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PO box 97 e PEAAY. CHIO 44081 e TELEPHONE (216) 259-3737 e ADDRESS-10 CENTEH ROAD 1 Serving The Best Location :n the Nation Al Kaplan PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l vlCE PRESIDE NT )
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Mr. James G. Reppler Regional Administrator, Region III l Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road )
Glen Ellyn, Ill. 60137 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Response to Western Reserve Alliance 10 CFR 2.206 Petition
Dear Mr. Keppler:
Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company's February 18, 1986 response to the petition filed by Western Reserve Alliance ("WRA") with the NRC Commissioners on February 4, 1986, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. WRA's petition raised issues relating to (1) the January 31, 1986 l Ohio earthquake; (2) the integrity of the Perry Quality Assurance / Quality Control Program, based on allegations set forth in WRA's Petition; and (3) )
CEI's compliance with 10 CFR Part 140 in light of the proposed affiliation of !
CEI and The Toledo Edison Company ("TE").
The enclosed response demonstrates that WRA's Petition fails to meet the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 2.206 and of the Commission's Statement of Policy: Handling of Late Allegations, 50 Fed. Reg. 11030 (1985). WRA's ,
assertions regarding the January 31, 1986 earthquake are not supported by any l technical justification, and are without merit, as discussed in the attached )
response and in CEI's Seismic Event Evaluation (February 1986). Similarly, WRA 1 raised no facts that would support its generalized assertions about CEI's ability to comply with 10 CFR Part 140. Finally, CEI has conducted detailed j reviews of the 48 allegations set forth in WRA's Petition. As discussed in our response, the allegations are not timely, and fail to raise material or new j safety issues requiring further review. - l 8605300701 860321 1 PDR FOIA g l HIATT86-91 PDR /
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James G. Keppler February 19, 1986 l PY-CEI/01E-0171 L 1 To summarize, CEI has reviewed WRA's Petition in detail. The enclosed response demonstrates that WRA's Petition is without basis and does not raise safety issues. My staff and I are available to discuss any aspect of this matter with you and your staff.
Very truly ours l I
($h i A. Kaplan Vice President Nuclear Operations Division l
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M Ammy **. GLASSPIEGEL February 18, 1986 Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner James K. Asselstine U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission )
Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 l Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.'C. 20555 Re: The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2)
Docket Nos. 50-440 and 50-441
Dear Commissioners:
l This letter is in response to the February 4, 1986 peti-tion of Mr. Donald L. Schlemmer, submitted on behalf of Western Reserve Alliance ("WRA") pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206, regard-ing the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (" Perry"). WRA's Petition requests the NRC to take the following actions:
- 1. Require the complete and permanent closure of the Perry nuclear plants because of the Perry plants' inadequate seismic design.
CEI and the NRC set the standards for the Perry plants' ability to withstand gravita-tional forces well-below the actual gravi-tational forces that the plants are being subjected to during actual earthquakes.
i This was clearly demonstrated during the earthquake of January 31, 1986.
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Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.
February 18, 1986 l Page 2 l
- 2. Require an independent design and construc-tion verification program (IDVCP) to assess the integrity of the Perry One and Perry Two site quality assurance (QA) programs and its implementation because the Cleveland Illuminating Company [ sic] (CEI) and its contractors have failed to imple-ment an acceptable design and construction !
program for the Perry One and Perry Two l nuclear plants that meet the requirements :
i of 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B. l l
- 3. Review the Application before the Securi-ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Can-terior Energy Corporation (CEC) (formerly North Holding Company), which seeks, by its application, the SEC's approval to acquire all of the outstanding shares of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) and Toledo Edison (TE), Ohio corpora- .
tions, and approval of the related mergers l by which the transactions will be effectu-ated." l l
For the reasons discussed below, WRA's 5 2.206 Petition is without basis and should be denied in all respects.
I. Section 2.206 Requirements WRA's Petition is filed under 5 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. Section 2.205 permits any person to file a re-quest for the NRC Staff 1/ to institute a proceeding pursuant to 5 2.202 to modify, suspend or revoke a license,.or for such 1/ Section 2.206 provides for requests to be " addressed to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, the Director, Office of Inspec-tion and Enforcement, as appropriate." See 10 C.F.R. 6 2.206(a). Thus, WRA's Petition should not have been addressed to NRC Commissioners in the first instance.
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I Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts (
Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr. !
February 18, 1986 ,
Page 3 ;
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I other action as may be proper. 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206(a). Section :
2.206(a) states that "[t]he requests shall specify the action requested and set forth the facts that constitute the basis for the request." Id. (emphasis added).
As demonstrated below, WRA's Petition is grounded on i unsupported, unspecified assertions. The Petition fails to set j forth " facts that constitute the basis for the request," as re- !
i quired by 10 C.F.R. $ 2.206. Nor does the Petition provide a basis to believe that there are violations of Commission reg- I ulations, potentially hazardous conditions, or other facts l which would constitute sufficient grounds for the Staff to in- l stitute a 5 2.202 proceeding. j l
l Further, petitions filed pursuant to i 2.206 which are grounded on late-filed allegations are governed by the Commis- j sion's Statement of Policy: Handling of Late Allegations, 50 !
Fed. Reg. 11030 (1985). See Union Electric Company (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), DD-85-7, 21 N.R.C. 1552 (1985). As discussed below, WRA's late-filed allegations, set forth in Section III l of the Petition, were not promptly raised.2/ The allegations !
raise issues that "are not material to any licensing decision !
or which on their face or after initial inquiry are determined to be frivolous or too vague or general in nature to provide sufficient information for the staff to investigate,"3/ as well as issues that are not "new in the sense of raising a matter l not previously considered or tending to corroborate previously received but not yet resolved allegations."4/ Thus, WRA's l l
2/ See 50 Fed. Reg. at 11031.
1 3/ Id. See Attachment 1, Exhibit A, items 1=14, 18-22, l 24-28, 30, 32-33, 35, 38-39, 41-47 (raising frivolous, vague or ;
general allegations without sufficient information to investi-gate); items 23, 29, 34, 37 (raising commercial or other issues ;
unrelated to licensing).
4/ Id. See Attachment 1, Exhibit A, items 15-17, 31, 36, 40, 48 (raising issues that were previously investigated and re-solved by CEI and the NRC).
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l Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine j Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal ;
Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr. !
February 18, 1986 j Page 4 l
allegations are neither material nor new, as defined by the i Commission's Statement of Policy, and therefore do not merit further review.
Even if the Staff were to apply the screening criteria for further review of new and material issues, set forth in the Statement of Policy, for the reasons discussed below and in Attachment 1 hereto, the allegations are not " correct," under screening criterion No. 1.5/ Similarly, for the reasons set forth in CEI's responses to WRA's allegations, WRA has failed to raise a significant safety concern. Accordingly, there is no basis for the Staff to give " prompt consideration of the al-legation recognizing the public interest in avoiding undue
- delay," under screening criterion No. 2 of the Policy State-ment. p/
Thus, for the reasons set forth in this letter, WRA has failed to satisfy the applicable Commission regulations and Policy Statement governing $ 2.206 petitions and late-filed al-legations.
5/ Under screening criterion No. 1 of the Statement of Poli-I cy, the Staff is to assess "[t]he likelihood that the allega-tion is correct, taking into consideration all available information including the apparent level of knowledge, exper-i tise and reliability of the individual submitting the allega-tion in terms of the allegation submitted and the possible ex-t istence of more credible contrary information." 50 Fed. Req.
at 11031. WRA's bare, unsupported, unsworn allegations do not even attempt to establish the level of knowledge, expertise and reliability of the individual submitting the allegations. As discussed below, WRA's failure to submit timely its allegations further calls into question its credibility in raising allega-tions at this late date. The extensive CEI and NRC information available, as identified in the attached affidavit of Timothy .
! A. Boss, constitutes "more credible contrary information," id., ,
! demonstrating that WRA's allegations are not correct. l i
i g/ 50 Fed. Reg. at 11032.
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February 18, 1986 Page 5 II. Seismic Design WRA makes a number of unsupported claims with respect to an earthquake that occurred in the vicinity of the Perry Plant on January 31, 1986. WRA asserts the following:
- 1. The Perry plants were designed to withstand extremely minimal gravitational forces (.15). The earthquake of January 31, 1986 subjected the Perry plants to substantially greater gravitational forces than the plants were designed to withstand (.19; .23; .25).
- 2. The epicenter of the January 31, 1985 [ sic} earth-quake was extremely close to the Perry nuclear plants. .
- 3. The Perry plant site is literally on a fault line.
- 4. CEI filled the fault line with cement and said it was a glacial scar.
- 5. CEI built the plant at this dangerous location over the objections of consumer groups who raised the '
earthquake and fault line issue most vigorously.
- 6. A fault line can move at any time no matter how new or old.
- 7. Because of the vibration and ground acceleration, the soil conditions at the Perry site subject the plant to greater degrees of gravitational forces than would occur in other parts of the world.
Petition at 4 n.2. The Petition also contains the following statement:
The Perry nuclear plants are built on a fault line that WRA contends is not a glacial scar. WRA contends that there will be more earthquakes of a greater magnitude.
The epicenters of these quakes may be even closer to the Perry plants. The current
SH Aw, PITTM AN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDG E a maavutasmie smCLwo.aeo ano,tsseoma6 CO#eonarious Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.
February 18, 1986 Page 6 delay in determining what the devices are that measure the gravitional forces is in-dicative of the shoddy attitude with which CEI constructed these plants. The current reports that these devices can only be read and interpreted by the vendors is most dis-turbing. Also, the delay in getting this information makes a reasonable person highly suspicious of the credibility of both CEI and the NRC.
Petition at 6. The Petition contains no technical support of justification for these assertions, which are without basis.
CEI and its geological, seismological, structural and equipment consultants have completed a detailed analysis of the January 31, 1986 earthquake, including an analysis of the im-pact of the earthquake on Perry plant structures and components and on the design capability of the Plant. A copy of CEI's report on the results of its reviews has been filed with the NRC Staff and placed on the Perry docket. See Seismic Event Evaluation Report, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Docket Nos.
50-440; 50-441, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (February 1986) (" Seismic Event Evaluation"). CEI orally presented its findings to the NRC Staff on February 11, 1986, and to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards on February 12 and 13.
As set forth in CEI's Seismic Event Evaluation, the earth-quake
- 1) did not adversely affect the plant structures, systems or components,
- 2) was within the design capability of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, and (3) does not change the licensing basis or conclusions regarding the site geolo-gy, seismology or design basis earth-quake.
