ML20138R561

Special Insp Repts 50-369/85-29 & 50-370/85-28 on 850903-11. No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Response Facilities.Weaknesses Noted: Meteorological Measurements & Control Room Assessment Areas

ML20138R561
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	12/16/1985
From:	Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138R556	List: ML20138R555 ML20138R561
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, RTR-REGGD-01.097, RTR-REGGD-1.097 50-369-85-29, 50-370-85-28, GL-82-33, NUDOCS 8512310367
Download: ML20138R561 (46)

See also: IR 05000369/1985029

Text

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u UNITED STATES

[0Kro q

', NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

$" * $ REGION 11

j j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

• '- t ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323

\**"*/ DEC 2 3 M6

Report Nos.. 50-369/85-29 and 50-370/85-28

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17

Facility Nane: McGuire 1 and 2

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Appraisal Conduct September 3-11,_',85

Team Leader: . .. ,

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A. L. Cunningna ~

y, lZ Jh/

Dat6 SMned

Accompanying Personnel: K. C. McBride

J. E. Fairobent

R. T. Hogan

G. W. Laoinski, Jr.

A. K. Locoser

D. R. Perrotti

D. H. Schult:

M. E. Wangler

- E. F. Williams, Jr.

Approvec by .

M/

T. R. Decker, Section Chief

/ /M!F

Cate' Signed

Emergency Preparecness Section

Division of Raciation Sa#ety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Inspection on Septemoer 3-11. 1985.

Areas Inspected

This special, announced insoection involved 280 inspector-hours onsite and

68 inspector-hours offsite in the area of an Emergency Response Facilities (ERF)

aporaisal. The appraisal was conducted using draf t Revision 5 of IE Insoection

Procedure 82212 to cetermine if the licensee has successfully implemented the

requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737. The appraisal included tne Technical

Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), Crisis Management Center,

and the respective cata acquisition systems, instrumentation, supplies and

equipment for these facilities.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified. However, two appraisal

weaknesses were identified in the meteorological measurements (1.2.4.2. A) and

Control Room dose assessment (1.2.4.2.B) areas respectively.

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TABLES OF CONTENTS

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INTRODUCTION v

1.0 Technical Support Facility 1

1.1 Physical Facilities 1

1.1.1 Design 1

1.1.1.1 Size 1

1.1.1.2 Layout 2

1.1.1.3 Location 2

1.1.1.4 Structure 2

1.1.1.5 Habitability / Environment 2

1.1.1.6 Display Interfaces 3

1.1.2 Radiological Equipment and Supplies 6

1.1.2.1 Radiation Monitoring 6

1.1.2.2 Personnel Dosimeters 6

1.1.2.3 Protective Supplies 6

1.1.3 Non-Radiological Equipment anc Supplies 6

1.1.3.1 Communications 6

1.1.3.2 Recorcs/Orawings 7

1.1.3.3 Support Supplies 7

1.1.3.4 Powar Supply 8

1.1.3.5 Conclusion 9

1.2 Information Manacement 9

1.2.1 Variables Provided 9

1.2.1.1 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Rev. 2 Variables 9

1.2.1.2 Other Variables 10

1.2.1.3 Relationship to Functional Needs 10

1.2.2 Data _ Acquisition 11

1.2.2.1 Data Collection Method- 11

1.2.2.2 Time Resolution 11

1.2.2.3 Isolation 12

1.2.3 Data Communications 13

1.2.3.1 Capacity 13

1.2.3.2 Error Detection 13

1.2.3.3 Transmission Between ERFs 13

1.2.4 Data Analysis' 13

1.2.4.1 Reactor Technical Support 13

1.2.4.2 Dose Assessment 14

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1.2.5 Data Storage 22

1.2.5.1 Storage Capabilities 22

1.2.5.2 Conclusion 22

1.2.6 System Reliability 23

1.2.6.1 Verification 23

1.2.6.2 Computer Based Systems 23

1.2.6.3 Manual Systems 24

1.2.7 On-Shift Dose Assessment 24

1.2.7.1 Dose Assessment proficiency 24

1.2.7.2 Dose Assessment Technical Adequacy 25

1.3 Functional Capabilities and Walkthroughs 25

1.3.1 Operations 25

1.3.1.1 Organization 25

1.3.1.2 Staffing 25

1.3.1.3 Activation 25

1.3.1.4 Communication Interfaces 26

1.3.1.5 Offsite Interfaces 26

1.3.1.6 Transfer of Responsibilities 26

1.3.2 Control Room Support 26

1.3.2.1 Technical Support 26

1.3.2.2 Walk-Throughs 26

1.3.3 Initial EOF Functions 27

2.0 Operations Support Center (CSC) 27

2.1 Physical Facilities 27

2.1.1 Design 27

2.1.1.1 Location 27

2.1.1.2 Alternate OSC Location (s) 27

2.1.1.3 Si:e, Layout, and Environment 27

2.1.1.4 Display Interface 27

2.1.2 Radiological Equipment and Supplies 28

2.1.2.1 Radiation Monitoring 28

2.1.2.2 Personnel Dosimeters 28

2.1.2.3 Protective Supplies 28

2.1.3 Non-Radiological Equipment and Supplies 28

2.1.3.1 Communications 28

2.1.3.2 Support Supplies 28

2.2 Functional Caoabilities and Walkthroughs 28

2.2.1 Operations 28

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2.2.1.1 Staffing 29

2.2.1.2 Activation 29

2.2.1.3 Onsite Interface 29

2.2.2 OSC Functions 29

2.2.2.1 Coordination, Assignment, Proficiency, 29

and Walkthroughs

2.2.3 Conclusion 29

3.0 Crisis Management Center 29

3.1 Physical Facilities 29

3.1.1 Design 29

3.1.1.1 Size 29

3.1.1.2 Layout 30

3.1.1.3 Location 30

3.1.1.4 Structure 30

3.1.1.5 Habitability / Environment 31

3.1.1.6 Display Interfaces 31

3.1.2 Radiological Equipment and Supplies 32

3.1.2.2 Personnel Dosimeters

3.1.2.3 Protective Supplies

3.1.3 Non-Radiological Equipment and Supplies 32

3.1.3.1 Communications 32

3.1.3.2 Records / Drawings 32

3.1.3.3 Support Supplies 32

3.2 Information Manaoement Systems 33

3.2.1 Variables Provided 33

3.2.1.1 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Rev. 2 Variables 33

3.2.1.2 Other Variables 33

3.2.1.3 Relationship to Functional Needs 33

3.2.2 Data Acquisition 34

3.2.2.1 Data Collection Method 34

3.2.2.2 Time Resolution

3.2.2.3 Isolation

3.2.3 Data Communications 34

3.2.3.1 Capacity

3.2.3.2 Error Detection

3.2.3.3 Transmission Between ERFs

3.2.4 Data Analysis 34

3.2.4.1 Reactor Technical Support 34

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3.2.4.2 Dose Assessment 35

3.2.4.3 Central Processor Capability 35

3.2.5 Data Storage 35

3.2.5.1 Storage Capabilities

3.2.6 System Reliability 35

3.2.6.1 Verification 36

3.2.6.2 Computer Based Systems 36

3.2.6.3 Manual Systems 36

3.3 Functional Caoabilities and Walkthroughs 36

3.3.1 Operations 36

3.3.1.1 Organization 36

3.3.1.2 Staffing 36

3.3.1.3 Activation 36

3.3.1.4 Communication Interfaces 37

3.3.1.5 Offsite Interfaces 37

3.3.1.6 Transfer of Responsibilities 37

3.3.2 TSC Support 37

3.3.2.1 Technical Support 37

3.3.2.2 Logistic Support 37

3.3.2.3 Implementation of Mitigating Actions

3.3.3 CMC Functions 38

3.3.3.1 Notification / Communication 38

3.3.3.2 Dose Assessment

3.3.3.3 Protective Action Decisionmaking 38

3.3.3.4 Coordination of Radiological and

Environmental Assessment 39

3.3.3.5 Walk-Throughs 39

4.0 Persons Contacted 39

5.0 Exit Interview 40

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this appraisal was the performance of a con.prehensive evaluation

of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) to determine if the licensee has

successfully implemented the respective requirements defined in Supplement 1 to

NUREG-0737, and guidance promulgated in Regulatory Guide 1.97.

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EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES

APPRAISAL EVALUATION

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1.0 Technical Suoport Center (TSC)

1.1 Physical Facilities

1.1.1 Design

1.1.1.1 Size 4

The McGuire TSC is a multi-room area of approximately 1,400 square

1 feet. ,l'here are an estimated 35-50 people expected to man the TSC

dur.f ng' emergencies. During the TSC walkthrough, it was observed that

three work areas were severely overcrowded, while several other areas

provided insufficient workspace for writing and document lay-down. The

overcrowded areas were .the Emergency Director's room (Room 913), and

the computer and the dose assessment areas. The latter area provided

only 90 si;uare feet, much of which was occupied by equipment. The dose

assessment area provided standing-room-only. Consistent witF the

spatial constraints, traffic flow into, out of, and through this

facility was difficult.

The above findings were discussed in detail with cognizant licensee

representatives who indicated that changes to this facility, including

reconfiguration, are planned. It was noted, however, that neither the

magnituce nor projected completion of the planned changes were defined.

This finding will be tracked as an open item until such ti',1e that

indicated facility modifications are completed (50-369/8d-29-01,.

50-370/85-28-01). Based upon a human factors evaluation, the minimum

facility modifications and recommendations are listed below.

Improvement Items

The cose assessment area should be exoanded to at least three

times its present size or approximately 300 square feet, to

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adequately accomodate the expected staff of six to seven persons

(IFI 50-369/85-29-02, 50-370/85-28-02).

The Emergency Director's office - Room 913, should be sized to

accomodate tne personnel expected to staff the general area.

Since this area is not access-controlled, the manpower estimate

should be increased to allow for non-staff personnel and

intruders, i.e., a total of 20-30 persons. Sufficient walkthrough

space should ' be provided. It appears that the present size,

namely 360 square feet, should be increased to 1,000-1,500 square

feet (IFI 50-369/85-29-03, 50-370/85-28-03).

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• The computer room lacks adequate walking and equipment maintenance

space. The area should be increased in width by two feet

(IFI 50-369/85-29-04, 50-370/85-28-04).

All areas should be provided with additional writing surfaces,

document lay-down areas, and chairs (IFI 50-369/85-29-05,

50-370/85-28-05).

1.1.1.2 Layout

The layout of the TSC is generally adequate considering the multi-room

constraints. Traffic problems appeared to be a function of size

instead of configuration. The exception; however, is the dose

assessment area. The dose assessment staff is located in an area that

is not readily accessible to the TSC status boards, the computer room,

and the Emergency Director. During the walkthrough, the subject staff

was updated only by using a runner (the Health Physics Supervisor).

1.1.1.3 Location and 1.1.1.4 Structure

The McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) Technical Supoort Center (TSC) is

located near the Control Room on the 767 ft. elevation of the Service

Building in Rooms 911, 912, 97.3, and 914. The TSC is in close

proximity to the Operations Support Center (OSC) wh;ch 'is located in

Rooms 909 and 910 of the Service Building. The TSC's location is

within a two minute walk from the Control Room. The only security

control point (key card reader) aetween the Control Room and the TSC is

located at the entrance to the Control Room. The TSC provides

facilities near the Control Room with detailed analyses of plant

systems and status during emergencies and abnormal conditions. The.

facility is designed to have the an'9 radiological habitability as the

Control Room during accident cor itions. In the event that the TSC

becomes uninhabitable, provision has been made for an alternate

location in the rear of the Control Room, namely, Rooms 930 and 931.

