ML20203J006

Forwards Exercise Evaluation of Implementation of State & Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans, Conducted on 850827 by Fema.Recommendations to Be Implemented Involve Actions by Other Parties & Political Institutions

ML20203J006
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	07/30/1986
From:	Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Reed C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
References
NUDOCS 8608050156
Download: ML20203J006 (2)

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1 JUL 3 01986 Docket No. 50-254 Docket No. 50-265 Comonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Gentlemen:

The final exercise report from FEMA dated March 10, 1986, is enclosed for the exercise conducted on August 27, 1985 at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This was a full participation exercise for the State of Iowa, and Clinton and Scott Counties.

A problem was identified concerning the timing of the notification by the utility to the offsite governments. This matter has been resolved, as reported by a January 3, 1986 memorandum from FEMA Region VII. There were also areas of inadequacy requiring corrective actions.

We fully recognize that the recomendations to be implemented may involve actions by other parties and political institutions which are not under your direct control. Nonetheless, we would expect the subject of offsite prepared-ness for the area around the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station to be addressed by you as well as others.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

If you have any questions regardin Mr. William Snell of my staff at (g 312) this letter, please contact 790-5513.

Sincerely,

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$$$sogggy $I8 F W. D. Shafer, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch

Enclosure:

As Stated

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See Attached Distribution g/ y RIII RIII RIII RI 1 d v es es 1 /y 6g Allen Snell -Jack 4w Sh r T a W' 1/M

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Comonwealth Edison Company 2 JUL 301986 Distribution cc w/ enclosure:

D. L. Farrar, Director of Nuclear Licensing R. L. Bax, Plant Manager -

DCS/RSB (RIDS)

Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Phyllis Dunton, Attorney General's Office, Environmental Control Division cc w/o enclosure:

D. Matthews, OIE, EPB l

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Federal Emergency Management Agency 5

1. Washington, D.C. 20472 o e V MAR I O 1986 PitIGR!iY ROUTING fjff gui  :

PEPORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan @  %!C Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response g

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Office of Inspection and Enforcement U" As U . Nuclear latory Conmission FILE V ~

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FRObt . .

Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Program

SUBJECT:

Exercise Report of the August 27, 1985, Exercise of the Offsite R1diological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Attached is the final exercise report of the August 27,1985, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Ouad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Cordova, Illinois. This was a full-participation exercise for the State of Iowa, Clinton and Scott Counties. The State of Illinois and its localities were not scheduled to participate in this exercise. The exercise report, dated October 25, 1985, was prepared by the Federal Emergency Mnagement Agency (FE M) Region VII.

Region VII has provided copies of this report to the State of Iowa and requested a schedule of corrective actions. When we receive and analyze the corrective actions, we will send you the results of that review.

The Quad cities exercise identified a problem with the plan for notification from the utility to the offsite governments. At the exercise, a procedure was adequately demonstrated whereby all levels of governments would be notified simultaneously of emergencies at the plant. However, fem Region VII learned that the simultaneous procedure was in offeet only for the exercise, and contrary to information provided by the State of Iowa, was not part of the standing plan of the utility. In the attached September 4,1985 letter, fem Region VII informed the State that it couldn't accept changing a procedure only for an exercise. It also set forth certain requirements for the State to meet in order to correct this situation.

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By the attached January 3,1986 menorandum, FER Region VII confinned that the required plan changes have been made, including the execution of an acceptable letter of agreement by Iowa, Illinois and Ccmnorwealth Edison. 'Ihe applicable plans now doctanent the simultaneous notification procedure adequately demonstrated in the August 27, 1985 exercise.

'Ihese actions successfully resolve the problems previously identified with the sinultaneous notification procedures at the Quad Cities site.

If you have any questions, please contact W. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2860.

Attachments As Stated i

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a EXERCISE

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EVALUATION l

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August 27,1985, Exercise of the j Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of Iowa, Clinton and Scott Counties ,

for Commonwealth Edison's QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1 1

near Cordova, Rock Island County, Illinois J

FEDERAL EMERGENCY. MANAGEMENT' AGENCY Region Vll OCTOBER 25,1985 P ATRICK J. BREHENY 011 Walnut Street Regional Director Kansas City, MO 64106 65 5bbciSIOS 4 '3 )

3 EXERCISE EVALUATION OF THE IMPIRENTATION OF STATE AND IDCAL RADIOLOGICAL BERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS CONDUCTED AUGUST 27, 1985 for the QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION Cordova, Rock Island County, Illinois Casumonwealth Edison, Licensee PARTICIPANTS:

State of Iowa County of Clinton County of Scott (All Iowa jurisdictions participated; however, the Illinois jurisdictions did not participate. )

OCTOBER 25, 1985 prepared by Federal Dnergency Management Agency Region VII Kansas City, MO l

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. CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS AND ACR0NYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv EIERCISE

SUMMARY

.................................................... vi 1 INTRODUCTI ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Exercise Background......................................... 1 1.2 Exercise Evaluators......................................... 2 1.3 Evaluation Criteria......................................... 2 1.L Exercise Objectives......................................... 3 1.5 Ex e r c i s e S c e n a r i o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 -

1.6 State and Local Resources................................... Ii 2 RYFRCISE EVALUATI ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I f 2.1 !cva Operations............................................. If 2.1.1 State E=ergency Operations Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.1.2 Etergency Operations Facility....................... 1E 2.1.3 Jcint Public Information Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.1.L State Forward Co==and Post........................... 21 2.1.5 RAD Assessment and Field Tea Coordination.......... 2~

2.1.6 Fi eld Mon i t ori ng Te ams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 2.1.7 Me d i c al Drd 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 -

2.2 C ut.n ty Op e ra t i on s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 2.2.1 Clinton County E0C........................... ...... 25 2.2.P Clinton County Reception and Decon.................. 2' 2.2.3 Sc tt County E0C.................................... 2E 2.2.L Scott County Reception and Decen.................... 3C 3 SC EN ARI O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 le

SUMMARY

OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

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. ABMWVIATIONS AND ACRONDE ANL Argonne National Laboratory ARC American Red Cross CCE00 Clinton County Emergency Operations Center CE Commonwealth Edison, Licensee DOE Department of Energy DOT Department of Transporation EBS Etergency Broadcast Systen ECC Energency Con:=u.nication Center ECOS Incrgency Core Coolant Systen EOF E:ergency Operations Facility EFA I viron= ental Protection Agency EFL Emergency Preparedness Director EFI Energency Planning Zone FAA Federal Aviation Administration FD'.A Federal Emergency Management Agency FCF Fo: ard Co==ani Fost FHA Federal Highway Administration HHS/FHS Health and Hu=En Services /Public Health Service IDAg Iowa Department of Agriculture i

IDOT Iowa Department of Transportation INEL Idaho National Engineering laboratory l ISDH Iowa State Department of Health ISF Iowa State Patrol, Department of Public Safety JFIC Joint Public Inforcation Center KI Potassiu= Iodide

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LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident NARS Nuclear Accident Reporting Syste:

NUREG-065!- Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-065k/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1)

ODS State of Iowa, Office of Disaster Services PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protective Action Recommendation PIO Public Information Officer PHS Public Health Service Q0NFS Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station RAC Regional Assistance Co==ittee l

RCS Reactor Coolant Syster RER Residual Heat Re= oval SCEOC Scott County Emergency Operations Center SEOC State Energency Operations Center

':'LE Thersolurinescent Dositeter UHL University (State) Hygienic Laboratory, University of Iowa USCG United States Coact Guard US:A United States Department of Agriculture 1

WAWM Jova Department of Water, Air and Waste Management i

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EXERCISE SIDMARY The purpose of an exercise is to determine the ability of appropriate off-site agencies to respond to an emergency covered by State and local Radiological E=ergency Response Plans. The evaluation of such an effort vill, of necessity, tend to focus on the negative aspects of the exercise, on deficiencies in planning, preparedness and performance and areas of required corrective action, and suggestions for improvement.

This focus of attention on the negative should not be taken to mean that there were not a great many positive accomplishments as well. Indeed there were, and especially noteworthy aspects of the exercise are cited througnout this report. However, in the interest of brevity, deficiencies, areas requiring corrective action, and reco==endations for improvement will be e=phasized in this Exercise Evaluation.

Definitions of these three categories follow:

(1) Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that vould cause a finding that off-site energency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of a radiological emergency.

(2) Areas requiring corrective actions are de=onstrated and observed inadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled exercise, they are not cor.s id ered , by the=selves, to adversely icpact public health and safety.

(3) Reco= endations for improvement concern prcble: areas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely i= pact public health and safety. While not required, correction of these would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.

It should be noted that no deficiencies were observed at any location or activity during this exercise. Generally, the mobilization of staff and activation of facilities was successfully accomplished, and the appropriate response was carried out according to plan. Departures from this pattern of operation are shown as areas requiring corrective acticn and are listed below.

IOWA OPERATIONS State Energency Operations Center (SEOC)

1. The radiological staff did not respond pro =ptly to extracrdinary l high radiciodine field scritering data; they need te give scre vi

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attention to the quantitative signifiersnee of radioiodine concentrations in the air and their connection to thyroid doses (IEEG-065L, I.10. ).

2. A Plan change is required on page VI-9 of the State RERP to make it consistent with the Agriculture Plan (NURM-065k, P.h.).

Energency Operations Facility (EOF) 3 The level of ISDH staffing was inadequate to perform their mission (IEEG-065L, E.2. ) .

