i1 12 13 14 I5 16 17 I8 I9 I

( 0.000 Range = 10.230 kev 10.110 ->

Integral 0 = 146969 Grit sample from the top of the control power transformer in the 3BE13 bucket l

l

Figure 41

,. &g ' pw .

l, -

3 : ,;..

w e

m.# c - .

[

..a. .. ,

) .

2vit

?' 0 2;<.-

' # i.

, et O r. . 0 4. ._ i P li .

.r.

I 13-Feb-1998 13:52:55 FIRE COATItiG Preset. 100 secs Vert = 1721 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed = 41 secs Ca 5

0 Si 20 KV l

Al Ca C Mg i K

tia !

Zn

~r _ _- u _- -,._u_=__--

__-_ ,om %

ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 l8 19 7 4- 0.000 Range. 10.230 kev 10.110 -S Integral 0 = 11006'6 Sample of the fire coating on the girders in the Unit 2 Train "A" switchgear room

Figure 42 r . . .. a _

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.s gj i (,:

,s q[

M .

\#

g 20KU 050X 2 0 0 t> 0020 PhotoMet 13-Feb-1998 13:47: 45 LAGGING Preset- 100 secs Vert- 2319 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed- 35 sees Si Ca l

0 20 KV Al Mg I S Ca 4 Cl K Fe l h -.--

_- __._=:_s. .~

l1 12 13 I4 15 16 17 l8 I9 I l

(- 0.000 10.110 -)

Range = 10.230 kev Integral 0 = 154708 !

i l

Sample of the lagging, west wall cable trays in the Unit 2 Train "A"switchgear roorn

I Figure 43

,~ l

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20kV 0 25F X 40 O t> 0011 PhotoMet 13-Feb-1998 13:00:24 SIREN PANEL TOP Preset. 100 secs Vert. 12$2 counts Disp. 1 Elapsed = 66 secs Zn Na 20 KV Zn 0

Cl i

C Si S Ca Zn l h w_" - . .

I1 12 13 14 15 16 17 I8 19 I l

(- 0.000 Range = 10.230 kev Integral 0 =

10.110 -h 74107 Dirt sample from the Train "A" switchgear room siren panel

1 l

l Figure 44 l l

START-UP ,CHAN'HEL SWYfC Ha ,h -

a. .

~ -

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t .'

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j. .

. .x 2 0 F li 0 25FX 40 0 F' 0012 PhotoMe+

13-Feb-1998 13:02:34 STAT-UP CHANNEL SLIITCH Preset = 100 secs Vert = 2165 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed = 64 secs Si i

20 KV 0

Cl Na ZnAl S Ca Mg K Fe C j ,

Ca Ti 2n h h Fe l uc- -u ,

Ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 l8 19 I

(- 0.000 Range = 10.230 key Integral O =

10.110 ->

177006 Dirt sample from the Train "B" switchgear room startup channel switch cabinet l

l l

Figure 45 2BE B ACK 'r. ' ..

s

- 5 -

, . j

_ 9 '..

~

e ~ '

-g -

= . .

e

. P s .

20kU 0 2 5 k >: 40 0 F' 0013.PhotoMet 13-Feb-1998 13:13:31 2BE BACK Preset- 100 secs Vert = 2637 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed- 49 secs Ca 20 KV l

l 1

0 St I

Hg Ca Ca C Na K K Fe 2n Al Zn Y :w; _

_.A_ .-

l1 12 13 14 15 16 17 I8 19 I

(- 0.000 Range = 10.230 kev 10.110 ->

Integral 0 = 126574 Dirt sample from the back of MCC 2BE

Figure 46 2BE SOUTH .

r, . * ~k .

~;.;, ,

fM.l a

.h

.Ap .-

k [,G , \ ' ['

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?.fhop h *

. 2 , c. >

M..- ,

20VU 0 25KX 40 O t> 0018 PhotoMet 13-Feb-1998 13:37:05 2BE SOUTH Preset. 100 secs Vert. 2916 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed = 72 secs l

O Fe 1

C Si Mg I'

j A! S C1 Ca fi Fe Na

,=___Y _. . . ..

I1 12 13 14 15 16 17 I8 I9 I 4- 0.000 Range = 10.230 kev 10.110 ->

Integral 0 = 208241 Dirt sample from the south end of MCC 2BE

i l

I Figure 47 !

.yv - -yg; y, , ,

$.".S.- -W .1-2BE31, B O T T O j) ._

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e,

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/

2 0 V' U 0 25FX 4 0 . 0 t '. 0 0 1 7 PhotoMet 13-Feb-1998 13:33:39 2BE31, BOTTOM Preset. 100 secs Vert- 802 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed- 24 secs Si S Ca l 0 20 KV I

i i

i C Cl i Na ,

i I

, Al i I

K Ca Fe M9 I

V( Zn !

t Ii 12 13 14 2 a-pf 15 16 17 I8

&m 19 I I

(- 0.000 Range = 10.230 key 10.110 ->

Integral 0 - 76753 .