1.1.1.5 Habitability / Environment

The facility has been designed to have the same habitability as the

Control Room. TSC personnel are protected from gamma radiation hazards

by concrete block shielding that is designed to limit the integrated

dose under post accident conditions to 2.5 rem. The shielding is the

equivalent of 4 inch thick casted concrete walls, a 6 1.nch thick floor,

and 112 inch thick ceiling. The TSC is provided with its own

ventilation system that includes high efficiency air particulate (HEPA)

and charcoal filtration. Following a safety injection at either Unit 1

or 2,.the emergency ventilation system is actuated and air intakes pass

through the filter train into the TSC. The air intakes to the TSC are

monitored for noble gases. Audio and visual alarms for the radio-

logical monitors have been installed in the TSC and Control Room to

alert personnel of adverse conditions. The monitors- are calibrated to

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two trip set points. Trip 1 provides a warning, while trip 2 initiates

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an interlock which isolates the TSC ventilation and places it into a

recirculation mode. The system also generates a slight positive

pressure within the TSC. The system is calibrated and checked for

operability, including filter checks and interlock initiation, on a

scheduled frequency. It was determined that the two TSC radiological

monitors in their normal mode, are turned off. When the TSC is

activated for an emergency, someone is supposed to be dispatched to

manually actuate the monitors. The effectiveness of this policy is

limited to slow moving accidents, and is dependent on assuring that an

assigned person does, in fact, turn on the monitors. Further, the

monitors must be actuated in sufficient time to stabilize detector

response.

Imorovement Item

The radiation monitors should be maintained in an operating mode on.a

continuous basis to assure radiological protection for TSC personnel

during an emergency. This item was discussed in detail with cognizant

licensee representatives who acknowledged the finding

(IFI 50-369/85-29-02, 50-370/85-28-06). This item will be reviewed

during sucsequent inspections.

1.1.1.6 Display Interface

The McGuire TSC has the following methods of display available:

Status Board - The status boards are the primary source for

recording and communicating site data within the facility. It

provides pre-formatted space for recording data on approximately

80 variables for up to 45 minutes, at 15 minute intervals.

Operator Aid Computer (OAC) Terminals -

Two terminals provide

access to real-time data from the plant computer as well as

historical trending for most monitored plant variables for up to

48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. Data is provided in tabular form.

Printers - Three printers are available for displaying computer

data. Two are associated with the OAC terminals and one is used

with the dose assessment terminal to display dose assessment

information and meteorological data.

Site Emergency Planning Maps - Ten and 50 mile reading maps are

provided. The 10 mile map in the dose assessment area-is overlaid

with plexiglass and provided with a compass and cursor style

pointer. This compass and pointer concept is effective, except

that pointer increments (5, 10, and 20 mile ranges) are not

consistent with the scale of the map. Correct increments are

marked on the surface of the pointer with a marking pen; however,

the markings are smeared and difficult to read.

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The McGuire TSC does not have the capability for graphically trending

data. Tabular trends can be generated on the OAC. The displays

present data in an easily identifiable and legible form. Data are

directly useable and do not require change or conversion. The single

exception, however, addresses off-normal core temperature data. The

computer performs temperature range checks on the in-core thermocouples

to determine that core temperatures are within the expected range. The

ranges are set by operations / nuclear engineering and are not equivalent

to the instrument range; i.e., in-core thermocouple ranges are set at

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500 F to 718 F. When the expected range is exceeded, an asterisk is

displayed instead of the actual data value. As a result, if in core

thermocouples read graater than 718 F, only asterisks are displayed.

Since thermal excursions may occur under emergency conditions, the

displays of core temperature, e.g., the core map, may become

meaningless rows of asterisks. According to licensee personnel, this

situation could be corrected by changing the range of the variable (s)

in question to full instrument range. When the change was

demonstrated, the correction of range took only three minutes; however,

the correction reouired a knowledgeable engineer or a control room

operator. It appears that the change in range could be more easily

accomplished using software algor".hms.

An additional concern addressed the timeliness of data updates. As

presently configured. data from the OAC is manually offloaded to the

VAX computer. This process is discussed under data aquisition in

Section 1.2.2, below. The process can be implemented in 10 to 15

minutes. The primary source of data in the TSC, the VAX computer, can

only provide data that is at least 5 minutes old and could be as much

as 15 minutes or more old, depending on the reliability and timeliness

of the manual data transfer, and the time that the data was last

sampled. The time delay could greatly affect the time that the data

was last sampled. This time delay could greatly affect the dose

calculation program because the input data (for both releases and

meteorology) would then be 15 minute " snapshots" that may be

unrepresentative of prevailing conditions. It is possible, therefore,

that Cose assessment personnel, as well as reactor operations

personnel, will make frequent requests for real-time data from the OAC

terminal operator and/or crowd around the terminals and printers to get

the latest data. This situation could predispose to possible confusion

regarding the data. itself, e.g., what vintage data was used in the

latest dose calculation.

Regarding the usability of the computer terminals, the inspector

identified one concern; namely, that the nearly vertical orientation of

the OAC . terminal keyboards makes key-in commands very difficult.

Imorovement Items

Based on the above review and evaluation of display interface,

recommended improvement items are listed below.

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A different technique should be used to alert the operators that

core temperature data is outside of expected range. Whatever

method is chosen, it should not automatically remove the data from

display as the present method does, i.e., replacing abnormal

values with an asterisk. Two less intrusive options are:

(1) putting the data in reverse video, and (2) boxing the data in

an outline.

Since it appeared that the core temperature range checking and

replacement of aonormal values with an asterisk was used by

licensee personnel as both an alerting function and a data

validation function, it is further recommended that the two

functions be scparately identified on displays so that the

operator knows unambiguously whether the data is within the

expected range and is valid. The alerting function should be

consistent with that used in the Safety Parameter Display System,

i.e., color coding as follows: green = normal, yellow =

off-normal, orange = abnormal, red = emergency. The boxing and

reverse video concepts mentioned above could be used as redundant

codes so that video concepts mentioned above could be used as

redundant codes. This approach would preclude loss of information

on black and white displays such as print-outs

(IFI 50-369/85-29-07, 50-370/85-28-07).

Data validation should be through the use of appropriate software

algorithms. Simple range checks are generally insufficient. Data

validity (valid, invalid, and unvalidated) should then be

displayed in an unambiguous manner, e.g. , by showing unvalidated

or suspect ca.a followed by a question mark, and by replacing

invalic data with an appropriate message such as "off-scale high"

or "recundant sensors differ 2 percent" (IFI 50-369/85-29-09,

50-370/35-25-03).

The present manual data transfer of data from the OAC to the VAX

computers should be eliminated and the VAX should be provided with

continuous access to data at, or near, real-time (IFI

50-369/S5-29-09, 50-?70/85-28-09).

Graphic trending capability should be provided in the TSC. The

sampling frecuency of trended data should be adequate to detect

significant enanges (IFI 50-369/85-29-10, 50-370/85-23-10).

0AC terminal keyboards that are now fixed in a nearly vertical

orientation should be reoriented to an ergonomically correct

position so that mis-keying is minimized (IFI 50-369/85-29-11,

50-370/85-28-11).

The items defined above were discussed in detail with cognizant

licensee representatives. The licensee acknowledged the items, and

stated that such changes are planned. These items will be reviewed

during subsequent inspections.

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1.1.2 Radiolooical Equioment and Supplies

1.1.2.1 Radiation Monitoring,1.1.2.2 Personnel Dosimeters, and 1.1.2.3

Protective Supplies

The TSC is equipped with an installed area radiation monitor and

dedicated portable monitoring equipment. Additional dose rate

equipment is available from the Surveillance and Control Laboratory

(S&C Lab) to monitor TSC dose rates, radiological concentrations in

air, and levels of personnel and surface contamination. Supplies of

direct reading dosimeters up to 500 mR and a dosimeter charger were

available in dedicated TSC lockers. Should a dosimeter of high range

be required, it would be obtained from the Dosimetry Control Point or

the Oosimetry Office. Adequate supplies of respiratory / protective

equipment and protective clothing are available in the TSC lockers. A

complete inventory is available in the warehouse. Potassium iodide and

instructions for the use thereof were available in a dedicated locker

in the TSC. Decontamination facilities used by TSC personnel are

located within a few minutes walking distance in the First Aid Room

within the restrictad area.

Area radiation monitor data is used by the Station Health Physicist in

the TSC to brief health physics technicians on the plant radiological

-conditions w1en accompanying in plant teams. Currently, this

monitoring data is acquired by sending a messenger to the Control Room

to record the data or by contacting the Control Room via telephone.

Since hard copy data is accessible from the OAC, procedures or

instructions should be developed to describe the method for obtaining

monitoring data from the OAC in the TSC (IFI 50-369/85-29-12,

370/85-28-12). Such an improvement would provide easier access and

useability of these data by the Station Health Physicist, and avoid tile

need to contact the Control Room and avoid the possibility of

transcription errors. This item will be reviewed during subsequent

inspections.

1.1.3 Nonradiolooical Equioment and Supolies

1.1.3.1 Communications

The licensee has provided multiple systems for transmitting and

receiving emergency information between the various Emergency Response

Facilities (ERFs) and offsite locations during emergencies. The

communications systems for McGuire are similar to those used at Catawba

Nuclear Station which were evaluated and discussed in the Catawba ERF

Appraisal (Inspection Report Nos. 50-413/85-39, 50-414/85-36).

The TSC provides communication interface between the Control Room,

Crisis Management Center (the Emergency Operations Facility for the

Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations), State and county warning i

points / Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), and NRC (via the ENS l

phone). The Crisis Management Center is located at the licensee's

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General Office in Charlotte, North Carolina. State / county warning

points are manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day. The primary communication link

with offsite agencies .is a selected service telephone system (SSS). A

direct " intercom" line exists between the Emergency Coordinator (EC) at

the TSC and Recovery Manager (RM) at the Crisis Management Center

(CMC). Backup communication links consist of commercial telephone

and/or radio. The TSC has radio communication with the McGuire offsite

field monitoring teams. Key personnel in the TSC are provided with

their own communication link (e.g., inplant phone, offsite phone or

intercom). The communication systems are described in Section F and

illustrated ii. Figures F-2 of the McGuire emergency plan. Communica-

tion equipment in the Control Room and TSC was inspected on

January 7-11, 1985 (Inspection Report Nos. 50-369/85-02, 50-370/85-02).

Records reviewed during that inspection disclosed that communication

tests were conducted at the frequency specified in NUREG-0654.

1.1.3.2 Records / Drawings

As configured in the non-emergency mode, the McGuire TSC has available

most of the documents expected to adequately support operations in the

eme gency mode. These items included the FSAR, Emergency Plan and its

Implementing Procedures, off-normal and emergency procedures, and other

wall displays expected in the emergency configuration. Technical

manuals, piping, instrumentation, and electrical drawings are not

routinely available in the TSC, but are obtained from nearby satellite

libraries. The instrument and electrical (IAE) library is across the

hall from the TSC. The mechanical library is 200 feet away from the

TSC, outsida of tne TSC's controlled ventilation environment. It was

observed that the IAE library was very comprehensive relative to

mecnanical areas, and included all piping diagrams and systems

descriotions that could be reasonably expected to be required for'

preliminary investigative efforts. Most emergency type drawings (e.g. ,

system flow) were maintained in hard copy. All drawings were on

, aperture cards; nowever, power for the printer was observed to be

nonessential. Many persons manning the TSC during the walkthroughs

were noted - to bring "other" documents that they personally found

necessary to support emergency functions (e.g., steam tables).

Documents in use at tne TSC during the walkthrough were coserved to be

current, controlled copies, and consistent with station acministrative

directives and procecures.

