IR 05000382/1998005

Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/98-05 on 980312

ML20217J266
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	04/27/1998
From:	Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Dugger C ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
References
50-382-98-05, 50-382-98-5, NUDOCS 9804300205
Download: ML20217J266 (5)

Text

e jaucoq UNITED STATES

4 - ,A *g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

%- 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400 g * * * * * /[ AR LINGTON. TEXAS 760114064 April 27,1998 Charles M. Dugger, Vice President Operations -Waterford 3 Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-382/98-05 AND NOTICE OF VIOt.ATION

Dear Mr. Dugger:

Thank you for your letter of April 9,1998, in response to our letter and Notice of Violation dated March 12,1998. We have reviewed your reply and find it responsive to the concems raised in our Notice of Violation. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintained.

Sincerely, D%>W Blaine Murray, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety I

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Docket No.: 50-382 License No.: NPF-38 jl cc:

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 Vice President, Operations Support ,

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P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 ,

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9804300205 980427

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -2-

[ . Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway P.O. Box 651 -

Jackson, Mississippi 39205 General Manager, Plant Operations Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 Manager- Licensing Manager Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.

< P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066

. Chairman Louisiana Public Service Commission One American Place, Suite 1630 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825-1697

Director, Nuclear Safety &

Regulatory Affairs Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 William H. Spell, Administrator Louisiana Radiation Protection Division P.O. Box 82135 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884-2135 Parish President St. Charles Parish P.O. Box 302 Hahnville, Louisiana 70057 Mr. William A. Cross Bethesda Licensing ONice 3 Metro Center Suite 610 -

Bethesda, Maryland 20814

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -3-Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, N.W.

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -4-DISTRIBUTION w/ cony of licensee's letter dated April 9.1991:

DCD (IE04)

Regional Administrator Wat-3 Resident inspector DRS Director DRS Deputy Director DRP Director DRS-PSB Branch Chief (DRP/D)

Project Engineer (DRP/D)

Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

MIS System RIV File DRS Action item File (98-G-0045) (Goines)

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_ DOCUMENT NAME: R:\ WAT\WT805AK.1WD To receive copy of document, Indicate in box:"C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy RIV:PSB _ s E C:DRS\PSL TWDexter:nh /)p) BMurray i

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -4-plSJRIBUTION w/conv of licensee's letter dated Acril 9.1998:

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Regional Administrator Wat-3 Residentinspector DRS Director DRS Deputy Director DRP Director DRS-PSB Branch Chief (DRP/D)

Project Engineer (DRP/D)

Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

MIS System RIV File DRS Action item File (98-G-0045) (Goines)

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l 't 0 0 0'?J DOCUMENT NAME: R:\_WAT\WT805AK.TWD To receive copy of document, Indicate in box:"C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy RIV:PSB _ s E C:DRS\PSE l l l TWDexter:nh //(p) BMurray ( 1

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e', s%;., -n-W3F1-98-0071 A4.05 PR April 9,1998 g U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission v ATTN: Document Control Desk p g 0@

Washington, D.C. 20555 O p.gEGtOt4U Subject: Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 License No. NPF-38 NRC Inspection Report 98-05 Reply to Notice of Violation Gentlemen:

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In accordance with 10CFR2.201, Entergy Operations, Inc. hereby submits in Attachment 1 the response to the violation identified in Enclosure 1 of the subject inspection Report.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact me at (504) 739-6242 or Tim Gaudet at (504) 739-6666.

Very truly yours, E.C. Ewing Director, Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs ECE/GCS/ssf i Attachment

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cc: E.W. Merschoff (NRC Region IV), C.P. Patel (NRC-NRR),

J. Smith, N.S. Reynolds, NRC Resident inspectors Office M ~ ( ( 7 2.

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Attachm::nt to

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W3F1-98-0071

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Paga 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 1 ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. RESPONSE TO THE VIOLATION IDENTIFIED IN ENCLOSURE 1 OF INSPECTION REPORT 98-05 VIOLATION NO. 9805-03 License Condition 2.E of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Operating License NPF-38, dated December 19,1995, requires that the licensee fully l implement and maintain in effect the Commission approved Physical Security Plan, !

including amendments and changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p).

Waterford 3 Physical Security Plan, Revision 17, dated March 1996, Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.6, " Vehicle Denial" states, in part, " Railroad derailers are installed inside the protected area on the railroad spurs that enter the site."

Plant Security Procedure PS-011-103, " Vehicle Access Control," Revision 8, Section 5. paragraph 5.6.1, states, in part, Railroad derailers are installed inside the protected area on rail spurs that allow entry into the protected area."

Plant Security Procedure PS-012-101, " Perimeter Barriers," Revision 9, Section 5.6, paragraph 5.6.1, states, " Security Officers will inspect the derailers to ensure that they are locked in the derail configuration. This check will be made twice each shift."

Contrary to the above, on February 11,1998, the inspector identified that the derailer was not locked in the derail configuration. This degraded condition had existed since November 11,1997.

This is a severity level IV violation (Supplement Ill) (382/98-05-03).

RESPONSE (1) Reason for the Violation I

The root cause for this violation is inadequate procedures, in that security procedures did not clearly define railroad derailers as security barriers and did not identify compensatory measures for a failed derailer. As a result, appropriate measures were not taken to address the deficiency.

On November 11,1997, security personnel identified that the train derailer located in the protected area had become unattached from the rail. On the same day, security personnel generated a corrective action document, Condition Identification (Cl) 313395, to have the derailer reattached to the rail.

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However, security personnel failed to realize that the unattached derailer represented a failed security barrier. In consequence, the unattached derailer was not immediately repaired or compensated for within ten minutes. The derailer remained unattached and unposted until February 12,1998.

(2) Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved The area near the unattached derailer was posted by security personnel and the derailer was repaired on February 12,1998.

As an interim measure, the Security Information database was updated to require compensating for a failed derailer by posting security personnel. This will remain in affect until appropriate procedures are revised.

Security procedure PS-018-108, Loss or Degradation of Security Equipment and Systems, was revised on March 20,1998, to clearly define the railroad derailer as a security barrier. The procedure was also revised to stipilate compensatory measures required when the derailer fails or is unavailable.

A security sign has been attached to the railroad derailer, identifying it as security equipment.- The sign requires that security be notified prior to removal or maintenance on the derailer.

(3) Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations Security procedure PS-015-101, Security Patrols, will be revised to require Security Officers to contact the Central Alarm Station or the Secondary Alarm Station Console Operator upon discovery of a derailer deficiency. The procedure will also require the Security Officer to post the affected area until further instructions are given.

Plant administrative procedure UNT-005-002, Condition Identification, will be

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revised to require that security personnel be notified prior to maintenance being performed on security equipment.

(4) Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Based on the completed corrective actions for Violation 98-05-03, Waterford 3 haa restored compliance to requirements. Additional corrective steps to revise -

procedures PS-015-101 and UNT-005-002 will be completed by June 30, 1998.

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