Dirt sample from the bottom of cubicle 2BE31 l

l

I l

Figure 48 y '..

T't S T ,F8 4 M E L TPB ~

=

d.. 1 4 .

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2 0 V I) 0 2 5 F :: 40 Ot' 0016 PhotoMet i

13-Feb-1998 13:29:59 TEST PANEL TRB Preset. 100 secs Vert- 2679 counts Disp. 1 Elapsed- 43 secs Ca S

20 KV 0

l f

51 C

j Ca lig A l' i fla Fe Zn 11 12 13 14 15 16 ._17. - - I8 19 I

(- 0.000 Range. 10.230 kev Integral 0 -

10.110 ->

150264 Dirt sample from the top of the Train "B" switchgear room test panel

l l

l 1

Figure 49 l

s. d ,a Q.. BRACKET ' qf'y(4

EL' g . ,' x e -

,e g

.w i

-[

. .a[db * . ~ [j

~

pk (7-

,. .j

. go " '

20FU , O 25FX 40 O t' 0019 PhotoMet.

i 13-Feb-1998 13: 43:46 TEST PANEL BRACKET Preset- 100 secs Vert. 1351 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed = 19 secs I

S Ca l

t l l

1 l

1 0

20 KV l l

l l

j St Ca j Al 4

{

,d = _=_ -::= w_ , _ _ .-. a I1 12 13 14 15 16 17 l8 19 i

(- 0.-000 Range = 10 230 kev Integral O =

10.110 4 71634 Dirt sample from the Train "B" switchgear room test panel bracket

Figure 50

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sw .v 2O} U *25 2X 397F 0015 PhotoMet 13-Feb-1998 13:18:56 Preset- 100 secs BLOWri SATID Elapsed = 37 secs Vert = 4655 counts Disp = 1 Si 20 KV O

I i

t Al l l

Na K i K

~s :- : =_

I8 I9 i l1 12 13 14 15 16 17 0.000 Range = 10.230 kev 10.110 ->

4.- Integral O = 160909 Sample of blown sand

1 Figure 51

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l /?

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20Kt' 051X *196F 0014 PhotoMet 13-Feb-1998 13:16:10 SHASHED BLAST MEDIA Preset. 100 secs Vert = 2081 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed = 30 secs O

Si 20 VV l

l Al l

Fe Fe Mt

& :s=_. _ - __._..__ ,

Ii 12 13 14 I5 16 I7 i8 I9 i

(- 0.000 Range. 10.230 kev Integral 0 =

10.110 ->

112110 Sample of crushed blasting media

l I

l l

l Figure 52 ,

1 l

l I

l 4

ll.., ?

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l l

l

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" " '/ Gunite samoles f

from the hillside gb['<

Figure 53 13-Feb-1998 12:14:14 Gul1ITE ..

Preset = 100 secs Verte 3382 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed = 48 secs lCa ,

20 KV l

Si i

0 Ca l l.

A ll C Mg l Ti Fe sd L _ _ -

A. __ -

i ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 I8 i9 i

(- 0.000 Range = 10.230 kev Integral 0 =

10.110 -6 121165 l

13-Feb-1998 12:19: 47 GUliITE SMALL PARTICLES Preset = 100 sees Vert = 1827 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed. 31 sees Ca 20 KV Si 0

Al Ca C

fig , , S Ti Fe l

-=. O . . . - .-.. ) . _ . _ __ _.

l ti 12 13 14 15 16 17 ~ ~ ~ l8 i9 i l 4- 0.000 Range. 10.230 kev 10.110 -) l Integral 0 - 81503 l EDS analysis of Gunite showing uniform elemental composition of varying size samples

Figure 54 I 6-Feb-1998 09:28:02 {

i DEBRIS FROM FRAME Preset. 100 secs

{ Vert. 2949 counts Disp = 1 Elapsed = 33 secs {

1 Si Ca 0

)

20 KY i

Al Zn 5 Na $Cl K Ca C i Mg ( Ti Cr Fe Zn (h _-m-:: .-

_A u

~'

I1 12 13 14 I5 l6 17 l8 19 l

(- 0.000 Range = 10.230 kev 10.110 -)

Integral 0 - 270599 I

i 13-F e b-1998 12 : 19 : 47 f

- GUNITE SMALL PARTICLES Preset = 100 secs

' Vert. 1827 counts Disp. 1 Elapsed- 31 secs Ca

'l I

i j 20 KV i

t 1 Si t I o

t I ! Al Ca j i, C Ti S Fe !

h __ M Y- - 4 . ,._- _ A __ .. _ - -

ti 12 13 14 15 16 17 l8 19 I l

(- 0.000 Range. 10.230 kev 10.110 -b !