L. Tne State needs to be included in the message distribution system, providing them with written data throughout the exercise (NUREG-065L, H.2.).

Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) 5 Provide correct rumor control telephone numbers at future press briefings (IR.iREG-065L, G.L.c. ).

Forward Cnemand Post (PCP)

6. Mobilization and activation requires that local responders not be prepositioned and that the facilities net be activated in advance (IEEG-065L, E.2. ) .

Radiological Assessment and Field Team Coordination

7. Tne map used for showing radiological menitoring points needs to be revised (IMEG-065L, J.10.a. ).

Fie3d Monitoring Teams l

6. Additional training in air sampling techniques is required for l

the field monitoring teams (IMEG-065L, I.9. ).

Medical Drill i

l 9 Tne proper use of dosimetry, including TLDs, needs to be demonstrated by the ambulance crew (13 EG-065 , K.3.a.).

COUNTY OPERATIONS i

! Clinton County Emergency Operating Center (CCEOC)

10. Public alerting within 15 minutes of the receipt of the off-site notice was not demonstrated and must be demenstrated at the next exercise (IGEG-065L, E.6. and Appendix 3)

11. Tnere was an inadequate supply of TLDs for emergency workers, including those at the Clinton County decontamination station.

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Tnis was also cited as a problem at the 196h exercise (NUREG-065h, K.3.a.).

12. There was an inadequate supply of KI at the Clinton County EOC (NUREG-065h, J.10.e.)..

Clinton County Reception and Decontm ination (DeWitt Central High School and Goose lake Northeast High School) 13 Activation, staffing and capability for radiological monitoring and decontamination was not demonstrated for either facility; this must be demonstrated for both facilities at the next exercise (NURE-065h, E.2., K.5.a., and K.5.b.).

1h. A layout for monitoring and segregating evacuees both outside the facility and inside the decontamination area needs to be established; this must be demonstrated at the next exercise (NUREG-065h, K.5.a. and K.5.b.).

Scott County Emergency Operations Center (SCEOC) 15 Public alerting within 15 minutes of the receipt of the off-site notice was not demonstrated; this must be demonstrated at the next exercise (NUREG-065h, E.6. and Appendix 3).

16. Procedures for managing and monitoring radiological exposure of emergency workers need to be devised and demonstrated (NUREG-065k, K.3.a).

17. Reentry and recovery needs to be de=onstrated in relation to public information activities and special entry procedures for essential services (NUREG-065k, J.10.J. and M.1.).

Scott County Reception and Decontamination (North Scott High School) 18 Additional training is required for the volunteer fire department in the UHL procedures for monitoring and decontamination (NUREG-ofSh, K.5.b.).

19 A greater e=phasis on contamination control inside the building decontamination area, as well as access control and direction of evacuees is required. Appropriate receptacles for contaminated vaste are also required (NUREG-065h, K.5.a. and K.5.b.).

SCENARIO

20. Future scenarios need to provide adequate radiological data for the specific exercise situations requiring it, as well as the data required for a detailed demonstration of ingestion pathway protective action decision-making (NUR E -065h, N.1.b.).

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1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FDG) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.

FDG 's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the reviev and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed by State and local governments.

Determining whether such plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by State and local governments, and Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process, to vit: The Energy Reorganization of 197L and the Atomic Energy Act of 195k, Chapter 19, Section 276, both atended October 1, 1980.

U.S. Departnent of Co==erce (DOC)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission (NBC)

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

U.S. Depart =ent of Energy (DOE)

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

- U.S. Putlic Health Service (PHS)

U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)

Representatives of these agencies serve as rerbers of the Regional i

Assistance Co: ittee (EAC), which is chaired by FDG.

! For=al submission of the radiological energency respense plans for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS) to the RAC by the State of Iove and affected local jurisdictions was followed by a critique and evaluation of these plans.

I A joint radiological energency preparedness exercise was conducted j for QCNPS on August 27, 1985, between the hours of 0800 and 1600. It was i

classified as Full Scale with the State of Iowa and the counties of Clinton and Scott participating; neither the State of Illinois nor the Illinois counties participated. The results of that exercise are presented in this report.

1.2 E2RCISE EVAIDA'10RS Seventeen Federal agency personnel and five FDG contract staff evaluated the off-site emergency response functions. These individuals and their exercise assignments are given below:

OBSERVER AGENCY ASSIGBGNTS Wolf Biedenfeld HHS/PHS Ambulance Drill /Clinton Decon.

Bob Bissell FDM Clinton Co. EOC Pat Breheny FDG Overview Bill Brinck EPA Field Team Coordination Marlee Carroll FDG EOF John Cole =an FDG Regional Office Coordination Dee De= itt ANL JPIC Bill Gasper ANL Field Monitoring Team Caroline Herzenberg ANL State EOC Tom Hogan FDG Overview Chuck Huyet FDG Regional Office Coordination Steve Kouba DOE Field Monitoring Team Rich Leonard FDG Overview Mark Lickers DOT /USCG Forward Co--and Post Ron NcCabe FDG State EOC Gary McClure FDG Scott Co. EOC Eileen C'Eare FDG/ ARC Reception and Mass Care Bob Rospenda ANL Clinton Co. EOC Brad Sal =enson INEL Reception /Decon. Centers Dick Su=pter FDG Scott Co. EOC Jan Tho:pson DOT Forward Co==and Post Dianne Wilson FDG State EOC 1.3 EVAIDATION CRITERIA Tne evaluation criteria for this exercise were:

1. NUREG-065L/FDG-REP-1, Rev.1 ( All applicable requirements).

1.a. The thirty-five standardized objectives developed as a su==ary of observable ele =ents contained in NUREG-065L, and utilized by the Iowa Office of Disaster Services in its submission of exercise objectives.

2. Iowa Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Section B, Nuclear Power Plant Accident / Incident (all current revisions through December, 196L).

3 Quad Cities - Site Specific Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan, Clinton County, Scott County (all current revisions through Dece ber, 195L).

L. Mercrandum dated August 9, 1985, frot Rick Batsey, Iowa ODS, changing the plans listed in 2 and 3 above, regarding the use of the NARS I

for simultaneous notification of the State of Iowa ODS and Clinton and Scott Counties at all four emergency classification levels.

1 . 16 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES On May 17, 1985, the State of Iowa submitted formal objectives for State and local .iurisdictions for this exercise. The format of this submission utilizes the thirty-five standardized objectives referred to under 1.a. above. The objectives are categorized as either " generic" or "fifth year" in this submission. ' Generic refers to those objectives required of any full-scale exercise, while fifth year refers to those objectives (or aspects of the ) still remaining undemonstrated in the first four years of the five year exercise cycle.

As noted, all objectives are stated in terms of the thirty-five s andard objectives and are numbered 1 through 35 They vill be referred to by number throughout this evaluation report.

In addition to the stated otjectives, there were nine other iters carried over fro = the 19% exercise requiring closure. They were evaluated for closure at the 1985 exercise; the results are included in this report.

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?, l DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC DEFENSE i

.l (N l OFFICE OF DISASTER SERVICES STATE OF IOWA

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,, JOHN D CRANDALL DiafCTom 1985 Cordova Off-site Objectives SCOTT COUNTY Item OBJECTIVE COMMENTS 1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize Demonstrate Civil Defense and Staff mo-staff and activate facilities bilization. (Fifth year) promptly.

2 Demonstrate ability to fully None.

staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock. (gen-eric) 3 Demonstrate ability to make de- None.

cisions and to coordinate emer-gency activities. (generic) 4 Demonstrate adequacy of facili- None.

ties and displays to support emergency operations. (generic) 5 Demonstrate ability to communi- Demonstrate comunication with the plant cate with all appropriate loca- as would occur in a General Emergency, ac-tions, organizations, and field cording to the State Plan. Involves NRS personnel. notification to Scott County. Also demonstrate comunication to the JPIC, in-cluding a back-up communication to util-ity E0F. Demonstrate communication to schools. (Fifth year) 13 Demonstrate ability to alert the Will be demonstrated purusant to FEMA public within the 10-mile EPZ, guidance entitled, " Statement on the and disseminate an initial in- 15 Minute Alert / Notification Requirement structional messaae for REP," Attachment One.

minutes. (generic) , within 15 14 Demonstrate ability to formu- Demonstrate that messages involving pro-late anc distribute appropriate tective action areas can be locally de-instructions to the public in a ciphered (utilizing some descriptive timely fashion. (Fifth Year) system other than sectors).

16 Demenstrate the organizational Verify resources, and willingness to deal ability and resources necessary with evacuation impediments.

to deal with impediments to evac-uation, as inclement weather or traffic cbstructions.

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1955 Cordova Off-site Objectives Page 2 .

ITEM OBJECTIVES COMMENTS 18 Demonstrate the organizational Demonstrate ability to identify and pro-ability and resources necessary tect (including transit res'ources) mobil-to effect an orderly evacuation i ty-impai red. Includes contact.

of mobility-impaired individu-als within the plume EPZ.

(Fifth Year) 19 Demonstrate the organizational Demonstrate ability to protect school ability and resources necessary children and personnel within 10-mile to effect an orderly evacuation EPZ, Scott County. Verify resources of schools within the plume EPZ. for same.

(Fifth Year) 20 Demonstrate ability to continu- Demonstrate permanent record devices ously monitor and control emer- available and usage.

gency worker exposure. (Fifth Year) 22 Demonstrate the ability to sup- Demonstrate distribution procedures, ply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do 50.

