IR 05000482/2018010
| ML18318A330 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/2018 |
| From: | Thomas Farnholtz Region 4 Engineering Branch 1 |
| To: | Heflin A Wolf Creek |
| References | |
| IR 2018010 | |
| Download: ML18318A330 (35) | |
Text
November 14, 2018
SUBJECT:
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION NRC DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE
(TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2018010
Dear Mr. Heflin:
On August 3, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. On August 2, 2018, the NRC team held an initial debrief of the results of this inspection with Mr. Jamie McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. On October 1, 2018, a phone call was held with Mr. Steve Smith, Vice President, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff, to clarify the characterization of the identified findings. On November 1, 2018, an additional phone call was held with Mr. Daljit Mand, Director, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff, to revise the characterization of the identified findings. On November 13, 2018, a final exit phone call was held with Mr. Gabe Fugate, Director, Plant Support, and other members of the licensee staff, to identify changes to the inspection findings as a result of an enforcement policy review. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC team documented four findings of very low safety significance (Green) and one licensee identified finding, in this report. These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspectors at the Wolf Creek Generating Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Thomas R. Farnholtz, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
Sincerely, Docket No. 50-482 License No. NPF-42
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000482/2018010 w/ Attachment:
Supplemental Information
Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000482
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-010-0041
Licensee:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Facility:
Wolf Creek Generating Station
Location:
Burlington, KS 66839
Inspection Dates:
July 11, 2018 to August 3, 2018
Inspectors:
R. Kopriva, Senior Resident Inspector, Engineering Branch 1
F. Thomas, Resident Inspector, Branch B
I. Anchondo, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2
A. Palmer, Senior Reactor Technology Instructor, Technical Training
Center
H. Leake, Contractor, Beckman and Associates
J. Zudans, Contractor, Beckman and Associates
Approved By:
Thomas R. Farnholtz, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an Integrated Inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC-identified and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Follow Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000482/2018010-01 Closed None 71111.21M The team identified two examples of a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to follow procedures.
Failure to Establish an Adequate Procedure for Operator Time Critical/Time Sensitive Actions Validation Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000482/2018010-02 Closed None 71111.21M The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,
Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to have an adequate Procedure.
Procedure AI 21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, Revision 14, Attachment B
- Time Sensitive Action List, does not have unique identifiers for cross referencing the records to the procedure.
Failure to Correct Reoccurring Problems with Time Critical/Sensitive Action Activities Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000482/2018010-03 Closed
[P.4] - Problem Identification and Resolution, Trending 71111.21M The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,
Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct reoccurring problems with Time Critical/Time Sensitive Action issues.
Failure to Identify that the 125 VDC Equalizing Voltage had Exceeded Design Requirements Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000482/2018010-04 Closed
[H.13] - Human Performance,
Consistent Process 71111.21M -
The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,
Design Control, for the failure to verify or check the adequacy of design calculation NK-E-001, 125 Volt Direct-Current (VDC) Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Studies, Revision 4. The licensee failed to recognize that the actual 125 VDC Class 1E bus voltages had exceeded the maximum design limit voltages for downstream equipment identified in the calculation, and they had not placed any limits on voltages which could exceed the design limit of 140 VDC on the Class 1E System components.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21MDesign Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
From July 16, 2018 to August 3, 2018, the team reviewed the following design attributes associated with risk-significant components, permanent plant modifications, and operating experience.
Component===
- (1) Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump PAL02.
a)
Material condition of pump/turbine and pump room walkdown.
b)
Condition reports and maintenance activities associated with pump and turbine.
c)
Operating procedures for pump operation during a design bases loss-of-coolant accident coincident with a loss-of-offsite power.
d)
Pump testing procedures and test trends associated with in-service testing.
e)
System health, system descriptions, vendor technical manual and corrective action reviews.
f )
Engineering evaluations of pump non-conforming conditions.
- (2) Shutdown RCP Seals.
a)
Material condition of seals, maintenance activities and corrective actions.
b)
Operating procedures for pump operation in support of FLEX conditions and conformance to requirements for sealing acceptability.
c)
Condition reports and maintenance activities associated with seals and seal package.
d)
FLEX strategies and their implementation at Wolf Creek and conformance to regulatory requirements.
e)
Reactor coolant pump seal test procedures, test results and test trends.
f )
Evolution of Generation III design and modification changes.
- (3) Reactor Coolant Pump A Circuit Breaker PA0107.
a)
Design Basis documents.
b)
Current system health report.
c)
Selected drawings.
d)
Maintenance and test procedures.
e)
Condition Reports associated with the Reactor Coolant Pump Circuit Breaker PA0107.
f )
Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports.
g)
Electrical distribution and system load flow/voltage drop calculations.
- (4) 125 VDC Switchboard Bus NK41 a)
Design basis documents.
b)
Current system health report.
c)
Selected drawings.
d)
Maintenance and test procedures.
e)
Condition Reports associated with the 125 Volts Direct Current (VDC) System Inverter Bus NK01.
f )
Battery short circuit calculations, sizing calculations, coordination studies, voltage drop calculations, and switchboard maintenance activities were appropriate for the design of the system.
g)
Input and output operating voltage characteristics to verify the NK41 switchboard and downstream components can perform their design function through all input voltage ranges.
h)
Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports.
I )
Preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing procedures for Class 1E 125 VDC System components.
- (5) 13.8KV AC Bus PA01 a)
Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports.
b)
Load flow, voltage drop, and short circuit calculations.
c)
Protective device selection and settings.
d)
Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing.
e)
Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during a walkdown).
- (6) 4160 VAC Bus NB02 a)
Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports.
b)
Load flow, voltage drop, and short circuit calculations.
c)
Protective device selection and settings.
d)
Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing.
e)
Equipment qualification specifications.
f )
Adequacy of offsite power during design basis events.
g)
Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during a walkdown).