Integral 0 = 81503 j l

l Showing match between the grit found on the 2BE35 interlock (top) and Gunite

7 l

ATTACHMENT 6 i

Linestarter Chronology of Events 4

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n decde a e , c a .

d t

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c.

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)

ATTACHMENT 7 Recovery Sequence Diagram, Auxiliary Feedwater Speed Probe i

i i

RECOVERY SEQUENCE DIAGRAM Attachment 7 AUXlLIARY FEEDWATER SPEED PROBE SEISMIC EVENT d'

I r m Loss of Offsite Pmver

( >1 1

TDAFW Pump e f '

9alves Actuate to' Speed Probe Motor Driven Control Dislodges Restoration \

AFW 2P141 Starts Secondary Side ( . > of 2P504 L J2 L Pressure ;3 \

Recognize No TDAFW Flow 1 I

/ SS Depatch

\5 Operator to Reset

\

/

TDAFW Pump l

Inspect / Notify CR TDAFW Pump Ready to Start 1

l 7

Recogntre CR Starts LEGEND Dislodged Probe / TDAFW Nottfy CR Pump /Susequent

\ PumpTrip

/11 INITIATING EVENT OR

[ \ 's SUCCESS CRITERION

! SS Directs SS Direct Local \

Restoraten Manual Start

\

. 12 \ i i

CR Starts Local TDAFW 9 TDAFW Pump Manual Start ACTION Complete BLUE OPERATOR / , 10 RED MAINTENANCE / 13

' I 7-LONG TERM COOUNG ACHIEVED INFORMATION BLOCK _,/ 15

Attachment 7 '

RECOVERY SEQUENCE DIAGRAM Auxiliary Feedwater Speed Probe Notes PREFACE in LER 2-98-001 SCE identified that the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump,2P140 was considered inoperable due to a loose threaded connection on the speed probe. The speed probe controls the speed of the TDAFW pump. Without the speed probe, the pump would tend to overspeed and the overspeed trip would trip the pump. The nature of the inoperability was such that only in a seismic event was it postulated to not perform its function. The duration of the inoperability is indeterminate. However, SCE believes that it may have occurred during activities in l December and therefore, the duration is considered to be from December 10,1997 (last satisfactory Technical Specification surveillance) to December 29,1997 (identification and restoration of the speed probe). In addition, during a portion of this time interval, one of the motor driven AFW pumps was inoperable. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) performed to evaluate the safety significance of the loose speed probe connection did not credit manual start and control of the TDAFW pump, nor the inspection and restoration of a dislodged speed probe. However, a subsequent review of procedures indicates the operators would attempt manual start and control of the TDAFW pump in the event the pump would not operate normally. The PRA used to establish the safety significance of this event has been revised to credit the manual start and control of the AFW pump based on an Individual Plant Examination (IPE) and Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) hunian reliability analysis which credits recovery of the TDAFW pump following a loss of DC control power. This Recovery Sequence Diagram (RSD) addresses the ability to successfully establish long term secondary cooling considering motor driven AFW pump 2P504 is out of service for maintenance and the TDAFW pump speed probe will dislodge in a seismic event. This RSD does not show all possible recovery paths. For the purposes of this RSD establishment of long term secondary cooling is considered success, in the case of a seismic event of sufficient magnitude to cause a loss of offsite power, the Shift Superintendent (SS) would declare an event in accordance with SO123-Vill-1

" Recognition and Classification of Emergencies." The nature of the recovery actions credited in this RSD are not dependent on the manning and activation of the I emergency response facilities.

2 l

Attachment 7 RECOVERY SEQUENCE DIAGRAM Auxiliary Feedwater Speed Probe Notes CONCLUSIONS If no other failures are considered, the flow from one motor driven pump is sufficient and long term cooling can be maintained. This success path was considered in the PRA, analysis whose results were reported in the LER. The revised best estimate core damage risk increase for the period between December 10,1997, and December 29, 1997, considering recovery of the TDAFW pump, is 3E-08. Furthermore,if the duration of the inoperability was extended back to 1993, considering recovery, the best estimate core damage increase would be 7E-7 per year.

1. LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER The analyzed fragility of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) switchyard is lower than the estimated fragility of the loose speed probe. Therefore, this RSD evaluation considers seismic events which would result in loss of the switchyard, and therefore would result in loss of offsite power.

2. MOTOR DRIVEN AFW PUMP 2P141 STARTS On a Loss of Offsite Power generated signal (LOVS), the diesel generators will start and the available motor driven pump will start (based on the Emergency Feedwater Actuation System (EFAS) signal).