(Fifth Year)

24. Demonstrate ability to brief the None.

media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner. (generic) 25 Demonstrate ability to provide Demonstrate connection to JPIC.

advance coordination of informa-tion released. (Fifth Year) 29 Demonstrate adequate equipment Demonstrate registration, monitoring, and procedures for decontamina- and decontamination of emergency workers tion of emergency workers, equip- to include knowledge of contamination ment and vehicles. (Fifth Year) levels and properly maintained monitor-ing equipment.

35 Demonstrate ability to determine Demonstrate knowledge of special entry and imolement appropriate meas- procedures for essential services via ures for controlled recovery and discussion of same during exercise re-reentry. (Fifth Year) covery and reentry period. Demonstrate public information dissemination on re-entry. May involve a simulation of mess-age preparation / dissemination.

- 1985 Cordova Off-site Objectives Page 3 ITEM OBJECTIVES COMMENTS _

QUAD CITIES RECEPTION CENTERS (FIFTH YEAR) 1& Facility activation and staf.- Demonstrate facility activation and 2 fing. staffing.

27 & Registration, monitoring, and Demonstrate recistration, monitoring, de-28 mass care of evacuees. contamination and mass care procedures and resources. The degree of demonstra-tion should involve at least one indi-vidual or family going thru the entire process. Components of this can be simulated, such as decontamination-show capability and resources to do so.

Goose Lake High School, DeWitt High School, and one of the facilities in Davenoort are to be included. Note: The Davenport Reception Cen-ter may demonstrate during the Quad Cities exercise or Duane Arnold exercise, because the same facilities, resources, personnel, etc. would be used for both of these plants.

Scott County will be demonstrating the aforementioned at the Cordova exercise in August 1985. This generic set of activities will also al-low for credit applied to the October 1985 Duane Arnold Exercise.

CLINTON COUNTY l Demonstrate ability to mobilize None.

staff and activate facilities promptly. (generic) 2 Demonstrate ability to fully None.

staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

(genericJ 3 Demonstrate ability to make None.

decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. (generic) 4 Demonstrate aceauacy of facilities None.

and displays to support emergency operations. (generic)

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ITEM OBJECTIVES COMMENTS 5 Comunication. (Fifth Year) Demonstrate communication with the plant as would be required in a General Emer-gency, according to State Plan. Involves NARS contact at General Emergency. Demon-strate comunication to the utility EOF and show coordination with the JPIC.

Also demonstrate back-up comunication to E0F.

13 Demonstrate ability to alert the Will be demonstrated pursuant to FEMA public within the 10-mile EPZ, guidance entitled, " Statement on the and disseminate an initial in- 15 Minute Alert / Notification Require-structional message, within 15 ment for REP, Attachment One.

minutes. (aeneric)

Ic Public Instruction (Fifth Year) Demonstrate route alerting instruction consistent with current protective ac-tion.

16 Evacuation impediments. (Fifth Verify resources list and procedures to Year) deal with evacuation impediments.

18 Mobility-Impaired. (Fifth Year) Verify list of needy as completed. Verify city and school buses as resources.

19 Schools (Fifth Year) Verify resources necessary to protect school children and personnel within 10-mile EPZ.

20 Exposure Control. (Fifth Year) Verify adequate dosimetry for county emergency workers. Demonstrate perman-ent record devices availability and usage.

22 KI supply (Fifth Year) Demonstrate distribution arocedures.

24 Media Briefing. (Fifth Year) Demonstrate preparation and making of news release and simulate conducting of a press briefing.

25 PIO Coordination. (Fifth Year) Demonstrate coordination with JPIC.

29 Decontamination. (Fifth Year) Demonstrate registration, monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers, to include knowledge of contamination levels and properly maintained monitor-ing equipment.

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. 1985 Cordova Off-site Objectives Page g i ITEM OBJECTIVES COMMENTS QUAD CITIES EOF (UTILITY E0F, MORRISON,ILLIN0IS) 1 E0F activation. (Fifth Year) Demonstrate staff mobilization but simulate non-prepositioning with the proper tale on transit time / methods, to include notification.

2 EOF staffing. (Fif th Year) Simulate 24-hour staffing by verifica-tion of capability.

4 E0F adequacy. (Fifth Year) State liaisons to function as always and demonstrate E0F adequacy in keeping them aware of EOF activities, status up-dates, etc.

5 Communications. (Fifth Year) Demonstrate back-up communications to State E0C and County E0Cs.

NOTE: No.10 was included as a " generic" objective at the Utility EOF.

This is not the case for off-site personnel located at the Morrison, Illinois, EOF.

10 Demonstrate ability to project This objective is actually performed at dosage to the public via plume the Iowa State EOC in Des Moines, and in exposure, based on plant and the Iowa field monitoring functions. The field data, and to determine ap- only possible application lies in the propriate protective measures, fact that the utility, from its EOF, based on PAGs, available shelter, will recommend PAGs to Iowa based upon evacuation time estimates, and its own assessment. Iowa, of course, all other appropriate factors. will independently assess the situation; therefore, an actual demonstration of this objective will not occur here E2-ordination of certain information, will, and that is the objective.

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1985 Cordova Off-site Objectives Page 6 ,.

ITEM OBJECTIVES COMMENTS QUAD CITIES JPIC 1 Facility activation. (Fifth Year) Demonstrate staff mobilization, but simulate non-prepositioning with the proper story in transit time / methods, to include notification.

2 Facility staffing. (Fifth Year) Simulate 24-hour staffing capability with verification of same.

4 Demonstrate adequacy of facili- None, ties to support emergency opera-tions. (generic) 5 Demonstrate ability to communi- None.

Cate with all appropriate loca-tions, organizations, and field personnel. (generic) 24 Demonstrate ability to brief None.

the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner. (generic) 25 Demonstrate ability to provide None.

advance coordination of infor-mation released. (generic) 26 Rumor Control (Fifth Year) Demonstrate Rumor Control at JPIC.

l IOWA STATE F.C.P.

I Demonstrate ability to mobilize With exception of State Patrol.

staff and activate facilities l promptly. (generic) 2 Demonstrate ability to fully Will simulate this, but will show staff facilities and maintain resources, staffing around the clock.

(generic) 3 Demonstrate ability to make None.

decisions and to coordinate i

emergency activities. (generic) 1 I

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1985 Cordova Off-site Objectives Page 7 ITEM OBJECTIVES COMMENTS 4 Demonstrate adequacy of facili- None.

ties and displays to support emergency operations. (generic) 5 Demonstrate ability to communi- None.

cate with all appropriate loca-tions, organizations, and field personnel. (generic) 16 Evacuation impediments. (Fifth Discussion amongst FCP players of re- '

Year) sources available to deal with impedi-ments.

20 Exposure control (Fifth Year) Demonstrate permanent record devices at FCP. Exhibit procedures for ex-posure control.

22 KI Supply. (Fifth Year) Exhibit distribution procedures.

10WA STATE E0C 1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize None.

staff and activate facilities promotly. (ceneric) 2 Demonstrate ability to fully Simulate this, but will outline re-staff facilities and maintain sources.

staffing around the clock. (gen-eric) 3 Demonstrate ability to make de- None.

cisions and to coordinate emer-gency activities. (generic)

Demonstrate adecuacy of facili- None.

ties and displays to support emer-gency operations. (generic) 5 Demonstrate ability to communicate None, with all appropriate locations, or-ganizations, and field personnel.

(generic) i

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1985 Cordova Off-site Objectives Page 8 ,

ITEM OBJECTIVES COMMENTS 10 Demonstrate ability to project None, dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine ap-propriate protective measures, based on PAGs, available shel-ter, evacuation time estimates, and all other appropriate factors.

(generic) 15 Denonstrate the organizational Demonstrate assistance requests to U.S.

ability and resources necessary Coast Guard and U.S. Army Corps of Engin-to manage an orderly evacuation eers, for Mississippi River Control, of all or part of the plume verifying their resources for same.

EPZ. (Fifth Year)

This relates to the following objective number 17.

17 Demonstrate the organizational Also exhibit special entry for essential ability and resources necessary services via discussion of methods and to control access to an evacuated resources amongst State EOC players.

area.

24 Demonstrate ability to brief the Exhibit appropriate displays for same.

media in clear, accurate and timely manner. (Fifth Year) 25 Demonstrate ability to provide ad- None, vance coordination of information released. (generic) 12 Demonstrate ability to implement Exhibit infomation on food processing protective actions for ingestion plants (non-dairy) and detailed crop, pathway hazards. (Fifth Year) maps, as they are avsilable. Procedures for obtaining information not available i in State E0C, will be demonstrated.

l 11 Demonstrate ability to project This is a generic and will be optional l dosage to the public via ingestion for performance at the October 30, pathway exposure, based on field 1985, Duane Arnold exercise.

data, and to determine appropri-l ate protective measures, based on PAGs and other relevant factors.

(generic) l 1

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1985 Cordova Off-site Objectives Page o ITEM OBJECTIVES COMMENTS FIELD MONITORING / COORDINATION /

RAD LAB / DECONTAMINATION 4 Demonstrate adequacy of facili- None.

ties and displays to support emergency o'perations. (generic) 5 Demonstrate ability to comuni- None.

cate with all appropriate loca-tions, organizations, and field personnel. (generic) 6 Demonstrate ability to mobilize None.

5 aeploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion. (generic) 7 Demonstrate appropriate equip- None.

ment and procedures for deter-mining ambient radiation levels.

