ML20210C105

Forwards Action Plan for Evaluating Effect of 860131 Earthquake on Plant Design & Lists Milestones Scheduled for Each Activity.Team Meeting Scheduled for 850221 to Obtain Draft SERs on Review Findings.Ser Input Requested by 860225

ML20210C105
Person / Time
Site:	Perry, 05000000
Issue date:	02/19/1986
From:	Stefano J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Bernero R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20195C722	List: ML20195C718 ML20195C739 ML20195C752 ML20195C756 ML20195C760 ML20195C768 ML20195C779 ML20195C852 ML20195C860 ML20195C867 ML20195C873 ML20195C894 ML20210C096 ML20210C105 ML20210T527 ML20210T540 ML20210T548 ML20210T556 ML20210T561 ML20210T567 ML20210T572 ML20210T580 ML20210T587 ML20210T593 ML20210T601 ML20210T607 ML20210T614 ML20210T621 PNO-III-86-009, on 860131,earthquake Felt at Plant.No Significant Damage Reported.Some Site Personnel Evacuated. Site Area Emergency Declared.Supporting Documentation Encl PNO-III-86-009A, on 860131,earthquake Experienced at Plant. Site Response Activities Accomplished by Implementing Emergency Plan,Although Action Not Required Prior to Licensing.No Significant Damage Noted
References
FOIA-86-91 NUDOCS 8603030136
Download: ML20210C105 (53)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:F, .! -.,4 UNITED STATES 3.,.. ") l' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g a WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 o,, \\.....* FE8191986 Docket Nos: 50-440 and $0-441 MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert M. Bernero, Director Division of BWR Licensing 1 r) THRU: Walter R. Butler, Director BWR Project Directorate No. 4 y' ]. Division of BWR Licensing FROM: John J. Stefano, Senior Project Manager BWR Project Directorate No. 4 Division of BWR Licensing

SUBJECT:

ACTION PLAN FOR EVALUATING PERRY EARTHQUAKE i This memorandum provides the Action Plan for the NRR staff's evaluation of the impact of the January 31, 1986, earthquake on the Perry plant design, i including the milestones (completed and still to be completed) scheduled for each of the activities in the Action Plan. Enclosure (1) identifies the NRC Review Team (the Team) assigned the earthquake evaluation task, and the respective Team member areas of review, responsibilities and related inter-actions. A team meeting has been scheduled beginning at 8:30 a.m. on Friday, February 21, 1986, in Room P-110, for the purpose of obtaining draft SER's on the review findings. The team's consultants are also invited to participate in that meeting and to present their preliminary findings. It is the Project Manager's intent to separate the Team's findings into: (1) those dealing specifically with the Perry plant design; and (2) those of generic interest and recommended for ongoing study. Enclosure (2) identifies the topics proposed to be covered in SER Supplement No.9 for Perry, and the format to be followed in the preparation of SER inputs by the team. All completed SER inputs should be submitted to the Project Manager no later than COB, Tuesday, February 25, 1986, to ensure that a comprehensive draft of SER Supplement No. 9 can be furnished f sr review by the ACRS Seismic Subcommittee by February 28, 1986. In addition, the team members are required to provide affidavits, based on their respective evaluation findings as applicable, to ELD (Colleen Woodhead) no later than COB, Tuesday February 26, 1986, addressing the intervenor's Motion to reopen the Perry hearing. A copy of that Motion and the questions to be responded to in the affidavits are contained in Enclosure (3), Y (* s!, i a &, d C y 4/rr

y The following significant actions / milestones have either been completed or still need to be completed for expediting resolution of the earthquake impact on Perry Unit 1 (dates for responding to Congressional inquiries, 2.206 Petitions, etc are included):- y earthquake occurred of 11:48 a.m. approx.

• Jan. 31, 1986 10-12 mile south of the Perry site NRR/RIII investigation team visit to plant
• Feb. 1-2, 1986 site to determine extent of plant damage and obtain seismic instrumentation data.

Followup NRR/RIII investigation team visit Feb. 5-7, 1986 to plant site to assess damage to plant equipment, systems and components.

• Feb.

11, 1986 CEI presentation of preliminary findings from its assessment of plant damage / seismic data and discussion of other matters related to Perry Unit I licensing.

• Feb. 12, 1986 CEI filing of a report on earthquake impact findings and NRC/CEI briefing of ACRS Subcommittee on the earthquake.
• Feb. 13, 1986 NRC/CEI briefing of ACRS full comittee on the earthquake.
• Feb. 14, 1986 Chairman's response to Eckart/Seiberling/

Markey Green Ticket Letters re: Earthquake to V. Stello

• Feb. 21, 1986 NRC staff meeting to discuss draft evalu-ation findings and identify additional information from CEI as necessary.
• Feb. 25, 1986 NRC staff SSER inputs to PM.
• Feb. 26, 1986 NRC staff affidavits to ELD.
• Feb. 27, 1986 Response to Western Alliance and OCRE 2.206 Petitions.
• Feb. 28, 1986 Provide comprehensive SSER to ACRS Seismic Subcommittee.

NRC response to OCRE Motion to reopen hearing

• March 5, 1986
• March 7, 1986 NRC issuance of final SSER.

Discussion of SSER with ACRS Seismic

• March 12, 1986 Subcommittee.

l l

7 t

• March 13, 1986 Discussion of SSER with ACRS Full Comnittee.
• To be determined.

Decision to issue low power operating License for Perry Unit 1. If there is any comment with the assignment of team member responsibilities or the topics to be addressed in their SER inputs, they should be provided to Mr. Bernero with copy to the Project Manager and his backup PM, Steve Stern. I may be reached at X29473. Mr. Stern may be contacted at X29478. ] ist I b ((,4 JohhJ.S fano),; Sen rue // r Project Manager BWR Project DirJcto e No. 4 Di sion (jf B Lic sing

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/encls: See next page

r i ENCLOSURE (1) PERRY EARTHQUAKE REVIEW TEAM TEAM MEMBE8 (EXT) AREA 0F REVIEW / RESPONSIBILITY John Stefano (X29473) Project Manager Stephen Stern (X29478) Backup Project Manager Robert Hermann (X27798) Overall Team Leader for technical input to the SER. Phyllis Sobel (X27591) Evaluate geology / seismology data obtained from CEI and assess ground motions transmitted to plant structures. Interacts with.L. Reiter and reports to R. Hermann. Arnold Lee (X27305) Evaluates earthquake impact on plant components, systems and equipment, including confirmation of equipment seismic / dynamic qualifications. Inter-acts with J. Johnson (consultant) on structural review and J. Singh (EG&G) on equipment qualification. Reports to R. Hermann. Harold Polk (X28426) Evaluate seismic instrumentation installed in plant. Provides SER input directly to R. Hermann. LeonReiter(X28357) Principal reviewer of the geology / seismology aspects of the earthquake i and motions transmitted to the plant i structure. Interacts with NRC/RES i (Richardson /Guzy/Beratan)RES j consultants, and P. Sobel. W. Snell (RIII) (388-5513) Assess emergency plan actions taken by l CEI following the earthquake event. 4 i l

i i f ENCLOSURE (2) i l SSER NO. 9 TOPICS / ASSIGNMENTS ~ l l SER SECTION/ TITLE REVIEWER 1.0 Introduction J. Stefano/S. Stern 7 l 2.5 Geology and Seismology L. Reiter/P. Sobel 3.7 Seismic Design - R. Hermann/H. Polk i 3.7.3 Instrumentation I i j 3.8 Design of Seismic Category I R. Hermann/J. Johnson Structures t j 3.10 Seismic and Dynamic Qualifcation of R. Hermann/A. Lee /J. Singh Mechanical and Electrical Equipment J 13.3 Emergency Plans W. Snell I j SER FORMAT i Each SER input shall address the following points: 8 j

1) Brief overview of previous discussion in SER

2) What has changed since the previous SER (1-31-86 earthquake) l 3)

Impact on app 1icable plant systems of 1/31/86 earthquake j

4) Findings and determinations

5) Conclusions, including basis for confirming / disputing adequacy i

of design basis, t All SSER inputs must be typed on System 5520 and stored on the 5520 system to allow subsequent transmittal to CRESS. 5520 call sheets should be attached to j your SSER inputs. i 4 i

(Enclosure 3) 1 AFFIDAVIT OF ~ i I, being daly sworn do depose and state as follows: I am employed in the Division of Safety Review and Oversight, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, in the Nuclear Regulatory Comission. A statement of my professional qualifications is attached to this affidavit. The purpose of my affidavit is to respond to the assertions about January 31, 1986, earthquake in Ohio contained in a motion to reopen the record filed on February 3, 1986, by Ohio Citizens for Responsible 1 Energy (OCRE). i l 1. OCRE states that a magnitude 5.0 (Richter scale) earthquake occurred on l January 31, 1986, in northeast Ohio; the epicenter of the earthquake was less than 10 miles from the Perry plant; and ground accelerations occurred from 0.199 to 0.25g. I 2.

Response

1 3. OCRE alleges that the ground accelerations exceeded the SSE anchor of 0.159 for the Perry plant. 4

Response

1 5. OCRE asserts that the recent earthquake near the Perry plant shows the con-clusions in the FSAR and SER concerning the low seismicity of the area and lack of capable fauts in the vecinity of the plant to be erroneous. (OCRE references FSAR Sec. 2.5.3.6 and Appendix 0, p. r-94 and SER p. 2-21). 6.

Response

i 7. OCRE states the recent earthquake indicates the SSE and OBE for the Perry plant should be more severe and the seismic capability of safety-related structures, systems, and components at Perry should be upgraded accordingly. 8. Reponse: l 1 I

i t-t i i I 9. OCRE asserts that the contention submitted in the motion to reopen the J record, which challenges the adequacy of the seismic design of the Perry i plant, raises a significant safety issue.

10. Reponse:

I t i I attest the foregoing affidavit is true and correct to the best of my knowl-edge and belief. 1 i (Name) i (Title) l (Div) { (Office) I i b d I 4 1 I I 4 4 1 i I I

t Caewsua.(o UNITED STATE 5 0F AMERICA NVCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS5IctJ gertre tre atcms: St.rety and L1:enssng Appeal BCort ) In the Motter or ) ) 70ceket Nos. 50-440 CL THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC 50-441 OL ) ILLUMINATINO CO. ET AL. ) ) (Perry Nuclear powe.- Plant. ) Unsts i and D

• MOTION T0 REOPEN TME RECORO AND 70 SUBMIT A NEW CONT 1.

INTRODUCTION At 11:,7 AM cn Frisos. Jor.ucry 31, 1984 on earthquake wien a masnseuse cr 1.0 on ene Rienter secte struck Northeast Onio, the enscenter of the eartmouote as estimate,d te ne near Nuclear Power Themss:n. Onsc. less tnan 10 miles from the Perry Plant. Ee: Avse er enss event. intervener omso Citizens rce moves to reopen the recore Ress nsstle Energy ('OCRE*) heresy p u r s e s e s e r s un t.ii t e s n s a nd litsgotang the rollowsnt rce tne

cetenesen.

A;;1 scones nove not gemenstrated that ene sessms: eessgn or ene Perry tJ6:le t.r F ewe r Plon t as adequate in lignt or osserved 1 :a* sessmscity. !!. BASIS FOR THE CONTENTION information is availomie on the unsle only Preitmsnary serenownse at en'ss esse. this in/cemotion strongly indicates taat. oc o sit e.s m u m, ene FiAA analysis of sste creo sessmsesty nee:s to te res:ne. Tne Janvorj 31 eorthquave clearly shows ene eco:Lussons in ene FiAR ona SER (NUREG+0587) to be erroneous. no coponte toutes easst an en* Far awomote. st as con:1 weed anot vsesnsty cr une piarit. FSAA Seerson .S.3.48 SER ot 9. 0-C1. ne Pior. sste as otso sosd to be on crea of low sessmscaty. Uf0c1(()D i 11PP-

i Appendax 0,

p. 0-94.

FSAR SecI$on 2 are news accounts?(see Attachment), Even mere cisturbing to the sorthquake were estimated statsng that accelerotions from conge frem 0.19 9 to e.25 g. Perry is designed to uithstens 0.

This, FSAR Section 2.5.2.6.

shutdoun earthquake). g (sore t quake in the serinieten er the operating hosts ear h crons wate (on eorthquoke uhich'could reasonably be A 10 Crn 100 Appendsx expected to ofrect ene picnt site muring the operating life of severe SSE ond OBE should be more the pione). anescotes that the sorsty-the seismic capability of snan presently pcstulatee, and related structures, systems, and componen'ts ct Perry shculd be upgrades oce=resncly. III. STANDARCS FOR REOPEHING THE RECORD stondord for reopening the record: the There ss a trsportste E issue, one oddress o signirscont n.ctaen must be tsmely, at must had it been considered snstsolly, the ne.1r prorrerec materso1. resdit to have been reaches. have causea o darrerent mssnt one Electrie_(050b14 Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Paesrse Gas Unsts 1 one 2), ALAB-596 11 NRC 876 (1980). OCRE's motsen meets oil of the'Se stondards.* Tne earthquoke cecurred Friocy, fne e>otten as tsNely. Januory 31 on: enss motsen as besne filed Hondor, Februory 3 I 1564. The seismse a sssnarscone matter. Tme motscn otso rt.:ses sessan c/ o nuclear po.or plant is on extremely serious matter,

3 doubt earthquoxe reises significant one the octurrence or tne or Perry *s seismic design. Had the Licensing occur the odequocy it is virtually.cerecin that georo been owere or this situation. a estrerent result would have been reoches. the etondards for reopensne the recore. CCRE hos emus met STANDARDS FOR LATE-FILE 0 CONTENTIONS IV. be the rive' rectors whien must 10 CFR .714 t o) (1) delineotes scienced in cetermanang whether to admit c 1ste-filed contaneten. These rotters weigh in CCRE's favor. Factor (s) concerns goed cause for tote filing. As shown cause for fil..ing on this dote. there is certosnly good

chove, conce' ens the ovosichtlity or'other eeons for Foctor (ii)

OCRE knows or ne other meaningful Fratecting CCRE's interests. ways or protectans its interests. While it is certoinly that a possiele te rite o peeseson under 10 CFR .296 requesting ents matter, practical procesesns me snsesotee to hear the these seestsons illustrates tnot empertence with everwnelmtos mojersty of enom are denied. Thus, this is not o meaningrut optson. the extent to uhten CCRE's Fcesar (sts), concerns The an seveloping a sound record. partsespotten will ossist 15eense proceedine demonstrates that recora or ene caeroesng a sientrieone contrthution to t8e CCRE ss very capable of maksng cross-eeomsnoesen one prorrering socumentary evsdence. cae:re my In cadttsen. OCAE ss c:tsvely seeking seismologsses to serve

l _q, thss earthquoke As besng The roce anot os expert, witnesses. the scientists sncreases seweied extehsively by numerous j and 1 nelihood thot OCRE will be chie to utili,,:e eneir work i the heor'ang. for presentotson or rindings Foctor (sv) conearns two extent to which other parties wil! l is not swore or'any other represent 0CRE's interests. CCRE willsnS cr ocle to represent CCRE's anterests, As has party sn this proceedin'g, Applicants and seen moee cmsly opporent 5 torr wsil not oct in CCRE's interests, Factor (v) concerns the extent to which the prceaeding will me deloyed or the assues troceened. The admission or this cause some delay end,broodent'ng or cententien ws11 undoubtedly these consequences pole in comparison to the sstues,

However, Yankee Nuclece_

isswe; compare Vermont tne ssgnstsconce of the atAa-yonkee Nuclear Power Station), P:wer Corncer.esen_ (Vernent Ice, 6 AEC 359, 365 (1973) (delay sn the issuonce of on operotsng 1scense ss preser when serious sorsey problems have ] teen uncovered), fnus, the rectcrs en ene whcie weign in the interest of odmittana tre contention. OCRE prays that the Appeal Board is ac mcVeo, Respectfu11y submitted. i .Ja _. Susan L. Hsort ecad keptgeended M huntme $$70 h ASed aanneur, on #me

~ 1. - w..- ~ c

u.. a a

x a ra.1, n c. mame Lage Earthquake Epicenter l -.c RC ear,.

