ML20153C018
| ML20153C018 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/1988 |
| From: | Chamberlain D, Holler E, William Jones NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20153C013 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-88-08, 50-458-88-8, IEB-80-70, NUDOCS 8805060132 | |
| Download: ML20153C018 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1988008
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APPENDIX B
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/88-08
Docket:
50-458
Licensee: Gulf States Utilities Company (CSU)
P. O. Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)
Inspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana
Inspection Conducted: February 16 through March 31, 1988
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Inspectors:
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D. D.VChamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector
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Project Section C, Division of Reactor Projects
_M o k 3. b
4hirr
W. B. Jones, ResidenthInspector
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Project Section C, bivision of Reactor Projects
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Approved:
E.
J.' Holler, Chief, Project Section C
Dite '
Division of Reactor Projects
8805060132 880502
ADOCK 05000459
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Inspection deport
~ Inspection Conducted February 16 through March 31, 1988
(Report 50-458/88-08)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, uncnnounced inspection of licensee action on
previous inspection findings, status of facility operating license conditions,
NRC Bulletin 80-70, 10 CFR Part 21 Reports, surveillance test observation,
maintenance observation and operational safety verification.
Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified (inadequate
alarm response procedure, paragraph 8).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- D. L. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Training
W. J. Beck, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering
J. E. Booker, Manager, Oversight
- E. M. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiation Programs
- J. W. Cook, Lead Environmental Analyst, Nuclear
Licensing
- T. C. Crouse, Manager, Quality Assurance
- J. C. Deddens, Senior Vice President, River Bend
Nuclear Group
- D. R. Derbonne, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance
- L. A. England, Director, Nuclear Licensing
R. W. Frayer, Director, Projects
P. E. Freehill, Outage Manager
A. O. Fredieu, Supervisor, Operations
P. D. Graham, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations
J. R. Hamilton, Director, Design Engineering
- G. K. Henry, Director, Quality Assurance Operations
B. E. Hey, Nuclear Engineer, Design Engineering
- G. R. Kimmell, Director, Quality Services
R. J. King, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
A. D. Kowale;uk, Director, Oversight-
J. W. Leavines, Director, Field Engineering
I. M. Malik, Supervisor, Quality Systems
J. H. McQuirter, Licensing Engineer
- T. G. Murphy, Supervisor, Planning and Scheduling
- V. J. Normand, Supervisor, Administrative Services
W. H. Odell, Manager, Administration
- T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager
C. A. Rohrmann, Training Systems Coordinator
- M. F. Sankovich, Manager, Engineering
- J. P. Shippert, Operations Engineer
- K. E. Suhrke, Manager, Project Management
R. J. Vachon, Senior Compliance Analyst
- J. Venable, Assistant Operations Supervisor
- T. L. Weir, Director
R. G. West, Supervisor, General Maintenance
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- E. J. Holler, Chief, Project Section C, Division of Reactor Projects
- D. D. Chamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector
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The NRC inspectors also interviewed additional licensee personnel during
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the inspection period.
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April 6, 1988.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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a.
(Closed) Violation (450/8729-01):
Failure to follow procedure for
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control of locked valves.
This violation resulted when'a nuclear equipment operator unlocked
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and closed a normally locked open valve using the emergency key
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without notifying the control room staff.
The operator was
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transferring the control rod drive (CRD) pump suction path from the
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condensate storaga tank to the condenser, utilizing the station
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operating procedure, when he misunderstood the directiens provided
and closed the condensate storage tank suction line.
The Assistant
Plant Manager-Operations issued a memorandum reiterating the
licensee's policy for adherence to all procedures and to ensure that
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all individuals involved in an evolution understand the task to be
performed.
Station Operating Procedure (50P) SOP-0002, "Control Rod
Drive Hydraulics," was revised to add a caution statement for the
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transfer of the CRD pump suction path.
The remaining SOPS were also
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reviewed to detertaine if additional instructions or cautions were
needed for other plant evolutions.
