IR 05000482/2018002

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2018002 and Assessment Follow-Up Letter

ML18226A175
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	08/12/2018
From:	Nick Taylor NRC Region 4
To:	Heflin A Wolf Creek
References
Download: ML18226A175 (60)

Text

ust 12, 2018

SUBJECT:

WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2018002 AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER

Dear Mr. Heflin:

On June 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. On July 17, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. Additionally, NRC inspectors documented one Severity Level IV violation with no associated finding. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station.

In the 2017 Annual Assessment Letter for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2017006, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) ML18052A345), the NRC identified a cross-cutting theme in the safety conscious work environment (SCWE) area. On August 8, 2018, the NRC documented an assessment of the licensees progress in addressing the SCWE theme in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2018007 (ADAMS ML18218A265). The inspectors determined that while the licensee had taken some corrective actions to address the work environment challenges on site, these actions had not yet been effective to improve the SCWE in the maintenance support group.

Based on this conclusion and the previously documented finding with a cross-cutting aspect related to the inconsistent implementation of SCWE policy (S.1), as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2017004 (ADAMS ML18043A114), the NRC determined that a theme in the SCWE area continues to exist. The NRC will continue to monitor your staffs progress in implementing corrective actions for this theme.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Nicholas H. Taylor, Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-482 License No. NPF-42

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000482/2018002 w/Attachments:

1. Documents Reviewed 2 Request for Information Inservice Inspection 3. Request for Information O

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000482 License Number: NPF-42 Report Number: 05000482/2018002 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-002-0012 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station Location: Burlington, Kansas Inspection Dates: April 1, 2018 to June 30, 2018 Inspectors: D. Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector F. Thomas, Resident Inspector C. Alldredge, Health Physicist I. Anchondo, Reactor Inspector J. Melfi, Project Engineer J. ODonnell, CHP, Health Physicist Approved By: N. Taylor Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects 1 Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an Integrated Inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC-identified and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations Announcement of an NRC Inspectors Presence by Station Personnel Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Not Severity Level IV Not 71111.20 -

Applicable NCV Applicable Refueling 05000482/2018002-01 and Other Closed Outage Activities The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4),

Inspections, associated with the licensees failure to ensure the arrival and presence of NRC Inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility without a specific request by the NRC inspector.

Specifically, a contract radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building where the resident inspector was present and observing core offload activities, and the technician informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of an NRC radiation protection inspection team without being requested to do so; this impacts the NRCs ability to regulate and perform unannounced inspections.

Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.3] - 71152 -

Systems NCV 05000482/2018002-02 Human Problem Closed Performance, Identification Change and Management Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately recognize that the cable spreading room floor was a control building ventilation isolation boundary. Specifically, the licensee cut openings in the floor/ceiling between the 2,032 foot and 2,016 foot elevations of the control building and the impact on the control room envelopes ability to pressurize was not recognized. This was a primary contributor to the train B control room emergency ventilation system being unable to maintain the appropriate pressure in the control room envelope.

Failure to Adequately Implement Instrumentation and Controls Surveillance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Green [H.2] - Human 71152 -

Events NCV 05000482/2018002-03 Performance, Problem Closed Field Presence Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement surveillance procedures that affected safety-related equipment and plant stability. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately implement testing and calibration procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation. This resulted in two letdown isolation signals, securing of pressurizer heaters, and a pressurizer level transient on March 29, 2018.

PLANT STATUS

Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period shutdown for Refueling Outage 22.

The reactor was restarted on May 17, 2018, and power ascension was commenced. The unit was returned to approximately rated thermal power on May 21, 2018, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/

reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program

- Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in Inspection Manual Chapter 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01Adverse Weather Protection Summer Readiness

The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC)power systems.

71111.04Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Essential service water train B on June 20, 2018

(2) Auxiliary feedwater train B on June 26, 2018.

Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the spent fuel pool cooling system April 8 through April 15, 2018.

71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly Quarterly Inspection

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Volume control tank and volume control tank valve compartment, fire area A-8 on April 21, 2018

(2) Reactor building, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas RB-1 and RB-2 on May 16, 2018

(3) Reactor building, elevation 2,026 feet, fire areas RB-2, RB-3, RB-4, RB-7, and RB-8 on May 16, 2018

(4) Reactor building, elevation 2,047 feet, fire areas RB-5 and RB-10 on May 16, 2018

(5) Reactor building, elevation 2,068 feet 8 inches, fire areas RB-6 and RB-10 on May 16, 2018

(6) Fuel pool heat exchanger rooms and general area, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas F-1, F-2, and F-3 on May 31, 2018.

===71111.06Flood Protection Measures Cables (Partial Sample)

The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in essential service water electrical manhole MHE1A on June 18, 2018.

71111.08Inservice Inspection Activities ===

(1) Nondestructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities The inspector directly observed the following nondestructive examinations:

SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Reactor Vessel Control Rod Drive Mechanism Visual (VE)

Head Penetration Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 14, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 38, 43, 54, 66, 71, and 74.

The inspector reviewed records for the following nondestructive examinations:

SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Feedwater Weld Number AE-04-F015 and Ultrasonic System AE-04-S010-C (Data Sheet Number AGF_012)

SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Feedwater Steam Generator A Inner Radius - Ultrasonic System Weld Number EBB01A-11-IR (Data Sheet Number AJS_010)

Steam Steam Weld Number EBB01A- Ultrasonic Generator STEAM-3-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_002)

Steam Steam Weld Number EBB01A- Ultrasonic Generator STEAM-6-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_003)

Steam Weld Number EBB01A-11-W Ultrasonic Generator (Data Sheet Number RAL_004)

Steam Steam Weld Number EBB01A- Ultrasonic Generator STEAM-2-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_005)

(2) Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities The inspector reviewed the results of the licensees bare metal visual inspection of the reactor vessel upper head penetrations. The inspector also reviewed whether the required inspection coverage was achieved and whether limitations were properly recorded. The inspector reviewed whether the personnel performing the inspection were certified examiners to their respective nondestructive examination method.

On May 10, 2018, the licensee was granted verbal approval for performing an alternative volumetric examination and leak path assessment in lieu of the visual examination requirements of Note 1 of Table 1, American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Case N-729-4. Although not indicative of possible nozzle leakage, the licensee was not able to perform the required visual examination of penetration number one due to a hard substance obstructing the annulus. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had satisfactorily completed the ultrasonic inspection and leak path assessment. The licensee had also cleaned the annulus of penetration number one.

(3) Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities The Inspector evaluated the licensees boric acid control program performance.

(4) Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Activities The inspector reviewed the SG tube eddy current examination scope and expansion criteria to determine whether these criteria met technical specification requirements, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidelines, and commitments made to the NRC. The inspector also reviewed whether the eddy current inspection scope included areas of degradations that were known to represent potential eddy current test challenges such as the top of tube sheet, tube support plates, and U-bends. The inspector confirmed that no repairs were required at the time of the inspection and that the licensees inspection scope was appropriate.

(5) Identification and Resolution of Problems (71111.08-02.05)

The inspector reviewed 14 condition reports, which dealt with inservice inspection activities, and found the corrective actions for inservice inspection issues were appropriate.

71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Requalification

The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator simulator requalification exams on

===May 31, 2018.

Operator Performance (1 Sample)===

The inspectors observed and evaluated operator performance during energization of the XNB01 transformer and NB01 safety-related bus on May 2, 2018, and performance of STS AE-211, Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test, during startup activities on May 17, 2018.

71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system level instrumentation reading erratically on May 24, 2017.

71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) Elevated risk during lowered inventory and preparations for reactor head lift on April 6, 2018, and refueling water storage tank unavailability on April 7, 2018

(2) Elevated spent fuel pool cooling risk while defueled on April 19 and April 21, 2018

(3) Elevated risk during Mode 5 while implementing low temperature overpressure protection controls and emergency core cooling pump testing on May 8 and 9, 2018.

71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Operability evaluation of safety injection and accumulator to loop 1 check valve bonnet bolting issues on April 22, 2018

(2) Operability evaluation of start-up transformer XMR01 power factor testing on April 25, 2018

(3) Operability evaluation of thermal sleeve inspection results on May 8, 2018

(4) Operability evaluation of train A safety injection pump for motor current reading higher than name plate rating on May 11, 2018.

71111.18Plant Modifications

The inspectors evaluated the spent fuel pool alternate decay heat removal permanent modification.

71111.19Post Maintenance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) Start-up transformer XMR01 testing after switchyard modification and transmission line modification on April 27, 2018

(2) Emergency diesel generator train B 24-hour testing following outage maintenance on May 1, 2018

(3) Centrifugal charging pump train A testing after completion of seal maintenance on May 9, 2018

(4) STS EM-100A, Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test, following A safety injection pump replacement work on May 11, 2018

(5) Train B spent fuel pool cooling pump testing after boric acid cleaning and oil sample on May 31, 2018

(6) STS IC-503B, Channel Calibration Pressurizer Level, following emergent bistable card replacement on June 19, 2018.

71111.20Refueling and Other Outage Activities

The inspectors evaluated Refueling Outage 22 activities from April 1 to May 18, 2018.