3. VALVES ACTUATE TO CONTROL SECONDARY SIDE PRESSURE When a Main Steam Safety Valve (s) setpoint is reached, the valve (s) wil!

actuate and relieve steam pressure. In addition, as a part of the Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs) of procedure SO23-12-1 " Standard Post Trip Actions," the Operators will place the Atmospheric Dump Valves in automatic to control steam pressure at 1000 psia.

4. TDAFW PUMP SPEED PROBE DISLODGES It is assumed in seismic events with a magnitude > 0.9g spectral 3

Attachment 7 RECOVERY SEQUENCE DIAGRAM Auxiliary Feedwater Speed Probe Notes ,

! acceleration, the TDAFW pump speed probe would dislodge and woul.1 l render the pump without speed control. While the TDAFW pump would l get a start signal as the result of the EFAS 1 and 2 signal generation on J l LO Steam Generator Level, it is assumed that the pump would immediately trip on overspeed.

5. RECOGNIZE NO TDAFW FLOW -

The Assistant Control Operator (ACO) as a part of the verification of proper EFAS actuation, would recognize that flow was from only the available motor driven pump. Based on Operations experience this would take < 1 minute. If the available motor driven pump did not start due to a station blackout scenario, the progression of recovery actions would be the same.

6. SS DISPATCH OPERATOR TO RESET TDAFW PUMP The SS would dispatch an Operator to locally inspect and reset 2P140.

This is estimated to take < 3 minutes.

7. INSPECT / NOTIFY CR TDAFW PUMP READY TO START The Operator would proceed to the AFW pump house and inspect the pump and area to look for any apparent cause. If nothing was found, the i Operator would reset 2P140 (per local signage and training) and notify l the Control Room (CR ) that the pump was ready to start. This is 4 estimated to take < 8 minutes.

8. CR STARTS TDAFW PUMP / SUBSEQUENT PUMP TRIP Upon notification of the reset of the TDAFW pump, the CR Operator would start the pump. The pump would trip on overspeed once again.

l However, the local Operator in the AFW pump house would report that it j sounded like the governor was not controlling speed. This is estimated to take < 2 minutes. ,

4 l

I

I Attachment 7 RECOVERY SEQUENCE DIAGRAM Auxiliary Feedwater Speed Probe Notes

9. SS DIRECT LOCAL MANUAL START l Based on the information from the local Operator, the SS would direct the l the local operator perform a Iwl-manual start per the signage and j training. This is estimated to take < 1 minute.

10. LOCAL TDAFW MANUAL START COMPLETE l

l The local Operator would manually start and raise pump discharge l pressure to approximately 1350 psig per the local signage. This is l estimated to take < 7 minutes based on qualification and training. (In the l past SCE had frequent overspeed trips due to water in the steam supply line which necessitated local start and control of the TDAFW Pump).

SCE has an instructional video, the local control action is contained in procedures, local signage guides the Operator though the steps to locally l start and control the pump, and the ability to locally start and control the

pump is part of operator qualification requirements. Local manual operation of 2P140 is described in Aux Feedwater Operating Instruction SO23-2-4, Section 6.4. This is referred to by Emergency Operating Instruction (EOI) SO23-12-8 " Station Blackout," Step 6, in the " Response

, Not Obtained," column. This method disables the governor control I locally, and has the Operator control steam flow manually to control 2P140 discharge pressure. In addition, local operation of 2P140 is l required in some Appendix R scenarios, and therefore is included in SO23-13-2, " Shutdown From Outside the Contre! Room," Attachment 12, Section 2.3.

l

11. RECOGNIZE DISLODGED PROBE / NOTIFY CR During the Operator inspection described in Note 7, it is probable that the dislodged probe would be identified. The Operator would subsequently notify the CR. The time for this recognition and notification is considered l to be similar to the 8 minutes described in Note 7. !

i

12. SS DIRECTS RESTORATION 5

Attachment 7 RECOVERY SEQUENCE DIAGRAM Auxiliary Feedwater Speed Probe Notes L Based on the information from the local Operator, the SS would direct the local OPERATOR to restore the speed probe. The local Operator would then reconnect the probe (no tools required) and notify the CR.

13. CR STARTS TDAFW PUMP l Upon notification, the CR Operator would start the pump. The estimated time for t 1

the actions described in Notes 12 and 13 is less than the time for the local TDAFW start (<7 minutes). It should be noted that no credit is taken for this recovery path in the PRA evaluation.

l .14. RESTORATION OF 2P504 Based on the need for Auxiliary Feedwater, SCE concludes that the SS would recognize the potential to restore 2P504 and direct Maintenance to begin restoration. However, no credit is taken for this recovery path.

