IR 05000285/1987019

Insp Rept 50-285/87-19 on 870721-23.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Eight Deficiencies Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Emergency Response Capabilities During Exercise of Emergency Plan & Procedures

ML20237H628
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	08/19/1987
From:	Fisher W, Terc N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237H617	List: IR 05000285/1987019 ML20237H615
References
50-285-87-19, NUDOCS 8708250088
Download: ML20237H628 (6)

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APPENDIX l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NE Inspection Report: 50-285/87-19 License: DPR-40 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)

1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)

Inspection At: Fort Calhoun and Omaha, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: July 21- 3, 1987 i

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Inspector: ~

N. M. Terc, NRC Team Leader

- b 7 Date Other Inspectors: P. Michaud, NRC Resident Inspector, Fort St. Vrain E. Plettner, NRC Resident Inspector, Cooper Station W. Holley, Radiation Specialist, Region IV - USNRC l G. Bryan, Comex Corporation Approved: tw [L W. L. Fisher, Chief'Huc' ear Materials and P//9/f7 Date Emergency Preparedness Branch Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted July 21-23, 1987 (NRC Report Number 50-285/87-19)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's emergency response capabilities during an exercise of the emergency plan and procedure Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. Eight deficiencies were identified (paragraphs 3 to 9).

8708250088 870820 PDR ADOCK 05000205 G PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee

• L. Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Production

• Gates, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station

• S. Gebers, Site Emergency Plan Coordinator f

• T. L. Patterson, Manager, Technical Support l *C. Norris, Supervisor, Radiological Support

• A. W. Richard, Manager, Quality Assurance

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• D. Munderloh, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory and Industry Affairs

• J. Fisicaro, Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory and Industry Affairs

• H. F. Sterba, Division Manager, Corporate Communications

• G. L. Roach, Supervisor, Chemical and Radiation Protection

• W. R. Nehrenz, Health Physicist, Radiation Health and Emergency Planning-

• F. F. Franco, Manager, Radiation Health and Emergency Planning l

• R. L. Jaworski, Section Manager, Technical Services Others l

• Harrell, Senior Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun Station j * Denotes attendance at ex.it interview The NRC inspector also held discussions with other station and corporate personnel in the areas of dose assessment, health physics, operations, and emergency response organizatio . Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings Closed (285/8619-01): Prompting in the Control Room - The NRC inspector determined that there was no prompting in the control room during the emergency ex m.is Closed (285/8619-02): Deficient security Practices - The NRC inspector determined that security practices did not hinder offsite emergency monitoring . teams entering or leaving the protected are Closed (285/8619-04): Inadequate Formulation of Protective Action-Recommendations (PARS) - The NRC inspector determined that the licensee formulated and provided protective action recommendations to offsite authorities efficientl Closed (285/8619-05): Deficient PARS - The NRC inspector noted that the licensee was able to make effective PARS based on plant statu _ _ _ - _ _ _

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3. Clear Functional Areas Inspected Inspection of the following areas revealed no violations, deviations, unresolved items, or open items. The inspection included interviews with cognizant individuals, observations of activities, and record review The depth and scope of these activities were consistent with past findings and with the current status of the facilit The functional areas marked with an asterisk (*) either were not inspected or they require further review and evaluation during the current inspection cycl Procedure Functional Area and Inspection Requirements 82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors (1) Control Room (2) Technical Support Center (3) Emergency Operations Facility (4) Operations Support Center (5) Corporate Command Center *

(6) Offsite Monitoring Team *

(7) Corrective Action / Rescue Team (8) Security / Accountability Team *

l (9) Press Center *

(10) Medical Team *

(11) Postaccident Sampling N/A Exercise Scenario 4. Control Room 82301 (1) {

The information flow between Emergency Response Facilities was deficient in that:

• The Shift Supervisor failed to make announcements in the control room i pertaining.to the activation of the Emergency Operation l Facility (E0F) and the transfer of overall command and control responsibilities to the Recovery Manager. As a result, the control room staff was not aware that the Recovery Manager was in charge of classifying emergencies. When the Site Area Emergency was declared at 9:42 a.m. by the Recovery Manager at the E0F, the control room staff erroneously assumed that the decision to escalate to a Site l Area Emergency was made by the Site Director at the Technical Support 1 Center (TSC).

