IR 05000482/2018002
| ML18226A175 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/2018 |
| From: | Nick Taylor NRC Region 4 |
| To: | Heflin A Wolf Creek |
| References | |
| Download: ML18226A175 (60) | |
Text
ust 12, 2018
SUBJECT:
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2018002 AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER
Dear Mr. Heflin:
On June 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. On July 17, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. Additionally, NRC inspectors documented one Severity Level IV violation with no associated finding. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station.
In the 2017 Annual Assessment Letter for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2017006, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) ML18052A345), the NRC identified a cross-cutting theme in the safety conscious work environment (SCWE) area. On August 8, 2018, the NRC documented an assessment of the licensees progress in addressing the SCWE theme in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2018007 (ADAMS ML18218A265). The inspectors determined that while the licensee had taken some corrective actions to address the work environment challenges on site, these actions had not yet been effective to improve the SCWE in the maintenance support group.
Based on this conclusion and the previously documented finding with a cross-cutting aspect related to the inconsistent implementation of SCWE policy (S.1), as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2017004 (ADAMS ML18043A114), the NRC determined that a theme in the SCWE area continues to exist. The NRC will continue to monitor your staffs progress in implementing corrective actions for this theme.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Nicholas H. Taylor, Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-482 License No. NPF-42
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000482/2018002 w/Attachments:
1. Documents Reviewed 2 Request for Information Inservice Inspection 3. Request for Information O
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 05000482 License Number: NPF-42 Report Number: 05000482/2018002 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-002-0012 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station Location: Burlington, Kansas Inspection Dates: April 1, 2018 to June 30, 2018 Inspectors: D. Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector F. Thomas, Resident Inspector C. Alldredge, Health Physicist I. Anchondo, Reactor Inspector J. Melfi, Project Engineer J. ODonnell, CHP, Health Physicist Approved By: N. Taylor Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects 1 Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an Integrated Inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC-identified and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations Announcement of an NRC Inspectors Presence by Station Personnel Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Not Severity Level IV Not 71111.20 -
Applicable NCV Applicable Refueling 05000482/2018002-01 and Other Closed Outage Activities The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4),
Inspections, associated with the licensees failure to ensure the arrival and presence of NRC Inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility without a specific request by the NRC inspector.
Specifically, a contract radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building where the resident inspector was present and observing core offload activities, and the technician informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of an NRC radiation protection inspection team without being requested to do so; this impacts the NRCs ability to regulate and perform unannounced inspections.
Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.3] - 71152 -
Systems NCV 05000482/2018002-02 Human Problem Closed Performance, Identification Change and Management Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately recognize that the cable spreading room floor was a control building ventilation isolation boundary. Specifically, the licensee cut openings in the floor/ceiling between the 2,032 foot and 2,016 foot elevations of the control building and the impact on the control room envelopes ability to pressurize was not recognized. This was a primary contributor to the train B control room emergency ventilation system being unable to maintain the appropriate pressure in the control room envelope.
Failure to Adequately Implement Instrumentation and Controls Surveillance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Green [H.2] - Human 71152 -
Events NCV 05000482/2018002-03 Performance, Problem Closed Field Presence Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement surveillance procedures that affected safety-related equipment and plant stability. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately implement testing and calibration procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation. This resulted in two letdown isolation signals, securing of pressurizer heaters, and a pressurizer level transient on March 29, 2018.
PLANT STATUS
Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period shutdown for Refueling Outage 22.
The reactor was restarted on May 17, 2018, and power ascension was commenced. The unit was returned to approximately rated thermal power on May 21, 2018, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program
- Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in Inspection Manual Chapter 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01Adverse Weather Protection Summer Readiness
The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC)power systems.
71111.04Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Essential service water train B on June 20, 2018
- (2) Auxiliary feedwater train B on June 26, 2018.
Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the spent fuel pool cooling system April 8 through April 15, 2018.
71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly Quarterly Inspection
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Volume control tank and volume control tank valve compartment, fire area A-8 on April 21, 2018
- (2) Reactor building, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas RB-1 and RB-2 on May 16, 2018
- (3) Reactor building, elevation 2,026 feet, fire areas RB-2, RB-3, RB-4, RB-7, and RB-8 on May 16, 2018
- (4) Reactor building, elevation 2,047 feet, fire areas RB-5 and RB-10 on May 16, 2018
- (5) Reactor building, elevation 2,068 feet 8 inches, fire areas RB-6 and RB-10 on May 16, 2018
- (6) Fuel pool heat exchanger rooms and general area, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas F-1, F-2, and F-3 on May 31, 2018.
===71111.06Flood Protection Measures Cables (Partial Sample)
The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in essential service water electrical manhole MHE1A on June 18, 2018.
71111.08Inservice Inspection Activities ===
- (1) Nondestructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities The inspector directly observed the following nondestructive examinations:
SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Reactor Vessel Control Rod Drive Mechanism Visual (VE)
Head Penetration Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 14, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 38, 43, 54, 66, 71, and 74.
The inspector reviewed records for the following nondestructive examinations:
SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Feedwater Weld Number AE-04-F015 and Ultrasonic System AE-04-S010-C (Data Sheet Number AGF_012)
SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Feedwater Steam Generator A Inner Radius - Ultrasonic System Weld Number EBB01A-11-IR (Data Sheet Number AJS_010)
Steam Steam Weld Number EBB01A- Ultrasonic Generator STEAM-3-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_002)
Steam Steam Weld Number EBB01A- Ultrasonic Generator STEAM-6-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_003)
Steam Weld Number EBB01A-11-W Ultrasonic Generator (Data Sheet Number RAL_004)
Steam Steam Weld Number EBB01A- Ultrasonic Generator STEAM-2-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_005)
- (2) Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities The inspector reviewed the results of the licensees bare metal visual inspection of the reactor vessel upper head penetrations. The inspector also reviewed whether the required inspection coverage was achieved and whether limitations were properly recorded. The inspector reviewed whether the personnel performing the inspection were certified examiners to their respective nondestructive examination method.
On May 10, 2018, the licensee was granted verbal approval for performing an alternative volumetric examination and leak path assessment in lieu of the visual examination requirements of Note 1 of Table 1, American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Case N-729-4. Although not indicative of possible nozzle leakage, the licensee was not able to perform the required visual examination of penetration number one due to a hard substance obstructing the annulus. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had satisfactorily completed the ultrasonic inspection and leak path assessment. The licensee had also cleaned the annulus of penetration number one.
- (3) Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities The Inspector evaluated the licensees boric acid control program performance.
- (4) Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Activities The inspector reviewed the SG tube eddy current examination scope and expansion criteria to determine whether these criteria met technical specification requirements, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidelines, and commitments made to the NRC. The inspector also reviewed whether the eddy current inspection scope included areas of degradations that were known to represent potential eddy current test challenges such as the top of tube sheet, tube support plates, and U-bends. The inspector confirmed that no repairs were required at the time of the inspection and that the licensees inspection scope was appropriate.
- (5) Identification and Resolution of Problems (71111.08-02.05)
The inspector reviewed 14 condition reports, which dealt with inservice inspection activities, and found the corrective actions for inservice inspection issues were appropriate.
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Requalification
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator simulator requalification exams on
===May 31, 2018.
Operator Performance (1 Sample)===
The inspectors observed and evaluated operator performance during energization of the XNB01 transformer and NB01 safety-related bus on May 2, 2018, and performance of STS AE-211, Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test, during startup activities on May 17, 2018.
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system level instrumentation reading erratically on May 24, 2017.
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Elevated risk during lowered inventory and preparations for reactor head lift on April 6, 2018, and refueling water storage tank unavailability on April 7, 2018
- (2) Elevated spent fuel pool cooling risk while defueled on April 19 and April 21, 2018
- (3) Elevated risk during Mode 5 while implementing low temperature overpressure protection controls and emergency core cooling pump testing on May 8 and 9, 2018.
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Operability evaluation of safety injection and accumulator to loop 1 check valve bonnet bolting issues on April 22, 2018
- (2) Operability evaluation of start-up transformer XMR01 power factor testing on April 25, 2018
- (3) Operability evaluation of thermal sleeve inspection results on May 8, 2018
- (4) Operability evaluation of train A safety injection pump for motor current reading higher than name plate rating on May 11, 2018.
71111.18Plant Modifications
The inspectors evaluated the spent fuel pool alternate decay heat removal permanent modification.
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
- (1) Start-up transformer XMR01 testing after switchyard modification and transmission line modification on April 27, 2018
- (2) Emergency diesel generator train B 24-hour testing following outage maintenance on May 1, 2018
- (3) Centrifugal charging pump train A testing after completion of seal maintenance on May 9, 2018
- (4) STS EM-100A, Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test, following A safety injection pump replacement work on May 11, 2018
- (5) Train B spent fuel pool cooling pump testing after boric acid cleaning and oil sample on May 31, 2018
- (6) STS IC-503B, Channel Calibration Pressurizer Level, following emergent bistable card replacement on June 19, 2018.
71111.20Refueling and Other Outage Activities
The inspectors evaluated Refueling Outage 22 activities from April 1 to May 18, 2018.
