ML20136E530
| ML20136E530 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 09/27/1983 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Earl A WISCONSIN, STATE OF |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20136E535 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8310070096 | |
| Download: ML20136E530 (4) | |
Text
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SEP 2 71983 i
l The Menorable Anthony 5. Earl Governor of Wisconsin -
Madison. Wisconsin 53702 .
Bear Governor Earl ~ .' ' '
Officials of the State of Wisconsin. including Mr. Peter Y. McAvoy of your staff, have had a number of discussions with staff members of the Naclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regarding shipeents of spent nuclear reactor fuel from the General Electric facility near Norris. Illinois to the point -
Beach Nuclear Power Station. They have also discussed the planned spent '
fuel shipments to Point Beach from the West Valley. New York facility. The purpose of this letter is to provide background information on the planned g removal of spent fuel from West Valley and to assure you that we will -
continue to work closely with you and your staff as these plans proceed.
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Four utilities. including the Wisconsin Electric Peuer Campany, presently have spent nuclear reactor fusi stored at the Western New York Ruclear .*; \. >
3ervice Center (the " Center" near West Valley. New York about 30 miles southofBuffale). The reactor fuel was shipped to the Center in the early , .?, . -
to mid-seventies for planned chemical reprocessing. With the plant shutdown 4i. .
in 1972 and withdrawal from the reprocessing operation by the plant operator
";hin ?- Ig75. the spent fuel remained in storage at the Center, which is owned
'. - Iq the New Yort State Energy Research and Development Authority (RYERDA).
A recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of .
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New Jprk held that the omiers of the fuel must remove it within a reasonable 1
time. The requests for removal of the fuel by NYERDA are related to
' activities being condected at the site by the U.S. Department of Energy -
(DOE) in accordance with the West Valley Demonstration Pro,1ect Act of 1980.
(Pub.L.96-368). Under this Act. DOE is preparing to solidify liquid high-level radioactive westes at the site that resulted from previous reprocessing operations. Clearing the spent fuel storage pool will enable DOE to use the facility for decontamination activities related to the wasta solidification operation. .
- The schedules for return of the fuel have not yet been firmly established, but preparatory actions have been initiated by Wisconsin Electric and Commonwealth Edison for return of that.r fuel to the Point Beach and Dresden reactor. sites, respectively. The court has initiated a review of the '
situation for the four utilities to , establish a reasonable time frame for removal of the fuel. The utilities'and reactors are listed below with the amount of fuel involved.
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, The Honorable Anthony 5. Earl 12- ,
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Eenerating Reactor site . Metric Tens Assemblies
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Commonwealth Edis's e Dresden (Illinois) .
30.4' 206 Generet public Utilities , %sterCreek(NewJersey) 42.8 224
. Rochester ses & Electric . Ginna(NewYork) ,. 31.1' 81 Wisconsin Electric power pointBeach(Wisconsin)' t 43.0 114
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~ According' to the information we have received.114 shipments are planned for the point Beach fuel, and 30 shipments are expedted for the Dresden fuel. The relative difference in the ntsaber of shipments results from the different types of reactor fuel involved and the capacity of the casks. ,
If the same cask models should be used, the amber of projected shipments
, for Sinna fuel would be 81, with 32 required for the Oyster Creek fuel. -
l . We expect that the stil.ities will be the ' shippers" of the fuel who will .
. arrange for loading of the casks by DOE and delivery of the fuer(to the '.
carriers) and, accordingly, the shipments will be subject to NRC requirements.-
In broad terms. NRC regulations require the use of certified casks designed to withstand severe accidents and roste approvals intended to minimize the risk of theft or sabotage. , Our rules also require that licensees provide ' ~ -
advance notification to governors or their designees of the routes that will be used through the particular state and shipping schedules. The - -
latter information must be protected from disclosure to unautheirized persons. The Department of Transportation has responsibility for regulating the conditions of transport, such as . vehicle safety and driver training.
As hou may know. Mr. James G. Kappler, Regional Assinistrator, NRC Region III, and members of his staff, the Department of Transportation, and representatives of Wisconsin and Illinois are working together to arrive at an appropriate inspection progran for ongoing and planned spent fuel shipments to assure safe movement of the feel with effective ese of resources. Mr. Kappler umuld be pleased to meet with you if you should desire more detail en these
. matters. Mr Kappler can be contacted by telephone at 312-730-5500.
Sincerely,
~
. , Wide @ ?!@l.D_hti, ,
William J. Dircks Executive Director
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- 4 W 9 1he Honorable Anthony 5. Eari .e - .-
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'.... t ses Mr. Peter V. McAvey. Executive Assistant 2 F!
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Department of Atrinistratica
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Ness Flores. Chairman . , s-Public Service Commission i ?
State Liaison Officer .
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- L. D. Santman. D.fractor Material Transportation Bureau Department of Transportation .
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- MINNESOTA-DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SURVEY SHEET FOR SUBJECT SHIPMENT.
Has:been mailed by. Minnesota to Region III. Region III will fax it'to IE as soon as it arrives.
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\ Enclosure' N
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY ColetISSION REGION III Report No. 50-263/85020(DRP) ,
Docket No. 50-263 ' License No. DRP-22 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Inspection At: Monticello Site, Monticello, MN
. Inspection Conducted: July 9 - September 9,1985 Inspector: P. L. Hartmann Approved By: D. C. oyd, C 9 N Reactor Projects Section 2D Date Inspection Summary Inspection on July 9 - September 9, 1985 (Report No. 50-263/85020(DRP))
Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of operational safety verification; maintenance; surveillance; Licensee Event Reports; spent fuel shipments; and offsite activities. The inspection involved a total of 230 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector including 24 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No violations or ' safety concerns were identified in the seven areas inspected.
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DETAILS
- 1. Persons Contacted 8W. A. Shamla, Plant Manager .
M. H. Clarity, Assistant to the Plant Manager D. E. Nevinski, Plant Superintendent, Engineering & Radiation Protection H. M. Kendall, Plant Office Manager D. D. Antony, Superintendent of Operations W. E. Anderson, Plant Superintendent, Operations & Maintenance i R. L. Scheinost, Superintendent, Quality Engineering J. R. Pasch, Superintendent, Security & Services )
L. H. Waldinger, Superintendent, Radiation Protection W. J. Hill, Superintendent, Technical Engineering W. W. Albold, Superintendent of Maintenance B. D. Day, Superintendent, Operations Engineering L. L. Nolan, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services
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The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees including members of the technical and engineering staffs and reactor and auxiliary operators.
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- Denotes those licensee representatives attending the management exit interviews.
- 2. Operational Safety Verification The unit was operated at near full power during the majority of the inspection period. On July 29, 1985, a reacter scram occurred and is discussed further below. Following the reactor scram, the licensee decided to remain shutdown for a 36-hour outage to find and repair a reactor building closed cooling water leak. The repairs were made and the unit was returned to service July 30, 1985.
l The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,
! including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations
! and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment i
in need of maintenance, plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implemen'sation of radiation protection controls. The inspector walked down the accessible portions of the standby liquid control system to verify operability.
During the inspection period, the licensee noted a reddish brown substance in the standby liquid control (SLC) tank. An underwater in.,pection of the tank showed no anomalies. In addition, the licensee had the substance analyzed and learned the matter was slime sold <
l consisting of myxonycetes.
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,i The slime developed by the presence of cotton fibers, probably falling into the tank through the manhole over several years. To remedy this, the water of the SLC tank was externally filtered to remove the slime and
- the manhole is now locked. At no time was the operability of the SLC system impaired.
On July 29, 1985, while at 995 power, a reactor scram occurred due to low reactor vessel level. All systems responded as required. The events .
leading to the scram are as follows: Arcing was detected on one of the '
two recirculation motor generator exciter collector ring brushes. The decision was made to replace the arcing brush with the motor operating.
This was thought to be possible by reducing exciter current to a point ;
where the redundant non-arcing brush could carry the exciter current and permit the arcing brush to be removed. It was not known that the non-arcing brush was not in contact with the collector ring, thus unable to carry current.
When the replacement of the arcing brush began, the process of removing the arcing brush resulted in an abrupt loss of field in the No. 12 ,
recirculation motor generator. The loss of field resulted in the tripping of the No.12 motor generator and recirculation pump, and loss of recirculation flow in the B loop. The resultant swell raised the level above the reactor feed pump trip setpoint, tripping both reactor feed pumps. While operators were restarting a reactor feed pump and attempting to restore level, reactor vessel level fell below the reactor scram level setpoint.
The root cause of this event was improper installation of a motor generator collector ring brush. To prevent recurrence of this event, procedures are being revised to improve the precautions and instructions i as applicable.
On August 8, 1985, while at full power, a water hammer occurred when the No. 11 RHR pump was started in the torus cooling mode. In response the licensee inspected all accessible RHR snubbers and hangers with no l abnormalities noted. Also, RHR valves 2006 and 2007 torque switches were inspected to verify proper seating. No problems were noted. The following day the A loop of RHR was vented at high points in the system, and No. 11 RHR pump was started in the same manner as previously. No water hammer occurred. The cognizant system engineer is continuing to investigate this event. The inspector will follow his findings and recommendations.
On August 9, 1985, the licensee notified the inspector of a missed technical specification surveillance requirement. Specifically, Technical Specification 4.12.B.1.h currently requires, "the yard main and the reactor building and the turbine building (fire suppression) headers shall be flushed every 12 months." This requirement was amended in 1981 to add the turbine building header to the reactor building and yard main header flush requirements. The requirement to flush the turbine building header was not implemented, and this was discovered by the licensee on August 5, 1985. The turbine building header was flushed the seme day, and no indication of blockage was observed.
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0 The safety significance of not flushing the turbine header from the June 1981 license amendment to August 6,1985, is minimal. At all times the reactor building header was operable as was demonstrated by its yearly flushing. The turbine building and reactor headers were cross-connected in October 1980; thus, since that time a water supply for the turbine building has been available. .