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Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr. l February 18, 1986 ,
Page 7 ,
Seismic Event Evaluation at $ 1.0. As discussed in CEI's ,
report, the earthquake was of smaller magnitude (4.96, based on USGS data) and intensity (VI, based on preliminary evaluation of survey data) than the postulated earthquake used as the basis for the plant's seismic design (intensity 5.3 + .5 and magnitude VII). The many safety and non-safety related systems -
which were operating or energized at the time of the earthquake responded in accordance with this design. Extensive plant '
walkdowns and inspections revealed no structural or equipment damage. And while certain recorded response spectra exceeded the design response spectra in the high frequency range, ex-ceedances are expected given the analytical methods of Regula- ,
tory Guide 1.60 and are of no engineering significance.
WRA's alleged " fault line" on the Perry site that CEI
" filled in . . . with eement and said it was a glacial scar" was examined in detail both at the construction permit stage and at the operating license stage. During the site excava-tion, CEI discovered and reported to the NRC geologic anomalies consisting of a series of minor folds and shallow faults.
Based on thorough examination, CEI, the NRC Staff, and geolo-gists from the USGS and the Corps of Engineers unanimously con-cluded that these geologic structures were a
nontectonic and are unrelated to any deep-seated crustal origin. Therefore, we l conclude that these features pose no safety i threat to the facility.
Supp. 3 to the NRC Staff Safety Evaluation (November 1975).
The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board agreed, finding that the geologic anomalies (a) are non-tectonic in origin, (b)'are the result of glacial activity, and (c) cannot be expected to cause earthquakes.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-449, 6 N.R.C. 884 (1977). The Staff has restated this conclusion in the operating license stage Safety Evalua-tion report, NUREG-0887 (May 1982) at 2 2-23. The January 31 earthquake provides nothing which would change this i
SH AW. PITTM AN. POTTs & TRowBRIDGE
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Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts ,
Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.
February 18, 1986 Page 8 conclusion. Certainly, WRA has pointed to no basis for challenging the scientific and technical opinions reached by CEI, its consultants, the NRC Staff, the USGS, the Corps of En-gineers and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board.7/
III. Integrity of the Perry Quality Assurance Program WRA's last-minute allegations regarding the Perry con-struction quality assurance / quality control ("QA/QC") program (Petition at 6-11) are untimely and without any basis.Section III of the Petition states that it contains "a list of allega-tions and documentation!/ given to GAP 9/ by various whis-tieblowers through the course of its investigations regarding the Perry plants." Petition at 6 (emphasis added). Thus, WRA does not even attempt.to demonstrate that it has satisfied its duty under the Commissio'n's Statement of Policy to bring its 7/ See Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), DD-79-21, 10 N.R.C.
717, 719 n 3 (1979) (parties must be prevented from using 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206 procedures as a vehicle for reconsideration of issues previously decided).
g/ Applicants obtained a copy of WRA's Petition after reading about it in Ohio newspapers and requesting a copy from Mr.
Schlemmer and from the NRC Staff. Applicants received copies of Mr. Schlemmer's letter from Mr. Schlemmer and from the Staff. The copies received contain no " documentation" other than Mr. Schlemmer's ll-page letter. Although the letter contains references to " affidavits" (Petition at 7) and to
" documentation" submitted by the Government Accountability Project (" GAP") (Petition at 4 n.1), Applicants have no knowl-edge concerning any such affidavits or documentation.
9/ The Petition states that " GAP has been advising and as-sisting WRA in regard to dealing with the numerous allegations made by the large number of whistleblowers that contacted WRA,"
and that GAP is playing "the lead role . . . in investigating and submitting the allegations and documentation regarding the Perry site." Petition at 4 & n.1.
i SH AW, PITTM AN, PoTTs & TROWB RIDGE
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Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.
February 18, 1986 Page 9 purported safety concerns "promptly to the attention of the applicant or licensee," or "directly to the NRC."10/ Nor are the allegations " specific and documented to the fullest exteat ,
possible,"11/ as the Policy Statement requires. Indeed, as [
noted-above, many of the allegations are so vague as to pre- !
clude any bat the most general response.
Last year, after reading press reports discussing allega-tions by Mr. Schlemmer, CEI's " Call For Quality" Ombudsman 12/
wrote to Mr. Schlemmer on July 9, 1985, to request details con-cerning the allegations. CEI's Ombudsman stressed the impor- l tar.ce of examining the claimed defects in the construction of the plant, and emphasized that it was not necessary for WRA to identify the individuals who may have provided information to ;
WRA. See Attachment 1 and Exhibit "C" hereto. Mr. Schlemmer and Ms. Billie Pirner Ga'rde of GAP responded to the Ombudsman's {
letter but refused to supply further details. See Attachment 1, Exhibits "D" and "E". The Ombudsman made a second request to Mr. Schlemmer and Ms. Garde for information (see Attachment 1, Exhibit "F" hereto), but received no response. j I
10/ 50 Fed. Reg. at 11031. l 11/ Id.
l 12/ CEI's Call for Quality program, instituted in 1984, en- t courages workers to contact the Perry Plant Ombudsman on a con- j fidential basis if the workers are aware of any conditions which they believe might affect the safety of the plant. See :
Attachment "1" and Exhibit "F" hereto (Affidavit and letter of l Timothy A. Boss). The Call For Quality Program was instituted prior to the Commission's official endorsement of such programs in Statement of Policy: Handling of Late Allegations. See 50 ;
Fed. Reg. at 11031 n.1. ("The Commission encourages the estab-lishment of programs by utilities for the purpose of identi-fying and resolving allegations affecting safety in a timely manner as design and construction of a nuclear facility pro-ceeds.") (
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Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.
February 18, 1986 Page 10 Thus, the timing of WRA's Petition is highly suspect and seems to be little more than a thinly disguised attempt to delay fuel load. Since WRA and GAP have apparently known of allegations concerning the Perry construction program for some time, there is no justification for their failure to have dis-closed any concerns to CEI and the Commission prior to the com-pletion of construction, so that CEI and the NRC could have in-vestigated the concerns and taken any necessary corrective action. Such considerations are the basis for the Commission's requirement in its Statement of Policy that allegations be promptly disclosed to the applicant or to the NRC.13/
The WRA/ GAP excuse for failing to disclose safety concerns to CEI, i.e., that management cannot be trusted to respond in good faith to safety concerns, see Attachment 1, Exhibits D and E, is unsupported by facts supplied by WRA in its Petition and is belied by the record of management responsiveness and con-cern for quality at Perry. Moreover, the Atomic Safety and Li-censing Board, after hearing extensive testimony on CEI's qual-ity assurance program, concluded that the program "has prevented, and will continue to prevent, unsafe conditions at the plant."14/ This well-founded conclusion contradicts WRA's unsupported allegations concerning CEI's management of hte QA/QC program at Perry.
For these reasons, and for the reasons discussed in Sec-tion I of this letter, and in Attachment 1 and Exhibit A hereto, the allegations in WRA's Petition (1) are not timely; (2) fail to raise material or new issues; and (3) are incor-rect, and fail to raise safety issues. Thus, contrary to WRA's assertion at pages 1, 5 of the Petition, there is no basis for the Staff to require a further design and construction re-view 15/ to assess the integrity of the Perry QA/QC program.
13/ 50 Fed. Reg. at 11031 & n.1.
14/ See LBP-83-77, 18 N.R.C. 1365 (1983), affirmed ALAB-802, 21 N.R.C. 490 (1985).
15/ See Attachment 1, Exhibit A, items 1, 2, 21-22, 38, 41, 43 discussing examples of the extensive, multi-layered CEI and NRC (Continued next page)
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Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal !
Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.
February 18, 1986 l Page 11 ;
l IV. 10 CFR Part 140 l The third part of WRA's letter requests NRC to review the application pending before the Securities and Exchange Commis- f sion to permit the formation of a holding company (Centerior ;
Energy Corporation) which will own all the common stock of CEI j and The Toledo Edison Company (TE). WRA argues without support ;
that the proposed application between CEI and TE "will result [
in the violation of 10 CFR Part 140." !
' r CEI has kept the NRC Staff fully informed as to the pro-posed CEI-TE affiliation. By letters dated August 14, 1985, !
November 13, 1985, January 8, 1986, January 31, 1986 and l February 13, 1986, we have forwarded to the NRC the relevant CEI and TE filings with the SEC. By letter to the NRC Staff j dated December 20, 1985, CEI further explained how the proposed ;
affiliation would affect the management of the Perry plant. j k
WRA's allegations lack both specifics and an awareness of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 140. These regulations re-quire, for an operating nuclear power reactor, that the l licensee maintain $160 million in financial protection plus l secondary financial protection in the form of private liability !
insurance available under an industry retrospective rating plan I providing for deferred premiums. CEI has in force liability ;
insurance policies (American Nuclear Insurers Policy No. NF 291 and Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters Policy No. MF 124) which provide for $160 million in financial protection.
An indemnity agreement with the NRC (No. B-98) was issued on March 7, 1985 and will be amended on the date the operating i license is issued. CEI has also submitted to the NRC Certifi-cates of Insurance for deferred premiums under. Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association / Mutual Atomic Energy Liability i Underwriters Master Policy No. 1. This insurance provides an ,
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f (Continued) inspections which have been carried out, and which have con-firmed the adequacy of the Perry QA/QC program; see also ASLB '
and ALAB decisions cited at n.14 supra.
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Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino :
Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts j Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.
February 18, 1986 Page 12 aggregate of $30 million per event in the event that utilities !
are unable to meet deferred premium obligations. CEI, and the i co-owners of the Perry Plant, will also submit to NRC the cer-tified financial statements provided for by 10 CFR 5 140.21(e), !
as CEI c'd Toledo Edison have annually done with respect to the Davis-Besse plant.
There is simply no relationship between the proposed CEI-TE affiliation and compliance with Part 140. Of course, TE as the operating licensee for the Davis-Besse facility is also meeting the same Part 140 requirements.
In connection with WRA's Part 140 allegations, it is worth recalling that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula-tion, has already considered an earlier petition under 10 CFR
$ 2.206 which claimed that the Perry co-owners were not finan-cially qualified. The Director denied the petition. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 ) , DD-85-14, 22 N.R.C. 635 (1985). The Director's Deci-sion explicitly noted that the proposed affiliation would not i alter the Staff's conclusion on financial qualifications. The Director stated:
I The Staff is aware that CEI and TE are con- '
sidering a merger. That fact does not alter the analyses set forth in this Deci-sion of the Perry Licensees' financial qualifications. One stated purpose of the !
possible merger is to strengthen the com- ;
bined financial position of CEI and TE. ;
22 N.R.C. at 641.n.3. WRA has provided no information to the contrary. In language that applies equally here, the Director j held: " Mere speculation that financial pressures will under- i mine the safety of licensed activities is not enough." 22 !
N.R.C. at 637. WRA has not even shown " mere speculation." f i
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Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.
February 18, 1986 Page 13 VI. Conclusion For the reasons set forth in this letter and in the Attachment and Exhibits hereto, WRA's Petition should be de-nied.
