IR 05000458/1988008

Insp Rept 50-458/88-08 on 880216-0331.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings, Status of Facility OL Conditions,Nrc Bulletin 80-70,10CFR21 Repts & Surveillance Test & Maint Observations

ML20153C018
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	04/29/1988
From:	Chamberlain D, Holler E, William Jones NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20153C013	List: ML20153C009 ML20153C014 ML20153C018
References
50-458-88-08, 50-458-88-8, IEB-80-70, NUDOCS 8805060132
Download: ML20153C018 (15)

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APPENDIX B

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/88-08 Docket: 50-458 Licensee: Gulf States Utilities Company (CSU)

P. O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)

Inspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: February 16 through March 31, 1988 Inspectors: ,' 88

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D. D.VChamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector Date Project Section C, Division of Reactor Projects

_M o k 3. b W. B. Jones, ResidenthInspector 4hirr Datb '

Project Section C, bivision of Reactor Projects Approved:

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E. J.' Holler, Chief, Project Section C Dite '

Division of Reactor Projects 8805060132 880502 PDR ADOCK 05000459 Q DCD

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-2-Inspection deport

~ Inspection Conducted February 16 through March 31, 1988 (Report 50-458/88-08)

Areas Inspected: Routine, uncnnounced inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings, status of facility operating license conditions, NRC Bulletin 80-70, 10 CFR Part 21 Reports, surveillance test observation, maintenance observation and operational safety verificatio Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified (inadequate alarm response procedure, paragraph 8).

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• L. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Training W. J. Beck, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering J. E. Booker, Manager, Oversight

• E. M. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiation Programs

• J. W. Cook, Lead Environmental Analyst, Nuclear Licensing

• T. C. Crouse, Manager, Quality Assurance

• J. C. Deddens, Senior Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group

• D. R. Derbonne, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance

• L. A. England, Director, Nuclear Licensing R. W. Frayer, Director, Projects P. E. Freehill, Outage Manager A. O. Fredieu, Supervisor, Operations P. D. Graham, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations J. R. Hamilton, Director, Design Engineering

• G. K. Henry, Director, Quality Assurance Operations B. E. Hey, Nuclear Engineer, Design Engineering

• G. R. Kimmell, Director, Quality Services R. J. King, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing A. D. Kowale;uk, Director, Oversight-J. W. Leavines, Director, Field Engineering I. M. Malik, Supervisor, Quality Systems J. H. McQuirter, Licensing Engineer

• T. G. Murphy, Supervisor, Planning and Scheduling

• V. J. Normand, Supervisor, Administrative Services W. H. Odell, Manager, Administration

• T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager C. A. Rohrmann, Training Systems Coordinator

• M. F. Sankovich, Manager, Engineering

• J. P. Shippert, Operations Engineer

• K. E. Suhrke, Manager, Project Management R. J. Vachon, Senior Compliance Analyst

• J. Venable, Assistant Operations Supervisor

• T. L. Weir, Director R. G. West, Supervisor, General Maintenance NRC i

• E. J. Holler, Chief, Project Section C, Division of Reactor Projects

• D. D. Chamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector

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The NRC inspectors also interviewed additional licensee personnel during  !

the inspection perio , t

• Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on

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April 6, 198 l

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' Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (450/8729-01): Failure to follow procedure for -

control of locked valve This violation resulted when'a nuclear equipment operator unlocked [

and closed a normally locked open valve using the emergency key t without notifying the control room staf The operator was !

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transferring the control rod drive (CRD) pump suction path from the s

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condensate storaga tank to the condenser, utilizing the station operating procedure, when he misunderstood the directiens provided and closed the condensate storage tank suction line. The Assistant Plant Manager-Operations issued a memorandum reiterating the licensee's policy for adherence to all procedures and to ensure that !

all individuals involved in an evolution understand the task to be performe Station Operating Procedure (50P) SOP-0002, "Control Rod :

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Drive Hydraulics," was revised to add a caution statement for the transfer of the CRD pump suction path. The remaining SOPS were also !

reviewed to detertaine if additional instructions or cautions were ;

needed for other plant evolutions. Finally, licensee management ;

personnel reviewed the precedures for controlling locked valves with ;

each shift crew. The resident inspector attended three of these r discussions and found the review to be adequat (

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This violation is close l

f (Closed) Violation (458/8531-01)

Failure to identify all valves in

' the valve lineup check sheet, required to conduct the integrated leak

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The licensee has revised Surveillance Test Procedure STP-057-3703,