15. LONG TERM COOLING ACHIEVED The only recovery path credited in determining the risk increase was the l local start and manual control of the TDAFW pump. The estimated time l

to complete this recovery path is 20 minutes. The Attachment 8 PRA evaluation describes MAAP runs with no Auxiliary Feedwater flow, which indicate that there is at least 55 minutes to perform this action prior to loss of natural circulation. There would be additional time prior to core

' damage.

Based on recovery of the TDAFW pump, the revised best estimate core damage l risk increase for the period between December 10,1997, and December 29, 1997 is 3E-08. Furthermore, if the duration of the inoperability was extended back to 1993, considering recovery, the best estimate core damage increase would be 7E-7 per year.

l l

\

l 6 1

)

ATTACHMENT 8 Probabilistic Risk Assessment - 2P140 Speed Probe Sensor Connection Vulnerability l

l l

\

Attachment 8 Page1 of5 PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 2P140 Speed Probe Sensor Connection Vulnerability l

PURPOSE i

l The purpose of this study is to determine the increase in core damage and large early

( release risk from seismic vulnerability of the turbine-driven AFW pump 2P140 speed

! probe sensor connection.

l BACKGROUND l LER-1998-001 documents an event where the speed probe sensor connection for turbine-driven AFW pump 2P140 was found to be loose. The pump was determined to

be vulnerable to failure from overspeed following a seismic event of sufficient magnitude to disconnect the loose speed probe sensor.

The period where the speed probe was loose is uncertain, but is believed to have j l

l occurred during painting activities beginning on December 11,1997 until the time of i discovery at 1400 hours0.0162 days 0.389 hours 0.00231 weeks 5.327e-4 months on December 29,1997. However, the last documonted event I where the speed probe connection was manipulated was in 1993.

l The turbine-driven AFW pump P140 is included in the San Onofre IPEEE seismic model and is credited for providing steam generator makeup in the event of a loss of offsite power and failure of the motor-driven AFW pumps (see Figure 1).

l METHODOLOGY The increase in core damage from inoperability of AFW pump 2P140 was evaluated using the San Onofre IPEEE models. Actual plant configurations during the period December 11,1997 to December 29,1997 were considered in the unavailability and alignment of key plant components important to risk. Average plant configurations and component unavailabilities were assumed for periods prior to December 11,1997.

The analysis considers different periods where plant risk from seismic events differed due to the status of implementation of modifications to reduce seismic risk.

ASSUMPTIONS The following key assumptions were used in the risk assessment:

1. The seismic fragility of 2P140 sensor was assumed to be 0.99 (spectral) based on a fragility analysis.

l Attachment 8 Page 2 of 5

2. Credit for recovery of the 2P140 was assumed based on procedures and training which instruct the operators in running the pump without DC power (i.e.,

manually throttling the steam inlet valve). The human reliability analysis for this activity is attached. Based on plant specific MAAP runs for a seismic event resulting in a loss of offsite power and random failure of the emergency diesel generators, the operators have approximately 55 minutes to perform this recovery action prior to loss of natural circulation.

RESULTS The increase in core damage risk from seismic vulnerability of the turbine-driven AFW pump 2P140 speed probe sensor connection for the period December 11,1997 to December 29,1997 is estimated to be 3E-8. The instantaneous core damage risk profile during the period is provided in Figure 2. The core damage risk increase for periods prior to December 1997 in the event the condition occurred earlier are less than 7E-7 per year based on average maintenance and plant alignment configurations.

Figure 3 provides the absolute as well as percent increase in seismic core damage risk for years since 1993. -

The increase in large early release risk from seismic vulnerability of the turbine-driven AFW pump 2P140 speed probe sensor connection is assumed to be insignificant based on the IPEEE analysis which indicates that early containment failure is unlikely in loss of secondary heat removal events.

I CONCLUSIONS The increase in core damage release risk from seismic vulnerability of the turbine-driven AFW pump 2P140 speed probe sensor connection was insignificant during the period of December 11,1997 to December 29,1997, and small during prior years if the condition occurred earlier. The increase in large early release risk from seismic vulnerability of the turbine-driven AFW pump 2P140 speed probe sensor connection was insignificant.

I i

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Attachment 8 Page 4 of 5 FIGURE 2 UNIT 2 INSTANTANEOUS SEISMIC CDF PROFILE 1.00E-03

+ at.gg 1 Avg Seismic Risk During Period: -

-- 1) Base = 4.7E-5 / yr -

c> -2) W/ 2P140 Sensor = 4.76E-5 / yr -

" ~ - ~ '

$ % Risk Increase per year = SE-7 / yr 9:,

Increase in CDP:

c = RiskIncrease x Duration i'

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[1.00E-04 -

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i OPERATOR ACTION

SUMMARY

DATA SHEET l

. OPERATOR ACTION: Operator Falls 51anually Operate TDAFWP P-140 Given DC Control -

l Power (Battery) Fails at T=0 l BASIC EVENT / FAULT TREE: L-HCTPl401HU / Auxiliary Feedwater System l

{

l l I. INTRODUCTION:

The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) P-140 i is dependent on DC power to the governor controls for pump l

speed control. In the event DC control power is rendered unavailable, the operator may take manual control to operate the pump locally. This summary data sheet documents the l assessment of the probability of operator failure to properly operate the TDAFWP after the primary and alternate (bat t e ry) DC power sources have been depleted.