Component Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) (1 Sample)
- (1) Containment Isolation Valve EJHV8701A a)
Procedures and associated testing records for the containment and pressure isolation function.
b)
Operating procedures for manual manipulation of EJHV8701A during accident conditions.
c)
Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports.
Permanent Plant Modification (4 Samples)
- (1) DCP 014893, Switchgear Racking Mechanism Chain Repair,
- (2) DCP 015251, Emergency Diesel Generator Exciter Power Potential Transformer Protection,
- (3) DCP 015214, Essential Service Water - Water Hammer Vacuum Breaker Valves Spring Replacement,
- (5) DCP 014831, Improved Reactor Coolant Pump Passive Shutdown Seal.
- (6) DCP 004637, Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve Nitrogen Backup Port.
- (7) DCP 015081, New Residual Heat Removal Pressure Transmitter EJPIT0027 and NPIS Point.
Operating Experience (1 Sample)
- (1) NRC Generic Letter 2006-02, Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power
Evaluation of Inspection Related Operator Procedures and Actions
- (1) Control room operator actions resulting from a simulated small break Loss of Coolant Accident.
a)
Control room crew was expected to implement procedures to address the loss of coolant accident and trip reactor coolant pumps when conditions were met.
b)
From the time when reactor coolant system pressure drops below setpoint and conditions are met the operators must take actions to secure reactor coolant pumps within five minutes.
- (2) Control room operator actions resulted from a loss of coolant accident which emptied the reactor water storage tank water into containment sump.
a)
Control room crew was expected to implement procedures to address the empty reactor water storage tank and transfer the emergency core cooling system pumps from injection mode to cold leg recirculation mode.
b)
From the time the reactor water storage tank level reaches Lo Lo 1 setpoint the operators must take actions to transfer emergency core cooling system equipment from injection mode to cold leg recirculation within eight minutes nine seconds.
- (3) Control room operator actions resulted from a loss of coolant accident which emptied the reactor water storage tank water into containment sump.
a)
Control room crew was expected to implement procedures to address the empty reactor water storage tank and transfer the remaining emergency core cooling system pumps from injection mode to cold leg recirculation mode.
b)
From the time the reactor water storage tanks level reaches Lo Lo 2 setpoint the operators must take actions to transfer remaining emergency core cooling system equipment from injection mode to cold leg recirculation within two minutes ten seconds.
- (4) Control room operator actions resulted from a loss of component cooling water in one train with the emergency core cooling system pumps running.
a)
Control room crew was expected to implement procedures to address stopping the affected emergency core cooling system pumps during a loss of component cooling water cooling in a single train.
b)
From the time the component cooling water pumps are not running in a single train the operators must take actions to stop the affected emergency core cooling system pumps to prevent damage from loss of cooling within thirty minutes.
All operator action timings were completed on the simulator successfully.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Follow Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000482/2018010-01 Closed None 71111.21M
Introduction:
The team identified two examples of a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to follow procedures.
Example 1
Description:
The team reviewed control room time critical and time sensitive activities which are used to validate design bases criteria. Without verification and validation of time critical/sensitive activities, the licensee would not be able to confirm that timing of design bases criteria would be met.
The team selected time critical and time sensitive, non-exempt tasks to be reviewed, which are identified in Attachments A and B of Procedure AI 21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, revision 14. These nonexempt tasks are required to be validated at least once every five years. The team reviewed approximately forty nine records from 2013 to 2018, and found that when reviewing Time Verification Form AIF 21-016-02, Revision 1, most of the records provided had Block 2 and Block 3 filled out improperly. The errors included the blocks being empty or were filled out with insufficient information. Block 2 is the identification information to link the form back to the task in the Attachments A or B of the procedure.
Block 3 is the reference information to show to how it was validated using other documents.
Without correct information in Block 2, the licensee had difficulty demonstrating which task was validated. Without correct information in Block 3, the licensee had difficulty demonstrating under what conditions the task was validated, which calls into question the validity of the document. With some records left blank in Block 2 or Block 3 the licensee was left to determine how the task was validated using comments or assumptions. The team chose only nonexempt tasks to simplify the inspection. It was not clear from the records provided to the team that the licensees program is being performed as required, and was not being performed as designated in the program procedures.
Corrective Actions: The licensee has acknowledged that the forms had not been filled out properly and that Procedure AI 21-016 had not been followed. The licensee has entered this concern into their corrective action program, and will review the concern of failure to follow station procedures.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report CR-00125356.
Example 2
Description:
During a review of Operability Evaluation OE-NK-18-005, dated July 26, 2018, the team questioned whether the downstream components from Class 1E 125 VAC Bus NK01 had been considered in the extent of condition of the evaluation. The operability evaluation did not address the downstream components, as Condition Report CR-00125361 only focused on the NK batteries and chargers, without regard for the downstream components. This does not comply with the licensees procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment, Revision 35. Section 6.1.2.1.a requires that operability determinations should include which structures, systems, and components (SSCs) are affected by the degraded or non-conforming condition. The operability determination performed for condition report CR-125361 failed to meet this requirement in that the components downstream of the NK buses had not been considered for overvoltage effects.
Corrective Actions: On August 1, 2018, the licensee completed the revised Operability Evaluation OE NK-18-005, to address the effect of the overvoltage condition on the downstream 125 VDC rated equipment. The licensee determined that reasonable assurance exists that the systems, structures, and components, associated with the operability evaluation remained capable of performing their specified safety function. The licensee has entered this concern into their corrective action program, and will review the concern of failure to follow station procedures.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report CR-00125487
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The team determined that the licensees failure to follow procedures (Procedure AI-21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, Revision 14, and Procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment, Revision 35) was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The team determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, for Example 1: the licensee failed to complete Time Verification Form AIF 21-016-02, to accurately validate simulator time critical and time sensitive activities for control room and in plant activities. Without verification of time critical/sensitive activities, the licensee could not confirm the timing of design bases criteria would be met. For Example 2: the operability screening of Condition Report CR-00125361 for the 140 VDC design limit for 125 VDC System components having been exceeded only focused on battery banks NK11, NK12, NK13, NK14, and the battery chargers, but did not address the effects of overvoltage conditions on downstream equipment.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the findings using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued October 7, 2016. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the team determined the findings to be of very low safety significance (Green)because the findings were a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather.