(generic) 8 Demonstrate appropriate equip- None.

ment and procedures for measure-ment of airborne radiciodine concentrations as low as 10-/

UCi/CC in the presence of noble gases. (generic) 10 Demonstrate ability to project None dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to detennine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs, available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and all other appropriate factors. (generic) 20 Demonstrate ability to continu- None.

ously monitor and control emer-gency worker exposure. (generic) 29 Demonstrate adequate equipment / (Fifth Year) Demonstrate the proceedures for decontamination facility (only) which would be used of emergency workers, equipment, for decontamination of field monitor-vehicles. (generic) ing teams and their equipment. Lg-tjoyn_ will be determined and submitted with scenario.

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, i 1985 Cordova Off-site Objectives Page 10 ITEM OBJECTIVES COMMENTS MEDIC Iowa is required to demonstrate an ambulance drill within the 1985 Cordova exercise. While the Moline Public Hospital is the primary dedicated facility for receiving a radiologically-contaminated victim (from on-site) and has demonstrated this capability in a previous exercise (1984), there needs to be a repeat demonstra-tion for a victim from within the Iowa side of the EPZ, with at-tendant ambulance services. The exercise of this objective would not require the hospital itself to go through its decontamination protocol, but is intended to show primary field care / ambulance for Iowans. Iowa also needs to expand, in writing, the extension of Moline Hospital's receiving responsibilities to the Iowa side of the EPZ. (Fifth Year)

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1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO The exercise scenario began with Unit One in cold shutdown, seven days into an eight week refueling outage. While Unit Two was shutting down from full power to a standby hot pressurized condition, a large air leak developed in the condenser boot. Shortly thereafter, the Unit 1 refuel platform partially collapsed due to breaking at the structural veld splices. This left the bridge . sitting precariously on the vall between the reactor cavity and the storage pool. As a result of this collapse, one operator was thrown off the platfor= into the reactor cavity.

Later, the refuel platform shifted causing the fuel bundle to drop and da= age several fuel rods. This resulted in a release of noble gases fro = the damaged rods. The situation escalated and resulted in si 6nificant levels of noble gas and iodine release in the reactor building; activity release at the chinney continued to increase.

A list of major events with planned and actual times follow:

Planned Actual Time Event Time 0750 Unusual Event 07h0 0900 Alert 0900 110C Site Area E=ergency 1110 1230 General Energency 1235 1600 Exercise Terminated 1607 1.6 STATE AND LOCAL RESOURCE Listed below are organizations that planned to participate:

State of Iowa

1. Iowa Office of Disaster Services

2. Iowa State Department of Health

3. Iowa National Guard L. Iowa Department of Public Safety (Iowa Highway Patrol) 5 Iowa Department of Water, Air, and Waste Management

6. Iowa Depart =ent of Transportation

7. University Hygienic Laboratory

6. Office of the Governor 9 Office of the Attorney General

10. Iowa Department of Human Services

11. Iowa Department of Agriculture

12. Iowa Co: ission on Aging 13 Iowa Conservation Co==ission Ih. Iowa Co=serce Commission 15 Office of the Adjutant General

16. American Red Cross i

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Clinton County Scott County -

Civil Defense Sheriff's Department Sheriff's Departnent Highway Department Highway Department Board Chairman County Supervisor Health Department Social Services Public Information Office Public Information Office American Red Cross American Red Cross Human Services Area Education Agency Environmental Health Amateur Radio Club Area Education Agency Municipal fire, police, Municipal Mayors and mayors City of Princeton City of Clinton Town of LeClaire Town of Co=anche Town of McCausland Town of Lov Moor

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9 2 EXERCISE EVAIAJATION 2.1 IOWA OPERATIONS 2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

The following objectives were to be demonstrated at this facility:

1, 2, 3, k , 5, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 2h and 25 The SEOC received a call from the utility on the NARS line at 0900 notifying it of the " Alert" classification. Staff mobilization procedures were demonstrated, and staffing of the facility was completed by 0930 by all appropriate agencies, except for the Department of Transportation representative who arrived at 1030. An actual emergency prevented the Department of Water, Air and Waste Manage =ent fro: attending; however, they were available by telephone throughout the exercise.

Mobilizatien of dose assessment personnel was not demonstrated. They were prepositiened, in that they arrived during the Unusual Event and before the Alert status. However, it should be noted that the dose assessment personnel were very capable, well-trained and well-informed.

With the exception of WAWM and dose assess =ent personnel, round-the-clock staffing was de=onstrated by shift change and/or presentation of a roster.

With the exceptien of this and the co=ments above concerning prepositioning, both Objectives Nu=ber 1 and 2 were adequately demonstrated.

Decision-=aking and the ability to coordinate emergency activities was fully demonstrated (Objective 3). Periodic briefings were held to update and involve the staff. There was good discussion between the Department of Health and the counties on protective actions; all of the protective actions were coordinated by phone prior to transmittal by hard-copy.

The SED ~ provided a positive work environment augmented by good maps and displays, fully demonstrating Objective Number L.

Co==unica icn syste=s were adequate with special mention to the smooth functioning cf the administrative hot-line, which proved to be so=ewhat unreliable in the previous year's exercise. The NARS provides a direct co==unicatien link with the utility and is continuously monitored. All primary co==urication systems were demonstrated; however, backup systems were not. There was a problem in getting radiological data fro the plant.

This was also a problem in the 198L exercise. This is described in greater detail under the EOF section of this report. A hard copy channel, such as that utilized by the Iowa SEOC for Fort Calhoun vould be an excellent solution to this problem. Other than these limitations, Objective Number 5 was adequately demonstrated.

The ability to project dosage to the public via plu=e exposure was adequately deconstrated with expected doses derived fro = both plant release data and field readings. Field monitoring teams were mobilized and deployed

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in a timely canner; the plume was located, but edges and time variations were not defined in detail. The dose assessment and radiological staff were doing a good job of thinking ahead about plant condition developments and their implications for off-site effects. Also, they demonstrated capability and versatility in using a variety of approaches for getting estimates of dose projections. Protective action recommendations for the plume pathway were promptly reviewed and updated as conditions changed.

One problem' did emerge when the radiological staff did not respond promptly to extraordinarily high radioiodine field measurement data. Instead, this was handled as routine data rather than being quickly reevaluated as erroneous, or confirmed and the appropriate actions taken. The recommen:iation is that all radiological staff (including the field team members and captain) give more attention to the quantitative significance of radiciodine concentrations in the air and their connection to thyroid doses.

A limited demonstration of ingestion pathway protective action decision-making took place; the scenario was lacking in data to provide a more thorough display of capability. Illinois did not participate in the exercise, and therefore, there was no interstate coordination of protective action decision-making.

Other than the problem encountered with the radioiodine release and the limited deconstration concerning the ingestion pathway, Objectives Number 10 and 11 vere adequately demonstrated.

The SEOC had current information on the location of dairy farms, food processing plants and water supply intake points. This, coupled with the availability of detailed crop information available through the Agricultural Extension Agency, which was contacted during the exercise, fully demonstrated Objective Number 12. However, as noted in the 198L Exercise Report, a plan i change is required on page VI-9 of the State RERP to make it consistent i vith the Agriculture Plan. Procedures for notification of dairy far=ers l

are consistent with the Agriculture Plan, but conflict with the State Plan.

Resources and procedures for evacuation activity and access control vere accounted for, but actual field activity was simulated. Objectives Number 15 and 17 vere adequately deconstrated.

The capability to conduct a news briefing was demonstrated, using appropriate caps and displays. Infor=ation released was coordina ed in advance with all appropriate locations. Objectives Number 2L and 25 vere fully demonstrated.

Su==ary: Objectives not fully demonstrated during this exercise:

1, 2, 5, 10 and 11.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions

1. Tne radiological staff did not respond promptly to extraordinarily high radiciodine field monitoring data; they need to give more attention to the quantitative significance of radiciodine concentrations in the air and their connection to thyroid doses (NUEE-065L, I.10.).

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2. A Plan change is required on page VI-9 of the State RERP to make it consistent with the Agriculture Plan (NUREG-065k, P.L.).

2.1.2 Ehergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The following objectives were to be demonstrated at this facility:

1, 2, L, 5 and 10.

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Staffing of the EOF was completed by 1121 with mobilization of the staff demonstrated. Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated for the ODS staff; however, only one ISDH representative was in attendance. This level of IDHS staffing was inadequate to perform their mission, as vill be described below. In addition, 2h hour staffing for this function was not demonstrated.

The alternate representative utilized in past exercises has been reassigned and is ne longer available.

The location of the State participants at the EOF makes it impossible to read the status boards, observe the utility radiological decision making or even see the utility's posting of the current E=ergency Action Level classification. Because of this, the State ODS staff maintained their oW posting of these levels within sight of both State staffs.

Two ISDH representatives are required to adequately meet the demands of the role. One person must constantly staff the rad conference line while the other is given free access to the utility's functional area. He may be a " roving ISDH liaison" reporting back to the rad conference line.

The reliance on verbal data until vell into the exercise led to two instances where the IGC requested confirmation of data transmitted, which proved to be correct. A provision for the utility to supply written data, to include the State in the message distribution system at the earliest stages, would improve the flow of information. In addition, the States follow up transmission of hard copy data vould reduce the potential for error.