The root cause of the failure to implement the turbine building header flush requirement was the result of a reproduction error. The amendment copy received from the NRC was off center and had cut off the right-hand margin " bars" used to denote changes. The procedure used to identify technical specification changes did not provide adequate guidance to detect omission of side " bars." As a result, the changes were not identified and the surveillance procedure was not revised to incorporate this requirement. Long term corrective action is to closely scrutinize the amendments received at the plant to ensure all changes to technical specifications are noted. Immediate corrective action was to include the turbine header in the surveillance Fire Protection System Header Flush Surveillance 0267 and perform the flush.
Because this problem was: identified by the licensee; fits Severity IV or V; was reported; was corrected with measures to prevent recurrences; was not a violation that was preventable by licensee corrective action for a previous violation; a notice of violation will not be issued.
On August 13, 1985, while at full power, a reactor building ventilation isolation and standby gas treatment initiation occurred. The cause was a high level trip of the reactor building exhaust plenum radiation monitor.
While performing surveillance the low level trip was tested. As the
, instrument was returned to normal, level spiked to the high level trip setpoint. The trip setpoint is very close to background.
l To prevent recurrence, the licensee has changed the procedure to keep the
, test signal in circuit until the high level trip is bypassed (by l jumpers). The long term resolution is a request (in the form of a license amendment) to allow bypassing the instrument while testing.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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- 3. Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry 1
codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were 4
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inspected as applicable; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. ,
Work requests were reviewed to detemine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment ,
maintenance which may affect system perfomance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
- No.12 Recirculation Motor Generator Brush Replacement
- No. 12 Control Rod Drive Pump Maintenance s.
- No. 2102 RHR Motor Valve Repair No violations or deviations were identified.
- 4. Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed surveillan::e testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that limiting 4 conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and
- resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following test activities:
- Scram Discharge Volume Level Setpoint Test
- Low Condenser Vacuum Reactor Scram Test No violations or deviations were identified.
- 5. Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
(Closed) LER 85 Reactor Building Vent Wide Range Gas Monitor Spike (Closed) LER 85 Reactor Scram During Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Testing. This event is also discussed in Inspection Report No.50-263/85012(DRP) 5
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(Closed) LER 85 Actuations of Emergency Filtration Train in Emergency Mode. These events are discussed in Inspection Report 50-263/85012 (DRP)
(Closed) LER 85 Reactor Building Vent Wide Range Gas Monitor Trip Due to Power Loss .
(Closed) LER 85 Reactor Scram Following Recirc Pump Trip. This event is discussed in Paragraph 2.
(Closed) LER 85 Missed Fire Protection Surveillance. This event is discussed in Paragraph 2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 6. Spent Fuel Shipments During the inspection period, the licensee made five spent fuel shipments to the General Electric Company Morris Operation in Morris, Illinois. A shipment consisted of 36 BWR fuel assemblies in 2 IF-300 casks mounted on rail cars, I cask per car.
On two of the shipments, before the rail cars with the casks IF-301 and
- IF-302 were shipped from the Monticello site, the inspector verified that shipping forms were completed, that the rail cars were properly placarded, and that the casks were correctly labeled. The radiation and contamination surveys were noted to have been completed and to have been within departure limits requirements. The inspector also performed independent direct radiation and removable contamination surveys of the casks using NRC portable survey equipment and noted these readings and indications agreed with the licensee's survey records and information presented in the radioactive materials shipment records.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 7. Offsite Activities During this inspection period, the inspector participated in the following activities:
- July 15, 1985 - Addressed the Monticello Rotary Club regarding the Resident Inspector Program.
- July 16,1985 - Met with J. Gonyeau, Manager, Production Training, and toured the Riverside training facility.
- July 17, 1985 - Met with the following NSP persons:
B. Richards, President and Chief Executive Officer R. Haik, Senior Vice President and General Counsel C. Larson, Vice President, Nuclear Generation 6
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- July 31, 1985 - Met with A. Grimsmo, Mayor of Monticello, and discussed the Resident Inspector Program and matters of mutual interest.
- 8. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the cor.clusio6 of the inspection on September 9, 1985. The inspector discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any documents / processes as proprietary.
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- Enclosure 2B U. 5. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 50-263/85018(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Inspection At: Monticello Site, Monticello, MN Inspection Conducted: June 3-7, 1985 Inspector: W. B M//M Ddte Approved By: L. !
Facilities Radiation Protection 6M?/9f Date Section Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted June 3-7, 1985 (Report No. 50-263/85018(DRSS))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the radiation protection program, radioact.ive waste systems, and transportation of radioactive materials including: organization and management control; gaseous radioactive waste; liquid radioactive waste; calibrations and surveillance of gaseous and liquid process monitors; solid radioactive waste; transportation of radioactive materials; control of contaminated areas; an IE bulletin; and and I.E.
l information notice. The inspection involved 36 inspector-hours on site by one NRC inspector.
- Results
- No violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
- 1. Persons Contacted l
- W. Anderson, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance L. Brehm, Production Engineer (Radwaste)
M. Davis, Radiation Protection Specialist
- F. Fey, General Superintendent, Radiation Protection and Chemistry W. Hill, Superintendent, Technical Engineering C. Horn, Health Physicist M. Miller, Senior Plant Health Physicist
- D. Nevinski, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection M. Moses, Plant Administrative Specialist J. Peterson, Radiochemistry Supervisor
- L. Waldinger, Superintendent, Radiation Protection The inspector also contacted other licensee employees and contractors.
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting.
- 2. General This inspection, which began at 11:30 a.m. on June 3, 1985, was conducted to examine routine aspects of the operational radiation protection, radwaste, and transportation programs. The inspection included tours of several radiologically controlled areas and independent surveys of direct radiation levels within those areas. Radiological controls, posting and housekeeping were good.
- 3. Organization and Management Controls The inspector reviewed the licensee's organization and management controls for the radiation protection and radwaste programs including changes in the organizational structure and staffing, effectiveness of procedures and other management techniques used to implement these programs, experience concerning self-identification and correction of program implementation weaknesses, and effectiveness of audits of these programs.
The Supervisor, Radiation Services has recently accepted a corporate position. He will spend part time at Monticello until a replacement is named. The licensee anticipates the position will be filled about July 1, 1985. One additional radiation protection specialist (RPS) in radiation protection has been hired since the last radiation protection inspection in February 1985. No other changes in the radiation protection organization were noted.
The Radiation Protection Manger (RPM) who is also the Superintendent, Radiation Protection reports administratively to the Plant Superintendent for Engineering and Radiation Protection who in turn reports the Plant Manager. When questioned about his direct access to the Plant Manager on radiation protection matters the RPM said he has direct access to the Plant Manager concerning radiation protection matters when necessary.
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The RPM has met with the Plant Manager several times during the recent outage to discuss radiation protection procedure adherence by other plant work groups. In addition, a supervisor's meeting is held weekly with the plant manager; any and all matters can be discussed at this meeting. There appears to be no problem with RPM access to the plant manager.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 4. Gaseous Radioactive Waste The inspector reviewed the licensee's gaseous radwaste management program, including: determination whether changes to equipment and procedures were in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59; determination whether gaseous radioactive waste effluents were in accordance with regulatory requirements; adequacy of required records, reports, and notifications; determination whether process and effluent monitors are maintained, calibrated, and operated as required; and experience concerning identification and correction of programmatic weaknesses.
The licensee's gaseous radwaste management program was reviewed for the '
period from October 1984 to date. The inspector reviewed semiannual effluent reports for 1984 and effluent records were selectively reviewed for the last half of 1984 and 1985 to date. The review of the 1984 gaseous waste records and effluent reports showed that release of noble gases, iodines, particulates, and tritium via this pathway were very small both in curies and as a percent of technical specification limits.
Contributing to the low releases was the plant's shutdown status from February 1984 until about the middle of January 1985 (recirculation piping replacement).
The standby gas treatment system (SBGT) has HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers subject to technical specification surveillance requirements.
During the last maintenance / refueling outage which ended in January 1985, the HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers for both SBGT trains were tested.
Records of inplace tests on both the HEPA filters and the charcoal j absorber showed the efficiency to be greater than 99.99 percent for all i tests. In addition, a laboratory analysis of representative carbon
- samples showed efficiency for methyl iodide removal of 99.13 precent for -
train "A" and 97.88 percent for train "B". All of the efficiencies exceed the T/A requirements.
l While performing a routine surveillance test, " Reactor Building Vent Noble Gas Grab Sampling", during power operation, one of two valves j to the grab sarnier was left closed. When the plant radiation protection
, specialist (RPS) performing the procedure started closing the bypass
! valve in order to obtain the proper sample flow rate thru the sampler, j all sample flow was cut off to the Reactor Building Ventilation Wide
! Range Gas Monitor (WRGM). The loss of sample flow initiated HIGH and i IN0P trips of the WRGM, resulting in isolation of the reactor building
! ventilation and startup of the standby gas treatment system (SBGT). The i RPS noticed his error, opened the proper valve and completed the procedure i
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1 correctly. All trips associated with the event were restored. The Licensee Event' Report (LER) investigation showed that loss of sample flow ,
to the monitor should have caused an INOP trip but should not have caused I a HIGH trip. The INOP trip alone would not have initiated reactor building ventilation isolation and startup of the SBGT system, but should have initiated an alarm telling operators to start the redundant channel A WRGM. Further investigation and testing showed the channel A monitor initiated the same trips when sample flow was cut off. The problem is being discussed with General Atomic, the WRGM supplier to determine the cause and possible solution. The licensee has clarified the sampling procedure and has reinstructed the RPS's, in proper completion of the surveillance test. No additional problems were noted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 5. Liquids and Liquid Radioactive Wastes The inspector reviewed the licensee's reactor liquids and liquid radwaste managemesit programs, including: determination whether changes to equip-ment and procedures were in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59; determination whether reactor liquids meet chemical and radiochemical requirements; determination whether liquid radioactive waste effluents were in accordance with regulatory requirements; adequacy of required records, reports, and notifications; determination whether process and effluent monitors are maintained, calibrated, and operated as required; and experience concerning identification and correction of programmatic weaknesses.
No liquid radwaste releases were made during 1984 and 1985 to date. Waste liquids continue to be recycled for reuse in the reactor coolant system or used in processing solid wastes. An average of about 800,000 gallons of waste water has been processed per month during 1984 and January 1985.