• ASnlO Ul0

~ l lant Ett Cli 42. r .Q _. - --, w- "y--- On ddri --s*. ~ yc ,'.nBlli.A 5 5 E-r* I Nh ( w._ W- ~~ ~ r: f ;/ 2 ;. \\57 E ..y - -f e* 4 g ~ ,,./.~ ' ' i' .[ By )OtJGRASEE)ERNER j.k {'{Q'g$%s. aCs ih pr J 1 gg,,g y,gg,,, 1 ]/.h.},. I . 7 .f[* ? \\- Ay.. ;,,, NORDI PERRY VILIAGE-were ., gij he,, g,g About 1.500 workers '* s vA .m 1 pi,-7wV_ -~ evacuated freen the Perry .t. I'riday ~ 3 Nuclear Power Plantwhen an casO.;'*e prompte .y-- . _. 7.*7.{,w.::,,,,,,,[ j e' + spfd [ d J the plant operater la declare a, ,..i.g,Q,- t r,._,. ' -.(; ,J j site ares prec.utionaryemerFency, the secondhighest , -: g,yg 4- ,.-i 4 l a- , ', '. ~ of Nuclear Retrulaio y Com-emergency I - 'C6UN1- ' '~ { l .t;fQf-A..-{.gg7,,,. " ' ',..g ' E- ' _ - I m:ssion I a ', - l clausbeations.The quake lavalved ground t t that apparesdly "? '-409" *- l / the 56.4 gy, acceleration surpassed the lisaitbilhonPerry plant L*;desgned to ~ said he could not confirm J withstand, said Sam W. Swars, l CIeveIand 104eetric deny the reports." Die poet seniur engineer with the SaaEarthouake Swan said, but varians sources, Co., the plant the operating." King said operator.said the quake caused Illuminating l iFranciscobased incluihng the pland -operator. { Engineers Inc. Ihe earthquakesagni6 cast inDuence to major plant estunated itse quake to pnerate l J know about them, and we was i l were damage crews on NRC design -s"**ians, he anywhere between.33 g and.25 se CEI for to know aboutthemnow."

• may have systems.

inspect ? Russ to continuing NRC spokesanan The quake snarked one of theA **g" is a anacasure of growed damage.he said.Itegarding the report of high Marabito, of the o%aon's said. g-in relallen to eMice in suburban gravity diaring an earttupaake.ground acceleration. King said. very fe "* insta2 ices a modern acceleration l find regional SeeNUCLEAR,Page: w-sub. nuclear power g,lant wasjected ta a tsernornear thenevel trymg to ) Swas said.That unemoare has no "We've been out." IIc someone to check this i relatlosetotheR6ciderscale. he it was designed Io..;;.-1M-William Kag, spokest.an for is Perry ptant f said. The j designed to w',thstand.15 g. -y n i I J

m ~ I ~ m n..-_.~.., juromPagege ..h d.N W SWa aa'J he heard figuI. ranging from!.0lti(5.25'g. M [y h.Cb8h. st 2,000 of the plant's 4,000 er,. pioyees were sent home after nuclear ;planW (fi,-jhp,-Ja j q Chicago, said a five member f p. yholsis l the quake. Most of the em. Unitet! $tatea NRC teamis being dispatched to (g, 3 T ployees evacuated were con-i rangingJ the Pertp plant 40 examine the struction and officeworkers.depending p rpji n,ie - situation.4fe said CEI reportedsignificant damages and Second ahlft employees were

ify, al@

to report to work as usual atter earthquake, prob-added thatleaking pipes in non. safety systems could not be no release existed since the nuclear

• e.

the complete downgrade., Qalligra

Is I constdered 61gnificant.When asked about the ground.

designed to withstans!>.p g,, ~..p Swan aald..- .l'9 plant was not operating, Marabito .The quake oriptnating! near 1 h

issue, acceleration acknowledged hearing a figuresimilar to.10 g, but he said, "I

• N-Coleman said. Plant operators were alerted sen-Perry"comes 31 a "Wetime he sa to the quake by acasors in the

?.h have no idea what that means. d attive cy i control room that measured thending Itcensing. T NRC will to c-five memiser was tremor at.25 g, accordingf to wil be how high gruud o $,c, The determine if the quake Coleman. "On s design baals,.25g l, within or outalde the design j he said. d bants, he said. to declare a ' site area Marabito said he doca tint hk lasuewithbe studiedtodeath." know what effect the quake will emergency, heauld. us a lt in " chaos" in {i coleman said CEl walkdown have on licensing ut the Perry(cams discovered three leaks, :ll could resu d ign r them in non safety. terms of new regulatory ' [k plant, which is awaiting its operating licenso. RuglonalN!(C ufhetals and CEl personne systems. No injuries :were requirementa,he said. all of P '*'c-were scheduled to meetTuesday

g. j

.o ik.cnning und reported. other nucleat' ' f,k g,2 Ohio's M-generating faelllty, Davis Besse T, l',O ! *[. to discuss ,2

1. }

fuelluading. near Port Clh} ton, also off line, carthquuke, which was '(.a centered near the Luke Occuga tooknoemergencyactionsother - The ) thancontuctingthecounty, state-county border, measured 5 on <t und NitC as royulred, said I)1" the (bchter scale.The utlhty, howevct, declared Itteharti Kelly, a spokesman for l< site area operator Toledo precaununary D.,vis tlesso cmergency inuncdiately after Edison. The tremor ut Davls-a the tremur, wluch occurred at which had about 740 3,,

Ilcsse, workers on site, was not strong q!,

J I N7 am The classificulton .h,o was lowered to u precauttunuty enough to tri er the plant's g uf ert a short (nue later, and the aclstruc slarms, esaid. sold Earthquake * - i plant returned tu nurmal status Swan Engineers Inc. Is involved with

• l 9 ett::Sp m.

Masauto said the NrtC was electric utility companies sround the United States. Most p; tutormet! cf the yunke im. medlDiety and act up a three-electric generating plants, u ! j h,,. ,7N,i 8 : 1 ny phene hookup with Perry, especially nuclear plants, are f l h. the NHC Chicago srea office well constructed and can de 3 und its main headquarters in withalund most earthquakes, M.c,;. .p 13ethesda, Md. Since 11 does not even those slightly exceeding il t,' l have a license, the utility was their limit to withstand 4 ~ E",,. l not required 10 declare say tremur,he auld. l'uctnrs, such as the helght of . i ) ', emergency status,he said. !,i. acccicruflun mcasuring devices, site urvu J'. h' i! emergency und then an u!ert could lead to deceivingly"high Docturing m /9 le w he, ..1", / seems to show the conservative "umpilfted accelerullan, said. Ilowever, he said, "What of the g and cautious nature had a I'm hearing is ynu y operator, he said.CEl technics! spokenm.m Dill algniheunt quake." g.. Colernan said betweca f.!x to nge g .u tj b I f~- y ?.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ese.e copies or ena foregesng we're served my Tass is t o. o

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1966 to the Service Last. . 3'_ d. doy of 3_ W. * ~ a Guson L. Hiott SEFvict LIST COLLEEN P. WOODHEAD, E50 JAMES P. GLEASON. CNAIRMAN OFFICE OF THE EXECLTTIVE LEGAL D ATONIC 5AFETY & LICENSING 60ARD RECTDA 513 GILNOURE DR. U.S. NUCLEAA AEGULRTORY CONH. SILUER SPRING, MD 20001 WASHINGTON, 'D.C. 39555 - -- DR. JERAY R. KLINE DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION ATONIC SAFETV & LICENSING 20ARD OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY U.5. NUCLEAR REGULATOAY CONN. U.S. NUCLEAR AEGULATORY CONH. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 WASHINGTON, D.C. 99555 TERRY J. LODGE, ESG. A QN F ENSING 60ARD 618 N. MICHIGAN ST. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOAY COMM. gL UA5MINGTON. D.C. 20555 O M 43624 ALAt1 5. A05ErfrhAL, CHAIRMAN DONALD d. EZZONE, ESG 8110MIC SAFETf & LICENSING APPgAL ASS'T PAOSECUTING ATTY euARD LAKE CO. ADMINISTRATION CEt4Tei; u.5. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONN. yN L dh 44877 UA$tfIt4GTON, D.C. 20555 l' H. U. REED JOHNSON JOHN G. CARDINAL, E50 HsYittIC 5AFL'Tr & LICENSING APPiiAL PR05ECLrrING RTTY u0:1R0 ASHTABULA CD. COURTHOUSE u.$. NUCLEAR REGULATGAY Conn. JEFFER$0N, OH 44947 UA5HINGTON, D.C. 20S55

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WILSEA nrottIC SAFETf & LICENSING AAAdAL 60ARO u..s. NUCLEAR AdGULAT0AV C0nn. We45 nit 4GTON. C.C. 20655 UAV $ILSt!RG. E50.

1. HAW, PITTNAN. P0TTS, & T110uosi0 CE

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Port 100, App. A 10 CFR Ch. I (1-1-85 Edition) Nuclear Regulatory Commission Port 100, App. A tnneously. This requirement may be proposed sites for nuclear power plants and scistnic waves. " Magnitude" means the nu-(1) Movement at or near ti.e ground sur-reduced in relation to the degree of the suitability of the plant design bases es. merical value on a Rschter scale. face at least once within the past 35.000 cotipling between reactors, the proba-tablished in consideration of the seismic and (b) The " intensity of an earthquake b a years or movement of a recurring nature bility cf concomitant accidents and geologic characteristics of the proposed measure of its effects on man. on man built within the past500.000 years. sites. structures, and on the carth's surface at = the probability that an individual (2) Macro-seismicity instrumentally deter-These criteria are based on the limited particular I cation. " Intensity" means the mined with records of sufficient precision to w uld not be exposed to the radiation geophysical and geological information numerical value on the Modified Mercalli demonstrate a direct relationship with the gifects from simultaneotts releases, available to date concerning faults and fault. 'C* I'* The applicant would be expected to carthquake occurrence and effect. They will (c) The " Safe Shutdown Earthquake"'135 justify to the satisfaction of the Com-be revised as necessary when more complete is that earthquake which is based upon an (3) A structural relationship to a capable fault according to characteristics (1) or (2) Inissi:n the basis for such a reduction information becomes available. [*$8,lyj 'g of this paragraph such that movement on [ in tha source term. ,,'scopg ology and seismology and specific character-ne e uld be reasonably expected to be ac. (3) The applicant is expected to istics of local subsurface material. It is that companied by movement on the other. chiw that the simultaneous operaggon These criteria, which apply to nuclear earthquake which produces the maximum in some cases, the geologic evidence of cf rnultiple reactors at a site will not power plants, describe the nature of the in. vibratory ground motion for which certain past activity at or near the ground surface vestigations required to obtain the geologic structures, systems, and components are de-along a particular fault may be obscured at C' ult in total radioactive effluent re-and seismic data necessary to determine site signed to remain functional. These struc-a particular site. This might occur. for ex-frases beyond the allowable limits of suitability and provide reasonable assurance tures, systems, and components are those ample, at a site having a deep overburden. applicable regulations. that a nuclear power plant can be construct-necessary to assure: Por these cases, evidence may exist else-ed and operated at a proposed site without (1) The integrity of the reactor coolant where along the fault from which an eval-NOTS: For farther guidance in developing undue risk to the health and safety of the pressure boundary, untion of its characteristica in the vicinity the cxcl ssion area, the low population zone, public. They describe procedures for deter-(2) The capability to shut down the reac. of the site can be reasonably based. Such arid the population center distance, refer-mining the quantitative tibratory ground D tor and maintain it in a safe shutdown con. evidence shall be used in determining (nc2 la mace to Technical Information Doc-motion design basis at a site due to carth-dition, or whether the fault is a capable fault within umint 14844. dated March 23.1962. which quakes and describe information needed to (3) The capability to prevent or mitigate this definition. contijns a procedural method and a sample determine whether and to a hat extent a nu. the consequences of accidents which could Notwithstanding the foregoing para-c;lculition that result in distances roughly clear power plant need be designed to with. result in potential offsite exposures compa. graphs til(g)(1),(2) and (3), structural asso-reflecting current siting practices of the stand the effects of surface faulting. Other rable to the guideline exposures of this part. clation of a fault with geologic structural Commission. The calculations described in geologic and seismic factors required to be (d) The " Operating Basis Earthquake" is features which are geologically old (at least Techniccl Information Document 14844 taken into account in the siting and design that earthquake which, considering the re-pre-Quaternary) such as many of those may be used as a point of departtre for con-of nuclear power plants are identified. gional and local geology and seismology and found in the Eastern region of the IJnited sideration of particular site requirements The investigations described in this ap-specific characteristics of local subsurface States shall. In the absence of conflicting chich may result from evaluation of the pendix are within the scope of investiga. material, could reasonably be expected to evidence, demonstrate that the fault is not a characteristics of a parhcular reactor, its tions permitted by I 50.10(cMI) of this chap. affect the plant site during the operating capable fault within this definition. purpose and method of ope ration. ter. life of the plant;it is that earthquake which th) A " tectonic province" is a region of the Copies of Technical information Docu-Each applicant for a construction permit produces the vibratory growth motion for ment 14844 may be obtained from the Com-shall investigate all seismic and geologic fac. which those features of the nuclear power North American continent characterized by a relative consistency of the geologic struc-mission *a Public Document Room.1717 Il tors that may a4fect the design and oper-plant necessary for continued operation tural features contained therein Street NW., WashL.xton. D C., or by writing stion of the proposed nuclear power plant without undue risk to the health and safety the Directar of Naclear Reactor Regulation, irrespective of whether such factors are ex. of the public are designed to remain func-gg3 3 tectonic structure" is a large scale dislocation or distortion within the earth's U.S. Nuclear hesA atory Commission. plicitly irduded in these criteria. Additional tional., fault _ is a tectonic structure along Washington. D.C. 20555. Investigations and/or more conservative de. (e) A (27 FR 3509. Apr.12.1962, as amended at 3g ter o han inc e nt e h m ter als b u sed pa alle vestigatio is e within sh ha cle FR 4610. Mar.19. W66; 38 FR 1273. Jan.11 fracture plane'd disruptions such as It is distinct fr h ar power reactor may not be located unless 1973; 40 FR 8793. Mar. 3.1975; 40 FR 26527 a hav gc plex ge 1 o I types of groun nd a detailed investigation of the regional and une 24.19751 t the particular seismology and geology of a slides, fissures, and craters. A fault may I cal geologic and seismic characteristics of site indicate that some of these criteria, or have gouge or breccia between its two walls the site demonstrates that the need to APPEN2 x A-Selsas!C AND G EOt.OGIC portions thereof, need not be satisfied the and includes any associated monoclinal flex. surface faulting has been proper-es SITI;c CRITERIA FOR Nt1Ct. EAR POwrR ic tions of hese eri la Id " ' '"#*"' "~ ture (k) The " control width" of a fault is the an PLANTS (f) " Surface faulting" is differential maximum width of the zone containing supporting data to justify clearly such de-partures should be presented. ground displacement at or near the surface mapped fault traces. Including all faults These criteria do net address investiga-caused directly by fault movement and is which can be reasonably inferred to have tions of volcanic phenomer a required for distinct from nontectonic types of ground experienced differential movement during General Design Criterion 2 of Appendix A to Part 50 of this chapter requires that nu-sites located in areas of volcanic activity. In-disruptions, such as landslides, fissures, and Quaternary times and which join or can rea-clent power plant structures, systems, and craters. sonably be inferred to join the main fault vestigations of the vc 9 de sapwls of such d components important to safety be designed sites will be determis. 4 on a case-by-case (g) A " capable fault" is a fault which has trace, measured within 10 miles along the to withstand the effects of natural phenom-exhibited one or more of the following char-fault's trend in both directions from the be-ena such as earthquakes. tornadoes. hurri. acteristics: point of nearest approach to the site. (See canes. floods. tsunami, and seiches without l'igure i f this appendix.) III. DErINITIoNs loss Cf capabslity to perform their safety (Il A "responr.e spectrum" as a plot of the functions. It is the purpose of these criteria As used in these criteria: .The. Safe Shutdown Earthquake" de-maximum responses (acceleration, velocity I to set forth the principal seismic and geo-(a) The " magnitude" of an earthquahe is a gines that earthquake which has commonly or displacement) of a family of idealized logic considerations which guide the Com-measure of the size of an earthouahe and is been referred to as the " Design Basis Earth-single-degree-of-freedom damped oscillators mission in its evaluation of the suitability of related to the energy released in the form of 4"' e-agairst siatural frequencies (or periods) of 818 819 [nc o my e. _T-