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"Primary Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test," to include the six

differential pressure instruments and the one motor operated valve .

l that were omitted from the original valve lineup in i L preoperational/ acceptance test procedure 1-PT-57-1. These valves !

i have been added to the valve lineup in STP-057-3703, utilizing f Temporary Change Notice 87-174 [

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l (Closed) Violation (458/8727-02): Failure to initiate hot work ;

' permit for grinding activit '

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This violation involved the failure to secure a valid Hot Work Permit i

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the Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve 1821*A0V022B, The Assistant Plant Manager-Maintenance issued Memorandum Number APM-M-87-342 which promulgates the licensee's requirement for adherence to procedure The NRC inspectors have observed similar activities requiring a Hot Work Permit and establishment of a designated fire watch since the issuance of the above memorandum,- No further problems in this area have been identifie This violation is closed, (Closed) Violation (458/8716-01): Failure of followup action by the licensee to assure that specified corrective action for an NRC violation and a deviation had been complete The specified corrective actions have now oeen ccmpleted and verified. The licensee established a task force to review all previously identified corrective actions for NRC findings. Overdue items identified by the task force have all been completed. Field engineering has implemented a work tracking system which includes corrective actions for NRC items. Individual departments have assigned department coordinators to assure prompt attention and high priority to corrective actions for NRC items and other item Monthly trend information is provided to senior managemen The additional tracking and management attention should prevent recurrence of this proble This violation is close (Closed) Violation (458/8720-05): Failure to verify diesel fuel oil properties within 31 days as required by Technical Specification Subsequent verification by the licensee revealed that all required TS fuel oil properties were met. The licensee has entered TS fuel oil analysis requirements in the River Cend Surveillance Test Procedure Tracking Program to prevent future occurrences of this nature. TS training has been completed for the chemistry supervisor and applicable staff member This violation is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (458/8720-07): Two instances of misaligned instrument valves identified by the license Both of these instances of misaligned instrument valves were evaluated by the NRC to determine enforcement action for a subsequent case of misaligned instrument valves. This is documented in NRC Inspection Report 458/8728. Violation 8728-01 was issued for this subsequent case. Licensee corrective actions will be documented in response to this violatio This unresolved item is close __ ___ _

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5 (Closed) Violation (458/8724-02): Failure to utilize the proper revision of a surveillance test procedure for daily fire door position check The licensee has performed the surveillance test to the correct procedure and a review of past surveillance tests conducted revealed that no other tests had been conducted to the incorrect revisio Security personnel have received additional training to provide instruction on obtaining the correct procedure. Plant security has also been placed on distribution for procedure changes to the daily fire door position' surveillance tes This violation is closed, (Closed) Violation (458/8724-01): Inadequate 50P for the fuel pool cooling and cleanup syste This procedure allowed a siphen path of the upper fuel pool to be established to the condensate storage tank. The problem was compounded with inadequate controls on anti-siphon device The fuel pool siphon event and licensee corrective actions are fully described in NRC Inspection Report 458/872 The licensee has completed all corrective actions which included drilling redundant anti-siphon holes in the upper and lower fuel storage pool This violation is closed, (Closed) Unresolved Item (458/8640-03): Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)/ residual heat removal (RHR) steam lina break instrument setpoin The licensee had experienced problems with water formation in the instrument lines for the RCIC/RHR steam line break instrument. This water formation caused an instrument offset of negative 110 inches of water during RCIC system operation. During the first refueling outage in 1987, the licensee implemented a design modification to correct the problem. Testing conducted during plant startup in 1988 revealed that the water column formation condition has been corrected by the design modificatio This unresolved item is close (Closed) Violation (458/8636-01): Inadequate safety evaluation for a temporary modification to the control building ventilation syste The licensee identified that the safety evaluation for the temporary modification which removed a low air flow trip was inadequate. The evaluation failed to recognize that the automatic start of the redundant division of control building ventilation was also affected under certain conditions. The licensee took immediate action to restore the temporary alterations to the original uesign i

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l configuration. The licensee also performed an engineering evaluation which verified that manual operator actuation of the redundant system after 20 minutes would have prevented any room temperatures from exceeding the design basis temperatures. A review of other temporary alterations and prompt design changes revealed no other problems with safety evaluations. The temporary alteration program has been discontinued at River Bend. Additional procedural controls and training have been implemented to strengthen the safety evaluation ,

process for design modification This violaticn is closed, (Closed) Violation (458/8620-02): Engineering piping and instrument drawing (P&ID) differences between the actual system configuration and procedure ,