No problems were noted.
The licensee's reactor coolant radiochemistry results for the period October 1984 through June 5, 1985, were reviewed. No discrepancies from the technical specification surveillance requirements for radioiodine sempling or monthly gamma isotopic analyses were noted. The dose equivalent iodine-131 at power is currently about 0.006 uCi/gm which is well below the 5 uCi/gm limit.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 6. Calibrations and Surveillances of Gaseous and Liquid Process and Effluent Monitors The inspector reviewed records of calibrations and functional tests of the gaseous and liquid system monitors. All of these monitors were calibrated as required during 1984.
According to licensee records, condenser air in-leakage and gas decay tank gross radioactivity are determined weekly and the maximum gross radio-activity permitted in one gas decay tank has not been exceeded. No problems were identified.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
- 7. Solid Radioactive Waste The inspector reviewed the licensee's solid radioactive waste management program, including: determination whether changes to equipment and procedures were in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59; adequacy of implementing procedures to properly classify and characterize waste, prepare manifests, and mark packages; overall performance of the process control and quality assurance programs; adequacy of required records, reports, and notifica-tions; and experience concerning identification and correction of pro-grammatic weaknesses.
The licensee continues to use a contracted mobile solidification service for radwaste. Review of the licensee's waste disposal records revealed no discrepancies from the waste disposal data reported in the effluent and waste disposal semi-annual reports.
According to the licensee, Process Control Program (PCP) procedures have been revised to conform with changes in Chem-Nuclear procedures for solidification. In addition, a new etched disc type radwaste filter has been installed in the system. The new filter is designed to eliminate filter precoating and therefore reduce radwaste.
The inspector reviewed the following recently revised process control procedures:
0338, Revision 4, CNSI, Process Control Program for Cement Solidification Units 8105, Revision 14, Radwaste Liner and Solidification 8119, Revision 6, Chem-Nuclear Mobile Cement Solidification Procedure The inspector observed the transfer for shipment of a liner containing solidified radwaste. Workers appeared to follow applicable procedures.
The rail shipment was properly surveyed and placarded. The waste manifest and shipping papers appeared to be in order. No problems were noted.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
- 8. Transportation of Radioactive Materials The inspector reviewed the licensee's transportation of radioactive materials program, including: determination whether writt'en implementing procedures are adequate, maintained current, properly approved, and acceptably implemented; 50.59; determination whether shipments are in compliance with NRC and DOT regulations and the licensee's quality assurance program; determination if there were any transportation incidents involving licensee shipments; adequacy of required records, reports, shipment documentation, and notifications; and experience concerning identification and correction of programmatic weaknesses.
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Records of radioactive material shipments made during 1985 to date were selec fw* eTy reviewed. During this pertoa .n snipise;its ;;rea ma e includ-ing.afloht shipments of spent nuclear fuel to Morris Operations, o Illidois.
No problems were noted.
The following new or recently revised radwaste shipping procedures were reviewed:
8110, Revision 11, Master Radioactive Shipping Procedure 8171, Revision 0, Advance Notification for Spent Fuel Shipments 8178, Revision 0, Procedure for Shipping Radioactive Waste Using 14-210H/14-215H Cask No problems were noted.
This inspection reviewed the licensee's method for ensuring that certifi-cation of compliance maintenance requirements are met. The required maintenance is usually performed by the cask owner. If the cask requires maintenance, such as seal inspection and/or replacement while at the licensee's facility, it is done. Stickers on the casks indicate the date maintenance has been completed. The licensee's procedures require confirmation that required package maintenance has been completed prior to shipment.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 9. Control of Contaminated Areas The licensee is spending considerable effort to reduce the number of contaminated areas in the reactor building, radwaste building, and the turbine building. A review of plant areas is being performed to determine contamination levels and decontamination action levels in these areas. Where possible the root cause of the contamination will be I
determined and corrected. Where feasible the decontamination action level will be reduced. Decontamination work requests have been issued for the following areas: laundry; snubber test; reactor building 935' east and south side; condensate pump pit; reactor building 962' condensate deminerlizer, feedwater area 951' turbine building; 974' reactor cubucle; 1027' reactor building step off pad; CRD pump room; laundry waste tank l and pump room; east shutdown cooling; "A" centrifuge room; Chem-Nuclear l
area, radwaste building; 1027' refuel floor; decon area reactor building; l
985' radwaste pump room; "8" hopper room, radwaste building; and 947' l tank room, radwaste building. Decontamination of these areas is in progress; completion is expected in 1985.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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- 10. IE Bulletin 84-03 Bulletin 84-03: Refueling Cavity Water Seal. According to licensee representatives, a gross seal failure is not a credible accident due to the passive design of the refueling cavity water seal. Additionally, should a gross seal failure occur water loss could be readily compensated and fuel in the vessel or spent fuel pool would remain covered. In the event of a refueling cavity seal failure while fuel is in transit, significant time would exist to place the fuel in a safe location (either in the spent fuel pool or the reactor vessel) due to the limited rate of water loss.
- 11. IE Information Notice 85-06 Information Notice 85-06: Contamination of Breathing Air System.
According to licensee representatives, the service air system is used for supplied breathing air where required. Procedures require samples of the service air to be taken and analysed prior to initial use and daily thereafter while being used for breathing air. The air is analysed for radioactive contamination.
- 12. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 7, 1985. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection and discussed the likely content of the inspection report. The licensee did not identify any information as proprietary.
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Enclosure 2C
'Allt 1 8 G85 Docket No. 50-263 Northern States Power Company ATTN: Mr. C. E. Larson '
Vice President, Nuclear .,
Generation 4 416 Nicollet Mall '
Minneapolis, MN 55401 Gentlemen:
This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Messrs. C. II. Brown and P. L. Ilartmann of this office on May 7 through July 8, 1985, of activities '
at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Station authorized by NRC Operating License No. DPR-22, and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. W. Shamla and members of his staff at the conclusion of the inspection.
The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective exaaination of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel.
During this inspection no violations of NRC requirements were identified; however, an unresolved item from a previous inspection conducted February 4-8, 1985 has been upgraded to a violation as specified in the enclosed Appendix.
A written response is required.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter, the enclosures, and your response to this letter sL11 be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
The responses directed by this letter (and the accompanying Notice) are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.
U O 7CO2.JU UbO/lu DR ADOCK 05000263' PDR \
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i Northern States Power Company 2 jut 181985 Ua will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.
Sincerely, e
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h W4m' W. D. Shafer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2
Enclosure:
Inspection Report l
No. 50-263/85012(DRP) ;
i cc w/ enclosure. l U. A. Shamla, Plant Manager DMB/ Document Control Dask (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, Rll! Monticello Resident inspector, RIII Prairie Island John V. Ferman, Ph.D.,
Nuclear Engineer, MPCA l
Boyd/ r C iissotamos w Ha json Gret man x
Nore%s 07/17/85 /t T
AEE.endix NOTICE OF VIOLATION Northern States Power Company Docket No. 50-263 As a result of the inspection conducted on February 4-8, 1985, and in accord-ence with the General Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions (10 CTR Part 2, Appendix C), the following violation was identified:
10 CTR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XII, as implemented Ly the licensee's Operational Quality Assurance Plan (0QAP), Revision 9, Section 14.0, requires that measures be established to assure that tools, gauges, instruments, and other measuring and testing devices used in activities affecting quality are properly controlled, calibrated, and adjusted at specified periods to maintain occuracy within necessary limits.
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N18.7-1976, committed to by the licensee in OQAP Section 1.3, requires that test equipment used to verify compliance with specifications be adjusted and calibrated at predetermined intervals.
Contrary to the above, the licensee has failed to include timing devices that are used to take data to satisfy safety-related technical specification surveillance requirements (such as isolation-valve stroke times) in the seasuring and test equipment calibration program.
This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement !).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CTR 2.201, you are required to submit to this of fice within thirty days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply, including for each item of noncompliance: (1) cor-rective action taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective action to be taken to avoid further noncompliance; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause shown.
Dated Was T s h w 3 .-
J. 3. Harrison, Chief Engineering Branc.h 9 5^7T'^2-G3 5 av / a u PDR ADOC.K 05000?63 G PDR
U. S. NL' CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 50-263/85012(DRP) l Docket No. !0-263 Licenso No. DPR-22 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Hall Hinneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Cenerating Stat.'on Inspection At: Monticello Site, Monticello, MN Inspectton Ccnducted: May 7 - July 8, 1985 Inspectors: P. L. Ilartmann C. II. Brown Approved By: D.C.Boyd,Chigf#A d Reactor Projects Section 2D rAr Date es Inspection Summary inspection on May 7 - July 8 1985 (Report No. 50 263/85012(DRP))
Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of operational safety verification; maintenance; spent fuel; onsite review committee; procedures. control rod drave; design changes; regional requests; Part 21 reports; and Operational Quality Assurance (previous unresolved item).
The inspection involved a total of 227 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 39 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
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y No violatsons or safety concerns were identified in the nine areas inspected; one violation was identified in the area of Operational Quality Assurance (previous unresolved item) regarding the calibration of test instruments (paragraph 2).
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DETAILS
- 1. Persons Contacted
- V. A. Shamla, Plant Manager M. 11. Clarity, Assistant to the Plant Manager D. E. Nevinski, Plant Superintendent, Ergineering & Radiation Protection H. M. Kendall Plant Office Manager D. D. Antony, Superintendent of Operations W. E. Anderson, Plant Superintendent, Operations & Maintenance R. L. Scheinost Superintendent, Quality Engineering J. R. Pasch, Superintendent, Security & Services L. II. Valdinger, Superintendent, Radiation Protection W. J.11111. Superintendent Technical Engineering W. W. Albold Superintendent of Maintenance i B. D. Day, Superintendent. Operations Engineering L. L. Nolan, Superintendent. Nuclear Technical Services The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees including members l of the technical and engineering staffs and reactor and auxiliary l operators.
- Denotes those licensee representatives attending the management exit interviews.