The inspectors completed inspection procedure Sections 03.01.d and 03.01.e.
71111.22Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Routine
- (1) STS KJ-001B, Integrated D/G and Safeguard Actuation Test - Train B, on May 11, 2018
In-service (1 Sample)
May 2, 2018 Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection (1 Sample)
Containment Isolation Valve (1 Sample)
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls Radiological Hazard Assessment
The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards assessments and controls.
Instructions to Workers (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated worker instructions.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated contamination and radioactive material controls.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards control and work coverage.
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated risk-significant high radiation area and very high radiation area controls.
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance and radiation protection technician proficiency.
71124.02Occupational As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls
The inspectors reviewed ALARA practices and radiological work controls by reviewing the following activities:
- (2) RWP 182601, Routine Outage Access (No Locked High Radiation Areas)
- (3) RWP 182300, Maintenance Support
- (6) RWP 184420, Scaffolding Activities RF22
- (7) RWP 184482, Canopy Seal Clamp Activities Disassembly
Radiation Worker Performance (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
- (1) BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (04/01/2017-03/31/2018)
- (2) BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (04/01/2017-03/31/2018)
- (3) OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (04/01/2017-3/30/2018)
- (4) PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (04/01/2017-03/30/2018).
71152Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) On March 5, 2018, Condition Report 120056 documented that the required control room pressurization could not be developed.
- (2) On March 29, 2018, Condition Report 120807 documented that incorrect test switches were operated during a performance of STS IC-503B, Channel Calibration Pressurizer Level.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Announcement of an NRC Inspectors Presence by Station Personnel Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV Not Applicable
71111.20 - Refueling NCV
and Other Outage 05000482/2018002-01 Activities Closed The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), Inspections, associated with the licensees failure to ensure the arrival and presence of NRC Inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility without a specific request by the NRC inspector. Specifically, a contract radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building where the resident inspector was present and observing core offload activities, and the technician informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of an NRC radiation protection inspection team without being requested to do so; this impacted the NRCs ability to regulate and perform unannounced inspections.
Description:
On April 10, 2018, the resident inspector was in the spent fuel pool building observing fuel movement activities in support of core off-load for Refueling Outage 22. NRC radiation protection inspectors were also onsite conducting inspection activities. At approximately 11:00 a.m., the resident inspector observed a BHI contractor enter the spent fuel pool building and announce to members of a work crew that NRC inspectors had entered the radiologically controlled area (containment) and to be mindful and careful.
The resident inspector spoke with the visiting NRC radiation protection inspectors later that afternoon and confirmed they had entered containment at approximately 10:30 a.m. on April 10, 2018, and had not requested that their presence be announced. The resident inspector noted that his location in the spent fuel pool building, where the announcement of NRC inspectors had occurred, was in close proximity to where the other NRC inspectors were entering containment.
Corrective Actions: On April 25, 2018, the licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program. Additional corrective actions included the performance of a stand down with all BHI employees to inform them that conduct that alerts workers to the presence of the NRC, or any oversight group, is prohibited; the licensee also published an article in a site newsletter explaining the requirements of 10 CFR 50.70. The article informed site personnel that a violation had occurred and described site management expectations regarding appropriate conduct.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 122359 and 122375.
Performance Assessment:
The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency.
Enforcement:
The Reactor Oversight Processs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance.
Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation, which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate, using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.
Severity: The finding was evaluated in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management and because the violation was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV NCV, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), Inspections, requires, in part, that the licensee shall ensure that the arrival and presence of an NRC inspector, who has been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), is not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility unless specifically requested by the NRC inspector.
Contrary to the above, on April 10, 2018, the licensee failed to ensure that the arrival and presence of NRC inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility unless specifically requested by the NRC inspectors. Specifically, a radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building and informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of NRC radiation protection inspectors without being requested to do so.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation
71152 - Problem
Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed the licensees progress in addressing the cross-cutting theme in the SCWE area, as discussed in the 2017 Annual Assessment Letter for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2017006, ADAMS ML18052A345). The NRCs review of the licensees progress in addressing the SCWE theme was accomplished within the scope of the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection, which was completed on June 28, 2018. NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2018007 (ADAMS ML18218A265), dated August 8, 2018, discusses the results of this inspection, which concluded that actions taken to address the work environment challenges in the maintenance support group had not yet been effective.
The inspectors also considered whether there was an emerging trend associated with impacting the regulatory process. The inspectors noted NCV 05000482/2018002-01, as documented in this report, which involved announcement of an NRC inspectors presence by station personnel. The inspectors also noted that the announcement of an inspectors presence was not an isolated event. Specifically, the presence of an NRC inspector was announced by a Wolf Creek employee to a state official during a drill on February 27, 2018.
However, the inspectors determined that no violation occurred in this case because the announcement, which was not requested by the inspector, was not made to licensee personnel and was thereby outside the NRCs regulatory authority. These issues and other reportability questions being evaluated by ongoing inspections were considered, and no emerging trend has been identified at this time.
The inspectors noted that four NCVs that occurred within an approximate 1 year time period relate to the licensees understanding of the design basis and design basis implementing documents. Specifically:
- NCV 05000482/2018002-02, Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope, involved a failure to ensure an implementing documentthe boundary matrixidentified all boundary functions; this led to a failure to control a boundary and was a primary contributor to the failure to pressurize the control room envelope.
- NCV 05000482/2018001-01, Inadequate Functionality Assessment Associated with the Emergency Excess Letdown Flowpath, involved discrepancies between the Technical Specification Bases, procedures, and the updated safety analysis report; these discrepancies contributed to an inadequate functionality assessment.
- NCV 05000482/2017003-02, Failure to Ensure the Design Basis was Adequately Represented in the Technical Specification Bases, involved discrepancies between the auxiliary feedwater Technical Specification Bases and the updated safety analysis report; as a result, inoperability of an auxiliary feedwater train was not recognized.
- NCV 05000482/2017002-02, Failure to Declare Train A Component Cooling Water Inoperable, related to the Technical Specification Bases not specifically identifying specific valves importance to the safety-related design functions as outlined in the updated safety analysis report; as a result, inoperability of safety-related equipment was not recognized.
In each of these cases the inspectors observed that the updated safety analysis report was not consistently being referenced when questions about the adequacy or completeness of the Technical Specification Bases were identified. The inspectors also observed that each of these NCVs represented some organizational knowledge gap concerning the design basis as outlined in the updated safety analysis report.
Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Section Aspect Mitigating Green [H.3] - Human
71152 - Systems NCV 05000482/2018002-02 Performance, Problem
Closed Change Identification Management and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately recognize that the cable spreading room floor was a control building ventilation isolation boundary. Specifically, the licensee cut openings in the floor/ceiling between the 2,032 foot and 2,016 foot elevations of the control building and the impact on the control room envelopes ability to pressurize was not recognized. This was a primary contributor to the train B control room emergency ventilation system being unable to maintain the appropriate pressure in the control room envelope.
Description:
On March 5, 2018, the licensee performed Procedure STS PE-004, Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test, Revision 16, and the train B control room emergency ventilation systems ability to pressurize the control room envelope and maintain pressure greater than or equal to 0.25 inches water gauge failed. Readings varied from nearly no measurable differential pressurerelative to outside airto approximately 0.15 inches water gauge. During this test, control building doors were not controlled.
Later tests on March 5, 2018, which maintained control of control building doors, had results that varied between 0.18 and 0.26 inches water gauge, with an average of 0.2258 inches water gauge. Troubleshooting was performed and, on March 6, 2018, an interim configuration associated with Design Change Package 14269, SGK05 Tech Spec Addition and Compensatory Modifications, was found to be impacting readings. Specifically, between September 17, 2017, and January 17, 2018, four approximately 2 foot by 2 foot openings were cut in the floor/ceiling between the 2,032 foot and 2,016 foot elevations of the control building to support ongoing ductwork installation.
On January 17, 2018, after penetrations for the modification were completed, compensatory measures consisting of steel plates covering the four floor openings were in place until ductwork installation began on February 19, 2018. These compensatory measures were put in place for fire, flood, and other functional concerns. On February 12, 2018, while the compensatory measures were in place, the train A control room emergency ventilation system successfully pressurized the control room envelope to 0.38 inches water gauge, demonstrating that the compensatory measures were adequate for maintaining control room envelope pressurization capability when in place.
Surveillance testing was performed for trains A and B of the control room emergency ventilation system on March 15, 2018, and the control room envelope was pressurized to 0.3448 and 0.3695 inches water gauge, respectively, which met surveillance requirements.
The system was restored to operable on March 16, 2018.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees cause evaluation, which determined that the probable causes of the issue were inadequate identification of control building ventilation isolation boundaries in WCRE-35, Boundary Matrix, Revision 0, and control of conditions during STS PE-004. Specifically, the inspectors also determined that the 2,016 foot to 2,032 foot elevation breaches were a primary contributor to the failure of the control room emergency ventilation system to maintain adequate control room envelope pressure. The inspectors noted that WCRE-35, which was referenced during modification work for Design Change Package 14269, did not identify the barriers between the 2,016 and 2,032 foot elevations of the control building as control building ventilation isolation boundaries. WCRE-35 was a new document that was first approved on November 30, 2016, and was created from A, Boundary Matrix, of AP 10-104, Breach Authorization, Revision 35.