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1.1.3.3 Support Supolies

The TSC was determined to have adequate supplies of nonradiological

supplies requird to implement its intended function. Locked cabinets

were used as emergency kits, and are under Emergency Plan administra-

tive controls.

Appropriate status boards were available in the TSC. Trending

capability for wall-type display were simply columnar display of

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successive values on the status board. Graph paper was available for

plotting parameters of interest on a small scale.

1.1.3.4 power Supplies -

Four main areas of power continuity were considered in evaluating the

ability of the TSC to function during a station blackout: (1) the

operator aid computer (OAC) which is the TSC data acquisition system;

(2) ventilation and cooling; (3) communications; and (4) lighting.

The TSC does not have its own dedicated power system such as a diesel,

but rather relies on power from plant essentials (vital) busses, or in

some cases, power from an " alternate" bus, meaning the other unit.

Observations in each of the above cited areas are listed below.

1. The OAC is normally powered from a constant current charger on the

auxiliary control power battery through a static inverter, static

transfer switch (to shift to other unit battery), and isolation

transformer to a computer power distribution panel (#1 and 2 KY).

Videos and line printers, as well as the console, in use in the

TSC are powered from this distribution panel. Design duration of

the battery upon loss of all AC is eight hours. Distribution of

the crisis data sheets in the TSC would be adversely affected

since the copy machine used to reproduce the data sheets would

become inoperative on loss of all AC. Data transmission to the

CMC and other. facilities such as the counties, States, and NRC

would be modified to accommodate the loss of the station computer

(VAX) in the event of loss of all AC. Transmission to the CMC by

modem from the OAC room would permit operation under such

circumstances.

2. Ventilation and cooling, including control valve operating power

(both air and electrical) for the TSC is fed from two nonessential

sources. Normal power is Motor Control Center (MCC) 1 EMXA.

Alternate power is MCC 2 EMXA (Units #1 and #2, respectively). In

event of loss of-AC power to Unit 1. an automatic transfer switch

shifts power to the unaffected unit. A loss of all AC would

result in the loss of TSC ventilation and cooling.

3. TSC communications (phones) are powered in a fashion similar to

the OAC,.that is from the DC auxiliary control. power bus througn a

static inverter (different from the OAC inverter), and then from

appropriate distribution panels. Offsite systems, including the

numerous bell lines in the TSC, and the company microwave link are

powered from emergency power sources including batteries and

diesel. Radio-telephone transceivers in the TSC use AC powered

battery trickle chargers on emergency battery packs.

4. Lighting systems in the TSC include both AC and DC units. AC

lighting is powered in a normal mode analogous to the power for

ventilation and cooling. Normal power is nonessential Load Center

• .

.

.

9 i

(LC) ISLXF, and alternate power is LC 2SLXF (i.e., Units #1 and 2,

respectively). A difference does exist, however, because an

automatic transfer function is not provided. If normal power were

lost, operations personnel would manually shift lighting to the

alternate feeder. A loss of AC causes ten 40 watt DC light units

which operate on continuous AC chargers to come on automatically.

Since the TSC is relatively small, the DC lighting is adequate to

move around, but insufficient to perform close administrative

work. Emergency hand-held devices are available in the emergency

kits, and are possessed by most individuals manning the TSC. AC

wall receptacles are similarly powered (as lights); therefore, a

loss of AC would cause the loss of computeri:ed dose assessment

since the terminal is a portable unit brought to the TSC.

1.1.3.5 Conclusion

Based on these findings, this portion of the licensee's program meets

the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

1.2 Information Management

1.2.1 Variables Provided

1.2.1.1 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variables

Duke Power Coroany letter dated March 29, 1984, responded to Generic

Letter 82-33 (Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737) regarding the McGuire Station

conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2. Included in this letter

was a Regulatory Guide 1.97 comparison section wherein the McGuire

Station instruments are compared with the .ecommendations of the

Regulatory Guide for "PWR variables" (Table 2). Instrument ranges,-

design, environmental qualification, type of display and company

position statements are provided for each variable. Additionally, an

implementation schedule is included wnere modifications are planned.

The majority of these planned modifications were scheduled to be

comcleted by the end of the first refueling outage following

January 1986, for each unit. The inspt; tors were informed that a

reouest has or will be made to delay implementing the planned changes

from the 1986 timeframe until tne first outage following January 1988.

The Operator Aids Computer (OAC) is capable of displaying, both in the

Control Room (CR) and the Technical Support Center (TSC) essentially

all parameters or variables available in the CR, including those

Regulatory Guide 1.97 variables currently presented in the CR. At the

TSC console, a floppy disc transcription of desired data can be made

and then injected into the VAX system for storage, computations, and/or

retransmission. Data in the VAX can be accessed by the TSC dose

assessment team via a terminal / printer located at their station. )

I

__ _

- . . .- .. . .. --

. -

10

J

1.2.1.2 Other Variables

All Regulatory Guide 1.97 variables appropriate to the performance of

i

the TSC in technical and logistic support to the CR, and performance of

Crisis Management Center (CMC) functions prior to the activation, are

, available, or ace.eptable substitutes have been identified except one.

The exception is containment sump water temperatures, which the

i licensee cont 9nds is not used in the management of a design basis

accident, nee is that parameter used in the execution of any of the

Emergency- Cperating Procedures (EOPs). As noted in the comparison of

.

'

plant specific variables, and discussed in Section 1.2.1.1, not all of

the instruments meet the Regulatory Guide 1.97 guidelines for one or

! more reasons, e.g., seismic qualification, range, environmental

cualification, power sources, etc. Refer to the subject exception

requests currently under review by NRR.

.

The TSC provides access to the National Weather Service (NWS) via

telephone to the Charlotte Airport. A NOAA tone alert radio (weather

data) is located in the TSC.

'

Additionally, weather forecasting is

available to the TSC by telephone from the CMC.

l The TSC has access to emergency medical assistance and to emergency

vendor assistance by telephone. Offsite rronitoring in formation is

,

'

received in the TSC by radio from the field monitoring teams.

Evacuation time estimates are contained in the CMC Implementing

Procedure CMIP-1. A copy of the subject procedure is available in the

TSC.

1.2.1.3 Relationsnio to Functional Needs

'

'

The plant OAC has a console for each unit in the TSC that can perform

all functions available to the Control ~ Room with the exception that the

Control Room has a separate video press.rtation for alarm status. All

functions concerning alarm status may be " called up" for presentation

,

i

on the TSC video, if desired. In addition to alarm status, system-

diagrams with pertinent pa ramete rs . Critical ' Safety Function (GSF)

status trees, and transient monitor functions (window of ' approximately

150 parameters stored to memory for the 10 minutes before a trip, and

30 minutes af ter the reactor trip for maximum of two trips without

,

operator action) are also available. The select 3d transient monitor

functions may be cownloaded to an IBM 9000, running sof tware entitled

-

" transient monitor delog" that will make a 4 color plot. of all ~ the

variables versus time;. therefore, permitting rapid accident analysis.

.

j

~ Approximately 200 parameters -have been selected based 'on engineering

j analysis that are the " crisis parameters" routinely selected for

l continual observation (at -15-minute intervals) in the- TSC, and

i distribution to "other" facilities such -as the CMC. This.15-minute

interval introduces a delay in the availability of real time data 'in

the TSC and CMC by as much as a half-hour. Approximately 50 param,eters

, may also be added to 'the parameter- list with a -few ' keystrokes s >on

l

4

i

. . _ .- _ _ _ . . . _ _ . ,_,..._ ,_ _..-.._...,_ , _ ~ , _ . , , _ , . .

. .

11

decision of TSC managers to monitor additional items. Distribution of

these parameter logs to the various emergency response personnel

manning the TSC would be adversely affected by a loss of all AC. The

licensee has submitted (March 29, 1984) for NRC review and approval,

the list of numerous Regulatory Guide 1.97 exceptions. A tecnnical

evaluation review (TER) is expected in late 1985. Many of the

exceptions that the licensee committed to correct prior to the 1986

outage have been the subject of a request to delay correction to 1988.

This finding will be tracked as an open item (50-369/85-29-13 and

50-370/85-28-13). This item will be reviewed during subsequent

inspections.

1.2.2 Data Acquisition

1.2.2.1 Data Collection Method and 1.2.2.2 Time Resolution

Emergency Response Facility (ERF) functions are supported by two

different computer systems: a Honeywell 4400 system, and a DEC

VAX 11-780 system network. The Honeywell 4400 system, referred to as

the Operator Aid Computer (OAC) performs data acquisition and

reporting. User selectable parameter reporting and sensor trend

plotting is performed by either one of two VAX 11-780 systems (one at

the McGuire site in the Administration Building and one at the

licensee's General Office in Charlotte, Nortn Carolina).

The OAC is configured as follows:

Item Quantity

Random Access Memory (RAM) 64K words

bulk RAM 1.6M words

hard disk drives none

flexible disk drives (8 inch) 1

magnetic tape drives none

line printers (OAC and TSC) 2

terminal printers (OAC and TSC) 2

Tektronix 4006 Cathode Ray Tube

(CRT) terminal 1

Sensors monitored by the OAC include accroximately 1560 analog  ;

(continuously variable) and 3840 digital ( two-state) sensors. plant '

safety sensors are scanned every 15-minutes, but selected sensors may  ;

be displayed on OAC or TSC CRTs, or printers on OAC or TSC printers as l

per user-specified time intervals (1 second to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />). The time l

resolution for the data transmission is adequate to assure transmission

without loss, since the data acquisition rate is low speed.

Two VAX 11-780 computers support ERF functions by providing safety -

parameters sensor reports and trend plots. The two VAX 11-780 systems

are linked via DECNET, and sensor data may be transferred using the

_ - _l

. .

12

'

Virtual Memory System (VMS) mail software. Configurations for the VAX

'11-780 systems are as follows:

System McGuire Charlotte

RAM 4 MB 6 MB

Hard Disk memory 1000 MB 2000 MB

Magnetic Tape Drive none 2

Dial-up Ports 12 12

Data trend plots at McGuire or at Charlotte may be done using a VAX

11-780 computer system. The plots are performed by Tektronix 4010

series graphics display terminals with hard copy devices. Any plant

safety parameter data may be trended for a historical time period.

Sensor data availability at the VAX 11-780 computer depends on two

processes, namely: (1) data - transmission from the OAC to the VAX

computers; and (2) the editing and engineering approval of a data set

prior to release for general access.

The current simplified procedure for transferring sensor data from the

OAC to an available VAX 11-780 entails the following: (1) load an

8-inch floppy disk into the Honeywell diskette subsystem; (2) write

sensor data set to the floppy; (3) transfer the data diskette to a

Mohawk series 21 microcomputer system drive in the OAC; (4) establish a

dial-up link to an available VAX 11-780 (dial number, type in use ID,

and password); (5) transmit sensor data set to VAX computer; a r.d

(6) log off VAX system. The transfer of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> plant data was

observed to reat: ire roughly 10 to 15 minutes.

One potential orcblem discovered during discussions with licensee

design engineers is a result of the data transfer process and the OAC

environmental control system. Currently, the data transfer involves

entering a ventilation system which is part of the service building

ventilation and therefore, has no protective filtration systems (i.e.,

HEPA or cnarcoal filters). Althougn it is highly unlikely that

contamination would enter the service building ventilation system, data

transfer from the OAC to a VAX 11-780 would be awkward if, indeed,

radioactive or other contamination were cresent (i.e., protective

clothing and breatning apparatus may be required).

1.2.3.3 Isolation

Licensee testing has assured adequate signal isolation for variables

obtained from safety systems. Current and future design modifications

.= tve established eouipment characteristics and required testing to

assure that no cegradation of safety systems will occur with planned

improvements to the data acquisition systems.

'

s

!

. .