- 2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Although this irspection report primarily documents the results of inspec-tions performed by the Division of Reactor Projects, the followirg item
- identified in a previous inspection by the Division of Reactor Safaty is being included.
l (Closed) L'nresolved item (50-263/85 07-06): Resolution of the licensee's position on calibrat ion of t iming devices. This item is being closed by upgrading at to a violation. In Inspettion Report 50 263/85-07(DRS) the licenmee was requested to determine if they had a program for controlling and calibrating timing devices used eo determine conformance to technical requirements and if not, to demeribe their position on this matter. In i
their response (Larson to Spessard) dated April 3, 1985, they stated that as described in Administ rat ive Control Directive 4 ACD 6.4, paragraph 6.1.2, they contadered stopwatches to be devices where normal commercial practicen provide adequate accuracy. Therefore, they do not have a program for controlling and calibrating them. The inspector disagrees with this pohntion for the following reasons:
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- a. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XII, requires that measures be established to assure that tools, gauges, instruments, and other measuring and testing devices used in activities affecting quality are properly controlled, calibrated, and adjusted at specified periods to maintain accuracy within necessary limits.
- b. American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N18.7, 1976, paragraph 5.2.16 (to which the licensee is committed) requires that test equipment used to verify compliance with specifications be adjusted and calibrated at predetermined intervals.
- c. Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 498-1975 also requires calibration of test equipment which is used to assure that important parts of nuclear stations are in conformance with technical requirements.
The failure of the licensee to develop, implement, and maintain a program for the control and calibration of timing devices is considered to be a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XII.
- 3. Operational Safety Verification The unit operated at rull power during the majority of the inspection period. A reactor scram occurred June 12, 1985, and is discussed further below.
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of af fected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
On June 12, 1985, while at 100*. power a reactor scran occurred. The cause was a main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure. MSIV closure resulted from a group 1 isolation, caused by a technician improperly testing the group 1 logic during a surveillance. Specifically the technician failed to valve in the channel C pressure switch and reset the A train half scram prior to valving out the channel D pressure switch.
This action met the group 1 isolation logic, resulting in MSIV isolation.
All systems responded as required to the reactor scras. The unit was returned to power on the same day.
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s On June 20, 1985, a meeting was held with the licensee to discu=r the recently issued Amendment 32 to the technical specifications (Section 4.0) which states: " Specific time intervals between tests may be extended up to 25% of the surveillance interval to accommodate normal test schedules....". The licensee asked for an interpretation of this:
The inspectors and the NRR license project manager reviewed the Safety Evaluation Report enclosed with the amendment, noting the identification of Monticello's fixed surveillance program that " prevents repetitive addition of the 25% tolerance".
The inspectors and the license project manager determined that the 25%
extension allowance means that each surveillance must be completed within
+/- 25% of each scheduled fixed date. This further means that if test number one is performed 25% carly, test number two cculd be perform =d 5%
late with no violation. The Region III Section Chief concurred in this interpretation and the licensee was so notified.
On three occasions during the reporting period, the emergency filtration train (EFT) was actuated. One occurrence was due to the hydrogen ,uffite detector blowing a fuse. Two occurrences were due to chloride monitor operational problems. All of these monitors actuate the EFT when any single monitor failure is sensed by the EFT logic.
lo remedy the many actuations of the EFT, the licensee has initiated the following two actions: ,
Removal of the hydrogen sulfite, ammonia and hydrochloric acid toxic gas monitors. The licensing group has requested NRR to review this action.
Installing improved hardware and increasing the number of- chlorine monitors from two to four. Also developing a "one out of two taken twice" logic. The latter would provide for actuation of the EFT for a genuine chlorine presence and not a single detector failure. This action has been submitted to the onsite nuclear construction and engineering department to complete.
The inspector notad these actions in response to a recurring problem involving EFT actuations. .
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- 4. Hasntenance_0bmervatton l
Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and coeponents l listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted l
in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
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The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systans to service, quality control records were maintained, and activities were accomplished by qualified personnel. Portions of the following maintenance activity were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:
Repair of Beaker 4320 No violations or deviations were identified.
- 5. Spent Fuel
- a. Fuel Shipment During the inspection period of May 7 to July 8 the licensee made four spent fuel shipments to the General Electric Company Morris Operation in Norris. Illinois. A shipment consisted of 36 BVR fuel assemblies in two IF-300 casks mounted on rail cars, one cask per car. The inspector performed independent direct radiation and reuovable contamination surveys of the casks using NRC portable survey equipment on two shipments. These readings and indications agreed with the licensee's survey records and information presented in the radioactive materials shipment records,
- b. Cask Rail Shipment on two of the shipments, before the rail cars with the casks IF-301 and IF.302 were shipped from the Monticello site, the inspector
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, verified that shipping forms were completed, that the rail cars were properly placarded, and that the casks were correctly labeled. The
, radiation and contamination surveys described above were noted to have been completed and to have been within departure limits requirements. The licensee survey results were spot checked by the
, inspector and found to be satisfactory. The training of the personnel escorting the casks was found to be as required. The
} communications capability was noted to be effective.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 6. Onsite Neview Committee The inspector attended portions of four meetings of the onsite review committee (Operations Committee) during the months of May and June to observe conforsance with technical specifications and other regulatory requirements. The review included noting adherence to the charter and k ". administrative procedures governtng the review group activities, the group's membership and qualifications, the meeting frequency and required
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quorum. The activition of the committuo, including review of proposed tact.nical specifications changos, noncomplianco items and correctivo action, proposed facility modifications and proceduro changos, and biannual rovinw of proceduros, were noted to be performed as required.
No violations or doviations woro identified.
- 7. Plant Proceduros The following proceduros for the past year wara noted to have boon reviewed and approved in accordance with technical specifications requirements: '
C.1 Startup Proceduro C.2 Power Operation HT-PH7.8 250V Battory Dischargo Capacity Test 4010 OCD llCV Vater Accumulator Removal and Rainstallation 4111 PM llPCI Pumps A.2-102 Notification of an Unusual Event A.2-103 Alert l B.2.3* Reactor Isolation Cooling System B.2.4 Main Stoam ACD-04.08 Bypass Control l ACD-07.01 Design Chango Control ACD-03.11 Proceduro Review and Approval
- Also contains operating and abnormal oporating proceduras, t
Technical specifications revisions woro noted to have boon included and 10 CFN 50.59(a) and (b) worn mado as required. The associated chocklists woro noted to be up to dato and files woro found updated. The temporary changes reviewed as an ongoing itom have boon found to have had propor review and have had timely review by the onsito review committoa.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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- 8. Control kod Drivo piltors On March 23 1985, a scram inknrtion timo test indicated that two control rod drivan had slow (longer) meram times. The times were longer than the previoun tunt, but within the technical specifications required inmortion
, timen. Tho two driven were " unmodified" drives
- and adjacent to each othnr. The slower drive van maintained at the fully inserted position and electrically disarmed.
During the May 3, 1985, outage, 11 drives were replaced with ..odified driven. Thohn included the two that had the slow ncram timos. The inner movable filters worn examined and found to be relatively clean. The two filtern f rom the nlow driven waro also found to ho "6 mil" filters which tendnd to be plugged fastor and produco the slower scram timing. The "6 mit" wore supplied by the vendor as "10 mil" (correct size) filters. The procosa that resultad in the nupplying of incorrect filters is under review at this time.
The scram timon woro satisfactory on startup. Thoro are 46 " unmodified drivon" romaining in the Monticello plant.
- Soo Innpoction Roport No. 50-263/85-008(DRp) -
No violations or deviationn wore identified.
9 Dog gn Changos and Hodifications Through record review the innpoctor verified for the design changes listed below that design changos wara made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59; that domign changon woro reviewod in accordance with technical specificnLions and the establimbed Quality Assurance program; that design changes woro conducted in accordance with written procedLres which included identification of inspections required by codes or standards, and acceptanco test procedures which defined acceptance values or I acceptanco standards; that test records verified performance of equipment l
modified to technical specifications /pSAR requirements and performance of modified equipment was reviewed and approved; that operating procedures modifications woro mado and approved in accordance with technical mpocifications; that installat ion procedures were adequate for the identified function; that am built drawingh woro changed to reflect the modifications;* and that records of domign changes were maintained as describod in 10 CFR 50.59(b) and the omtablishod QA program.
81Z02o post Accident Sampling System MlZO34 RCIC Auto Restart 83Z057 SRV Blowdown Control System 7
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( 83ZO49 Replacomant Hodification of Reactor Rocirculation Piping 83Z089 Appendix R Upgrado of Fire Barriors
- A large number of drawings have been modified and are marked up, but final drawings are still being made.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 10. liogiona_I Roquests
- a. By memo dated March 25, 1985 C. E. Norelius requested all Senior Residnnt inspectors to cunduct a special inspection in the area of station battery operation and maintenance. This matter related to NRC-identified deficiencies in the areas of station battery operation and maintenance. Through a plant walkdown of the station ba t t e r ie s , review of maintenance records and Procedure Nos. STP 01931. STp 0193 2, STp 0194 and STp 0199 and interviews with l st it ton personnol, the inspector determined the followf ugl.
The station battery cells were all replaced during the last tWo outagus.
The condition of the bottorios, cells, connectors, and supports '
are satisfactory.
j The station personnel perform short-term surveillance. The l longer-term surveillan :o is performed by off-site personnel i
that monitor tl.a battorios for all the plants in the system, i.e. , specific gravities of all cells in the battery, capacity dischargo, and equalizing charge.
Colls are replaced in the battery very raraly and then only if the call is a duplicato,
- b. By memo dated April 18, 1985, C. E. Norolius requestod all Sanfor Resident inspectors to gather information in response to Temporary Instruction 2515/67, Survey of I.icensons' Rosponso to Selected Items. The inspector reviewed the licenseo response to INp0 SOERs 84-2 and 84-3, and the information obtained was supplied to Region
!!! management.
- c. Region 111 managomont hy memo dated June 7, 1985, requestod the inspector to verify licenson actions involving closure of IE Dullatin No. 80-07. A memo dated March 20, 1985, from E. Jordan,
! Diructor of Inspection and Enforcoment, required verificatnon of specific actions by the licensee. The memo required Monticello's action for long-term resolution of the jot pump problem to be scheduled ultrasonic oxamination of the now hold down beams.