The inspectors completed inspection procedure Sections 03.01.d and 03.01.e.

71111.22Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Routine

(1) STS KJ-001B, Integrated D/G and Safeguard Actuation Test - Train B, on May 11, 2018

In-service (1 Sample)

(1) STS EM-003A, ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test, on

May 2, 2018 Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection (1 Sample)

(1) STS BB-006, RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer, on June 27, 2018

Containment Isolation Valve (1 Sample)

(1) STS PE-128, Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) of Penetration P-29, on April 24,

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls Radiological Hazard Assessment

The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards assessments and controls.

Instructions to Workers (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated worker instructions.

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated contamination and radioactive material controls.

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards control and work coverage.

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated risk-significant high radiation area and very high radiation area controls.

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance and radiation protection technician proficiency.

71124.02Occupational As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls

The inspectors reviewed ALARA practices and radiological work controls by reviewing the following activities:

(1) RWP 180021, Cartridge Filter Change-Out in Aux and RW Buildings

(2) RWP 182601, Routine Outage Access (No Locked High Radiation Areas)

(3) RWP 182300, Maintenance Support

(4) RWP 183220, Primary S/G Eddy Current RWP

(5) RWP 184207, RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs

(6) RWP 184420, Scaffolding Activities RF22

(7) RWP 184482, Canopy Seal Clamp Activities Disassembly

Radiation Worker Performance (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71151Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

(1) BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (04/01/2017-03/31/2018)

(2) BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (04/01/2017-03/31/2018)

(3) OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (04/01/2017-3/30/2018)

(4) PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (04/01/2017-03/30/2018).

71152Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review

The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) On March 5, 2018, Condition Report 120056 documented that the required control room pressurization could not be developed.

(2) On March 29, 2018, Condition Report 120807 documented that incorrect test switches were operated during a performance of STS IC-503B, Channel Calibration Pressurizer Level.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Announcement of an NRC Inspectors Presence by Station Personnel Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV Not Applicable

71111.20 - Refueling NCV

and Other Outage 05000482/2018002-01 Activities Closed The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), Inspections, associated with the licensees failure to ensure the arrival and presence of NRC Inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility without a specific request by the NRC inspector. Specifically, a contract radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building where the resident inspector was present and observing core offload activities, and the technician informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of an NRC radiation protection inspection team without being requested to do so; this impacted the NRCs ability to regulate and perform unannounced inspections.

Description:

On April 10, 2018, the resident inspector was in the spent fuel pool building observing fuel movement activities in support of core off-load for Refueling Outage 22. NRC radiation protection inspectors were also onsite conducting inspection activities. At approximately 11:00 a.m., the resident inspector observed a BHI contractor enter the spent fuel pool building and announce to members of a work crew that NRC inspectors had entered the radiologically controlled area (containment) and to be mindful and careful.

The resident inspector spoke with the visiting NRC radiation protection inspectors later that afternoon and confirmed they had entered containment at approximately 10:30 a.m. on April 10, 2018, and had not requested that their presence be announced. The resident inspector noted that his location in the spent fuel pool building, where the announcement of NRC inspectors had occurred, was in close proximity to where the other NRC inspectors were entering containment.

Corrective Actions: On April 25, 2018, the licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program. Additional corrective actions included the performance of a stand down with all BHI employees to inform them that conduct that alerts workers to the presence of the NRC, or any oversight group, is prohibited; the licensee also published an article in a site newsletter explaining the requirements of 10 CFR 50.70. The article informed site personnel that a violation had occurred and described site management expectations regarding appropriate conduct.

Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 122359 and 122375.

Performance Assessment:

The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency.

Enforcement:

The Reactor Oversight Processs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance.

Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation, which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate, using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.

Severity: The finding was evaluated in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management and because the violation was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV NCV, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), Inspections, requires, in part, that the licensee shall ensure that the arrival and presence of an NRC inspector, who has been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), is not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility unless specifically requested by the NRC inspector.

Contrary to the above, on April 10, 2018, the licensee failed to ensure that the arrival and presence of NRC inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility unless specifically requested by the NRC inspectors. Specifically, a radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building and informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of NRC radiation protection inspectors without being requested to do so.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation

71152 - Problem

Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed the licensees progress in addressing the cross-cutting theme in the SCWE area, as discussed in the 2017 Annual Assessment Letter for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2017006, ADAMS ML18052A345). The NRCs review of the licensees progress in addressing the SCWE theme was accomplished within the scope of the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection, which was completed on June 28, 2018. NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2018007 (ADAMS ML18218A265), dated August 8, 2018, discusses the results of this inspection, which concluded that actions taken to address the work environment challenges in the maintenance support group had not yet been effective.

The inspectors also considered whether there was an emerging trend associated with impacting the regulatory process. The inspectors noted NCV 05000482/2018002-01, as documented in this report, which involved announcement of an NRC inspectors presence by station personnel. The inspectors also noted that the announcement of an inspectors presence was not an isolated event. Specifically, the presence of an NRC inspector was announced by a Wolf Creek employee to a state official during a drill on February 27, 2018.

However, the inspectors determined that no violation occurred in this case because the announcement, which was not requested by the inspector, was not made to licensee personnel and was thereby outside the NRCs regulatory authority. These issues and other reportability questions being evaluated by ongoing inspections were considered, and no emerging trend has been identified at this time.

The inspectors noted that four NCVs that occurred within an approximate 1 year time period relate to the licensees understanding of the design basis and design basis implementing documents. Specifically:

• NCV 05000482/2018002-02, Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope, involved a failure to ensure an implementing documentthe boundary matrixidentified all boundary functions; this led to a failure to control a boundary and was a primary contributor to the failure to pressurize the control room envelope.

• NCV 05000482/2018001-01, Inadequate Functionality Assessment Associated with the Emergency Excess Letdown Flowpath, involved discrepancies between the Technical Specification Bases, procedures, and the updated safety analysis report; these discrepancies contributed to an inadequate functionality assessment.

• NCV 05000482/2017003-02, Failure to Ensure the Design Basis was Adequately Represented in the Technical Specification Bases, involved discrepancies between the auxiliary feedwater Technical Specification Bases and the updated safety analysis report; as a result, inoperability of an auxiliary feedwater train was not recognized.

• NCV 05000482/2017002-02, Failure to Declare Train A Component Cooling Water Inoperable, related to the Technical Specification Bases not specifically identifying specific valves importance to the safety-related design functions as outlined in the updated safety analysis report; as a result, inoperability of safety-related equipment was not recognized.

In each of these cases the inspectors observed that the updated safety analysis report was not consistently being referenced when questions about the adequacy or completeness of the Technical Specification Bases were identified. The inspectors also observed that each of these NCVs represented some organizational knowledge gap concerning the design basis as outlined in the updated safety analysis report.

Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Section Aspect Mitigating Green [H.3] - Human

71152 - Systems NCV 05000482/2018002-02 Performance, Problem

Closed Change Identification Management and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately recognize that the cable spreading room floor was a control building ventilation isolation boundary. Specifically, the licensee cut openings in the floor/ceiling between the 2,032 foot and 2,016 foot elevations of the control building and the impact on the control room envelopes ability to pressurize was not recognized. This was a primary contributor to the train B control room emergency ventilation system being unable to maintain the appropriate pressure in the control room envelope.

Description:

On March 5, 2018, the licensee performed Procedure STS PE-004, Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test, Revision 16, and the train B control room emergency ventilation systems ability to pressurize the control room envelope and maintain pressure greater than or equal to 0.25 inches water gauge failed. Readings varied from nearly no measurable differential pressurerelative to outside airto approximately 0.15 inches water gauge. During this test, control building doors were not controlled.

Later tests on March 5, 2018, which maintained control of control building doors, had results that varied between 0.18 and 0.26 inches water gauge, with an average of 0.2258 inches water gauge. Troubleshooting was performed and, on March 6, 2018, an interim configuration associated with Design Change Package 14269, SGK05 Tech Spec Addition and Compensatory Modifications, was found to be impacting readings. Specifically, between September 17, 2017, and January 17, 2018, four approximately 2 foot by 2 foot openings were cut in the floor/ceiling between the 2,032 foot and 2,016 foot elevations of the control building to support ongoing ductwork installation.

On January 17, 2018, after penetrations for the modification were completed, compensatory measures consisting of steel plates covering the four floor openings were in place until ductwork installation began on February 19, 2018. These compensatory measures were put in place for fire, flood, and other functional concerns. On February 12, 2018, while the compensatory measures were in place, the train A control room emergency ventilation system successfully pressurized the control room envelope to 0.38 inches water gauge, demonstrating that the compensatory measures were adequate for maintaining control room envelope pressurization capability when in place.

Surveillance testing was performed for trains A and B of the control room emergency ventilation system on March 15, 2018, and the control room envelope was pressurized to 0.3448 and 0.3695 inches water gauge, respectively, which met surveillance requirements.