Finally, licensee management
personnel reviewed the precedures for controlling locked valves with
each shift crew.
The resident inspector attended three of these
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discussions and found the review to be adequate.
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This violation is closed.
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b.
(Closed) Violation (458/8531-01):
Failure to identify all valves in
the valve lineup check sheet, required to conduct the integrated leak
rate test.
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The licensee has revised Surveillance Test Procedure STP-057-3703,
"Primary Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test," to include the six
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differential pressure instruments and the one motor operated valve
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that were omitted from the original valve lineup in
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preoperational/ acceptance test procedure 1-PT-57-1.
These valves
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have been added to the valve lineup in STP-057-3703, utilizing
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Temporary Change Notice 87-1748.
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This violation is closed.
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c.
(Closed) Violation (458/8727-02):
Failure to initiate hot work
permit for grinding activity.
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This violation involved the failure to secure a valid Hot Work Permit
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and to establish a designated fire watch for grinding activities on
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the Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve 1821*A0V022B,
The Assistant
Plant Manager-Maintenance issued Memorandum Number APM-M-87-342 which
promulgates the licensee's requirement for adherence to procedures.
The NRC inspectors have observed similar activities requiring a Hot
Work Permit and establishment of a designated fire watch since the
issuance of the above memorandum,- No further problems in this area
have been identified.
This violation is closed,
d.
(Closed) Violation (458/8716-01):
Failure of followup action by the
licensee to assure that specified corrective action for an NRC
violation and a deviation had been completed.
The specified corrective actions have now oeen ccmpleted and
verified.
The licensee established a task force to review all
previously identified corrective actions for NRC findings.
Overdue
items identified by the task force have all been completed.
Field
engineering has implemented a work tracking system which includes
corrective actions for NRC items.
Individual departments have
assigned department coordinators to assure prompt attention and high
priority to corrective actions for NRC items and other items.
Monthly trend information is provided to senior management.
The
additional tracking and management attention should prevent
recurrence of this problem.
This violation is closed.
e.
(Closed) Violation (458/8720-05):
Failure to verify diesel fuel oil
properties within 31 days as required by Technical Specifications.
Subsequent verification by the licensee revealed that all required TS
fuel oil properties were met.
The licensee has entered TS fuel oil
analysis requirements in the River Cend Surveillance Test Procedure
Tracking Program to prevent future occurrences of this nature.
TS
training has been completed for the chemistry supervisor and
applicable staff members.
This violation is closed.
f.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (458/8720-07):
Two instances of misaligned
instrument valves identified by the licensee.
Both of these instances of misaligned instrument valves were
evaluated by the NRC to determine enforcement action for a subsequent
case of misaligned instrument valves.
This is documented in NRC
Inspection Report 458/8728.
Violation 8728-01 was issued for this
subsequent case.
Licensee corrective actions will be documented in
response to this violation.
This unresolved item is closed.
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g.
(Closed) Violation (458/8724-02):
Failure to utilize the proper
revision of a surveillance test procedure for daily fire door
position checks.
The licensee has performed the surveillance test to the correct
procedure and a review of past surveillance tests conducted revealed
that no other tests had been conducted to the incorrect revision.
Security personnel have received additional training to provide
instruction on obtaining the correct procedure.
Plant security has
also been placed on distribution for procedure changes to the daily
fire door position' surveillance test.
This violation is closed,
b.
(Closed) Violation (458/8724-01):
Inadequate 50P for the fuel pool
cooling and cleanup system.
This procedure allowed a siphen path of the upper fuel pool to be
established to the condensate storage tank.
The problem was
compounded with inadequate controls on anti-siphon devices.
The fuel
pool siphon event and licensee corrective actions are fully described
in NRC Inspection Report 458/8724.
The licensee has completed all
corrective actions which included drilling redundant anti-siphon
holes in the upper and lower fuel storage pools.
This violation is closed,
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (458/8640-03):
Reactor core isolation
cooling (RCIC)/ residual heat removal (RHR) steam lina break
instrument setpoint.