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O The licanson has not schoduled ultramonic examination. Gonoral Electric doon not currently recommand any inspection of the improved hold down boamu. The licenman added that due to a diffaronce in beam configuration, the newer hold down beams cannot bo examined with present ultramonic capabilities.
The licensee has added visual innpoetion of the hold down beams to the inmorvice inspection program. The adequacy of this inspection program will be carried as an open item pending NRC review (263/85012-Ol(DRP)).
- 11. 10 C M Part 21 Roport In an April 15, 1985, letter to NSP, Chicago Tuba and Iron (CT&l) transmitted Part 21 notifications that CT61 had received from their suppliers, ilub Inc. and Phonnix Stool Corporation. The problem related to the identification of a small lonath (20') of 10" Schedulo 140 pipo of being loss than required thicknens. In responso, the licensee re-certified the thicknous of 18' of the pipe. The section of pipo used (2') was amployed an a structural component. The wall thickness testing showed no dimension trends to indicate the 2' section of pipe installed would havo yioided different or inadoquate wall thickness measurements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 12. Open items Open items are matters which have boon discunmod with the liconneo which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licenson or both. An open item disclosed during the inspoction in discussed in paragraph 9.
- 13. Exit Interview The inspector mot with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph I at the conclusion of the inspection on July 8, 1985. The inspector discumund the purposa and scopo of the inspection and the findings.
l'ho inspector also discummed tho likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or proconses reviewod by the inspector during the inspection. The licenmoo did not identify any documents /processos am propriotary.
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6 .363 n -or -
Enclosure; 2D ,
s MAY 2 31985 Docket No. 50-263 ,
Northern States Power Company ATTN: Mr. C. E. Larson Director of Nuclear Generation 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Gentlemen:
This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. C. H. Brown of this office on March 5 through May 6,1985, of activities at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Station authorized by NRC Operating License No. DPR-22 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. W. Shamla at the conclusion of the inspection.
The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel.
No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspection.
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.
Sincerely,
" Original Signed by D. C. Boyd" for W. D. Shafer, Chief Projects Branch 2
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 50-263/85-08(DRP) cc w/ encl:
W. A. Shamla, Plant Manager DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, RIII Monticello Resident Inspector, RIII Prairie , a ,_ a ; , r c Is1and a-r V~ rt v -
John W. Fennan, Ph.D. ,
Nuclear Engineer, MPCA RIII f \ RIII P f" DeFayetle/cs RIIIfgWeil Boyd I
[ Shafer 05/17/85 6N
F l
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III -
Report No. 50-263/85008(DRP)
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Inspection At: Monticello Site, Monticello, MN Inspection Cenducted: March 5 through May 6, 1985 Inspector: C. H. Brown Approved By: D. C. Boyd, hi f 5F'24 - 8 5 Reactor Projects Section 2D Date Inspection Summary Inspection on March 5, through May 6, 1985 (Report No. 50-263/85008(DRP))
Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of onsite review committee; operational safety verification; spent fuel; fire dampers; seismic battery racks; nitrogen line to torus; reactor scram; CRD surveillance; Licensee Event Reports; allegations; and TMI action items. The inspection involved a total of 118 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 17 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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4' DETAILS
- 1. Persons Contacted
- W. A. Shamla, Plant Manager M. H. Clarity. Assistant to the Plant Manager D. E. Nevinski, Plant Superintendent, Engineering & Radiation Protection H. M. Kendall, Plant Office Manager D. D. Antony, Superintendent of Operations W. E. Anderson, Plant Superintendent, Operations & Maintenance R. L. Scheinost, Superintendent, Quality Engineering J. R. Pasch, Superintendent, Security & Services L. H. Waldinger, Superintendent, Radiation Protection W. J. Hill, Superintendent, Technical Engineering W. W. Albold, Superintendent of Maintenance B. D. Day, Superintendent, Operations Engineering L. L. Nolan, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services The inspector also contacted other licensee employees including members of the technical and engineering staffs and reactor and auxiliary operators.
- Denotes those licensee representatives attending the management exit interviews.
- 2. Onsite Review Committee The inspector attended portions of four meetings of the onsite review connittee (Operations Connittee) during the months of March and April to observe conformance with technical specifications and other regulatory requirements. The review included noting adherence to the charter and administrative procedures governing the review group's activities, the group's membership and qualifications, the meeting frequency and required quorum. The activities of the committee, including review of proposed technical specifications changes, plant operations, noncompliance items and corrective action, proposed facility modifications and procedure changes, test results, and biannual review of procedures were noted to be perfomed as required.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
- 3. Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of March and April. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment 2
in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented
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in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that* facility operations were in confonnance with the requirements established under technical specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
- 4. Spent Fuel
- a. Fuel Shipment During the inspection period, the licensee made three spent fuel element shipments to the General Electric Company Morris Operation in Morris, Illinois. Each shipment consisted of 36 BWR fuel assemblies in 2 IF-300 casks mounted on rail cars, one cask per car.
The inspector was not available to perfonn independent direct radiation and removable contamination surveys of the casks using NRC portable survey equipment. The readings and indications that the licensee's survey records and information presented in the radioactive materials shipment records were reviewed and found to be essentially the same as those of previous shipments.
- b. Cask Rail Shipment The inspector, by interview of various plant personnel the day after the rail cars with the casks IF-301 and IF-302 were shipped from the Monticello site, verified that shipping forms were completed, that the rail cars were properly placarded, and that the casks were correctly labeled. The radiation and contamination surveys described above were noted to have been completed and to have been l, within departure limits requirements. The licensee survey results were checked by the inspector and found to be similar to previous shipments. The personnel escorting the casks were found to be basically the same as before. The comunications capability was stated to be the same as previous shipments. The inspector noted that the onsite contact had no communication problems the following day.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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- 5. Fire Dampers (10 CFR Part 21 Report)
The licensee installed fire protection dampers manufactured by Ruskin Corporation during the 1984 outage. Subsequently the licensee received a i 3 l
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letter which was classified a 10 CFR Part 21 Report from Ruskin stating that the dampers may not close with rated air flow through the damper.
The licensee tested the dampers at rated flow and found six of the dampers did not close. Three of these dampers were in horizontal ducts and three were installed in vertical ducts. The temporary solution to this problem was the issuance of memorandum for control room operator action stating that if certain specified fire alarus are received, the fan causing air flow through ducts in that area would be deenergized. The breaker is specified for each of the affected fire alarm areas. The fire strategy (which is a procedure for localized fire fighting) for each of these areas, also has had temporary menos issued which directs that the fans must be deenergized. These temporary measures will remain in effect until the vendor resolves the issue on a permanent basis.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
- 6. Seismic Battery Racks In November,1984, the NRC was notified of a potential problem at several Consnonwealth Edison sites involving the gap between the battery cells and the battery racks for batteries supplied by GNB Batteries. Inc. (formerly >
Gould Batteries. Inc.). The issue was whether the batteries would fail during a seismic event if the gap was greater that about 1/8 inch. As a result of this GNB Batteries was requested by NRC to verify that all '
other nuclear plant purchasers of this equipment be notified of the ,
potential problem. The inspector verified that the problem does not exist at Monticello because during the last two outages, all of the GNB batteries were replaced with C & D and Exide batteries. The rack design has a plastic spacer on all the cell supports and holding bars. The plastic spacer is approximately 1/8-inch thick. The holding bars have tie bolts which are tightened to a specified torque to prevent the cells from moving during a seismic event.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
- 7. Nitrogen Line to Torus In February,1984, the General Electric Company issued Service Information Letter (SIL) No. 402 dealing with wetwell/drywell inerting. A crack was found in the vent header in the torus of Hatch Unit 2 which was attributed to brittle fracture caused by the injection of cold nitrogen into the torus during inerting. GE recommended that all BWR owners with Nark I or Mark 11 containment systems examine their inerting systems to verify that there were no cracks and that such damage would not occur in the future. The licensee examined the torus nitrogen inerting line position and the torus ring header in the nitrogen line vicinity. The ring header was found to be unharmed by the nitrogen entering during the inerting procedure. The nitrogen line enters the torus midway between the area of the ring header and the adjacent torus wall. If any liquid nitrogen was allowed to come through the line, it would not drip onto the ring header. The examination l of the nitrogen inerting lines performed during the outage indicated satisfactory results. This issue was the subject of Inspection and 4
. l Enforcement Bulletin 84-01 and was closed for the Monticello site in inspection report 50-263/84006.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control '
room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant
- parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry. The inspector verified the establishment of prcper connunications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by t.he licensee.
All systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to operation on April 12, 1985.
The scram was the result of a line fault during the time disconnects were being closed to place a transfonner back in service at one of NSP's non-nuclear facilities. This event is described in more detail in LER 85008.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
- 9. CRD furveillance The scram time test was performed on selected CR0s on April 5, 1985, and two were found to have had a longer scram time than during the startup testing which occurred on these unmodified adjacent drives.
The times were within technical specifications requirements. ' .ao licensee decided to leave the slower drive fully inserted and to i electrically disarm it. These drives, and nine more are to be replaced with modified drives if time permits during the upcoming shutdown scheduled to start May 4, 1985. The modification to the drive consists
- of replacing the movable inner screen with a fixed screen.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
- 10. Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to detennine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
j a. (Closed)LER80-30: Failure of AP-2541-B Drywell Floor Drain Sump Outboard Isolation Valve to Close. During nonnal plant operations, I an attempt to close the drywell floor drain sump outboard isolation
! valve failed although the inboard isolation valve closed. The
, failure was caused by a defective solenoid which was replaced. The l
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licensee's internal Reportable Occurrence Event Report No. M-RO-80-30 also recomended that a periodic preventive maintenance (PM) program should be established for all safety-related solenoid valves. The inspector reviewed Preventive Maintenance Procedure No. 4911. "ASCO, 4
Class 1E Solenoid Valve Inspection and Cleaning Procedure" which provides instructions for the periodic inspection, cleaning, and parts replacement of ASCO, Class IE qualified solenoid valves. The list of solenoid valves included the drywell floor drain solenoid valve which failed in LER 80030.