Respectfully submitted, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge By: 4 III/ . 4MMI@f Jay E. $1 berg, P . C .' /
Harry Hf Glasspiegel Counsel for The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, for itself and as Agent for the Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power Company, and The Toledo Edison Company (Applicants)
Enclosures cc: Harold R. Denton (Director, NRC Office of Reactor Regulation)
James G. Keppler (NRC Regional Administrator, .
Region III)
Chief, NRC Docketing and Service Branch
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ATTACHMENT I ,
February 18, 1986 UNITID STATES OF AMERICA ,
HUCLEAR RICULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of )
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATINC COMPANY, E AL. ) 50-441
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) ) ;
AFFIDAVIT OF TIMOTHY A. BOSS County of Lake )
- ss:
State of Ohio ) t Timothy A. Boss, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
- 1. I, Timothy A. Boss, am Supervisor, Quality Audit Unit, and Corporate Ombudsman at The Perry Nuclear Power Plant. I an employed by The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company ("CEI"). My business address is Perry Nuclear Power Plant, 10 Center Road, Perry, Ohio 44081.
- 2. As the Supervisor of the Quality Audit Unit, I am responsible for pro-viding a system of planned and periodic internal audits to assure proper imple-mentation of the Quality Assurance program, policy, procedures, and instructions both for construction and operations. I an also responsible for periodically evaluating and reporting to CEI senior management the status and adequacy of the l
. Quality Assurance program. As Corporate Ombudsman, I am responsible for imple- i menting and administering CEI's Call for Quality program. The Call for Quality
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- Program, which was lustituter! by CR1 fu 1934, is in addition tc the quality as-s*uranca/quelity control programs instituted in 0: corda: tee with 10 CFR Part 50, Appandix B of the NRC's regulations, call fo.r Quality 'envides p an additional progree through vhich C1I can receive quality concerns in confidence, investi-gate thefr serit, document findings, 3ssure resolution e.f any quality related problems, and previde feedback to the concerned party.
- 3. I have 'eviewed r the letter to the NRC Commissioners from Donald L.
Schleusser of *Jestern Reserve Alli.ance ("WRA"), dated February 4,1986, which was filed as a patitido pursuant to 10 C.F it. Section 2.206 (" Petition"). Responses to the 48 itema centsinad in Ser. tion II!, passe 7-11, of the Petition have been preparad under my supervision. the responses are contained in Exhibit "A" attached hersto. I as familiar with the contents of the responses in Exhibit A, a:td have reviewed the various Per'ry and NRC inspection documents referenced in the response. Many of tne all'esations r.cised in WRMs Petition are too iiague or general in nature to provida suff.icient .isfor.wation for CBI to invsstigate. CEI has responded to these allegationa with information that appears to CEI to be relevant to the general issue raised. Other allegations reise cosssercial or other iasues which have no apparent relationship to safety. The remaining alle-gations raice matters which have air,ady been fully investigated and resolved by CII cod taa WRC. Thus, for the reasons set forth in Exhibit A, WRA's allega-tions raise no amfety tenues that have not already been fully addressed and re-solved by CEI and the NRC. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this Affidavit and in Exhibit A attached hereto, and believe the information set forth to be true and correct. ,
4 I have previously attempted to obtain from Mr. Schlemmer his knowledge of any safety concerns with the Perry Plant. In a newspaper article dated June 15,1985 (Exhibit "B" hereto), Mr. Schlemmer claimed that he had learned of var-tous safety probisms at Perry. I wrote to Mr. Schlemmer on July 9, 1985, and asked that he provide me with information 60 these matters so that their signif-icance cuald be investigated, (Erhibit "C" hersto). I stressed to Mr.
Schlammer that he need act identify the workers who may have provided in- ,
formation to his, so long as the information about the claimed defect was spe-cific enough to permit CEI to adoquately investigate whether the defect was present. Mr. Schlemmer and Ms. Billie PirT.er Carde of the Government Account-4 ability Project (" GAP") each wrote back ib tesponse to my letter, refusing to provide the information requested (Exhibita "O" and "E" hereto).. I made a sec-cod request to Mr. Schlesser and Ma. Carde on . September 6, 1985 (Exhibit "F")
, but retsived no respotee.
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Timothy A.
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pubscribed and sworn to before se this g sy of reb very.1986.
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No Public 4 My Commission Empirest 3410t E. WOff Notary Puti:c. State of O*
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4 EXHIBIT A s
EXHIBIT A RESPONSES OF THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILIUMINATING CO. TO ITEMS IN WESTERN RESERVE ALLIANCE 5 2.206 PETITION '
DATED FEBRUARY 4, 1986 4
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DATED: FEBRUARY 18, 1986 i
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u ITEM #1 .
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With regard to NRC regulations, the Finst Esfety Analysis Aspert (FSAR); ;
Environmental $sfetf Report (Safety Evaluation Report) NREG 88.7 [ sic) l which was made specifically for Per 7 sad 10 CTR 50: workers allege there has been less than the previous commitment on ths part cf CEI.
RESPONSE ,
The design, construction, testing, n'od operstdoc festures and programs for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant are described in the FioK1 $sfety Analysis Report (FSAR). These incitde detailed descriptions of plant spcifig items as well as descriptions of the de5ree of cospliance with netictally <
recognised codes and standseds.
CEI has procedures and pregrass to ensute that setivities are perfermed .ss described in the FSAI. Mhereoce to these proceduras and programs du ,
mer.itored by periodic audits and su;veillances.
Implementation 6f the FSAR ia additionally cohiirwd by a p cgram of periodic NRC inspections of both the activities sad of the decumentetica at Perry Nuclear Towar Plant., These FRC inspections a*so sed.lede detailed ,
esaminations and assessments of the sacapsant 5: cates,1s and quality assurance program. nede .peric.dic inspecticna tover a13. asp 9ct.s et design.
construction, testics, operations, and quality nesurecca.
The NRC has conducted additicual inspetticas and Sudits t;-) verity C2I f cocpliance with regulatory requircuncts. .Among these pret
- 1. Cenctruction Assessment Tate intpection
- 2. Indep.er. dest Design Insp.sec. ton
, 3. Instrumentatics and Centrols 3rasch Audit i
- 4. Fire Protection Assenssent
- 5. Equipment Qualification Audit
- 6. Emergency Plan Evaluation These inspections and audits are perforsw.1 in addition to the to.stine
, inspections by NRC Kesident Inspecters and 2egion III, '
his multi-level system of lespectiana and evalvetione grosides asst;macco that CEI is complying eith its cons.itus. cts to the NEO. e ITEM #2 CEI mede compitzent fer radistien waste a,anegement systes (.1ER). Workaxs
, allege that in fact there exists ne real quality system, no quality program.
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RESPONSE _
1 FEAR Chapter 11 and portions of Chapter 3 describe the radioactive waste l system and the basis for design and construction. These documents describe i
the radioactive waste system including the requirements for quality assurance during construction and testing. The FSAR discusses CEI's implementation of nationally recognized codes and standards auch as the American National Standards Institute " Power Piping" standard and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
- Boiler and Fressure Yesser Code".
i Quality assurance for pressure vessels, piping, valves and storege tanks is fully governed by the ASME. ANSI and other codes listed in FSAR. These codes specify the requirements for in-process and post welding inspection and testing. The ASME code and the ANSI standard describe construction, fr.spection and testing techniques which result in high quality systems.
These codes and standards utilise a multi-faceted approach to quality assurance placing emphasis on conservative design and process control. In edditice. the . quality program was implemented thrcush approved construction and welding procedures. welder testing and cartification, and specified
, welddhg techniques Th4se aspects of the quality program are supplemented by inspections ,and testing.
Mensgement, administrative and quality contrels ensured compliance with
. cots motheds and that quality was built into the systes, The quality
- nesurar.te requirements have been implemented at the Ferry Nuclear Power
- Platt. Yor geneple, the inspection program for the Liquid Radioactive 4,ste Sys:sc (G-50) included over 1.300 surveillence inspections that ideetitled and currected any construction deficioccies.
Following complatien of constructien, the integrity of the systecs'
- practur, boutdacy was verified by hydrostatic test er in-service leak test and pneusatic proof testing in .secordance with code requirements. Finally.
th6 systems Arc subjected to rigorous and comp ~cebensive preoperational testieg se deceribed in FSAR Chapter 144 these testa verify the design and
, cperio,ta.ity of the systems.
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'CEI lud ;ctae NRC to believ6 QT.I was ccacitted to Regulatory Guide 1.143.
The NkC was Ifd to believe tLat CEI ses conkitted to this plan in its
- entirety. Yode' a a3 3 ege that there yo only enndem QC at best. here are many stide that was1d not meet cede requirements. '
P&SICNCE
- CEI has defined degree of confbrian.ce cf the radwest.e systeg to Regulatory Guide 1.143 y/.tb the er.teption posed in FSAR Table 1.8. CEI8s quality cinesifi'catien fo2 the redraste syntam was specif
- led in F3AR Table 3.2-1 ,
IUIII. Ite subject ef confortonce to Regulatoty Quid,1.143 was discussed betweet CE.T and the NEC in correspehdence terween April 2.1965 and July 24, 19 0 . FSAR Table 1.8 was enc 4ed in september 19'5 8 to clarify CEI's i pckition and thic an(c6 ment was tryiewed and apptyved by the NRC.
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l A comprchtnsivo quality assurcnco pregram for the redwnsto cystas in <
compliance with applicable codes and standards was implemented as described in response to ites 2.
The Radweste System welds are in compliance with the applicable codes.
There are no indications of a breakdown of any part of the quality I assurance program related to the radvaste system.
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Workers allege that the above conditions have been permitted because CEI ;
has fraudulently classified the waste management system. Workers say the l
. class system that CEI has designated for the waste management system is not in compliance with FSAR commitments. This impropriety has been committed .
by CEI deliberately to avoid safety requirements, workers allege. l RESPONSE -
The design, construction, quality inspections and testing of the ,
radioactive waste system were conducted to ensure that the system meets the !
requirements of 10 CFR 20 and complies with the descriptions in the FSAR including:
- 1) Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.26. " Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water . Stean . and Radioactive-Weste Containing Components for Nuclear Power Plants" (FSAR Table 1.8): and.
- 2) Implementation of the design specified in FSAR Chapter 11 and the design criteria includi'ng industry codes and standards listed in FSAR Table 3.2-1 XVIII; and 1
- 3) Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.143 " Design Guidance for l Radioactive Waste Management Systems. Structures, and Components !
Installed in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" with the exceptions and clarifications noted in FSAR Table 1.8;
- 4) Implementation of the comprehensive program of preoperational testing described in FSAR Chapter 14 IHM #5 l
CEI committed itself to the 1979 regulatory guides. Under these guides i they may not have to build Class 3 section or specification but they are
! supposed to have a particular QC/QA program. Workers allege they do not have such progress in these areas.