The licensee had experienced problems with water formation in the
instrument lines for the RCIC/RHR steam line break instrument.
This
water formation caused an instrument offset of negative 110 inches of
water during RCIC system operation.
During the first refueling
outage in 1987, the licensee implemented a design modification to
correct the problem.
Testing conducted during plant startup in 1988
revealed that the water column formation condition has been corrected
by the design modification.
This unresolved item is closed.
J.
(Closed) Violation (458/8636-01):
Inadequate safety evaluation for a
temporary modification to the control building ventilation system.
The licensee identified that the safety evaluation for the temporary
modification which removed a low air flow trip was inadequate.
The
evaluation failed to recognize that the automatic start of the
redundant division of control building ventilation was also affected
under certain conditions.
The licensee took immediate action to
restore the temporary alterations to the original uesign
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configuration.
The licensee also performed an engineering evaluation
which verified that manual operator actuation of the redundant system
after 20 minutes would have prevented any room temperatures from
exceeding the design basis temperatures.
A review of other temporary
alterations and prompt design changes revealed no other problems with
safety evaluations.
The temporary alteration program has been
discontinued at River Bend.
Additional procedural controls and
training have been implemented to strengthen the safety evaluation
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process for design modifications.
This violaticn is closed,
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(Closed) Violation (458/8620-02):
Engineering piping and instrument
drawing (P&ID) differences between the actual system configuration
and procedures.
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The licensee has corrected the specific differences identified by the
NRC inspector.
Additional procedural controls to ensure replacement
of vent and drain line pipe caps have been implemented.
Locked valve
criteria have been examined and consistency with procedures and
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drawings have been established.
A 100 percent review of 220 P& ids
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have been completed and any discrepancies identified have been
incorporated into design modifications to update the drawings.
This violation is closed.
1.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8040-04): Monitor licensee corrective
actions for turning vane failures in ventilation system ductwork.
The licensee's corrective action for this problem included repair of
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cracked dampers and removal of certain dampers of the annulus mixing
system.
The licensee also inspected other high velocity systems and
no other turning vane problems were found.
The dampers that were
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repaired in the annulus mixing system were replaced with a heavy duty
assembly designed to withstand the inherent high velocity and
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turbulent flow conditions of this system.
These repairs have
performed satisfactorily for about 2 years.
Based on the repairs and
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inspections performed to date, the licensee has determined that the
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turning vane problems were limited to the initial failures discovered
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in the annulus mixirg system.
No further corrective actions or
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inspections are deeued necessary.
This open item is closed.
m.
(Closed) Violation (458/8720-06):
Failure to include necessary
quality assurance (QA) controls in a procurement document for
analysis of emergency diesel generator fuel oil.
The existing vendor supplying laboratory analysis services did not
have a program to implement applicable 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
requirements for services provided.
The licensee has recently
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contracted with E. W. Saybolt & Company, Inc. for diesel generator
fuel oil analysis. This vendor has recently implemented a QA program
which was surveyed and evaluated by Gulf States Utilities. A
Contract for services has been released based on this preaward survey
and resolution of outstanding issues.
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This violation is closed.
3.
Status of Facility License Condition
(Closed) License Condition (?.C.7):
"Prior to startup following the first
refueling outage, GSV shall implement design modifications to improve the
capabilities of existing bypassed and inoperable status indication used to
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monitor the status of safety-related systems. The specific design changes
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to be implemented are identified in a GSU letter dated December 3,1984,
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as clarified in a GSU letter dated March 5,1985."
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The licensee has installed an additional plant alarm panel in the main
control room to implement the additional bypass / inoperable status
indications defined in USAR Table 7.5-12.
This new alarm panel
supplemented existing control room alarms.
These alarm indications were
tested and placed in operation following the first refueling outage at
River Bend.
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License Condition 2.C.7 is closed.
4.