WCRE-35 notes, The information in the attachment has been copied directly from the procedure Attachment A, but when there were discrepancies identified the information has been verified and updated. The inspectors determined that the creation of the new WCRE-35 document was an opportunity for the licensee to recognize the subject boundarys importance and categorize the barrier as a control building ventilation isolation boundary.
Corrective Actions: The licensee completed Revision 3 of WCRE-35 on April 16, 2018, which reflects additional control building ventilation isolation boundaries, essential reading was issued, and other actions were performed to improve control room envelope pressurization margin.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report 120056.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to recognize control building ventilation isolation boundaries and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, Design Control, is a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the control room emergency ventilation systems ability to maintain adequate pressurization of the control room envelope was adversely impacted after an ongoing ventilation modification breached the floor without compensatory measures in place.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room and represents a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere. Thus, a detailed risk evaluation is required.
The senior reactor analyst evaluated the subject performance deficiency and resulting plant conditions to determine the risk impact on the plant. The analyst identified that the control room emergency ventilation system is not a significant risk contributor, because it does not directly affect the core damage frequency, provided operators have a habitable environment.
Although the control room boundary was significantly degraded in the as-found condition, either train of the control room emergency ventilation system was capable of maintaining the control room envelope with some level of pressurization, based on multiple test results.
Therefore, while some deterioration of the control room environment could be expected, the control room emergency ventilation system appeared to be capable of maintaining a habitable environment throughout the relatively limited exposure period of the performance deficiency.
As a result, the increase in risk caused by the degraded condition of the control room envelope was negligible, and the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of change management in that leaders did not use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority. Specifically, managers did not ensure that individuals understood the importance of, and their role in, the change management process when WCRE-35 was recently revised and implemented. As a result, WCRE-35 did not identify all control building ventilation isolation boundaries.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies, measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license application, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.
Contrary to the above, until April 16, 2018, for quality-related components associated with the control building, to which 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, applies, the licensee failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license application, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that all control building ventilation isolation boundaries were adequately identified in WCRE-35, Boundary Matrix, which the station uses to identify boundary functions, such that the control room envelope could be adequately pressurized in accordance with design basis requirements.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Adequately Implement Instrumentation and Controls Surveillance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Section Aspect Initiating Green [H.2] - Human
71152 - Events NCV 05000482/2018002-03 Performance, Problem
Closed Field Presence Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement surveillance procedures that affected safety-related equipment and plant stability. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately implement testing and calibration procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation. This resulted in two letdown isolation signals, securing of pressurizer heaters, and a pressurizer level transient on March 29, 2018.
Description:
On March 29, 2018, the licensee was performing Procedure STS IC-503B, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration, Revision 12. This surveillance procedure performs calibration and testing activities associated with three pressurizer level channels, one-at-a-time. To perform calibration of each channel, a control room operator selects away from the channel to be tested, which ensures the controlling pressurizer level channels are not being tested. This allows maintenance technicians to perform calibration and testing activities associated with the desired channel. Following calibration and testing of each channel, the channel is restored and actions are taken to select away from the next desired channel to be tested, which again ensures the controlling pressurizer level channels are not being tested.
During the testing on March 29, 2018, station personnel successfully completed the calibration of channel 459, which is located in the SB038 cabinet. The technicians then informed the control room operator they were moving to the next section of the procedure associated with channel 460, and the operator selected away from channel 460 in accordance with procedure. The technicians had flagged a switch to be manipulated in cabinet SB038, but had incorrectly flagged the switch for channel 459. As a result, channel 459 was again taken to the test position, but this channel was now a controlling pressurizer level channel since channel 460 was to be tested next. The instrument failed low, which resulted in an actual pressurizer level transientlevel got as high as approximately 63 percent from a normal level of approximately 56.6 percentisolation of letdown, and automatic de-energization of the pressurizer back-up heaters.
Step 8.3.3 of Procedure STS IC-503B stated, At C2-0847 (LS/460), PLACE BS-1 (LS/460A)to TEST position. This procedure step was not followed and the technicians did not adequately use human performance tools to ensure they were in the appropriate cabinet and flagging the appropriate channel, and supervision was not present when the inappropriate cabinet was flagged.
Operators responded to the transient using Off-Normal Procedure OFN SB-008, Instrument Malfunctions, Revision 45, reselected channel 460 as the controlling pressurizer level channel in accordance with the off-normal procedure, and an operator stated to the technician that they had received the 459 loop alarms. The technician then restored channel 459 from the test position without supervision and proceeded on in Procedure STS IC-503B.
Procedure OFN SB-008 had ensured that the alternate pressurizer level channel on the pressurizer level control selector switch was selected. The technician did not re-perform Step 8.3.1.b, which states, Place BB LS-459D, PZR LEV CRTL SEL switch to L459/L461 position, before proceeding with channel 460 testing. Thus, when channel 460 was taken to the test position, this caused a second actual pressurizer level transientlevel got as high as 63 percenta second letdown isolation signal (though it had not yet been restored), and a second automatic de-energization of the back-up heaters signal was received. Operators again responded to the transient and stabilized the plant. Additionally, following the second actual pressurizer level transient operators provided the order to the technician to, stop work.
The licensees evaluation determined that because of the risk associated with this task, supervisory oversight was required. Specifically, the qualitative risk screening performed for the task identified the need for leadership team member implementation oversight as a risk mitigating action. However, the oversight had not yet made it to the control room. The inspectors agreed with the licensees conclusions that the lack of oversight was the most significant contributor to both failures to follow procedures.
Corrective Actions: The transient was stabilized, work was stopped following the second event, an event review was conducted, a stand-down was initiated, technician qualifications were removed, communications were made to operations and the site, and an interim action was created to have an operations individual present during two-minute drills for any work performed in the cabinets in the back of the control room.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report 120807.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to adequately implement the testing and calibration procedure for pressurizer level instrumentation on two occasions and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation calibration were not followed on two occasions:
- (1) when an instrumentation and control technician failed to take the appropriate channel to test in accordance with procedure; and
- (2) when the individual failed to adequately verify the appropriate channels were selected in accordance with procedure on March 29, 2018. These actions failed the 459 level transmitter channel low inappropriately and then subsequently failed the 460 level transmitter channel low inappropriately, respectively.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in two separate actual pressurizer level transients, letdown isolation signals, and signals for automatic de-energization of the pressurizer back-up heaters.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding was not a deficiency that caused a plant trip and did not cause the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a trip to stable plant shutdown (e.g. loss of condenser, loss of feedwater). Furthermore, there were no other events such as a high energy line break, internal flooding, or fire. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of field presence in that senior managers did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities. Specifically, managers and supervisors did not practice visible leadership in the field and during safety significant evolutions like performance of Procedure STS IC-503B by placing eyes on the problem, coaching, mentoring, reinforcing standards and reinforcing positive decision making practices and behaviors, which led to the multiple examples of failure to follow procedures.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances.
- (1) Procedure STS IC-503B, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration, Revision 12, an Appendix B quality related procedure, provides instructions for performing pressurizer level instrument calibration testing. Procedure STS IC-503B, Step 8.3.3, requires that BS-1 (LS/460A) be placed in the test position. Contrary to the above, on March 29, 2018, BS-1 (LS/460A) was not placed in the test position.
Specifically, the 459 channel was placed in the test position inappropriately.
- (2) Procedure STS IC-503B, Step 8.3.1.b, requires, in part, verification that BB LS-459D, the pressurizer level control selector switch, be placed in the L459/L461 position for channel 460 testing and calibration. Contrary to the above, on March 29, 2018, verification that BB LS-459D, the pressurizer level control selector switch, was placed in the L459/L461 position for channel 460 testing and calibration was not performed.