13

1.2.3 Data Communication

1.2.3.1 Caoacity, 1.2.3.2 Error Detection, and 1.2.3.3 Transmission

B_etws.n ERFs

Data communications from the Honeywell computer to peripheral devices

in the OAC and TSC are implemented by hard-wired serial data links.

Data sint to the Honeywell computer from the plant sensor front-end

multiplexors is checked for transmission errors using error detecting /

correction techniques. McGuire personnel reported that data / characters

sent from the Honeywell to OAC/TSC peripherals is done without using

error detection / correction techniques. It is therefore recommended

that McGuire review the feasibility of implementing error detection /

correction for all communications. Data transmission from the VAX

systems to remote TSC/ CMC terminals use parity checking to verify data

correctness.

McGuire did not have a Tektronix 4010 series graphics terminal in the

TSC (probably because there is no room for one). If this situation is

changed and data trend plotting is done in the TSC, the dial-up

mechanism would probably require multiple attempts to establish

communications, since this is what occurred in an engineering trailer

at McGuire.

Imorovement Item

A dedicated line should be acquired if treno-plotting w.ll be relied on

to support critical plant safety analysis. ' The cited reccmmendation

was discussed with cognizant licensee representatives

,

(IFI 50-369/85-29-14 and 50-370/85-28-14).

1.2.4 Data Analysis

1.2.4.1 Reactor Technical Support

Several programs assist the TSC in history review and accident

forecasting. Data storage in the OAC takes several formats including a

cata point accumulation. This permits the operator to select any

parameter and list the value at any desired time interval for as much

as 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in the past. Classical graphic plots of this type of

information would have to be done manually. However, graphic plotting

of the transient monitor function (120 analog and 24 digital parameters

scanned each seccnd) is possible with a download to another computer

equipped with appropriate software. Further innovative data processing

schemes witn much greater resolution are under test at the present

time.

_

. _ - . _ -.

, . -

. ~

14

.

1.2.4.2 Dose Assessment at the Technical Succort Center

A. Technical Supoort Center (TSC)

Dose assessment capabilities in the TSC are provided by a

computerized dose assessment system (" Class A Model"), and manual

methods. Procedures describing the use of the computerized system

were referenced in Implementing Procedure HP/0/B/1009/08

(Evaluation of a Reactor Coolant Leak). Procedures for using the

manual metheds are found in RP/0/A/5700/01 (Notification of

Unusual Event), RP/0/A/5700/02 (Alert), HP/0/8/1009/05 ( Fi rst

Response Evaluation of Offsite Dose From a Reactor Coolant Leak

Inside Containment), HP/0/B/1009/06 (Quantifying High Level

Gaseous ' Radioactive Release During Accident Conditions),

i Hp/0/B/1009/08 (Evaluation of a Reactor Coolant Leak Inside

Containment), and HP/0/B/1009/09 (Release of Reactor Coolant

Through Unit Vent Exceeding Technical Specifications).

The " Class A Model," or Model, is a computerized environmental

,

'

model for calculating and projecting radiation doses from radio-

active materials released in gaseous effluents during an

emergency. For this model, source term or meteorological data may

be keyed manually or may be derived f rom 15 minute old monitor

readings transferred from the Operator Aid Computer (OAC). Doses

to the whole body from plume exposure and to the thyroid from

inhalation of radiciodines are available. Doses that may result

from ingestion of contaminated food are not available in the

model.

The manual methods are hand calculation methods that use

simplifying assumptions and dedicated forms to aid in the-

calculation.

Additionally, dose calculations may be based on samples taken by

field monitoring teams, which can be quickly dispatched. For the

purpose of evaluating monitoring team data, vehicles with beta-

gamma survey meters, air samplers, and single-channel analyzers

with GeLi detectors are available. Vegetation and water samples

may be taken, but must be analyzed in the environmental lab

located at the training center near the McGuire Station. Because

of its proximity to the McGuire station, this laboratory may not

be available during an accident. Also available in the field as

part of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program are five

permanent airborne particulate and radioiodine monitors and

40 TLDs to measure environmental radiation.

1. Source-Term

Adequate information is available in the TSC to determine

,

source terms for all potential release pathways. Airborne

process radiation monitors are located to monitor ventilation

• .

, . _ . - _ .

. _ _ _ ._ _

. .

15

exhaust concentration and flow for containment and contain-

ment purge effluent, annulus effluent, Auxiliary Building

effluent, condenser air ejector exhaust, and all other

identified release point effluents. However, these

individual monitors are not specifically listed for accident

monitoring by Regulatory Guide 1.97 since these systems

exhaust through the unit vent where the primary monitors are

located. The unit vent flow is monitored by three channels

of instrumentation covering an equivalent range of 10 ' to

5 x 103 Ci/cc Kr' for low and mid ranges, and 1 to 10' R/hr

gross gamma for the high range. Readouts include three

Control Room indicators, three computer points, and three

recorded channels.

The vent from the steam generator safety relief valves or

atmospheric dump valves is monitored by four area radiation

monitors located adjacent to tne main steam lines and

upstream of the main steam isolation valves, to detect

secondary side radiation. Correlation curves provide for

conversion from R/hr to Ci/cc over a range of 10 2 to

10' R/hr. Each monitor is read out by a CR ind'cator, a

computer point, and a channel recorder.

Containment monitors provide for personnel protection area

radiation monitoring over a 10 2 to 10" mR/hr range with

special monitors located adjacent to the reactor coolant

filters whicn cover a 10 2 to 10" R/hr range. High range

containment monitoring is accomplished using two redundant

channels covering the range of 1 to 10' R/hr. Each channel

is displayed on a CR indicator and is read into the OAC. 0.n e

of the channels is recorded.

'

It shoulc be noted that the area radiation monitors in the

10 2 to 10 mr/hr range co not meet Regulatory Guide 1.97

criteria (i.e., 10 2 to 10' R/hr). This finding was

referenced in NRC letter to the licensee dated August 6, 1985

(TER). The licensee is planning a response to this letter.

,

Containment leak rate and containment breach situations are

provided for in procedure HP/0/8/1009/08. A leak rate

i

determination method and curves are provided for estimating

leak rates of various hole sizes and varying pressures.

The fuel storage building exhaust passes through the unit

vent and thus any radioactivity exhausting from that area is

monitorea by the unit vent monitors. Post accident sampling

results and in-plant radiological monitoring results are

coordinated by the Health Physics Office and provided to the

TSC on data sheets delivered by runner or passed by

telephone. Inoperable or off-scale monitoring instruments

are provided for in source term determination by procedure

,

i

. . - - . .

.- .

!

I

16

i~ HP/0/B/1009/06, " Alternate Method for Determining Dose Rate

Within the Reactor Building."

All of the variables addressed above are available in the

TSC, either by 0AC, VAX (via OAC/ FLOPPY DISC input), or in

i

'

the case of Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) and in-plant

radiological monitoring results, by runner-delivered data

i sheets or by direct telephone communication.

- Source term methods provide for contribution by radio-

nuclides. Specifically, the noble gases and iodine

activities are monitored, using the unit vent detectors for

real time measurements. Default values, when needed, are

obtained from the CMC Dose Assessment group by telephone.

,

Procedures provide methods for converting gross activity

readings to Xenon-133 equivalents for ease of handling

subsequent computations. Lab analysis is available; samples

which have not undergone isotopic analysis are considered to

be all I-131 for simplification and conservatism.

2. Meteorology

Onsite meteorological measurements at the McGuire station are

made on two towers co-locaced at plant grade and

i

approximately 350 meters (350m) west of the reactor complex.

} The meteorological towers are located on a small plateau,

with terrain elevations falling sharply to the south and

i west, and rising to the north. Recently, two warehouse

buildings (approximately 10m in heighc) were constructed east

(

of the towers. The closest building is located approximate,1y

50m from the towers. The presence of the nearby buildings,

' the relative proximity of major ' plant structures, and

topography of the terrain could influence meteorological

.

measurements, particularly low-level (10 meters) wind speed

1

' and direction. It is conceivable that upper-level

measurements of these parameters could also be affected.

Reflection from the metal surfaces of the warehouse buildings

may possibly affect the measurement of-vertical temperature

difference on the principal meteorological tower during

,

'

strong insolation. The measurements program was upgraded in

July 1983. It is recommended that the upgraded documentation

,

of meteorological measurements program should be incorporated

j into the FSAR.

i Meteorological parameters include wind speed and wind

direction which are monitored at the 10m and 40m towers.

I

'

- Atmospheric stability indicators available include vertical

temperature difference ( AT) measured between the 10m and 40m

'

levels on the 40m tower, and the standard deviation of

horizontal wind direction (sigma-theta) at the 10m level. A

i=

,

. . .. _- , , , _ . . . _ _- _ _ , _ - ._ , , , , , _ . , _ , _ . _ . . _ . . . _ . ,

.

-

17

measurement of precipitation is also available. All

meteorological parameters are transmitted to the OAC and

stored as 15-minute averages, updated every minute, with a

minimum recall of data from the preceding 24-hour period.

The meteorological data stored in the OAC are downloaded to

the VAX computer for dissemination to plant personnel

involved in dose assessments and projections. However, at

the time of the inspection, the meteorological data processed

through the OAC was not validated and would not have been

appropriate for use in a real emergency response situation.

Meteorological data, including two levels of wind speed and

direction, vertical temperature difference (AT), and

precipitation are recorded on strip charts in the Control

Room area. Vertical temperature difference is recorded on a

multi point recorder which is difficult to read and somewhat

confusing for determining 15-minute averages. The levels of

measurement for wind speed and direction were poorly

indicated on the recorders, and the recorders for upper level

wind speed and direction were mounted at such a height as to

make determinations of 15-minuto average conditions extremely

difficult. The recorders should be re-configured and better

identified. No tackup or redundant onsite measurements are

available. If site metearological data are not available,

meteorological information can be obtained from either the

National Weather Service (NWS) station at Charlotte, or the

Catawba Plant. However, procedures for dose assessment which

utilize meteorological data do not reflect the hierarchy for

substitution of missing onsi te data. The Charlotte NWS

station also provides regional and forecast meteorological

conditions, although the type and extent of information is'

not specified in plant procedures. Information on severe

weather is available to Control Room operators through a

tone-alert weather radio and through the DPC load dispatcher,

although no specific procedure apparently exists for

dispatener notification to the Control Room.

Atmospheric transport and diffusion is characterized either

through a puff-advection model (which considers only temporal

variations in meteorological conditions) used through the VAX

computer as part of the Class A Model, or through a simple

straight-line, Gaussian plume model incorporated in manual

dose assessment procedures. All atmospheric releases from

the plant are considered as ground-level, with consideration

for initial mixing in wake of plant structures. However, the

display of model output is not consistent with stated model

assumptions and constraints. For example, the oatput

indicates doses from elevated releases, and, for extremely

unstable conditions displays a vertical plume spread

parameter (sigma-Z) which exceeds the assumed limitation on

vertical mixing. The puff-advection model uses either

15-minute averages of onsite meteorological data processed

-_ .- - - -- . - . .

. .

J

18

i

through the OAC and downloaded to the VAX computer, or

~

information keyed manually into the computer. This model can

provide dose projections through manual input of forecast

conditions .or the assumption of persistence of observed

conditions.

The procedures for dose assessment which use meteorological

data not available in computer files neither specify the

averaging period (i.e.,15 minutes) nor the valid time of the

.

meteorological observations. All dose assessment procedures

'

should be re-examined to ensure identification and

incorporation of averaging period and valid observation time.