Licensee Action on NRC Bulletin 80-70
This area of the inspection was conducted to review licensee actions
relative to NRC Bulletin No. 80-70, "Cracking and Failure of Jet Pump Hold
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Down Beam Assemblies." The licensee's action on this bulletin was
addressed in NRC Inspectior Report 458/85-54, paragraph 4.
This bulletin
remained open pending issuance of the inservice inspection (ISI) plan.
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The resident inspector reviewed Appendix J of the licensee's ISI Plan
issued May 19, 1987. This appendix establishes the frequency for reactor
vessel exams which includes the entire jet pump exam, jet pump sensing
lines, jet pump riser brace, jet pump hold down beam, jet pump bolt and
weld assembly, and reactor pressure vessel weld.
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This NRC bulletin is closed,
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5.
10 CFR Part 21 Reports
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The resident inspector was provided copies of selected 10 CFR Part 21
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reports by NRC Region IV, which may be applicable to equipment or services
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supplied to River Bend. These reports were provided to the licensee, who
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verified that the reports either had been or were being evaluated for
applicability at River Bend. Any reports that were not already entered
into the licensee tracking system were immediately entered. A listing of
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reports by date, manufacturer, and subject is provided below:
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September 16, 1986 - General Electric Company - Potential defect with
solenoid valve rebuild kits for control rod drive hydraulic control
units.
January 19, 1988 - Limitorque Corporation - Improperly sized terminal
lugs to motor leads.
(Report submitted by Gulf States Utilities)
The resident inspector will continue to provide copies of potentially
applicable 10 CFR Part 21 reports for licensee evaluation and a followup
of licensee action on selected 10 CFR Part 21 reports will be conducted
during future NRC inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the
inspection.
6.
Surveillance Test Observation
During this inspection period, the resident inspector observed the
performance of Surveillance Test Procedures STP-505-4503, "RPS/ Control Rod
B'ock-APRM Weekly CHFUNCT, Weekly CHCAL (C51*K6050) and 18 Month LSFT,"
6TP-508-4514, "Turbine Stop Valve Closure Monthly CHFUNCT (C71-N006
Channels A thru H," STP-110-0101, "Turbine Overspeed Protection System
Weekly Operability Test," STP-051-0201 "RPS-Main Steam Isolation
Valve-Closure Monthly CHFUNCT," and STP-509-0101, "Main Turbine Bypass
System Valve Cycle Test." The following observations were made during the
performances of the above surveillance tests:
STP-505-4503 - This surveillance procedure was performed on March 25,
1988, with the reactor in operational condition 1, to satisfy the
weekly channel functional tests required by River Bend Station (RBS)
Technical Specification (TS) for the reactor protection system (RPS)
- average power range monitor (APRM) and control rod block-APRM
instrument (CSI-APRM C).
The APRMs are required to be operable when
the reactor is in operational condition 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5.
The
instrumentation and control (I & C) technicians obtained permission
from the control operating foreman (C0F) prior to initiating this
STP.
Communications were established between the two I&C technicians
located at the instrument and the H13-P680 control panel.
The
at-the-controls (ATC) operator was notified prior to a RPS half-scram
being inserted and was immediately notified when the RPS half-scram
could be reset.
The required jumpers were controlled in accordance
with General Maintenance Procedure GMP-042, "Circuit Testing and
Lifted Leads and Jumpers." During restoration, a 75 percent
indicated power swing was observed on local power range
monitor (LPRM) 4-C-30-15.
After approximately 10 minutes, the LPRM
returned to the expected indicated power.
Maintenance Work
Request (MWR) 115028 was initiated to investigate the cause for the
erratic power swings.
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STP-508-4514 - This surveillance procedure was performed on March 26,
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1988, with the reactor at 79 percent power.
This STP is required to
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be performed monthly with the reactor in operational condition 1, to
meet the TS requirements for channel fuxtional testing of the RPS
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turbine stop valve closure and the end of cycle recirculation pump
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trip system turbine stop salve closure (C71-N006) Channels A
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through H.