Specifically, testing and calibration of channel 460 occurred while channel 460 was selected as the controlling channel.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
On April 13, 2018, the inspector presented the occupational radiation safety inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On May 8, 2018, the inspector presented the inservice inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On July 17, 2018, the inspector presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71111.01Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
Number Title Revision
OFN AF-025 Unit Limitations 55
Drawings
Number Title Revision
KD-7496 One Line Diagram 67
Condition Reports
23867 123954 123955 123956 123957
23958 123959 123961 123962 123963
23968 123969
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Date
Temporary Waverly-LaCygne 345 kV line outages Expires
Operating Guide December 31,
2018
Transmission Outage of the Wolf Creek-Benton 345 kV Line February 28,
Operating 2018
Directive 0300
Transmission Outage of the Wolf Creek-Rose Hill 345 kV Line February 28,
Operating 2018
Directive 0301
Transmission Outage of Wolf Creek 345 kV Breaker 345-40 or 345-60 February 28,
Operating 2018
Directive 0306
Transmission Outage of the Wolf Creek-Waverly 345 kV Line February 28,
Operating 2018
Directive 0307
Transmission Outage of the Waverly-LaCygne 345 kV Line February 28,
Operating 2018
Directive 0308
71111.04Equipment Alignment
Procedures
Number Title Revision
CKL AL-120 Auxiliary Feedwater Normal Lineup 42
CKL EC-120 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Normal Valve 17
Lineup/Breaker Checklist
CKL EF-120 Essential Service Water Valve, Breaker and Switch Lineup 54
Drawings
Number Title Revision
E-13EC09 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power 1
Supply Motor Controller
E-13GG02 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Coolers 3
KD-7496 One-Line Diagram 61
M-12AL01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater 28
System
M-12EC01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and 23
Clean-up System
M-12EC02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and 7
Clean-up System
M-12EF01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential SVC Water 29
System
M-12EF02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water 42
System
M-K2EF01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water 70
System
M-K2EF01A Abandoned ESW Equipment 2
M-K2EF03 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water 19
System
M-K2EF03A Abandoned ESW Equipment 1
Condition Reports
2669 121872 122213 122233 124453
71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly
Procedures
Number Title Revision
AP 10-106 Fire Preplans 18A
Drawings
Number Title Revision
E-1F9905 Fire Hazard Analysis 8
Condition Reports
21946 122915 122944 123429 123446
23920 123921
71111.06Flood Protection Measures
Drawings
Number Title Revision
C-K201 E.S.
- W.S. Yard Pipelines & Elect. Duct Banks Plan, Sections 10
& Schedules SHT.1
C-K201 E.S.
- W.S. Yard Pipelines & Elect. Duct Banks Plan, Sections 12
& Schedules SHT.1
C-K202 E.S.
Sections & Schedules SHT.-2
C-K202 E.S.
Sections & Schedules SHT.-2
C-K209 E.S.W.S. Electrical Manholes Plans Sections & Details 9
C-K212 E.S.W.S Yard Pipelines & Elec. Duct Banks Plan & Sections 4
Condition Reports
24380 124381 124382 124383 124397
24409
71111.08Inservice Inspection Activities
Procedures
Number Title Revision
54-ISI-603-009 Automated Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Pressure 9
Vessel Closure Head Penetration Containing Thermal
AP-16F-001 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program 9
I-ENG-023 Steam Generator Data Analysis Guidelines 16
LMT-08-PDI-UT-1 Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds 0
LMT-08-PDI-UT-11 Ultrasonic Examination of Nozzle Inner Radius Area at Wolf 0
Creek Generating Station
LMT-08-UT-004 Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Welds and Adjacent Base 0
Material > 2.0 in Thickness
SG-SGMP-15-4 Wolf Creek Generating Station RF20 Condition Monitoring 0
and Operational Assessment
SG-SGMP-16-18 Wolf Creek Generating Station RF21 Condition Monitoring 0
and Operational Assessment
SG-SGMP-18-9 Wolf Creek Generating Station RF22 Condition Monitoring 0
and Operational Assessment for
Cycle 23 and Cycle 24
STS PE-040E Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Visual Inspection 7
WCRE-30 Inservice Inspection Program Plan Wolf Creek Generating 2
Station Interval 4
Condition Reports
93748 93749 107686 108888 109175
111055 112584 113666 114073 117639
117827 121438 121439
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Procedures
Number Title Revision
STS AE-211 Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test 3
SYS NB-201 Transferring NB01 Power Sources 61
SYS NB-320 Deenergizing and Energizing ESF Transformers 12
Condition Reports
23853 123950 123951
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Revision/
Date
17-01 (IC342) 2018 Biennial Requalification Exam Scenario 1
18-01 (340) 2018 Annual Requalification Exam 0
STS AE-211 Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test Completed
May 17, 2018
SYS NB-201 Transferring NB01 Power Sources Completed
May 2, 2018
SYS NB-320 Deenergizing and Energizing ESF Transformers Completed
May 2, 2018
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness
Condition Reports
113227 122957
Work Orders
17-428387-001
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Date
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling April 1, 2015
through
June 30, 2015
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling October 1, 2015
through December
31, 2015
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling April 1, 2016
through December,
2016
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling July 1, 2016 through
June 30, 2017
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling January 1, 2017
through June 30,
2017
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Date
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling July 1, 2017 through
December 31, 2017
EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-01
EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-02
EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-03
EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-04
EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-05
EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-06
EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-07
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Procedures
Number Title Revision
AP 21C-001 Wolf Creek Substation 20
AP 21D-004 Control of Containment Penetrations During Shutdown 11A
Operations
AP 22C-008 Qualitative Risk Management 4B
FHP 02-001 Refueling Operations 46
FHP 02-007A Reactor Vessel Closure Head Removal 12A
FHP 05-001 Equipment Hatch Operations 0
GEN 00-008 RCS Level Less Than Reactor Vessel Flange Operations 32
STS GP-001 Containment Purge Valves Actuation Test 27
STS GP-006 CTMT Closure Verification 14
STS GP-006 CTMT Closure Verification 24A
SYS BB-215 RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor 48
Drawings
Number Title Revision
M-12BB01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 36
System
M-12BB02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 28
System
M-12BB04 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 23
System
M-12EJ01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat 54
Removal System
M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 44
Injection System
M-12EM02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 22
Injection System
M-12EM03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 3
Injection System Test Line
Condition Reports
21353
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Date
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary April 5, 2018
Shift: Nights, Mode: 5
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary April 6, 2018
Shift: Days, Mode 6
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary April 7, 2018
Shift: Nights, Mode 6
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary April 12, 2018
Shift: Nights, Defueled
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary April 19, 2018
Shift: Nights, Defueled
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary April 24, 2018
Shift: Days, Defueled
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary May 8, 2018
Shift: Nights, Mode: 6
ET 88-0193 Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of Decay December 23,
Heat Removal 1988
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Date
ET 92-0001 Docket No. 50-482: Change in Commitment Associated January 2,
with Generic Letter 88-17 1992
STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6 Completed
May 9, 2018
WM 89-0041 Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of Decay February 2,
Heat Removal 1989
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Procedures
Number Title Revision
AP 22A-001 Screening, Prioritization and Pre-Approval 21
AP 26C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment 35
AP 28-001 Operability Evaluations 25
Drawings
Number Title Revision
Westinghouse Drawing 1464F11
M-703-00055 Closure Head (SAP) General Assembly W02
M-709-00099 Control Rod Mechanism Housing Details - Sheet 1 W01
Condition Reports
2207 122351 122581 123083 123084
23567 123902 123903 123905 123906
23907 123908 123914
Work Orders
18-438919-000 18-438984-000 18-439282-000
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Revision/Date
APF 05-013-01 M-721-00096 - Instruction Manual for Safety Injection W25
Pump
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Revision/Date
APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition - DPEM01A May 1, 2018
Current Reading Higher Than Name Plate Rating - CR
2518
APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition - DPEM01A May 3, 2018
Current Reading Higher Than Name Plate Rating - CR
2581
APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition - PEM01A RF22 May 9, 2018
Rework Hydraulic Performance Impact
MRP 2018-010 Electric Power Research Institute - Notification of Recent April 20, 2018
PWR CRDM Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear and Control
Rod Motion Stoppage Operating Experience and
Recommended Plant Actions
XX-E-006 Calculation XX-E-006 AC System Analysis Rev. 7 - 7
Appendix 31 - Scenario L1 (LOCA) Motor Starting
Analysis - Output Report
71111.18Plant Modifications
Drawings
Number Title Revision/Date
E-13GG02 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Coolers 3
E-13EC09 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power 1
Supply Motor Controller
M-084A-00010 8539 SGG45 Wiring Diagram January 31,
2018
WIP-E-12EC09- Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power 1
000-A-1 Supply Motor Controller
WIP-E-IR0211A- Raceway Plan Plant Site Southwest Quadrant Underground 00
2B-1 Duct Bank EL. [Elevation] 2000-0
WIP-M-1X6906- Fuel Building Penetration Closure Wall Elevations 00
000-A-1
WIP-M-1X6906- Fuel Building Penetration Closure Wall Elevations 00
001-A-1
WIP-M-13EG29- Piping Isometric Drawing Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 00
000-A-1 Fuel Building
Condition Reports
2629 122684 122959 123060 123146
23193 123195 123259 123584 123592
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Date
14403 Field Change Notice: Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation April 30, 2015
System
14496 Field Change Notice: Fukushima Spent Fuel Pool Makeup August 30,
2016
241 Change Package Engineering Disposition: Spent Fuel Pool November 29,
Alternate Cooling Modification 2017
273 Field Change Notice: Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Cooling March 3,
Electrical 2018
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing
Procedures
Number Title Revision
STN EC-201 Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up System Valve Test 2
STN XMR-001 XMR01 Control Alarm and Trip Circuit Verification 3
STS BG-100A Centrifugal Charging System A Train Inservice Pump 48
STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6 84
STS EM-100A Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test 41
STS IC-503B Channel Calibration pressurizer Level 12
STS IC-503B Channel Calibration pressurizer Level 12A
STS KJ-015B Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02 44
SYS EC-120 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Startup 56
Drawings
Number Title Revision
E-0033.3-009-03 Power Transformer, Class, OA/FA/FOA, Shell Form, 3
Outdoor, Three Phase, KVA 60000/80000/100000, H.