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The licensee has corrected the specific differences identified by the NRC inspector. Additional procedural controls to ensure replacement of vent and drain line pipe caps have been implemented. Locked valve criteria have been examined and consistency with procedures and i drawings have been established. A 100 percent review of 220 P& ids i

have been completed and any discrepancies identified have been incorporated into design modifications to update the drawing This violation is close ; (Closed) Open Item (458/8040-04): Monitor licensee corrective actions for turning vane failures in ventilation system ductwor The licensee's corrective action for this problem included repair of i cracked dampers and removal of certain dampers of the annulus mixing system. The licensee also inspected other high velocity systems and no other turning vane problems were found. The dampers that were ,

repaired in the annulus mixing system were replaced with a heavy duty  ;

assembly designed to withstand the inherent high velocity and i turbulent flow conditions of this system. These repairs have performed satisfactorily for about 2 years. Based on the repairs and ,

inspections performed to date, the licensee has determined that the i turning vane problems were limited to the initial failures discovered <

in the annulus mixirg system. No further corrective actions or  !

inspections are deeued necessar This open item is close (Closed) Violation (458/8720-06): Failure to include necessary quality assurance (QA) controls in a procurement document for analysis of emergency diesel generator fuel oi The existing vendor supplying laboratory analysis services did not have a program to implement applicable 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, requirements for services provided. The licensee has recently

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contracted with E. W. Saybolt & Company, Inc. for diesel generator fuel oil analysis. This vendor has recently implemented a QA program which was surveyed and evaluated by Gulf States Utilities. A Contract for services has been released based on this preaward survey '

and resolution of outstanding issue This violation is close . Status of Facility License Condition

(Closed) License Condition (?.C.7): "Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, GSV shall implement design modifications to improve the capabilities of existing bypassed and inoperable status indication used to -

monitor the status of safety-related systems. The specific design changes '

to be implemented are identified in a GSU letter dated December 3,1984, j as clarified in a GSU letter dated March 5,1985." 1 The licensee has installed an additional plant alarm panel in the main control room to implement the additional bypass / inoperable status indications defined in USAR Table 7.5-12. This new alarm panel supplemented existing control room alarm These alarm indications were tested and placed in operation following the first refueling outage at River Ben ,

i License Condition 2.C.7 is close . Licensee Action on NRC Bulletin 80-70 This area of the inspection was conducted to review licensee actions relative to NRC Bulletin No. 80-70, "Cracking and Failure of Jet Pump Hold I Down Beam Assemblies." The licensee's action on this bulletin was addressed in NRC Inspectior Report 458/85-54, paragraph 4. This bulletin remained open pending issuance of the inservice inspection (ISI) pla '

The resident inspector reviewed Appendix J of the licensee's ISI Plan issued May 19, 1987. This appendix establishes the frequency for reactor vessel exams which includes the entire jet pump exam, jet pump sensing

lines, jet pump riser brace, jet pump hold down beam, jet pump bolt and weld assembly, and reactor pressure vessel weld.

c j This NRC bulletin is closed, i 5. 10 CFR Part 21 Reports i

The resident inspector was provided copies of selected 10 CFR Part 21 I reports by NRC Region IV, which may be applicable to equipment or services ,

i supplied to River Bend. These reports were provided to the licensee, who verified that the reports either had been or were being evaluated for applicability at River Bend. Any reports that were not already entered into the licensee tracking system were immediately entered. A listing of j reports by date, manufacturer, and subject is provided below:

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September 16, 1986 - General Electric Company - Potential defect with solenoid valve rebuild kits for control rod drive hydraulic control unit January 19, 1988 - Limitorque Corporation - Improperly sized terminal lugs to motor leads. (Report submitted by Gulf States Utilities)

The resident inspector will continue to provide copies of potentially applicable 10 CFR Part 21 reports for licensee evaluation and a followup of licensee action on selected 10 CFR Part 21 reports will be conducted during future NRC inspection No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Surveillance Test Observation During this inspection period, the resident inspector observed the performance of Surveillance Test Procedures STP-505-4503, "RPS/ Control Rod B'ock-APRM Weekly CHFUNCT, Weekly CHCAL (C51*K6050) and 18 Month LSFT,"