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RESPONSE
CEI assumes that this item continues to relate to the radvaste system. The statement that ASME Class III may not be applicable is correct. As described in FSAR Table 1.8 and Table 3.2-1. the radweste system was built in compliance with Quality Group D criteria as identified in Regulatory Guida 1.26 and also the requirements of Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.143 (which identify applicable codes and standards). CEI's compliance with the quality assurance portions of these references is discussed in response to items 1. 2. 3. and 4 and 21.
I ITEM #6 In these areas welds have been installed below standard and there is a bad valve problem, workers allege.
RESPONSE
Requirements applicable to the radweste system are outlined in Table I of Regulatory Guide 1.143 and Table I of Regulatory Guide 1.26 and FSAR Table 3.2-1 IvIII. The methods used to verify the acceptability of welds are clearly established in national codes and standards referenced in the Regulatory Guides (e.g. B31.1. ASME). The methods prescribed in these codes were implemented and the results documented. There is no indication that any radwaste system welds are below standard.
Operability of the radwaste systes, including valves, is verified during preoperational testing. Preoperational testing of the liquid radwaste system was witnessed by quality assurance as described in Surveillance Report 85-171. All test deficiencies, including problems with valve operability, were documented, evaluated, and corrected in accordance with the quality assurance program.
ITEM #7 Every weld that was bad on every valve that was not up to par was thus classified by CEI as a non-safety ites. Under this classification of ncn-safety item it really meant no QA.
RESPONSE
CEI does not downgrade systems or portions of systems due to a parts inability to function as designed. Defective welds or valves are repaired or replaced to meet their intended function for both safety and non-safety systems. There is no basis in this ites that welds or valves were declassified to non-safety because they were bad. Welds in non-safety systems are in corpliance with applicable codes and standards.
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ITEM #8
- There were many problems with the hydrostatic tests.
RESPONSE
i Hydrostatic testing is performed by personnel certified in accordance with i
American National Standards Institute requirements. Rydrostatic tests are performed using detailed and approved procedures which conform to the applicatie codes and standards and good engineering practices. Hydrostatic tests have been witnessed by quality assurance personnel and the results
> are documented. Any unsuccessful tests are repeated following the j completion of the required repairs.
i There is no indication that hydrostatic tests were not performed or performed inproperly.
ITEM #9 CEI did not even have state inspectors in regard to these tests.
RESPONSE
Hydrostatic and pneumatic proof tects performed under ASME Section III are witnessed by an Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) as required by the A95 Code. In these cases, an Ohio Stats Inspector is not required to witness the test. Proof tests performed under ANSI Standard B31.1 were witnessed by an inspector who is certified by the State of Ohio; and, the results were documented and reported to the State Authority. CEI ensures these inspections are performed through the use of procedure FA 1007 " State i
Pressure Piping Ir.spection Program". Quality assurance document reviews at the completion of testing ensure that test results are not accepted unless j the test was witnessed by the ANI or Ohio State Inspector, as appropriate.
l i ITEM #10 l
There are problems with the G.50 system. This is the liquid rod [ sic]
I waste system. Workers allege that the way the system is currently set up
, radioactivity will be put into Lake Erie. (How much? Unanclyzed by CEI .)
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r ect rg l During the preoperational test program, newly constructed piping systems.
including the liquid radweste system, were flushed to remove dirt prior to l piscing the system in operation. During the flushing of'the liquid radweste system, a temporary drain line was used to discharge flush water into Lake Erie. The flush water is clean water and does not contain j radioactive material of acy kind. CEI consulted with the Ohio j
Environmental Protecticn Agency and teceived their concurrence prior to the i discharge of this flush water.
The temporary flushing connection on the liquid radweste system was removed at the completion of the flushing program and the flushing drain connection has been sesled with a blank flange. There is no potential that this connectica vill represent a discharge path for radioactive material once the system is placed in cparation.
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s ITEM #11 By law it should be noted in the FSAR any time there is a lessening of .,
CEI's commitment to NRC rules. CEI has made several changes to its commitment tc the NRC rules but they have not reported them in the FSAR.
RESPONSE
CEI informs the NRC of changes in design and methods used to meet regulatory requirements. This notification is made through letters and meetings with the staff and documented in FSAR amendments. These changes to the design and methods are a normal and aspected part of the operating license application process, as prescribed in the Code of Federal I Regulations (10 CFR 50.54a; 10 CFR 50.71e). Changes are subject to the NRC review, comment and approval process prior to receipt of the operating license. This information exchange continues after receipt of the operating license as required by 10 CFR 50.59.
The NRC also performs audits and inspections to ensure that FSAR requirements are being implemented as outlined in response to Item #1.
ITEM #12 CEI said they would have a system of alaras that would go off in the rod
[ sic] waste room control and the main control room at the same time.
Although CEI made the commitment to the NRC, CEI decided not to have the dual system of alarms installed as promised. CEI never reported this change in their plans to the NRC. This is a lesser commitment than was originally told to the NRC.
RESPONSE
An earlier version of the FSAR did indicate that there would be a dual alarm in the radweste control room and the " main control room". Changes were subsequently made and appropriately documented to eliminate the dual alarm for the reasons stated below.
Many radwaste system conditions, including routine changes in pump and tank status, cause alarm indications. The alarm wculd annunciate in the Radweste Control Roce and as a generic radwaste system alarm in the " main control roca". The generic alarm had been installed because it was originally not intended to require continuous manning of the Radweste Control Rcom. It was later determined that the duplicate generic alarm in the "maic . Xrol room" could distract Plant Operators .from their primary function whhout any ccepensating increase in safety or efficiency.
Moreover, CEI decided that Radweste Control Room would be manned 24 %urs a day by trained and qualified operators. 'Ihese operators monitor and respond to all indicatiens and alarr.s coming from radweste systems and report to the operators in the " main control roca". Therefore, the duplicate alarm in the "=ain centrol room" was rencved by an approved design change. This design change was included in Amendment 20 to the PSAR (11.2.7.12) in July 1985.
. ITEM #13 i
CEI sentioned in the FSAR its plans to deal with beta and gamma radiation.
Subsequently CEI changed its plans to include only gamma radiation. CEI never reported this subsequent change in the PSAR.
RESPONSE ,
l Perry Nuclear Power Plant is designed and CEI has programs to accommodate both beta and gamma radiation. CEI did not change its plans for dealing ,
l with both types of radiation.
The radiation protection design aspects of the plant and the Health Physics Program controls including access controls, radiation monitoring, personnel dosimetry, and worker training have been evaluated by the NRC and found in compliance with regulatory requirements as stated in the Safety Evaluation Report and in Inspection Reports 85027 and 85068 dated August 29, 1985. and November 1. 1985. respectively.
ITEM #14 In the containment building, regarding steel penetration and pipes, the welds are cracked.
RESPONSE
A comprehensive program of inspection and testing and, where necessary, repairs followed by re-inspe'etion and re-testing has ensured that containment penetration welds are satisfactory. Welds for sealed penetration pipe assemblies have had 100% contractor / vendor quality control inspection and testing. As a minimuc. inspection and tests included:
visual inspection. leak testing, and either liquid penetrant, magnetic particle, ultrasonic or radiographic testing. Additionally, these welds have had tests witnessed by the Authorized Nuclear Inspector in accordance with ASME Section III. The CEI Quality Assurance Program supplemented these controls through vendor surveillance and field inspections.
The program for veldies, inspecting and testing of containment penetrations is covered by the ASME code. CEI has verified that required inspections and tests were performed by the contractor. This has been verified through a review of centractor installation documentation and the CEI end ANI review of the ASME N-5/N-3 documentation packages.
During the inspection and testing of the flued head structures in sealed containment penetrations some welds were suspected of having cracks. This potential deficiency was reported to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10 CPR 50.55(e) on July 31, 1985 as Deficiency Analysis Report 250. Subsequent inspections determined that there were no cracked welds on the flued head structures. The NRC was inforned of this finding by letter on October 22. 1985. (PT-CEI/OIE 0121L). This issue was reviewed by the NRC and closed in Inspecticn Report 85072. dated Decer.ber 6, 1985.
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' ITEM #15 Boots around the penetrations were redesigned to expand a little more: s ome of the penetrations so in and out at an angle. The pressure is going through the penetrations and this is the only seal. There are plastic seals around the penetrations. If the plastic boot around the penetration fails, the system could belch and radiation could go out. This is true because even though there is negative pressure, the system could still belch. Also it is possible that in some cases there may not be negative pressure. If this were to occur, radiation would just leak out. Most nuclear plants use metal boots, but CEI uses plastic because it is faster, workers allege. These are in the containment vessel.
RESPONSE
Nylon reinforced silicone rubber seal " boots" are used to seal the penetrations where the safety relief valve discharge lines penetrate the drywell wall. The drywell wall is completely inside the containment and drywell wall seals are not a direct path for the release of radioactive material to the environment. In contrast, containment penetration seal boots. including those at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, are typically made of steel because they do represent a potential leakage path to the environment.
The dryvell penetration seal boots did f ail during the drywell Structural Integrity Test and prevented drywell pressurization to the required 30 PSIG. The boot failure was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CTR 50.55(e) on August 6. ,1985 as Deficiency Analysis Report 251. The boot failure was subsequently determined not to represent a significant design deficiency. Without any seal boots installed, the total leakage of air through the affected drywell penetrations would be substantially less than the amount permitted by the design basis.
The dryvell penetration seal boots have been redesigned to prevent permanent creasing and the new boots have been installed. The drywell was pressurized to 30 PSIG and the structural integrity test was success' f completed. This issue was reviewed by the NRC and closed in Inspection Report 86002, dated February 4.1986.
1 ITEM #16 Workers allege dresser valves are a fiasco (rod [ sic] waste system). This j can be seen by looking at DAR 2.12 (sic) . These are vent valves and drain valves to drain radiation. (Some of these valves are already 10 years '
old.) Workers allege that the design of the valve is not any good. The rework program of CEI reworked 100 of these valves. They put the redesigned valves through a test. It is called an in-service leak rate test. Many of the redesigned valves failed the test. These are small bore '
valves .
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RESPONSE
Deficiencies with the operation of Dresser diaphragm valves were identified by CEI during the preoperational test program. The cause of Dresser Valve jamming was diagnosed as insufficient clearance between the disc cap and disc guide. This deficiency was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) on October 29, 1984 as Deficiency Analysis Report 212. The valves were reworked to correct this problem but retesting revealed that the smallest size Dresser Valves still experienced jamming. This jamming was traced to undersized disc springs and appropriate corrective action was taken. This issue was reviewed by the NRC and was closed during Inspection 85089 which was completed December 18. 1985.