Thissurveillancetestwasperformedinconjunctionwith
STP-110-0101, "Turbine Overspeed Protection System Weekly Operability
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Test." Direct communications were maintained between the I&C
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technicians and ATC operator to minimize the time the turbine stop
valves remained closed. The licensee determined that all the
acceptance criteria was met and the test results were properly
reviewed by the C0F.
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STP-110-0101 - This STP was performed on March 26, 1988, with the
reactor at 79 percent thermal power.
This surveillance was performed
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to test each high pressure turbine stop valve, high pressure turbine
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control valve, low pressure turbine intermediate stup valve and low
pressure turbine intercept valve.
This surveillance is required to
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be performed every 7 days when the plant is in operational
condition 1 or 2 to satisfy TS 4.3.8.2.a.
This activity was closely
supervised by the shift supervisor and plant parameters were allowed
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to steady out prior to cycling the next valve.
The expected RPS
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half-scrams were received when the turbine control valves were
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cycled.
All test acceptance criteria were met and the test results
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reviewed and accepted by the C0F,
STP-509-0101 - This STP was performed on March 26, 1988, with the
reactor aT79 percent thermal power.
This surveillance test
demonstrates the operability of each of the two turbine bypass valves
by cycling each valve through one complete cycle.
This surveillance
must be performed at least once every 7 days with the reactor in
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operational condition 1 as specified in TS 4.7.9.a.
Full valve
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travel was verified through indication of bypass valve position and a
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decrease in megawatt electri'c output.
Each valve was observed to
perform as expected.
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STP-051-0201
This surveillance was performed on March 26, 1988,
with the reacIor at 79 percent rated thermal power.
This monthly STP
implements the requirement of TS Section 4.3.1.1 Table 4.3.1.1-1.6 to
perform a channel functional test of the RPS main steam line
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isolation valve (MSIV) closure instrumentation.
The MSIVs were
tested individually using the slow closure feature.
The RPS
half-scram was observed to actuate prior to the MSIV indicating
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mid position, which actuates at approximately 10 percent closed, as
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expected.
The MSIV was immediately allowed to reopen once the
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intermediate position was indicated.
The ATC operator closely
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monitored main steam line flow instrumentation to ensure that the
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MSIV was not traveling fully closed.
Communications were maintained
5etween the ATC operator and the operator during the performaace of
the MSIV channel functional surveillance.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of_the
inspection.
7.
Maintenance Observation
On March 30, 1988, the licensee placed the Division II diesel generator in
the maintenance mode to perform required preventive maintenance.
The
plant entered a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limiting condition of operation (LCO) as required
All of the Division I and III emergency core cooling
systems and support systems remained operable during this LC0 period.
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resident inspector verified that the required clearance had been initiated
in accordance with Admini*:rative Procedure ADM-0027,"Protective Tagging."
Each of the valves and breakers identified on the clearance (88-0338) were
observed to be in their correct positions as specified by the clearance
order.
After completion of the preventive maintenance activities, the
clearance was released and a post-maintenance test performed to verify
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diesel generator operability.
No problems were identified during the
performance of the maintenance activities that could have resulted in the
diesel generator not being able to fulfill its safety function.
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following preventive maintenance work activities were observed and/or
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maintenance packages reviewed:
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P516420 - This maintenance activity involved inspection of the
governor linkages for wear and loose parts.
The licensee found the
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linkage mechanism to be acceptable.
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P516738 - This maintenance activity involved inspection of the ring
oilers.
No problems were identified by the licensee during the
inspection.
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P516538 - Lubrication and inspection of fuel oil pump coupling.
The
puap coupling was cleaned, reassembled and greased in accordance with
the lubrication manual.
No problems were identified during the
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inspection.
P516266 - The starting air manifold was inspected as required by this
maintenance work order.
No problems were identified during the
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inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the
inspection.
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8.
Operational Safety Verification
The resident inspectors observed operational activities throughout the
inspection period and closely monitored operational events.
Control room
activities and conduct were generally observed to be well controlled.
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Proper control room staffing was maintained and access to the control room
operational areas was controlled.