e Port 100, App. A 10 CFR Ch. I (1-1-85 Edition) i Nuclear Regulatory Commission Port 100, App. A the oscillators to a specified vibratory plant, such as sdsmic w ave velocities. densi-in order to permit appropriate consideration or addition of fluid to the subsurface, ex-motion input at their supports. ty, water content, poran4ty and strength; of the geologic history of such faults in es-traction of minerals, or the loading effects (S) Listing of all historncally ~ reported tablishing the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. of dams or reservoirs; sv. areutaro suvrsTICAftoNs earthquakes wh6ch have affected or which For guidance in determining which faults (3) Determination of geologic evidence of. may be of significance in determining the fault offset at or near the ground surface at The geologic, seismic and engineering could reasonably be expected to have affect. characteristics of a site and its environs ed the site, including the date of occurrence Safe Shutdown Earthquake. Table I of this or near the site; thall ue investigated in sufficient scope and and the following measured or estimated appendix presents the minimum length of (4) For faults greater than 1000 feet long, detail to provide reasonable assurance that data: magnitude or highest intensity, and a l fault to be considered versus distance from any part of which is within 5 miles' of the they are sufficiently well understood to plot of the epicenter or location of highest site. Capable faults of lesser lenath than site, determination of whether these faults permit an adequate evaluation of the pro-intensity. Where historically reported s' those indicated in Table I and faults which are to be considered as capable faults; * ' posed site, and to provide sufficient infor* earthquakes could have caused a maximum are not capable faults need not be consid-(5) Listing of all historically reported mation to support the determinations re-ground acceleration of at least one-tenth ered in determining the Safe Shutdown earthquakes which can reasonably be amanci. etuired by these criteria and to permit ade-the acceleration of gravity (0.lg) at the Earthquake except where unusual circum-ated with capable faults greater than 1000 quatt engineering solutions to actual or po-t stances indicate such consideration is appro-foundations of the proposed nuclear power feet long, any part of which is within 5 - tential geologic and seismic effects at the plant structures, the acceleration or intensi-D'I*I'; miles' of the site. Including the date of oc. ,P s[n the of ata rt ne ty and duration of ground shaking at these currence and the following measured or esti-TABLE 1 nve t foundations shall also be estimated. Since mated data: magnitude or highest intensity, ta the investigations shall be determined by the nature of the region surrounding the earthquakes have been reported in terms of j and a plot of the epicenter or region of ' proposed site. The investigations shall be various parameters such as magnitude, in-innung highest intensity; carried out by a review of the pertinent ilt, tensity at a given location, and effect on l (6) Correlation of epicenters or locations s tature and field investigations and shall in, ground, structures, and people at a specific o,sunce eram wie see (meest of highest intensity of historically reported clude the steps outlined in paragraphs (a) location, some of these data may have to be o so 20 t earthquakes with capable faults greater. through (c) of this section. estimated by use of appropriate empirical Gemise em 20 no so - S than 1000 feet long. any part of which is lo-(M Required innestsgation for Fabrafory relationships. The comparative characterts-G '" 50 20 M $ cated within 5 miles'of the site: Ground Motion. The purpose of the investi-tics of the material underlying the epicen- [f5a[$ (7) For capable faults greater than 1000 g*tions required by this paragraph is to tral location or region of highest intensity feet long, any part of which is within 5 ~ obtain information needed to describe the and of the material underlying the site in r - tange or sea (meso mench snes tie consenrod miles' of the site, determination of: vibratory ground motion produced by the transmitting carthquake vibratory motion ei ensamerune sa8* Sn*8=a Ea**sk* (i)The length of the fault; Saf A Shutdown Earthquake. All of the steps shall be considered; (8) For capable faults, any part of which is (11) The relationship of the fault to region-in agr hs a ) th h a 8) of (6) Correlation of epicenters or locations within 200 miles' of the site and which may at tectonic structures; highest intensity of historically reported be of significance in establishing the Safe (111) The nature, amount, and geologic his-8u Earthquake can be clearly estab-earthquakes, where possible, with tectonic Shutdown Earthquake, determination of: tory of displacements along the fault, in. lished by investigations and determinations structures any part of which is located (i)The length of the fault; ciuding particularly the estimated amount cf a lesser scope The investigations re-wkthin 200 miles of the site. Epicenters or (11) The relationship of the fault to region. of the maximum Quaternary displacement ' quired by this paragraph provide an ade-locations of highest intensity which cannot al tectonic atructures; and related to any one carthquake along the ruste basis for selection of an Operating be reasonably correlated with tectonic struc-(111) The nature, amount, and geologic his. fault; and Basis Earthquake. The investigations shall tures shall be identified with tectonic prov-tory of displacements along the fault, in-(iv) The outer limits of the fault estab ' include the following: (1) Determination of the lithologic, strati, inces any part of which is located within 200 cluding particularly the estimated amount lished by mapping Quaternary fault traces i graphic, hydrologic, and structural geologic miles of the site; of the maximum Quaternary displacement for 10 miles along its trend in both direc-conditions of the site and the region sur. (7) For faults, any part of which is within related to any one earthquake along the tions from the point of its nearest approach rounding the site, includMg its geologic his. 200 miles 8 of the site and which may be of fault. to the site. tory; significance in establishing the Safe Shut. (b) Requered Investigation for Surface (c) Required lnt)estigation for Scismica#y (2) Identification and evaluation of tec-down Earthquake, determination of wheth. Fanffing. The purpose of the investigations Induced floods and Water Watics. (1) For tonic structures underlying the site and the er these faults are to be considered as capa-required by this paragraph is to obtain in-coastal sites, the investigations shall include. a I region surrounding the site, shether buried ble faults. " This determination is required d, formation to determine whether and to the determination of: A or Expressed at the surface. The evaluation 'I what extent the nuclear power plant need should consider the possible effects caused be designed for surface faultinr,. If the by man's activities such as withdrawal of 8 If the Safe Shutdown Earthquake can be design basis for surface faulting can be

• If the design basis for surfeee fauning i

fluid from or addition of fluid to the subsur. associated with a fault closer than 200 miles i face, extraction of minerals, or the loading to the site, the procedures of paragraphs clearly estabhshed by investigations of a can be determined from a fault closer than a lesser scope, not all of the steps in para. 5 miles to the site, the procedt.res of para-(ffects of dams or reservoirs; (ax7) and (aM8) of this section need not be graphs (bM 41 through (bM7) of this section graphs (bH4) through (bM7) of tNs section (3) Evaluation of physical evidence con. carried out for successively more remote need be carried out. The investigations shall need not be carriul out for successively cerning the behavior during prior earth. faults. include the following: mere remote faults. (uakes of the surficial geologic materials 8In the absence of absolute dating evi-(Il Determination of the Ilthologic, strati.

• In the atence c! atssolute dating. evi-and the substrata underlying the site from dence of recency of movement may be ob.

graphic. hydrologic, and structural geologie dence of recenG of mvvement may be ob-the lithologic, stratigrr.phic, and structural tained by applying relative dating technique conditions of the site and the area sur-tained be applying relative dating tech-geologic studies; to ruptured. offset, warped or otherwise j roundmg the site, including its geologic his. titoucs to itctmM esfiset, warped'or other. (4) Determination of the static and dy-structurally disturbed surface or near sur. tory; westructrally disturbed surface of near-namic engineering properties of the matert-face materials or geomorphic features. (2) Evaluation of tectonic structures ure Orf ace materials or geomorphic features. Os underlying the site. Included should be

• The applicant shall evaluate whether or derlying the site, whether buried or ex-

'The appka'nt shall evaluate whether or properties needed to determine the behavior not a fault is a capable fault with respect to pressed at the surface, with regard to their not a faun is a capable fault with respect to c.f the underlying material during earth-the characteristics outlined in paragraphs potential for causing surface displacement the characteristics outlined in paragraphs cuakes and the characteristics of the under-IlligMI) (2), and (3) by tonducting a res-at or near the site. The evaluation shall Go-Ill(6Mit. (2), and (3) by conducting a rea-lying material in transmitting earthquake-sonable investigation using suitable gaologic sider the possible effects caused by man's sonable investigation using suitable geologi-induced motions to the foundations of the and geophysical techniques. activities such as withdrawal or fluid from cat and geophysical techniques. 820 821

Port 100, App.. A 10 CFR Ch.111-185 EdifWn) Nudaar R:guloiny C:mmiulin Port 100, App. A (1) Information regarding distantly and 10-catsse the maximurm vthratory dround jn the case where a causative faldt la near power plant alth respect to capable faults ettly ger> crated waves ce tsunami whAch metion at the site abould te designated the the s&te. the effect of proxim6ty of amearth-aball be considered. The area over which hiv2 afferted or could have affected the &fe Shutdown Earthquake. The siavitsc quake on tice Epectral characteristics of the escia of these faults has caused surface lute. Available evidence regarding the runup procedures for determining the design temota safe Shutdown F.arthquake shall be takeM faulting 18: the past is identified by mapping und tirawdown assonated mth historic tsu-for vibratory ground motion are seven in the ento account. The procedurrs in paragraphs its fault traces in the viciruty of the site. nc.mi in the same coastal region as the site following paragraphs. tam 1M D through daMlHilD of this settlon "The fault traces are mapped along the trend thill clso be included. (I) Deferm e raattom of S@ Ehuhfows shall be appised in a conservative manner. of the fault for 10 miles in both directions th) bil features of coastal topographF EarfhquaAA The Hafe Shu?down hrth-The determinations carried out in accord-from the paint of its nearest approach to which might tend to modify taunamt runup quake shall be identified through evaluation ance with paragraphs (axlHan and the nuckar power plant because, for exam-or drawdown., Appropriate as a61able evi- ,,f seismic and geologir information devel-ssNIM6tD shall a.msre that the safe shut' plc. trates may be obscured along portions dence regarding historne local modifications oped pursuant to trie requirements of para-down carthquake is' tensity is..as a mini-of the fault. The maximum eldth of the in tsunamt runup or drawndown at comatal graph IVia). as follows: mum, equal to the maximum liis? 'rne eartib mapped fault traces, called the control loc 0 Dons having topography similar to that (H The biatoric earthquakes of greatest quake intensity experienced within the tec-width, la then determined from this map. of the alte shall glso be obtained, and magnitude or intenssty ahich hue teen tonic province in which the ok is located. 15ccause surface faulting has sometimes oc-thH Appropriate geologic and sdsmic evi-correlatedulth teetente htauctures punnant in the event that geological and scistnolog!' curred beyond the limit of mapped fault dence to provide information for establish' to the requirements of paragrinph t aH83 of can data warrant. the Safe Shutdown Earth-traces or where fault traces have not been in) the oesign baste for seismicstly induced section IV bhall be determined. In widition. qtaahe shall be larger than that derived by previowly recognized, the control width of floods or water waves fro n s local offshore fa espable f aulta, the attformation required me of the peucedures set forth in section IV the fault is increased by a factor which is Etrt%uake, from IWal offshore cf fc(ta of by paragratah (SMU of section IV shall also and V of the appen.t!u. The maximum vibra-dependent trpon the largest potential earth-an anshoie earthquake. or frorn cuastal,sub-be taken anto acco9nt in determinmg the WY mefef atWris of the Safe Shutdown quake related to the fault. This larger width sidence. This evidence shall be determined. earthouakes of greatest roAgnitude aclated Farthquake at each of the verfeus founda-delineates a zone called the zone requiring to the extent practical by a procedure almi' to the faults. The magnitude or hitenoty of 11o:1 inti ns M h smclear seemes pant ddailed f aultiv g investigation, in which the Ilr to that required in paragrapha (as and structures at a #ven site shad te deter-(b) of this section The probable alap enarac-earthquakes bascd on geologic ewicore ma,"y P"'8 8 mined taktnz inu secount tic chsracterM-g g;# '"" Jnimed. The following parmaraphs outline teristics of offshore f aults shall also be con-tics of the Underiytnt soit 2nalertal en trans, t ea 4e oc o eterm ng the Eldered ab well as the potential for offshore h"o fd [ mdtting the entt Munk*4nducrd motiens. at te a r u slides in subma<.'ne material. Ing that tne epirrators 08 the omrthquakes etsined pmuant to WagaMag. % on'for a cmPabic f.we-and del cf sectica IV. The Safe 6huMyun (2) For sites located near lakes and rivers,

1. st ma t y g

investigations siroilar to thcx required hu (I Easthqua me shau be definet by respouse tit Ocrermteaften of Zone Requirtsc De-a g gg relat t t e lec le taaled 'bulttrie Intystapuraost. 'Ihe zonei re-apecta corresponding to the enaximte W e paragraph icM1) of this section shall be car-si ctures are situated at tp Mnt ori W brttory arcckrattor*n as octlined en paJa. cutring ddalledisultirsg investigat%on foe a ried out, as appropriate, to determine the structures cimest m the Mtc. gtaph tak of secthn VI;. and capable fault swtilch was imestigated awsu-potential for the nuclev power plant to be (ii) Where epicenters or lorstione nf high-(v1 Whera' the ?naximuns viftettsey acc6 sht to Ptw requir? ment of paragraph (bM"l) exposed to seastnicalry traduced floods and est intensity of historically reinrted earth-erstions of the' Safe Simtdown Earcivpate of section IV nam tar determieted through unter a' ave 4 aA for emample,'frOfn the fail

• ure rturing an earthouake of an upstream quakes cannot be reasonsbly related to tec-at the foundattoN of the mucitar ' power a:m e.! the folla.wms table:

tonic structures but are tdentified pursuani piartt ettucturea are deterrntned to be lesa dam or from sli<tes of earth or dcbris into a f (("[s

1. [testro lon I w h ec o cp vrc n hic e

to re MWL50 f SnrWG if*Vf MCOKM V. SEISMIC aND Cr,otDGIC DEsICN 84sES trie alte 18 located, the accelerations at the paragtkDhs (mM& Kh thrssCgh (M Of this sec. site shall te determined E.ssumpus Wat teen,, it shs41 tre assismed that the matineum W Determinatron of Deseen Basis for Vi-(Mae eartMunkes occur at the site, vibratory acceletstaens ei the mie shut-w*i or e=way. brafory Gned Elross The design of each M Mere # centers or locations of 4he down Earthquake at these lustrdattores are 'd*P**8******** nucle r powc* plant shall take into account highest intensity of histurichHy repotted at irast e.l g. .. -- - _ -*'***8 {Q'7""W Us2 Pjotential effects Cf ribratory ground earthquakes cannot be reasonably related to 42F Ekterminatson of Opersitag bests motion caused by earttMuakes The des.lgn tectonic structures but are klentsfied pursu-EartAQuaAc. Th* Operat.tna Basis E-stth-tust $5~ i e caw nam basis for the maximum vibratcry gmtund go n%, ant to the requirementa of tratagraph (aM6) quake shall be specific 4 by the applicarst ) = rawas ert motion and the espected vibrato'ry grotind of section IV Cth lettonic provinces in after ciensidering ttle seisinology and areolo-6M5_..-._., ww s,, r s.,._ .. w.3,r.. mot.iora should be determined throGeh ev41-sbich the site ta not loca'ted, trae accelera-gy of the region sutruunding tt e site. If vi-untion of, the klimalogy, gedogy, and the tjone at thC bite shell be determened assom-bratory ground motion exceedtnt_ that of' setsmte and sectogic hisWy of the site aM it.a that the epleenters or locations of high-the Operating flasts 'Earthtu.ake occurs, Ttie tarsest me.gnitudetarrthquake retutet th) siirrounding region. The snast severe est Intensity of Civse earth' qualms are at the shutdown of the rsuclear power plant aill be to trae fautt shall be trsed in Tabte 1 ~5Ms eartbeakes assuciated with tectenac struc-csesest gaoint to the site on.the tsuundary of required. Prior to rest.tming opr%tions. ther earthenake shs18 be determined from the in-4 r turrs or tectenic prouncrs n the region sur. a rounditig the alte should te toeptified. con. the tectonic prminct; licensee 'will be required to demonstrate to formatmn dete46 ped pu'wardt to the re; sidering those historicahy rrported earth, tiv6 The earthqunt' producing the maxi-the Commission that no functional damage culvementa of paragraph thi of Section tv gudes that can be aswcasted ettt. these mum wit'ratory 'acecIvation at the site. as has occurred to those features pecessary fos for the fault, taking into accourit the infor-structure's or provinces and other relevant detes*nined frotn parmeraph 4autMD contmued operation without undue risk to mation required b.y paragraph (bWT) ci sec-facton. If faults in the regiort autruunding through Giu of this arcthn shal* be desta-the beslth and safety et' the public. 'Itun IV. The control width used in Table 3 la the site sie capable fauYta. the most severe nated the Safe Shutduwn Earthquakat for The maximum vibratory ground accelera-determined by mapping the outer Atmits of' evthqcakes associated with these faults tibratcry ground melle44, exerps, as tr>ted in t*on of the Operating, Basis Earthquake the fault traces from inforrmatwn &veloped' should be dMermincd by sbo constdvring paragraph tam 14v) of this wetion The shall be at licast une half the araximum vi-pursuant to paragraph (bM7Htyt of sect. ion .their gvologic htsterk The vibratory ground characteristics!Of tne Safe Shumwn Earth. bcatory ground acceleration of the Safe !V. The corstrol width shall be used m Table motion. t t the site should be then deter-quake shall he derived from more than one' . Shutdown Earthquake. 2 unless the characteristics of the fault are mined by assurning that the epteenters og earthquake deferrotMed it'orn twaracrash tbt Determinataos of Need Co Destas for otscured for a signif trant gwrtion of the 10 locauons of Itighest toternity of the earth- (ax!MO through @ of thts set'tson, where Sar/dce Findtsac.In order to determ'me miles on either side of the potnt of nearest guetce are situated at the point en ttte t,c. necessary to assure that the mastmcm vt. ahether a nuclear power plant.ts requAred approach to the nucle'as power plan.t. In this tonec structures or tettonic p'ovitices near-btattiry es4fleration at the mate throughcu4 to be designed to withstand the ef fects of event the use in Table 2 of the width of r tst ta the site, The ca?that3ake which cotM the fregureccy range of inttrest As include & surface f aulting, the lecetmn et the nuclear mapped fault traces more than 10 mues 822 823 o.