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ITEM #17 Workers allege that the Borg-Warner valves (rod [ sic] waste system) are causing a lot of trouble. This can be seen on DAR 2.13 [ sic] . (some of these valves are already 10 years old.) The E-rays of the valves do not match up with the valves (compared with what is currently installed).
Later they found they would not open or close properly. These valves would not work except when they were in a vertical position. They were designed to work in the horizontal position but they did not work in that position.
Some of these valves are 20 inches in diameter.
RESPONSE
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1 This item combines two separate issues related to Borg Warner Valves. One issue is that radiographs "do not match up with the valves (compared with what is currently installed)". The other issue is DAR 213 which dealt with valve operability.
The first issue was the subject of DAR 141 which was reported to the NRC on April 18, 1984 During the comparison of site generated radiographs with those supplies by Borg Warner, three discrepancies were identified. One valve was found to have been machined af ter it had been radiographed. Two other valves were found to have identification markers interchanged.
Initially, the radiographs did not appear to match up with the installed valves. After an in depth investigation. CEI concluded that these were the only discrepancies where radiographs did not match up. This issue was reviewed by the NRC and closed in Inspection Report 84-06 dated May 18, 1984.
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Deficiencies with the operation of Borg Warner Gate valves were identified by CEI during the preoperational test program and reported to the NRC as DAR 213 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). Several different sizes and models of Borg Warner gate valves experienced jamming when installed horizontally as discussed in the DAR. Internal inspections of valves of each size and model number revealed the cause of the jamming to be improperly sized or pcsitioned guide rails. A comprehensive program of repairs and retesting was performed and this issue was reviewed with the NRC and closed in Inspection Report 85080 dated December 2. 1985.
ITEM #1'8 CEI has on occasion used nonconformance reports to make design changes, as opposed to the appropriate design change request forms. An ASME experienced engineer should be able to find many examples of such situations.
RESPONSE
The use of nonconformance reports are in accordance with CEI's Quality l Assurance Program requirements. As each portion of the plant is
- onstructed. it is checked by inspectors and any differences between the
, design drawing and the installed ites are documented on a nonconformance report. These reports can be dispositioned as: use as ist rework repairs or scrap. Rework and scrap dispositions result in restoring the installed ites to the original design requirement. Dispositions of "use as is" and
" repair" result in final conditions which are different from the originsi l design. Before approving these dispositions, each is evaluated by engineering to ensure that the proposed as built condition meets the required design criteria. When changes are acceptable to the engineer he signs the nonconformance report to indicate his approval. Consequently, these nonconformance reports become design change documents and are described as such in project procedures.
ITEM #19 Men in certain unions that have been tied to corruption or organized crime activity have tried to prolong their jobs by sabotaging many items at the Ferry plants. .
RESPONSE
There have been no known instances of sabotage at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Moreover, there are safeguards to ensure that sabotage would not remain undetected. The construction and permanent security program as well as the comprehensive inspection and testing program eliminate the potential j that construction phase sabotage could affect safe operation of the plant.
Prior to loading nuclear fuel, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant is subjected to a comprehensive preoperational test program. This program includes detailed visual inspections and operational tests which ensure that !
systems, equipment and components are operating properly. In the early stages of this test program. CEI implemented a comprehensive security !
program which limited access to completed areas of the plant (and later the entire plant) to those personnel who did not complete an employee screening l program. This screening program, includes a backgroun,d investigation. i Additional assurance that sabotage would be detected and not result in l unsafe conditions is provided through the ongoing surveillance and periodic l test program. This program tests the operation of safety and many l non-safety systems icrediately prior to the systems being placed in operation.
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ITEM #20 During the ILRT [ sic} test CEI was trying to get up to 30 lbs. PSI yet they could not even make 12 or 15. CEI did not know where the leaks were.
RESPONSE
CEI assumes this item refers to the drywell Structural Integrity Test and not the containment ILRT (Integrated Leak Rate Test) since the ILRT was performed at a pressure of 11.3 PSIG.
The drywell was pressurized to 30 PSIG and the structural integrity test was successfully completed.
1 ITEM d21 Workers allege while working at Perry Nuclear Power Plant they have seen smoking of marijuana and drinking of intoxicants.
RESPONSE
CEI has always maintained a strict policy at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant regarding the possession of illegal drugs and alcohol which is stated in the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Employee's Randbook. Any person found possessing alcoholic beverages or illegal drugs is turned ever to site security and subjected to immediate disciplinary action. usually dismissal.
In the past seven years, approximately 29 individuals have been permanently dismissed from the site for, alcohol abuse and apprazimately 18 more have been dismissed for drug abuse or possession within the plant property.
l In preparation for fuel load CEI has taken additional steps to ensure its j strict policies regarding illegal drugs and alcohol are enforced. These steps, are described by the following progras:
- 1) Prior to receiving unescorted access to the plant, both CEI and non-CEI l employees must undergo a personnel screening process which verifies an applicant's trustworthiness and reliability to perform his job duties I within a nuclear power plant.
- 2) Supervisors are trained to detect aberrant behavior and are continually
( watching for changes in behavior or attitudes which may be the result j of drug or alcohol abuse.
- 3) A trained dog is used to perform periodic checks of the plant for illegal narcotics.
- 4) CEI performs daily checks of lunch boxes and other p'ackages in order to prevent the introduction of drugs and alcohol onto the Perry Plant Site.
If an individual's per formance were impaired due to drugs or alcohol. CEI's comprehensive prograns of surveillances, inspections and testing of safety related and non-safety equipment would provide a high degree of assurance that wcrk performed by such a person would be detected and corrected. ,
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CEI's confidcoco in this program is beced upta the concept of defense in depth. All vital work must be performed using very detailed procedures which receive multiple engineering and quality assurance reviewc. During i performance of the work, there is close quality surveillance of the entire ,
activity which, among other things, ensures compliance with these procedures. Each critical step in the work procedure is identified as a hold point and the workman cannot proceed past a hold point until his work is inspected by quality assurance personnel. Work is're-inspected when the task is completed. Prior to being tested, detailed reviews are performed by Test Engineers and Technicians to ensure equipment conforms to every aspect of the design drawing. Every piece of equipment is checked for proper calibration and operation during Initial Check-out and Run-In Testing. Then, every system is subjected to a comprehensive preoperational or acceptance test to ensure conformance with design criteria and proper operation. Finally, before being declared operational and periodically throughout the life of the plant, systems are subjected to surveillance or periodic tests which reconfira proper operation. Each stage of the defense in depth process is subjected to quality assurance surveillance and quality control inspections. Management controls such as independent verification l are also applied to many steps in this process. This program assures detection and correction of any work that does not meet the applicable specifications and requirements.
l ITEM #22 l
l Workers allege they have seen welders taking tests illegally at the Power !
site, with no supervision.
RESPONSE
CEI takes numerous steps as discussed below to ensure the validity of welding tests and the qualification of the welders. Additional assurance is provided by welding code requirements for in process and post process inspections and finally by a program for the proof testing of welds.
l Throughout the construction process, all welders were subject to random !
inspections while performing field activities. Frca these random '
inspections, all welders are subject to immediate retest if their workmanship is considered questionable. These randon inspections were in addition to code requirements for in process and post process inspections of welds. All safety related welding activities have been 100% visually inspected and accepted by certified inspectors. Additionally, safety class pressure boundary welds have received welding code specified nondestructive testing (NDE). The type of NDE required by the various codes is dependent upon the type and service of the weld.
At the time of the NRC's Construction Assessment Team Audit in 1983, contractor programs required the welder candidates to read and sign test documentation and to sign in and out of the welding test. Supervision of this program was provided by Contractor Engineering /QC personnel. The test shops were also subject to CEI surveillances and audits. . Based upon a recommendation by the Construction Assessment Team for additional controls.
CEI implemented a " photo badge" system for all contractors. Implementation of this system required that the welder candidates exhibit to the Test i j Director a signed, picture identification prior to being allowed to test.
The NRC received allegotiens ccrly in 1985 rcstrding ecidsr quclificatien tests. See allegation RIII-85-A-0065. This allegation was found to be
' unsubstantiated, and was closed by the NRC in Inspection Report 85023 dated May 20. 1985.
ITEM #23 Workers allege they have seen contractors overloading jobs, while many workers just sat around for days doing nothing.
RESPONSE
Allegations about worker productivity do not relate to the quality of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. This is a commercial item and does not raise any safety issues.
However CEI has always maintained a close scrutiny of contractor activities, using CEI area teams which coordinated work in all parts of the plant. The high level of activity required careful pisaning and close supervision to minimize overcrowded conditions. With various contractors performing work in confined areas overloading was not overlooked or tolerated. CEI's Contract Administration Section also required daily activity reports from the contractors and additional people could not be employed without justification. CEI's strong management commitment and involvement during the construction phase has maintained programs and direction which has provided for productivity at standard and above standard rates.
ITEM #24 Workers allege they have been approached by members of Local 744 and " asked if I wanted some cocaine."
RESPONSE
Ibis item is addressed in the response to Item 21.
ITEM #25 Workers allege they turned the above information over to the FBI and have heard nothing since.
RESPONSE
No response to this item is possible by CEI.
ITEM #26 Workers allege they saw men who " stayed loaded on cocaine the whole job".
RESPONSE
This item was addressed in the response to Item 21.
t _ _ - - .-
I' TEM #27 The workers allege that foremen knew about men being stoned on cocaine because the men "did not hide it." Yet there is no evidence that the forenen did anything at all in this regard.
RESPONSE
This item is addressed in the response to Ites 21.
ITEM #28 Workers allege that uncertified welders would use the names of certified welders on welding jobs when the certified welders were not even on the site. The foreman at the plant site were the ones who approved and encouraged such activity.
RESPONSE
As part of the weld fit up process required for safety-related welding. the certification of the welder is checked against a certification matriz. The welder cannot proceed if he is not certified for the welding process specified in the work package. Additionally, while a welder is performing the weld quality assurance personnel monitor various welding parameters including identification of the certified welder.
Additionally as discussed in the response to Item (22 throughout the construction process, all welders were subject to randon inspections while performing field activities. From these random inspections, all welders are subject to immediate retest if their workmanship is considered questionable. These random inspections were in addition to code requirements for in process and post process inspections of welds. All safety related welding activities have been 1001 visually inspected and accepted by certified inspectors. Additionally, safety class pressure boundary welds have received welding code specified nondestructive testing ,
(NDE). The type of NDE required by the various codes is dependent upon the l type and service of the weld.
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ITEM #29 40.000 tons of reinforcement rod was wrongly ordered and then sent to the scrap yard by true.k.
RESPONSE
This is a commercial issue and does not raise any safety issues.