- V.
345000,
- Y. Y., 13800, 60 Hertz
E-003.3-00008 CA/FA/FOA Transformer Control Schematic Wiring Diagram W10
Drawings
Number Title Revision
E-003.3-00022 Power Transformer, Class OA/FA/FOA, Shell Form, W09
Outdoor, Three Phase, KVA 60000/80000/100000, H.
- V.
345000, L
- Y. Y. 13800, 60 Hertz
E-11MR01 Startup Transformer Single Line Metering and Relaying 7
Diagram
M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 45
Injection System
M-761-00076-06 Process Control Block Diagram SNUPPS 6
Condition Reports
2520 122524 122526 122527 122784
2954 124387 124400 124405
Work Orders
13-366290-005 15-403582-002 17-427200-023 17-432721-000 17-432722-000
18-438909-000 18-438919-001 18-438923-001
Miscellaneous
Number Title Date
APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet (STRS) - Fuel Pool April 23,
Cooling and Cleanup System Valve Test 2018
STN EM-100A SI Pump A Reference Pump Completed
April 29,
2018
STS EM-100A Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test Completed
May 11, 2018
STS KJ-015B Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02 Completed
May 1, 2018
71111.20Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Procedures
Number Title Revision
AI-07B-024 Instructions For Containment Purge Permits 18
FHP 05-001 Equipment Hatch Operations 0
GEN 00-002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby 101
Procedures
Number Title Revision
GEN 00-003 Hot Standby to Minimum Load 101
GEN 00-008 RCS Level Less Than Reactor Vessel Flange Operations 32
INC C-0044 Functional Check of 7300 Process Power Supply 7
RXE 01-002 Reload Low Power Physics Testing 26
STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6 84
STS GP-006 CTMT Closure Verification 24A
SYS BB-112 Vacuum Fill of the RCS 43
SYS BB-215 RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor 47A
SYS BB-215 RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor 48
SYS SB-300 Deenergizing SB Protection Sets 5
Drawings
Number Title Revision
E-13NN01 Class IE Instrument AC Schematic 9
E-13SB09 Schematic Diagram Process Protection Cabinets 1,2,3,4 00
Safeguards Test Cabinets and Fire Isolation Cabinets
M-12BB01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 36
System
M-12BB02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 28
System
M-12BB04 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 23
System
M-12EJ01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat 54
Removal System
M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 44
Injection System
M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 45
Injection System
M-12EM02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 22
Injection System
M-12EM03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant 3
Injection System Test Line
Condition Reports
20865 120906 120917 120934 120963
21467 121469 121507 121575 121710
21779 121825 121881 121901 121938
21953 122359 122375 122571 122593
2787 122798 122837 123075 123087
23221 123429 123434 123440 123444
23446 123448 123488 123500 123517
23752 123767
Work Orders
17-426098-000 18-437026-000
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Revision/Date
Foreign Material Inspections During Wolf Creek RF 22
Failed Fuel Mitigation - Presenter Daljit Mand
OPS RF-22 Rotation Schedule
Refuel 22: Failed Fuel Action Matrix for Completion Core January 4,
Testing 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 6, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days April 11, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 11, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 12, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 13, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days April 15, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 16, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days April 17, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 18, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 19, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days April 25, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 26, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days April 29, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 29, 2018
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Revision/Date
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days April 30, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights April 30, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 1, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 1, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 2, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 2, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 3, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 4, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 4, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 6, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 7, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 7, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 8, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 8, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 9, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 9, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 10, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 13, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 14, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 14, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 15, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 15, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 16, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days May 17, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights May 17, 2018
RF2[2] FIN Team Schedule
AIF 21-016-02 Time Verification Form - Days - Credited April 3, 2018
AIF 21-016-02 Time Verification Form - Nights - Credited April 3, 2018
AIF 21-016-02 Time Verification Form - Nights - No Credit Taken April 3, 2018
AIF 22D-008-02 Mode 2 (M2U)/Mode 1 (M1U) Restart Checklist Completed
May 17, 2108
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Revision/Date
APF 15C-002-01 Procedure Cover Sheet - Vacuum Fill of the RCS Completed
May 11, 2018
APF 21-001-02 Control Room Turnover Checklist - On-Coming CRS/WC May 7, 2018
SRO/RO/BOP Review
APF 22B-001-08 Shutdown Risk Assessment Mode 6 Refueling Operations 12
>23 Ft. Above Vessel Flange
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled April 4, 2018
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled April 7, 2018
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled April 11, 2018
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled April 14, 2018
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled April 15, 2018
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled April 17, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 1, 2018
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 3, 2018
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 4, 2018
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 5, 2018
Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 5
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 6, 2018
Summary - Shift Days, Mode 6
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 7, 2018
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: 6
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 7, 2018
Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 6
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment May 8, 2018
Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 6
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 11, 2018
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 14, 2018
Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: Defueled
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 15, 2018
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 15, 2018
Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: Defueled
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Revision/Date
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment April 17, 2018
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment May 8, 2018
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled
APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 181102 January 18,
2018
APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 182602 15
APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 183000 March 7, 2018
APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 182602 March 8, 2018
APF 25A-401-04 Pre-Job Briefing Form - RWP Number: 182601 10A
BGV0365 Mixed Bed Demins Inlet Line Upstrm Drain 20
C22: R-EN-A- Clearance Order April 2, 2018
2A
C22: R-EN-B- Clearance Order March 31, 2018
2A
C22: R-OP-S- Clearance Order May 4, 2018
001B
C22: R-OP-S- Clearance Order May 9, 2018
2A
C22: R-OP-S- Clearance Order May 11, 2018
2B
C22: R-OP-S- Clearance Order May 6, 2018
003A
ET 88-0193 Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of December 23,
Decay Heat Removal 1988
ET 92-0001 Docket No. 50-482: Change in Commitment Associated January 2,
with Generic Letter 88-17 1992
GTRE 32 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Report Created
Radiochemistry Lab April 18, 2018,
2:36
GTRE 32 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Report Created
Radiochemistry Lab April 18, 2018,
08:43
GTRE 32 Char Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Report Created
Radiochemistry Lab April 15, 2018,
14:59
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Revision/Date
GTRE 33 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Report Created
Radiochemistry Lab April 18, 2018,
07:04
GTRE 33 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Report Created
Radiochemistry Lab April 18, 2018,
07:05
K04-013 Gas Effluent Release Report April 16, 2018
RA 18-0032 Minor Corrections to Refuel 22 Risk Assessment Team March 20, 2018
Report RA 18-0021 - Schedule Level 1 Rev. C 2/1/2018
RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit - 181102 000
RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit - 182601 000
RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit - 182602 000
RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit - 182602 002
RFP 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit - 184206 000
RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180225-3 February 25,
2018
RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180320- March 20, 2018
RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180405- April 5, 2018
RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180416-1 April 16, 2018
RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180407-6 April 7, 2018
RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180421- April 21, 2018
RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180406- April 6, 2018
RXE 01-002 Reload Low Power Physics Testing Completed
May 17, 2018
STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6 Completed
May 11, 2018
STS GP-006 Containment Closure Verification Completed
April 6, 2018
WM 26-0034 Docket No. 50-482: Foreign Ownership, Control or April 26, 2018
Influence (FOCI) Information - Change to Lists of
Owners, Officers, Directors and Executive Personnel
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Revision/Date
WM 89-0041 Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of February 2,
Decay Heat Removal 1989
71111.22Surveillance Testing
Procedures
Number Title Revision
STS BB-004 RCS Water Inventory Balance 49
STS BB-006 RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer 19
STS BB-010 Manual RCS Water Inventory Balance 2
STS CV-210A ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve 27
Test
STS EM-003A ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test 23
STS KJ-001B Integrated D/G and Safeguard Actuation Test - Train B 61
STS PE-128 LLRT [Local Leak Rate Test] Valve Lineup for Penetrations 6
and 29
Condition Reports
2451 122757 122783 123223
Miscellaneous
Number Title Revision/Date
STS CV-210A ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve Completed
Test April 29, 2018
STS CV-210A ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve Completed
Test May 1, 2018
STS EM-003A ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test Completed
May 2, 2018
WCRE-03 Wolf Creek Tank Document 22
71124.01Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Procedures
Number Title Revision
AP 19D-100 Radioactive Source Program 5
Procedures
Number Title Revision
AP 25A-001 Radiation Protection Manual 17B
AP 25A-100 Access to Locked High or Very High Rad Areas 29
AP 25A-100 Containment Entry 18A
AP 25B-100 Radiation Worker Guidelines 51
Radiation Protection Organization, Responsibilities and
RPP 01-105 21
Code of Conduct
RPP 02-105 Radiation Work Permit 48
RPP 02-215 Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas 34A
RPP 02-405 RCA Access Control 20
RPP 02-515 Release of Material from the RCA 34
RPP 02-605 Control and Inventory of Radioactive Sources 18
Condition Reports
2244 112935 112973 113053 113055
113627 113631 114261 116377 116509
116510 117296 119183 119223 120975
21159 121171 121281 121282 121568
Radiation Work Permits
Number Title Revision
180021 Cartridge Filter Change-Out in Aux and RW Buildings 0
2601 Routine Outage Access (No LHRA Access) 0
183220 Primary S/G Eddy Current Testing 1
184199 Secondary Side S/G FOSAR 0
184200 Secondary Side S/G Sludge Lance 0
184420 Scaffolding 0
184482 RV Head Disassembly - Canopy Seal Clamp Activities 0
184483 RV Head Reassembly - Canopy Seal Clamp Activities 0
186020 Reactor Vessel Head Preparation 1
Radiation Surveys
Number Title Date
M-20180305-17 1306 and 1308C March 5, 2018
M-20180305-4 Resin Bed, Demin Alley, Filter Pit March 4, 2018
M-20180307-16 Seal Water HX & VCT Valve Room March 7, 2018
M-20180307-2 B RHR HX Room March 7, 2018
M-20180308-12 North and South Pipe Pen March 8, 2018
M-20180324-6 SJ 143 Sample Panel March 24, 2018
M-20180329-1 B RHR Pump March 29, 2018
M-20180402-20 S/G A&D Secondary April 2, 2018
M-20180403-2 S/G A&D Secondary April 3, 2018
M-20180409-19 2000 Aux South April 9, 2018
M-20180411-11 S/G A&D Secondary April 11, 2018
M-20180411-21 2047 Containment April 11, 2018
Number Title Date
18-0129 Containment RX Cavity April 1, 2018
18-0131 CTMT 2000' O/S Bio-shield April 1, 2018
18-0147 Fuel Building 2047 & above April 2, 2018
18-0154 CTMT 2047' April 3, 2018
18-0181 CTMT 2047 (Marinelli Grab Sample) April 4, 2018
18-0182 CTMT 2047 (Follow-up West of Cavity) April 4, 2018
18-0182 CTMT 2047 (Follow-up West of Cavity) April 4, 2018
Audits and Self-Assessments
Number Title Date
QA Audit Report:
18-01-RP/PC March 12, 2018
Radiation Protection And Process Control
Self-Assessment:
QH-2017-1476 Radiation Protection Procedures and Radiation May 4, 2017
Worker Behavior Observations
Radiation Protection Programmatic Review as
QH-2017-1481 delineated in NRC Inspection Procedures 71124.01, April 24, 2017
71124.03, and 71151.OR01
Miscellaneous Documents
Number Title Date
18-0181 Skin Dose From Noble Gas Calculation Sheet April 4, 2018
K 03-70 Air Sample Log April 4, 2018
RPF 02-605-03 Sealed Source Inventory January 29, 2018
STS HP-001 Sealed Source Contamination Surveillance Test January 29, 2018
71124.02Occupational As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls
Procedures
Number Title Revision
APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package 15
APF 25A-401-04 Pre-Job Briefing Form 10A
APF 25A-401-07 In-Progress ALARA Review 1
APF 25A-401-08 Post-Job ALARA Review 1
RPF 02-105-05 RWP Risk Assessment 16A
RPP 02-605 Control & Inventory of Radioactive Sources 18
Condition Reports
2973 113052 113056 113057 113058
113627 113631 113708 113736 113762
114261 114915 115344 115564 115795
116952 117296 118610 119253 119743
119745 120919 120921 121089 121091
21099 121197 121217 121266 121270
21341 121375 121420 121422 121447
21482
Audits and Self-Assessments
Number Title Date
Quality Assurance Audit Report
18-01-RP/PC March 12, 2018
Radiation Protection and Process Control
Radiation Protection Programmatic Review as
QH-2017-1481 delineated in NRC Inspection Procedures 71124.01, April 24, 2017
71124.03, and 71151.OR01
NRC Inspection Procedure 71124.04, Occupational
QH-2017-1505 Dose Assessment and NRC 71124.02 Occupational May 22, 2017
ALARA Planning and Controls
Radiation Work Permit Packages
Number Title Revision
180021 Cartridge Filter Change-Out in Aux and RW Buildings A
2300 Maintenance Support 0
2601 Routine Outage Access (No Locked High Radiation Areas) 0
183220 Primary S/G Eddy Current RWP 1
184207 RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs 0
184207 RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs 1
184207 RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs 2
184420 Scaffolding Activities RF22 0
184482 Canopy Seal Clamp Activities Disassembly 0
Miscellaneous Documents
Title Date
RF 21 & Pre RF21 Forced Outage Radiation Protection Summary January 9, 2017
71151Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures
Number Title Revision
AP 02A-001 Primary Chemistry Control 21
CHS SJ-143B RCS/CVCS/RHR Sampling at SJ-143 Panel 2
STS BB-006 RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer 18
Condition Reports
23874 123885 124426 124427
Miscellaneous
Number Title Date
RCS June 2017 through June 2018 Printed June 20,
Measurement 2018
Reports
STS PE-019B RHR Suction Valve Leak Test Completed
November 18,
2016
STS PE-109E RCS Isolation Check Valve Leak Test Completed
November 19,
2016
71152Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedures
Number Title Revision
AP 10-104 Breach Authorization 35
AP 10-104 Breach Authorization 37A
AP 23-009 Control Room Envelope Habitability Program 2
OFN SB-008 Instrument Malfunctions 45
STS IC-503B Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration 12
STS PE-004 Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test 16
Condition Reports
20056 120807 122587 123642 123823
Work Orders
18-437033-006
Miscellaneous
Number Title Revision/
Date
QA-2018-0421 Oversight of Operations During the First Quarter of 2018 April 20,
from 12/21/17 to 3/29/18 2018
Miscellaneous
Number Title Revision/
Date
QA-2018-0425 QA Assessment of the Maintenance 2018 First Quarter FAO April 22,
Report on 4/2/19 2018
QA-2018-0426 Provide QA Oversight of Engineering for the First Quarter of April 20,
2018 2018
QA-2018-0434 RF22 QA Assessment of Refuel Pool Overfill on 4-7-18 April 29,
2018
QH-2018-1628 FME Quick Hit Self-Assessment May 23, 2018
QS-2018-2504 QA Surveillance of Clearance Order Removal February 5,
2018
QS-2018-2510 Surveillance of CARB Meeting 1-17-18 February 5,
2018
QS-2018-2517 QA Observation of Question About Compensatory Measure February 5,
Fire Watch on 1/22/18 2018
QS-2018-2530 Power Block Roof Leaks February 7,
2018
QS-2018-2587 Attended and Observed Meeting on Effects of Modifications March 26,
269 2018
QS-2018-2597 QA Walkdown of Turbine and Control Buildings March 28,
2018
QS-2018-2601 RF22 Observation of Operations Just In Time Training for April 2, 2018
Plant Cooldown
QS-2018-2646 RF22 QA Observation of Holes Being Drilled for SGK05 April 8, 2018
Modification Work on 4/8/18
QS-2018-2649 RF 22 QA Review of FME Monitor Logs in Containment on April 9, 2018
4/8/18
QS-2018-2679 RF22 QA Observation of BHI Workers 4-12-18 April 13,
2018
RA 18-0054 Docket No. 50-482: Wolf Creek Generating Station Cycle April 29,
and Cycle 23 Core Operating Limits Report 2018
STS PE-004 Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test Completed
March 7,
2018
STS PE-004 Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test Completed
March 15,
2018
WCRE-35 Boundary Matrix 0
Miscellaneous
Number Title Revision/
Date
WCRE-35 Boundary Matrix 3
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection
requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, Control
Number 31500011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the
requesting document displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget control
number.
This letter and its enclosure will be made available for public inspection and copying at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, and Requests for
Withholding.
Information Request
January 24, 2018
Notification of Inspection and Request for Information
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Station
NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2018002
INSERVICE INSPECTION DOCUMENT REQUEST
A. Information Requested for the In-Office Preparation Week
The following information should be sent to the Region IV office in hard copy or electronic
format (ims.certrec.com preferred), in care of Isaac Anchondo, by March 26, 2018, to
facilitate the selection of specific items that will be reviewed during the onsite inspection
week. The inspector will select specific items from the information requested below and then
request from your staff additional documents needed during the onsite inspection week
(Section B of this enclosure). We ask that the specific items selected from the lists be
available and ready for review on the first day of inspection. Please provide requested
documentation electronically if possible. If requested documents are large and only hard
copy formats are available, please inform the inspector(s), and provide subject
documentation during the first day of the onsite inspection.
If you have any questions regarding this information request, please call the inspector as
soon as possible.