_ ~, 4 a ""**' E*'gude6ery Cememisessut Peri 100, App. A l $gye 100, App. A le CFA Clo 8 '(1-1-85 feHelen) on a comparabic ba.is le th&& of the nudear The arvalysis or test shall take into' ac. [ frem the point cf nearest approach to the (l') Areas of actant er poteWhat saarface or power plant, taking into account the sisteri-count soil-structure interactio7 effects and nuclear power plant may be asppropriate. subsurface soebsidence,. upalft, or ccIlapse re-at underlying the structures and the diffrt-the espected duration of vibratory molleet The mone requiring detained faulthag Lt yes-so,iting from: ent location with respect to that of tane site. It is permissible to design for strain limits in tasation. as detertnined from Table 2. shan tal Natural features such as tectonic de-escrss of yield stram 'sn 'some of these he used for the fault eseept ahere: pressions and casernous or ha,rst terrainE vs.. NrrucaTsom To pramaansac ossica safetyerelated structurea, ensems, and com- [ (1)The sone requiring sletas4ed fanatting ini paTticularly those undertata by emicareous Vibradory ground motoom-(O Sq/c pnts during the Safe Shutdown Earth-vestasation from Table 2 ts less than one-or other notuble deposits; Sh utdown Eartuvake The.tibratory quate arat under the postu: lated concurrent ! i' half mile la ' width. In this, case ithe anne (64 Wlan's activ4 ties auch as withdrawal of conditions., provided that the necessary grournd motion produced by the Safe Shut. t-)q ake shall be ochned by re. safety functions are rrraintained. } shall be at leaist one-hatt mile in w&dth; or fluid from or add 4 tion of' fluid to the subsur-f till Definitive evidence concerning the re-face, entraction of anincrats, or the loading spo ase a ectra orresponding to the maxt.

42) Opero' ting Basts Earthquate The Op-clonal and local characterist6cs of the fault effects of dams or reservoirs; and mism vibratory acceleru.ticans at the elev'a-erating Basis Earthquake shall be defined justifies use of a efferent value. I or esam-(c) Reglenal deformatiork thans of the fouradations of the nuclear by response spectra. Al.1 structures. systenas.

pie thrust or bedding-plane faults may re-

1. 1) Deformational zones such as ahears quira an increase itn skith of the zone to acw jointa, fractures, folds, or combinatnons of' power plar.L atructures determbe pursuant and cempenents of the nuclear power plant to paragraph (shl) of section V. The re.

necessary for continued operation without j count for the pro)ccLed dip of the fault these features. 69unse spectra shsJ2 4etate the' response of undue risk to the health and safety of the (lith Zoces of alterstaon or irregular the foundationa of Llie nuclear power piang pubhc shall be designed to remain function-I i plane;or j (ill) More detailed three-dimens60nal in-wekth'ering profties and Zohra of structural . structures to the vibratory ground motion, al and withm applicable stress and deforma-4 l formation such as that obtained from pre-weakness composed of crushed or disturbed consiidertnd such foundatiers to be single. tion limits when subjected to the effects of cise investigative tectmiques, rnay justify matertala. degree-of freedom damped oscillators a,nd the vibratory motion of the Operating Baats the use of a narrower zone. Possible eaam-riv) Unreheved tes6 dual stresses in bed

• nestetting soll structure lateraction effecta. Earthquake in combination with normal ope 1

pies of such techniques are the use of accu-

rock, In view of the limited data available on vi.

erating loa <1s. The engineering method used i rate records from closely spaced drill holes (v) Rocks or sacs that might be,utistable bratory ground motions of strong earth. to insure that these structures, systems, and ! or from closely spaced, high-resolution O'ff-because of their m%neralogy. lack of consoki-auakes, it usually will be appropriate that components are capable of withstanding the 1 shire geophysical surveys, dation, water cor: tent, or potentially unde'. the response spectra be smoothed design effecta of the Operating Basis Earthquake strable response to seismte or other events spectra developed from a series of response shall involve the use of either a suitable dy. ] In delineating the zone requiring detailed fl.ulting investigation for a fault, the center Seismic response characteristics te be con-spectra related to 'the vibratory motions namic analysis or a suitable qua&tfication I cf the zone shall coinckle with the center of abdered shall include liquefaction. thizotro-c$used by more than one earthquake. test to demonstrate that the tstructures, sys-the fault at the point of nearest approach py. differential consolidation, cratering, and The nuclear power plant shall be designed tems and components can withstand the c.f the fault to the nuclear power plant as ll-fissuring. 30 titat, if the Safe Shutdown Earthquake seismic and other concurrent loads, except lustrated in Figure 1.

42) Slope stabslaty. Stability of all slopes-occurs. certain structures, systems, and com-

• IB"re it can be demonstrated that the use (c) Determination e/ Design Bases for both natural and artilletat, the fatture of ponents will remain functional These strue, of an equivalent static load method provides i

Seismically Induced Floods and Water which enutd adversely affect the nuclear tures, systems, and components are those adequate conservatism. The analysis or test shall take into account soil-structure intero i 3 Wives. The size of seismically induced power plant, shall be cons.idered. An assess

• necessary to assure (i) the integrity of the I

floods and water w9ves which could affect a ment shall be made of the potential effects reactor coolant pressure boundary. (ill the action effects and the expected duration of site from either locally or distantly generat-of erosion or deposition and of combinations capabilit y to shut down the reactor and vibratory motion. ed seismic activity shall be determined, of erosion or deposition with seismic activi-maintain it in a safe cond6 tion, or (111) the (3) Required Sessmic instrumentattoss. i taking into consideration the results of the ty, taking into account information concern

• capability to prevent or mitigate the conse. Suitable instrumentation shall be provided investigation required by paragraph (c) of ing the physical property of the materials goences of accidents which could result in so that the seismic response of nuclear section lV. locat topographic characteristics underlying the site developed pursuant to potential offsite exposures comparable to power plant features important to safety trhich might tend to modify the possible paragraph (axt) (3), and 40 of section IV the guideline ex' osures of this part In addi.

can be determined promptly to permit com-1 p l runup and drawdown at the site shall be and the effects of the Safe Shutdown tie to seismic loads, including aftershocks, parison of such response with that used as 3 considered. Adverse tide conditions shall Earthquake. applicable concurrent functional and accl. the design basis. Such a comparison is ) s.lso be taken into account in determining (3) Coolina scaler supply. Assurance of dent-induced loads shall be taken into ac-needed to decide whether the plant can con-the effect of the floods and waves on the adequate cooling water supply for emergen-count in the des.lgn of these safety related tinue to be operated safely and to permit j site. The characteristics of the earthquake cy and long-term shutdown decay heat re-structures, systems, and compunents. The such timely action as may be appropriate. to be used in evaluating the offshore ef fects movat shall be considered in the design of design of the nuclear power plant shall also These criteria do not address the need for af local earthquakes shall be determined by the nuclear power plant, taking in to ac-take into account the possible effects of the instrumentation that would automatically & procedure similar to that used to deter-count information concerning the physical Safe Shutdown Earthquake on the facility shut down a nuclear power plas.t when an,' mine the characteristics of the Safe Shut-properties of the materials underlying the foundations by ground disruption. such as earthquake occurs which exceeds a prede-1 do rn Earthquake in paragraph V(a). site developed pursuant to paragraphs fissuring, differential consolidation, crater-termined intensity. The need for such in-J (d) Determination of OfAcr Dessen Condi- (aM1) (3). and (4) of section IV and the ef-ing. liquefaction, and landshding. as re-strumentation is under consideration. t frons-41) Sott Stabelsty. Vibratory ground fects of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake and quired in paragraph (d) of section V. Ib) Surface Faktling. (1) If the nuclear motion associated with the Safe Shutdown the design basis for surf ace f aulting. Consid-The engineering method used to insure power plant is to be located within the sone Earthquake can cause soll instability due to eration of river blockage or diversion or that the required safety functions are main-requiring detailed faulting investigation, a r 1 ground disruption such as fissuring, differ-other failures which may block the flow of tained during and after the vibratory detailed investigation of the regional and ential consolidation, liquefaction, and cra-cooling water, coastal uplift or subsidence. ground motion associated with the Safe local geologic and seismic characteristics of tering which is not directly related to sur-or tsunami runup and drawdown, and fail-Shutdown Earthquake shall involve the use the site shall be carried out to determine l face faulting. The following geologic fea-ure of dams and intake structures shall be of either a suitable dynamic analysis or a the need to take into account surface fault-tures which could affect the foundations of included in the evaluation, where appropri-suitable qualification test to demonstrate ing in the design of the nuclear power plant. I i the proposed nuclear power plant structures ste. that structures, systems and components Where it is determined that surface faulting i shall be evaluated. taking lato account the (4) Distant structures. Those structures can withstand the seisrr.ic and other concur-need not be taken into account sufficient information concerning the physical proper-which are not located in the immediate vi-rent loads, except where it can be demon-data to clearly justify the determination ties of materials underlying the site devel-cinity of the site but which are safety relat. strated that the use of an equivalent static shall be presented in the hcense application. ! f oped pursuant to paragraphs (aN 1). (3), and ed shall be designed to withstand the effect load method provides adequate conserv-(2) Where it is determined that surface l (4) of section IV and the effects of the Safe of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake and the atism. faulting must be taken into account, the ap-Shutdown Earthquake: design basis for surface faulting determined 825 824

10 CFR Ch. I (1-1-85 Edition) Nuclear Regulatory Commi:sion Fort 110 Port 110 sec. Sec. 11 Inf mad n c Hech n requirements: Subpart H-Pubik Natificanan end Aveifebility plicant shall, in establishing the design basis of Dme w aws for surface faulting on a site take into ac-ABAP OF QUATERNART IBACES OMB approval. 1 110.8 Last of nuclear equspment and mate-count evidence concerning the regional and real under NHC export licensing authority. 110.10 Public notice of receipt of an appti. local geologic and seismic characteristics of 04 h $f PROACH 10 cation. Q !!0.9 Iht of nucicar equipment and mate. r 110.11 Notice of withdrawal of an app!!ca-the site and from any other relevant data. rial under NRC import licensing author. a (3) The design basis for surface faulting R tion' // [NUCl[AR POWER PtANI it y. 110.12 Availability of documents in the shall be taken into account in the design of f LOCA110N part memptions Public Document Room. the nuclear power plant by providing rea. g _If a 110.13 Availabihty of NHC records. sonable assurance that in the event of such J displacement during faulting certain struc-

k. -CONTROL W10TH Of FAutt 110.10 General.

"*" * " " " ' ' " ^ * ^ " ' ' " " " * " " * ' " - 5 6aert i-r 6'i Forskipetie rre ed.res tures, systems, and components will remain %"'" n"e'n'J"*'*nd"n'!"O,y"to a Ll'i 7 gggn==a orning tkenne Appikations Subpert C-General Lkenses 2 IIME5 CONTROL WIDIH) 110.80 Basis for hearings' the integrity of the reactor coclant pressure (f- -CONT 30t WIDTH 0F IAuti 110.20 General. 110 81 W J-boundary, 00 the capability to shut down 110.21 Expert of special nuclear material. 82 110.22 Export of source material. I10'titi the reactor and maintain it in a safe shut-o r. down condition or (till the capability to pre- !!0.23 Export of byproduct material. 110.83 vent or mitigate the consequences of acci. FIGumE l-DI AGaAMM ATIC II4USTmATIoM or 110.24 Export of deuterium. 11O.84 Commission action on a hearing re. dents which could result in potential offsite 110.25 Export of nuclear grade graphite. quest or intervention petition. exposures comparable to the guideline expo. DELINEATloM or WIDTil or ZONE REQUlmINo 110.26 Export of nuclear reactor compo- !!0.85 No e of hearing consisting of writ-sures of this part. In addition to seismic DETAII.ED PAULTING INVESTIGATIONS Fon n loads, including af tershocks. applicable con. SPEC 1ric Nuct.EAa PowEm PI. ANT LOCATION. functional and accident-induced 110.86 Notice of oral hearing. loads shall be taken into account in the (Sec. 201. Pub.1. 93-438, 88 Stat.1243 (42 110.28 Embargoed destinations !!0.87 Conditions in a notice or order. current design of such safety features. The design U.S.C. 5841)) 110.29 Restricted destinations' !!0.88 Authority of the Secretary' f 38 PR 31281. Nov.13.1973. as amended at 110.89 Filing and service. provisions shall be based on an assumption that the design basis for surface faulting 38 FR 32575. Nov. 27.1973; 42 FR 2052. Jan. Subpart D-Appikations for Specific tkenses !!0.90 Computation of time' ons Commission consultaLi can occur in any direction and azimuth and 10.1977] !!0.30 Filing license applications. 110.91 I under any part of the nuclear power plant N. an Ihall ake into PART 110-EXPORT AND IMPORT OF licatIns** se6 o,,3 _ ges,i,gs P NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATE-oun n sppr p I the estimated rate at which the surface Subpert E-geview of License Appiketiens !!0.101 FHing and servic' e. RIAL 110.102 IIcaring docket. faulting may occur. (c) Scismically Induced Floods and Wafer 110.40 Commission review. 110.103 Acceptance of hearing documents. Waves and OtAcr Design Conditions. The Swbrert A-General Provisions 110.41 Executive Branch review. 110.104 Presiding officer. design basis for seismically induced floods 110.42 Export licensing criteria. 110.105 Responsibility and power of the Sec. 110.43 Physical security standards. presiding officer in an oral hearing. and water waves from either locally or dis-110.1 Purpose and scope. 110.44 Issuance or denial of licenses. tantly generated seismic activity and other I10.106 Participation in a hearing, !!0.2 DefinitionL I10.45 Conduct resulting in termination of design conditions determined pursuant to !!0.101 Presentation of testimony in er 110.3 Interpretations. nuclear exports. oral hearing. paragraphs (c) and (d) of section V. shall be !!0.4 Inquiries. 110.108 Appearance in an oral hearing. taken into account in the design of the nu-110.5 License requirements. Subpert F-License Terms and gelated 110.109 Motions and requests. clear power plant so as to prevent undue !!0.6 Retransfers. Provisions 110.110 Default. risk to the health and safety of the public. 110.111 Walver of a rule or regulation. 110.50 Terms. 110.51 Amendment and renewal of licenses. 110.112 Reporter and transcript for an ora !!0.52 Revocation suspension, and modift. hearing. !!0.113 Commission action. cation. 110 53 United States address, records, and Subpert K-5pecial Procedures for Clessified inspections. information in Hearings Subpart G-Violations and Enforcement 110.120 Purpose and scope. 110.121 Security clearances and jaccess t< !!0.60 Violations. classified information. 110 61 Notice of violation. 110.122 Classification assistance. 110.62 Order to show cause. 110.63 Order for revocation, suspension, or 110.123 Notice of intent to introduce class fled information. modification. 110.124 Rearrangement or suspension of 110.64 Civil penalty. 110.65 Settlement and compromise. hearing. 110.66 Enforcement hearing. 110.125 Unclassified statements required. 827 826

NU REG-0800 (Ferm:rly NUREG 75/087) q aw n ....I

• e.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOW i W ! STAN DARD REVIEW PLAN

• W/ a OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION N.v...f 2.5.1 BASIC GEOLOGIC AND SEISMIC INFORMATION REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES I

Primary - Geosciences Branch (GB) r Secondary - None l I. AREAS OF REVIEW GB reviews the geologic and seismic information submitted irl the applicant's safety analysis report (SAR). The principal regulation used by GB in determining the scope and adequacy of the submitted geologic and seismologic information is Appendix A to j 10 CFR Part 100, " Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" (Ref. 3). Additional guidance (regulations and regulatory guides) is provided to the GB through References 1, 2, 4, and 5. GB judges the adequacy of the geologic and seismic information cited in support of the applicant's conclusions concerning the suitability of the plant site. The GB will coordinate other branch evaluations that interface with the geologic and seismologic aspects of the site as follows: Hydrologic and'Geotechnical Engineering Branch (HGEB) will determine the adequacy of the hydrologic and geotechnical engineering information cited in support of the applicant's conclusions concerning the suitability of the plant site as part of HGEB's primary review responsibilities for SRP Sections 2.4, 2.5.4, and 2.5.5. For example, as part of its primary review responsibility, the HGEB reviews the adequacy of the applicant's model describing the present and projected use of local and regional groundwater resources. Assessment of this hydrologic information by the HGEB is essential to the GB in making its determination, for example, where appli-cable, of the subsidence potential of the site environs. An additional pr,imary review responsibility for the HGEB consists in'some cases of the verification, through investigations and testing conducted by the applicant, of the preloading history of the plant's soil foundations by means of glacial and other geologic pro-cesses. The applicant's information describing the above process is contained in SRP Section 2.5.4. The HGEB, as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 2.5.4, reviews the information presented by the applicant concerning the soil and rock properties which may affect the nuclear power plant facilities. This HGEB coordination is required in those cases where verification of geologic processes affecting the site can be determined through various testing tr:ethodologies. Rev. ? .luly 19Al USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN Standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff respons.ible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the public as piart of the i Commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures snd po:icp. Standard review l plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance w 'h ther i E, not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Repotse for Nudear Po<rer Plants. Not all sections of the standard Format have a corresponding review plan. Published standard review plans will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect Nrw informa-tion and experience. Comments and suggestions for isnprovement will be considered and should be sent to the u.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Washington, D.C. 20565. i i l