6TP-508-4514, "Turbine Stop Valve Closure Monthly CHFUNCT (C71-N006 Channels A thru H," STP-110-0101, "Turbine Overspeed Protection System Weekly Operability Test," STP-051-0201 "RPS-Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure Monthly CHFUNCT," and STP-509-0101, "Main Turbine Bypass System Valve Cycle Test." The following observations were made during the performances of the above surveillance tests:

STP-505-4503 - This surveillance procedure was performed on March 25, 1988, with the reactor in operational condition 1, to satisfy the weekly channel functional tests required by River Bend Station (RBS)

Technical Specification (TS) for the reactor protection system (RPS)

- average power range monitor (APRM) and control rod block-APRM instrument (CSI-APRM C). The APRMs are required to be operable when the reactor is in operational condition 1, 2, 3, 4 or The instrumentation and control (I & C) technicians obtained permission from the control operating foreman (C0F) prior to initiating this ST Communications were established between the two I&C technicians located at the instrument and the H13-P680 control panel. The at-the-controls (ATC) operator was notified prior to a RPS half-scram being inserted and was immediately notified when the RPS half-scram could be reset. The required jumpers were controlled in accordance with General Maintenance Procedure GMP-042, "Circuit Testing and Lifted Leads and Jumpers." During restoration, a 75 percent indicated power swing was observed on local power range monitor (LPRM) 4-C-30-15. After approximately 10 minutes, the LPRM returned to the expected indicated power. Maintenance Work Request (MWR) 115028 was initiated to investigate the cause for the erratic power swing '

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• STP-508-4514 - This surveillance procedure was performed on March 26, ,

1988, with the reactor at 79 percent power. This STP is required to I be performed monthly with the reactor in operational condition 1, to meet the TS requirements for channel fuxtional testing of the RPS ,

t turbine stop valve closure and the end of cycle recirculation pump t trip system turbine stop salve closure (C71-N006) Channels A  !

through H. Thissurveillancetestwasperformedinconjunctionwith STP-110-0101, "Turbine Overspeed Protection System Weekly Operability

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, Test." Direct communications were maintained between the I&C  :

technicians and ATC operator to minimize the time the turbine stop valves remained closed. The licensee determined that all the acceptance criteria was met and the test results were properly

reviewed by the C0 [

STP-110-0101 - This STP was performed on March 26, 1988, with the  :

reactor at 79 percent thermal power. This surveillance was performed  !

to test each high pressure turbine stop valve, high pressure turbine  !

control valve, low pressure turbine intermediate stup valve and low

pressure turbine intercept valve. This surveillance is required to

! be performed every 7 days when the plant is in operational condition 1 or 2 to satisfy TS 4.3.8.2.a. This activity was closely supervised by the shift supervisor and plant parameters were allowed ,

to steady out prior to cycling the next valve. The expected RPS  !

half-scrams were received when the turbine control valves were l cycled. All test acceptance criteria were met and the test results  !

reviewed and accepted by the C0F,  :

• STP-509-0101 - This STP was performed on March 26, 1988, with the reactor aT79 percent thermal power. This surveillance test demonstrates the operability of each of the two turbine bypass valves by cycling each valve through one complete cycle. This surveillance must be performed at least once every 7 days with the reactor in  !

1 operational condition 1 as specified in TS 4.7.9.a. Full valve '

I travel was verified through indication of bypass valve position and a t decrease in megawatt electri'c output. Each valve was observed to  ;

perform as expecte !

STP-051-0201 This surveillance was performed on March 26, 1988, with the reacIor at 79 percent rated thermal power. This monthly STP implements the requirement of TS Section 4.3.1.1 Table 4.3.1.1-1.6 to 4 perform a channel functional test of the RPS main steam line isolation valve (MSIV) closure instrumentation. The MSIVs were tested individually using the slow closure feature. The RPS

half-scram was observed to actuate prior to the MSIV indicating ,

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mid position, which actuates at approximately 10 percent closed, as  !

expecte The MSIV was immediately allowed to reopen once the ,

intermediate position was indicated. The ATC operator closely  !

, monitored main steam line flow instrumentation to ensure that the [

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MSIV was not traveling fully close Communications were maintained 5etween the ATC operator and the operator during the performaace of *

the MSIV channel functional surveillanc No violations or deviations were identified in this area of_the inspectio . Maintenance Observation On March 30, 1988, the licensee placed the Division II diesel generator in the maintenance mode to perform required preventive maintenanc The plant entered a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limiting condition of operation (LCO) as required by the RBS TS 3.8.1. All of the Division I and III emergency core cooling systems and support systems remained operable during this LC0 perio The ~

resident inspector verified that the required clearance had been initiated in accordance with Admini*:rative Procedure ADM-0027,"Protective Tagging."