- b. (Closed)LER81005: RHR SW CV-1728 Uncoupled. In 1981 during a startup of the A loop in the shutdown cooling system, the valve i operator stem on the RHR service water heat exchanger discharge
- control valve, CV-1728, uncoupled from the valve stem causing the loop to be inoperable. Investigation by the licensee revealed the cause to be improper coupling 'of the valve operator stem and the valve stem. The coupling component was replaced and verified to be correct by an I&C specialist. The similar valve in the redundant loop was inspected to ensure that it did not have a similar problem.
The problem and the corrective action was reviewed and concurred
.l with by the Operations Comittee in Meeting No.1155 on November 11, 1982.
- c. (Closed)LER81008: HPCI-10 Disc Pin Failure. During nomal refueling leak testing of the upstream containment isolation check
~
, valves on the HPCI steam exhaust line in 1981, the disc of the non-containment isolation valve was found lodged in the downstream
! piping. Investigation determined the cause to be fatigue failure of 1
the disc pin. A new disc, disc nut, and disc pin were installed, the valve was reassemoled, and a successful leak test was completed.
! By internal memorandum dated May 13,1981, (Krumpos to Clarity) the i licensee recomended consideration be given to certain other
- corrective actions. As a result, the vendor was requested to provide an engineering evaluation of a redesigned disc pin. This
- evaluation was provided by letter of May 3, 1984, to the licensee
, from Anchor / Darling, in which it is stated that the new design was l superior to the older design in both material and configuration.
l The licensee then instituted Design Change No. 83M096 in which a
- Safety Evaluation was perfomed for installing a new pin. The modification and testing is being controlled by the Work Request Authorizationprocess(WRANo. 84-07890).
i The licensee's Reportable Occurrence Investigative Report No. M-R0-81-08 also recomended that a note should be added to the HPCI Pump Monthly Test No. 0255-6-III to notify the system engineer .
) if the HPCI exhaust pressure exceeds 30 psig. The inspector verified i
that such a note was added after Step 45 of the procedure.
- d. (Closed)LER82010: Type B Containment Leakage Test Failures.
l During a refueling outage local leak rate test, the RCIC-9 turbine l exhaust check valve was found to be leaking in excess of technical l specifications acceptance criteria. The cause was found to be due
! 6
l to valve service conditions, and the valve disc and valve seat were replaced. The LER stated that RCIC-9 will be inspected for wear every refueling outage until an acceptable replacement vilve can be found. The inspector verified that the Operations Engineering Staff Outage Checklist, Fom No. 3198, Revision 9, has been modified by including a Step 16 to initiate a work request authorization to perform this inspection during every refueling outage. For the long tem, the licensee is investigating a design change to modify the RCIC vacuum exhaust line vacuum breaker valves to solenoid operated valves and delete the requirement that the RCIC-9 valves be leak tested.
- e. (Closed)LER82-14: Type B Containment Leakage Test Failure.
During a refueling outage local leak rate test, the drywell atmospheric control system inboard isolation valve bypass valve (No. CV-2385) was found leaking in excess of technical specification acceptance criteria. Investigation revealed that the leak was caused by a wear groove which had been worn into the globe valve disc face by repeated operation over the years. The valve disc was machined, lapped, reinstalled and retested and found to be satisfactory. The licensee comitted, in the LER, to inspect similar valves for possible wear. This inspection was documented in the licensee's Reportable Occurrence Investigative Report No. M-R0-82-14 where it is stated that the only similar valve (No. CV-2386) was inspected and no significant wear was found. ~
- f. (Closed) LER 83002: RCIC EGM Resistor Failure. While performing a surveillance test during a normal plant startup in 1983, a resistor in the RCIC governor control system failed resulting in loss of DC power to the system. The failed resistor was replaced with a variable resistor of improved design and RCIC operability was verified. The licensee followed up with a final Reportable Occurrence Report No. M-R0-83-02 on February 9,1983, in which the licensee discussed the failure and the corrective action (replacement of the resistor).
- g. (Closed)LER83003: RHR SW Loops Inoperable. During normal plant operation, the RHR heat exchanger discharge control valves were not I maintaining the heat exchanger differential pressures adequately I while the systems were shut down. Investigation revealed the cause to be piston ring wear apparently caused by nonnal flow induced vibration. Since there had been two previous such occurrences, the
, licensee contacted the valve manufacturer who suggested replacing l the graphite piston rings with spring-loaded teflon rings. These changes were made by the licensee and the proper differential pressure then was maintained. A recomendation was made in the licensee's Reportable Occurrence Investigative Report No, M-R0-83-03 that the differential pressure be trended to detect any decreases.
, Furthermore, to provide a positive means of detecting a decrease in
! the differential pressure, the licensee modified the system by adding l an alarm and an annunciator in the control room to provide imediate
! notification of such conditions. This was accomplished under Design l Change No. 82M037.
7
- h. (0 pen)LER83004: Low Flow on S8GT "B" Train. In February 1983 while perfoming a weekly surveillance test on the "B" train of the Standby 6as Treatment (58GT) system, the flow was noted to be less than the minimum technical specifications requirements. ,
Investigation revealed that the demisters (filter-like devices which i are located ahead of the filters to remove moisture in the droplet form) were becoming clogged with dirt. This dirt, which apparently was generated by grinding, welding, and other maintenance activities
- during plant outages, was drawn into the S8GT system when it was j used extensively to provide improved ventilation of the drywell during outages. The demisters were cleaned and returned to service.
In the LER, the licensee committed to revise the surveillance procedures to check the pressure drop across the demisters. The inspector verified that Test No.1265, " Quarterly Reactor Building Ventilation System Automatic Isolation Test" has been revised to include the recording of the differential pressures across the demisters. However, there is no comparison of this recorded value to any other value, and no action or alert statement which specifies any corrective action which should be taken if the value varies from some given value. It simply is a recording of a number and as such would i have little value to anyone not intimately familiar with the system, i The licensee agrees with the inspector and has connitted to add a comparison or alert statement to the procedure. This LER will remain open.
- i. (Closed)LER83005: No.14 RHR Pump Out of Service. While
- performing surveillance tests early in 1983 on one of the RHR pumps,
! the licensee noted a reduction in pump head capacity. Although the
- pump met all technical specifications requirements, the licensee decided to investigate the cause of the reduction and discovered a mop head in the suction of the pump. The licensee postulated that the mop head entered the RHR system during a previous maintenance l outage. The mop head was removed and the pump tested satisfactorily.
- To preclude such events from happening again, the licensee connitted c
to femalize final inspections for maintenance projects.
Administrative C'ontrol Document No. 4 ACD-2.3, " Plant Inspection !
l Program", establishes the Monticello plant inspection program. In
, that document the Quality Engineer is designated as being responsible l for assuring that inspection instructions are prepared and that required inspections are conducted. Required inspections are defined l' to include housekeeping activities. Administrative Control Document No. 4 AWI-2.3.5, " Inspection Procedure for Maintenance Activity," .
- provided an inspection procedure for maintenance activities. In the >
> " Instructions" section of that document, inspection planning is to ,
include housekeeping and cleanliness of open critical systems.
l j. (Closed) LER 83008: Leak in 15A Feedwater Heater Extraction Steam
- Trap Outlet Pipe. During nomal operation, routine inspection found
! a leak en the 15A feedwater extraction steam line drain. Invest i igation by the licensee detemined the cause to be steam erosion.
l The line was replaced. The licensee performed further analysis
! and issued Reportable Occurrence Investigative Report No. M-R0-83-08 which reconnended that steam trap preventive maintenance procedure
)
! 8
(No. 4908) should be completed during the following scheduled outage ,
and should be scheduled on a regular basis. Another recommndation was to identify and replace erosion susceptible steam trips and steam lines as necessary. The inspector determined that 3000-4000 feet of such carbon steel lines have been replaced with stainless steel lines in various systems including RCIC, HPCI, main steam, air ejector, and off gas. In addition, all 14A,148,15A and 158 feedwater extraction steam line drains also were replaced. The inspector also verified that PM 4908 was added to the Master Mechanical and Electrical PM list and will be performed every five years during a refueling outage.
- 11. TMI Action Items
- a. I.A.1.3.2 - Shift Staffing Requirements On September 29, 1983, the licensee requested an extension to the effective date for implementation 01 the shift staffing rule, and also requested that for the purpose of meeting the rule the shift supervisor's office be considered as part of the control room. By letter of December 30, 1983, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations (NRR) granted an extension to the implementation date but deferred action on the shift supervisor's office. By letter of November 14, 1984, NRR granted an exemption to this staffing rule (now codified as 10CFR 50.54(m)(2)) provided certain conditions were met:
- 1) An intercom system exists between the main control room and the shift supervisor's office and there are normal telephone communications between the two areas.
- 2) A computer alann cathode ray tube (CRT) be installed in the shift supervisor's ofice which displays numerous plant alarm conditions.
- 3) A computer parameter display CRT be installed in the shift supervisor's office which nonnally displays such items as power level, reactor pressure and generator output.
- 4) A camera be installed in the main control room connected to a CRT in the shift supervisor's office.
- 5) Recorders exist in the shift supervisor's office for reactor pressure, reactor water level, reactor power, and drywell pressure.
- 6) An annunciator panel be installed in the shift supervisors office to specifically annunciate reactor level foutside normal limits),reactorpressure(outsidenormallimitsj,)
scram, and drywell pressure (outside normal limitsreactor .
- 7) A connon annunciator exists in the shift supervisor's office to annunciate all front panel alanns.
9 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..
- 8) The key to the security door between the shift supervisnr's office and the control room be kept insnediately availabit in the office in the event of failure of the card reader.
The inspector verified by direct observation that all of these conditions were met. Therefore, this TMI item is considered closed.
- 12. A11eestions On October 25, 1984 Region !!! received infomation concerning AZCO, a heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) contractor at the Monticello plant for Northern States Power Company (NSP). AZCO has been a HVAC contractor at Monticello since construction days, and at the time of this allegation was involved in a number of non-safety related work activities at the site.
The allegations were not based on specific events but rather were based on general concerns and casual observations by an individual not directly involved in the work activities in question. Basically the alleger was concerned about a possible " conflict of interest" in the way he perceived that some AZCO job assignments were being perfomed. He was particularly concerned about the activities of two AZCO supervisors who he believed were alternately supervising AZCO production work and AZCO QA/QC inspection work. He felt that if the same supervisor directed the production work, then the quality of the work should be in question.