Cross-cutting Aspect: The team determined that the finding did not have a cross cutting aspect associated with it.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, which states Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
Contrary to the above, prior to July 30, 2018, the licensee failed to accomplish activities affecting quality in accordance with station procedures. For Example 1; Procedure AI-21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, Revision 14, contains Form AIF 21-016-02, Time Verification Form, Revision 1. On AIF 21-016-02, Block 2 is the identification information to link the form back to the task in the Attachments A or B of the procedure. Block 3 is the reference information to show to how it was validated using other documents. On several the forms, Block 2 and Block 3 were not filled out correctly as required by the procedure. For Example 2; licensee Procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment, Revision 35, Section 6.1.2, states, in part, that the scope of a Operability Determination must be sufficient to address the capability of systems, structures, and components to perform their specified safety functions. The operability screening of Condition Report CR-00125361 did not follow Procedure AP 26C-004, in that it did not address all of the capabilities of the component to perform its safety function as the effects of overvoltage conditions on downstream equipment were not analyzed.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Establish an Adequate Procedure for Operator Time Critical Actions Validation Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000482/2018010-02 Closed None 71111.21M
Introduction:
The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to have an adequate Procedure.
Procedure AI 21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, Revision 14, Attachment B
- Time Sensitive Action List, does not have unique identifiers for cross referencing the records to the procedure.
Description:
The Design Basis Assurance inspection procedure 71111.21M, Section 03.01 b.2.b discusses operations margin and refers to components required to be operated during high risk and/or time critical operations. The team elected to review Procedure AI 21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, Revision 14, to confirm that the licensee was performing design basis time critical and time sensitive actions for operations activities. The team identified a procedure deficiency in that Attachment B, Time Sensitive Action List, did not have unique identifiers in task Block 2 similar to task Block 2 found in Attachment A. This lack of unique identifier prevents cross referencing the records for Time Sensitive Actions listed in Attachment B with the records documenting the required validation. Block 2 of Form AIF AI 21-016-02 would use this information to link the form back to the task in the procedure attachments to prove it had been validated.
As an example, in the Time Critical Action heading, each time critical action in Attachment A starts with a code TCA_SLB_S1. Attachment B just has verbiage. The records that were provided were filled out with a variety of descriptions, usually not matching the description provided in the attachment. Without this unique information identifier, it was difficult to determine which task was validated, and at times impossible to determine what was being validated.
Corrective Actions: The licensee has acknowledged that Form AIF AI 21-016-02, B, Time Sensitive Action List, did not have unique identifiers in task Block 2, and is in the process of reviewing the procedure to identify and correct deficiencies that may exist.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Reports CR-00125536 and CR-00125350.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The team determined that the licensees failure to have an adequate procedure with unique identifiers for the Time Sensitive Actions in Attachment B of Procedure AI 21-016 was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The team determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the licensee failed to have unique identifiers for the time sensitive actions so that records could be cross referenced to the procedure to document that the required tasks had been validated successfully.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued October 7, 2016. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green)because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather.
Cross-cutting Aspect: The team determined that this finding did not have a cross cutting aspect associated with it.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, which states, Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
Contrary to the above, prior to July 30, 2018, the licensee failed to include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities had been satisfactorily accomplished. The licensee had failed to establish an adequate procedure for cross referencing Time Sensitive Actions listed in Attachment B with the records documenting the required validation. Specifically, Procedure AI 21-016, Attachment B - Time Sensitive Action List, Revision 14, was inadequate in that each Time Sensitive Action did not have a unique identifier for cross referencing the records to the procedure. (Could not correlate which records were used to validate which task).
Disposition: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Correct Reoccurring Problems with Time Critical/Sensitive Action Activities Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000482/2018010-03 Closed
[P.4] - Problem Identification and Resolution, Trending 71111.21M
Introduction:
The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct reoccurring problems with completing Time Critical/Time Sensitive Action issues.
Description:
The team reviewed corrective actions associated with Procedure AP 21-04, Operator Response Time Program, Revision 4B, and Procedure AI 21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, Revision 14. The team found that during the five year cycle of the program, the licensee had identified multiple (approximately 18) deficiencies in the program (i.e. source document to the form is not consistently being utilized, several of the time critical actions in AI 21-016 have not been validated, time critical actions not submitted as required, time sensitive action program requires enhancement, operations time sensitive action cannot be satisfied, several operator time critical actions are not validated and could result in operating outside of analyzed limits.) The licensees review pertaining to the identification of the problems, and resolution of the issues had resulted in inadequate identification of reoccurring problems, and problem resolution. The concerns were also identification in a Mid Cycle Self-Assessment (CR-00085924), QA Audits (CR-00104699), and an NRC Component Design Basis Inspection (CR-00103698). The corrective actions derived to answer the concerns had not prevented the problems from reoccurring. The licensee had addressed the concerns in eighteen different condition reports dating back to 2013.
The team found that over the last five years, the corrective actions taken by the licensee for the deficiencies and deviations in the Operator Time Critical Action Validations were ineffective.
Corrective Actions: The licensee has acknowledged that the corrective actions for these issues had not resolved the issues. The licensee has entered this concern into their corrective action program, and will be reviewing the issues.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report CR-00125533.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to promptly identify and correct deficiencies with the validation of Time Critical and Time Sensitive Actions, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The team determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the licensee did not recognize that they had failed to correct reoccurring deficiencies concerning validation of Time Critical/Time Sensitive Actions over the last five years, which could lead to inaccurate design bases assumptions or incorrect operator actions.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued October 7, 2016. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green)because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather.