Each of the valves and breakers identified on the clearance (88-0338) were observed to be in their correct positions as specified by the clearance order. After completion of the preventive maintenance activities, the clearance was released and a post-maintenance test performed to verify i diesel generator operability. No problems were identified during the performance of the maintenance activities that could have resulted in the diesel generator not being able to fulfill its safety functio The a following preventive maintenance work activities were observed and/or f maintenance packages reviewed:

i P516420 - This maintenance activity involved inspection of the

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governor linkages for wear and loose parts. The licensee found the j linkage mechanism to be acceptable.

P516738 - This maintenance activity involved inspection of the ring oilers. No problems were identified by the licensee during the inspection.

P516538 - Lubrication and inspection of fuel oil pump couplin The puap coupling was cleaned, reassembled and greased in accordance with

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the lubrication manua No problems were identified during the inspectio *

P516266 - The starting air manifold was inspected as required by this

maintenance work orde No problems were identified during the

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inspection.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the

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inspectio I i Operational Safety Verification The resident inspectors observed operational activities throughout the inspection period and closely monitored operational events. Control room activities and conduct were generally observed to be well controlled.

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Proper control room staffing was maintained and access to the control room operational areas was controlled. Selected shift turnover meetings were ;

observed and it was found that information concerning plant status was l being covered in each of these meetings. System walkdowns of the "B" low pressure coolant injection system and low pressure core spray system were

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conducted to verify major flow path and proper breaker alignment for ,

system operability. Plant tours were conducted, and overall plant cleanliness was good.

General radiation protection practices were observed and no problems were noted. Personnel exiting the radiation control area were observed and

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radiation monitors were being properly utilized to check for '

contaminatio Prompt security officer response to door alarms was observed and compensatory posts were established where required. Protected and vital area barriers were found to be intact, t l The resident inspectors also reviewed licensee actions on operational events and potential problems. The results of reviews of selected items i are described below: l Emergency Exercise: The resident inspectors participated in the j licensee conducted emergency exercise on February 24, 198 This

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exercise included local, state and federal participatio The NRC

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participation included NRC Region IV management personnel on site and activation of the Region IV emergency response facility. An NRC inspection team was also on site to evaluate the licensee's emergency response capability. The evaluation results are documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/88-07. While participating in the exercise, !

the resident inspectors monitored the licensee actions to control and i mitigate the consequences of the simulated emergency. These i

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observations were made in the control room, technical support center, i

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and emergency operating facility. Licensee actions were deemed to be 1 controlled and proper to control and siitigate the simulated

emergenc ;

' Inadvertent Activation of Emergency Sirens: At 7:31 p.m. CST on March 29, 1988, an emergency stren activated in West Feliciana Parish for approximately 3 minutes. The siren activation was caused by

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lightning striking the siren. The Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness and the local radio station were notified of the

inadvertent siren activation. A message was transmitted over the emergency broadcast system at 7:49 p.m. CST stating that no actual ;

emergency existe ; Reactor Shutdown: During this inspection period, the licensee initiated a manual reactor shutdown as required by RBS T5s and !

received an automatic reactor scram during the subsequent reactor [

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startu These reactor shutdowns are described below:

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Manual Reactor Shutdown Required by TSs: During full power operation on February 19, 1988, the "A" reactor recirculation pump tripped on an over-current condition. Reactor thermal power was reduced to within the limits specified in RBS TS Figure 3.4.1.1-1 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and placed in Hot Shutdown  :

within the subsequent 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The licensee later determined that moisture had entered the pump motor conduit, which is i located in the drywell, resulting in the indicated ground at the i pump motor. The pump motor cable conduit was subsequently t cleaned and sealed and a reactor startup initiated on [

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Automatic Reactor Scram: During a reactor startup on February 21, 1988, with the reactor at approximately 4 percent thermal power, the reactor scram resulted from a main turbine trip signal. The reactor scram occurred during shell warming of '

the main turbine. Turbine first stage pressure was allowed to exceed the equivalent of 40 percent power and with the turbine stop valves closed, an automatic scram was initiated. The licensee has added a caution statement to the turbine shell warming procedure stating that a reactor scram will occur if (

turbine first stage pressure is allowed to exceed 40 percent indicated power. However, sufficient guidance was given in '