The inspection into this allegation was perfomed by the NRC's Senior ResidentInspector(SRI)attheMonticelloplant,whowasincontactwith the alleger during the course of the inspection. The SRI, who is thoroughly familiar with NSP's work control policies and procedures, reviewed the NSP work scheduler's computer runs covering the period between June and November of 1984. This computer run is a key work activities identification and tracking document utilized by the NSP outage planning and scheduling group. The computer run identifies each work activity to be accomplished, identifies who is to perfom the work, (NSP or contractors), identifies the schedule for the work activity, and identifies the schedule for the work activity, and identifies the work request which authorized the work. All work perfomed at this plant must be on this list before the work schedulers will authorize its performance.
The SRI's review of this computer run established that none of the work wrformed by AZCO was safety related work. This was later confimed by 1SP management. The SRI then examined a sampling of work request authorizations, which identify by signature or initials who supervised the work perfomed and who performed the QA/QC inspections related to the work, to detemine if any AZC0 supervisor (s) had perfomed both production and inspection work on the same job. This sampling examination was concentrated in the time area identified by the alleger but also included sampling throughout the June to November 1984 period. These examinations determined that AZC0 supervisors do perfom both as production supervisors and as supervisors of QA/QC activities, however, there were no cases found in which they had perfomed both of these supervisory functions on the same work activity.
. . . . m )
. b Following the above independent inspection sffort the SRI infomed the licensee of the general nature of the allegation and requested NSP to detemine whether or not AZC0 had performed any safety related work during the period in question, and to identify how NSP assures that contractors adhere to the NSP policies and procedures to detemine that a quality job is performed. First, the NSP schedulers and the NSP Nuclear Engineering and Construction coordinators confimed by a review of their records, including the work schedulers computer run, that AZCO had not performed any safety related work during the time period in question. Secondly, NSP routinely audits the perfomance of contractor activities by direct observation and by reviews of the documentation of their work activities.
One of the key documents reviewed is the work request authorization form which identifies the personnel involved in the production and QA/QC activities. During these audits, NSP found no indication that any AZCO supervisory personnel were perfoming production work and QA/QC inspection of that same work. ,
Based on the above findings, and particularly since none of the work in question was safety related work, this allegation is considered to be closed.
- 13. Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the period and at the conclusion of the inspection on May 6,1985, and sunnerized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee did not find any information in this report that should be withheld from being placed in the Public Document Room.
11
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- UNITED 8TATES NUCLEAR CECULATORY COMMISSION 6 REGION 111 e 79e ROOSEVELT ROAD
- GLEN ELLYN,ILLINols 80137 (FEE 2.LY Docket No. 50-263 Northern States Power Company ATTN: Mr. C. E. Larson Director of Nuclear Generation 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Gentlemen:
This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. C. H. Brown of this office on January 11 through February 4, 1985, of activities at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Station authorized by NPC Operating License No. DPR-22 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. W. Shamla at the conclusion of the inspection.
The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective exami-nation of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel.
No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspection.
In accordance with 10 CTR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office, by telephone, within ten days of the date of this letter and submit written application to withhold information contained therein within thirty days of the date of this letter. Such application must be consistent with the re-quirements of 2.790(b)(1). If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified periods noted above, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the Public Document Room.
, , . ,,,.e awqe 2 G w f & l ~ame f I " W
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I Northern States Power Company 2 We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.
Sincerely,
" Original sige.ad by n. F. Vern!ck" R. F. Warnick, Chief Projects Branch 1
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 50-263/85-02(DRP) ,
cc w/ enc 1:
W. A. Shamla, Plant Manager DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, RIII Monticello Resident Inspector, RIII Prairie Island John W. Fernan, Ph.D.,
Nuclear Engineet, MPCA O
RI I RIIIf RIII hl RIII
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(Y Y D syette/rr Boyd G er ar ick 02/22/85 ,
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 50-263/85-02(DRP)
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Licensee: . Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Inspection At: Monticello Site, Monticello, MN Inspection Conducted: January 11 through February 4,1985 Inspector: C. H. Brown Approved By:
s'4d D. C. Boyd, Chief ,
JSA24/d6 Reactor Projects Section IB Date Inspection Summary Inspection on January 11 - February 4, 1984 (Report No. 50-263/85-02(DRP))
Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of operational safety; onsite review committee; inspection during long term shutdown; reactor startup; and spent fuel shipment. The inspection ihvolved a total of 132.5 inspector-hours onsite by 2 NRC inspectors including 50 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
- 1. Persons Contacted
- W. A'. Shaela, Plant Manager M. H. Clarity, Assistant to the Plant Manager D. E. Nevinski, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection H. M. Kendall, Plant Office Manager
- D. D. Antony, Superintendent of Operations W. E. Andersen, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance R. L. Scheinost, Superintendent, Quality Engineering J. R. Pasch, Superintendent, Security and Services l- L. H. Waldinger, Superintendent, Technical Engineering W. J. Hill, Superintendent, Technical Engineering W. W. Albold, Superintendent of Maintenance
- B. D. Day, Superintendent, Operations Engineering 1 L. L. Nolan, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services The inspector also contacted other licensee employees including members of the technical and engineering staffs and reactor and auxiliary operators.
- Denotes those licensee representatives attending the management exit
! interviews.
. 2. Inspection Durina Long Term Shutdown The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs 1
and conducted discussions with control room operators. During the first part of the inspection period the reactor still was shut down for replace-l ment of recirculating water system pipes, but was making preparations for
- restart. Therefore, the discussions with the control room operators were concerned with operators' knowledge and awareness of required actions for 4 the impending startup. All operators interviewed appeared to be knowledge-able and trained, including training on new or modified systems. They were aware of modifications that had been made and of tests that had to be conducted.~
The inspector verified that surveillance tests required during the shutdown were accomplished, reviewed tagout records, and verified applicability of containment integrity. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building
, accessible areas, including exterior areas, were made to make independent assessments of equipment conditions, plant conditions, radiological con-trols, safety, adherence to regulatory requirements, and to verify that i
maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of mainten-ance. The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, including potential fire hazards, and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector by observation and direct interview i,
verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accord-
! ance with the station security plan. The inspector reviewed the licensee's
! 2 l
N jumper / bypass controls to verify there were no conflicts with technical specifications and verified the implementation of radioactive waste system
- controls. The inspector witnessed portions of the radioactive waste systems controls associated with radweste shipments and barreling.
The inspector observed portions of the work in progress for maintenance on various equipment.
1 No items of noncoepliance or deviations were identified.
- 3. Dnsite Review Committee The inspector attended portions of two meetings of the onsite review i committee (Operations Committee) during the month of January to observe '
conformance with technical specifications and other regulatory requirements.
This included a meeting at which plant status for startup was reviewed.
The required completion of design changes was verified and the up-to-date completion of surveillance tests was reviewed. The status of long-term surveillances (18 months or longer) was checked to make certain that none would be required until the next scheduled outage one year hence.
The Operations Committee (DC) also reviewed the CRD post-maintenance tests.
, In the last inspection report a discussion was included on the slow scram times of the control rods which were caused by plugged CRDM filters. The
' filters were modified or replaced and all scram times rechecked. All
, were satisfactory. The OC discussed and approyed the results of these modifications and tests.
The inspector's review of the DC also included noting adherence to the charter and administrative procedures governing the review group's acti-vities, the group's membership and qualifications, the meeting frequency,
! and required quorum. The activities of the committee, including review of t proposed technical specifications changes, noncompliance items and correc-tive action, proposed facility modifications and procedure changes, test i
results, and biannual review of procedures were noted to be performed as
- required.
! No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
! 4. Startup From Long Term Shutdown The inspector observed the major portion of the Operation Committee's (00)
!- meeting of January 16, at which plant status was reviewed to verify the plant was ready for restart. The committee reviewed the results of the
< post maintenance testing on the control rod drive mechanisms (a commitment
, to Region III); verified that all prestartup paperwork and surveillances l
were completed; and that training was completed for the design changes
- performed during the outage. It also reviewed the results of the hydro-static pressure test performed on the primary system, and the status of commitments to the NRC. Based on these reviews the OC determined that the plant was ready to be restarted.
i 1
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Restart commenced on January 17, 1985, and NRC inspectors observed the startup from initial control rod withdrawal through initial criticality and until the turbine was on the line at approximately 25% power. This augmented inspection coverage occurred over the period of January 17-19, 1935. The startup progressed smoothly with only einer equipment problems resulting in occasional slight delays. All procedures were followed, personnel were cognizant of their responsibilities, communications among control room personnel were excellent, and shift turnovers were smooth.
No itees of noncompliance were identified.
- 5. Operational Safety Verification Subsequent to initial criticality and power ascension tests, the reactor went into normal power operation. The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators. The inspector verified the operability of selected emer-gency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. As was done during the outage, tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector also observed that plant personnel were fully cognizant of the operational status of the plant and that operational procedures were being followed.
This was to verify that personnel had not picked up any " bad habits" or had become lax due to the eleven month outage. No laxness was observed and all personnel were following operational procedures and practices.
The inspector also walked down the accessible portions of the recircula-tion, reactor water cleanup, and standby liquid control systems to verify operability.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
- 6. Spent Fuel
- a. Fuel Shipment During the previous inspection period, the licensee made a spent fuel element shipment to the General Elec,tric Company Morris Operation in Norris, Illinois. The shipment consisted of 36 BWR fuel assemblies in 2 IF-300 casks mounted on rail cars,'one cask per car. A regional radiation specialist performed an onsite inspection of an outgoing spent fuel rail shipment. Included was an independent direct radia-tion and contamination survey and review of licensee shipping proce-dures, compliance with shipping container certificate of compliance requirements, and compliance with regulatory requirements for completion of shipping papers and radiological shipping limits.