The constant menitoring of the phone line would enable all parties to request and transmit infor=ation, when needed, rather than waiting for the next time the staffer returns to the phone and requesting ic=ediate results. The utility responded beyond the normal requirements on several occasiens by allowing their Recovery Manager and their Environmental Systems Manager to respond directly to State inquiries over the Rad conference line, had this been a real incident or had Illinois been participating, such personal attention could not have been given.

With these certain exceptions concerning the ISDH, Objectives Numbers 1 and 2 vere adequately demonstrated; Objective Number h was only partially demonstrated.

All primary and secondary co unication lines were de=onstrated; the secondary system involved the use of two separate microwave telephone systems, each with a different access location. As was noted in the SE00 section o

of this report, there was a problem getting plant technical data to the SIDC . It is reco== ended that the primary and back up telecopiers assigned to the State PIO function be made available to the rad health tear for hard copy data transmission. Other than this, Objective Number 5 was adequately demonstrated.

Although Objective Number 10 was listed for the EOF, it was determined that it does not apply to this location.

Summary: Objectives not fully demonstrated during this exercise:

1, 2 and h.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions

3. The level of ISDH staffing was inadequate to perform their mission (NUREG-065h, E.2.).

h. Tne State needs to be included in the message distribution system, providing the= with written data throughout the exercise (NUREG-065h, E.2.).

Recomunendation Tne ISDH staff should utilize the other hard copy device, available tc State persennel, for transmitting radiological data to the SE00.

2.1.3 Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)

Tne following objectives were to be demonstrated at the JPIC: 1, 2, L, 5, 2h, 25 and 26.

l Staff mobilization, facility activation and the verification of j r:und-the-clock staffing fully de=onstrated Objectives Number 1 and 2.

Tnis was based on the availability of k staff people, 2 per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shift.

Space and equipment were available for the PI0s to give briefings.

Sixteen telephones were available for the media, and the facility has a seating capacity of about fifty. In addition, PIOS were connected to all le:atiens via the Administrative hot-line located at the EOF, which enabled nessage confirmation and requests for local data. Objective Number h was fully deconstrated.

Objective Nu=ber 5 was listed for the JFIC, but deemed applicable to the EOF instead.

l Eight briefings were given at approximately half hour intervals.

l prescripted messages were used, supplemented by appropriate sector messages fro = the SOPS. Press packets were very understandable and easy to use for reference; the use of color coding for different sections was very effective.

Tne for=at would seem to work well as a generic packet for other plants Icva is involved with (utilizing site-specific inserts). Objectives Number 2- and 25 vere fully de=enstrated.

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A licited demonstration of rumor control capability took place (Objective 26). No rumor control phone numbers were included in any press releases.

Ynen asked about rumor control, the PIO referred to the five numbers listed in the emergency brochure, which were not specifically intended for lumor control; in addition, this was not consistent with the number shown for rumor control in the press packet. There was one television and radio at the EOF for monitoring news broadcasts for accuracy; hove-ter, this activity was not demonstrated.

Su=cary: Objective Number 26 was not fully demonstrated at this exercise.

Area Requiring Corrective Action 5 Provide correct rumor control telephone numbers at future press briefings (NUREG-065L, G.L.c. ).

Recommendation If each State's ru=or control telephone number is constant, include thes in the next printing of the brochure.

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o 2.1.k Forward Cnemmand Post (FCP)

• The following objectives were to be demcnstrated at the FCP: 1, 2, 3, h, 5,16, 20 and 22. .,

The FCP was activated at 0912 at the Alert suge.. The facility had been set up in advance of the exercise activation, and 'th'e Iowa Conservation Co==ission was prepositioned before the Alert. Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated for all FCP participants. In light of the above limitations, Objectives Number 1 and 2 were demonstrated. , -

Objective 3, emergency operations management, was fully de=Instrated with good interaction among the' various agencier present. Adequacy of facilities and co==unications capability, Objectives Number h and 5, were also fully de enstrated. In the 198h exercise, some problems were experienced with the conference line, but this syste= functioned smoothly with no dicruptions in service in this exercise.

The Iowa DOT Resident Maintenance Office had the appropriate resources necessary te deal with i= pediments te evacuation, fully ' demonstrating Objective Nu=ber 16.

The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was fully demonstrated (Objective 20). An adequate supply of potassium

~ iodide (KI) was available, and the staff was familiar with proper procedures concerning its use, fully de=onstrating Objective Number 22.

Su==ary: Objective Nuncer 1 was not fully demonstrated at this exercise.

Area Requiring Corrective Action

6. Mobilization and activation requires that local responders not be prepositioned and that the facilities not be activated in advance (NUEEG-065h, E.2.).

2.1.5 Radiological Assessment and Field Team Coordination The following objectives were to be deconstrated for the Radiological Assessrent and Field Team Coordination function: h, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 20 and 29 Future submissions of objectives should include Number 35, reentry and recovery, for this function when it is included as a State or County exercise objective.

The facility for the radiological assessment and field team coordination activities was adequate, containing relevant status boards and maps. The status board was only partially kept up to date; information on protective actions was not kept current throughout the exercise. There was a need for the Coordinator to be kept fully aware of plant conditions (see the proble cited concerning information dissetination in the EOF section, 2.1.2).

A third persen is needed to maintain the status board and to keep the Coordinator apprised of relevant information available through the CCE3C (down the hall). Objective Number 1 was partially demonstrated.

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The map used by the utility, Iowa and Illinois that shows radiological monitoring points, needs to be revised. It was pointed out in the 198h exercise report that this map shows duplicate points with the same identification name, such as, B3 or C1. this occurs in sectors containing portions of Iowa and Illinois. The two States and the utility need to devise a system that assigns a separate "name" for each point. The current situation could be very confusing in a real emergency with all parties involved in radiological monitoring. Objective Number h was partially demonstrated.

Primary comanications systems were demonstrated; hoves er, backup systems were not. A radio system has been purchased to coordinate field team co==unication. However, direct communication was not possible, and all transmissions had to be relayed through a remote base station. This limited the Coordinator's ability to direct the teams efficiently and hampered his getting data back from the field. A proposed relocation of the radiological assess =ent and field team coordination function to the Clinton County EOC should allow direct co==unication between the field tea =s and the Coordinator.

Objective Nu=ber 5 vas adequately demonstrated.

Field monitoring tea =s were mobilized and deployed in a ti=ely manner, which fully demonstrated Objective Nu=ber 6. Objectives Number 7 and 8 are included under the Field Monitoring Teams section of this report.

No mechanis: vas available for coordinating efforts of the utility field tea =s and State field teams. Dose calculations were pro =ptly made at the SE00 and were checked by their co=puter at the SEOC. Monitoring data was not plotted on a .:ap due to a shortage in personnel at this location; having this data available on a map would have been helpful to the Ccordinator in knowing where to =ove his teams and knowing which areas to close off.

The scenario did not allow for the plume boundaries to be correctly defined; the scenario only provided center-line readings.

Dese projection was not de=onstrated by the Field Team Coordinator, as was Iowa's intention by including Objective Nu=ter 10 for this location, due to problems encountered with the progra==able calculator. The result was that dose projection was only done at the SEDC. Therefore, Objective Number 10 was adequately de=onstrated at th SEOC, but these calculations were not done in the field, which provM h valuable check of the SE00 calculations, and is desirable.

Objective Nu=ter 20 is included unuer tne i-ield Monitoring Teams section of this report.

Adequate equip =ent and procedures for decontamination of field teams was demonstrated (Objective 29). More detail is provided under the Scott County Beception and Decontamination Centers section of this report.

Smry: The following objectives were not fully demonstrated at this exercise: 1, L and 10.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions T. The map used for showing radiological =cnitoring points needs to be revised (NURP3-0654, J.10.a.).

,1 Recomunendation It is desirable for the Field Tea = Coordinator to calculate dose projections in addition to that done at the SEOC. This provides a valuable check of the-SEOC calculations.

Move the Field Team Coordinator to the Clinton County EOC to facilitate direct radio co==unication between the Coordinatcr and . field monitoring teams. Provide et third person at this facility to keep the status board up to date and to gather relevant information from the County EOC.

2.1.6 Field Monitorirg Teams The following objectives were to be demonstrated by the Field Monitoring Teams: 5, 6, 7, 8 and 20.

Objective hu=ber 5 was adequately de=onstrated.

Mobilization of the field tea =s was adequately demonstrated. Check lists were used to verify the inventory of equip =ent. Appropriate equip =ent and procedures for determining a=bient radiation levels were de=onstrated.

A =inor proble: arose in that the Green Tea = vas unable to replace the batteries in their Multichannel Analyzer without a Phillips screwdrivar.

Tnis should be added to the equip =ent list for both tears. Objectives Number 6 and 7 vere fully de=enstrated.

Both teams adequately demonstrated appropriate equip =ent and procedures for =easure=ent of airborne radiciodine in the presence of noble gases (Objective 8). However, additional training is reco== ended for the Blue Team in air sa=pling techniques. The Blue Tea re=ained in the plume, at the sa:pling location, to take readings on the air filter cartridges.

Tnerefore, an accurate count would not have been obtained.

The Blue Tea = should be co== ended for their good job in locating sa=pling points although they were unfamiliar with the area. Also, their use of an EPZ =ap with a plastic overlay to = ark data fro = each sampling point proved to be very helpful.

Field Team exposure control (Objective 20) was fully de=enstrated.

Each tea = had adequate protective equip =ent including anti-contamination suits, boots, gloves and tongs, and respirators. Tne teams had adequate dosimetry including TLDs. The tears were not aware of the pre-established l decontamination station they would utilize in the event of contamination.