For those areas of review identified above as being reviewed as part of the primary responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria necessary for the review and their methods of application are contained in the referenced SRP section of the corresponding primary branch. The geologic and seismic information which must be provided in order for the site review to proceed is divided into the following three categories: 1. Geologic features: mass-wasting, differential subsidence, faulting, chemical weathering, cavernous or karst terrains, evidence of pre-consolidation, for example, by means of overburden removal through erosional processes. 2. Seismic features: ground fai'ure under dynamic iciding, liquefaction, vibratory ground motion, tsunami, and residual stresses. 3. Man-made conditions: changes in groundwater conditions, subsidence or collapse caused by withdrawal of fluids or mineral extraction, induced seismicity and fault movement caused by fluid. injection (including reser-voir impoundment) or withdrawal. Information relating to the above conditions as presented in SAR Sections 2.5.1.1 (Regional Geology) and 2.5.1.2 (Site Geology), should be reviewed in terms of the regional and site physiography, geomorphology, stratigraphy, lithology, and tectonics. In addition, with specific reference to site geology, the follow-ing subjects should be revieweri as they relate to the above-mentioned conditions: topography, slope stability, fluid injection or withdrawal, mineral extraction, faulting, shearing, jointing, seismicity and fracturing. The above information should be documented by appropriate references to all relevant published and unpublished matertals. Illustration should include but should not be limited to physiographic, topographic, geologic, tectonic, gravity, and magnetic maps, structure and stratigraphic sections, boring logs, and aerial photographs. Certain sites will require illustrations of specialized character such as maps of subsidence, irregular weathering conditions, landslide potential, hydrocarbon extraction (oil or gas wells), faults, joints, and karst features. Some site characteristics must be documented by reference to seismic reflection or refraction profiles or to maps produced by various remote sensing techniques. As appropriate, maps should include a superimposed plot plan of the plant facili-ties. Other documentation should show the relationship of all seismic Category I facili'.ies (clearly identified) to subsurface geology. Core boring logs, logs and meps of trenches, aerial photographs, Landsat imagery, and geophysical data l Should be presented for evaluation. In addition, a plot plan showing the locations of all plant structures, borings, trenches, profiles, etc. should be l included. The review can be brought to an earlier conclusion if the following suggestions are followed by the applicant. The SAR should contain sufficient data to allow the reviewer to make an independent assessment of the applicant's conclusions. That is, the reviewer should be led in a logical manner from the data and pre-t mises given to the conclusions that are drawn without having to make an exten-i sive independent literature search. Controversial information should not be e ignored so as to enhance a particular position. The geologic terminology used should conform to standard reference works (Refs. 6, 11). Finally, the objective of Section 2.5.1 of the SAR is to describe geologic and seismic features as ~

r 2.5.1-2 Rev. 2 - July 1981 E

they affect the site under' review, an'd all data, information, discussions, interpretations, and conclusions should be. directed to this objective. Aimless presentation of data, although it may appear to satisfy the investigative require-ments, will result in a disjointed SAR and cause needless delays in completing the safety review. II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA The applicable rules and basic acceptance criteria pertinent to the areas of this section of the SRP are given below: 1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" Generai Design Criterion 2 " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena" - This criterion requires that safety-related portions of the structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety function (Ref.1). 2. 10 CFR Part 100, " Reactor Site Criteria" - This part describes criteria which guide the evaluation of the suitability of proposed sites for nuclear power and testing reactors (Ref. 2). 3. 10 CFR Part 100, Aopendix A, " Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Pcwer Plants" - These criteria oescribe the nature of the investiga-tions required to cotain the geologic and seismic data necessary to deter-mine site suitability and identifies geologic and seismic factors required to be taken into account in the siting and design of nuclear power plants (Ref. 3). The following regulatory guides provide information, recommendations, and guidance and in general. describe a basis acceptable to the staff for imple-menting the requirements of GDC 2, Part 100, and Appendix A to Part 100. a. Regulatory Guide 1.132, " Site Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear Power Plants" - This guide describes, programs of site investigations related to geotechnical aspects that would normally meet the needs for evaluating the safety of the site from the standpoint of the per-formance of foundations and earthquakes under anticipated loading conditions including earthquake. It provides general guidance and recommendations for developing site-specific investigation programs as well as specific guidance for conducting subsurface investigations, the spacing and depth of borings and sampling (Ref. 4). b. Regulatory Guide 4.7, " General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations" - Tnis guide discusses the major site characteristics related to public health and safety which the NRC staff considers in determining the suitability of sites for nuclear power stations (Ref. 5). The information presented in the SAR must be complete and thoroughly documented, and must be consistent with the requirements of Reference 3 and should conform to the format suggested in Refererice 12. Information from varied sources, including the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and other Federal or State agency published and open file papers, maps, aerial photographs, geophysical data, etc., and similar data from nongovernmental sources covering the region l 2.5.1-3 Rev. 2 - July 1981 e a

1 in which the site is located, are used to establish the staff's conclusions as to the completeness and acceptability of the SAR. Specific criteria necessary to meet the relevant requirements of GDC 2, Part 100 and Appendix A to Part 100 are as follows: Subsection 2.5.1.1, " Regional Geology." In meeting the requirements of References 1, 2, and 3, the subsection will be considered acceptable if a com-plete and documented discussion is presented of all geologic, seismic, and man-made features. This subsection should contain a review of the regional physiog-raphy, geomorphology, stratigraphy, structure, and geologic history to provide a framework within which the geologic, seismic and man-made features of safety significance to the site can be evaluated. Subsection 2.5.1.2, " Site Geology." In meeting the requirements of References 1, 2, and 3 and the regulatory positions of References 4 and 5, the subsection will be judged acceptable if it contains a description and evaluation of site-related geologic features, seismic conditions, and man-made conditions which may represent a potential hazard to the site. This subsection should also l contain the following general site information: 1. The site stratigraphy, including relationship to and correlation with the regional stratigraphy. 2. The structural geology of the site and the relationship of site structure to regional tectonics. 3. The geologic history of the site as it relates to the regional geologic history. 4. The engineering significance of geologic features underlying the site as they relate to: Dynamic behavior during prior earthquakes. a. b. Zones of alteration, irregular weathering, or zones of structural weakness. c. Unrelieved residual stresses in bedrock. d. Materials that could be unstable because of their mineralogy or unstable physical properties. e. Effects of man's activities in the area. 5. The site groundwater conditions. III. REVIEW PROCECURES The staff review is conducted in three phases. The first phase is the accept-ance review, a brief review of the SAR to evaluate its completeness and to i identify obvious safety issues that could result in delays at subsequent stages of the review. After an SAR is docketed, the staff conducts a thorough review of the material. In this second phase of the review an effort is made to identify 2.5.1-4 Rev. 2 - July 1981

i I I all safety issues. The reviewer carefully examines the SAR to see that all interpretations are founded on sound geological *and seismological practice and do not exceed the limits of validity of the applicant's data or of other data i published in the literature. As necessary, questions and comments transmitted I i to the applicant will identify issues that have not been addressed, areas wnere staff interpretations differ from those given in the SAR, and issues that have i not been sufficiently documented to permit the staff to concur in the conclusions reached by the applicant. When possible, the staff takes positions on safety-l related issues at this point. The third review phase is the staff evaluation of the applicant's responses to questions raised in the second phase. At the i end of the third phase, the staff takes positions on all safety-ralated issues, either concurring with the applicant's positions or taking more conservative positions as may be necessary in the staff's view to assure the required degree of safety, Pertinent references, such as published geological reports, professional papers, i j open-file material, university theses, physiographic and geological maps, and aeromagnetic and gravity maps, are ordered from the appropriate sources and reviewed. The general references used extensively by the staff are R'eferences 6, 7, and 11. GeoRef data base (Ref. 9) and other data bases, such as l References 8 and 10, are used to identify specific references. I The judgments on acceptance or rejection of the SAR for review are governed by two criteria: (1) adherence to the Standard Format (Ref. 12) in identifying l and describing the geologic, seismic and man-made features that affect safety of the site; and (2) provision of adequate information and documentation to allow for an independent staff review of the conclusions made therein. l During the acceptance review the staff decides to what extent consultants should l be involved. The necessary informatiori is then made available to these consult-l ants. Consultants are asked to handle such varied tasks as reviewing the tec- ] tonic setting of plants in regions of complex geology, evaluation of the poten-tial for surface displacement, verifying an applicant's mineral identifications, or providing advice on the proper level of earthquake ground motion (response spectrum) to be used (based on state-of-the-art studies) in the seismic evaluation ] of selected sites. ] After docketing, a detailed review of the SAR and relevant references is con-i ducted by the staff and its advisors. Questions and comments are developed frcm items that have not been adequately addressed by the applicant, those which become apparent during the detailed review, or those which develop from J the additional information provided as a result of the acceptance review. These questions (Q-1) usually require the applicant to conduct additional investiga-tions or to supply clarifying information. Many questions result from the i reviewer's discovery of references not cited by the applicant that contain con-clusions which are in conflict with those mada by the applicant. When the i a;;plicant provides insufficient data to support his interpretations and conclu-l sions, and there are reasonable and more conservative alternative interpreta-tions in the literature, the staff will request additional investigations. This phase of the review will usually involve meetings with the applicant to i clarify questions and allow him to present new data. In addition, during the Q-1 phase of the construction permit review, the staff visits the site. l l The applicant's responses to Q-1 questions are reviewed and any remaining issues are settled either by additional questions (Q-2) or by staff positions (RSP). i I i 2.5.1-5 'Rev. 2 - July 1981 r

A staff position is usually in the form of a requirement to design for a specific i condition in a way which the staff considers to be sufficiently conservative and consistent with the requisites of Reference 3. When all safety issues have l been resolved, the staff provides its input to the safety evaluation report (SER). IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS If the evaluation by the staff, on completion of the review of the geologic and seismologic aspects of the plant site and region, confirms that the applicant has met the requirements of applicable portions of References 1, 2, and 3 and the guidelines contained in References 4 and 5, the conclusion in the SER states that the information provided and investigations performed support the applicant's conclusions regarding the geologic and seismic integrity of the proposed nuclear power plant site. Staff reservations about any significant deficiency presented in the applicant's SAR are stated in sufficient detail to make clear the precise nature of concern. The above evaluation determinations are made by the staff during both the construction permit (CP) and operating license (OL) phases of review. Operating license (OL) applications are reviewed for any new information devel-oped subsequent to the construction permit (CP) safety evaluation report (SER). The review will also determine whether the CP recommendations have been implemented. A typical OL-stage finding for this section of the SER follows: In our review of the geologic and seismologic aspects of the plant we have considered pertinent information gathered since our initial geologic and seismologic review which was made in conjunction with the issuance of the construction permit. This new information includes data gained from both site and near-site investigations as well as from a review of recently published literature. As a result of our recent review of the geologic and seismologic information, we have determined that our earlier conclusion regarding the safety of the plant from a geological and seismological standpoint remains valid. These conclusions can be summarized as follows: (1) Geologic and seismologic investigations and information provided by the applicant and required by Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 provide an adequate basis to establish that no capable faults exist in the plant site area which would cause earthquakes to be centered there. (2) No evidence has been found to indicate that a potential exists for surface faulting at the plant. (3) The acceleration level 0.25g proposed for the safe shutdown earth-quake is the appropriate acceleration level used to anchor a Regulatory Guide 1.50 spectra for the seismic design of the plant in conformance with Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100. (4) The potential for detrimental subsidence (resulting from the near-site extraction of groundwater) affecting the proposed nuclear plant is considered nonexistent. 2.5.1-6 Rev. 2 - July 1981 r

The new information reviewed for the proposed nuclean power plant is-discussed in Sections,2.5.1, 2.5.2,.and 2.5.3 below. The staff concluded that the site is acceptable from a geologic and seismologic standpoint and meets the requirements of (1) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A (General Design Criterion 2), (2) 10 CFR Part 100, and (3) 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. This conclusion is based on the following: 1. The applicant has met the requirements of: a. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A (General Design Criterion 2) with respect to protection against natural phenomena such as earthquakes, faulting, and collapse. b. 10 CFR Part 100 (Reactor Site Criteria) with respect to the identification of physical characteristics such as geology and seismology used in determining the suitability of the site. c. 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A (Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants) with respect to obtaining the geologic and seismic information necessary to determine (1) site suitability, and (2) to determine the appropriate design of the plant. In complying with this regulation the applicant also meets the staff's guidance described in Regulatory Guide 1.132 (Site Investigations for Founda-tions of Nuclear Power Plants) and Regulatory Guide 4.7 (General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations). V. IMPLEMENTATION The following is intended to provide guidance to applicants and licensees regard-ing the NRC staff's plans for using this SRP section. Except in those cases in which the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the method described herein will be used by the staff in its evaluation of confo.mance with Commission regulations. Implementation schedules for conformance to parts of the method discussed herein are contained in the referenced regulatory guides. VI. REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena." 2. 10 CFR Part 100, " Reactor Site Criteria." 3. 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, " Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants." 4. Regulatory Guide 1.132, " Site Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear Power Plants." 2.5.1-7 Rev. 2 - July 1981 r

5. Regulatory Guide 4.7, " General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power l Stations." l 6. R. L. Bates and J. Jackson, eds., " Glossary of Geology," Second Edition, i American Geological Institute, Falls Church, Virginia (1980). I 7. G. V. Cohee (Chairman) et al., " Tectonic Map of the United States," U.S. Geological Survey and American Association of Petroleum Geologists (1962). 8. American Petroleum Institute data bas.e, accessible through RECON system. 9. GeoRef data base, American Geological Institute, Falls Church, Virginia. 10. RECON / Energy data base, Department of Energy. 11. A. L. Odom and R. D. Hatcher, Jr., "A Characterization of Faults in the Appalachian Foldbelt," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-1621 (1980). 12. Regulatory Guide 1.70, " Standard Format and Content of Safety Ana' lysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants." l I I l t i i i 1 [ 2.5.1-8 Rev. 2 - July 1981 ,___,,,_m

NU R EG-0800 (F:rm:rly NUREG.75/0871 /p no wa \\ U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (JM$) STANDARD REVIEW PLAN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION g u-...../ b 2.5.2 VIBRATORY GROUND MOTION REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Geosciences Branch (GB) Secondary - None I. AREAS OF REVIEW The GB review covers the seismological and geological investigations carried out to I establish the acceleration for seismic design of the plant, the procedures and analyses used by the applicant to determine the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and the operating basis earthquake (OBE) for the site, and the seismic design bases for foundations. The principal regulation used by GB in determining the scope and acequacy of the submitted seismologic and geologic information and attendant proce-dures ano analyses is Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100, " Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" (Ref. 3). Additional guidance (regulations, regulatory guides, and reports) is provided to GB through References 1, 2 and 4 through 9. Specific areas of review include: seismicity (Subsection 2.5.2.1), geologic and tectonic characteristics of the site and region (Subsection 2.5.2.2), correlation of earthquake activity with geologic structure or tectonic provinces (Sub-section 2.5.2.3), maximum earthquake potential (Subsection 2.5.2.4), seismic wave transmission characteristics of tne site (Subsection 2.5.2.5), safe shutdown earth-quake (Subsection 2.5.2.6), and operating basis earthquake (Subsection 2.5.2.7). II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA The applicable regulations (Refs.1, 2, 3) and regulatory guides (Refs. 4, 5, 6) and basic acceptance criteria pertinent to the areas of this section of the Standard Review Plan are: Rev. 1 - July 1981 USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN standard review plans are prepared f or the guidance of the ofUce of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the public as part of the Commiss.on's pol;ct to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. standard review plans see not suestitutes for regu!atory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them is not reowired. The standard review plan sections are lieved to the st6ndard Format and Content of safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants-Not all sections of the standard Format have a corresponding review plan. Published standard review plans will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new informa-tion and experience. comments and suggestions for improvement will be considered and should be sent to the u.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. office of Nwc' ear Reactor Regulation. Washington, o.C. 20566. r

l i 1 1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants"; General Design Criterion 2 " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena." l This criterion requires that safety-related portions of the structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand l the effects of earthquakes, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions (Ref.1). i l* 2. 10 CFR Part 100, " Reactor Site Criteria." This part describes criteria which guide the evaluation of the suitability of proposed sites for j nuclear power and testing reactors (Ref. 2). i ] 3. 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, " Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for l Nuclear Power Plants." These criteria describe the nature of the investi-I gations required to obtain the geologic and seismic data necessary to determine site suitability and identifies geologic and seismic factors s required to be taken into account in the siting and design of nuclear power plants (Ref. 3). 1 I 4 Regulatory Guide 1.132, " Site Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear Power Plants." This guide describes programs of site investigations related to geotechnical aspects that would normally meet the needs for evaluating the safety of the site from the standpoint of the performance .of fcundations under anticipated loading conditions including earthquake. It provides general guidance and recommendations for developing site-specific investigation programs as well as specific guidance for conducting subsurface investigations, including the spacing and depth of borings as i l well as sampling intervals (Ref. 4). i 5. Regulatory Guide 4.7, " General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power i Stations." This guide discusses the major site characteristics related to public-health and Safety which the NRC staff considers in determining I the suitability of sites for nuclear power stations (Ref. 5). } 6. Regulatory Guide 1.60, " Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear j Power Plants." This guide gives a method acceptable to the NRC staff for defining the response spectra corresponding to the expected maximum ground acceleration (Ref. 6). l The primary required investigations are described in 10 CFR Part 100, Section IV(a) of Appendix A (Ref. 3). The acceptable procedures for determining the seismic design bases are given in Section V(a) and Section VI(a) of the appendix. The seismic design bases are predicated on a reasonable, conservative determination of the safe shutdown earthquake and the operating basis earthquake. As defined in Section III of 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A (Ref. 3), the SSE and OBE are l j based on consideration of the regional and local geology and seismology and l on the characteristics of the subsurface materials at the site and are described l j in terms of the vibratory ground motion which they would produce at the site. No comprehensive definitive rules can be promulgated regarding the investigations needed to establish the seismic design bases; the requirements vary from site to site. l 2.5.2-2 Rev. 1 - July 1981 i ,.---,,w -e 7--.-,m-...v,,,,. -w.~n um.,...,w,, -.v,-m.-.--- __m.,m,.m .,--y .-e-,-w- ,w m -n r_