The system was restored to operable on March 16, 2018.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees cause evaluation, which determined that the probable causes of the issue were inadequate identification of control building ventilation isolation boundaries in WCRE-35, Boundary Matrix, Revision 0, and control of conditions during STS PE-004. Specifically, the inspectors also determined that the 2,016 foot to 2,032 foot elevation breaches were a primary contributor to the failure of the control room emergency ventilation system to maintain adequate control room envelope pressure. The inspectors noted that WCRE-35, which was referenced during modification work for Design Change Package 14269, did not identify the barriers between the 2,016 and 2,032 foot elevations of the control building as control building ventilation isolation boundaries. WCRE-35 was a new document that was first approved on November 30, 2016, and was created from A, Boundary Matrix, of AP 10-104, Breach Authorization, Revision 35.

WCRE-35 notes, The information in the attachment has been copied directly from the procedure Attachment A, but when there were discrepancies identified the information has been verified and updated. The inspectors determined that the creation of the new WCRE-35 document was an opportunity for the licensee to recognize the subject boundarys importance and categorize the barrier as a control building ventilation isolation boundary.

Corrective Actions: The licensee completed Revision 3 of WCRE-35 on April 16, 2018, which reflects additional control building ventilation isolation boundaries, essential reading was issued, and other actions were performed to improve control room envelope pressurization margin.

Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report 120056.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to recognize control building ventilation isolation boundaries and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, Design Control, is a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the control room emergency ventilation systems ability to maintain adequate pressurization of the control room envelope was adversely impacted after an ongoing ventilation modification breached the floor without compensatory measures in place.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room and represents a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere. Thus, a detailed risk evaluation is required.

The senior reactor analyst evaluated the subject performance deficiency and resulting plant conditions to determine the risk impact on the plant. The analyst identified that the control room emergency ventilation system is not a significant risk contributor, because it does not directly affect the core damage frequency, provided operators have a habitable environment.

Although the control room boundary was significantly degraded in the as-found condition, either train of the control room emergency ventilation system was capable of maintaining the control room envelope with some level of pressurization, based on multiple test results.

Therefore, while some deterioration of the control room environment could be expected, the control room emergency ventilation system appeared to be capable of maintaining a habitable environment throughout the relatively limited exposure period of the performance deficiency.

As a result, the increase in risk caused by the degraded condition of the control room envelope was negligible, and the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of change management in that leaders did not use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority. Specifically, managers did not ensure that individuals understood the importance of, and their role in, the change management process when WCRE-35 was recently revised and implemented. As a result, WCRE-35 did not identify all control building ventilation isolation boundaries.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies, measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license application, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.

Contrary to the above, until April 16, 2018, for quality-related components associated with the control building, to which 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, applies, the licensee failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license application, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that all control building ventilation isolation boundaries were adequately identified in WCRE-35, Boundary Matrix, which the station uses to identify boundary functions, such that the control room envelope could be adequately pressurized in accordance with design basis requirements.

Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Adequately Implement Instrumentation and Controls Surveillance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Section Aspect Initiating Green [H.2] - Human

71152 - Events NCV 05000482/2018002-03 Performance, Problem

Closed Field Presence Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement surveillance procedures that affected safety-related equipment and plant stability. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately implement testing and calibration procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation. This resulted in two letdown isolation signals, securing of pressurizer heaters, and a pressurizer level transient on March 29, 2018.

Description:

On March 29, 2018, the licensee was performing Procedure STS IC-503B, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration, Revision 12. This surveillance procedure performs calibration and testing activities associated with three pressurizer level channels, one-at-a-time. To perform calibration of each channel, a control room operator selects away from the channel to be tested, which ensures the controlling pressurizer level channels are not being tested. This allows maintenance technicians to perform calibration and testing activities associated with the desired channel. Following calibration and testing of each channel, the channel is restored and actions are taken to select away from the next desired channel to be tested, which again ensures the controlling pressurizer level channels are not being tested.

During the testing on March 29, 2018, station personnel successfully completed the calibration of channel 459, which is located in the SB038 cabinet. The technicians then informed the control room operator they were moving to the next section of the procedure associated with channel 460, and the operator selected away from channel 460 in accordance with procedure. The technicians had flagged a switch to be manipulated in cabinet SB038, but had incorrectly flagged the switch for channel 459. As a result, channel 459 was again taken to the test position, but this channel was now a controlling pressurizer level channel since channel 460 was to be tested next. The instrument failed low, which resulted in an actual pressurizer level transientlevel got as high as approximately 63 percent from a normal level of approximately 56.6 percentisolation of letdown, and automatic de-energization of the pressurizer back-up heaters.

Step 8.3.3 of Procedure STS IC-503B stated, At C2-0847 (LS/460), PLACE BS-1 (LS/460A)to TEST position. This procedure step was not followed and the technicians did not adequately use human performance tools to ensure they were in the appropriate cabinet and flagging the appropriate channel, and supervision was not present when the inappropriate cabinet was flagged.

Operators responded to the transient using Off-Normal Procedure OFN SB-008, Instrument Malfunctions, Revision 45, reselected channel 460 as the controlling pressurizer level channel in accordance with the off-normal procedure, and an operator stated to the technician that they had received the 459 loop alarms. The technician then restored channel 459 from the test position without supervision and proceeded on in Procedure STS IC-503B.

Procedure OFN SB-008 had ensured that the alternate pressurizer level channel on the pressurizer level control selector switch was selected. The technician did not re-perform Step 8.3.1.b, which states, Place BB LS-459D, PZR LEV CRTL SEL switch to L459/L461 position, before proceeding with channel 460 testing. Thus, when channel 460 was taken to the test position, this caused a second actual pressurizer level transientlevel got as high as 63 percenta second letdown isolation signal (though it had not yet been restored), and a second automatic de-energization of the back-up heaters signal was received. Operators again responded to the transient and stabilized the plant. Additionally, following the second actual pressurizer level transient operators provided the order to the technician to, stop work.

The licensees evaluation determined that because of the risk associated with this task, supervisory oversight was required. Specifically, the qualitative risk screening performed for the task identified the need for leadership team member implementation oversight as a risk mitigating action. However, the oversight had not yet made it to the control room. The inspectors agreed with the licensees conclusions that the lack of oversight was the most significant contributor to both failures to follow procedures.

Corrective Actions: The transient was stabilized, work was stopped following the second event, an event review was conducted, a stand-down was initiated, technician qualifications were removed, communications were made to operations and the site, and an interim action was created to have an operations individual present during two-minute drills for any work performed in the cabinets in the back of the control room.

Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report 120807.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to adequately implement the testing and calibration procedure for pressurizer level instrumentation on two occasions and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation calibration were not followed on two occasions:

(1) when an instrumentation and control technician failed to take the appropriate channel to test in accordance with procedure; and

(2) when the individual failed to adequately verify the appropriate channels were selected in accordance with procedure on March 29, 2018. These actions failed the 459 level transmitter channel low inappropriately and then subsequently failed the 460 level transmitter channel low inappropriately, respectively.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.

Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in two separate actual pressurizer level transients, letdown isolation signals, and signals for automatic de-energization of the pressurizer back-up heaters.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding was not a deficiency that caused a plant trip and did not cause the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a trip to stable plant shutdown (e.g. loss of condenser, loss of feedwater). Furthermore, there were no other events such as a high energy line break, internal flooding, or fire. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of field presence in that senior managers did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities. Specifically, managers and supervisors did not practice visible leadership in the field and during safety significant evolutions like performance of Procedure STS IC-503B by placing eyes on the problem, coaching, mentoring, reinforcing standards and reinforcing positive decision making practices and behaviors, which led to the multiple examples of failure to follow procedures.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances.

(1) Procedure STS IC-503B, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration, Revision 12, an Appendix B quality related procedure, provides instructions for performing pressurizer level instrument calibration testing. Procedure STS IC-503B, Step 8.3.3, requires that BS-1 (LS/460A) be placed in the test position. Contrary to the above, on March 29, 2018, BS-1 (LS/460A) was not placed in the test position.

Specifically, the 459 channel was placed in the test position inappropriately.

(2) Procedure STS IC-503B, Step 8.3.1.b, requires, in part, verification that BB LS-459D, the pressurizer level control selector switch, be placed in the L459/L461 position for channel 460 testing and calibration. Contrary to the above, on March 29, 2018, verification that BB LS-459D, the pressurizer level control selector switch, was placed in the L459/L461 position for channel 460 testing and calibration was not performed.

Specifically, testing and calibration of channel 460 occurred while channel 460 was selected as the controlling channel.

Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

On April 13, 2018, the inspector presented the occupational radiation safety inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On May 8, 2018, the inspector presented the inservice inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On July 17, 2018, the inspector presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

71111.01Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

Number Title Revision

OFN AF-025 Unit Limitations 55

Drawings

Number Title Revision

KD-7496 One Line Diagram 67

Condition Reports

23867 123954 123955 123956 123957

23958 123959 123961 123962 123963

23968 123969

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date

Temporary Waverly-LaCygne 345 kV line outages Expires

Operating Guide December 31,

2018

Transmission Outage of the Wolf Creek-Benton 345 kV Line February 28,

Operating 2018

Directive 0300

Transmission Outage of the Wolf Creek-Rose Hill 345 kV Line February 28,

Operating 2018

Directive 0301

Transmission Outage of Wolf Creek 345 kV Breaker 345-40 or 345-60 February 28,

Operating 2018

Directive 0306

Transmission Outage of the Wolf Creek-Waverly 345 kV Line February 28,

Operating 2018

Directive 0307

Transmission Outage of the Waverly-LaCygne 345 kV Line February 28,

Operating 2018

Directive 0308

71111.04Equipment Alignment

Procedures

Number Title Revision

CKL AL-120 Auxiliary Feedwater Normal Lineup 42

CKL EC-120 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Normal Valve 17

Lineup/Breaker Checklist

CKL EF-120 Essential Service Water Valve, Breaker and Switch Lineup 54

Drawings

Number Title Revision

E-13EC09 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power 1

Supply Motor Controller

E-13GG02 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Coolers 3

KD-7496 One-Line Diagram 61

M-12AL01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater 28

System

M-12EC01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and 23

Clean-up System

M-12EC02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and 7

Clean-up System

M-12EF01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential SVC Water 29

System

M-12EF02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water 42

System

M-K2EF01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water 70

System

M-K2EF01A Abandoned ESW Equipment 2

M-K2EF03 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water 19

System

M-K2EF03A Abandoned ESW Equipment 1

Condition Reports

2669 121872 122213 122233 124453

71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AP 10-106 Fire Preplans 18A

Drawings

Number Title Revision

E-1F9905 Fire Hazard Analysis 8

Condition Reports

21946 122915 122944 123429 123446

23920 123921

71111.06Flood Protection Measures

Drawings

Number Title Revision

C-K201 E.S.

W.S. Yard Pipelines & Elect. Duct Banks Plan, Sections 10

& Schedules SHT.1

C-K201 E.S.

W.S. Yard Pipelines & Elect. Duct Banks Plan, Sections 12

& Schedules SHT.1

C-K202 E.S.

W.S. Yard Pipelines & Electrical Duct Banks Plan, 10

Sections & Schedules SHT.-2

C-K202 E.S.

W.S. Yard Pipelines & Electrical Duct Banks Plan, 11

Sections & Schedules SHT.-2

C-K209 E.S.W.S. Electrical Manholes Plans Sections & Details 9

C-K212 E.S.W.S Yard Pipelines & Elec. Duct Banks Plan & Sections 4

Condition Reports

24380 124381 124382 124383 124397

24409

71111.08Inservice Inspection Activities

Procedures

Number Title Revision

54-ISI-603-009 Automated Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Pressure 9

Vessel Closure Head Penetration Containing Thermal

Sleeves

AP-16F-001 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program 9

I-ENG-023 Steam Generator Data Analysis Guidelines 16

LMT-08-PDI-UT-1 Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds 0

LMT-08-PDI-UT-11 Ultrasonic Examination of Nozzle Inner Radius Area at Wolf 0

Creek Generating Station

LMT-08-UT-004 Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Welds and Adjacent Base 0

Material > 2.0 in Thickness

SG-SGMP-15-4 Wolf Creek Generating Station RF20 Condition Monitoring 0

and Operational Assessment

SG-SGMP-16-18 Wolf Creek Generating Station RF21 Condition Monitoring 0

and Operational Assessment

SG-SGMP-18-9 Wolf Creek Generating Station RF22 Condition Monitoring 0

and Operational Assessment for

Cycle 23 and Cycle 24

STS PE-040E Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Visual Inspection 7

WCRE-30 Inservice Inspection Program Plan Wolf Creek Generating 2

Station Interval 4

Condition Reports

93748 93749 107686 108888 109175

111055 112584 113666 114073 117639

117827 121438 121439

71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Procedures

Number Title Revision

STS AE-211 Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test 3

SYS NB-201 Transferring NB01 Power Sources 61

SYS NB-320 Deenergizing and Energizing ESF Transformers 12

Condition Reports

23853 123950 123951

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision/

Date

17-01 (IC342) 2018 Biennial Requalification Exam Scenario 1

18-01 (340) 2018 Annual Requalification Exam 0

STS AE-211 Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test Completed

May 17, 2018

SYS NB-201 Transferring NB01 Power Sources Completed

May 2, 2018

SYS NB-320 Deenergizing and Energizing ESF Transformers Completed

May 2, 2018

71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness

Condition Reports

113227 122957

Work Orders

17-428387-001

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling April 1, 2015

through

June 30, 2015

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling October 1, 2015

through December

31, 2015

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling April 1, 2016

through December,

2016

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling July 1, 2016 through

June 30, 2017

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling January 1, 2017

through June 30,

2017

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling July 1, 2017 through

December 31, 2017

EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-01

EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-02

EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-03

EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-04

EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-05

EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-06

EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-07

71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AP 21C-001 Wolf Creek Substation 20

AP 21D-004 Control of Containment Penetrations During Shutdown 11A

Operations

AP 22C-008 Qualitative Risk Management 4B

FHP 02-001 Refueling Operations 46

FHP 02-007A Reactor Vessel Closure Head Removal 12A

FHP 05-001 Equipment Hatch Operations 0

GEN 00-008 RCS Level Less Than Reactor Vessel Flange Operations 32

STS GP-001 Containment Purge Valves Actuation Test 27

STS GP-006 CTMT Closure Verification 14

STS GP-006 CTMT Closure Verification 24A

SYS BB-215 RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor 48

Drawings

Number Title Revision

M-12BB01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 36

System

M-12BB02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 28

System

M-12BB04 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 23

System

M-12EJ01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat 54

Removal System

M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 44

Injection System

M-12EM02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 22

Injection System

M-12EM03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 3

Injection System Test Line

Condition Reports

21353

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary April 5, 2018

Shift: Nights, Mode: 5

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary April 6, 2018

Shift: Days, Mode 6

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary April 7, 2018

Shift: Nights, Mode 6

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary April 12, 2018

Shift: Nights, Defueled

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary April 19, 2018

Shift: Nights, Defueled

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary April 24, 2018

Shift: Days, Defueled

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary May 8, 2018

Shift: Nights, Mode: 6

ET 88-0193 Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of Decay December 23,

Heat Removal 1988

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date

ET 92-0001 Docket No. 50-482: Change in Commitment Associated January 2,

with Generic Letter 88-17 1992

STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6 Completed

May 9, 2018

WM 89-0041 Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of Decay February 2,

Heat Removal 1989

71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AP 22A-001 Screening, Prioritization and Pre-Approval 21

AP 26C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment 35

AP 28-001 Operability Evaluations 25

Drawings

Number Title Revision

Westinghouse Drawing 1464F11

M-703-00055 Closure Head (SAP) General Assembly W02

M-709-00099 Control Rod Mechanism Housing Details - Sheet 1 W01

Condition Reports

2207 122351 122581 123083 123084

23567 123902 123903 123905 123906

23907 123908 123914

Work Orders

18-438919-000 18-438984-000 18-439282-000

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision/Date

APF 05-013-01 M-721-00096 - Instruction Manual for Safety Injection W25

Pump

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision/Date

APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition - DPEM01A May 1, 2018

Current Reading Higher Than Name Plate Rating - CR

2518

APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition - DPEM01A May 3, 2018

Current Reading Higher Than Name Plate Rating - CR

2581

APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition - PEM01A RF22 May 9, 2018

Rework Hydraulic Performance Impact

MRP 2018-010 Electric Power Research Institute - Notification of Recent April 20, 2018

PWR CRDM Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear and Control

Rod Motion Stoppage Operating Experience and

Recommended Plant Actions

XX-E-006 Calculation XX-E-006 AC System Analysis Rev. 7 - 7

Appendix 31 - Scenario L1 (LOCA) Motor Starting

Analysis - Output Report

71111.18Plant Modifications

Drawings

Number Title Revision/Date

E-13GG02 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Coolers 3

E-13EC09 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power 1

Supply Motor Controller

M-084A-00010 8539 SGG45 Wiring Diagram January 31,

2018

WIP-E-12EC09- Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power 1

000-A-1 Supply Motor Controller

WIP-E-IR0211A- Raceway Plan Plant Site Southwest Quadrant Underground 00

2B-1 Duct Bank EL. [Elevation] 2000-0

WIP-M-1X6906- Fuel Building Penetration Closure Wall Elevations 00

000-A-1

WIP-M-1X6906- Fuel Building Penetration Closure Wall Elevations 00

001-A-1

WIP-M-13EG29- Piping Isometric Drawing Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 00

000-A-1 Fuel Building

Condition Reports

2629 122684 122959 123060 123146

23193 123195 123259 123584 123592

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date

14403 Field Change Notice: Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation April 30, 2015

System

14496 Field Change Notice: Fukushima Spent Fuel Pool Makeup August 30,

2016

241 Change Package Engineering Disposition: Spent Fuel Pool November 29,

Alternate Cooling Modification 2017

273 Field Change Notice: Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Cooling March 3,

Electrical 2018

71111.19Post Maintenance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision

STN EC-201 Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up System Valve Test 2

STN XMR-001 XMR01 Control Alarm and Trip Circuit Verification 3

STS BG-100A Centrifugal Charging System A Train Inservice Pump 48

STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6 84

STS EM-100A Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test 41

STS IC-503B Channel Calibration pressurizer Level 12

STS IC-503B Channel Calibration pressurizer Level 12A

STS KJ-015B Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02 44

SYS EC-120 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Startup 56

Drawings

Number Title Revision

E-0033.3-009-03 Power Transformer, Class, OA/FA/FOA, Shell Form, 3

Outdoor, Three Phase, KVA 60000/80000/100000, H.