Cross-cutting Aspect: The team determined that this finding had a cross cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Trending, where the organization periodically analyzes information from the corrective action program and other assessments in the aggregate to identify programmatic and common cause issues. The licensee failed to recognize reoccurring concerns pertaining to time critical action, even after these issues had been identified in self-assessment and Quality Control audits. [P.4]
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states, in part, Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, defective materials and equipment, and nonconformances, are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, since May 2012 until August 1, 2018, the licensee failed to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, deficiencies, and nonconformances, are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee had identified multiple (approximately 18) deficiencies with Time Critical and Time Sensitive Actions and the corrective actions had been inadequate to correct the conditions, even after these issues had been identified in self-assessment and Quality Control audits.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Identify 125 VDC Equalizing Voltage Exceeded Design Requirements Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000482/2018010-04 Closed
[H.13] - Human Performance, Consistent Process 71111.21M -
Introduction:
The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to verify or check the adequacy of design calculation NK-E-001, 125 Volt Direct-Current (VDC) Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Studies, Revision 4. The licensee failed to recognize that the actual 125 VDC Class 1E bus voltages had exceeded the maximum design limit voltages for downstream equipment identified in the calculation, and they had not placed any limits on voltages which could exceed the design limit of 140 VDC on the Class 1E System components.
Description:
One of the components the team selected to inspect was the 125 VDC Switchboard Bus NK41. The Wolf Creek Updated Safety Analysis Report, Section 1.2.7.2 states that vital alternating current instrumentation and control power supply systems include battery systems, static inverters, and distribution panels. All of the voltages listed in that section of the updated safety analysis report are nominal values, and all electrical Class IE equipment is designed to accept the expected range in voltage. As part of the review for this component, the team reviewed design calculation NK-E-001, 125 Volt Direct-Current (VDC) Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Studies, Revision 4. During the review of the calculation, the team identified concerns with the validation of certain criteria specified in the calculation.
The team noted that procedure MPE E050Q-05, Battery Equalizing Procedure, Revision 14, references a battery equalizing voltage range of 139.5 to 140 VDC for the 125 VDC batteries (NK11, NK12, NK13, and NK14); and procedure STS NB-005, Breaker Alignment Verification, Revision 34, Appendix B, references a required voltage range of 130 to 140 VDC for the Class 1E 125 VDC electrical distribution buses NK01, NK02, NK03, and NK04.
The team identified that design calculation NK-E-001 lists several components with maximum voltage limits that are less than the maximum voltages of 140 VDC. The team requested voltage data during the time that the battery equalize charging was in progress. The licensee provided the team data measurements that had been taken between April 10, 2018 and April 18, 2018. The data indicated that the actual NK01 bus voltage exceeded the 140 VDC procedure and calculation limit (up to 143 VDC for approximately 20 minutes during NK11 battery equalize charging). The team identified periods when components downstream of the Class 1E 125 VDC electrical distribution buses (with design limits less than 140 VDC) had been exposed to voltages that exceeded maximum design values for components listed in design calculation NK-E-001. The licensee did not have an analysis to address the concern pertaining to whether the equipment downstream of the NK01 bus could withstand voltages that exceeded design limits. Also, Procedure MPE E050Q-05 references a maximum equalizing voltage of 140 VDC for the battery banks.
According to licensee systems engineering personnel, this condition would only be expected during battery equalize charging activities. Section 7.2 of procedure MPE E050Q-05 requires that battery terminal voltage is measured and that potentiometer adjustments be made to obtain equalize values given in the table for equalize voltage range, but there were no steps that prohibited exceeding the 140 VDC maximum value. Furthermore, procedure STS NB-005, Breaker Alignment Verification, does not reference any specific steps to ensure that the 140 VDC voltage limit would not be exceeded. Neither of the procedures referenced identify any actions to be taken when the voltage limit is exceeded.
Corrective Actions. On August 1, 2018, the licensee completed Operability Evaluation OE NK-18-005, to address the effect of the overvoltage condition on the 125 VDC battery, battery charger, and equalizer. The licensee determined that reasonable assurance exists that the systems, structures, or components associated with the operability evaluation remained capable of performing their specified safety function. According to updated information in Condition Report CR-00125361, a procedure change request (PCR) was initiated to add battery voltage monitoring to procedure MPE E050Q-05 to ensure maximum voltage values are not exceeded. Furthermore, updated information in Condition Report CR-00125468, indicated that an action was initiated to review previous performance of NK buses to determine the historical amount of overvoltage that may have occurred.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-00125361 and CR-00125468.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to verify or check the adequacy of design calculation NK-E-001, 125 Volt Direct-Current (VDC) Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Studies, Revision 4, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The team determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design calculation NK-E-001, 125 Volt Direct-Current (VDC) Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Studies, Revision 4, regarding maximum allowed Class 1E 125 VDC voltage, and procedures involving Class 1E 125 VDC system components. There had been periods of time when components downstream of the Class 1E 125 VDC electrical distribution buses (with design limits less than 140 VDC) had been exposed to voltages that exceeded maximum design values. Furthermore, procedure STS NB-005, Breaker Alignment Verification, does not reference any specific steps to ensure that the 140 VDC voltage is not exceeded, and none of the procedures reference any actions to take when the voltage limit is exceeded.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued October 7, 2016. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green)because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: The team determined that this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Consistent Process, where Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate.
Specifically, the licensee did not use a consistent, systematic approach for reviewing components downstream of the battery chargers for overvoltage conditions as identified in the design basis calculation. [H.13]
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states in part, Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.
Contrary to the above, prior to August 1, 2018, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.