Although measurements of sigma-theta and precipitation are

j available, neither are reflected in assessments of

atmospheric transport and diffusion. Availability of

sigma-theta data from only the 10m level is not consistent

i

with the use of wind direction from the 40m level as the

primary indicator of transport direction. If sigma-theta is

to be used as an indicator of atmospheric stability for dose

assessments, it should be determined from the same level as

tne primary wind direction. During the appraisal, use of the

puff-advection model through the VAX computer could not be

demonstrated to provide dose estimates within 15 minutes.

Accordingly, the licensee acreed to use a number of test

cases provided by the NRC to demonstrate the capability of

the puff-advection model curing variable meteorological

conditions. TLe results of toese test cases and review of

documentation describing the model and its technical basis

will provide the bases for NRC-acceptance of the

puff-advection model for dose assessments. This finding is~

4

summarized and classified on page 20 below.

'

Although neither the puff-advection model nor the straight-

line model explicitly provide estimates of uncertainties

associated with plume position, written procedures exist

i which expand the projected affected. area based on wind speed

!

and/or data source. These procedures could be improved to

expand the projected affected area considering applicability

of available information and hierarchy for data substitution.

The puff-advection model could be improved to consider decay,

depletion, and deposition of radioactive material. The

, output of the model could also be expanded to include

i calculated relative concentrations (X/Q) at specified

I

distances for review and' assessment by licensee

meteorologists.

!

'

The onsite meteorological measurements program at McGuire

station has provided a reliable indication of meteorological

variables. Joint recovery - of the primary meteorological

parameters (wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric

1 stability) demonstrated an efficiency greater than 90% from

4

6,

, ~ , . - _ , , -,.m. .,,m .- . ,_..-,._m. . - - ,- . - - - - . _ , , . _ - . .

i

1. *

-

19

I

l January 1982 - June 1985. The licensee should continue to

monitor data availability to ensure that meteorological data

will be available for use in an emergency situation.

The OAC could provide a check on the validity of meteoro-

l logical data by comparison with pre-cetermined acceptable

ranges and flag suspect data on the visual display and in the

data downloaded to the VAX computer. The licensee considers

meteorological data from the McGuire station to represent

conditions throughout the plume exposure EPZ, and also

considers data from the Charlotte NWS station and Catawba to

represent real-time conditions at the McGuire site. However,

no studies or assessments supporting these positions have

been performed.

1

Based on the above review, the finding listed below will be

tracked as indicated. These items will be reviewed during

subseouent inspections.

, Locations of the meteorological towers should be

i

evaluated to determine the quality of data, and the

effects of the nearby warehouse buildings, proximity of

major plant structur.3s, and topography of the area on

such aata (IFI 50-369/85-29-15, 50-370/85-28-15). This

finding is considered an improvement item.

The meteorological maasurements program, as upgraded in

1983, should be incorocrated into tne FSAR

(50-413/85-39-16, 50-414/85-36-16). This fir ding is

classified as an improvement item.

Validation of the meteorological data processed through

1

the OAC (50-369/85-29-17, 50-370/85-2S-17). This item

relates to guidance promulgated in Regulatory Guide 1.23

j and will be tracked as an appraisal weakness.

Evaluation of the representativeness of meteorological

data from the NWS station at Charlotte and/or Catawba

for real-time conditions at McGuire or installation of

backup or redundant onsite. meteorological measurements,

backup or redundant measurements - including separate

power eupplies, cabling, and recorders (IFI

50-369/85 29-18, 50-370/85-28-18). This finding is

considered an improvement item.

Revision of procedures which provide for use of

meteorological data to reflect the hierarchy for data

substitution, and specify averaging period (e.g., 15 1

minutes) and valid time of the observations (IFI

,

50-369/85-29-19, 50-370/85-28-19). This ' finding is

i

,

classified as an improvement item. '

l

_ _

. -

.

20

i

Digital displays of meteorological data (e.g., via the

OAC or the summary sheet provided through the VAX

computer) should specify the averaging period and valid

time of the observation (IFI 50-369/85-29-20,

50-370/85-28-20). This item will be tracked as an

improvement item.

• Submittal of complete documentation (i .e., description

of the technical bases) for the puff-advection

I atmospheric dispersion model and a complete description

of the upgraded meteorological measurements program

(50-369/85-29-21, 50-370/85-28-21). This item will be

tracked as an open item.

Identification of the regional and forecast meteoro-

logical information to be provided on request by the NWS

station in Charlotte (IFI 50-369/85-29-22,

50-370/85-28-22). This finding is an improvement item.

All of the above comments and identified findings were fully

I

discussed with cognizant licensee representatives. The

licensee is committed to development of an improved meteoro-

logical program, and acknowledged the findings disclosed

herein. Tnese items will be reviewed during subsequent

inspections.

3. Computer 1:ed Dose Assessment

The Class A Model has the capability to estimate and pro.iect

doses and dose rates at 11 radial distances from 0.5 miles;to

10.0 miles. The model will calculate whole body and thyroid

cases and dose rates from submersion in a radioactive gas

cloud. Although the computer output lists doses from

elevated clumes. as previously stated, reputedly the computer

program treats all releases as ground level. To calculate

doses tne model uses Xenon-133 equivalent source terms for

noble gas exposure calculations, and Iodine-131 equivalent

for radiciodine inhalation dose calculations. These source

terms are provided either by 15 .winute old effluent monitor

readings. or by manual inout of source terms. Meteorological

data are provided in a similar manner.

Information supporting validation of the model was provided

during the appraisal. Additionally, during the appraisal, an

independent, partial validation was attempted on the model.

Calculations in the model tended to underestimate whole body

doses and overestimate thyroid doses. The observed

differences could not be resolved during the appraisal

because of lack of time to review available documentation.

Upon receipt of appropriate documentation, evaluation of the

computer model will be completed. This will be tracked as an

%

. - - - -..~. - - . . -. . . . . . . _ _ - _ - _ - _ . _ . . - _

.

l. >

4

i-

21

.

open item and will be reviewed during subsequent inspections

(50-369/85-29-23,50-370/85-28-23).

1

"

Although personnel from the TSC have the initial responsi-  !

bility for environmental sampling, personnel in the Crisis

. Management Center (CMC) use the field monitoring data to f

( refine previous dose projections. These data may be used to

calculate potential dose from contaminated foods. However,

the computer model does not compute ingestion doses.

.

Procedure EDA-1 in the CMC implementing procedures is used

'

for this purpose. It is recommended that the computerized

<

model should be modified to include ingestion pathway dose

calculations, and that documentation related thereto

{ should be provided to the NRC for review (50-369/85-29-24,

50-370/85-28-24).

.

B. Control Room (CR)

!

s Dose assessment capability in the Control Room is provided by the

OAC using the Nuclear-23 option or a manual method using procedure

HP/0/B/1009/05 (First Response Evaluation of Offsite Dose From a

5

Reactor Coolant Leak Inside Containment). No procedure for using

'

the OAC for dose assessment was found in the EPIP. This finding

is identified as an appraisal weakness and will be reviewed during

4 subsequent inspections '(50-369/85-29-25. 50-370/85-28-25).

i

i Nuclear-23 in the OAC uses a computerized model to calculate a

!

radiation " dose factor" for determining the appropriate protective

action recommendation in areas 0-5 miles and 5-10 miles from the

plant. Doses are not explicitly calculated for these areas;

however, radiation ' doses to the whole body at the site boundary- ,

are apparently based on'this dose-factor. This method appears t'o

be used strictly for protective action recommendations and not for

i classifying-the level of the emergency at a plant.

! Input from various plant monitors are used to calculate the " dose

! factor." Source term input 'is provided by-vent gas monitors and

[' containment radiation monitors. Meteorology' data (i .e. , average .

! wind ' speed ~ wind direction, and delta T) from the appropriate

,

monitors are used by Nuclear-23 to determine atmospheric stability

L class, and the dilution factor in the ' area of interest. The

! calculated value of this " dose factor" determines the action to be .

taken within the areas affected as well as the specific areas.

'

, The dose factor appears to be related to whole body dose rather

'

than thyroid dose. Accordingly, the appropriate protective action

may not be recommended, particularly for high radiciodine

j concentrations in the effluent. The manual. method uses procedure

HP/0/B/1009/05 (First Response Evaluation of Offsite Dose From a

,

.

l

Reactor Coolant Leak -Inside Containment) to perform the same

calculation as ~ the OAC, .if the 0AC , is not available. Input

parameters for the manual method - must be read directly from

i

!

'

.

e. -

,- . - , .-s. - ,....~y -_e ..,,-._,.....,.r-,.,,,,,., i,,,--..,~-.+.~,,-w,.c~_,,.e.,m_.-

.

. .

22

effluent and meteorological monitors. It is therefore recommended

that the Nuclear-23 method should be evaluated to ensure that both

whole body and thyroid doses are appropriately considered in

protective action recommendations (50-369/85-29-26,

50-370/85-28-26).

It should be noted that the Nuclear-23 option could not be

exercised during the appraisal. Although the Nuclear-23 screen

with monitor information could be viewed, the actual process of

determining the appropriate protective action could not be

demonstrated. The explanation given at the time of the appraisal

was that execution of Nuclear-23 is prevented by interlock or

relay until an actual emergency occurs. This situation should be

rectified to permit periodic execution of the program outside of

an emergency by Control Room personnel to ensure their knowledge

and proficiency in the use of the program (IFI 50-369/85-29-27,

50-370/85-28-27). This item was discussed with licensee

representatives. This finding is an improvement item.

As discussed in Section 1.2.4.2 ( A). wind speed, wind direction,

and vertical temperature difference are available in the control

room area through strip chart recorders and the OAC. At the time

of the inspection, the meteorological data processed through the

OAC was not validated and would not have been appropriate for use

'

in a real emergency resconse situation. Other concerns relateo to

'

the strip chart recorders and the display of meteorological

information on the OAC are discussed in Section 1.2.4.2 ( A) .

I

Procedures which use meteorological information in emergency

classification, protective action recommendations, or dose

assessment should specify averaging period for meteorological data

and the hierarchy of substitution of missing meteorological data.

These items are the subject of recommended improvement items

discussed above.

1.2.5 Data Storage

1.2.5.1 Storage Cacabilities

Section 1.2.2 describes the storage capability for the Honeywell 4400

and the VAX 11-780 minicomputer systems. Routinely, 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of

15-minute interval scan data is stored in the Honeywell bulk memory.

Data transmitted to the VAX comp'u ters may be stored continuously on

hard disk and magnetic tape or on the Honeywell floppy drive system.

Overall, system storage capability satisfies NRC requirements.

The OAC also has the capability to store 10-minute pre-transient and

30-minute post-transient data storage in the Honeywell's bulk RAM

memory. After a transient has been detected and the 40 minutes'of data

stored, the transient storage mechanism is halted until an operator has

served the data to a floppy disk.

6

_ _ _ _ _ . .

l

't

23

1.2.5.2 Conclesion

Based on above findings, this portion of the licensee's program meets

the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

1.2.6 System Reliability

1.2.6.1 Verification

System verification was conducted on the OAC and VAX largely by means

of operator observations during exercises and drills. Prior to

acceptance of the OAC, factory and site acceptance tests were conducted

to issure that the hardware and sof tware which made up the system at

that time functioned correctly. Subsequently, only module-level

testi,g was conducted as software and hardware were modified or added

to the system. Correlation with control room indications is confirmed

routinely during exercises and drills to assure that the TSC is

4

receiviny data that is consistent with control room instruments. The

dose assessment software was verified by providing the system with

simulated input, running the program, and comparing the results with

1

hand calculctions. No independent verification was conducted at the

system level for either the OAC or the VAX; however, module-level

~

independent verification is routinely dore on any new software, such as

the dose assessment program.