Selected shift turnover meetings were
observed and it was found that information concerning plant status was
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being covered in each of these meetings.
System walkdowns of the "B" low
pressure coolant injection system and low pressure core spray system were
conducted to verify major flow path and proper breaker alignment for
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system operability.
Plant tours were conducted, and overall plant
cleanliness was good.
General radiation protection practices were observed and no problems were
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noted.
Personnel exiting the radiation control area were observed and
radiation monitors were being properly utilized to check for
contamination.
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Prompt security officer response to door alarms was observed and
compensatory posts were established where required.
Protected and vital
area barriers were found to be intact,
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The resident inspectors also reviewed licensee actions on operational
events and potential problems.
The results of reviews of selected items
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are described below:
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a.
Emergency Exercise:
The resident inspectors participated in the
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licensee conducted emergency exercise on February 24, 1988.
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exercise included local, state and federal participation.
The NRC
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participation included NRC Region IV management personnel on site and
activation of the Region IV emergency response facility.
An NRC
inspection team was also on site to evaluate the licensee's emergency
response capability.
The evaluation results are documented in NRC
Inspection Report 50-458/88-07. While participating in the exercise,
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the resident inspectors monitored the licensee actions to control and
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mitigate the consequences of the simulated emergency.
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observations were made in the control room, technical support center,
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and emergency operating facility.
Licensee actions were deemed to be
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controlled and proper to control and siitigate the simulated
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emergency.
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b.
Inadvertent Activation of Emergency Sirens:
At 7:31 p.m. CST on
March 29, 1988, an emergency stren activated in West Feliciana Parish
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for approximately 3 minutes.
The siren activation was caused by
lightning striking the siren.
The Louisiana Office of Emergency
Preparedness and the local radio station were notified of the
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A message was transmitted over the
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emergency broadcast system at 7:49 p.m. CST stating that no actual
emergency existed.
c.
Reactor Shutdown:
During this inspection period, the licensee
initiated a manual reactor shutdown as required by RBS T5s and
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received an automatic reactor scram during the subsequent reactor
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startup.
These reactor shutdowns are described below:
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Manual Reactor Shutdown Required by TSs:
During full power
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operation on February 19, 1988, the "A" reactor recirculation
pump tripped on an over-current condition.
Reactor thermal
power was reduced to within the limits specified in RBS
TS Figure 3.4.1.1-1 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and placed in Hot Shutdown
within the subsequent 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The licensee later determined
that moisture had entered the pump motor conduit, which is
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located in the drywell, resulting in the indicated ground at the
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pump motor. The pump motor cable conduit was subsequently
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cleaned and sealed and a reactor startup initiated on
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February 21, 1988.
Automatic Reactor Scram:
During a reactor startup on
February 21, 1988, with the reactor at approximately 4 percent
thermal power, the reactor scram resulted from a main turbine
trip signal. The reactor scram occurred during shell warming of
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the main turbine.
Turbine first stage pressure was allowed to
exceed the equivalent of 40 percent power and with the turbine
stop valves closed, an automatic scram was initiated.
The
licensee has added a caution statement to the turbine shell
warming procedure stating that a reactor scram will occur if
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turbine first stage pressure is allowed to exceed 40 percent
indicated power.
However, sufficient guidance was given in
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SOPS 50D-0080, "Turbine Generator Operation," Revision 4, to
maintain turbine first stage pressure below 173 psig (40 percent
power) and thus have prevented this reactor scram.
d.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System:
During this inspection
period, the licensee experienced three events involving the reactor
core isolation cooling (RCIC) system during surveillance testing.
Two of these events involved repositioning of the RCIC suction line
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from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the suppression pool.
The
third event involved an isolation of the RCIC system.
These three
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events are described below:
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STP-500-4550 - On March 8,1988, instrumentation and control
(I&C) technicians were performing Surveillance Test
Procedure STP-500-4550, "RPCS High and Low Power Setpoint
Functional Test (C11-N654 A, D, C and D and C11-N655 A and B),"
when an unexpected actuation of relay E51-K79 energized, causing
the RCIC suction path to transfer from the CST to the
suppression pool.