Specifically, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design calculation NK-E-001, Revision 4, 125 Volt Direct-Current (VDC) Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Studies, and procedures involving Class 1E 125 VDC system components, by not recognizing that the actual 125 VDC Class 1E bus voltages had exceeded the maximum design limit voltages for downstream equipment identified in design calculation NK-E-001. Also, the licensee had not placed any voltage limits in any procedures for the 125 VDC Class 1E System which had actually exceeded the design limit of 140 VDC.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71152Problem Identification and Resolution This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states, in part, Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, prior to 2015, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a repetitive deficiency or nonconformance. Specifically, the licensee had identified a leaking flange on the residual heat removal heat exchanger since 1997. Prior to 1997 a different data base had been used to record boric acid leakage, and the data was not available during the inspection. Over the years since plant startup, the licensee had been diligent in completing boric acid evaluations on the leaking residual heat removal heat exchanger flange, indicating minimal wastage of the flange closure studs and nuts that had been subjected to boric acid.
Corrective actions included cleaning up the boric acid leakage, and checking or re-torqueing the closure nuts. These measures did not correct the problem of the leaking heat exchanger flange.
In 2015 the licensee completed an in-depth engineering evaluation of the leaking flange, including discussions with the heat exchanger manufacturer. New corrective measures included changing the torque values on the closure studs and nuts. The licensee is still evaluating the results of the corrective actions taken to preclude further leakage.
Significance/Severity Level: The team assessed the significance of the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued October 7, 2016. The team concluded the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because all questions in Exhibit 2 could be answered no.
Corrective Action Reference(s): Condition Reports CR-00057242, CR-00057267, and CR-
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
On August 2, 2018, the team presented the initial results of this design basis assurance inspection to Mr. Jamie McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On October 1, 2018, a phone call was held with Mr. Steve Smith, Vice President, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff, to clarify the characterization of the identified findings.
On November 1, 2018, an additional phone call was held with Mr. Daljit Mand, Director, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff, to revise the characterization of the identified findings. On November 13, 2018, a final exit phone call was held with Mr. Gabe Fugate, Director, Plant Support, and other members of the licensee staff, to identify changes to the inspection findings as a result of an enforcement policy review. The team verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
A1-1
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Calculations
Number
Title
Revision
A-06-W
Thermal Capability of Electrical Penetration
Assemblies (EPA) Versus Dual Short Circuit
Protection to Satisfy Reg. [Regulatory] Guide 1.63
007
H-06
Protective Relays
H-08
System NB Protective Relays
H-15
Provide RCPM Protective Relay Settings (Class 1E)
for UV & UF
NK-E-001
25 VDC Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage
Drop and Short Circuit Studies
NN-E-001
Class 1E NN Inverter Loading
P-009A-010-
CN001
Piping Stress Analysis for Essential Service Water
System, Train B
June 20, 2017
PK-E-001
Non-Class 1E 125 Volt DC System
WCN-023-CALC-
001
Transient water hammer analysis of the essential
service water system following a LOOP with a higher
setpoint for the vacuum breakers at the top of the loop.
XX-E-006
AC System Analysis
Condition Reports (CR-)
00056641
00077640
00098218
00106993
00118952
00057242
00077791
00098844
00107885
00118954
00057267
00077792
00099349
00107915
00119043
00069540
00077794
00099930
00109450
00119167-01
00070051
00082790
00099956
00109656
00120213
00070256
00085924
00099993
00109733
00121267
00070380
00088577
00100863
00109893
00121828
00070718
00088665
00101289
00110094
00122600
00071246
00091857
00101942
00110420
00123328
A1-2
Condition Reports (CR-)
00071977
00092106
00102416-01
00110546
00123329
00072165
00092324
00103150
00111571
00123660
00072426
00093748
00103658
00112981
00123843
00072496
00093748
00103698
00116051
00123902
00073206
00094365
00103918
00116852
00123908
00073240
00094366
00104699
00117311
00124694
00073244
00094627
00105147
00117441
00124822
00073443
00097769
00105480
00117639
00124997
00073445
00098177
00106923
00118853
Condition Reports Generated During the Inspection (CR-)
00125081
00125166
00125310
00125413
00125489
00125111
00125183
00125350
00125414
00125490
00125112
00125184
00125356
00125447
00125492
00125123
00125191
00125361
00125456
00125513
00125136
00125225
00125362
00125457
00125521
00125139
00125227
00125370
00125458
00125533
00125152
00125255
00125405
00125468
00125536
00125158
00125255a
00125406
00125487