l 1 i Subsection 2.5.2.1, " Seismicity." In meeting the requirement of Reference 3, this subsection is accepted when the complete historical record of earthcuakes in the region is listed and when all available parameters are given for each earthquake in the historical record. The listing should include all earth-i quakes having MM intensity greater than IV or magnitude greater than 3 which have been reported in all tectonic provinces any parts of which are within 200 miles of the site. A regional-scale map should be presented showing all listed earthquake epicenters and, in areas of high seismicity, should be l supplemented by a larger-scale map showing earthquake epicenters of all known j events within 50 miles of the site. The following information concerning each j earthquake is required whenever it is available: epicenter coordinates, depth of focus, origin time, highest intensity, magnitude, seismic moment, source mechanism, source dimensions, source rise time, rupture velocity, total disloca-tion, fractional stress drop, and any strong-motion recordings; references from which the specified information was obtained should be identified. All magnitude designations such as m, M(, M, etc., should be identified. In j b s l addition, any reported earthquake-induced geologic failure, such as liquefac-tion, landsliding, landspreading, and lurching should be described completely, including the level of strong motion which induced failure and the physical l properties of the materials. The completeness of the earthquake history of tne region is oecermined oy comparison to the historical earthquake data (HED) file (Ref.10) and other published sources of information (e.g., Refs.11 througn 14). When conflicting descriptions of individual earthquakes are , founc in the published references, GB shall evaluate which is appropriate for l licensing decisions. t i Subsection 2.5.2.2, " Geologic and Tectonic Characteristics of Site and Region." In meeting the requirements of References 1, 2, and 3, this subsection is accepted when all regional geologic structures and tectonic activity which are { significant in determining the earthquake potential of the region are identi-j fied. Information presented in Section 2.5.1 of the applicant's safety i analysis report (SAR) and information from o'ther literature sources (e.g., Refs. 9, and 15 through 19) dealing with regional tectonics should be l developed into a coherent, well-documented discussion to be used as the basis l { for determining tectonic provinces and the earthquake generating potential of l the identified geologic structures. Specifically, each tectonic province, any l part of which is within 200 miles of the site, must be identified. Those characteristics of geologic structure, tectonic history, present and past i stress regimes, and seismicity which distinguish the various tectonic pro-vinces and the particular areas within those provinces where historical earth-ouakes have occurred should be described. Alternative regional tectonic mocels from available literature sources should be discussed. When several of the alternative models conform equally well with the observed pnenomena, the model which results in the more conservative assessment of the earthquake i potential at the site is accepted. In addition, in those area where there are capable faults, the results of the additional investigative requirements + ~ described in 10 CFR oart 100, Appendix A, Section IV(a)(8) (Ref. 3), must be presented. The discussion should be augmented by a regional-scale map showing the tectonic provinces, earthquake epicenters, locations of geologic structures and other features which characterize the provinces, and the locations of any capable faults. I j a ) 2.5.2-3 Rev. 1 - July 1981 i ) i { . -. ~

Subsection 2.5.2.3,"CorrelationofEarthduakeActivitywithGeologicStructure 2 or Tectonic Provinces." In meeting the requirements of Reference 3, acceptance of this subsection is based on the development of the relationship between the .l relatively short history of earthquake activity and the geologic structures or tectonic provinces of a region. The applicant's presentation is accepted when the earthquakes discussed in Subsection 2.5.2.1 of the SAR are shown to be ) associated with either geologic structure or a tectonic province. Whenever an earthquake epicenter or concentration of earthquake epicenters can be reasonably i correlated with geologic structures, the rationale for the association should l be developed considering the properties of the geologic structure and the 1 regional tectonic model. The discussion should include identification of the methods used to locate the earthquake epicenters, an estimate of their accuracy, and a detailed account which compares and contrasts the geologic structure involved in the earthquake activity with other areas within the tectonic j province. Particular attention should be given to determining the capability j of faults with which instrumentally-located earthquake epicenters are associated. The applicant may choose to define tectonic provinces to correspond to subdivi-j i sions generally accepted in the literature. A subdivision of a tectonic i province is accepted if it can be corroborated on the basis of detailed seis-micity studies, tectonic flux measurements, contrasting structural fabric, l different geologic history, differences in stress regime, etc. If detailed i' investigations reveal no significant differences between areas within a tectonic ] province, the areas should be considered to compose a single tectonic province. 4 The presentation should be augmented by a regional-scale map showing the I tectonic provinces, the earthquake epicenters, and the locations of geologic structures and measurements used to define provinces. Acceptance of the proposed tectonic provinces is based on the staff's independent review of the seismicity, tectonic flux (Ref. 39), geologic structure, and stress regime in l l the region of the site. i Subsection 2.5.2.4, " Maximum Earthquake Potential." In meeting the requirements of Reference 3, this subsection is accepted when the vibratory ground motion I due to the maximum credible earthquake associated with each geologic structure j or the maximum historic earthquake associated with each tectonic province has been assessed and when the earthquake which would produce the maximum vibratory l grou7d motion at the site has been determined. Earthquakes associated with each geologic structure or tectonic province must be identified. Where an earthquake is associated with geologic structure, the maximum earthquake which ,i could occur on that structure should be evaluated, taking into account such factors as the type of the faulting, fault length, fault displacement, fault ] slip rate, and earthquake history (e.g., Refs. 21,22,23,42). In order to determine the maximum earthquake that could occur on those faults which are shown or assumed to be capable, the staff accepts conservative values based on historic experience in the region and specific considerations of the earthquake history, sense of movement, and geologic history of movement on the faults. Where the earthquakes are associated with a tectonic province, the largest historical earthquake within the province should be identified and, wnenever possible, a probabilistic' estimate of the earthquake return i period should be made. Isoseismal maps should also be presented for the most l significant earthquakes. The ground motion at the site should be evaluated i assuming seismic energy transmission effects are constant over the region of I i ] 2.5.2-4 Rev. 1 - July 1981 i l l - - -..- - - -,,.----- -..~,, n. _ - - - - - ~,. - - -, - -

the site and assuming that the largest earthquake associated with each geologic structure or with each tectonic province occurs at the point of closest approach of the structure or province to the site. The set of conditions describing the occurrence of the earthquake which would produce the most severe vibratory ground motion at the site should be defined. If different potential earthquakes would produce the maximum ground motion in different frequency bands, the conditions describing all such earthquakes should be specified. The description of the potential earthquake occurrence is to include the maximum intensity or magnitude and the distance from the assumed location of the potential earthquake to the site. The staff indepen-dently evaluates the effects on site ground motion of the largest earthquake associated with each geologic structure or tectonic province. Acceptance of the description of the potential earthquake which would produce the largest ground motion at the site is based on the staff's independent analysis. Subsection 2.5.2.5, " Seismic Wave Transmission Characteristics of the Site." In meeting the requirements of Reference 3, this subsection is accepted when the seismic wave transmission characteristics (amplification or deamplification) of the materials overlying bedrock at the site are described as a function of the significant frequencies. The following material properties should be determined for each stratum uncer the site: seismic compressional and shear wave velocities, bulk densities, soil index properties and classification, shear modulus and damping variations with strain level, and water table eleva-tion and its variation. In each case, methods used to determine the properties should be described or a cross-reference should be given indicating where in the SAR the description is provided. For each set of conditions describing the occurrence of the maximum potential earthquake, determined in Subsection 2.5.2.4, the type of seismic waves producing the maximum ground motion and the significant frequencies must be determined. For each set of conditions an analysis should be performed to determine the effects of transmission in the site material for the identified seismic wave types in the significant frequency bands. Where horizontal shear waves produce the maximum ground motion, an analysis similar to that of Schnabel et al. (Ref. 24) is appropriate. Where compres-l sional or surface waves produce the maximum ground motion, other methods of analysis (Refs. 25, 26) may be more appropriate. However, since the techniques are still in the developmental state-of-the art stage and no generally agreed-on procedures can be promulgated at this time, the staff must use discretion in reviewing any method of analysis. The site amplification determined in this way should be compared with characteristics of site amplification in the epicentral area of the historical earthquake used as a basis for each maximum potential earthquake. If detailed soils investigations have been made in the epicentral area, the amplification analysis should be based on these. Because detailed' geologic investigations are generally not available for the epicentral areas of historical earthquakes, several factors should be considered in assessing amplification ef fects there, including: regional geology and soil conditions, earthquake isoseismal maps, and descriptions of earthquake effects. l 2.5.2-5 Rev.1 - July 1981 ?

I Subsection 2.5.2.6, " Safe Shutdown Earthquake." Ir. meeting the requirements of Reference 3, this subsection is accepted when the vibratory ground motion specified for the safe shutdown earthquake is described in terms of the level of acceleration for seismic design and its time history and is as conservative as that which would result at the site from the maximum credible earthquake l (determined in Subsection 2.5.2.4) and considering the variations in site transmission effects (determined in Subsection 2.5.2.5). If several different maximum potential earthquakes produce the largest ground motions in different frequency bands (as noted in Subsection 2.5.2.4), the vibratory ground motion specified for the SSE must be as conservative in each frequency band as that for each earthquake, including site transmission effects (as noted in Subsection 2.5.2.5). The amplitude and variation of acceleration at the ground surface, the effective 4 frequency range, and the duration corresponding to each maximum potentia 1 ] earthquake must be identified. The acceleration is to be expressed as a j fraction of the acceleration of gravity (g). Where the earthquake has been associated with a specific geologic structure, the acceleration should be s i determineo using a relation between acceleration, magnitude or fault length j and distance from the fault (cf. Refs. 20, 23). Where the earthquake has been l associated witn a tectonic province, the acceleration should be determined using appropriate relations between acceleration, intensity, epicentral inten-sity, and distance (e.g., Refs. 27, 28, 29, 32, 42). l 1 ~ ~ Numerous correlations between intensity and acceleration are given in the literature (Refs. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 41,, 42); several of them are considered l acceptable by the staff. The correlation used is accepted'if it is conservative when compared to the actual observational data. Acceptance is based on an analysis of the site's seismic energy transmission properties (Ref. 24, or j equivalent). Conservatism should be assessed based on consideration of the amplification analysis and in comparison with the actual published data. The staff will generally accept an acceleration for seismic design as being conserva-tive if, when applied at the ground surface, it results in a value at the foundation free field level as large as would be obtained from the empirical relation of the mean of the intensity acceleration values in Reference 31. [ Available ground motion time histories for earthquakes of comparable values of magnitude, epicentral distance, acceleration level, and site conditions should be presented (Ref. 40). The spectral content for each potential maximum earthquake should be described; it should be based on consideration of the available ground motion time histories and regional characteristics of seismic wave transmission. The dominant frequency associated with the peak acceleration should be determined either from analysis of ground motion time histories or by inference from descriptions of earthquake phenomenology, damage reports, and regional characteristics of seismic wave transmission. In some cases, the peak acceleration may not be as significant for engineering design purposes as a sustained acceleration at a lower level. One situation where the sustained acceleration level may differ from the peak acceleration is in proximity to the causative fault of the earthquake. It is appropriate in such cases to define the " reference acceleration for seismic design" as representative of the level of sustained acceleration. The " reference accelera-tion for seismic design" determined in this section of the applicant's SAR is 2.5.2-6 Rev. 1 - July 1981

taken to be the high frequency asymptote to the design response spectrum defined in Reference 6. At this time, the staff is not aware of any published l relations between earthquake intensity or magnitude and sustained acceleration. Such relations could be developed from analyses of the response spectra of accelerograph time histories in those areas where magnitude and intensity measurements are also available. In lieu of such studies, the peak accelerations are considered to represent conservative reference accelerations for seismic design. Lower levels of reference acceleration may be justified on a site specific basis. The staff's review of proposed' reference accelerations for seismic design considers: the proximity of the site to the geologic structure or province with which the potential earthquake is associated, characteristics of accelera-tion time histories at epicentral distances similar to that of the potential SSE, results of time-dependent spectral analyses of such time histories (cf. Refs. 33, 34, 35), the level and dominant frequency of the peak acceleration, j and seismic wave amplitude attenuation as a result of transmission.from the source to the site and in the material underlying the site. The free field response spectrum is reviewed by GB. The Structural Engineering Branch (SEB) reviews the design response spectrum under Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.7.1. In general, the response spectrum is acceptable if it is as conservative as the response spectrum from each of the potential earthquakes as described above. The time duration of strong ground motion is required for analysis of site foundation liquefaction potential and for design of many plant components. j The adequacy of the time history for structural analysis is reviewed by SEB under SRP Section 3.7.1. The time history is reviewed in this SRP section to confirm that it is compatible with the seismological and geological conditions in the site vicinity and with the accepted SSE model. At present, there is no truly adequate model for deterministically computing the time history of strong ground motion from a given source-site configuration. It is recognized that advances in this technology are being made. It is therefore acceptable to consider an ensemble of ground motion time histories from earth-quakes with similar size, site-source characteristics and spectral characteristics or results of a statistical analysis of such an ensemble. Total duration of the motion is acceptacle when (1) it is as conservative as values determined using the procedure described by Bolt (Ref. 36) for hard rock sites or for l analyses where nonstationarity of strong motion time functions is unimportant

• and (2) the spectrum of the derived accelerogram is found acceptable in the SEB review under SRP Section 3.7.1.

l Subsection 2.5.2.7, " Operating Basis Earthquake." In meeting the requirements of Reference 3, this subsection is acceptable when the vibratory ground motion for the OBE is described with the SSE and the acceleration level at the site specified. The minimum value of the acceleration level for the OBE is currently one-half the reference acceleration for seismic design corresponding to the SSE. For sites in highly seismic regions, mainly in the western United States, the complete description of the CBE, as given in 10 CFR Part 100, MFor sites on sediments or for analyses where nonstationarity is important, ' more conservative values may be required. See, e.g., Refs. 32 and 38. 2.5.2-7 Rev. 1 - July 1981

Appendix A, Section III(d) (Ref. 3), is required. In seme cases, probability calculations, like those described by Algermissen (Ref. 37), would be helpful [ in estimating the acceleration level reasonably expected to affect the plant site during the operating life of the plant. Acceptable source regions that can be use as input to these calculations are these geologic structures or tectonic provinces with which historical earthquake activity has been asso-ciated. Such descriptions should include the acceleration level of the OBE and a determination of the probability of exceeding that level during the 40 year operating life of the plant. l III. REVIEW PROCEDURES Upon receiving the applicant's SAR, an acceptance review is conducted.to I determine: compliance with the investigative requirements of 10 CFR Part 100, j Appendix A (Ref. 3). The reviewer also identifies any site-specific problems, [ the resolution of which could result in extended delays in completing the review. [ Af ter SAR acceptance and docketing, those areas are identified where additional I information is required to determine the earthquake hazard and to establish the design acceleration. These are transmitted to the applicant as draft reouests for additional information (Q-1). A site visit is ~ conducted during which the reviewer inspects the foundation (if available), local faulting, and other geologic conditions. During the l site visit the reviewer also discusses and clarifies the Q-1 questions with j the applicant and his consultants so that it is clearly understood what addi-tional information is required by the staff to continue the review. Following the site visit, a revised set of requests for additional information (Q-1) l including any additional questions which may have been developed during the site visit is formally transmitted to the applicant. t At the Q-2 stage the review procedure consists mainly Jf an eva,luation of the f applicant's response to the Q-1 questions. The reviewer prepares requests for additional clarifying information and formulates positions which may agree or disagree with those of the applicant. These are formally transmitted to the applicant. l 1 The safety analysis report and amendments responding to the requests for l { additional information (Q-1, Q-2) are reviewed to determine that the informa-l tion presented by the applicant is acceptable according to the criteria described in Section II above. Based on information supplied by the applicant, obtained i frem site visits, or from staff consultants or literature sources, the reviewer t independently identifies the relevant seismotectonic provinces, evaluates the capability of faults in the region, and determines the earthquake potential for each province and each capable fault or tectonic structure using procedures noted in Section II (Acceptance Criteria) above. The reviewer evaluates the [ t vibratory ground motion which the potential earthquakes could produce at the site and defines the safe shutdown earthquake and operating basis earthquake. 7 r p 2.5.2-8 Rev. 1 - July 1981 e m... _.