1.2.6.2 Comouter-Based Systems

The reliability of the OAC and VAX systems was tracked by the use of

unavailability records (harcware and software), maintenance logs, and

comparison with similar systems in sister plants. The OAC availability

appeared to be greater than .99 based on current information. The VAX

system availability appeared to be consistent with the OAC. The latest

data compiled during May 1985 through July 1985 indicated an average

total system availability of 99.86 percent.

There are, however, several concerns regarding system reliability. To

date, tnese concerns are based on configuration rather than McGuire's

availability records. Although the OAC and the VAX have proven

reliable over time, the link between the systems does not have much of

an empirical record upon which it can be judged. The VAX is useless

without data from the OAC and that data must be fed to the VAX by

manual transfer of a floppy disk. Since both humans and disk drives

are characterized by lapses in performance, the manual data link

between the OAC and the VAX may be a point of vulnerability in the

system.

Other concerns regard the power supplies for various portions of the

system. The OAC is provided with an uninterrupted power supply (UPS)

to assure continuity of data acquisition and storage. However, the VAX

ai McGuire is neither provided with UPS nor is it powered from a vital

bus.

. _- - - - -. _ _ - - -

._

>

.

jl

24

i

l

l

Improvement Item

Based on the above findings, the following is a recommendation for

improvement: an uninterrupted power supply should be provided for all

necessary components of the data acquisition and display system, e.g.,

the VAX computer, the dose assessment terminal, the Mohawk data link,

etc. (IFI 50-369/85-29-28, 50-370/85-28-28). This item was fully

discussed with cognizant licensee representatives. The licensee

acknowledged the item which will be reviewed during subsequent

inspections.

1.2.6.3 Manual Systems

Manually collected data is subjected to the same validity check as

computer-acquired data; that is, one or more reactor engineers scan the

data for reasonableness. Data collected in the Control Room is further

validated by cross-checking data sheets from two independent

technicians. If deemed necessary, verbal checks are made with the

Crisis Management Center (CMC) to assure that the data at the Control

Rocm, TSC, and CMC are consistent.

1.2.7 On-Shift Dose Assessment

) 1.2.7.1 Dose Assessment Proficiency

Information is available in the Control Room and the TSC via the OAC to

support computations of dose projections at the site boundary. At the

first indication of a potential radiological release problem, on-shif t

j health physics personnel are summoned to the Control Room to perform

'

dose assessment / dose projection calculations. The OAC " Nuclear-23" is

routinely used. In the event the OAC is unavailable, manual

calculations are conducted using procedure HP/0/B/1009/05 (First

'

Response Evaluation of Offsite Dose F-am a Reactor Coolant Leak Inside

Containment).

The cose assessment model used in the VAX system is not the same as

models used by the State or the NRC; however, the licensee had

compatibility comparisons made to the offsite models. The CMC is

equipped to provide to both the State and the NRC all data needed to

. run their codes.

l

It was reported, but not specifically observed, that when the CMC

,

accessed the VAX, McGuire station was essentially relegated to manual

calculations since the CMC has a higher priority on the VAX computer.

Imorovement Item

It is recommended that this item be reviewed by McGuire Station and CMC

personnel to determine if the existing situation is acceptable, and if

not, to develop a fix (IFI 50-369/85-29-29, 50-370/85-28-29). This

.

O

~

e. -

25

item was discussed with licensee representatives who acknowledged the

item. This item will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.

1.2.7.2 Dose Assessment Technical Adequacy

Based on discussions with on-shift Control Room personnel, and

observations of procedures, the on-shift staff was capable of

performing cose assessment calculations without impacting the immediate

response to an accident.

l

The assessment procedures were considered adequate to allow the

operator to arrive at tne proper EALs for emergency classification.

However, in reviewing procedures RP/0/A/5700/01 Notification of Unusual

Event; and RP/0/A/5700/02 Alert, a possible area for improvement was

noted.

Procedure 5700/01 (Enclosure 4.1, Event Category 5, and Enclosure 4.2,

Item 4.2.2), and ProcecNre 5700/02 (Enclosure 4.1, Event Category 5,

and Enclosure 4.2, Items 4.2.15). refer to Technical Specifications for

required EAL rather than defining the actual EALs in the procedures

which ccrrespond to the respective emergency classifications cited.

Imorovement Item

It is recommended that the actual levels at which emergency action is

required for event classification be insertec into the procecures in

lieu of referencing " Exceeds Tecnnical Specifications" or " Exceeds 10 x

Tech Specs". This would preclude the coerator having to rely on memory

or refer to a seconc reference, at a time when he may be pressed to

cope with a developing emergency (IFI 50-369/85-29-30,

50-370/85-28-30). This recommended improvement item was fully

discussec with cognizant licensees and is considered merely as a

possibla aid to the operations. The licensee acknowledged this

finding.

1.3 Functional Caoabilities and Walkthroughs

1.3.1 Operations

1.3.1.1 Organization, 1.3.1.2 Staffing, and 1.3.1.3 Activation

The functional capability of the TSC was evaluated by presenting an NRC

developed, hypotnetical accident scenario to key members of the

licensee's staff normally assigned to the TSC during an emergency.

. Licensee personnel responded to the postulated circumstances by

describing to the inspectors their actions and use of equipment and

supplies available in the TSC. The evaluation disclosed that the TSC

would be adeauately staffed and capable of performing its assigned

functi or.s . Shift staffing and augmentation was reviewed during an

inspection on January 7-11,1985 (Inspection Report Nos. 50-369/85-02,

370/85-02). Records reviewed during the referenced inspection

.-. .- - -.

- - . _ . .- --

.

26

disclosed that augmentation drills were held on June 25 and October 28,

1984. It was determined that staff augmentation times were consistent

with the criteria in Table 2 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. The

staffing levels for the TSC shown in the McGuire Emergency Plan conform

to the criteria of Table 2 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. Activation

of the TSC was reviewed during an October 30, 1984, exercise at McGuire

Station. The TSC was staffed and activated promptly upon notification

by the Emergency Coordinator and prior to a Site Area Emergency

declaration (Inspection Report Nos. 50-369/P4-31, 50-370/84-28).

1.3.1.4 Communications Interfaces

The communications interfaces between the Control Room, TSC, OSC. and

CMC are designated in the McGuire emergency plan and are identifiable

in the TSC. The procedures used during the walkthrough appeared to be

adequate. '>revious exercises identified problems in establishing and

maintaining communications from the TSC. This finding relates to the

high ambient noise levels that were experienced during the exercises.

The referenced elevated noise levels are consistent with the spatial

constraints of the TSC. Communications procedures and equipment,

however, appeared to be adequate.

1.3.1.5 Offsite Interfaces and 1.3.1.6 Transfer of Resoonsibilities

Communication interfaces between the TSC and offsite organizations are

identified in Section F and illustrated in Figure F-2 of the McGuire

Emergency Plan. Controlled procedures for notification of offsite

agencies are available in the TSC. The inspectors interviewed licensee

oersonnel and m iewed the licensee's procedures to determine how the

transfer of various responsibilities and functions were made, including

notification of offsite agencies, emergency direction and control,

protective action decisionmaking and recommendations. The transfer of

responsibilities from the TSC to the CMC is addressed in Station

Directive (50) 3.8.4 and Crisis Management Plan Implementing Procedure

CMIP-1. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and determined

that the licensee demonstrated a clear understanding of implementing

the transfer of responsibilities and functions from the TSC to the CMC.

1.3.2 Control Room Suoport

1.3.2.1 Technical Support and 1.3.2.2 Walkthroughs

The functional capability of the TSC was evaluated by presenting the

fully activated TSC staff with an NRC developed, hypothetical accident

scenario. Persons normally assigned to the facility during an

emergency staffed the facility in preparation for the walkthrough,

Licensee personnel were expected to respond to the postulated events

involving a total loss of AC power without auxiliary feedwater systems

available by describing their actions, and how procedures, equipment,

and supplies in the TSC would be used. The evaluation determined that

the TSC would be adequately staffed and capable of performing its

s.

. .. - ~. _ - - -

. >

d

27

i- i

i

i intended function. Comments in oths, areas of this report amplify f

,

observations made during the walkthrough and related and investigative

! effort.

1.3.3 Conclusion i

'

{

j Based on these findings, this portion of the licensee's program met the .

4 requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.  !

1

2.0 Operations Support Center (OSC)  ;

t

2.1 physical Facilities t

,

2.1.1 Design

l

j 2.1.1.1 Location and 2.1.1.2 Alternate Location I

i

The OSC is located on the 767 ft. level of the Service Building in the

operators' kitchen, Room 909. The OSC is in close proximity to the

-

TSC. Licensee representatives informed the inspector that an alternate )

>

OSC location has been providrid in the rear of the Control Room in the  ;

event the primary OSC becomes uninhabitable.

. 2.1.1.3 Size. Layout. aid Environment j

t

The McGuire OSC is essentially a square room approximating 360 square  ;

j feet. It appears to be minimally adequate for use as a staging and l

1 briefing area for the six to ten staff personnel expected. The  ;

I

environmental conditions are acceptable under normal conditions. Under l

l a loss of offsite power, however, lighting would be completely lost,

since there are no provisions for emergency lighting.

I

Imorovement Item

i

Provisions should be made for emergency lighting in the '0SC  ;

(IFI 50-369/85-29-31, 50-370/85-28-31). The four flashlights in the l

cmergency supply kit are insufficient to provide appropriate lighting

for briefing the OSC response teams. The above item was discussed with '

cognizant licensee representatives who acknowledged the recommendation,

i 1

2.1.1.4 Disolay Interface  !

The OSC is provided witn two types of displays, .namely, the status

board, and plant mimic diagrams. The status board provides space for

updating plant status, ' emergency status, supervisor log-in, and

required _ comments. The plant mimic diagrams are plastic laminated

8x10 inch reproductions of simple line drawings. Each elevatio?'of the

plant is depicted. Radiation monitors were identified by a coordinate

! system. All radiation menitors and their coordinate locatio.1s wero

l listed on the back of each diagram. It was observed, however,'that\the

!

s

.

t

1

P

_ _ _ _ _ __

. -

28

mimics did not include phone locations and numbers, and air supply

headers as noted the in Catawba mimics.

.

Improvement Item

The quality of the drawings (mimics) should be improved to include

phone locations, phone numbers, air supply head 2rs, etc. (IFI

50-369/85-29-32, 50-370/85-28-32). This item was discussed with

cognizant licensee representatives who acknowleged the recommendation,

i

2.1.2 Radiological Equioment and Supplies

2.1.2.1 Radiation Monitoring, 2.1.2.2 Personnel Dosimeters, and

,

2.1.2.3 protective Supplies

i

,

The OSC does not have any special shielding or radiologically protected

'

ventilation system for minimizing radiation exposure; there# ore,

personnel in this area may be evacuated under certain conditions.

Should evacuation become necessary, personnel required for emergency

response would be relocated to the back of the Control Room.

The OSC has a supply of deaicated emergency equipment and supplies

i including respiratory protection pratective clothing, radiation

i

monitoring instruments, potasstua iocide and personnel dosimetry.

Additional equipment is available from the S&C Laboratory, Dosimetry

i Control Point, Dosimetry Offica and trie warehouse. The radiological

equipment available provides tna capab'lity to measure anticipated dose

rates under accident conditions.

I Nonradiological Equiement and Supplies

2.1.3

2.1.3.1 Communications

t

The communication equipment in the OSC consists of plant telephone and

a PA speaker. The inspectors were informed by licensee representatives

that direction and control of the suoport staff assigned to the OSC

comes from the control room or TSC via plant phone. Communications in

the OSC were reviewed during an October 1984 exercise and determined to

be adequate (Inspection Report Nos. 50-369/84-31. 50-370/84-28).