V.

345000,

L.V. 13800,

Y. Y., 13800, 60 Hertz

E-003.3-00008 CA/FA/FOA Transformer Control Schematic Wiring Diagram W10

Drawings

Number Title Revision

E-003.3-00022 Power Transformer, Class OA/FA/FOA, Shell Form, W09

Outdoor, Three Phase, KVA 60000/80000/100000, H.

V.

345000, L

V. 13800,

Y. Y. 13800, 60 Hertz

E-11MR01 Startup Transformer Single Line Metering and Relaying 7

Diagram

M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 45

Injection System

M-761-00076-06 Process Control Block Diagram SNUPPS 6

Condition Reports

2520 122524 122526 122527 122784

2954 124387 124400 124405

Work Orders

13-366290-005 15-403582-002 17-427200-023 17-432721-000 17-432722-000

18-438909-000 18-438919-001 18-438923-001

Miscellaneous

Number Title Date

APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet (STRS) - Fuel Pool April 23,

Cooling and Cleanup System Valve Test 2018

STN EM-100A SI Pump A Reference Pump Completed

April 29,

2018

STS EM-100A Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test Completed

May 11, 2018

STS KJ-015B Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02 Completed

May 1, 2018

71111.20Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AI-07B-024 Instructions For Containment Purge Permits 18

FHP 05-001 Equipment Hatch Operations 0

GEN 00-002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby 101

Procedures

Number Title Revision

GEN 00-003 Hot Standby to Minimum Load 101

GEN 00-008 RCS Level Less Than Reactor Vessel Flange Operations 32

INC C-0044 Functional Check of 7300 Process Power Supply 7

RXE 01-002 Reload Low Power Physics Testing 26

STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6 84

STS GP-006 CTMT Closure Verification 24A

SYS BB-112 Vacuum Fill of the RCS 43

SYS BB-215 RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor 47A

SYS BB-215 RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor 48

SYS SB-300 Deenergizing SB Protection Sets 5

Drawings

Number Title Revision

E-13NN01 Class IE Instrument AC Schematic 9

E-13SB09 Schematic Diagram Process Protection Cabinets 1,2,3,4 00

Safeguards Test Cabinets and Fire Isolation Cabinets

M-12BB01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 36

System

M-12BB02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 28

System

M-12BB04 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 23

System

M-12EJ01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat 54

Removal System

M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 44

Injection System

M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 45

Injection System

M-12EM02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 22

Injection System

M-12EM03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 3

Injection System Test Line

Condition Reports

20865 120906 120917 120934 120963

21467 121469 121507 121575 121710

21779 121825 121881 121901 121938

21953 122359 122375 122571 122593

2787 122798 122837 123075 123087

23221 123429 123434 123440 123444

23446 123448 123488 123500 123517

23752 123767

Work Orders

17-426098-000 18-437026-000

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision/Date

Foreign Material Inspections During Wolf Creek RF 22

Failed Fuel Mitigation - Presenter Daljit Mand

OPS RF-22 Rotation Schedule

Refuel 22: Failed Fuel Action Matrix for Completion Core January 4,

Testing 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 6, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days April 11, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 11, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 12, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 13, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days April 15, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 16, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days April 17, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 18, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 19, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days April 25, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 26, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days April 29, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 29, 2018

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision/Date

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days April 30, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 30, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 1, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 1, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 2, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 2, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 3, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 4, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 4, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 6, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 7, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 7, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 8, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 8, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 9, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 9, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 10, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 13, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 14, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 14, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 15, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 15, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 16, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 17, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 17, 2018

RF2[2] FIN Team Schedule

AIF 21-016-02 Time Verification Form - Days - Credited April 3, 2018

AIF 21-016-02 Time Verification Form - Nights - Credited April 3, 2018

AIF 21-016-02 Time Verification Form - Nights - No Credit Taken April 3, 2018

AIF 22D-008-02 Mode 2 (M2U)/Mode 1 (M1U) Restart Checklist Completed

May 17, 2108

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision/Date

APF 15C-002-01 Procedure Cover Sheet - Vacuum Fill of the RCS Completed

May 11, 2018

APF 21-001-02 Control Room Turnover Checklist - On-Coming CRS/WC May 7, 2018

SRO/RO/BOP Review

APF 22B-001-08 Shutdown Risk Assessment Mode 6 Refueling Operations 12

>23 Ft. Above Vessel Flange

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled April 4, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled April 7, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled April 11, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled April 14, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled April 15, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled April 17, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 1, 2018

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 3, 2018

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 4, 2018

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 5, 2018

Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 5

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 6, 2018

Summary - Shift Days, Mode 6

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 7, 2018

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: 6

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 7, 2018

Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 6

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment May 8, 2018

Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 6

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 11, 2018

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 14, 2018

Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: Defueled

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 15, 2018

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 15, 2018

Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: Defueled

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision/Date

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 17, 2018

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment May 8, 2018

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled

APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 181102 January 18,

2018

APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 182602 15

APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 183000 March 7, 2018

APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 182602 March 8, 2018

APF 25A-401-04 Pre-Job Briefing Form - RWP Number: 182601 10A

BGV0365 Mixed Bed Demins Inlet Line Upstrm Drain 20

C22: R-EN-A- Clearance Order April 2, 2018

2A

C22: R-EN-B- Clearance Order March 31, 2018

2A

C22: R-OP-S- Clearance Order May 4, 2018

001B

C22: R-OP-S- Clearance Order May 9, 2018

2A

C22: R-OP-S- Clearance Order May 11, 2018

2B

C22: R-OP-S- Clearance Order May 6, 2018

003A

ET 88-0193 Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of December 23,

Decay Heat Removal 1988

ET 92-0001 Docket No. 50-482: Change in Commitment Associated January 2,

with Generic Letter 88-17 1992

GTRE 32 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Report Created

Radiochemistry Lab April 18, 2018,

2:36

GTRE 32 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Report Created

Radiochemistry Lab April 18, 2018,

08:43

GTRE 32 Char Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Report Created

Radiochemistry Lab April 15, 2018,

14:59

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision/Date

GTRE 33 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Report Created

Radiochemistry Lab April 18, 2018,

07:04

GTRE 33 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Report Created

Radiochemistry Lab April 18, 2018,

07:05

K04-013 Gas Effluent Release Report April 16, 2018

RA 18-0032 Minor Corrections to Refuel 22 Risk Assessment Team March 20, 2018

Report RA 18-0021 - Schedule Level 1 Rev. C 2/1/2018

RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit - 181102 000

RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit - 182601 000

RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit - 182602 000

RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit - 182602 002

RFP 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit - 184206 000

RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180225-3 February 25,

2018

RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180320- March 20, 2018

RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180405- April 5, 2018

RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180416-1 April 16, 2018

RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180407-6 April 7, 2018

RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180421- April 21, 2018

RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180406- April 6, 2018

RXE 01-002 Reload Low Power Physics Testing Completed

May 17, 2018

STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6 Completed

May 11, 2018

STS GP-006 Containment Closure Verification Completed

April 6, 2018

WM 26-0034 Docket No. 50-482: Foreign Ownership, Control or April 26, 2018

Influence (FOCI) Information - Change to Lists of

Owners, Officers, Directors and Executive Personnel

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision/Date

WM 89-0041 Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of February 2,

Decay Heat Removal 1989

71111.22Surveillance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision

STS BB-004 RCS Water Inventory Balance 49

STS BB-006 RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer 19

STS BB-010 Manual RCS Water Inventory Balance 2

STS CV-210A ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve 27

Test

STS EM-003A ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test 23

STS KJ-001B Integrated D/G and Safeguard Actuation Test - Train B 61

STS PE-128 LLRT [Local Leak Rate Test] Valve Lineup for Penetrations 6

and 29

Condition Reports

2451 122757 122783 123223

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date

STS CV-210A ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve Completed

Test April 29, 2018

STS CV-210A ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve Completed

Test May 1, 2018

STS EM-003A ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test Completed

May 2, 2018

WCRE-03 Wolf Creek Tank Document 22

71124.01Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AP 19D-100 Radioactive Source Program 5

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AP 25A-001 Radiation Protection Manual 17B