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS If the evaluation by the staff on completion of the review of the geologic and seismologic aspects of the plant site, confirms that the applicant has met the requirements or guidance of applicable portions of References 1 through 6,^ the conclus~ ion'in the SER states that the information provided and investiga-tions performed support the applicant's conclusions regarding the seismic integrity of the subject nuclear power plant site. In addition to the conclu-sion, this section of the SER includes (1) definitions of seismotectonic provinces; (2) evaluations of the capability of geologic structures in the region; (3) determinations of the-SSE acceleration at ground surface or at a subsurface level which may be more appropriate to the site; (4) reference acceleration for seismic design; (5) time duration of strong ground motion; (6) free field response spectrum based on evaluation of the potential earth-quakes; and (7) determinations of the OBE acceleration at ground surface. Staff reservations about any significant deficiency presented in the applicant's SAR are stated in sufficient detail to make clear the precise nature of the concern. The above evaluation determinations or redeterminations are made by the staff during both the construction permit (CP) and operating license (OL) phases of review. Operating license (OL) applications are reviewed for any new information developed subsequent to the construction permit (CP) safety evaluation report (SER). The review will also determine whether the CP recommendations have been implemented. A typical OL-stage summary finding fdr this section of the SER follows: In our review of the seismologic aspects of the plant site we have considered pertinent information gathered since our initial seismologic review which was made in conjunction with the issuance of the Construction Permit. This new information includes data gainee from both site and near-site investigations as well as from a review of rec s tly published literature. As a result of our recent reviee of the seismologic information, we have determined that our earlier con:lusion regarding the safety of the plant from a seismological standpoint rem 6 ins valid. These conclusions can be summari:ed as follows: (1) Seismologic information provided by the applicant and required by Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 provide an adequate basis to establish that no capable faults exist in the plant site area which would cause earthquakes to be centered there. (2) The acceleration level proposed for the safe shutdown earthquake is the appropriate acceleration level for the seismic design of the plant in conformance with Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100. The new information reviewed for the proposed nuclear power plant is discussed in Safety Evaluation Report Section 2.5.2. 2.5.2-9 Rev. 1 - July 1981 e

^ The staff concludes that the site is acceptable from a seismologic standpoint and meets the requirements of (1) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A (General Design Criterion 2), (2) 10 CFR Part 100, and (3) 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. This conclusion is based on the following: 1. The applicant has met the requirements of: a. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A (General Design Criterion 2) with resoect to protection against natural phenomena such as faulting. b. 10 CFR Part 100 (Reactor Site Criteria) with respect to the identi-fication of physical cnaracteristics such as geology (faulting) and seismology (near-site events) used in determining the suitability of the site. c. 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A (Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants) with respect to obtaining the geologic and seismic information necessary to determine (1) site suitability and (2) to determine the appropriate design of the plant. In complying with this regulation, the applicant also meets the staff's guidance described in Regulatory Guide 1.132, " Site Investigations for Founda-tions of Nuclear Power Plants," Regulatory Guide 4.7, " General Site Suitability for Nuclear Power Stations," and Regulatory Guide 1.60, " Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants." V. IMPLEMENTATION The following is intended to provide guidance to applicants and licensees regard-ing the NRC staff's plans for using this SRP section. Except in those cases in which the applicant / licensee proposes an acceptable alternative methud fur complying with specific portions of the Commission's regulations, the method described herein will be used by the staff in its i evaluation of conformance with Commission regulations. Implementation schedules for conformance to parts of the method discussed herein are contained in the referenced regulatory guides and NUREGs (Refs 4 through 9). V. REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena." 2. 10 CFR Part 100, " Reactor Site Criteria." 3. 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, " Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants." 2.5.2-10 Rev. 1 - July 1981 s ?

4. Regulatory Guide 1.132, " Site Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear Power Plants." 5. Regulatory Guide 4.7, " General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants." 6. Regulatory Guide 1.60, " Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants." 7. Regulatory Guide 1.70, " Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants." 8. NUREG-0625, " Report of Siting Policy. Task Force" (1979). 9. NUREG/CR-1577, "A Seismic Zoning Map for Siting Nuclear Electric Generating Facilities in the Eastern United States," prepared by Rondout Associates, Inc. for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Authored by N. Barstow, K. Brill, O. Nuttli, and P. Pomeroy (1980).

10. " Historical Earthquake Data File," National Geophysical and Solar-Terrestrial Data Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

11. " Earthquake History of the United States," Publication 41-1, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce 3 (1973). 12. " Earthquake History of the United States (1971-76 Supplement)," Publica-tion 41-1, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Depart-ment of Commerce; Geological Survey, U.S. Department of Interior (1979). 13. S. D. Townley and M. W. Allen, " Description Catalog of Earthquakes of the Pacific Coast of the United States, 1769 to 1928." Bulletin Seismological Society of America. Vol. 29 (1939). 14. W. E. T. Smith, " Earthquakes of fastern Canada and Adjacent Areas," Publica-tions of the Dominion Observatory (1962). 15. P. 8. King, "The Tectonics of North America - A Discussion to Accompany the Tectonic Map of North America, Scale 1:5,000,000," Professional Paper 628, U.S. Geological Survey (1969). 16. A. J. Eardley, " Tectonic Divisions of North America," Bulletin American Association of Petroleum Geologists, Vol. 35 (1951). 17. J. B. Hadley and J. F. Devine, "Seismotectonic Map of the Eastern United States," Publication MF-620, U.S. Geological Survey (1974). 18. M. L. Sbar and L. R. Sykes, " Contemporary Compressive Stress and Seismicity in Eastern North America: An Example of Intra-Plate Tectonics," Bulletin Geological Society of America, Vol. 84 (1973). 2.5.2-11 Rev. 1 - July 1981 9 y

19. R. B. Smith and M. L. Sbar, " Contemporary Tectonics and Seismicity of the Western United States with Emphasis on the Intermountain Sei'smic Belt," Bulletin Geological Society of America, Vol. 85 (1974). 20. P. B. Schnabel and H. B. Seed, " Acceleration in Rock for Earthquakes in the Western United States," Report No. EERC 72-2, Earthquake Engineering Center, University of California, Berkeley (1972). 21. J. N. Burne, " Tectonic Stress and Spectra of Seismic Shear Waves from Earthquakes," Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 75 (1970). 22. D. M. Boore, W. B. Joyner, A. A. Oliver III, and R. A. Page, " Estimation of Ground Motion Parameters," Circular 795, Geological Survey, U.S. Department of Interior (1978). 23. D. Tocher, " Earthquake Energy and Ground Breakage," Bulletin Seismological Society of America, Vol. 48 (1958). 24. P. 8. Schnabel, J. Lysmer, and H. B. Seed, " SHAKE-A Computer Program for Earthquake Response Analysis of Horizontally Layered Sites," Report No. EERC 72-12, Earthquake Engineering Research Center, University of California, Berkeley (1972). 25. M. D. Trifunac and F. E. Ucwadia, " Variations of Strong Earthquake Ground Shaking in the Los Angeles Area," Bulletin Seismological Society of America, Vol. 64 (1974). 26. L. A. Drake, " Love and Rayleigh Waves in Nonhorizontally Layered Media," Bulletin Seismological Society of America, Vol. 62 (1972). 27. N. N. Ambraseys, " Dynamics and Response of Foundation Materials in Epicen-tral Regions of Strong Earthquakes," Proceedings of the Fifth World Conference on Earthquake Engineering (1973). 28. F. Neumann, " Earthquake Intensity and Related Ground Motion," University of Washington Press (1954). 29.

8. Gutenberg and C. Richter, " Earthquake Magnitude, Intensity, Energy, and Acceleration," Bulletin Seismological Society of America, Vol. 46 (1956).

30. N. N. Ambraseys, "The Correlation of Intensity with Ground Motions," l Paper presented at Trieste Conference on Advancements of Engineering Seismology in Europe (1974). 31. M. D. Trifunac and A. G. Brady, "On the Correlation of Seismic Intensity Scales with Peaks of Recorded Strong Ground Motion," Bulletin Seismological Society of America, Vol. 65 (1975). 2.5.2-12 Rev. 1 - July 1981 E

32.

0. W. Nuttli, " State-of-the-Art for Assessing Earthquake Hazards in the United States, Report 1, Design Earthquakes for the Central U>iited States,"

Miscellaneous Paper S-73-1, U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station (1973). 33. V. Perez, " Peak Ground Accelerations and Their Effect on the Velocity Response Envelope Spectrum as a function of Time, San Fernando Earthquake, February 9,1971," Proceedings of the Fif th World Conference on Earth-quake Engineering (1973). 34 V. Perez, " Velocity Response Envelope Spectrum as a Function of Time for the Pacoima Dam, San Fernando Earthquake, February 9, 1971," Bulletin Seismological Society of America, Vol. 63 (1973). 35. H. B. Seed, C. Ugas, and J. Lysmer, " Site-Dependent Spectra for Earthquake-Resistant Design," Bulletin Seismological Society of America,.Vol. 66 (1976). 36. B. A. Bolt, "Ouration of Strong Ground Motion," Proceedings of the Fif th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering (1973). 37. S. T. Algermissen and O. M. Perkins, " Techniques for Seismic Zoning: 1. General Considerations and Parameters," Proceedings of the International Conference on Microzonation for Safer Construction Research and Applica-tion (1972). 38. L. Esteva and E. Rosenblueth, "Espectros Temblores a Distomicas Moderodas y Grandes," Proceedings of Chilean Conference on Seismology and Eartaquake Engineering, Vol. 1, University of Chile (1963). 39. P. St. Amand, "Two Proposed Measures of Seismicity," Bulletin Seismological Society of America, Vol. 46, pp. 41-45 (1956). 40. NUREG-0029 (1978) and NUREG/CR-0985 (1980), "Geotecnnical and Strong Motion Earthquake Data from U.S. Accelerograph Stations," prepared by Shannon and Wilson, Inc. and Agbabian Associates. 41. NUREG-0402, " Analysis of a Worldwide Strong Motion Data Sample to Develop an Improved Correlation Between Peak Acceleration, Seismic Intensity and Other Physical Parameters," prepared by Computer Sciences Corporation for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Authored by J. R. Murphy and L. J. O'Brien (1978). 42. W. W. Hays, " Procedures for Estimating Earthquake Ground Motions," Professional Paper 1114, U.S. Geological Survey (1980). 2.5.2-13 Rev. 1 - July 1981

NU REG-0800 (F:rm:rly NUREG 75/0871 /'f asn,\\ U.SJNUQLEAR REGULATOHY COMMISS*0N" a (hif.) STANDARD REVIEW PLAN %<f OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION e... 2.5.3 SURFACE FAULTING REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Geosciences Branch (GB) Secondary - None I. AREAS OF REVIEW GB reviews information in the applicant's safety analysis report (SAR) related to the existence of a potential for surface faulting affecting the site. The informa-tion presented in this section results largely from detailed surface and subsurface The geological and geophysical investigations performed in the site and vicinity. following specific subjects are addressed: the structural and stratigraphic condi-tions of the site and vicinity (subsection 2.5.3.1), any evidence of fault offset or evidence demonstrating the absence of faulting (subsection 2.5.3.2), earthquakes associated with faults (subsection 2.5.3.3), determination of age of most recent movement on f aults (subsection 2.5.3.4), determination of structural relationships of site area faults to regional faults (subsection 2.5.3.5), identification and description of capable faults (subsection 2.5.3.6), zones requiring detailed fault investigations (subsection 2.5.3.7), and results.of studies in zones requiring detailed f ault investigations (subsection 2.5.3.8). II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA GB acceptance criteria are based on meeting the requirements of the following. regulations: 1 1. 10 CFR Part 50, " Appendix A, " General Desian Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants"; General Design Criterion 2 " Design Bases for Drotection Against Natural Phencmena." This criterion requires tnat safety-related portions of the structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes,-tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions (Ref. 1). i l Rev. 2 - July 1981 i USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff resconsible for the review of j applications to construct and operate nuctear power plants. These documents are made available to the oublic as part of the j i Commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and polic:es Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them.s not required The l standard review plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plant 6. Not all sections of the standard Format have a corresponding rew ew plan. Publisned standard review p.ans will be revised penodically as appropriate to accommodate comments and to reflect new informa-tion and experience. Comments and suggestions for improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Washington. o.C. 20666. 1 /

.l 2. 10 CFR Part 100, " Reactor Site Criteria." This part describes criteria which guide the evaluation of the suitability of proposed sites for nuclear power and testing reactors (Ref. 2). 3. 10 CFR Part 100, Apoendix A, " Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants." These criteria describe the nature of the investi-gations required to obtain the geologic and seismic data necessary to determine site suitability and identify geologic and seismic factors required to be taken into account in the siting and design of nuclear power plants (Ref. 3). The following regulatory guides provide information, recommendations, and guidance and in general describe a basis acceptable to the staff for imple-l menting the requirements of GDC 2, Part 100, ano Appendix A to Part 100. a. Regulatory Guide 1.132, " Site Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear Power Plants." This guide describes programs of site investigations I related to geotechnical aspects that would normally meet the needs for evaluating the safety of the site from the standpoint of the per-3 formance of foundations and earthworks under anticipated loading condi-tions including earthquake. It provides general guidance and recom-i mendations for developing site-specific investigation programs as well as specific guidance for conducting subsurface investigations, including the spacing and depth of borings and sampling (Ref. 4). b. Regulatory Guide 4.7, " General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear l Power Stations." This guide discusses the major site characteristics related to public health and safety which the NRC staff considers in i determ'ining the suitability of sites for nuclear power stations (Ref. 5). i The data ano analyses presented in the SAR are acceptable if, as a minimum, they describe and document the information required by Reference 3 and should conform to the format sugges'ed in Reference 15. References 8, 9, and 10 are used by ttc staff as the principal relevant guides to judge whether or not all of the current pertinent references have been consulted. Amcng others, References 6, 7, 11 through 14, and 16 are also used by the staff. i Specific criteria necessary to meet the relevant requirements of the Commission regulations identified above are as follows: l Subsection 2.5.3.1. In meeting the requirements of References 1 through 3 and i tne positions of References 4 and 5, this subsection is considered acceptable j if the discussions of the stratigraphy, methods of fault dating, structural geology, and geologic history of the site are complete, compare well with studies conducted by others in the same area, and are supported by detailed investigations performed by the applicant. In the case of coastal and inland sites near large bodies of water, similar detailed investigations are to be i conducted offshore as well as onshore. Site and regional geologic maps and 1 profiles constructed at scales adequate to illustrate clearly the surficial j and bedrock geology, structural geology, topography, and the relationship of l i tne safety-related foundations of the nuclear power plant to these features 1 should be included in the SAR. i 2.5.3-2 Rev. 2 - July 1981 -. -, - ~ -.

,L ~ St.bsection 2.5.3.2. 'In meeting the requirements of References 1, 2, and 3, this subsection is icceptable if sufficient surface and subsurface information is provided and supported by detailed investigations, either to confirm the absence of faulting cr, if faulting is present, to demonstrate its age. If faulting is present in tne site victnity, it must be defined as to -fault geometry, amount and sense of movement, recursence yate, and age or latest movement. In l addition to geologi.c evidence which may indicate faulting, linears interpreted from topographic maps, low-and high-altitude aerial photographs, Landsat, Skylab, and other -imagery should be documented,and investigat d. In order to expedite e the review process, an identification list, index, and dupli' cates of the remote-sensing data used in the linear study should be provided to,the staff. Evidence ~ for absence of faulting is obtained by conducting site surface and subsurface investigations in such detail and areal extent to ensure that undetected offsets are not likely to exist. These investigations will vary i.m detail according to the geological comp %xity of the specific site. Subsection 2.5.3.3. In meeting the requirements of References 1, 2, and 3, this subsection is acceptaole if all historically reported earthquakes _within 5 adles of the site or near faults which trend within 5 miles of the site, as ~ discussed in SRP Sectioli 2.5.2, are evaluated with respect to hypocenter accuracy l and source origin. In conjunction with these discussions, a plot of the earth-quake epicenters superirr. posed on a map showing the local tectonic structures as defined in SRP Section 2.5.1 should be provided. Hypocentral error estimates l of the earthquakes should be shown. l ' Subsection 2.5.3.4. In meeting the requirements of References 1 and 3, this subsection is acceptable when every f ault, any part of which is within 5 miles of.the site, is investigated in sufficient detail using geological and geo-physical techniques of sufficient sensitivity to demonstrate the age of most recent movement (Ref. 16). An evaluation of the sensitivity and resolution of l the exploratory techniques used should be given. Msection2.5.3.5. In meeting the requirements of References 1, 2, and 3, this sucsection is acceptable when a discussion is given of the structural and genetic rel,ationship between site area faulting and the regional tectonic frame- .<c r k. In regions of active tectonism it may be necessary to conduct detailed geologic and geophysical. investigations to demonstrate the structural relation-shipr of site area f aults to regional faults known to be seismically active. Both 3 theoretical'and an observational basis for the conclusions reached should.be given. s Subsection 2.5.3.6. In meeting the requirements of References 1, 2, and 3, tnis sdosection is acceptable when it has been demonstrated chat the investi-gative techniques used have sufficient tensitivity to identify all faults greater than 1000 feet in length within 5 miles of the site and when the gecmetry, length, sense of movement, amount of offset, age of latest movement, and limits of the fault zone are given for each fault. Investigations are to extend at least 5 miles beyond all plant sites adjacent to large bodie, of water such as oceans, rivers, and lakes. Subsection 2.5.3.7. In meeting the requirements or Reference 3, this subsec-tion is judged acceptable if the zone designated by the applicant as requiring detailed faulting investigation is consistent with the description of such a zone described in Reference 3. l 2.5.3-3 Rev. 2 - July 1981