CEI purchased rebar for specific installations and each bar was bent in accordance with design requirements. In order to determine the placement -
location of each bar, the building, elevation and bar number was assigned to each piece of rebar. In 1981. 15 tons of rebar was scrapped because of l design changes, damage. or loss of identification tags which prevented CEI i from identifying the locatica in which the bar was supposed to be placed.
When this rebar was scrapped, it was sold in accordance with CEI's program j for scrap metal.
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, ITEM #30
' Insulation - 500 penetrations were installed wrong. Sleeves should have been put on before insulation. Now this insulation will break up from the
, pipes moving back and forth.
RESPONSE
This allegation appears to be about radiation and fire barrier seals in pipe openings through walls. Generally these openings are filled with a silicone foam or high density elastomer. In cases where pipe movement is anticipated to be greater than the ability of the material to fles, a penetration sleeve is installed around the pipe. The sleeve provides a -
space for the pipe to move freely without damaging the barrier material.
. The original engineering design requirements for penetration sleeves was based on pipe movement of an unsupported pipe. Subsequently, cases were identified by Engineering in which piping was anchored in place or otherwise had movement restricted. Engineering evaluated these situations +
on a case-by-case basis. Based upon this analysis, the design requirements were changed in October 1985 to eliminate the penetration sleeves where pipe movement was restricted. Thus, there are numerous cases where sleeves ;
are not required to be installed.
r ITEM #31 Portions of the containment vessel are now susceptible [ sic] because the I sprinkler system came on for undisclosed, accidental, or unknown reasons.
i RESPONSE , .
Inadvertent operation of the containment spray system during preoperational testing was identified and investigated by CEI as documented in Condition !
Report 85-027. The CEI investigation and the subsequent NRC review included a comprehensive inspection to identify equipment damage resulting from this event.
The minimal amount of equipment damage resulting from this event was documented and corrected. This event was reviewed by the NRC and closed in !
Inspection Report 85056 dated October 17. 1985.
ITEM #32 '
Power outage in the plant caused evacuation and cause of the outage is uncertain.
- RESPONSE '
t From time to time during construction and preoperational testing, isolated )
electrical outages have occurred which may have prevented or interrupted I work in specific areas of the plant. Emergency systems are installed to assure that lighting is available for the operation of the plant and for entry / exit to and from the plant when normal lighting systems are not operable. When normal lighting systems fail to operate, it is normal ,
practice to evacuate non-essential personnel from the specific areas involved until the normal lighting systems are restored.
Unplanned outages have been evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine the cause of the outage.
ITEM #33 m quality of the paint job at the plant site is not uniform. In some areas of the plant the paint is stready starting to come off. One can see this on the equipment hatch at the top of the unit. Other paint should -
have been taken off but was not. !
RESPONSE ;
- m requirements for applying nuclear coatings are described in the engineering specification provided to the painting contractor. m specifications and implementing procedures also indicate the requirements for QC inspections, m ee inspectioca verify that various requirements including uniform thickness is in accordance with the pre-established requirements.- Instances of coatings coming off in limited areas are l identified on nonconformance reports and ere corrected.
Costing deficiencies on the equipment hatch were identified on
- December 26. 1985. and documented on nonconformance report CQCS 444. These deficiencies have been corrected and the noncenformance report has been
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closed.
The Perry Nuclear Plant also has a saintenance program which will be used throughout the life of the plant to identify and correct deterioration of <
l paint including nuclear coatings.
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ITEM #34 CEI negotiations with unichs were in part responsible for bad feelings between unions. Situation arose where carpenters were supposed to give orders to laborers. This resulted in no one bringing cut boards to the appropriate local. Thus CEI had to permit the union to go back to their old way of doing things. This type of management caused weste, confusion, j bad feeling, and a lack of concentration en meeting health and safety standards.
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RESPONSE
This itea raises ccamercial issues and does not raise nuclear safety issues.
m only negotiation between CEI and building trade unions did not occur until late 1984, when the plant was virtually complete. m ee negotiations were conducted at the international level of the union and did not affect the day-to-day activities at the job site. j Carpenter helpers are laborers whose job is to assist the carpenters in the I erection and dismantling of scaffold. Nee laborers have a foremen. but ,
routinely accept directien from the carpenters they are employed te assist.
Without this c1cse cooperatien, which has existed for many years thecughout i the country, scaffolding could not be efficiently erected utilizing the 4 existing agreement between the Carpenters' Union and the Laborers' ' Union. )
l CEI has not taken any a: tion which adversely affected the working relationships between trades at the Ferry Nuclear Power Flant. I i i i
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ITEM #35 l i
Local 744 of the Boilermakers hired unqualified men under the direction of Louis Jewels. president of the local. to work at the Perry plant. They I were paid journeyman wages but should have been paid apprentice wages.
Numerous workers have stated that this occurred because of corruption in Local 744 and the International. Numerous workers have stated that vast '
sections of the plant do not meet NRC standards because of this activity.
RESPONSE
The extensive quality assurance programs welder testing and the defense in depth concept of performing work at the Ferry Nuclear Power Plant assure that work is completed in accordance with applicable specifications and requirements. See responses to items 21 and 22.
The quality programs utilized by the contractors assure that practices which would adversely affect the quality of the plant would be quickly detected. As an example, welders, including Boilermakers. must pass certification tests in order to be employed by a contractor to perform welding. The union has no control over these tests because they are conducted by the contractor. After testing. all work performed by craftsson is inspected by qualified certified quality assurance personnel who are also independent from the union. These quality programs ensure that the work meets NRC standards.
ITEM #36 ,
A lot of voids existed in the bioshield wall. These were fixed. but not ,
properly.
RESPONSE
CEI reported the presence of voids in the bioshield to the NRC in accordaece with 10 CFR 50.55(e) on December 1.1981. The analysis and corrective actions are documented on Deviation Analysis Report 074.
Methods approved by Engineering were developed to locate the voids in the bioshield wall and high density material was used to make the repairs.
Each lot of the material used for filling the void was tested for density prior to being released to the field. In addition, the grout material used ,
in the repair was tested prior to installation. These actions were .
i sufficient to ensure that voids in the bioshield were detected and properly l repaired. This item was reviewed by the NRC and closed out in Inspection l Report 84002. dated March 27, 1984.
i l ITEM #37 i
Stealing is very widespread at the Jerry plant. Even CEI personnel are involved. l l l t
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.' . RESPONSE Theft is a commercial issue. CEI's strict policy on theft is stated in the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Employee's Handbook. Theft of any sort from the project is grounds for immediate dismissal and denial of any future access to the plant. Within the last seven years, fifteen (15) individuals have been denied permanent access from the plant due to thef t. To prevent stealing at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant security personnel perfcra inspections of lunch boxes, briefcases, and any other packages being removed from the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Thus Perry Nuclear Power Plant officials have implemented strong measures to prevent this type of activity on plant property.
ITEM #38 The standard procedure regarding the way welding is done and inspected at Perry is not compliance with current NRC code.
RESPONSE
There is no " current NRC Code" for welding. Through the Code of Federal ,
Regulations. the NRC endorses the nationally recognized codes which govern welding such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. The American National Standards Institute, and The American Welding Society. CEI described its compliance with these codes as they apply to different parts of the plant in FSAR Chapter 3.
The NRC evaluates CEI's program of management, administrative and quality controls to ensure they are sufficient to ensure compliance with these codes. In addition, organizations such as the ASME perform detailed i reviews of contractors' programs for code implementation prior to certifying the contractor to perform work under the ASME code. The process used to award the ASME "N" stamp involves a thorough review of the controls the contractor will use to ensure requirements are fully implemented. CEI employs agents such as Hartford Steam Boiler to review code compliance programs for acceptability and monitor compliance using authorized inspectors.
These provisions, along with the quality assurance program described in i response to earlier items, ensure that CEI is in compliance with appropriate welding codes.
ITEM #39 There were irregularities in the welding tests that were given at Perry.
Indications are that some men took the test for other men who were unqualified. Some men took a welding test that took a day, while , ethers tj were permitted to take as long as a week.
RESPCNSE Itis item is addressed in part in the response to Item 22.
The time allowed for tests depends on the type of welding techniques being used. Some tests take longer to complete than others. For instance, the test for a 3/8" socket veld would take approximately four hours, while a 8" heavy wall weld may take as long as a week. Other parameters which affect the length of the test include: type of process, position, and equipment availability.
' ITEM #40 The polar crane in Unit I rides on a support beam above the reactor. The beam that the wheels of the polar crane ride on is defective. The beam that the track sits on is defective. This beam cay.e into the plant in sections. The welds that were made in the plant are good welds. The welds on the beam that were made outside the plant or f abricated by vendors are i bad. Thus the rail that the polar crane rides on is defective. l l
RESPONSE
i On October 29, 1979, the Unit 1 Polar Crane Boz Girder (PCBG) welds were rejected on Nonconformance Report 17-136 for various visual defects. ,
During the repair of these defects a small number of subsurface defects !
were uncovered and corrected.
1 In the second half of 1981, linear indications indicating a lack of fusion 1 were uncovered in the Unit 2 PCBGs. CEI reported this deficiency to the l NRC in accordance with 10 CPR 50.35(e) on February 26, 1982 as Deficiency l Analysis Report 71. An engineering evaluation concluded that the lack of i fusion problem was limited to the Unit 2 PCBGs. The basis for this conclusion was that the Unit 1 PCBGs were f abricated using welding parameters allowing heat input in the upper ranges of the welding procedure which. assured fusion. In contrast, the Unit 2 PCBGs were welded at I temperatures in the lower ranges which resulted in the lack of fusion i observed in the Unit 2 beams. I
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To confirm this conclusion. CEI had informational Ultrasonic Examination (UT) performed on three (3) successive girder sections (2 different drawing types) on the same major strength welds in Unit 1 as were tested in Unit 2.
The results of the UT test confirmed the conclusions of the engineering evaluation that the lack of fusion discontinuity was limited to the Unit 2 PCBG.
The NRC reviewed the corrective actions for the PCBGs and closed both Unit 1 and Unit 2 concerns in Inspection Reports 50-440/82-06 (DETP) and 50-441/82-06 (DETT) dated July 2.1982. This concern was further reviewed i by the NRC as documented in Inspection Report 50-440/85078 dated January 9 1986. l ITEM #41 QC inspectors were harassed and intimidated in an attempt to get them not to report QC violations.
RESPONSE
Throughout the Perry Project CEI management has encouraged the reporting o. j all QC concerns. This policy was expressed through procedures. -
indoctrination and training, written and posted notices to workers, and other types of coenunication which enphasize the importance of reporting any safety concerns either to CEI or to the NRC. CEI takes quick action to investigste any inspector concerns of potential violations of procedures or other requirenents. To further ensure that quality assurance concerns are being addressed. CEI instituted a " Call for Quality" program in June 1984 l
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his program. t;hich is in addities to QA/QC program requir:a cts. provides all employees with an additional mechanism to discuss concerns on a confidential basis. ne " Call for Quality" program has investigated all concerns and has not identified any case in which a QC inspector was discouraged from reporting QC concerns.