AP 25A-100 Access to Locked High or Very High Rad Areas 29

AP 25A-100 Containment Entry 18A

AP 25B-100 Radiation Worker Guidelines 51

AP 25B-300 RWP Program 24A

Radiation Protection Organization, Responsibilities and

RPP 01-105 21

Code of Conduct

RPP 02-105 Radiation Work Permit 48

RPP 02-215 Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas 34A

RPP 02-405 RCA Access Control 20

RPP 02-515 Release of Material from the RCA 34

RPP 02-605 Control and Inventory of Radioactive Sources 18

Condition Reports

2244 112935 112973 113053 113055

113627 113631 114261 116377 116509

116510 117296 119183 119223 120975

21159 121171 121281 121282 121568

Radiation Work Permits

Number Title Revision

180021 Cartridge Filter Change-Out in Aux and RW Buildings 0

2601 Routine Outage Access (No LHRA Access) 0

183220 Primary S/G Eddy Current Testing 1

184199 Secondary Side S/G FOSAR 0

184200 Secondary Side S/G Sludge Lance 0

184420 Scaffolding 0

184482 RV Head Disassembly - Canopy Seal Clamp Activities 0

184483 RV Head Reassembly - Canopy Seal Clamp Activities 0

186020 Reactor Vessel Head Preparation 1

Radiation Surveys

Number Title Date

M-20180305-17 1306 and 1308C March 5, 2018

M-20180305-4 Resin Bed, Demin Alley, Filter Pit March 4, 2018

M-20180307-16 Seal Water HX & VCT Valve Room March 7, 2018

M-20180307-2 B RHR HX Room March 7, 2018

M-20180308-12 North and South Pipe Pen March 8, 2018

M-20180324-6 SJ 143 Sample Panel March 24, 2018

M-20180329-1 B RHR Pump March 29, 2018

M-20180402-20 S/G A&D Secondary April 2, 2018

M-20180403-2 S/G A&D Secondary April 3, 2018

M-20180409-19 2000 Aux South April 9, 2018

M-20180411-11 S/G A&D Secondary April 11, 2018

M-20180411-21 2047 Containment April 11, 2018

Air Sample Surveys

Number Title Date

18-0129 Containment RX Cavity April 1, 2018

18-0131 CTMT 2000' O/S Bio-shield April 1, 2018

18-0147 Fuel Building 2047 & above April 2, 2018

18-0154 CTMT 2047' April 3, 2018

18-0181 CTMT 2047 (Marinelli Grab Sample) April 4, 2018

18-0182 CTMT 2047 (Follow-up West of Cavity) April 4, 2018

18-0182 CTMT 2047 (Follow-up West of Cavity) April 4, 2018

Audits and Self-Assessments

Number Title Date

QA Audit Report:

18-01-RP/PC March 12, 2018

Radiation Protection And Process Control

Self-Assessment:

QH-2017-1476 Radiation Protection Procedures and Radiation May 4, 2017

Worker Behavior Observations

Radiation Protection Programmatic Review as

QH-2017-1481 delineated in NRC Inspection Procedures 71124.01, April 24, 2017

71124.03, and 71151.OR01

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date

18-0181 Skin Dose From Noble Gas Calculation Sheet April 4, 2018

K 03-70 Air Sample Log April 4, 2018

RPF 02-605-03 Sealed Source Inventory January 29, 2018

STS HP-001 Sealed Source Contamination Surveillance Test January 29, 2018

71124.02Occupational As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AP 25A-401 ALARA Program 25

AP 25A-410 ALARA Committee 23

AP 25B-300 RWP Program 24A

APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package 15

APF 25A-401-04 Pre-Job Briefing Form 10A

APF 25A-401-07 In-Progress ALARA Review 1

APF 25A-401-08 Post-Job ALARA Review 1

RPF 02-105-05 RWP Risk Assessment 16A

RPP 02-105 RWP 48

RPP 02-605 Control & Inventory of Radioactive Sources 18

Condition Reports

2973 113052 113056 113057 113058

113627 113631 113708 113736 113762

114261 114915 115344 115564 115795

116952 117296 118610 119253 119743

119745 120919 120921 121089 121091

21099 121197 121217 121266 121270

21341 121375 121420 121422 121447

21482

Audits and Self-Assessments

Number Title Date

Quality Assurance Audit Report

18-01-RP/PC March 12, 2018

Radiation Protection and Process Control

Radiation Protection Programmatic Review as

QH-2017-1481 delineated in NRC Inspection Procedures 71124.01, April 24, 2017

71124.03, and 71151.OR01

NRC Inspection Procedure 71124.04, Occupational

QH-2017-1505 Dose Assessment and NRC 71124.02 Occupational May 22, 2017

ALARA Planning and Controls

Radiation Work Permit Packages

Number Title Revision

180021 Cartridge Filter Change-Out in Aux and RW Buildings A

2300 Maintenance Support 0

2601 Routine Outage Access (No Locked High Radiation Areas) 0

183220 Primary S/G Eddy Current RWP 1

184207 RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs 0

184207 RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs 1

184207 RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs 2

184420 Scaffolding Activities RF22 0

184482 Canopy Seal Clamp Activities Disassembly 0

Miscellaneous Documents

Title Date

RF 21 & Pre RF21 Forced Outage Radiation Protection Summary January 9, 2017

71151Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AP 02A-001 Primary Chemistry Control 21

CHS SJ-143B RCS/CVCS/RHR Sampling at SJ-143 Panel 2

STS BB-006 RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer 18

Condition Reports

23874 123885 124426 124427

Miscellaneous

Number Title Date

RCS June 2017 through June 2018 Printed June 20,

Measurement 2018

Reports

STS PE-019B RHR Suction Valve Leak Test Completed

November 18,

2016

STS PE-109E RCS Isolation Check Valve Leak Test Completed

November 19,

2016

71152Problem Identification and Resolution

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AP 10-104 Breach Authorization 35

AP 10-104 Breach Authorization 37A

AP 23-009 Control Room Envelope Habitability Program 2

OFN SB-008 Instrument Malfunctions 45

STS IC-503B Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration 12

STS PE-004 Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test 16

Condition Reports

20056 120807 122587 123642 123823

Work Orders

18-437033-006

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/

Date

QA-2018-0421 Oversight of Operations During the First Quarter of 2018 April 20,

from 12/21/17 to 3/29/18 2018

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/

Date

QA-2018-0425 QA Assessment of the Maintenance 2018 First Quarter FAO April 22,

Report on 4/2/19 2018

QA-2018-0426 Provide QA Oversight of Engineering for the First Quarter of April 20,

2018 2018

QA-2018-0434 RF22 QA Assessment of Refuel Pool Overfill on 4-7-18 April 29,

2018

QH-2018-1628 FME Quick Hit Self-Assessment May 23, 2018

QS-2018-2504 QA Surveillance of Clearance Order Removal February 5,

2018

QS-2018-2510 Surveillance of CARB Meeting 1-17-18 February 5,

2018

QS-2018-2517 QA Observation of Question About Compensatory Measure February 5,

Fire Watch on 1/22/18 2018

QS-2018-2530 Power Block Roof Leaks February 7,

2018

QS-2018-2587 Attended and Observed Meeting on Effects of Modifications March 26,

269 2018

QS-2018-2597 QA Walkdown of Turbine and Control Buildings March 28,

2018

QS-2018-2601 RF22 Observation of Operations Just In Time Training for April 2, 2018

Plant Cooldown

QS-2018-2646 RF22 QA Observation of Holes Being Drilled for SGK05 April 8, 2018

Modification Work on 4/8/18

QS-2018-2649 RF 22 QA Review of FME Monitor Logs in Containment on April 9, 2018

4/8/18

QS-2018-2679 RF22 QA Observation of BHI Workers 4-12-18 April 13,

2018

RA 18-0054 Docket No. 50-482: Wolf Creek Generating Station Cycle April 29,

and Cycle 23 Core Operating Limits Report 2018

STS PE-004 Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test Completed

March 7,

2018

STS PE-004 Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test Completed

March 15,

2018

WCRE-35 Boundary Matrix 0

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/

Date

WCRE-35 Boundary Matrix 3

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection

requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, Control

Number 31500011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to

respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the

requesting document displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget control

number.

This letter and its enclosure will be made available for public inspection and copying at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in

accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, and Requests for

Withholding.

Information Request

January 24, 2018

Notification of Inspection and Request for Information

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Station

NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2018002

INSERVICE INSPECTION DOCUMENT REQUEST

A. Information Requested for the In-Office Preparation Week

The following information should be sent to the Region IV office in hard copy or electronic

format (ims.certrec.com preferred), in care of Isaac Anchondo, by March 26, 2018, to

facilitate the selection of specific items that will be reviewed during the onsite inspection

week. The inspector will select specific items from the information requested below and then

request from your staff additional documents needed during the onsite inspection week

(Section B of this enclosure). We ask that the specific items selected from the lists be

available and ready for review on the first day of inspection. Please provide requested

documentation electronically if possible. If requested documents are large and only hard

copy formats are available, please inform the inspector(s), and provide subject

documentation during the first day of the onsite inspection.

If you have any questions regarding this information request, please call the inspector as

soon as possible.