However, they did obtain this infor=ation fro = the Coordinator.

Su==ary: Objective Number 6 was not fully de=0nstrated at this exercise.

Area Requiring Corrective Action S. Additional training in air sampling techniques is required for the field =0nitoring teams (NUEEG-065!., I.9. ).

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I 2.1.7 Medical Drill Tne objective to be demonstrated was Number 30, ambulance facilities.

The Illini Hospital Ambulance Service participated in this medical drill. Tne patient was surveyed, the contamination contained, injuries treated and transported in accordance with appropriate standards. The ambulance crew vore protective cloth' .e; and were equipped to reduce contamination to the ambulance interior.

The ambulance crew did not wear personal dosimetry, and it was not logged out to each individual, although it was in the vehicle. However, this did not include TLDs. Each individual should have had self-reading and permanent record dosimetry. More training of the staff and the use of check lists outlining procedures would probably resolve this problem.

The scenario did not provide for readings of specific exposure levels.

This prevented an assessment cf the ambulance crews knowled E e of levels of hazard or risk.

Other than the problem referred to above, Objective Nu=ber 30 was adequately demonstrated.

Su==ary: Objective Nu=ber 30 was not fully demonstrated at this exercise.

Area Requiring Corrective Action 9 Tne proper use of dosimetry, including TLDs, needs to be decor.strated by the actulance crew (NUREG-065!., K.3.a. ).

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2.2 COUNTY OPERATIONS 2.2.1 Clinton County Bnergency Operations Center (CCEOC)

The following objectives were to be demonstrated at the CCEOC: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 13, IL, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, eh, 25 and 29.

The CCE00 received notification of the Alert at 0858; EOC staffing was co=pleted at 11hh. Staff mobilization procedures were demonstrated as was round-the-clock staffing for all EOC participants except the Mayors of Lov Moor and DeWitt. With these two exceptions, Objectives Number 1 and 2 were fully demonstrated.

Decision-making and the coordination of emergency activities, Objective 3, was fully demonstrated. Facilities and displays to support the emergency operation vere adequate, fully de=onstrating Objective Number k.

All relevant primary co==unications systems were de=onstrated, as well as the backup to the SEOC, Scott County EOC and the EOF. A problem cited at the 19Sh exercise, a limited nu=ber of telephones for the EOC staff, was resolved with the installation of three additional phones. Objective Number 5 was adequately deconstrated.

The initial public alerting began during the Alert status. At 10h7, Clinton County received a telefax from the SEOC reco==ending an evacuation of all people within 0-2 miles of the plant. A simulated siren activation took place at 1055; the EBS message was prepared and a simulated calling of it to the EBS station took place by 1103. No route alerting was performed during this public alerting.

alerting to take place.

It took a total of sixteen minutes for this The second public alerting took place at the Site Area Emergency.

At 1110, a message was received over NARS that the Site Area Emergency was declared. At 1122, the CCE00 received a telefax from the SECC stating that the Site Area Energency had been declared. A simulated siren activation took place at 1128, and a simulated route alerting began at 1130. The EBS message was prepared, and a simulated calling of it to the EBS station took place by 1135 Therefore, a total of twenty-five minutes transpired from the time of the off-site notice of the emereeney classification to the public alerting.

To su==arize, the capability to alert the public within fifteen minutes after off-site authorities were notified of an emergency condition was not demonstrated. The CCEOC Director was under the assumption that he was supposed to wait until the emergency classifications were telefaxed to him before initiating any public alerting. Tnis procedure is not contained in the Plan. Had this procedure not been followed, and the resulting delay been avoided, it seems that the fifteen minute requirement could have been met and Objective Number 13 vould have been adequately de=onstrated.

Other than the proble vith initial public alerting described in the previous paragraph, Objective Nu=ber lh was adequately demonstrated. Public alerting and notification f neluded information about sheltering procedures.

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Resources for dealing with impediments to evacuation were verified, although they were not actually demonstrated in this exercise. The organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an evacuation of cotility-imparied people, as well as schools within the EPZ vere both adequately deconstrated. Resources were verified, but not acutally deployed to the field. Objectives Number 16, 18 and 19 vere adequately demonstrated.

Monitoring and control of emergency worker exposure (Objective 20) were adequately demonstrated with the exception of TLDs; the requirement for TLDs was pointed out in the '198h exercise report. Only five TLDs were available to the CCE0C at the time of the exercise; this amount is inadequate.

Although the staff was aware of proper procedures concerning the use of KI, an adequate supply of it was not available (Objective 22).

A siculated press briefing (no press in attendance) was conducted at the CCEOC utilizing appropriate maps and displays. Information released was consistent with the information coming from other spokespersons. This fully demonstrated Objectives Number 2h and 25 The Clinten Fire Department successfully de=onstrated equipment and pro:edures for the decontamination of emergency workers, their equipment and vehicles (Objective 29). However, no TLDs were available to the staff of this facility. Inadequacies in the scenario prevented a more thorough evaluation of survey techniques and decontamination procedures; in the future, readings at specific points should be provided to facilitate this.

Su==ary: The following objectives were not fully de=onstrated at this exercise: 1, 2, 13, 20 and 22.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

10. Public alerting within 15 minutes of the receipt of the off-site

! notice was not demonstrated and cust be demonstrated at the next l exercise (NUREG-065L, E.6. and Appendix 3).

11. There was an inadequate supply of TLDs for energency workers, including those at the Clinton County decontamination station.

This was also cited as a proble: at the 198h exercise (NUREG-065h,

[ n.3.a.>

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12. There was an inadequate supply of KI at the Clinton County EOC (NUREG-065h, J.10.e.).

Recommendations The initial notification to the public need only include an indication of the e=ergency and the direction to stay tuned for additional information.

Protective action instructions can be included in subsequent messages.

Alert and Notification efforts should not be delayed avaiting receipt of a c:nfirmatory telefax from the SEOC.

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As shielded storage is not required for TLDs (with provision for a

" control" TLD), an adequate number should be made available to the Clinton County EOC without further delay.

2.2.2 Clinton County Reception and Decont-hiation Two facilities were evaluated for Clinton County: DeWitt Central High School and Goose Lake Northeast High School. The following objectives were to be demonstrated for each facility: 1, 2, 27 and 28.

DeWitt Central High School Activation and staffing (Objectives 1 and 2) were fully demonstrated for the reception and congregate care aspects of this facility, but not for the radiological monitoring and decontamination functions. The UHL is responsible for establishing and staffing monitoring stations and decontaminatien centers, but their representative was unfamiliar with the facility layout.

According to the Clinton County Civil Defense Director, trained locals are available to perfom radiological monitoring and decontamination at the receptien centers (Clinton, Comanche and Lov Moor Fire Departments).

However, none of these groups de=onstrated this capability at the reception centers, due to an oversight in taking arrangements for their participation at these two centers, prior to the exercise. It should be noted that the Clinton Fire Department did demonstrate this capability at the Clinton deconta=1 nation station for emergency workers at this exeriese.

Registration and mass care cf evacuees (Objectives 27 and 28) were fully demonstrated.

Tne DeWitt shelter had the capacity for 1,250 people, and overflow shelters could have been opened, if necessary. The shelter was adequate in terns of sleeping accommodations, toilet facilities, drinking veter, storage, parking and food supplies. The shelter was also staffed and equipped to handle handicapped evacuees. The American Red Cross personnel vere well-trained, enthusiastic and demonstrated a thorough knowledge of their responsitilities.

Objective Eurber 27, in relation to radiological monitoring and decontamination, was not adequately de=enstrated. The UHL representative did have the appropriate radiation survey equipment and supplies.

However, he did not demonstrate a layout for monitoring and segregating evacuees, both outside of the facility and inside the decontacination area.

Goose lake Northeast High School The Goose Lake facility was not actually activated, but was evaluated for adequacy of facilities, personnel, equipment and supplies. A roster was presented to show adequate staffing capability for the reception, registration and mass care functions, including round-the-clock staffing capability. This fully demonstrated Objectives Number 1 and 2 for these functions. However, just as with the DeWitt facility, these two objectives were not acco:plished for radiological monitoring and decontamination.

The DeWitt section of this report, above, provides further detail on this.

Objectives 27 and 26, in relation to registration and mass care of evacuees, were adequately demonstrated at Goose Lake. A valk through of the facilities and discussion of procedures were used to verify this capability. This shelter can accommodate 1,100 people, and other facilities are available, if required. The ' shelter is adequate in terms of sleeping acco=modationc, toilet facilities, drinking water, storage, parking and food supplies. The shelter was also equipped to handle handicapped evacuees.

Objective Number 27 was not adequately demonstrated for the radiological monitoring and decontacination functions. Although the facility shoul' be adequate fer use as a monitoring and decontamination center, the same staffing and operational problems identified at the DeWitt center were in evidence here. See the DeWitt section of this report for further detail on this.

Sn--ery: Tne following objectives were not fully demonstrated at this exercise: 1, 2 and 27.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

13. Activation, staffing and capability for radiological monitoring and decontamination was not demonstrated for either facility; this must be demonstrated for both facilities at the next exercise (NURE -065L, E.2., K.5.a., and K.5.b.).

1L. A layout for monitoring and segregating evacuees both outside the facility and inside the decontamination area needs to be established; this cust be deconstrated at the next exercise (NUR E -065L, K.S.a. and K.5.b.).