Similar occurrences have been identified in
Condition Reports 86-1365, 86-1437, 87-0029, 87-0435, 87-0625,
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87-1715, 88-0043, 88-0052, 88-0143 and 88-0218, where spurious
transients in Panel H13*P629 have caused trips in Rosemount trip
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units.
A field review of Panel H13*P629 panel wiring from the
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power supply to the rack identified several discrepancies with
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the signal ground and chassis ground.
Modification
Request (MR) 88-0118 has been issued to correct the wiring
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discrepancies and a log is to be maintained identifying any
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further spurious trips.
The above identified panel wiring
discrepancies will be an unresolved item pending further review
by the NRC inspector (458/8808-02).
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STP-209-4206 - On March 10, 1988, I&C technicians were
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performing STP-209-4206, "RCIC-Suppression Pool Water Level High
Monthly CHFUNCT, 18 Month CHCAL, 18 Month LSFT (E51-N036A,
E51-N636A) " when an incorrect lead was lifted from the adjacent
panelspecIfiedintheSTP.
This resulted in an unexpected
switch of the RCIC '.uction path from the CST to the suppression
pool.
The licensee's corrective actions to preclude
reoccurrence will be to require the I&C technicians to give
in-shop training on the event and the importance of ensuring
actions required by the STP are first considered then correctly
performed.
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STP-207-4538 - On February 23, 1988, during the performance of
STP-207-4538, "RCIC Isolation-RCIC Steam Supply Pressure Low
Monthly CHFUNCT," a lifted lead was relanded prior to the RCIC
isolation being reset.
This resulted in a RCIC turbine
isolation and turbine trip.
This CTP had been revised per a
temporary change notice (TCN) to identify a new lead to be
lifted which is more readily accessible and will still prevent
the turbine trip and isolation.
Previous isolations have
occurred because of shorting leads that were not easily
accessible.
However, the TCN required the I&C technicians to
reland the lead prior to resetting the isolation signal.
A
complete review of other applicable STPs was performed and no
other instances where the lead was to be relanded prior to
resetting the isolation logic were identified,
e.
Alarm Response Procedures - On March 10, 1988, the senior resident
inspector was notified by the Office of Nu: lear Reactor Regulation
that the setpoints given in Alarm Response Procedure
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(ARP) ARP-601-19, "P601-19 Alarm Responses," Revision 2, were
incorrect for alarms 2403 and 20 9.
This discovery was made during a
review of a RBS TS change for main steam tunnel temprature
isolations.
Alarm numbers 2403 and 2409 are for main steam tunnel
ambient temperature high and main steam tunnel ventilation
differential temperature high.
The immediate and long range actions
to prevent the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) from closing on
high ambient temperature were reviewed by the resident inspectors,
lhe immediate and long range actions were found to be inadequate for
alarm 2403.
The temperature at which the main steam tunnel ambient
temperature should be maintained below was given as 180*F rather than
the correct value of 130 F.
A MSIV isolation will occur at 135*F.
In the event the main steam tunnel cooling systems can not maintain
the ambient temperature from approaching the MSIV isolation setpoint,
no additional operator actions are specified to prevent a full MSIV
isolation.
This failure to provide adequate ARPs for high main steam
tunnel temperature and differential temperature was identified by the
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resident inspectors as an apparent violation (458/8808-01).
The
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licensee is presently reviewing the remaining ARPs for correct
setpoint values.
A condition report will be initiated by the
licensee to identify and correct the identified deficiencies.
9.
Unresolved Item
An unresolved item is an item about which additional information is
required in order to determine if it is acceptable, a deviation, or a
violation.
There is one unresolved item in this report.
Paragraph
Item No.
Subject
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458/8808-02
Panel Wiring Descrepancies
10.
Exit Intervfew
An exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives identified
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in paragraph 1 of this report.
During this interview, the senior resident
inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection.
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