On April 16, 2018, a reactor inspector from the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC)
Region IV office will perform the baseline inservice inspection at Wolf Creek Nuclear
Operating Station, using NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.08, "Inservice Inspection
Activities. Experience has shown that this inspection is a resource intensive inspection
both for the NRC inspector and your staff. The date of this inspection may change
dependent on the outage schedule you provide. In order to minimize the impact to your
onsite resources and to ensure a productive inspection, we have enclosed a request for
documents needed for this inspection. These documents have been divided into two
groups. The first group (Section A of the enclosure) identified information to be provided
prior to the inspection to ensure that the inspector is adequately prepared. The second
group (Section B of the enclosure) identifies the information the inspector will need upon
arrival at the site. It is important that all of these documents are up to date and complete in
order to minimize the number of additional documents requested during the preparation
and/or the onsite portions of the inspection.
We have discussed the schedule for these inspection activities with your staff and
understand that our regulatory contact for this inspection will be William Muilenburg of your
licensing organization. The tentative inspection schedule is as follows:
Preparation week: March 26, 2018
Onsite weeks: April 16-27, 2018
Our inspection dates are subject to change based on your updated schedule of outage
activities. If there are any questions about this inspection or the material requested, please
contact Isaac Anchondo at (817) 200-1152. (email to: Isaac.Anchondo@nrc.gov).
A.1 ISI/Welding Programs and Schedule Information
1. A detailed schedule (including preliminary dates) of:
1.1. Nondestructive examinations planned for ASME Code Class Components
performed as part of your ASME Section XI, risk informed (if applicable), and
augmented inservice inspection programs during the upcoming outage.
1.2. Examinations planned for Alloy 82/182/600 components that are not included in
the Section XI scope (If applicable)
1.3. Examinations planned as part of your boric acid corrosion control program
(Mode 3 walkdowns, bolted connection walkdowns, etc.)
1.4. Welding activities that are scheduled to be completed during the upcoming
outage (ASME Class 1, 2, or 3 structures, systems, or components)
2. A copy of ASME Section XI Code Relief Requests and associated NRC safety
evaluations applicable to the examinations identified above.
2.1. A list of ASME Code Cases currently being used to include the system and/or
component the Code Case is being applied to.
3. A list of nondestructive examination reports which have identified recordable or
rejectable indications on any ASME Code Class components since the beginning of
the last refueling outage. This should include the previousSection XI pressure test(s)
conducted during start up and any evaluations associated with the results of the
pressure tests.
4. A list including a brief description (e.g., system, code class, weld category,
nondestructive examination performed) associated with the repair/replacement
activities of any ASME Code Class component since the beginning of the last outage
and/or planned this refueling outage.
5. If reactor vessel weld examinations required by the ASME Code are scheduled to
occur during the upcoming outage, provide a detailed description of the welds to be
examined and the extent of the planned examination. Please also provide reference
numbers for applicable procedures that will be used to conduct these examinations.
6. Copy of any 10 CFR Part 21 reports applicable to structures, systems, or
components within the scope of Section XI of the ASME Code that have been
identified since the beginning of the last refueling outage.
7. A list of any temporary non-code repairs in service (e.g., pinhole leaks).
8. Please provide copies of the most recent self-assessments for the inservice
inspection, welding, and Alloy 600 programs.
9. Copy of the procedures for welding techniques, and NDE that will be used during the
outage.
A.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
1. Provide a detailed scope of the planned bare metal visual examinations (e.g., volume
coverage, limitations, etc.) of the vessel upper head penetrations and/or any
nonvisual nondestructive examination of the reactor vessel head including the
examination procedures to be used.
A.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
1. Copy of the procedures that govern the scope, equipment and implementation of the
inspections required to identify boric acid leakage and the procedures for boric acid
leakage/corrosion evaluation.
2. Please provide a list of leaks (including code class of the components) that have
been identified since the last refueling outage and associated corrective action
documentation. If during the last cycle, the unit was shutdown, please provide
documentation of containment walkdown inspections performed as part of the boric
acid corrosion control program.
A.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspections
1. A detailed schedule of:
- Steam generator tube inspection, data analyses, and repair activities for the
upcoming outage.
- Steam generator secondary side inspection activities for the upcoming outage
(if occurring).
2. Copy of SG history documentation given to vendors performing eddy current (ET)
testing of the SGs during the upcoming outage.
3. Copy of procedure containing screening criteria used for selecting tubes for in-situ
pressure testing and the procedure to be used for in-situ pressure testing.
4. Copy of previous outage SG tube operational assessment. Also include a copy of
the following documents as they become available:
- Degradation assessment
- Condition monitoring assessment
5. Copy of the document defining the planned SG ET scope (e.g., 100 percent of
unrepaired tubes with bobbin probe and 20 percent sample of hot leg expansion
transition regions with rotating probe) and identify the scope expansion criteria,
which will be applied. Also identify and describe any deviations in this scope or
expansion criteria from the EPRI Guidelines.
6. Copy of the document describing the ET acquisition equipment to be applied
including ET probe types. Also identify the extent of planned tube examination
coverage with each probe type (e.g. rotating probe -0.080 inches, 0.115 inches
pancake coils and mid-range +point coil applied at the top-of-tube-sheet plus 3
inches to minus 12 inches).
7. Identify and quantify any SG tube leakage experienced during the previous operating
cycle. Also provide documentation identifying which SG was leaking and corrective
actions completed and planned for this condition.
8. Copy of steam generator eddy current data analyst guidelines and site validated
eddy current technique specification sheets. Additionally, please provide a copy of
EPRI Appendix H, Examination Technique Specification Sheets, qualification
records.
9. Provide past history of the condition and issues pertaining to the secondary side of
the steam generators (including items such as loose parts, fouling, top of tube sheet
condition, crud removal amounts, etc.).
Indicate where the primary, secondary, and resolution analyses are scheduled to
take place.
A.5 Additional Information Related to all Inservice Inspection Activities
1. A list with a brief description of inservice inspection, and boric acid corrosion control
program related issues (e.g., CR) entered into your corrective action program since
the beginning of the last refueling outage. For example, a list based upon data base
searches using key words related to piping such as: inservice inspection, ASME
Code,Section XI, NDE, cracks, wear, thinning, leakage, rust, corrosion, boric acid, or
errors in piping examinations.
2. Provide training (e.g. Scaffolding, Fall Protection, FME, Confined Space) if they are
required for the activities described in A.1 through A.3.
3. Please provide names and phone numbers for the following program leads:
Inservice inspection (examination, planning)
Containment exams
Reactor pressure vessel head exams
Snubbers and supports
Repair and replacement program
Licensing
Site welding engineer
Boric acid corrosion control program
Steam generator inspection activities (site lead and vendor contact)
2018):
B.1 Inservice Inspection / Welding Programs and Schedule Information
1. Updated schedules for inservice inspection/nondestructive examination activities,
including planned welding activities, and schedule showing contingency repair
plans, if available.
2. For ASME Code Class welds selected by the inspector from the lists provided from
section A of this enclosure, please provide copies of the following documentation for
each subject weld:
- Weld data sheet (traveler).
- Weld configuration and system location.
- Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for weldment.
- Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for welding procedures.
- Applicable welding procedures used to fabricate the welds.
- Copies of procedure qualification records (PQRs) supporting the weld
procedures from B.1.b.v.
- Copies of welders performance qualification records (WPQ).
- Copies of the nonconformance reports for the selected welds (If
applicable).
- Radiographs of the selected welds and access to equipment to allow
viewing radiographs (if radiographic testing was performed).
- Copies of the preservice examination records for the selected welds.
- Readily accessible copies of nondestructive examination personnel
qualifications records for reviewing.
3. For the inservice inspection related corrective action issues selected by the inspector
from section A of this enclosure, provide a copy of the corrective actions and
supporting documentation.
4. For the nondestructive examination reports with relevant conditions on an ASME Code
Class components selected by the inspector from Section A above, provide a copy of
the examination records, examiner qualification records, and associated corrective
action documents.
5. A copy of (or ready access to) most current revision of the inservice inspection
program manual and plan for the current interval.
6. For the nondestructive examinations selected by the inspector from section A of this
enclosure, provide a copy of the nondestructive examination procedures used to
perform the examinations (including calibration and flaw characterization/sizing
procedures). For ultrasonic examination procedures qualified in accordance with
ASME Code,Section XI, Appendix VIII, provide documentation supporting the
procedure qualification (e.g. the EPRI performance demonstration qualification
summary sheets). Also, include qualification documentation of the specific equipment
to be used (e.g., ultrasonic unit, cables, and transducers including serial numbers) and
nondestructive examination personnel qualification records.
B.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
1. Provide the nondestructive personnel qualification records for the examiners who will
perform examinations of the reactor pressure vessel head replacement.
2. Provide drawings showing the following:
- Reactor pressure vessel head and control rod drive mechanism nozzle
configurations
- Reactor pressure vessel head insulation configuration
Note: The drawings listed above should include fabrication drawings for the nozzle
attachment welds as applicable.
B.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
1. Please provide boric acid walk down inspection results, an updated list of boric acid
leaks identified so far this outage, associated corrective action documentation, and
overall status of planned boric acid inspections.
2. Please provide any engineering evaluations completed for boric acid leaks identified
since the end of the last refueling outage. Please include a status of corrective actions
to repair and/or clean these boric acid leaks. Please identify specifically which known
leaks, if any, have remained in service or will remain in service as active leaks.