. = -. Subsection 2.5.3.8. In meeting the requirements of References 1, 2, and 3, this subsection must be presented by the applicant if the aforementioned inves- ) tigations reveal that surface displacement must be taken into account. No commercial nuclear power plant has been constructed on a known capable fault and it is an open question as to whether it is feasible to de' sign for surface ) or near-surface displacement with confidence that the integrity of the safety-related features of the plant would remain intact should displacement occur. I It is, therefore, staff policy to recommend relocation of plant sites found to ( be located on capable faults as determined by the detailed faulting investiga-tion. If in the future it becomes feasible to design for surface faulting, it. I will be necessary to present the desiga basis for surface faulting and supporting data in considerable detail. j III. REVIEW PROCEDURES The staff review procedure involves an evaluation to determine that the appli-cant has followed the investigations outlined in Reference 3. Consultants / advisors assist the staff in reviewing this section of the SAR, on a case-by-case t basis. On request, the advisor / consultant provides expertise in numerous earth science disciplines and occasionally is able to provide first-hand knowledge of the site. A literature search is conducted concerning the regional and lccal geology. The staff also utilizes state geological surveys and contacts univer-sities and private industry to obtain additional data. Generally, the steps that applicants must follow in determining the presence and artent of faulting, and whether near-surface faulting (if present) represents a hazard or not, is outlined in the seismic and geologic siting criteria (Ref. 3). l Specific investigative techniques are not given in the criteria, however. The site area must be investigated by a combination of exploratory methods which may include borings, trenching, seismic ' profiling, geologic mapping, and geo-physical investigations. The results of these explorations are cross-compared and evaluated by the staff. i It has been the policy of the staff to encourage applicants to avoid areas wnere there is a possibility for surface faulting. As the question of whether or not a surface faulting condition exists is so critical in determining whether a particular site is suitable, this consideration is usually addressed very early in the review. Exceptions are those cases in which a fault, the existence of which was previously unknown, is revealed in excavations during construction or is discovered during the course of other investigations in the area. The staff is to be notified by the applicant when the excavations for critical structures are available for NRC inspection and when the detailed geologic maps to be used by the staff while examining the above excavations will be available for use. In addition, the staff is to be contacted immediately if a fault, not previously identified in the SAR, is found within 5 miles of the plant. When faults are identified in the site vicinity, it must be demonstrated that the faults are not capable. This is accomplished by determining the ages of the faults by absolute age dating (radiometric), associating the faulting with regional tectonic activity of known age, stratigraphic or geomorphic evidence, etc. Numerous age-dating techniques (principally radiometric) are discussed in Reference 16. In such cases the staff will carry out limited site obser-vations and investigations of its own such as examinations of excavations. In some cases, the staff may select samples from shear zones for subsequent dating analysis. Applicants usually trench in the areas where major facilities are i to be located. 2.5.3-4 Rev. 2 - July 1981 i 1

Sunsection 2.5.3.1 is evaluated by conducting,aa independent literature search and cross-comparing the results W.h t?.e rinfomation submitted in the-SAR. The comparison should show that the conclusions presented by the applicant are based on sound data, are consistent with tha pub (3shed reports of e.sperts who have worked in the area, and are cansi. stent with the conclusions af the staff and its advisors / consultants. If the appM d at's ccfclusions and ass.=ptions l conflict with the literature, substantive investigativa re$ults to support those conclusions must be submitteri to the staff for ce siew. Subsection 2.5.3.2 is evaluated by first deterrining through a literature search that all known evidences cf fault offsat have been considered in the investigation. The results of the applicanf.'s site investigaf. ions are studied and cross-ccmpared in detail to see if there is evidence of existi.ng er poten-tial displacements. If such evidence h found, additional investigations such as field mapping, geophysical investigations, borings, trenchino, etc., su.st be carried out to demonstrate that there is to offset or to cefine the charac-teristics of the fault if it does exist. Subsection 2.5.3.3 is reviewed in coojunction with -the consideration of 5@ Section 2.5.2. Historic earthouake data derived ffom the review of SRP h Section 2.5.2 are compared witti knowrs local ?ectcaic feat.uras and a determina-tion is mace as to whether any of these carthquakes can reasonably be associated with the local structures. This determination includes an evaluation of the hypocentral error estimates of the eartnquakes. When available, the eartnquake source mechanisms shoulc be evaluated wi th respect te f ault geometry. In addi-tion, applicants / licensees are anceufhed to evaluate the relationsMp of fault pa*ameters to earthquake sagr:itude. These Igrar,eters may ificlude, but are not limited to, slip rate, recurrence intervals, length, rd tg e of fcu?t. Subsection 2.5.3.4 is evaluated to determir,e if the age dating methodology usec cy tne applicant is based on accepted geological precedures. Ir, some cases unusual age dating techniques may be used.' When such methods are employed, ':.he staff wit ! require Extensive cocur:Lentation of tr.e technique and may treat it as a generic revfew item. The resolutica of all age dating tech-niques should be carafuMy docume? tad. J Subsection 2.5.3.5 is evaluated by determining through a literature search that tne applicant's evaluation of the reg *caal tectonic framewosk is consistent with that of recognized experts whose reports appear in the published literature. l The conclusions reached by the appifcent should be cased on sourd geologic principles and should explain the available geological and geophysical data. Whe1 special investigations are made to determine the structural relat onship between faults which pass within 5 miles of the site and regional faults, the resolution of the investigative techniques sPould be givefL Subsection 2.5.3.6 is evaluated to determine if a sufficiently detailed investi-gation has been made by the applicant to define the specif!c cberacteri: tics of all capable faults located uithin 5 miles of the site. The fault chaeacter-istics requiring definitions include: length, orientation, relationship of the fault.to regional structures; the natt.re, amount, ard geologic t.istory of displacements alon2 the f ault; and the outer limits of the fault Zone estab- ) lisned by mapping fault traces 10 mi'es along trends in both directions from the point of nearest uproach to the site (Ref. 3). The staff must be satisfied l that the investigation CCvers a larga enough area in sufflclent detail to demon-strate that there is little likelihood of near-surface displacement ha2ards associated with capable faults nxist hg undetected near the site. i 2.5.3-5 Rev. 2 - July 1981 i

Subsection 2.5.3.7. Criteria for determining the zone requiring detaileJ fault-ing investigation are clearly outlined in Reference 3. The staff reviews the l results of the applicant's faulting investigation together with the published literature. The investigative techniques employed by the applicant are evalu-ated to ascertain that they are consistent with the state of the art. As part of this phase, experts in specific disciplines are asked to review certain aspects of the investigative program. The results of the investigation are analyzed to determine whether the outer limits of the zone requiring faulting investigation are appropriately conservative. If there is insufficient data to substantiate the outer boundaries, more conservative assumptions are required. Subsection 2.5.3.8. If the detailed faulting investigations for the proposed commercial nuclear power plant reveal that there is a potential for surface displacement at the site, the staff recommends that an alternate location for the proposed plant be considered. In the future, when it may be feasible to design a commercial nuclear power plant for displacements, substantial infor-mation will be required to support the design basis for surface faulting. 4 IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS If the evaluation by the staff, on completion of the review of the geologic and seismologic aspects of the plant site, confirms that the applicant has met the requirements of applicable ' portions of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2, Design Bases for Protect.fon Against Natural Phenomena," 10 CFR Part 100, " Reactor Site Criteria," and 10 CFN Part 100, Appendix A, " Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," the conclusion in the SER states that the information provided and investigations performed support the applicant's conclusions regarding the geologic and seismic integ-rity of the subject nuclear power plant site. Staff reservations about any sf gnificant deficiency either presented in the applicant's SAR or identified by tne staff are stated in sufficient detail to make clear the precise nature of the concern. The above evaluation determinations are made by the staff during both the construction permit (CP) and operating license (OL) phases of review. Operating license (OL) applications are reviewed for any new information developed subsequent to the construction permit (CP) safety evaluation report (SER). The review will also determine whether the CP recommendations have been implemented. A typical OL-stage findir.g for (tis section of the SER follows: 10 cur review of the geologic and seismologic aspects of the plant site we have considered pertinent information gathered since our initial geologic and seismologic review which was made in conjunction with the issuance of the construction permit. This new information includes data gained from both site and near-site investigations as well as from a review of recently published literature. A3 a result of our recent review of the geologic and seismologic information, we have determined that our earlier conclusion regard'ing the safety of the plant from a geological and seismological standpoint remains valid. These conclusions can be summarized as follows: 2.5.3-6 Rev. 2 - July 1981 J 0

(1) Geologic and seis.to.iogic investigations and infortnation provided cy the. applicant ac& required by Accendh A to 10 CFR Part 100 provide an adequate basis to establish that no capaole faults exist in the plant site area wnicn would cause earthquakas to be centered there. (2) No evidence has been found to indicate that a potential exists for surface faulting at the plant site. The new information reviewed for the proposed nuclear power plant is discussed in Safety Evaluation Report Section 2.5.3. The staff concludes that the site is acceptable from a geologic and seismologic standpoint and meets the requirements of (1) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A (General Design Criterion 2), (2) 10 CFR Part 100, and (3) 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. This conclusion is based on the folicwing: 1. The applicant has met the requirements of: a. 10 CFR Part 50, Aopendix A (General Design Criterion 2) with respect to protection against natural pnenomena such as faulting. c. 10 CFR Part 100 (Reactor Site Criteria) with respect to the identification of physical characteristics such as geology (faulting) and seismology (near site events) used in determining the suitability of the site. c. 10 CFR Part 100, Appertdix A (Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants) with respect to obtaining the geologic and seismic information necessary to determine (1) site suitability, and (2) to determine the appropriate design of the plant. In complying with this regulation, the applicant also meets with the staff's guidance described in Regulatory Guide 1.132, (Site Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear Power Plants) and Regulatory Guide 4.7 (General Site Suitability for Nuclear Power Stations). V. IMPLEMENTATION The following is intended to provide guidance to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this SRP section. Except in those cases in which the applicant / licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying witn specific portions of the Commission's regulations, the method described nerei1 will be used by the staf f in its evaluation of conformance with Commission regulations. Implementation schedules for conformance to parts of the method discussed herein are contained in the referenced regulatory guides. VI. REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena." 2.5.3-7 Rev. 2 - July 1981 v

i

h 2.

10 CFR Part 100, " Reactor Site Criteria." l 3. 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, " Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for .t Nuclear Power Plants."

i 4.

Regulatory Guide 1.132, " Site Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear Power Plants." 5. Regulatory Guide 4.7, " General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations." 4 6. R. L. Bates and J. A. Jackson, eds., " Glossary of Geology," American Geological Institute, Falls Church, Virginia (1980). 7. G. V. Cohee (Chairman) et al., " Tectonic Map of the United States," U.S. Geological Survey and American Association of Petroleum Geologists (1962). 8. American Petroleum Institute data base, accessible through RECON system. 9. GeoRef data base, American Geological Institute, Falls Church, Virginia. 10. RECON / Energy data base, Department of Energy 11. State geological maps and accompanying texts. 12. U.S. Geological Survey 7.5-and 15-minute topographic and geologic quad- ] rangle maps. 13. Aerial photographs from Federal agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Geo-logical Survey, and the U.S. Forest Service. 14. Landsat, Skylab, and other imagery. 15. Regulatory Guide 1.70, " Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants."

i 16.

P. J. Murphy, J. Briedis, and J. H. Peck, " Dating Techriiques in Fault Investigations," p. 153-168, in: Geology in the Siting of Nuclear Power Plants; A. W. Hatheway and C. R. McClure, Jr., eds., Reviews in Engr. Geol., v. 4, Geol. Soc. America, 1979. 2.5.3-8 Rev. 2 - July 1981 1 ~,-,..n,c

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b$ S} n y % 1 0 togg i-i u g Weekly Event - Earth Sciences Branch b 4 NRC Regionai Seismographic Networks and the January 31, 1986 Earthquake in Ohio A moderate earthquake, magnitude of 4.9, occurred in Northeast Ohio at 11:46 ) a.m., EST, on January 31, 1986. The Perry Nuclear Power Plant, which is due for initial startup later this year, is located about 15 miles north of the epicenter. Three other nuclear power plant sites are within 150 miles of the epicenter. The National Earthquake Information Center determined the epicenter location using 17 seismographic stations telemetered to the Center in Colorado. Nine of the 13 stations within 1000 Km of the epicenter are part of the NRC's regional seismographic networks; two others are supported by DOE. The NRC established these regional seismographic networks in the central and Eastern United States beginning in about 1975. The networks were initiated for two basic reasons: (1) the NRC needed the data to carry out its mission, and (2) no other Federal agency would accept responsibility for them. The networks are providing accurate seismological data; i.e., location, magnitudes and recurrence rates, for NRC licensing decisionmaking. The network stations were carefully sited taking into consideration both the location of seismically active areas and ~ existing and planned nuclear power plant sites. Based upon the information obtained from the NRC regional seismographic networks during the January 31 earthquake (over a hundred records were recorded by the NRC networks), five NRC research contractors dispatched teams to the area to deploy portable seismographs to record any aftershocks which might occur; these accelerographs and microearthquake recorders were recording within 24 hours after the primary shock on January 31. Within the first 72 hours, three small aftershocks were recorded, reports by residents who felt the shock were being noted and reconnaissance teams were checking for any signs of primary ground rupture; f.e., fault displacements (none noted). The Corps of Engineers reported that the strong motion accelerographs at the M. J. Kirwan Dam and the Erie Pennsylvania Veterans Hospital triggered during the earthquake and that the records are being recovered. The dam is about 45 km and the hospital is about 100 km from the epicenter. Other strong motion instrumentation is being checked for triggers. This type of equipment will provide data only)for major seismic events (greater than 0.01g at the location of the instrument and by itself is inadequate to fully characterize even a major earthquake, such as the location of its epicenter or its focal parameters. The affected site area is located within the Central Stable Region Tectonic Province. Except for the 1929, magnitude 5.2, MMI VIII "Attica Earthquake," which is related to the Clarenden-Linden Fault Zone in Northwestern New York, j there is little evidence that elucidates any correlation between seismicity and j tectonic structure. Therefore, the tectonic province approach as prescribed by Appendix A of 10 CFR 100 has been used to develop the earthquake design bases for nuclear power plants in this area. Three historic earthquakes and three 1 l. 4

l clusters of cinor seismicity are ass ciated with the n:rth2 astern portion of this tectonic province, including the 1929 Attica Earthquake. The other two earthquakes were the 1937, magnitude 5.0 - 5.3, maximum MMI VII-VIII Anna, i Ohio Earthquake and the 1980, magnitude 5.0 - 5.3, maximum MMI VII, a Sharpsburg,Jentucky, earthquake. The clusters of minor activity were located p about 20 mile's west, about 175 northeast, and about 180 miles south of the t-epicenter of the current earthquake. The regional geology has been analyzed by the licensees for the several nuclear power plants in the area and their consultants, by the USGS and by the NRC. Collectively, it has been concluded that there are no capable faults within the northeastern portion of this tectonic province. This earthquake provides a unique opportunity to examine seismic effects at an Eastern NPP. Nine strong motion records are available from the plant itself; at least two sets of accelerograms from off-site have been identified, and over a hundred " weak motion" records were recorded by the NRC networks. This invaluable data set will be the focus of a major effort to develop an improved insight into the relation between recorded accelerations and specific effect within an NPP. A detailed assessment of the seismic response of an NPP to a number of high amplitude accelerations in narrow-frequency bands is a prime topic for such study. Due to budget reduction pressures and the recognition that operation of the regional seismic networks is more properly a U.S. Geological Survey responsibility, RES had been negotiating with the USGS for it to assume responstb111ty for monitoring seismic activity in the entire United States, including the central and eastern portions. A draft memorandum of understanding that would have accomplished this had been prepared, whereby the USGS was to assume responsibility for operation of the regional networks. In l return, the NRC was to provide certain funds to the USGS for the purchase of new, better equipment, which the USGS would install and operate, and thereby replace the NRC networks. Due to budgetary limitations, RES has had to withdraw from these negotiations and it plans to terminate its support for the NRC networks in fiscal year 1987; i.e., no NRC funding in 1988. Thus the majority of the seismographic stations east of the Continental Divide may well cease to operate in 1988, so that the accurate location and measurements of intensity and magnitude of earthquakes throughout the central and Eastern U.S. will no longer be available. This will greatly increase the difficulty of licensing decisions that will have to be made concerning the licensing and continuing safe operation of nuclear power plants affected by such an event. 1 There is legislation pending (S.1765) to amend the Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act of 1977 to provide for the establishment of national seismic data centers. These centers would collect and analyze data from regional seismographic networks, compile this data and make it available for governmental and public use. If this bill.fs passed and the centers established, they could provide a source of seismologic data alternative to the present NPC networks. t I 2 i l ,,n,- , -., -.}}