ITEM #42 nis harassment and intimidatica of QC inspectors took place and affected the quality of inspection at the diesel generators of Unit 1. Unit 2. and the 620 Central complaz.
RESPONSE
Several allegations were investigated in response to a Motion to Reopen the
! Atomic Safety Licensing Board (ASL3) Issue 3 record which was filed by
' Chio Citizens for Responsible Energy (OCRE) on November 30, 1983. Some of the allegations related to inspection of equipment in the areas of the Unit 1 and 2 diesel generators and the 620' elevation of the Control Complex.
De results of CEI's investigation are discussed in detail in the Applicant's Response to the Motion to Reopen dated December 19. 1983. As indicated in the Applicant's response. CEI and the Contractor determined that the allegations were unfounded. The action was dismissed by the ASLB by memorandus and order dated January 20, 1984 (LPD-84-3, 19 NRC 282 (1984)).
Af ter receiving this ites, the " Call for Quality" Ombudsman interviewed QC inspectors who have performed inspections in the area of the Diesel Generatcrs. The inspectors interviewed stated that they knew of no cases in which they were asked to accept substandard work and that they received adequate management support to resolve identified safety deficiencies.
CEI is not aware of any basis for the allegation described in this item. CEI ensures that all nonconformances are properly documented and l
that worker concerns are reported as described in response to Ites 41. l ITEM i43 The main control room suffered from a serious lack in terms of number of QC inspectors for the job. Due to the shortage of QC inspectors, the verification work that should have been done (regarding all electrical work, power modulators, and instrumentation) was not done in the main i control roca.
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RESPONSE
The only concern identified by CEI that appears to be related was addressed in August 1984 In response to an silegation the NRC reviewed the adequacy of Control Roon inspectiec activities. An ites of noncoepliance 8400701 ]-
was issued because the ins;eetion reports issued prior to 1983 covering activities in the Control F.com did not specifically state which activities s
' were inspected nor the secpe of activity. An evaluation was performed and I re-inspections were cenducted as required to resolve discrepancies. A CEI sudit of reports issued sicce 19E3 indicated that the reports did contain l adequate detail regarding activities inspected and the scope of activity.
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This item of noncompliance was closed by NRC Region III as documented in Inspection Report 85032 dated June 19. 1985.
The CEI Quality Assurance Program has strict management and administrative contrels which ensure that all required quality inspections are performed and documented. In addition. CEI has always used a systes of hold points in work pack.sges which require "in process" inspections. Review of Control Room documentation by the Nuclear Quality Assurance Department assures that all control room inspections have been performed.
ITEM #44 Due to overwork, the two QC inspectors were not allowed to see the computer room at e1<evation 638. The program was just not set up to deal with this.
RESPONSE
The computer room located en the 638' elevation of the Control Complex is non-safety and f alls outside the scope of the contractor Quality Control program. Although the contractor QA program is not required to perform inspections in this area, non-safety installations are inspected by the CEI Constructica Ouality Section. .
There are no safety issues relative to this ites.
ITEM #45 There are problems with emergency service water regarding pecker heads terminations. The vendor side is different from the Gilbert drawings. The rotation for the motor is opposite to industry drawings, !be rotation for the actor is 99-100% different free Gilbert drawings. Vorhers say they feel it is 100% because they have nevet mean ene that was correct. The concern of the workers is that they feel this situation could cause them to run backwards and "you would have a het reactor." '
RESPONSE
The direction of rotatien of three phase induction cotors depends upcn the phase sequence of the power cables to the motor. It is not practical to l mark the phase seguence on power cables or motor leads. Therefore. '
standard industrial practice is to connect the power leeds to the motor and check the direction of the rotation of the moto.r. If the direction of rotation is Lacorrect, the pever supply is disconnected and reconnected in the correct phase sequence. CEI performed this standard ptsetice for installing three phase induction motors, including .the emergency service water pump motor, during the Initial Checkout and Eun-in Testing. .
4 7o110 wing this installation test, the power leads (Cilbert side) and motor !
leads (vendor side) are marked and the drawings are revised to reflect the ,
installed condition. Additienal assurance that pumps are rotating in the ccrrect direction is obtained during preeperational tacting. During this ,
testing, the perfernance characteristics of the pumps are ebecked against performance data supplied by the pump manufacturer. This peccess veuld quickly identify a puep which rotated backwards.
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ITEM #46 l In the containment vessel there are numerous and serious cracks in the first 60 feet of stainless steel clad. There are cracks in the other parts of the stainless steel clad, but the first 60 feet of the lower portion is extremely bad. This would be in the area of #1 ring and #2 ring. There are "a lot of cracks in the double bar around the first ring, the bottom of it."
RESPONSE
CEI's responses to items 2.14, 21. and 22 discuss how problems such as those described in this allegation would be orevented or appropriately i detected and corrected.
CEI assumes that the item reistes to Deviation Analysis Reports 37 and 92.
DAR 37 pertains to sensitization of stainless steel cladding in the supression pool. DAR 92 concerns welds in the containment vessel. CEI reported these items to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). DAR 37 and 92 were reviewed by the NRC and closed respectively in Inspection Reports 85035 dated July 2.1985 and 83032 dated November 10. 1983.
ITEM #47 The welds in the fuel pools are bad. Do tests here. Look at the welds.
They are bad.
RESPONSE
CEI's response to items 2.14, 21. and 22 also apply to this response.
The fuel pool welds were designed, performed, inspected and tested in accordance with design requirements and the applicable welding codes. Fuel pool welds were inspected by liquid penetrant tests. Af ter erection and initial inspection, the leak chase channels were subjected to a pressure test. The balance of the welds are subjected to vacuum bos test. The final indication that the welds are acceptable is when the fuel pool is filled and the leak chase system is checked for water. There was no indication during the performance of these inspections and tests that these j welds are deficient. j l
ITEM #48 I The question was raised: "Why did they fix the bad crane gridder (sic) in Unit 2 but not in Unit 17" It is alleged that the Unit-1 crane gridder
[ sic] is bad.
RESPONSE !
This item was addressed in the response to Item 40.
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5 NXHIBIT B
sATuiOAY. JUNE 15.1985i
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Lake County .
Nuke workers question plant safety they're repdable " came.4ad der apase park" Bd imed By DOUGK0ERNER sa ggggg,,
He FO s e ivere o p an Responding to Schlesomer's parts andepsipsment.she aue.auses.shaw sa. .eet the sa
- One of uve largest pmap meters anythlag 'new etan sew,muu, u ,. .
NOHTH P5:HitY vil I. As.K I Tsc PERRY - The Perry Nuclear Power Plant received the 23rd of 25 in the drywell area,wluch tslocated
- Shaw said Ihe heathela* lest prcudent of W esti r e. Heserve fuel red shWe ynierday pernlag. The final two shapments are , in the testaanseest building below was delayed a month haranaa the Alhance, a firsti nd I, s>cd ants the reacter vessel, faaled abad a fire wh6chiavelvedacaNeleag.and caputed le be del 6med mt week. according le plant elhenais-aucicar group. md pr>terday some "As seen as the rods are received they are checked for any dastage sneathageandwasreplatea Thele- the meter laMme. However. E wan Pessy Notica Pomes Plant workers that snay have acewted during transportaties." said Wimaan King, geet hagh, 7.8th , r meter. Wad succe*M Weheadny
,* have salormed him of warseus Cleveland Electrie llheanimellag Co. was replaced. eigt. "He's pt edif4 ale la equipmcat ocletta some savolving The fuel rods ud he stared untal aH are recieved, then the piecess of .Whetherwarrantles arein edlect forenaties."
potential safety hasards loadangthe teacler webegin. is met signincast, she sad. Egulp-
- There are a aneher of eranes at A Cleveland Elettnc illusanaatuig meat is itsed er replaced in any the pleet eMe and asas ese superted '
' The auchar poww plant is espected le he is operaties late this year Ce spehenwoman. Elstabeth Shaw, cane, she said. The plant has been lebaw salety defects.
er early 1986.
saad the allegations by Donald L iander cessansetion Ier le years, and Regardlag ha sources.
Schiesamer contain ne vahdety.
"This is a not-les saarpnsing tactic." a substaalial .assount of pape was cut lavolves lacreasing the temperature aesne warranties may have espired. Shaw said any warhar aware el and reweided raadenly, met by weld le ahed500 degrees she said. defects er safety sher masaangs a 63 she baad.
hablenes,as requared by the Nuclear
- FINy percentof the soleegan a
- Aay pipHutting er weidag obligatedlelaiorge CEI er lho NRC CEI is the magenty owner of the aseded le remove and replace lhe "If a werker has a sencera, they Negulatory Cosuusikwes "lange" crameis defectie.
i C3 4 belHee aunear plant, which CEI Shaw called Seblegamer,a smeter was deae properly. "I can shedd reaNy report K?
plansiostareuplatethisycar.
- Equapsacat, some of which is But Shaw said esses worters may
? Schaemenee, who is based in delethve, Es teing ehtained from the statements "galte a laundry list? has&cally say what he said is laae-Usshwatse, D.C., said plant Z;mmer plant. Taial piant nerated She pelated out that W is cwate. H was dame properly. deel esseethlag is wrong ler an)
, cast of Casciaman en the t%es River. levolved with a private groeghaswa ansesedbyapsalleyanswance." auenber ef teaseas. " GAP
! werberssaidhap: = 1t is esidsthd if agaipenest was (Government Accesels '. I y
- A 35 ses anotar 6e the drywell .was to be a maclear power placilast as the Goverassent Accanetability is beingcoevested tacoal burning FieleCI. widek has ma===t'aa le purchased dreas lhe 21smaner phant. Projectimakes apelatleassensesc I area seat the reacter t.ormed out
- A heat test la the dryweN area lilech liesentag of shr nuclear because it was deelgaed is he a people out."
- aheet two weeks age.The sneier had presserlasd-water reacter and . Western Reserve Amaman has ans o sewee year warraely that had that caissed in Are last aienth con- pleets, glaues to be attempted ese- Of Western Esserve AMisees, a Perry is a heillegiraser reacter. eestacted the NRC ahead the i .espired. Other plant espalpaneet alee - = * *
- Shaw said. "I koos we have leaked allegauses.Eradammamarsaid.