• The control room staff failed to inform the TSC that a second explosion, with a potential to jeopardize safety equipment, had occurred in the auxiliary buildin The TSC staff performed independent leak rate calculations but neglected to inform the control room. In addition, the control room did not confirm ,

information requested by the OSC staff during a 49-minute perio _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -

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Verification of flow through the stack was needed by the health physics staff in the OSC to perform dose assessment. As a result of deficient information flow, necessary correct-ive and protective actions-were not coordinated adequately among these facilitie The above constitutes a deficiency (285/8719-01)

The NRC inspectors noted that in their postexercise critique the licensee l identified communication and information flow deficiencies among their emergency response facilitie No violations or deviations were identifie i

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! Technical Support Center (TSC) 82301 (2)

The NRC inspectors noted that Procedure EPIP.OSC-2 did not provide an NRC notification for In addition, paragraph IV 1A3A of the procedure requires use of the

! initial notification form (attachment 1) for all changes in emergency l classification. This conflicts with paragraph IV 2A7 of the same

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procedure, which refers the user to attachment 2 - the update form. This constitutes a deficiency (285/8719-02).

! The TSC communicator did not follow Procedure EPIP OSC-2 is accomplishing l state and local notification of declaration of the Alert. As a result, l the completed form (attachment 2) lacked information on release rates, i dose assessment, and protective action recommendations. In addition, the l completed form did not specify the name of the caller, and was not approved by the Site Director This constitutes a deficiency (285/8719-03).

The NRC inspector noted that airlock doors in the TSC did not close tightl This could result in potential contamination ar" radiation exposure of personnel in this facility. This constitutes a deficiency (285/8719-04).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 82301 (3)

Recordkeeping by the Recovery Manager was not accurate or complet In addition, it distracted him from other more vital duties (See deficiency 285/8719-06). Operational Support Center (OSC) 82301 (4)

The OSC communicator failed to relay information to the Site Director in the TSC pertaining to an actual event (a small fire in the control room area). (See deficiency 285/8719-02.)

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! Briefings of in plant repair and corrective action teams were inadequate.

! These teams were not provided technical and radiological information necessary to perform their tasks ef ficiently. For example, briefers did not provide repair teams with diagrams, procedures, floor plans, specific instructions on how to perform complex tasks, radiation dose rates, or ALARA guidelines. This constitutes a repeat deficiency from the previous l exercise (285/8719-05). (See deficiency 285/8619-03.)'

The maintenance supervisor was unable to keep complete and accurate records pertaining to activities in the OS This constitutes a deficiency (285/8719-06). (See also paragraph 6 of this report.)

No violations or deviations were identifie . Corrective Actions / Rescue Team 82301 (7)

The NRC inspector determined that inplant radiological controls were not consistently adequate. During the performance of some tasks, inplant repair / corrective action teams performed poorly in the radiation protection area. For example, teams did not take representative airborne contamination samples or general area radiation surveys when entering )

potentially hazardous areas during accident conditions. In addition, the j teams did not use correct procedural sequences when removing i anticontamination apparel. This constitutes a deficiency (285/8719-07).

No violations or deviations were identifie :

9. Scenario The NRC inspector identified a series of scenario incongruence which detracted from the realism and free play of the exercise. These appeared to be the result of: internal inconsistencies in the. scenario itself, insufficient controllers, poor logistics or improper timeliness in the positioning of controllers, and deficient controller training, The licensee identified a number of these deficiencies in their critique. Some examples follow:

• There was no controller evailable in room 69 to hand out data to players pertaining to ongoirg fir * The scenario did not anticipate that component cooling water pumps were safety related equipment mandating a manual tripping of the reactor when threatened by fire. This condition in itself would have terminated the accident sequence, preventing the continuation of the exercis * Control room operators were not given alarms indicating high radiation levels, although this data would be readily accessible to them during a real acciden _ _ _ _ _

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• On two occasions, the scenario required reactor operators to continue plant operations in violation of technical specification At t 9:10 a.m., scenario data given to operations reflected temperatures in excess of 200 F in the reactor coolant pump seal return, a condition that would have mandated tripping the pump and the reacto This sequence of events was prevented by the scenario. Another instance when the scenario forced actions against technical specifications occurred at 9:55 a.m. when only one component cooling water pump remained in operation. This condition would also have mandated a reactor trip but was prevented by the scenario. This is contrary to good reactor operational practices and opposes the didactic objectives of an emergency exercis * The duration of the fire assumed to take place in the auxiliary building during the scenario was not consistent with type of materials and other realistic considerations for that locatio * During the fire scenario, there were various instances of unnecessary simulation. For example, fire hoses were not charged with water, the access to post accident sampling system station was simulated, and the re-entry team simulated dressing and entering into the safety injection rooms. Furthermore, the players did not climb the extension ladder through loading hole that would have given then'

access to room 6 i The above constitutes a deficiency (285/8719-08). No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The NRC inspector met with the NRC Senior Resident Inspector and licensee !

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representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on July 23, 1987, and summarized l the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this repor l

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