On April 16, 2018, a reactor inspector from the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC)

Region IV office will perform the baseline inservice inspection at Wolf Creek Nuclear

Operating Station, using NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.08, "Inservice Inspection

Activities. Experience has shown that this inspection is a resource intensive inspection

both for the NRC inspector and your staff. The date of this inspection may change

dependent on the outage schedule you provide. In order to minimize the impact to your

onsite resources and to ensure a productive inspection, we have enclosed a request for

documents needed for this inspection. These documents have been divided into two

groups. The first group (Section A of the enclosure) identified information to be provided

prior to the inspection to ensure that the inspector is adequately prepared. The second

group (Section B of the enclosure) identifies the information the inspector will need upon

arrival at the site. It is important that all of these documents are up to date and complete in

order to minimize the number of additional documents requested during the preparation

and/or the onsite portions of the inspection.

We have discussed the schedule for these inspection activities with your staff and

understand that our regulatory contact for this inspection will be William Muilenburg of your

licensing organization. The tentative inspection schedule is as follows:

Preparation week: March 26, 2018

Onsite weeks: April 16-27, 2018

Our inspection dates are subject to change based on your updated schedule of outage

activities. If there are any questions about this inspection or the material requested, please

contact Isaac Anchondo at (817) 200-1152. (email to: Isaac.Anchondo@nrc.gov).

A.1 ISI/Welding Programs and Schedule Information

1. A detailed schedule (including preliminary dates) of:

1.1. Nondestructive examinations planned for ASME Code Class Components

performed as part of your ASME Section XI, risk informed (if applicable), and

augmented inservice inspection programs during the upcoming outage.

1.2. Examinations planned for Alloy 82/182/600 components that are not included in

the Section XI scope (If applicable)

1.3. Examinations planned as part of your boric acid corrosion control program

(Mode 3 walkdowns, bolted connection walkdowns, etc.)

1.4. Welding activities that are scheduled to be completed during the upcoming

outage (ASME Class 1, 2, or 3 structures, systems, or components)

2. A copy of ASME Section XI Code Relief Requests and associated NRC safety

evaluations applicable to the examinations identified above.

2.1. A list of ASME Code Cases currently being used to include the system and/or

component the Code Case is being applied to.

3. A list of nondestructive examination reports which have identified recordable or

rejectable indications on any ASME Code Class components since the beginning of

the last refueling outage. This should include the previousSection XI pressure test(s)

conducted during start up and any evaluations associated with the results of the

pressure tests.

4. A list including a brief description (e.g., system, code class, weld category,

nondestructive examination performed) associated with the repair/replacement

activities of any ASME Code Class component since the beginning of the last outage

and/or planned this refueling outage.

5. If reactor vessel weld examinations required by the ASME Code are scheduled to

occur during the upcoming outage, provide a detailed description of the welds to be

examined and the extent of the planned examination. Please also provide reference

numbers for applicable procedures that will be used to conduct these examinations.

6. Copy of any 10 CFR Part 21 reports applicable to structures, systems, or

components within the scope of Section XI of the ASME Code that have been

identified since the beginning of the last refueling outage.

7. A list of any temporary non-code repairs in service (e.g., pinhole leaks).

8. Please provide copies of the most recent self-assessments for the inservice

inspection, welding, and Alloy 600 programs.

9. Copy of the procedures for welding techniques, and NDE that will be used during the

outage.

A.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head

1. Provide a detailed scope of the planned bare metal visual examinations (e.g., volume

coverage, limitations, etc.) of the vessel upper head penetrations and/or any

nonvisual nondestructive examination of the reactor vessel head including the

examination procedures to be used.

A.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program

1. Copy of the procedures that govern the scope, equipment and implementation of the

inspections required to identify boric acid leakage and the procedures for boric acid

leakage/corrosion evaluation.

2. Please provide a list of leaks (including code class of the components) that have

been identified since the last refueling outage and associated corrective action

documentation. If during the last cycle, the unit was shutdown, please provide

documentation of containment walkdown inspections performed as part of the boric

acid corrosion control program.

A.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspections

1. A detailed schedule of:

• Steam generator tube inspection, data analyses, and repair activities for the

upcoming outage.

• Steam generator secondary side inspection activities for the upcoming outage

(if occurring).

2. Copy of SG history documentation given to vendors performing eddy current (ET)

testing of the SGs during the upcoming outage.

3. Copy of procedure containing screening criteria used for selecting tubes for in-situ

pressure testing and the procedure to be used for in-situ pressure testing.

4. Copy of previous outage SG tube operational assessment. Also include a copy of

the following documents as they become available:

• Degradation assessment

• Condition monitoring assessment

5. Copy of the document defining the planned SG ET scope (e.g., 100 percent of

unrepaired tubes with bobbin probe and 20 percent sample of hot leg expansion

transition regions with rotating probe) and identify the scope expansion criteria,

which will be applied. Also identify and describe any deviations in this scope or

expansion criteria from the EPRI Guidelines.

6. Copy of the document describing the ET acquisition equipment to be applied

including ET probe types. Also identify the extent of planned tube examination

coverage with each probe type (e.g. rotating probe -0.080 inches, 0.115 inches

pancake coils and mid-range +point coil applied at the top-of-tube-sheet plus 3

inches to minus 12 inches).

7. Identify and quantify any SG tube leakage experienced during the previous operating

cycle. Also provide documentation identifying which SG was leaking and corrective

actions completed and planned for this condition.

8. Copy of steam generator eddy current data analyst guidelines and site validated

eddy current technique specification sheets. Additionally, please provide a copy of

EPRI Appendix H, Examination Technique Specification Sheets, qualification

records.

9. Provide past history of the condition and issues pertaining to the secondary side of

the steam generators (including items such as loose parts, fouling, top of tube sheet

condition, crud removal amounts, etc.).

Indicate where the primary, secondary, and resolution analyses are scheduled to

take place.

A.5 Additional Information Related to all Inservice Inspection Activities

1. A list with a brief description of inservice inspection, and boric acid corrosion control

program related issues (e.g., CR) entered into your corrective action program since

the beginning of the last refueling outage. For example, a list based upon data base

searches using key words related to piping such as: inservice inspection, ASME

Code,Section XI, NDE, cracks, wear, thinning, leakage, rust, corrosion, boric acid, or

errors in piping examinations.

2. Provide training (e.g. Scaffolding, Fall Protection, FME, Confined Space) if they are

required for the activities described in A.1 through A.3.

3. Please provide names and phone numbers for the following program leads:

Inservice inspection (examination, planning)

Containment exams

Reactor pressure vessel head exams

Snubbers and supports

Repair and replacement program

Licensing

Site welding engineer

Boric acid corrosion control program

Steam generator inspection activities (site lead and vendor contact)

B. Information to be Provided Onsite to the Inspector(s) at the Entrance Meeting (April 16,

2018):

B.1 Inservice Inspection / Welding Programs and Schedule Information

1. Updated schedules for inservice inspection/nondestructive examination activities,

including planned welding activities, and schedule showing contingency repair

plans, if available.

2. For ASME Code Class welds selected by the inspector from the lists provided from

section A of this enclosure, please provide copies of the following documentation for

each subject weld:

• Weld data sheet (traveler).

• Weld configuration and system location.

• Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for weldment.

• Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for welding procedures.

• Applicable welding procedures used to fabricate the welds.

• Copies of procedure qualification records (PQRs) supporting the weld

procedures from B.1.b.v.

• Copies of welders performance qualification records (WPQ).

• Copies of the nonconformance reports for the selected welds (If

applicable).

• Radiographs of the selected welds and access to equipment to allow

viewing radiographs (if radiographic testing was performed).

• Copies of the preservice examination records for the selected welds.

• Readily accessible copies of nondestructive examination personnel

qualifications records for reviewing.

3. For the inservice inspection related corrective action issues selected by the inspector

from section A of this enclosure, provide a copy of the corrective actions and

supporting documentation.

4. For the nondestructive examination reports with relevant conditions on an ASME Code

Class components selected by the inspector from Section A above, provide a copy of

the examination records, examiner qualification records, and associated corrective

action documents.

5. A copy of (or ready access to) most current revision of the inservice inspection

program manual and plan for the current interval.

6. For the nondestructive examinations selected by the inspector from section A of this

enclosure, provide a copy of the nondestructive examination procedures used to

perform the examinations (including calibration and flaw characterization/sizing

procedures). For ultrasonic examination procedures qualified in accordance with

ASME Code,Section XI, Appendix VIII, provide documentation supporting the

procedure qualification (e.g. the EPRI performance demonstration qualification

summary sheets). Also, include qualification documentation of the specific equipment

to be used (e.g., ultrasonic unit, cables, and transducers including serial numbers) and

nondestructive examination personnel qualification records.

B.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head

1. Provide the nondestructive personnel qualification records for the examiners who will

perform examinations of the reactor pressure vessel head replacement.

2. Provide drawings showing the following:

• Reactor pressure vessel head and control rod drive mechanism nozzle

configurations

• Reactor pressure vessel head insulation configuration

Note: The drawings listed above should include fabrication drawings for the nozzle

attachment welds as applicable.

B.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program

1. Please provide boric acid walk down inspection results, an updated list of boric acid

leaks identified so far this outage, associated corrective action documentation, and

overall status of planned boric acid inspections.

2. Please provide any engineering evaluations completed for boric acid leaks identified

since the end of the last refueling outage. Please include a status of corrective actions

to repair and/or clean these boric acid leaks. Please identify specifically which known

leaks, if any, have remained in service or will remain in service as active leaks.