, hascaparedwarraalles successhiny, and the cause of the self deserthed feelure caemd be laund. The nest group. Shaw sold don't at other plaats that_ how knee
.' eTe reach and reeneve lhe mseier, _
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A r t. ic l e f rom Lake County Telegraph . y l "
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EXHIBIT C ,
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no sox sy a PEmmv. OMio 44031 e TELEPHONE (216) 259-3737 e ADOmEss.10 CENTER moAo
' WE Serving The Best location on the Nation PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l
J July 9, 1985 Mr. Donald L. schlencer c/o Western Reserve Alliance 19916 Magnolia Drive '
cleveland, GI 44196
Dear Mr. Schlesser:
vkricus press reports within the last few weks have quoted you as stating that you had knowledge of potential safety hazards at the Perry Maclear Power Plant. '
mar === of our commitment to the public health and safety, we investigate all :
allegations of potential safety probless and encourage all workers on site to identify such problems.
The news reports of your staterunts provided few details concerning your allegations, so that we can obtain the information needed to fully examine the )
claimed defects in the construction of the plant, please contact se as socm as possible. It is not necessary that you disclose the identity of workers who say have provided information to you, so long as the information about the claimed defect is specific enough that we may adequately investigate whether such a defect is present.
Very truly yours, Y r_ =_h
- h_y T. A. Boss, call for OJa_ity (216) 259-3737, ext. 5348 or (216) 259-2642 O
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EXHIBIT D Western Reserve Alliance i 10916 Magnolia Drive Cleveland, Ohio 44106 July 17, 1985 Mr. T. A. Boss c/o Mr. Jay Silberg Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1801 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Mr. T. A. Boss:
Thank you for your letter of July 9, 1985, in which you requested that the Western Reserve Alliance (WRA) contact you as I soon as possible so that the Cleveland Electric Illuminating I Company (CEI) can obtain the information to fully examine the claimed defects in the construction of the Perry nuclear plants.
I A number of years ago, the Western Reserve Alliance was contacted by a number of'whistleblowers from the Perry nuclear plants. Since that time the number of whistleblowers has grown.
The workers have come from a number of different unions and many are in non-union capacities.
Due to the number of whistleblowers and the scope of their '
allegations, the Western Reserve Alliance began to work closely i with the nationally recognized whistleblower organization, the i Government Accountability Project (GAP) . The reason we did this was to offer these individuals access to protection of this organization whose scope and nature is to help whistleblowers.
The structure of WRA differs from the Government Accountability Project.
We have turned the letter you sent to us over to the offices of GAP. It is GAP who will respond to your letter.
We could point out numerous interesting facts to you, but we will only mention a few. The reason for stating these are to show some of the reasons we are somewhat skeptical in regards to your sincerity. In response to an extensive article in the Lake County News Herald on Sunday, January 9, 1983, regarding men with ties to organized crime who were working or had worked at the Perry plants, CEI spokesman J. Lee Bailey said, "We see no long-term threat to safety."
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We can tell you Mr. Bailey is wrong.
Additional organized union corruption at the Perry plants y were revealed in the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources' staff report on union corruption. (See, Chairman's 72-page staff report, July 30, 1984). .
Witnesses have reported to us that CEI representatives received copies of WRA's testimony around midday at the Ohio
! Subcommittee Hearings on Emergency plans at the Perry Nuclear Plant which were held at Lakeland Community College (near the Perry plants) on July 9, 1985; the same day that you sent us two letters (one to Cleveland and one to Washington) which you mailed from Perry, Ohio. The WRA testimony dealt extensively with organized crime activity at the Perry plants.
1 On June 15, 1985, in the Painesville Telectraph, a CEI spokesperson tried to discredit the WRA by say:,ng we were not I
" reputable." It seems strange that CEI would a few weeks later ask this unreputable group for information about CEI's Perry plants.
Stranger still, in the same article, the CEI spokesperson ,
tried to discredit workers' allegations and WRA by telling the l public that the allegations could not be true because the Zimmer - !
nuclear plant was designed to be a pressurized water reactor and l Perry is a boiling water reactor. This CEI statement, of course, I is falso and both are boiling water reactors. l 7
Instead of going on to write volumes on why one should be l skeptical about the sincerity of CEI, we have turned this letter '
i j over to GAP who will respond to you.
Sincerely, ,
hc & d L. 8 Donald L. Schlemmer Western Reserve Alliance 2
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- 4 EXHIBIT E
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l .". EXHIBIT E 2 GOVEIUSENT ACCOUNTABluTY PROJECT l
1555 Cev.ec.wr Awnue N.W., Suite 202 :
Washington, D.C. N July 17, 1985 # l I
i Mr. T. A. Boss i i
c/o Mr. Jay Silberg i
- Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1801 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Mr. T. A. Boss:
I l We are writing to you because we have been asked to respond t i
to a letter you sent to the Western Reserve Alliance (WRA) dated i July 9, 1985. The Government Accountability Project (GAP) has been working with WRA for almost two years now because of a i l
quantity of whistleblowers which have contacted that utility consumer group. We and they believe it would be best for the protection of the whistleblowers if we respond to the letter you f sent to WRA. I Your letter and public comments by your spokespersons in
! recent news accounts raise a number of concerns. I am glad that you made efforts to raise them with consumer utility groups i directly and through the public media. I agree with your appa-
- j
' rent view that issues you raised are of definite public concern and require open and public discussion. I i
Since 1975 the Government Accountability Project has pro-vided legal and other assistance to those who " blow the whistle"
{' on fraud, waste, mismanagement and health and safety standards.
During that time we have developed a methodology that might vary i in particular circumstances, but which nevertheless remains !
i fairly consistent.
h First and foremost, we do not dictate for those who bring ;
information to us, how that information will be used or where it I will be taken. Those decisions are made solely by these who have obtained the information. If we are not willing to abide by the ;
conditions imposed by the whistleblower, we will decline to use l the information in any way. I i
In those cases where we are actually legally representing the potential whistleblower, we often have greatar latitude in l deciding how to proceed. But, we are ethically bound to protect i I
the client and to keep his or her interests very much in our
{ mind.
t Thus, the major factor weighing upon our discussions and ,
other deliberations about what to do about and where to go with j
sensitive information about problems is your reputation among workers at the Perry plants. If employees are afraid to risk going through the internal channels of CEI or the NRC, then we would indeed risk our own credibility by encouraging employees to ,
- " walk the plank." If we decide to legally represent the person i
l 1 I 1
i l who brings information forward, we would violate our own profes-I sional ethics by advising the client to use defective internal channels.
! Furthermore, unless I have sufficient evidence that an "open
! door" is truly open or an office to deal with problems does not view the whistleblower as "the problem," I will not advise
- employees to pursue those internal procedures. I also would want j to know beforehand that the problems raised by the potential l whistleblower would most likely be dealt with appropriately.
l l Frankly, the Western Reserve Alliance has indicated to us
, that you do not really have an "open door" policy. Please do not think that we have made any determination about your quality i
assurance complaint procedures or systems. Unfortunately, at j this point we do not know enough about your organization to make
- a valid judgment. Some employees have expressed doubts to us. j To allay their skepticism and our own reservations, we would need to hear from the employees who have tested your allegation l i
procedures. l I
l i
In fact, we would like to continue this dialogue with you ,
and respectfully request that you allow us to speak with those l who have reported problems to you publicly and openly through your system. If the only employees to use the procedure are ones*
who have done so anonymously, we would appreciate very much if
- you would somehow convey to them our desire to speak with them j anonymously about the allegations procedures and their experi-
! ences with them. Meanwhile, we hope you will give us some infor-
! mation about the types of complaints that have come through your
- allegation channels and what the final disposition of alleged problems have been.
, The numerous reports of organized crime activity at the Perry plants are most disturbing. Also, you should know that recently we have started to receive more contacts from whistle-blowers from the Perry plants on direct basis.
WRA contacted GAP about two years ago. At the time were were heavily involved in many cases around the country, especi-ally the Midland nuclear plant and the Zimmer nuclear plant. We were not able to take on a full investigation of the Perry
- plants. We agreed at that time to train a legal intern. Since
- that time Donald L. Schlemmer has served in thht capacity regard-ing the Perry plants.
Thank you in advance for your consideration of our requests.
Certainly we look forward to the possibility of working with you. ,
1 j sincerely, LN ,
Billie Pirner Garde
)
Citizens Clinic Director l .
O b
+es W
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e o som et a peamy. omo esos, e Tn:PMQNE 1319 350 3737 e AooAESS-in CENTsa n0A0 Serwng The Dest location in the Nation PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 8eptember 6, 1985 ,
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l Donald L. Schlemer c/o Westam maaerve Alliance 19916 lialative '
Cleve , GI 44106
Dear Mr. Schlamer:
Thank you for your letter of July 17, 1985, in respese to my letter of July 9, 1985.
I am sure that you w uld agree that it la to everyone's benefit if unsafe conditions that say exist at the Perry Maclear Power plant be identified and !
corrected at the earliest tism. It is for that reason that Cleveland Electric l Illuminating Company instituted its ' Call for @ality' progran sore than a year j ago. -
l
'the ' Call for @ality' program encourages workers to contact us en a confidential basis if they are aware of any conditions which they believe may
(.
affect the safety of the plant. The ocntact say be made through the " Call for
@ality" hotline, forns which are available at security poets, or by personally l
talking with the Perry Plant cebudsman. ENit interviews are also being ,
conducted. mrkers contaW the ' Call for @ality' program need not identify j themselves. Bowever, if the worker does provide his nans, the embudanen will :
report back to him the results of the investigation. !
The ' Call for Osality" organisation is a separate group directed by the @ ality .
Audit thit kpervisor. It is independent of both the construction and !'
cperational gaality organizations. The ' Call for @ality" program handles all concems broughc to it on a confidential basis, in order to protect the ;
identity of all those using the program and to encourage those who might otherwise be reluctant to bring the:.r concems forverd. ;
l While it is certainly possible that there may be see wrkers who for one :
reasm or another do not wish to conmnicate their concems to us directly, it !
serves no useful purpose for these emcerns to be withheld from the ' Call for
@ality" program. As I stated in my letter to you, we are only interested in i identifying any potential problens, and not in the identity of the workers who !
may have brought those pctential problens to the attention of wester Reserve i Alliance. We will deal with all concems in an appropriate manner. But even !
if screme should believe that a concern he or she has brought to us has not '
been dealt with appropriately, nothing will have been lost by disclosing the I substance of the concern to the ' Call for @ality' program, t i
~ r-e withholding infornetion identifying safety concems frcan those who are in a
( positicut to correct them can only result in plants that say be less safe thart they otherwise sdght be. If you have been informed of concems which may affect the safe operation of the Perry Plant, I would strongly urge that they
- be identified to the " Call for omlity" program or to the lac at the earliest poselble time.
Dery truly yours,
=_
- f. _ ' '- ,
T. A. k es, 02udsman Call for Qaality i (216) 259-3737, est. 5348 or l
- (216) 259-2547 cc
- Billie Pirner Garde, Il squire GovertsentAccowntabilityProject 1555 connecticut Avenue, N. W.
halte 292 Mashington,DC 29936 - 1 1
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