00125557
Design Change Packages
Number
Title
Revision
Date
014831
Improved RCP Passive Shutdown Seal
015040
Nitrogen Backup for EJHCV0606 and EJHCV0607
015070
NN Power to GK Damper
015081
New RHR Pressure Transmitter EJPIT0027 and
NPIS [Nuclear Plant Information System] Point
A1-3
Design Change Packages
Number
Title
Revision
Date
015214
ESW Water Hammer Vacuum Breaker Valves Spring
Replacement
14923
Restore Regulatory Compliance for 10 480 V MOVs
CCP 11897
Transformer XNB02 Tap Change
DCP 13271
Turbine Trip Wiring Changes in Support of DCP
011354
FCN 015251
EDG Exciter Power Potential Transformer Protection
MCP 14893
Switchgear Racking Mechanism Chain Repair
PMR 04637
RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve Nitrogen Backup
Port
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
5736
Vertical Residual H.E. Outline Drawing
5739
Vertical Residual Heat Exchanger Details
5740
Vertical Residual Heat Exchanger Details
E-009B-00025
Breaker Schematic G.E. 13.8KV
W02
E-02PA01
Logic Diagram, Unit Auxiliary Source 13.8kV Bus
Feeder Breakers
E-11001
Main Single Line Diagram
E-11005
List of Loads Supplied by Emergency Diesel
Generator
E-11010
DC [Direct Current] Main Single Line Diagram
E-11010
DC [Direct Current] Main Single Line Diagram
E-11010A
DC [Direct Current] Main Single Line Diagram (PK03
And PK04 Bus)
A1-4
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
E-11010A
DC [Direct Current] Main Single Line Diagram (PK03
And PK04 Bus)
E-11023
Relay Setting Tabulation & Coordination Curves
System NB
E-11030
Relay Setting Tabulation RCPM UV & UF Monitors
E-11032
Substation and Plant Transformer Tap Settings
E-11MA01
Main Generator Single Line Metering and Relaying
Diagram
E-11NB02
Lower Medium Voltage Sys. Class 1E 4.16 kV Single
Line Meter and Relay Diagram
E-11PA01
Higher Medium Voltage System 13.8 kV Single Line
Meter & Relay Diagram
E-11PK01
Non-Class 1E 125V System Meter & Relay Diagram
E-12NF01
Load Shedding and Emergency Load Sequencing
Logic
E-13BB01
Schematic Diagram Reactor Coolant Pumps
E-13N03
Schematic Diagram RHR Pump MOV
EID-0004
Pool Parameters
IP-M-18EF13-010-
Hanger Details Small Pipes, Essential Water System
KD-7496
One Line Diagram
KD-7496A
Distribution System Equipment Lineup Limitations
KL-1909
Logic Block Diagram, Load Shedding & Emergency
Load Sequencing System (LSELS)
E
M-018-00077
Electrical Schematic Diesel Gen. [Generator] Control
NE107
W01
M-018-00077
Electrical Schematic Diesel Gen. [Generator] Control
NE106
W20
M-018-00301
Interconnection Wiring Diagram (NE107)
W08
A1-5
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
M-12BB01
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant
System
M-12BB04
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant
System
M-12EF01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Essential Service
Water System
M-12EF02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Essential Service
Water System
M-12EJ01
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat
Removal System
M-12E-J01
P&ID, Residual Heat Removal System
M-12EM01
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure
Coolant Injection System
M-12EP01
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Accumulator Safety
Injection
M-223F-00003
CRISPIN Model VR-41 Model Relief Check Valve
Flanged Ends Size 4 Fig. 150 - VR
W04
M-724-00761
Motor Operated Gate Valve
WIP-J-110-00660-
W11-A-1
Wiring Diagram Termination Area Rack HF187A
Separation Group 5
WIP-J-110-00671-
W10-A-1
Rack HF187A & 187B Loading Standardized Nuclear
Unit Power Plant System Applicable to Unit 1, Bechtel
P.O. 10466-J-110-1
WIP-J-110-01026-
000-A-1
Instrument Loop Diagram Residual Heat Removal
System RHR Pump Discharge Header Pressure
WIP-J-14EJ08-
2-A-1
Instrument Isometric Drawing RHR [Residual Heat
Removal] HX [Heat Exchanger] 1B to ACCUM
[Accumulator] INJ [Injection] LP [ Loop] 3 & 4
WIP-J-17P39-000-
Instrument Mounting Detail Pressure Transmitter
(Rosemount) Packed Manifold
WIP-M-12EJ01-
053-A-1
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat
Removal System
WIP-M-13EJ10-
2-A-1
Schematic Diagram Instrumentation
A1-6
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
18-0022
Essential Reading - LBLOCA HL Break
AI 16C-006
Troubleshooting
AI 16C-007
Work Order Planning
AI 16F-001
Evaluation of Boric Acid Leakage
AI 21-016
Operator Time Critical Actions Validation
AI 23O-001
Functional Importance Determination
AI 26C-004
Technical Specification Application for Containment
Isolation Valves
AI 26C-004
Technical Specification Application for Containment
Isolation Valves
7A
AI 28A-010
Screening Condition Reports
29A
AI 28A-010
Screening Condition Reports
AI 28A-100
Condition Report Resolution
AI 28B-005
Evidence and Action Matrix
AI 30B-005
Development and Conduct of Simulator Activities for
Licensed Operator Training
AI 30B-015
Licensed Operator Requalification Examination
Guidelines
ALR 501
Standby Diesel Engine System Control Panel KJ-121
AP 05-002
Disposition and Change Packages
AP 05-002
Disposition and Change Package
AP 05-005
Design, Implementation and Configuration Control of
Modifications
AP 05-005
Design, Implementation and Configuration Control of
Modifications
2, 26
A1-7
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
AP 05-013
Review of Vendor Technical Documents
AP 05-013
Review of Vendor Technical Documents
AP 05-024
Minor Change Package