II, ACCIDENT SEQUENCES INVOLVED:

The sequence involved is any initiator (feedline break, steam generator tube rupture, loss of offsite power or Loss I of power conversion system) that in combination with other power failures and pump unavailabilities renders the TDAFWP as the only pump available to provide secondary heat removal. However, if 125 VDC Bus D3 and its associated

! battery B009 are unavailable, the TDAFWP speed cannot be controlled remotely.

III. DESCRIPTION OF HUMAN ACTIONS:

Following loss of control power to the TDAFWP governor and failure of the two MDAFWP, the control room supervisor (CRS)

) will send a plant equipment operator or. reactor operator to the AFW pump room to initiate actions to start the TDAFWP l manually. Instructions to operate the valve are listed in

1) the AFWS operation procedure (SO2 3 4 ) and 2) on a sign located adjacent to the TDAFWP. The steps are:

1) Open DC power to P-140 by either of the following:

l o 2 (3)D3P106, DC to P-140 Control Panel i I QI l o Two knife switches inside MS-4716 (AFW Bldg) for j i

HV-4716 and K-007 governor l

i 2) Ensure Closed / Manually Close HV-4716, Turbine K-007 l Trip Throttle Valve & Mechanism

3) Ensure HV-4716 Overspeed Trip is Reset CAUTION Use care when manually opening HV-4716 to prevent turbine overspeed.

4) Slowly Throttle Open HV-4716 1-1/2 turns to start pump on idle speed. l l

Page 1 of 8

\

I Attachment 8a OPERATOR ACTION

SUMMARY

DATA SHEET OPERATOR ACTION: Optrator Falls Manually Operate TDAFWP P-140 Giv::n DC Control Power (Battery) Fails at T=0 BASIC EVENT / FAULT TREE: L-HCTP1401HU / Auxiliary Feedwater System l

, 5) Continue to slowly open HV-4716 and raise P-140 l discharge pressure to 1350 psig, as read on PI-4703L l (east (west] side of P-140) .

6) As Steam Generator pressure varies over time, position EV-4716 as required to maintain P-140 pressure greater than S/G pressure.

l Procedural steps are also available to transfer to local-manual i l

control if loss of DC power may be imminent:

1) Open knife switch "DC TO HV4716" inside panel'MS-4716.

2) Commence Closing HV-4716 until P-140 discharge pressure decrease is noted on PI-403L or PI-4703 (CR-52).

NOTE: P-140 governor fails high when power is lost and may overspeed if HV-4716 is not throttled.

3) Open knife switch "DC TO K007 GOVERNOR" inside MS-4716.

4) Throttle HV-4716 Open or Closed to maintain S/G levels as directed by the Control Room.

IV. TIME LINE:

Time to first indication (or annunciation) (T ) : i

< 1 minute.

l The first indication of the need to take local-manual l control may be the loss of or erratic AFW flow from the TDAFWP. This should occur during DC power degradation at the end of battery life. However, for this scenario, the battery and bus are assumed to fail at t-0.

Maximum allowable time (T.) :

If DC power is lost at the time of the initiator, then

! the maximum time allowable for manual restart and control of the TDAFWP is the time to SG dryout and hot i leg uncovery. The minimum time this occurs is 55 minutes (25 minutes to dryout + 30 minutes to hot leg

! uncovery). This is based on reactor trip occurring I when trip is initiated by low steam generator level and maximum decay heat input. Note: If battery power is lost during a blackout (approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months due to Page 2 of 8

(

Attachment 8a OPERATOR ACTION

SUMMARY

DATA SHEET

. OPERATOR ACTION: Operator Fails Manually Operate TDAFWP P-140 Given DC Control Power (Battery) Fails at T=0 BASIC EVENT / FAULT TREE: L-HCTP1401HU / Auxiliary Feedwater System l

l battery depletion), decay would be much lower and the I time to dryout and hot leg uncovery would be much, much longer.

Post-diagnosis action time (T ) : ,

l 5 min (travel) + 5 min (communication) + 15 min (steps to operate TDAFWP) = 25 minutes I

l Diagnosis Time ( To = T , - T, - T 1) -

55 - 25 = 30 minutes V. COMPETING ACTIONS:

During a station blackout, competing actions could include recovery of offsite power, or diesel generators. For a turbine trip (with failure of fast transfer of 4kV bus A08, loss of HVAC to switchgear/ distribution rooms) competing actions could include recovery of A08, emergency HVAC, and other individual components required to meet critical safety functions.