SOPS 50D-0080, "Turbine Generator Operation," Revision 4, to maintain turbine first stage pressure below 173 psig (40 percent power) and thus have prevented this reactor scra Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System: During this inspection period, the licensee experienced three events involving the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system during surveillance testin ;

Two of these events involved repositioning of the RCIC suction line '

from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the suppression pool. The  ;

third event involved an isolation of the RCIC system. These three ,

events are described below: ,i

STP-500-4550 - On March 8,1988, instrumentation and control (I&C) technicians were performing Surveillance Test Procedure STP-500-4550, "RPCS High and Low Power Setpoint Functional Test (C11-N654 A, D, C and D and C11-N655 A and B),"

when an unexpected actuation of relay E51-K79 energized, causing the RCIC suction path to transfer from the CST to the suppression pool. Similar occurrences have been identified in Condition Reports 86-1365, 86-1437, 87-0029, 87-0435, 87-0625,  !

87-1715, 88-0043, 88-0052, 88-0143 and 88-0218, where spurious transients in Panel H13*P629 have caused trips in Rosemount trip i units. A field review of Panel H13*P629 panel wiring from the  !

power supply to the rack identified several discrepancies with  !

the signal ground and chassis ground. Modification  ;

Request (MR) 88-0118 has been issued to correct the wiring i discrepancies and a log is to be maintained identifying any

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further spurious trips. The above identified panel wiring discrepancies will be an unresolved item pending further review by the NRC inspector (458/8808-02). ,

• STP-209-4206 - On March 10, 1988, I&C technicians were -

performing STP-209-4206, "RCIC-Suppression Pool Water Level High Monthly CHFUNCT, 18 Month CHCAL, 18 Month LSFT (E51-N036A, E51-N636A) " when an incorrect lead was lifted from the adjacent panelspecIfiedintheSTP. This resulted in an unexpected switch of the RCIC '.uction path from the CST to the suppression poo The licensee's corrective actions to preclude reoccurrence will be to require the I&C technicians to give in-shop training on the event and the importance of ensuring actions required by the STP are first considered then correctly performe r STP-207-4538 - On February 23, 1988, during the performance of STP-207-4538, "RCIC Isolation-RCIC Steam Supply Pressure Low Monthly CHFUNCT," a lifted lead was relanded prior to the RCIC isolation being reset. This resulted in a RCIC turbine isolation and turbine tri This CTP had been revised per a temporary change notice (TCN) to identify a new lead to be lifted which is more readily accessible and will still prevent the turbine trip and isolatio Previous isolations have occurred because of shorting leads that were not easily accessibl However, the TCN required the I&C technicians to reland the lead prior to resetting the isolation signa A complete review of other applicable STPs was performed and no other instances where the lead was to be relanded prior to resetting the isolation logic were identified, e. Alarm Response Procedures - On March 10, 1988, the senior resident inspector was notified by the Office of Nu: lear Reactor Regulation that the setpoints given in Alarm Response Procedure [

(ARP) ARP-601-19, "P601-19 Alarm Responses," Revision 2, were incorrect for alarms 2403 and 20 9. This discovery was made during a review of a RBS TS change for main steam tunnel temprature isolations. Alarm numbers 2403 and 2409 are for main steam tunnel ambient temperature high and main steam tunnel ventilation differential temperature high. The immediate and long range actions to prevent the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) from closing on high ambient temperature were reviewed by the resident inspectors, lhe immediate and long range actions were found to be inadequate for alarm 2403. The temperature at which the main steam tunnel ambient temperature should be maintained below was given as 180*F rather than the correct value of 130 F. A MSIV isolation will occur at 135* ;

In the event the main steam tunnel cooling systems can not maintain the ambient temperature from approaching the MSIV isolation setpoint, no additional operator actions are specified to prevent a full MSIV isolation. This failure to provide adequate ARPs for high main steam ;

tunnel temperature and differential temperature was identified by the i

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l resident inspectors as an apparent violation (458/8808-01). The ,

licensee is presently reviewing the remaining ARPs for correct setpoint values. A condition report will be initiated by the licensee to identify and correct the identified deficiencie . Unresolved Item An unresolved item is an item about which additional information is required in order to determine if it is acceptable, a deviation, or a violation. There is one unresolved item in this repor Paragraph Item N Subject 8 458/8808-02 Panel Wiring Descrepancies I 1 Exit Intervfew An exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives identified i in paragraph 1 of this report. During this interview, the senior resident inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the inspectio t f

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