B.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspections

1. Copies of the Examination Technique Specification Sheets and associated

justification for any revisions.

2. Please provide a copy of the eddy current testing procedures used to perform the

steam generator tube inspections (specifically calibration and flaw

characterization/sizing procedures, etc.).

3. Copy of the guidance to be followed if a loose part or foreign material is identified in

the steam generators.

4. Identify the types of SG tube repair processes which will be implemented for defective

SG tubes (including any NRC reviews/evaluations/approvals of this repair process).

Provide the flaw depth sizing criteria to be applied for ET indications identified in the

SG tubes.

5. Copy of documents describing actions to be taken if a new SG tube degradation

mechanism is identified.

6. Provide procedures with guidance/instructions for identifying (e.g. physically locating

the tubes that require plugging) and plugging SG tubes.

7. List of corrective action documents generated by the vendor and/or site with respect

to steam generator inspection activities.

B.5 Codes and Standards

1. Ready access to (i.e., copies provided to the inspector(s) for use during the inspection

at the onsite inspection location, or room number and location where available):

• Applicable Editions of the ASME Code (Sections V, IX, and XI) for the

inservice inspection program and the repair/replacement program.

2. Copy of the performance demonstration initiative (PDI) generic procedures with the

latest applicable revisions that support site qualified ultrasonic examinations of piping

welds and components (e.g., PDI-UT-1, PDI-UT-2, PDI-UT-3, PDI-UT-10, etc.).

3. Boric Acid Corrosion Guidebook Revision 1 - EPRI Technical Report 1000975.

The following items are requested for the

Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection

Wolf Creek

April 9-13, 2018

Integrated Report 2018002

Inspection areas are listed in the attachments below.

Please provide the requested information on or before March 22, 2018.

Please submit this information using the same lettering system as below. For example, all

contacts and phone numbers for Inspection Procedure 71124.01 should be in a file/folder titled

1- A, applicable organization charts in file/folder 1- B, etc.

If information is placed on ims.certrec.com, please ensure the inspection exit date entered is at

least 30 days later than the onsite inspection dates, so the inspectors will have access to the

information while writing the report.

In addition to the corrective action document lists provided for each inspection procedure listed

below, please provide updated lists of corrective action documents at the entrance meeting.

The dates for these lists should range from the end dates of the original lists to the day of the

entrance meeting.

If more than one inspection procedure is to be conducted and the information requests appear

to be redundant, there is no need to provide duplicate copies. Enter a note explaining in which

file the information can be found.

If you have any questions or comments, please contact Natasha Greene at (817) 200-1154 or

natasha.greene@nrc.gov.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject

to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information

collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget,

control number 3150-0011.

1. Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) and

Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

Date of Last Inspection: May 8, 2017

A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the Radiation Protection Organization Staff

and Technicians

B. Applicable organization charts

C. Audits, self-assessments, and LERs written since date of last inspection, related to this

inspection area

D. Procedure indexes for the radiation protection procedures

E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.

Additional Specific Procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews

the procedure indexes.

1. Radiation Protection Program Description

2. Radiation Protection Conduct of Operations

3. Personnel Dosimetry Program

4. Posting of Radiological Areas

5. High Radiation Area Controls

6. RCA Access Controls and Radiation Worker Instructions

7. Conduct of Radiological Surveys

8. Radioactive Source Inventory and Control

9. Declared Pregnant Worker Program

F. List of corrective action documents (including corporate and sub-tiered systems) since

date of last inspection

a. Initiated by the radiation protection organization

b. Assigned to the radiation protection organization

NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search

criteria used. Please provide in document formats which are searchable so that

the inspector can perform word searches.

If not covered above, a summary of corrective action documents since date of last

inspection involving unmonitored releases, unplanned releases, or releases in which any

dose limit or administrative dose limit was exceeded (for Public Radiation Safety

Performance Indicator verification in accordance with IP 71151)

G. List of radiologically significant work activities scheduled to be conducted during the

inspection period (If the inspection is scheduled during an outage, please also include a

list of work activities greater than 1 rem, scheduled during the outage with the dose

estimate for the work activity.)

H. List of active radiation work permits

I. Radioactive source inventory list

a. All radioactive sources that are required to be leak tested

b. All radioactive sources that meet the 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix E, Category 2

and above threshold. Please indicate the radioisotope, initial and current activity

(w/assay date), and storage location for each applicable source.

J. The last two leak test results for the radioactive sources inventoried and required to be

leak tested. If applicable, specifically provide a list of all radioactive source(s) that have

failed its leak test within the last two years

K. A current listing of any non-fuel items stored within your pools, and if available, their

appropriate dose rates (Contact / @ 30cm)

L. Computer printout of radiological controlled area entries greater than 100 millirem since

the previous inspection to the current inspection entrance date. The printout should

include the date of entry, some form of worker identification, the radiation work permit

used by the worker, dose accrued by the worker, and the electronic dosimeter dose

alarm set-point used during the entry (for Occupational Radiation Safety Performance

Indicator verification in accordance with IP 71151).

Initial Request for Information

Integrated Inspection

Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection Report: 05000482/2018002

Inspection Dates: April 1 - June 30, 2018

Inspection Procedure: Integrated Inspection Procedures

Lead Inspector: Douglas Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector

I. Information Requested Prior to March 22, 2018

The following information should be provided in electronic format (Certrec IMS preferred),

to the attention of Douglas Dodson by March 22, 2018, to facilitate the reduction in the

items to be selected for a final list during inspection preparation. The inspection team

will finalize its sample selections and will provide an additional information request with

specific items. This information shall be made available by March 22, 2018. The specific

items selected from the lists shall be available and ready for review on the day indicated

in this request. *Please provide requested documentation electronically in pdf files,

Excel, or other searchable formats, if possible. The information should contain descriptive

names, and be indexed and hyperlinked to facilitate ease of use. Information in lists

should contain enough information to be easily understood by someone who has

knowledge of pressurized water reactor technology. If requested documents are large

and/or only hard copy formats are available, please inform the inspector(s), and provide

subject documentation.

1. Any pre-existing evaluation or list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system

components and associated calculations with low design margins.

2. A list of high risk spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system maintenance rule

components and functions based on engineering or expert panel judgment.

3. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related operating experience

evaluations for the last 3 years.

4. A list of all spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system time-critical operator actions in

procedures.

5. A list of permanent and temporary modifications related to spent fuel pool cooling

and cleanup system sorted by component.

6. A list of current spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related operator work

arounds/burdens.

7. A list of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system design calculations, which

provide the design margin information for components.

8. List of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system root cause evaluations

associated with component failures or design issues initiated/completed in the

last 5 years.

9. A list of any spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system common-cause failures of

components in the last 3 years.

10. An electronic copy of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system design bases

documents and any open, pending, or recently completed changes. Although not an

exhaustive list, please include any open, pending, or recently completed (last 3 years)

changes to temporary modifications, permanent modifications, engineering change

packages, and/or procedure change packages. Specifically, please include any open,

pending, or recently completed changes to emergency operating, abnormal operating,

normal operating, alarm response, system alignment, surveillance, or other procedure.

11. An electronic copy of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system System Health

notebook.

2. A copy of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related audits completed in the

last 2 years.

13. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system motor operated valves

(MOVs) in the program, design margin and risk ranking.

14. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system air operated valves (AOVs) in

the valve program, design margin and risk ranking.

15. Spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system structure, system, and components

maintenance rule category, scoping, unavailability data, unreliability data, functional

failure evaluations, (a)(1) determinations, (a)(1) goals, and any supporting basis

documentation.

16. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system licensee contacts for the

inspection team with pager or phone numbers.

17. An excel spreadsheet of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related PRA

human action basic events or risk ranking of operator actions from your site specific

PSA sorted by RAW and FV. Provide copies of your human reliability worksheets

for these items.

18. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide an Excel

spreadsheet of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related equipment basic

events (with definitions) including importance measures sorted by risk achievement

worth (RAW) and Fussell-Vesely (FV) from your internal events probabilistic risk

assessment (PRA). Include basic events with RAW value of 1.3 or greater.

19. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide a list of the top 50

cut-sets from your PRA.

20. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide copies of PRA

system notebooks, and the latest PRA summary document.

21. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, and if you have an external events

or fire PSA model, provide the information requested in items 17-19 for external

events and fire, as it relates to the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system.

2. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide a copy of the Wolf

Creek Nuclear Generating Station IPEEE changes, if available electronically.

ML18226A175

SUNSI Review ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:

By: NHTaylor Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive NRC-002

OFFICE SRI:DRP/B RI: DRP/B C:DRS/OB C:DRS/PSB2 C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2

NAME DDodson FThomas VGaddy HGepford TFarnholtz JDrake

SIGNATURE ded fdt vgg hjg WcS for jfd

DATE 8/3/2018 08/03/18 8/1/2018 8/1/2018 8/1/18 8/1/18

OFFICE PE:DRP/B BC:DRP/B

NAME JMelfi NTaylor

SIGNATURE jfm NHT

DATE 8/3/18 8/12/18