1 VI. PRECEDING RELATED ACTIONS:

The competing actions may be preceding actions also. {

VII. CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO PERFORM ACTION:

Failing to locally operate the TDAFWP will result in loss of SG makeup and eventual SG dryout, hot leg rnco'ery, core boiling and uncovery of the core.

l VIII. CONSEQUENCES OF PERFORMING ACTION:

Successful local operation of the TDAFWP will result in satisfying the acceptance criteria for secondary heat removal safety function, given that sources of water are available, and the valves can be aligned to allow flow to the appropriate steam generators.

Page 3 of 8 i

I Attachment 8a OPERATOR ACTION

SUMMARY

DATA SHEET OPERATOR ACT13N: Operat:r Falls Manually Operate TDAFWP P-140 Given DC Centrol -

Power (Battery) Falls at T=0 i BASIC EVENT / FAULT TREE: L-HCTP140lHU / Auxiliary Feedwater System

. IX. CREW TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE:

! (Provide ranking of O through 5 (0 being none, 1 being poor, l 5 being very good)]

SIMULATOR CLASSROOM PLANT EXPER.

j IDENTIFY 4 4 3 I DIAGNOSIS 4 4 3 RESPONSE 4 4 3 Notes: Start up of the TDAFWP without DC power is part of the Job Performance Measures program (JPM ,

61,61F) . All ope 2.ators are required to know each of the operator actions which are part of the JPM program (>100 actions).

l X. CLARITY OF APPLICABLE PROCEDURES: )

l The procedure (SO23-2-4, " Auxiliary Feedwater System

! Operation) for controlling the pump locally, which is also located adjacent to the TDAFWP, is short, simple, and clear.

XI. AVAILABILITY OF RELEVANT INDICATIONS:

1 Cues For Ooerator Action:

Cues in the control room that indicate the need for action l include fluctuating or loss of AFW flow from the TDAFWP and i the time expired since AC power to the bus has been lost.

l Locally, the cues for action are provided by the procedure i

for local operation of the TDAFWP. A key operator action is l to use the important cues from the control room to specify the particular cause of loss of feedwater.

l Indicators Used:

Indicators used in the control room include AFW flow indication, bus voltage, and the clock. Locally, the only indication used is discharge pressure indication (PI-4703L) which is located adjacent to the TDAFWP.

Indicator Availabilitv/Adecuacy:

The available indication in the control room and locally are adequate to ensure successful local operation of the TDAFWP.

Page 4 of 8

l l

l , Attachment 8a .

OPERATOR ACTION

SUMMARY

DATA SHEET l OPERATOR ACTION: Operator Falls Manually Operate TDAFWP P-140 Given DC Control Power (Battery) Fails at T=0 l

l BASIC EVENT / FAULT TREE: L-HCTP1401HU / Auxiliary Feedwater System l

XII. CONSIDERATIONS FOR " LOCAL" ACTIONS:

o Is required action proceduralized?

Yes, and it is affixed to the wall adjacent to the TDAFWP.

o How accessible is the component from the control room?

Considering distance and number of security doors, estimate time to reach component from the control room.

5 minutes o Is action considered to be relatively simple or {

complex? j i

Actions are relatively simple for a trained operator.

o Are any special tools required (keys, wrenches, etc.)? I If so, will they be readily accessible during the I accident sequence?

No (possibly ear plugs) o Will performance of the action require entering a harsh environment where protection clothing or equipment is necessary?

No. However, it may be warm due to the steam used by the TDAFWP.

o Are there any unique aspects of the action which could j affect the likelihood of successful completion (i.e., 1 requires more than one person, must be performed I concurrent with other actions, requires communication with the control room, etc.)?

Needs for special alignments of the system that depend on the specific cutset.

XIII. COMMUNICATIONS AND OPERATOR AVAILABILITY:

Hand-held radios would be the primary means of communication with the control room, however there are PAX phones located in the pump room.

I Page 5 of 8

I- Attachment 8a l OPERATOR ACTION SUMMAR DATA SHEET OPERATOR ACTION: Operator Falls Manually Op rate TDAFWP P 140 Given DC Control Power (Battery) Fails at T=0

! BASIC EVENT / FAULT TREE: L-HCTP140lHU / Auxiliary Feedwater System XIV. OPERATOR OVERSIGHT / CHECKING:

Proper operation of easily checked in the control room ny t

observation of the flow.

~

XV. STRESS LEVEL:

l Moderate.

l l XVI. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTION:

! None l

l XVII. OTHER INSIGHTS:

None.