Recomendation It is reco== ended that the diagrac of the layout for each facility be included in the relocation center plans.

f l 2.2.3 Scott County Bnergency operations Center (SCEOC)

Tne following objectives were to be demonstrated at the SCEOC: 1, l

l 2, 3, L, 5,13, IL,16,16,19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 29 and 35 Tne SCE00 received notice of the Alert at 0900. Staff mobilization I procedures were demonstrated, and staffing was co:pleted by 0923 Round-the-clock staffing was also demonstrated which comprised a full de=onstration cf Objectives Nu=ber 1 and 2.

Energency operations ranagement and adequacy of facilities (Objectives 3 and i) vere both fully demonstrated. It should be noted that I decision-making would have been greatly enhanced if a speaker phone had been ins Elled on the administrative het-line. An especially noteworthy aspect of this phase of the exercise was the excellent job done by the second in co--n-i vhen he took over the operations at the shift change. Sector population caps were revised to distinguish between actual residents and i

potential transients.

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. All relevant primary com=unications systees were demonstrated, as well as the backup to the EOF and media center. The administrative hot-line, which had been somewhat unreliable in the 198L exercise, functioned smoothly at this exercise. Objective Nu=ber 5 was fully demonstrated.

The SCEOC was notified of the Site Area Emergency at 1110 on the NARS.

The message vas not verified until 1117. The PIO included protective action reco=mendations in the initial notification and did not finish dictating the message to the EBS station until 1127. The lengthy time to verify the message and the inclusion of protective action reco=mendations resulted in the failure to notify the public in fifteen minutes. Also, the fact that the entire message had to be dictated was very time-consuring. If the EBS station vould be provided with copies of the prescripted messages, the need for dictating the entire message would be eliminated. The result was that Objective Number 13 was not demonstrated.

Objective Nu=ber IL was adequately demonstrated.

The capatility to deal with impediments to evacuation was fully demonstrated; resources were not actually activated in the field, but were verified as to their adequacy. Tne organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-i= paired individuals and schools within the plume EPZ vere adequately demonstrated through si=ulation, verification of resources and evaluation of procedures.

Tnerefore, Objectives Number 16,18 and 19 vere adequately demonstrated.

Tne ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure, Objective Number 20, was fully demonstrated. TLDs were available as was KI; also, the staff was aware of procedures concerning the use of KI, fully demonstrating Objective Nu=ber 22. However, there is no procedure calling for a periodic report from e=ergency workers as to the exposure levels encountered.

Objective Nu=ber 2L, cedia relations, was adequately demonstrated by a simulated press briefing. Objective Number 25, as it applied to the SCEOC, was fully demonstrated.

Objective Number 29 is included under the Scott County Reception and Decenta-4"c+4^- section of this report.

Feentry and recovery activities failed to adequately derenstrate Objective Nu ber 35 Tne SCEOC staff did not ergage in any public notification activities or issue any EBS messages on reentry restrictions.

However, arrangements were made to secure the evacuated areas. Special entry procedures for essential services, an aspect of Objective Nu:ber 35, was not deconstrated. Tnis had been carried over as an undemonstrated element fro: previous exercises.

Su= ary: The following objectives were not fully de=enstrated at this exercise: 13, 20 and 35 I

e Areas Requiring Corrective Actions 15 Public alerting within 15 minutes of the receipt of the off-site notice was not demonstrated; this must be demonstrated at the next exercise (NUREG-065h, E.6. and Appendix 3).

16. Procedures for managing and monitoring radiological exposure of emergency workers need to be devised and demonstrated (NUREU-065h, K.3.a.).

17. Eeentry and recovery needs to be demonstrated in relation to public infor=ation activities and special entry procedures for essential services (NUREG-065h, J.10.J. and M.l.).

Rectummendation Tne initial notification to the public need only include the indication cf an emergency and direction to stay tuned for additional information.

Prc:ective action instructions can be included in subsequent instructions.

It seets that adhering to this procedure would have facilitated meeting the 15 minute requirement.

2.2.h Scott County Reception and Decontamination Tne following ob,*ectives were to be demonstrated for this facility:

1, 2, 27, 26 and 29 North Scott High School Activation and staffing, Objectives Number 1 and 2, were adequately derenstrated for reception, registration, and cass care, as well as radiological conitorinE and decontamination.

Although Otjective 27 was adequately demonstrated for both the registration and tonitorinE of evacuees, so=e correctable weaknesses were

noted. Tne volunteer fire department personnel need to be fully trained l in the UHI. procedures for tonitoring and decontanination (e.g., instrument operation, centaminatien limits, survey techniques, record keeping forms).

A greater emphasis en contamination control inside the buildinE decontamination area, access control and direction by usin6 pre-printed signs and barrier ribbon, is also needed. Apprcpriate receptacles for contacinated vaste are also required.

Since the potential exists for the use of more than one instrument type for contamination surveys, it is recor= ended that procedures and l contamination survey limits be developed for each type of equipment.

l Additional instrutent resources should be identified, calibrated, and made available for use, if necessary (e.g., Civil Defense instrumentation, which has been issued to the volunteer fire departnents).

Tne facilities were adequate for mass care of evacuees. Tne shelter could acec odate approximately 300 people, and an overflow facility was I

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• ~ also available nearby. Tne facility was adequate in terms of sleeping acco==odations, toilets, drinking water, secure storage and parking. Adequate food supplies were also available. In addition, the shelter was staffed and equipped to handle handicapped evacuees. Objective Nu:ber 28 was fully demonstrated.

The North Scott High School facility was designated not only for evacuees, but also for emergency workers and field monitoring teams.

Tnerefore, Objective Number 29 was adequately demonstrated. However, the suggestions listed under Objective Number 27, in reEard to decontamination, also apply here.

Su-v ry: Objective Number 27 was not fully demonstrated at this exercise.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions

16. Additional training is required for the volunteer fire department in the UHL procedures for monitoring and decontatination (NUEEG-065L , K. 5.b. ) .

19 A greater emphasis on contamination control inside the building decontamination area, as well as access control and direction of evacuees is required. Appropriate receptacles for contarinated vaste are also required (NUREG-065h, K.5.a. and K.5.b.).

Recomunendation Additional instrument resources should be identified, calibrated and made available.

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- 3 SCPJtARIO Tne scenario only provided a limited amount of radiological data for the reentry and recovery phase of the exercise, resulting in a limited demonstration of this objective. Future scenarios shculd allow for a longer vind-down phase and more technical data to facilitate a more thorough demonstration of capability.

The scenario was also lacking in regard to field team monitoring.

The scenario only provided center line readings, which did not allow for the plume to be defined. 7t is recommended that in the future, a controller be provided for each field team with adequate data.

A third area where the scenario was lacking concerned the lack of technical data for the ambulance drill and for the Clinton County decontamination for energency workers. In both cases, readings should have been provided for specific points. Tne lack of specific contamination readings for the victic prevented a thorough assess:ent of the ambulance crew's knowledge of levels of hazard or risk. In the case of Clinten County's decontamination center, the lack of specific radiological readings prevented a thorough evalulation of survey techniques and decontamination procedures.

Areas Requring Corrective Action

20. Future scenarios need to previde adequate radiological data for the specific exercise situations requiring it, as well as the data required for a detailed demonstration of ingestion pathway protective action decision-making (NUREG-065!., N.l.b.).

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h SIDMARY OF ARFAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IOWA OPERATIONS State Emergency Operations Center (SB00)

1. Tne radiological staff did not respond promptly to extraordinary high radiciodine field monitoring data; they need to give more attention to the quantitative significance of radiciodine concentrations in the air and their connection to thyroid doses (NUREG-065L, I.10.).

2. A Plan change is required on page VI-9 of the State RERP to make it consistent with the Agriculture Plan (NUREG-065k, P.L.).

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 3 The level of ISDH staffing was inadequate to perform their r_ission (If5EG-065L, E.2.).

L. The State needs to be included in the cessage distribution system, providing them with written data throughout the exercise (fr@EG-065L, H.2. ) .

Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) 5 Provide correct rumor control telephone nu=bers at future press briefings (NUREG-065L, G.L.c. ).

Forward Cnnunnnd Post (FCP)

6. Mobilization and activation requires that local responders not be prepositioned and that the facilities not be activated in advance (IrJREG-065L, E.2.).

I Radiological Assessment and Field Team Coordination

7. The cap used for shoving radiological monitoring points needs to be revised (WREG-065L, J.10.a. ).

Field Monitoring Teams

8. Additional training in air sampling techniques is required for the field monitoring teams (NUREG-065L, I.9.).

Medical Drill 9 Tne proper use of dositetry, including TLDs, needs to be de=onstrated by the actulance crew (NUREG-065k, K.3.a.).

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COUNTY OPERATIONS Clinton County Bnergency Operating Center (CCEOC)

10. Public alerting within 15 minutes of the receipt of the off-site notice was not demonstrated and must be demonstrated at the next exercise (frJRE-065L, E.6. and Appendix 3).

11. Tnere was an inadequate supply of TLDs for emergency workers, including those at the Clinton County deconta=1 nation station.

This was also cited as a problem at the 198h exercise (NURE-065h, K.3.a.).

12. There was an inadequate supply of KI at the Clinton County EOC (frJREG-065L, K.3.a. ).

Clinton County Reception and Decon+==ination (DeWitt Central High School and Goose lake Northeast High School)

13. Activation, staffing and capability for radiological monitoring and decontat' nation was not de=enstrated for either facility; this cust be demonstrated for both facilities at the next exercise (IEE-065L, E.2. , K. 5.a. , and K. 5.b. ) .