Basic Engineering Dispositions
0, 1
Procedure Writers Guide
AP 15C003
Procedure Users Guide for Abnormal Plant Conditions 37
MPAC Work Request/Work Order Process Controls
21A
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
Industry Operating Experience Program
AP 21-001
Conduct of Operations
AP 21-004
Operator Response Time Program
4B
Diverse and Flexible Coping Mitigation Strategies
(FLEX) Program
Wolf Creek Substation
Screening, Prioritization and Pre-Approval
CFR 50.59 Reviews
Operability Determination and Functionality
Assessment
AP 28-001
Operability Evaluations
AP 28-007
Nonconformance Control
AP 28-011
Resolving Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions
Impacting SSCs
Corrective Action Program
A1-8
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
Corrective Action Program
BD EMG E-0
Reactor Trip of Safety Injection
BD EMG E-1
Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
BD EMG E-2
Faulted SG Isolation
BD EMG ES-12
Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation
EMG E-0
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
39A
EMG E-1
Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
EMG E-2
Faulted SG Isolation
EMG ES-12
Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation
EMG FR-C2
Response to Degraded Cooling
EMG FR-P1
Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock
Conditions
IP-ENG-001
Standard Design Process
KMS-4
Mechanical Standard for Bolting
KMS-6
Fastener Specification for Use at the Wolf Creek
General Station in Both ASME and Non-ASME/ANSI
M-10EJ
System Description Residual Heat Removal
MPE E009-01
Siemens Breaker Cubicle Maintenance, Testing, and
Swapping
MPE E009Q-01
13.8 kV and 4.16 kV Switchgear Inspection and
Testing
MPE E009Q-01
13.8 KV And 4.16 KV Switchgear Inspection and
Testing
33A
MPE E009Q-01
13.8 KV And 4.16 KV Switchgear Inspection and
Testing
A1-9
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
MPE E050Q-05
Battery Equalizing Procedure
MPM M712Q-01
Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Removal/Installation
MPM M712Q-02
Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cartridge
Inspection/Rebuild
OFN BB-005
RCP Malfunctions
OFN BB-005
RCP Malfunctions
OFN EG-004
CCW System Malfunctions
18B
OFN EG-004
CCW System Malfunctions
18B
PWROG-14006-P Implementation Guide for Generation III Westinghouse
Seal
0-B
PWROG-16030-
NP
Time Critical Action/Time Sensitive Action Program
Standard PA-PSC-0840
August, 2016
Record of
Completion
Flex Support Guideline (FSG) Validation Process
STN EJ-205
RHR System Valve Test
STN TCA-001
Manual Time Critical Action Timing
STS AL-103
TDAFW Pump Inservice Test
STS AL-104
STS AL-211
TDAFW Comprehensive Pump Testing and System
Flow Path Verification and Inservice Check Valve
STS BB-207
RCP Seal Water Injection Inservice Check Valve Test 8
STS BN-208A
RWST to RHR Pump A Suction Valve Test
3A
STS BN-208B
RWST to RHR Pump B Suction Valve Test
3A
STS IC-740A
RHR Switchover to Recirculation Sump Test - Train A
A1-10
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
STS IC-740B
RHR Switchover to Recirculation Sump Test - Train B
28C
STS IC-805B
Channel Calibration of NB02 Grid Degraded Voltage,
Time Delay Trip
STS IC-902A
Actuation Logic Test Train A Residual Heat Removal
Suction Isolation Valves
4A
STS MT-019A
25 VDC Class 1E Quarterly Inspection For NK11 and
NK13 Batteries
1B
STS MT-028
Penetration Breaker Inspection
STS MT-028
Penetration Breaker Inspection
STS MT-079
ESW System Water Hammer Inservice Check Valve
Test
STS NB-005
Breaker Alignment Verification
STS NB-005
Breaker Alignment Verification
STS PE-007
Periodic Verification of Motor Operated Valves
STS PE-19B
RHR Suction Valve Leak Test
STS VT-001
Verification of OMN-1, MOV Exercise Requirements
SYS NB-200
Transferring XNB01 Supply Between SL7 and #7
Transformer
SYS NK-331
De-energizing NK Buses
TSO 0101-21
Division of Responsibility of the Wolf Creek Substation July 13, 2018
TSO 0400-02
Wolf Creek 345 kV Bus Voltage
April 30, 2018
TSO 0414-02
Monitoring Wolf Creek Contingency Study 345 kV Bus April 30, 2018
Operator Time Critical Action Program Standard
Rev. 0
A1-11
Vendor Technical Document
Number
Title
Revision
Date
6998D62
Colt Industries Type WNR Volt Reg. [Voltage
Regulation] & Excitation System
January 17, 1983
E-009-00223
Instruction Manual for 13.8 kV Switchgear
W33
E-009-00242
Instruction Manual for 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear
W31
E-009-00258
IEEE 323 Qualification Program General Electric Co.
July 2, 1984
E-009-00342
Metal-Clad Switchgear
W09
E-009B-00001
Qualification Plan for Siemens 5-AF-GER-350-1200-
and 5-3AF-GER-350-2000-78
W05
E-009B-00006
Third Party Qualification Plan for Siemens 52STA
Switch Mechanisms
W01
E-009B-00009
Instruction Manual for Siemens Type 3AF-GER
Vertical Lift Direct Replacement Circuit Breakers
W06
E-009B-00018
Third Party Qualification Report for Siemens Types 5-
3AF-GER-350-1200-78 and 5-3AF-GER-350-2000-78
Vertical Lift Vacuum Circuit Breakers and 52STA
Switch Mechanisms
W01
E-009B-00029
Siemens Vacuum Circuit Breakers (Vehicle)
W02
E-009B-00029
Siemens Circuit Breakers (Vehicle) Type GER 5kV to
15kV
E-009B-00044
Siemens Type-3AFS Vacuum Circuit Breakers
W01
E-009B-00044
Siemens Type-3AFS Vacuum Circuit Breakers
W01
E-020-00055
Installation and Maintenance Instructions - AV-Line
Switchboards (GEH-2621C)