2.1.3.2 Support Supplies

An emergency kit located in the OSC, cantained both radiological and

nonradiological supplies specified by an inventory list defined in the

emergency plan. Immediately available warehouse supplies would be used

,

to augment those items during an emergency. The appraisal disclosed

that supplies were adequate to support the intended functions of the

OSC.

• .

.

.

29

2.2 Functional Capabilities and Walkthroughs

2.2.1 Operation

2.2.1.1 Staffing, 2.2.1.2 Activation, and 2.2.1.3 Onsite Interface

The functional capability of the OSC was evaluated by presenting an NRC

developed, hypothetical accident scenario to the OSC staff. Licensee

personnel responded to the postulated circumstances by describing the

actions that would be taken, and how the equipment and supplies

necessary for OSC function would be obtained and used. The OSC is

activated at the Alert level. At this time, operations, health

physics, instrument and control, chemistry and maintenance personnel

report to an OSC Coordinator. On shift operators and security

personnel provide fire and first aid functions, respectively. The OSC

Coordinator and alternate are pre-designated operations personnel.

Procedures are available for activation of the OSC. During the

October 1984 exercise, the OSC was observed to have been promptly

staffed and activated (Inspection Report Nos. 50-369/85-31,

50-370/84-28). OSC interfaces with the Control Room and TSC are

identified in the McGuire Emergency Plan, Statier Directives, and

Emergency Procedures.

2.2.2 OSC Functions '

' ' 2.2.2.1 Coordination, Assign nent, Proficiency, and Walkthroughs

The functional capability of the OSC was evaluated by presenting the

OSC staff with an NRC developed, nypothetical accident scenario of a

LOCA outside of containment. Licensee personnel were requested to

explain and cemonstrate OSC activation, and describe their action's, trse

of procedures, equipment, and supplies in responding to a TSC request

to investigate and correct the situation. The evaluation confirmed

that the OSC, as structured, was aceouately staffed and capable of

performing its intended functions. Other areas of this report amplify

tnese findings and provide details of other investigative work.

2.2.3 Conclusion 1

Based on these findings, dhis portion of the licensee's program met the

requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

.

,-

I

,v. -

m. , , . ,

.-r < -.. _ - -

.

..

30

3.0 Catawba /McGuire Crisis Manaoement Center (:MC)

3.1 Physical Facilities

'

3.1.1 Design

3.1.1.1 Size

The size of each of tha rooms in the licensee's Crisis Management

Center (CMC) is sufficient to accommodate the pre-designated Federal,

State, local, and utility personnel, and all necessary equipment. The

rooms involved are listed below, and identified by function size, and

-

staff complement.

WC 2390 - Health Physics, Rad Waste, Chemistry

370 sq. ft., 10-15 people

WC 1722 - Operations Data Room:

240 sq. ft., 3 people and

mobile computer

WC 1704 - Nuclear Engineering:

625 sq. ft., 8-12 people

WC 1488 - NRC:

440 sq. ft., 6-10 people

WC 1222 - Offsite Radiation:

560 sq. ft., 11 people and

mobile computer

WC 1010 - Recovery Manager:

770 sq. ft., 15-25 people

WC 925 - Administration and Logistics:

200 sq. ft. S-9 people.

3.1.1.2 Layout

The layout of each room appeared to be adequate: however, the layout of

the entire center (seven main rooms plus two support rooms located on

six floors, and in tnree different buildings) made interaction very

difficult. The licensee has completed plans to consolidate the CMC on

one floor of the addition to the power building. Construction of the

facility is in progress. This finding will be tracked as an open item

and will tme reviewed during subsequent inspections (50-369/85-29-33,

50-370/85-28-33).

. -,

, . .

31

3.1.1.3 Location and 3.1.1.4 Structure

The Catawba /McGuire CMC is a designated facility within the Duke Power

Company's General Office in Charlotte, North Carolina. The CMC is

approximately 18 miles from Catawba Nuclear Station and approximately

17 miles from McGuire Nuclear Station. The location of this facility

meets the criteria of Option 1 of Table 1 in Supplement I to

tfJREG-0737, and is, therefore, acceptable. The CMC consists of areas

on several floors in the Wachovia Center (staffed by the Recovery

Manager (RM) and support staff), the Duke Power Electric Center (Crisis

News Center), and the Power Building (Design and Construction Group).

The Wachovia Center has been constructed to meet the City of Charlotte

and State of North Carolina Building Codes. Because of the distance

from the sites, there are no special requirements for habitability or

for a backup Catawba /McGuire CMC. Two separate lines provide electrical

power to the Wachovia Center and an emergency diesel is available for

backup power, emergency lighting, and elevators. The inspector

expressed a concern over the layout of the CMC, namely the separation

of the Recovery Manager and key support staff groups. e.g., Offsite

Radiological Support. The inspectors noted that the functionirg of the .

CMC would be vastly improved if tne key groups were closer to the

Recovery Manager and their individual group managers. This concern was

also expressed by the licensee as previously stated. Mitigation of

this concern is discussed in Section 3.1.1.2. above.

3.1.1.5 habitability /Evironment

Because of the distance from the site, the CMC has not been designed to

be habitable under accident conditions. It should be noted therefore,

that radiation survey instruments are not available within the '

facility.

3.1.1.6 Disolay Interface

1. The CMC was provided with the same displays as the Catawba TSC and

OSC with the exceptions and additions listed below.

2. Operator Aid Computer Disolays - The CMC is provided with a

terminal and printer that interface only with the VAX not the OAC;

no cathode ray tube displays are available to display 0AC data.

3. Maps - Site and zone maps showing the emergency planning zones

were available for the Catawba site but not for McGuire.

4. Emergency Status - The CMC was provided with a status board

showing emergency level, zones sheltered, zones evacuated, and

units affected. l

l

-

- _.

. - _ _ _ _ _ - _

.. ' '

32

5. Mimics - The CMC was provided with additional mimics of liquid and

gaseous waste storage tanks, showing capacities and sources of

input. i

All displays were ledgible and understandable. Since data are

corrected / inserted at the TSC before release to the CMC, the data

sheets provided meaningful information and were -not characterized by

1

the listing of asterisks seen in the TSC (See Section 1.1.1.6).

The CMC is directly affected by the same lack of real-time data as the

TSC. Because all data in the CMC comes from the VAX computer, it is

delayed by the manual transfer of data from the OAC to the VAX. The

lack of real-time data may result in unnecessary calls to the Control

Room or TSC from the CMC in it's request for more recent data.

,

Improvement Items

Site emergency planning zone maps for the McGuire station should

be provised (IFI 50-369/85-29-34, 50-370/85-28-34).

The CMC should be provided with a continuous data stream at, or

near, real-time (IFI 50-369/85-29-35,50-370/85-28-35).

3.1.2 Radiological Eouioment and Supolies

l Radiological equipment and supplies, with the exception of some

protective clothing, are not maintained at the CMC because of the

following: (1) the CMC is located sufficiently far from the plant sucn

that habitability monitoring is not - required, and (2) environmental

monitoring teams are routinely dispatched from the site, and all.

ecuipment and supolies are located there. Teams are directed from the

CMC once that facility is activated.

3.1.3 Nonradiological Equipment and Sucolies

3.1.3.1 Communications

The Catawba /McGuire CMC utilizes the same communications systems

previously discussed for Catawba in Section 1.1.3 above. In addition,

the facility has similar reliable communication links with the McGuire

1

Nuclear Station (MNS) anc its offsite agencies. The telepnone system

at the CMC in the Wachovia Center has out of-building power and the

radios .' are provided with battery pack backup. Periodic tests are

conducted in conformance with the testing frequency ~ recommended by

NUREG-0654, Rev. 1.

3.1.3.2 Records / Drawings, 3.1.3.3 Support Supplies

As configured in the non-emergency mode, the CMC has prepositioned

documents and procedures in the recovery manager's (WC-1010) area only.

All other satellite support areas that become activated are provided-

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with required documents and procedures by arriving emergency staff

personnel. In general, the satellite areas are strategically located

within the area that is normally occupied by the staffing personnel.

This arrangement contributes to familiarity with the area, and easy

access to support materials that cannot be readily moved to central,

designated emergency response areas. For example, nuclear engineering

service locates to Room WC-1704, a large conference room on the design

engineers' floor. Checklists in the CMC implementing procedures

designate the person responsible and material that each discipline

brings to their area. Computers on this floor are the daily-use

machines of the engineers staffing f'e emergency area. In addition,

several satellite libraries and a central plant library are located in

the CMC area to provide any additional documents necessary. Documents

brought to the nuclear engineering services area of the CMC during the

walk-through were observed to be updated controlled documents appro-

priate for the accident scenario proposed. Pre positioned material in

the recovery manager's area was appropriate for the CMC to perform its

intended function.

3.2 Information Management Systems

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3.2.1 Variables Provided

. 3.2.1.1 Regulatory Guide 1.97. Rev. 2 - Variables

Section 1.2.1.1 addresses the current status of Regulatory Guide 1.97

variables. The Crisis Management Center (CMC) has access to tne /AX

computer via a terminal identical to that located in the TSC. This

terminal is located in the Offsite Radiation area of the CMC (Rm 1222).

Both the CMC ano the TSC terminals can initiate a VAX calculation, and

provice the results to the other terminal. Accordingly, any

parameter / variable or calculation available to the TSC via the OAC is

also available to the CMC.

3.2.1.2 Other Variables

All Regulatory Guide 1.97 variables which are available in the TSC are

also available in the CMC, as discussed in Section 1.2.1.2. Similar to

the TSC, the CMC has access to the National Weather Service and the

NOAA radio weather service. Additionally, the CMC has access to

weather- forecasting information. A recommencation to provice a

teletype terminal in the CMC is provided elsewhere in this report.

The CMC also has ready ' access to emergency medical and vendor

information and assistance via telephone. Comprehensive lists of

pertinent telephone numbers are maintained for immediate reference and

use.

Evacuation time estimates are tabulated in the CMC Implementing

Procedure CMIP-1, Copies of the procedure are readily available.

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Offsite monitoring information is available to the CMC from licensee

field monitoring teams. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Energy,

the NRC, and State agencies can be expected to conduct offsite

monitoring. This data can also be provided to the CMC.

3.2.1.3 Relationship To Functional Needs

Unlike the Technical Support Center, the Crisis Management Center does

not have an Operator Aid Computer (OAC) terminal. (See discussion in

paragraph 1.2.1.3). Plant data, status, and operating parameters are

stored in the OAC and transferred to the VAX. Usually, daily 15 minute

interval selected values (about 70) are transferred to a floppy disk.

This floppy disk is off-loaded to the MDS/21 data entry system for the

transfer to the station computer (VAX). After this data is verified as

accurate in the TSC, it is available for " release" to other, selected

users such as the State / counties, the NRC, and the CMC which are on the

general office (ESS) VAX. This " builds in" a delay of approximately

fifteen minutes or more before users outside the Control Room have data

in hand. A review of the standard format of partmeters available

indicates that data typically transmitted to the CMC from the Catawba

and McGuire Nuclear Station dif fer. Further, both of the formats may

not include some of the Reg. Guide 1.97 parameters such as subcooled

margin, core thermocouple output, and reactor vessel level indication.

Note, however, if a user such as the CMC, requires parameters in

addition to those normally transmitted, a request is made of the

operator transferring data from the OAC to tne disc referred to above.

Virtually any parameter or plant status data observed in the Control

Room can be monitored in the CMC (as in the TSC). The inspector also

observed that the data transmitted to the CMC may run as much as thirty

minutes late, since it is not real time data. Compared to the TSC, real

time data is not available in the CMC since the CMC does not have an

OAC console.

3.2.2 Data Acouisition

The honeywell data acquisition system was cescribed in Section 1.2.2

3.2.2.1 Isolation

Since no direct connections are made to plant eouipment by the data

acquisition systems of the CMC, isolation is guaranteed.