IL. A layout for conitoring and segregating evacuees both outside the facility and inside the decontamination area needs to be established; this cust be de=onstrated at the next exercise (IME-065L, E. 5.a. and K. 5.b. ).

Scott County Bnergency Operations Center (SCEC)

15. Public alerting within 15 minutes of the receipt of the off-site notice was net demonstrated; this must be de=enstrated at the next exercisc (!T*RE-065L, E.6. and Appendix 3).

16. Procedures for canaging and monitoring radiclogical exposure of e=ergency workers need to be devised and de=enstrated (faE-065L, K.3.a.).

17. Reentry and recevery needs to be de=enstrated in relation to public information ac:ivities and special entry procedures for essential services (tam-065L, J.10.J. and M.1. ).

Scott County Reception and Decontamination (North Scott High School)

16. Additional training is required for the volunteer fire department in the UHL precedures for monitoring and decontamination (IMEG-065L, K. 5.b. ) .

19 A greater er;haris on centarinatien centrol inside the building decontamination area, as well as access control and direction of evacuees is required. Appropriate receptacles for contaninated vaste are else required (ITTr.EG-065L, K.5.a. and E.5.t. ).

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SCERARIO l

20. Future scenarios need to provide adequate radiological data for

, the specific exercise situations requiring it, as well as the

< data required for a detailed demonstration of ingestion pathway protective action decision-raking (NUREG-0654, N.1.b. ).

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Federal Emergency Management Agency ,i

' l Region Vil til Walnut Street Kansas City, Missouri 64106 n)

- SEP 4E

<Nr'.JackCrsndall, Director leva Office of Disaster Services Roover State Office Building, Roz A-29 Des Moine 1 50319 -

Dear Mr  :

The a Cities exercise on August 27, 1985, identified a probism

• vi he plan for notification from the utility to the off-site governments. The plan, as written, called for notification to the State, and then fra the State to the Counties, until the letter of August 9,1985, from Mr. Rick Damsey of your staff, indicated that the plan was changed to simultaneous notification to the State and the Counties. The simaxataneous notification was the procedure demonstrated on August 27,1985 Bovever, at the exercise, representatives of the utility indicated ht the simultaneous notification procedure was in effect only for the exercise, and no perr.anent change to reflect the letter -

of August 9, 1985, was being made. We cannot accept any justificatioc for changing a procedure only for an exercise.

Exercises are intended to der.onstrate the standing plan, and I

are the basis for evaluation of capability to implement that plan. .

Therefore, since the procedure demonstrated at the August 27, 1985, exercise was the one of simultaneous notification, and considering the indicati:cs of the utility representatives ht this is not within their standing plan, we sust require the utility's coccurrence of the plan change, certifying as currently effective h procedure of simaltaneous notification. t'his plan change and certification from the utility must be provided to this office by September 30, 1985, to be incorporated into the exercise report.

In the absence of these actions by that date. September 30, 1985, the August 27,11985, in theexercise vill be notifiestion detemined portion to plan.

of the have included a deficiency The res. ult of this to demonstrste h will be the need.'for procedure a remedial for notification to W axercise State, and then fra the state to the Counties. This will be the standing plan if the utility does not concur en the simultaneous motifiestico procedure. '

Dependent upon the procedure for motification free the utility to W off-site governments, is W a' bility to alert and motify

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.. , 't . t P.83 SEP.84 '85 13:43 fem ngt a VII @ NSAS CITY 1

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I the public within 15-minutes of the motification to the off-site governments. If the plan, as agreed to by the utility and -

off-site govemments. involves motification from the State to the Counties mn there remains undemonstrated the It notification to the public within 15-minutes in this context. was not ~

demonstrated ine 1985 beesuse of the use of simultaneous actification. vtbe exercise of Detober 27,198L, demostrateo #

the procedure of motification to the State, and then from the State to the Counties, but it did not demonstrate the ability to alert and motify the public within 15-minutes or the 1 -

sotification to the State. (This situation was sitigated by the plan which, at that time, called for simultaneous motification '

to the State and Counties, although it vse contrary to the procedure demonstrated in 198L. as noted above.) Therefore,,

the remedial exercise which will be required to demonstrate t

State to County motification. in the absence of utility concurrence of simultaneous notification to the Counties, will also need to demonstrate public alert and motification within 15-minutes of the notification to the state.

Of course. I will be happy to discuss this mat,ter with you should you ao desire. Eavever, I can see no way to correct this situation other than as outlined herein. ,

l 1Revised evaluation terzinology defines a 'deficioney"

! as a demonstrated and observed inadequacy ht would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken ,

to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radiological emergency (formerly called a Class A Deficiency). ,_

Since

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4-Patri k J. ebeny Regional Director FD%-Region VII ,

. Y ee: ' James 0. Keppler. IRC III .

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} ( Fede$l Emergency Manage $ent Agency Region VII 911 Walnut Street . Kansas City, Missouri 64106 JAN 3 1986 .

MEMORANDUM FOR: Samuel Spec Associate Director l

. ate & Loc Prog ams & Support FROM:' d Patrick J. Breheny, Regional ire or, FEMA-Region VII

SUBJECT:

Update for the Quad Cities 350 Review The enclosed information is provided to you as an update on the status of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station 350, which is currently under your --

office's review. The two remaining areas requiring action by the Iowa Office of Disaster Services in order to complete the processing of the 350, have been resolved.

The plan deficiency identified during the k U6 A 2rW" U. h)lf W

-L^^ , exercise concerning simultaneous notification from the utility to the off-site governments has been resolved.

The attached memorandum from Commonwealth Edison to Mr. Jack Crandall, Iowa Office of Disaster Services dated December 15, 1985, and the Letter of Agreement (attached) dated October 22, 1985, confirm the off-site notification procedures that' vill be implemented during an emergency at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station and identify the notification codes to be utilized by each party. The simultaneous notification to the Iowa State Office of Disaster Services, Scott County and Clinton County vill occur at the Site Area and General Emergencies.

This is in accordance with the procedure demonstrated during the exercise.

The second area requiring action, concerning the improper submission of plan corrections, has also been resolved. All corrections (attached) for the Iowa State, Clinton County and Scott County plans have been submitted in an acceptable form.

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If you have any questions, please contact Bob Bissell at (FTS) 758-2161.

Attachments cc: Jack Crandall, Iowa Office of Disaster Services Region VIL RAC Ken Green, FD1A H.Q.

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• _ - . _ _ _ .. . . u ... . .. . _ _ . - . . . . . . . . .-m I Commo ealth Edison b  ;

72 West Adams Street. Chicago, liknors_ j

, Address Reply to' Post Office Box 757 Ch.cago,lihtos 60690 0767 ~

December. 13, 1985 Mr.:J. Crandall Director Iowa office of Disaster Services State of Iowa Hoover State office Building Room A-29 Des Moines. Iowa 50319 subject: NARS - Cordova Units one & Two - offsite Notification, State of Iowa

Dear Mr. Crandall:

This memo will confirm, and further define, the intent of Commonwealth Edison to provide the State of Iowa with offsite notifications a More outlined in the Letter of Intent / Agreement executed in October 1985.

specifically at the utility-designated SITE EMERGENCY and GENERAL E classifications, Commonwealth Edison will provide simultaneous notification

' the Iowa State office of Disaster Services, Scott County and Clinton RS County.

The NARS code we have identified to provide this specific notification is NA We anticipate a series of notification tests with Iowa beginning code 43.

possibly as early as February 1986.

Sincerely,

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L. D. Butterfie d Manager

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Nuclear Services Technical

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LDB/wss/lak/0077E/81 I - - --- - ---_ ___ _ __ ______ rL

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q a.u sER OF INTENT / AGREEMENT Per this agr nt between the Iowa Office of isaster Services,

' State of Iowa, and the Emergency Services and Disaster Agency, State of lilinois and the Commonwealth. Edison Company, the following Iowa off-site notifications will occur in the event of an incident at Comonwealth Edison's Fixed Nuclear Facility (Cordova Units One and Two),Cordova, Illinois.

Through the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS):

EMERGENCY CLASS 1FICAT10N _ NOTIFICATION METHOD Unusual Event Iowa ODS notified by the utility over NARS dial code 33. ODS to then notify Scott and Clinton Counties by a new NARS dial code to be determined or by another alternate method.

Alert Iowa ODS notified by NARS dial code

33. ODS to then notify Scott and -

Clinton Counties by a NARS dial code to be detemined or by another alternate method.

Site Emergency Simultaneous notification by the utility to Iowa ODS Scott County,

' and Clinton County over a new NARS dial code to be determined or by another alternate method.

General Emergency Simultaneous notification to Iowa 005, Scott County, and Clinton County over a new NARS dial code to be determined or by another alternate method.

10 6 E OF DISASTER SERVICES ILLINDIS EMERGENCY SERVICES AND DISASTER AGENCY

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..J6pnD.Crandall, Director

,W .

CharlesD.JonesGirector Dated: cD54I/ FT Dated: lok,*L."1.\,ST roMM0 WEALTH EDISON POMPANY L. D. Butterfield thuclear Services .

Technical Manager

, Dated: \kt O This agreement is predicated on either the installation, by the '

Comonwealth Edison Company, of a separate NARS dial code accessing locations within the State of Iowa at the exclusion of Illinois counties or, at the election of the State of Iowa, the development of an alternate method of notifying the Iowa counties. Any alternate method will be agreed upon by the State of Iowa and Commonwealth Ecison company.

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