E-020-00055
Instructions (GEH-3042A) - Mounting and Connecting
Hardware for QMR Double Branch Panelboard Units,30-100 Amperes
E-020-00055
Instructions (GEH-3043) - Mounting and Connecting
Hardware for QMR Double Branch Panelboard Units,30-600 Amperes
E-050A-00011
Lucent Technologies Lineage 2000 Round Cell Battery W03
A1-12
Vendor Technical Document
Number
Title
Revision
Date
M-021-00061
Instruction Manual for Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps
W29
M-072-00024
Operation/Maintenance for Cooling Water Heat
Exchangers
W07
M-072-00052
Instruction Manual for Auxiliary Heat Exchangers
W11
M-223F-00003
Crispin Model VR-41 Model Relief Check Valve
Flanged Ends Size 4 Fig. 150 - VR
W04
M-712-00068
Instruction Manual for Reactor Coolant Pump
W38
WIP-M-223F-
00004-W01-A-1
Crispin Mode VR-41 Relief Check Valve Flanged Size
150 LB Carbon Steel With Resilient Seat.
W02
Work Orders (WO)
2-242150-013
2-359883-000
13-381325-001
15-399466
16-420373-000
05-273137-002
13-364867-000
13-381325-002
15-399467
16-420373-001
05-277630
13-376820-000
14-385969-000
15-401047-002
17-421126-000
07-295699
13-376820-000
14-385969-001
15-401047-005
17-423640-000
2-357898
13-376820-005
14-394162
15-404075-000
17-434455-000
2-357899
13-376846-000
15-396644-000
15-404395-000
17-434455-001
2-359817-000
13-381325-000
15-398783
15-409923-001
Miscellaneous
Number
Title
Revision
Date
NERC Interface Coordination Agreement for the Wolf
Creek Substation
April 28, 2018
015214
Applicability Determination
015214
50.59 Screen
07381
Gaskets and Bolting Change Package
A1-13
Miscellaneous
Number
Title
Revision
Date
14831
Applicability Determination
14831
10CFR 50.59 Screening
15040
Applicability Determination
15040
CFR 50.59 Screening
17-00365
Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1 Safety
Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating
Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-
2-051
August 2, 2017
2012-0003
DCP 14016 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation
BED for CR
46330 Rev. 1
Evaluation of Voids in Suction Piping for Auxiliary Feed
Water Pumps
BED for SWO 15-
401047-002 and
15-401047-005
Expected Life Evaluation for ESW Vacuum Breaker
Valves
March 10, 2016
E-009
Technical Specification for Metal-Clad Switchboard
E-020
Technical Specification for DC Distribution
Switchboards for the Standardized Nuclear Unit Power
Plant System (SNUPPS)
E-020
Specification: DC Distribution Switchboards
E-058
Technical Specification for 600 Volt Single & Multiple
Conductor Copper Power Cable for Wolf Creek Nuclear
Operating Corporation
E-10NB
System Description, Lower Medium Voltage System
4.16 kV (Class 1E Power System
E-10NE
System Description, Standby Power Supply System
E-10NF
System Description, Load Shedding and Emergency
Load Sequencing
E-10NK
System Description for 125-Volt DC System (Class 1E
Power System)
A1-14
Miscellaneous
Number
Title
Revision
Date
E-10PA
System Description, Higher Medium Voltage System
13.8 kV (Non-Class 1E Power System)
E-10PA
System Description for Higher Medium Voltage System
- 13.8 KV (Non-Class IE Power System)
EFV0482
IST Basis Report for Valve EF V0482
N/A
EFV0484
IST Basis Report for Valve EF V0484
N/A
EMG C-12
LOCA Outside Containment
ET-17-0003
Docket no. 50-482: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating
Corporations Compliance Report for the
Implementation of Order EA-12-049
January 19, 2017
FD-SL-01-WC
Functional Description, Auxiliary Power System
LR1400302
Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP)
LTR-RES-13-108 Input to an Operability Determination Associated with
the Shutdown Seal (SDS) Failure to Actuate During
Post-Service Testing
M-021-00061
Instruction Manual For Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps
W29
M-10AL
Auxiliary Feedwater System, System Description
M-10BB
M-10BB
System Description for Reactor Coolant Systems
M-10EF
System Description Essential Service Water System
M-712-00210
Use of Westinghouse Shield Passive Shutdown Seal
for Flex Strategies
MGE LT-006
Maintenance of Limotorque Valve Operators Type
SMB-0 Thru 4
NEI 12-06 [Rev 5] Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX)
Implementation Guide
Improving the Effectiveness of Issue Resolution to
Enhance Safety and Efficiency
A1-15
Miscellaneous
Number
Title
Revision
Date
NK
System Health Report for 125 VDC (1E)
(July 1, 2017 -
December 31,
2017)
NRC Final Safety
Evaluation Report
Topical Report WCAP-17100-P/NP, REVISION 1,
PRA Model for the Westinghouse Shut Down Seal AL"
(PA-RMSC-0499) Pressurized Water Reactor Owners
Group, Project no. 694
April 29, 2011
NSAL-13-6
SHIELD Passive Thermal Shutdown Seal (SDS) Failure
to Actuate During Post-Service Test
July 26, 2013
OE NK-18-005
Operability Evaluation: NK001, NK002, NK003, NK004
25 VDC Bus Switchboard and Component
Downstream of the NK Bus Are Listed in Calculation
NK-E-001 Appendix E
July 31, 2018
OFN BB-031
Shutdown LOCA
OFN EJ-15
Loss of RHR Cooling
29B
ONF EJ-40
CL Recirculation During Mode 3, with Accumulator
Isolated in Mode 4, 5, or 6
System Health Report for High-Medium Voltage 13.8
kV
(July 1, 2017 -
December 31,
2017)
PM FILE 49330
A RCP no. 3 Seal Leak-off Flush
n/a
QH-2018-1612
USAR Self-Assessment for 2018 DBAI
July 19,2018
REVISION TO
Compliance with Order EA-12-049,
Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to
Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events
SCA-05-0028
Safety Classification Analysis, NB Syst. Magna Blast
Breaker Elevating Mechanism Roller Assembly
System Health
Report
July 1, 2017 -
December 31,
2017
System Health
Report
Auxiliary Feedwater System AL, AP, FC-1
July 1, 2017 -
December 31,
2017
A1-16
Miscellaneous
Number
Title
Revision
Date
TDAFWP Test
Trends
IST Hydraulic and Vibration Trends for TDAFWP and
Screen Shots from Data Program
Various dates
Docket No. 50-482: Request for Schedule Relaxation of
NRC Order EA-12-049, Requirement lV.A.2, at Wolf
Creek Generating Station
March 31, 2014
SUNSI Review
ADAMS:
Non-Publicly Available
Non-Sensitive
Keyword:
By: RAK
Yes No
Publicly Available
Sensitive
OFFICE
NAME
RKopriva
FThomas
IAnchondo
APalmer
TFarnholtz
NTaylor
SIGNATURE
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
DATE
11/01/18
10/26/18
10/23/18
11/02/18
11/05/18
11/12/18
OFFICE
NAME
TFarnholtz
SIGNATURE
/RA/
DATE
11/14/18