B.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspections
1. Copies of the Examination Technique Specification Sheets and associated
justification for any revisions.
2. Please provide a copy of the eddy current testing procedures used to perform the
steam generator tube inspections (specifically calibration and flaw
characterization/sizing procedures, etc.).
3. Copy of the guidance to be followed if a loose part or foreign material is identified in
the steam generators.
4. Identify the types of SG tube repair processes which will be implemented for defective
SG tubes (including any NRC reviews/evaluations/approvals of this repair process).
Provide the flaw depth sizing criteria to be applied for ET indications identified in the
SG tubes.
5. Copy of documents describing actions to be taken if a new SG tube degradation
mechanism is identified.
6. Provide procedures with guidance/instructions for identifying (e.g. physically locating
the tubes that require plugging) and plugging SG tubes.
7. List of corrective action documents generated by the vendor and/or site with respect
to steam generator inspection activities.
B.5 Codes and Standards
1. Ready access to (i.e., copies provided to the inspector(s) for use during the inspection
at the onsite inspection location, or room number and location where available):
- Applicable Editions of the ASME Code (Sections V, IX, and XI) for the
inservice inspection program and the repair/replacement program.
2. Copy of the performance demonstration initiative (PDI) generic procedures with the
latest applicable revisions that support site qualified ultrasonic examinations of piping
welds and components (e.g., PDI-UT-1, PDI-UT-2, PDI-UT-3, PDI-UT-10, etc.).
3. Boric Acid Corrosion Guidebook Revision 1 - EPRI Technical Report 1000975.
The following items are requested for the
Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection
Wolf Creek
April 9-13, 2018
Integrated Report 2018002
Inspection areas are listed in the attachments below.
Please provide the requested information on or before March 22, 2018.
Please submit this information using the same lettering system as below. For example, all
contacts and phone numbers for Inspection Procedure 71124.01 should be in a file/folder titled
1- A, applicable organization charts in file/folder 1- B, etc.
If information is placed on ims.certrec.com, please ensure the inspection exit date entered is at
least 30 days later than the onsite inspection dates, so the inspectors will have access to the
information while writing the report.
In addition to the corrective action document lists provided for each inspection procedure listed
below, please provide updated lists of corrective action documents at the entrance meeting.
The dates for these lists should range from the end dates of the original lists to the day of the
entrance meeting.
If more than one inspection procedure is to be conducted and the information requests appear
to be redundant, there is no need to provide duplicate copies. Enter a note explaining in which
file the information can be found.
If you have any questions or comments, please contact Natasha Greene at (817) 200-1154 or
natasha.greene@nrc.gov.
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject
to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information
collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget,
control number 3150-0011.
1. Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) and
Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
Date of Last Inspection: May 8, 2017
A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the Radiation Protection Organization Staff
and Technicians
B. Applicable organization charts
- C. Audits, self-assessments, and LERs written since date of last inspection, related to this
inspection area
D. Procedure indexes for the radiation protection procedures
E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.
Additional Specific Procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews
the procedure indexes.
1. Radiation Protection Program Description
2. Radiation Protection Conduct of Operations
3. Personnel Dosimetry Program
4. Posting of Radiological Areas
5. High Radiation Area Controls
6. RCA Access Controls and Radiation Worker Instructions
7. Conduct of Radiological Surveys
8. Radioactive Source Inventory and Control
9. Declared Pregnant Worker Program
F. List of corrective action documents (including corporate and sub-tiered systems) since
date of last inspection
a. Initiated by the radiation protection organization
b. Assigned to the radiation protection organization
NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search
criteria used. Please provide in document formats which are searchable so that
the inspector can perform word searches.
If not covered above, a summary of corrective action documents since date of last
inspection involving unmonitored releases, unplanned releases, or releases in which any
dose limit or administrative dose limit was exceeded (for Public Radiation Safety
Performance Indicator verification in accordance with IP 71151)
G. List of radiologically significant work activities scheduled to be conducted during the
inspection period (If the inspection is scheduled during an outage, please also include a
list of work activities greater than 1 rem, scheduled during the outage with the dose
estimate for the work activity.)
H. List of active radiation work permits
I. Radioactive source inventory list
a. All radioactive sources that are required to be leak tested
b. All radioactive sources that meet the 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix E, Category 2
and above threshold. Please indicate the radioisotope, initial and current activity
(w/assay date), and storage location for each applicable source.
J. The last two leak test results for the radioactive sources inventoried and required to be
leak tested. If applicable, specifically provide a list of all radioactive source(s) that have
failed its leak test within the last two years
- K. A current listing of any non-fuel items stored within your pools, and if available, their
appropriate dose rates (Contact / @ 30cm)
L. Computer printout of radiological controlled area entries greater than 100 millirem since
the previous inspection to the current inspection entrance date. The printout should
include the date of entry, some form of worker identification, the radiation work permit
used by the worker, dose accrued by the worker, and the electronic dosimeter dose
alarm set-point used during the entry (for Occupational Radiation Safety Performance
Indicator verification in accordance with IP 71151).
Initial Request for Information
Integrated Inspection
Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Inspection Report: 05000482/2018002
Inspection Dates: April 1 - June 30, 2018
Inspection Procedure: Integrated Inspection Procedures
Lead Inspector: Douglas Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector
The following information should be provided in electronic format (Certrec IMS preferred),
to the attention of Douglas Dodson by March 22, 2018, to facilitate the reduction in the
items to be selected for a final list during inspection preparation. The inspection team
will finalize its sample selections and will provide an additional information request with
specific items. This information shall be made available by March 22, 2018. The specific
items selected from the lists shall be available and ready for review on the day indicated
in this request. *Please provide requested documentation electronically in pdf files,
Excel, or other searchable formats, if possible. The information should contain descriptive
names, and be indexed and hyperlinked to facilitate ease of use. Information in lists
should contain enough information to be easily understood by someone who has
knowledge of pressurized water reactor technology. If requested documents are large
and/or only hard copy formats are available, please inform the inspector(s), and provide
subject documentation.
1. Any pre-existing evaluation or list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system
components and associated calculations with low design margins.
2. A list of high risk spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system maintenance rule
components and functions based on engineering or expert panel judgment.
3. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related operating experience
evaluations for the last 3 years.
4. A list of all spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system time-critical operator actions in
procedures.
5. A list of permanent and temporary modifications related to spent fuel pool cooling
and cleanup system sorted by component.
6. A list of current spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related operator work
arounds/burdens.
7. A list of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system design calculations, which
provide the design margin information for components.
8. List of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system root cause evaluations
associated with component failures or design issues initiated/completed in the
last 5 years.
9. A list of any spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system common-cause failures of
components in the last 3 years.
10. An electronic copy of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system design bases
documents and any open, pending, or recently completed changes. Although not an
exhaustive list, please include any open, pending, or recently completed (last 3 years)
changes to temporary modifications, permanent modifications, engineering change
packages, and/or procedure change packages. Specifically, please include any open,
pending, or recently completed changes to emergency operating, abnormal operating,
normal operating, alarm response, system alignment, surveillance, or other procedure.
11. An electronic copy of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system System Health
notebook.
2. A copy of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related audits completed in the
last 2 years.
13. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system motor operated valves
(MOVs) in the program, design margin and risk ranking.
14. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system air operated valves (AOVs) in
the valve program, design margin and risk ranking.
15. Spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system structure, system, and components
maintenance rule category, scoping, unavailability data, unreliability data, functional
failure evaluations, (a)(1) determinations, (a)(1) goals, and any supporting basis
documentation.
16. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system licensee contacts for the
inspection team with pager or phone numbers.
17. An excel spreadsheet of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related PRA
human action basic events or risk ranking of operator actions from your site specific
PSA sorted by RAW and FV. Provide copies of your human reliability worksheets
for these items.
18. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide an Excel
spreadsheet of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related equipment basic
events (with definitions) including importance measures sorted by risk achievement
worth (RAW) and Fussell-Vesely (FV) from your internal events probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA). Include basic events with RAW value of 1.3 or greater.
19. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide a list of the top 50
cut-sets from your PRA.
20. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide copies of PRA
system notebooks, and the latest PRA summary document.
21. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, and if you have an external events
or fire PSA model, provide the information requested in items 17-19 for external
events and fire, as it relates to the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system.
2. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide a copy of the Wolf
Creek Nuclear Generating Station IPEEE changes, if available electronically.
SUNSI Review ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:
By: NHTaylor Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive NRC-002
OFFICE SRI:DRP/B RI: DRP/B C:DRS/OB C:DRS/PSB2 C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2
NAME DDodson FThomas VGaddy HGepford TFarnholtz JDrake
SIGNATURE ded fdt vgg hjg WcS for jfd
DATE 8/3/2018 08/03/18 8/1/2018 8/1/2018 8/1/18 8/1/18
OFFICE PE:DRP/B BC:DRP/B
NAME JMelfi NTaylor
SIGNATURE jfm NHT
DATE 8/3/18 8/12/18