3.2.3 Data Communications

Data transfer mechanisms from the Honeywell 4400 to the VAX 11-78 0

systems were described in Section 1.2.3. Crisis Managament Center

(CMC) ex:.cises were concucted using dial-up communications lines. To

assure communications the licensee should establish dedicated communi-

cation lines between the CMC and VAX computers, and use dial-up as

back-up. This finding was discussed with licensee representatives who

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stated that direct linkage of the two computer systems -is planned.

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This finding will be tracked as an open item to assure its correction.

This item will be reviewed during subsequent inspections

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(50-413/85-39-36,50-414/85-36-36).

3.2.4 Data Analysis

3.2.4.1 Dose Assessment

Section 1.2.4.2 addresses the availability of adequate information

required to determine source terms for all potential release pathways.

The Crisis Management Center (CMC) has access to the VAX computer via

an identical terminal to the one located in the TSC for dose projection

calculations. The CMC terminal is located in the Offiste Radiation

group area of the CMC (Rm 1222). Both the CMC and the TSC terminals

can initiate a VAX calculation and provide the results to the other

terminals. Therefore, any parameter, variable, or calculation

available to the TSC via the current 0AC - floppy disc - VAX route is

also available to the CMC.

Complementing the offsite group under Nuclear Technical Services is the

Technical Services Support group which is composed of health physics,

chemistry and raowaste engineers. This group orovides current and

predicted calculations of actual or potential radioactive re'. eases from

potential sources via possible pathways. Scurce term methods used in

the CMC parallel tnose used in the TSC. The discussion presented in

Section 1.2.4.2 is ecually applicable to the CMC.

3.2.4.2 Reactor Technical Succort

The CMC is able to actively participate in accident analysis and

support of the TSC because of the normal daily responsibilities of the

General Office, i.e., management of design and construction of the new

plants, and continued management of the operating plants. The

combination of experience and material resources in the General Office

can ce ennanced by continuous access to real time data and status of

tne coerating plants.

3.2.4.3 Dose Assessment at the Crisis Manacement Center (CMC)

All dose assessment cacabilities that are available in the TSC are also

available in the CMC tnrough the " Class A Model" computer capabilities

and manual methods. As indicated in 1.2.7.1, the dose assessment model

is not the same as models used by the State or the NRC. However,

individuals from the offsite organizations to whom dose assessment

results are available, are present in the CMC dose assessment area.

The procedures for obtaining and using meteorological information in

the CMC are identical to those described for the TSC, and are subject

to the same concerns discussed in Section 1.2.4.2 (A). The CMC will be

staffed by a licensee Meteorologist, which enhances interpretation of

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real-time and forecast meteorological information. However, weather

products (e.g. , surface and upper air charts, radar reports, and

forecast maps) produced by the NWS are not directly available in the

CMC. To obtain these products, the meteorologist must leave the CMC

for approximately one hour. This action degrades the capability of the

CMC. Access to NWS products for use by the meteorologist should be

available in the CMC for activation during an emergency situation.

Suggested areas for improvement are the same as those described in

Section 1.2.4.2. of this report

-3.2.5 Data Storage

See Section 1.2.5.

3.2.6 System Reliability

3.2.6.1 Verification

.

See Section 1.2.6.1.

1

3.2.6.2 Comouter-Based Systems' Reliability

3ee Section 1.2.6.2.

3.2.6.3 Manual Systemt

See Section 1.2.6.3.

3.2.7 Conclusion

Based on these findings, this portion of the licensee's program meets

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the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

Imorovement Items

Standardize data sets McGuire Nuclear Stations co the CMC and

include all Regulatory Guide 1.97 parameters in the standard

format. If accident conditions warrant, depart from the

standardized fermat (e.g. , exclude some of the Reg. Guide 1.97

parameters) (IFI 50-369/85-29-37, 50-370/85-28-37).

Improve method of data transmission to the CMC such that the data

-is real . time or near real time data (see Section 3.1.1.6)

(IFI 50-369/85-29-38, 50-370/85-28-38).

' The above improvement items were. discussed with cognizant licensee i

representatives. The licensee acknowledged the item which will be ,

reviewed during subsequent inspections.  !

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3.3 Functional Capabilities and Walk-Throughs

3.3.1 Operations

3.3.1.1 Organization; 3.3.1.2 Staffing; 3.3.1.3 Activation

An NRC developed accident scenario and walkthroughs were used to

determine how the Catawba /McGuire CMC would function curing an

emergency. The availability and locations of key equipment,

procedures, supplies and other necessary material were identified by

CMC staff personnel in specific appraisal areas. Individuals in the

CMC responded to the postulated circumstances by describing the actions

that would be used. The notification of CMC response personnel is

initiated by a telephone call from the Catawba or McGuire TSC, via the

Duke Power Company Duty Engineer, to the Recovery Manager or his

alternate. This call initiates a telephone call-out tree to notify the

remaining CMC personnel. The inspector determined that the CMC support

staff was consistent with that described in Section N of the CMC Plan.

Table 2 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 addresses only one member of the

CMC sta#f in its staffing and response time requirements. The senior

manager of the CMC (Recovery Manager) is listed as necessary for

response in 60 minutes from declaration of an emergency. As specified

in the Cata.<ba and McGuire Nuclear Stations plans and procedures, the

Emergency Coordinator performs the role and furctions of the Recovery

Manager until the CMC is activated. Accorcingly, the capability to

manage the overall response effort and make protective action

recommendations to offsite authorities is not compromised. The

inspector deternined that the CMC staffing level conforms to the

criteria of Table 2 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

3.3.1.4 Communication Interfaces: 3.3.1.5 Offsite Interfaces;

and 3.3.1.6 Transfer of Resconsibilities

Communication and offsite interfaces are identified and described in

the CMC Plan. CMC Plan implementing procedures (CMIP) provide

instructions for effective communications with offsite autnorities.

CMIP-1 adcresses_ the responsibilities of the Recovery Manager and

immediate staff. These include initial actions and transfer of

responsibilities from the TSC, emergency classification, protective

action recommendations, communication with States, counties, and the

TSC, and de-escalation and recovery.

3.3.2. TSC Supoort

3.3.2.1 Looistic Support

The CMC is tasked and capable of providing extensive logistic support

to the licensee. An Administration and Logistics Section under the CMC

organization functions _ to direct and coordinate this support. Such

support includes, but is not limited to the following: (1) emergency

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power sources available within the company can be relocated to the site

if needed; (2) heavy equipment belor.ging to the company can be made

avai'able; (3) coordination of all aspects of information exchange and

other cooperation with Federal, State, and local agencies; (4) lodging,

meals, and transportation services can be arranged and provided.

3.3.2.2 Implementation of Mitigating Actions

The CMC is tasked and staffed to provide timely support to the TSC in

assessing the offsite impacts of proposed mitigating actions. The

Technical Services Support group develops expected concentrations and

release rates. These data are used by the Offsite Radiological group

to develop dose projections and assessments using the CMC terminal

access to the VAX Class A Model. Manual computations parallel the

computer calculat.;ns.

The Nuclear Engineering group can provide both independent recommen-

dations for alternative mitigating actions and an assessment of

proposed mitigating actions. Under the Recovery Manager, the CMC is

tasked to coordinate mitigative actions with Federal, State and local

agencies. The CMC coordinates radiological and other environmental

assessment calculations with the licensee. Crisis Management Plan

Saction A.1.d clearly establishes responsibility for implementing

mitigative actions. CMC Implementing Procedures adequately cover

notification requirements in the event of containment venting or other

clanned releases. Adequate decisional aids are available to the CMC

staff for planning venting of containment.

3.3.3 CMC Functions

3.3.3.1 Notification / Communication and 3.3.3.2 Protective Action

Decisionmaking

Notification and communication are accressed in Section 3.1.3.1,

3.3.1.3 and 3.3.1.5 above. Emergency classification and protective

action cecisionmaking are addressed in Section 3.3.1.6 above. In

addition, through an interview with the Recovery Manager, the inspector

determined that the licensee demonstrated clear understanding of

emergency classification, notifying and making protective action

recor.mendations to offsite authorities, and effective acceptance of all

responsibilities transferred from tne TSC to the CMC.

3.3.3.3 Dose Assessment

Based on observations of the walkthrough, in response to a

mini-scenario which simulated a station blackout condition, it was

concluded that adequate procedures exist to perform dose assessment

operations in the Control Room, TSC, and CMC, including procedures for

source term determination.

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The VAX system utilizes a class A Model for dose rate assessment and

projection. Additionally, the OAC contained a " Nuclear-23" program for

rapid determination (in the Control Room) of a "Go-No-Go" decision with

respect to protective action recommendations. Fallback manual

.

procedures are used to parallel the VAX results for consistency checks.

During the walkthrough, it was observed that the Dose Assessment

Report, Enclosure 5.5 to HP/0/8/1009/13 (Offsite Dose Projection-

Uncontrolled Release of Gaseous Radioactive Material Through the Unit

Vent), which was being filled out by the Dose Assessment group in the

TSC, was left blank in the section under Source Term " Corresponds

To." Queries of personnel failed to yield an acceptable reason for

this finding. Subsequent discussions with the CMC dose assessors

confirmed its use as a " reasonableness check" and as an input to aid

the Class A Model computation. It is recommended that the licensee

review this particular Section of the form and ensure that its intended

purpose is understood (50-369/85-29-39, 50-370/85-28-39).

The source term and dose assessment / projection computational systems

and procedures used in the Control Room, TSC, and CMC are essentially

identical.

3.3.4 Coordination of Radiological and Environmental Assessment

3.3.5 Walk-throughs

The functional capability of the CMC was evaluated by presenting the

fully activated CMC staff with a hypothetical accident scenario.

Persons normally assigned to the faci'ity during an emergency staffed

tne CMC during the walk-through. Licensee personnel were expected to

respond to the postulated events of a total loss of AC accompanied by-a

loss of auxiliary feedwater by describing their actions, and how

procedures, equipment, and supplies in the CMC would be used.

Evaluation determined that the CMC would be adeouately staffed and

capable of performing its intended function. Comments in other

sections of this report amplify observations made during the walk-

through and during subsequent investigative effort.

3.3.4 Conclusion

Basea on these findings, this portion of the licensee's program

appeared to meet the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

4.0 Persons Contacted

Duke Power Company General Office

• G. Vaughan, General Manager, Nuclear

• M. D. McIntosh, General Manager, Nuclear Support

• K. E. Harris, System Emergency Planner

1

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40

• S. Apple, Meteorologist

• L. Lewis, Offsite Radiation Manager

• R. D. Sharp, Nuclear Engineer Licensing

"G. Merritt, Crisis Management

• L. J. Parker, Technical Associate Licensing

• M. Greer, Assistant Engineer

Catawba Nuclear Station

• J. W. Hampton, Station Manager

• J. W. Cox Technical Services Superintendent

• C. L. Harczell, Compliance Engineer

• M. Bolch, Station Emergency Planner

McGuire Nuclear Station

• T. L. McConnel, Station Manager

• B. Hamilton, Superintencent, Technical Services

• R. Leonard, Station Emergency Planner

• N. McCraw, Compliance Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, computer

specialists, operators, mechanics, office and acministrar.ive personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

• P. Skinner, Senior Resicent Inspector, Catawba Nuclear Station

• W. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector, McGuire Nuclear Station

• Attended exit interview.

5.0 Exit Interview

The appraisal scope and fincings were summarized on September 11, 1985, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 4, above. The team leader defined the

specific areas evaluated and discussed in cetail all findings and

recommendations presented nerein. The licensee did not identify as

proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by -the inspectors

during this appraisal.

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