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, Page 6 of 8

Attachment 8a POST-INITIATOR HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITY CALCULATION WORKSHEET l* BASIC EVENT NA51E: HUSIAN ACTION DESCRII' TION:

L-HCTP140lHU Operator Fails To Afanually Operate the TDAFWP Without DC Power Within i Hour PROCEDURAL SUPPORT DETER 311 NATION:

STEPS I & 2: Is the post-initiator human action supported by written procedures? Circle yes or no below.

l Yes: List Applicable Procedures: 5023-2-4, " Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation. " Also, a step by step procedure to manually operate the TDAFWP without DCpower is listed on a placard immediately adjacent to the pump.

No: Assien Total Failure Probability (Fr) = 1.0.

REQUIRED TISIE RELATIONSHIP DETERSIINATION:

STEP 3. Using Figure 5 and 7, determine maximum allowable tia.e:

51aximum Allowable Time (T.) = $5 minutes Identify method of determining T (Judgement,, RETRAN): RETRAN / AIAAP fi.e., RETRAN was used to determine the SG boil-Jty time (25 minutes), and AfAAP was used to determine the time to uncover the hot leg Jbliowing SG dryout (30 minutes)].

STEPS 4 - 8: Determine the diagnostic time:

Post-diagnosis Action Time (T,) = 20 minutes l Identify method of determining T. (Judger,ent, walk-through, simulator, etc): Job Performance Alcasures 1 Program, simulator

! Available Diagnosis Time (T) = T - T, = 30 minutes Assumptions: Core damage is assumed to ocair when the hot leg is uncoveredfollowing SG dryout. The time to dryout time and the hot leg uncovery time were calculated based on loss ofallfeedwater immediatelyfollowing trip. In this case, loss of AFW occurs only after DC control power is lost (which is assumed to be immediatefrom random causes) i l DIAGNOSIS HEP DETERSIINATION:

i ,

STEP 9: 9a) Sciect the initial diagnosis HEP from Figure 10 or Table 16.

HEPu = 9E-5 )

9b) Is more than I abnormal event involved as defined in Table 15, Step 9b? Yes &

If yes, adjust HEP per Step 9B (Table 15) and Table 16 & 18.

H E gP ., = 9E-5 ;

1 9c) Adjust HEP based on Table 17 guidelines: (Circle one) Upper Lower Nominal I 9d) Is diagnosis HEP driven by symptom oriented EOl? (Circle one) Yes &

If 'yes,' adjust HEP to lower bound (Figure 10).

HEP g w = 9E-5 Page 7 of 8

l Attachment 8a I

i 9e) Does HEP involve knowledge of critical RCS/ Containment

)

parameters? (Circle one) Yes .t[q '

If no, go to step 9g. If parameters are committed to memory, use lower bound values in Figure 10 or Table 16. Otherwise use nominal values. Use Table 17 to adjust the uw values, as appropriate.

HEPm= (Circle one) Lower Nominal 9f) Not applicable, 9g) - Is diagnosis error for HEP credible? (Circle one) .Ysa No 1

i If 'yes,' write last adjusted HEP from Steps 9a - 9e as the final diagnosis HEP below and continue to Step 10. If 'no,' assign ' Final Diagnosis HEP' = 0.0 and discuss below, l

i Final Diagnosis HEP = 9E-5 l j Assumptions:

POST DIAGNOSIS IIEP DETERMINATION:

p;TEP 10: As defined in Step 10 of Table 15, identify type of post-diagnosis task and stress level:

! (Circle one) Dynamic Sten-hv-steo l (Circle one) Extremely high Moderately hirh i

l Based on type of task and stress level, select HEP (s) for post-diagnosis action HEP (s) from Table 19 [ Note:

If time stress is present or if this task is required as a result of an ineffective initial task, assess applicability 1 of doubling mle (Step 10g, Table 15). If yes, discuss in assumptions below.)

Post Diagnosis Action HEP (s) = 0.02 (initial error)

0.2 (checker) = 4E 3 Table 19 Item # 3 & 6 l

l Assumptions: 4E-3 is doubled to 8E-3 since it isjudged that although the action is part of the Job Performance Measures Pro.eram, this particular action as are all JPM tasks may not be tested on every year.

TOTAL FAILURE PROBABILITY (Fr) DETERMINATION:

STEP 11: Perform step 16 of Table 16 :

F, = Final Diagnosis HEP + Post-Diagnosis Action HEP (s) = 9E-5 + 4E 3 = 4E-3 (Note: If the calculated value of Fr exceeds 1.0, use 1.0.]

l Fn.,. m = IE-2 Error Factor (EF) = 5 l

NOTE: For all figures and tables, refer to Project Instruction PI 007. ' STEPS" refer to Table 15 of PI-007.

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ML20217Q616

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