4
l P
The inspector performed independent direct radiation and removable contamination surveys of the casks using NRC portable survey equip-ment. The maximum direct radiation detected was 25 aree/hr at contact and 8 mres/hr at one meter. The maximum removable contamination detected was about 1700 disintegrations per minute per 100 square centimeters. These readings and indications agreed with the licensee's survey records and information presented in the radioactive materials shipment records.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's compliance with Certificate of Compliance No. 9001, Revision 20, for the IF-300 casks; no deviations from the certificate's conditions for use were noted.
The inspector reviewed the shipping papers and rail car postings to determine if they set regulatory requirements. No problems were noted.
- b. Cask Rail Shipment Before the rail cars with the casks IF-301 and IF-302 were shipped from the Monticello site, the inspector verified that shipping forms were completed, that the rail cars were properly placarded, and that the casks were correctly labeled. The radiation and contamination surveys described above were noted to have been completed and to have been within departure limits requirements. The licensee survey results were spot checked by the inspector and found to be satisfac-tory. The training of the personnel escor' ting the casks was found to be as required. The communications capability was noted to be effective.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
- 7. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Parsgraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on February 4,1985, and summarised the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
i 5
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March 13, 1985 Docket No. 50-263 Northern States Power Company ATTN: Mr. C. E. Larson Director of Nuclear Generation 414 Nicollet Mall
. Minneapolis, MN 55401 Gentlemen:
This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. C. H. Brown of this office on February 5 through March 5,198C, of activities at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Station authorized by NRC Operating License No. DPR-22 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. W. Shamla at the conclusion of the inspection.
The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection censisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel.
No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspection.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Connission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure (s) will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.
Sincerely,
%INAI elped by.R. F. Warnick'8 R. F. Warnick, Chief Projects Branch 1
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No.50-263/85-03(DRP) x $2 Es::q ^ f"f RI I RI!! R DdFayette/r1 Boyd War ick 3/13/85 3//
4, Northern States Power Company 2 March 13, 1985 cc w/ enc 1:
W. A. Shaela Plant Manager DMB/DocumentControlDesk(RIDS)
Resident Inspector RI!! Monticello Resident Inspector RI!! Prairie ,
Island ,
John W. Fernan, Ph.D.,
Nuclear Engineer, MPCA
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0pti!SSION REGION !!!
Report No. 50-263/85-03(DRP)
Docket No. 50-263 License No. OPR-22 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Inspection At: Monticello Site, Monticello, MN Inspection Conducted: February 5 - March 5, 1985 Inspector: C. H. Brown kd Approved By: D.C.BoydChief S-/3-85 Reactor Projects Section IB Date Inspection Sununary Inspection on February 5-March 4,1985 (Report No. 50-263/85-03(DRP)?
Areas ;nspected: A routine, unannounced inspection by the resident nspector of onsite review conunitteet operational safety; and spent fuel shipment; The inspection involved a total of 47.5 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector including 11 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAIL 5 , l
- 1. Persons Contacted . l
- W. A. Shamle. Plant Manager !
M. N. Clarity. Assistant to the Plant Manager ;
- D. E. Nevinski. Plant Superintendent. Engineering & Radiation Protection !
N. M. Monda11. Plant Office Manager D. D. Antony. Superintendent of operations ' !
W. E. Anderson. Plant Superintendent. Operations & Maintoniace R. L. Scheinost. Superintendent. Quality Engineering '
J. R. Pasch. Superintendent. Security & Services . .
- L. H. Waldinger. Superintendent. Radiation Protection .
' + -
W. J. Mill. Superintendent. Technical Engineering W. W. Albold. Superintendent of Maintenance '
O. D. Day. Superintendent. Operations Engineering L. L. Nolan Superintendent. Nuclear Technical Services ;
The inspector also contacted other licensee employees including members ,
of the technical and engineering staffs and reactor and auxiliary operators.
- Denotes those licensee representatives attending the management exit -
interviews.
- 2. Onsite Review Cosedttee The inspector attended portions of two meetings of the onsite review committee (Operations Committee) during the month of February to observe conformance with technical specifications and other regulatory requirements. The review included noting adherence to the charter and administrative procedures governing the review group's activities, the group's membership and qualifications, the meeting frequency and required quorum. The activities of the committee, including review of proposed technical specifications changes, noncompliance items and corrective -
action, proposed facility modifications and procedure changes, test results, and biannual review of procedures were noted to be performed as required. ~
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
- 3. Oserational Safety Verification i
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed ah11 cable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the, month of 4 February. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including h tential fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and to verify tiat maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment,in need of . -
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- maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct. interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
' The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radweste shipments and barre 11ng.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
- 4. Spent Fuel
- a. Fuel Shipment During the inspection period, the licensee made a spent fuel element shipment to the General Electric Company Morris Operation in Morris, Illinois. The shipment consisted of 36 BWR fuel assemblies in 2 IF-300 casks mounted on rail cars, one cask per car. The inspector performed independent direct radiation and removable contamination surveys of the casks using NRC portable survey equipment. The maximum direct radiation detected was 145 mrem /hr at contact and 10 mrom/hr at one meter. The maximum removable contamination detected was about 180 disintegrations per minute nr 100 square centimeters.
These readings and indications agreed wit 1 the licensee's survey records and information presented in the radioactive materials shipment records.
- b. Cask Rail Shipment Before the rail cars with the casks IF-301 and IF-302 were shipped ftom the Monticello site, the inspector verified that shipping forms were completed, that the rail cars were properly placarded, and that the casks were correctly labeled. The radiation and contamination surveys described above were noted to have been completed and to have been within departure limits requirements. The licensee survey results were spot checked by the inspector and found to be satisfactory. The training of the personnel escorting the casks was found to be as required. The connunications capability was noted to be effective.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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- 5. Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph
- 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on March 5,1985, and sumarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee did not identify any information during the exit meeting that should be withheld from being placed in the Public Document Room.
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- Enclosur,e.' 3A1 OCT 1 7 E85 Docket No.72-001 General Electric Company ATIN: Mr. J. E. Van Hoomissen Manager, Spent Fuel Services Operation 310 De Guigne Drive Post Office Box 508 Sunnyvale, CA 94086 Gentlemen:
This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. G. M. France, III of this office on September 9-13, 1985, of activities at Morris Operation and to the inspections conducted by Mr. G. M. France, III and others of this office between March 13 and October 7, 1985, of spent fuel shipments, authorized by NRC Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-2500 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. E. E. Voiland and others at the conclusion of the inspection.
The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel.
No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspection.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
_v o s,m. neAoM J
General Electric Company 2 OCT 1 7 985 We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.
Sincerely,
- 0rigir.a1signedbyW.P.Shafer" W. D. Shafer, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 40-3392/85002(DRSS) cc w/ enclosure:
E. E. Voiland, Manager Morris Operation D. M. Dawson, Manager Licensing and Tranportation Fu'el Recovery Operations DCS/RSB (RIDS)
Phyllis Dunton, Attorney General's Office, Environmental Control Division Gary N. Wright, Manager Nuclear Facility Safety RIII FI RII: R:11 9di France /jp Grant Gr fer 10/15/85 t
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO MISSION REGION III Report No. 72-001/85-002(DRSS)
Docket No.72-001 License No. SNM-2500 l
Licensee: General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA 95125 Facility Name: Morris Operation Inspection At: Morris Operation, Morris, IL l Inspection Conducted: March 14 through October 7, 1985 Y/.Muu ti Principal Inspector: G. M. France, III bkW $ /f85 LJ /3 Fuel Shipment Inspector: W. B. Grant N Date h)I Approved By: L. R. G eger, Chief /6/'6Mf Facilities Radiation Protection Date Section Inspection Summary Inspection on March 14 through October 7, 1985 (Report No. 72-001/85002(DRSS))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of fuel shipping activities; fuel storage activities; and radiation protection and radwaste programs, including organization, ALARA, internal surveys, notifications, and reports; solid radwaste and transportation activities; environmental protection program, including airborne and liquid effluents, and maintenance surveillance activities. The inspection involved 57 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
w,-. aeAnm
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DETAILS
- 1. Persons Contacted R. M. Cartwright, Senior Technician, Analytical
- R. G. Damm, Senior Engineer, Licensing and Radiological Safety L. L. Denio, Supervisor, Quality Assurance and Safeguards J. S. Durham, Safety Technician R. V. Hand, Safety Technician
- T. E. Ingels, Manager, Quality Assurance and Safeguards
- J. E. McGrath, Supervisor Plant Safety S. P. Schmid, Specialist, Field Services T. E. Tehan, Senior Engineer, Field Services
- E. E. Voiland, Plant Manager
- Denotes those present at the meeting.
The inspector interviewed other licensee and State of Illinois personnel including: operators, safety technicians, State of Illinois Office of Waste Transportation inspectors, officials of Burlington Northern Railroad Company, and Burns Security personnel.
- 2. General The inspection of onsite activities, which began at 10:15 a.m. on September 8, 1985, was conducted to examine routine operations of spent fuel storage activities. Region III inspectors performed monthly onsite surveys on shipments of spent fuel received from the Monticello Nuclear Plant. The inspectors monitored the licensee's spent fuel program from March 14 through October 7, 1985. September 13, 1985, was the date of the onsite exit meeting.
- 3. Management Organization and Controls The inspector reviewed the licensee's neanagement organization and controls for radiation protection and operations, including changes in the organizational structure, procedure revising and updating, and utilization of audit systems.
- a. Organization Saveral personnel changes that may affect the radiation protection program have occurred since the previous inspection. Inspection Report No. (72-001/85001(DRSS)).
The Plant Safety Supervisor no longer reports to the Senior Engineer Licensing and Radiological Safety. He has been assigned additional duties in industrial and radiological safety support programs, and reports to the Morris Operation Manager. This organizational change provides the Morris Operation Manager with direct line support to resolve health and safety concerns.
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As discussed in the previous inspection report (72-001/85001) the Senior Engineer, Licensing and Radiological Safety position has been filled. The only significant difference in responsibility for the incumbent is that the Plant Safety Supervisor and four Safety Technicians report directly to the Morris Operation Manager.
The inspector noted that the incumbent in each of the above positions serves as members of the Plant Safety Committee and that items of particular safety significance will still be evaluated through safety committee review.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- b. Procedure Revising and Updating The inspector confirmed that the licensee periodically reviews and updates radiation protection and fuel storage operating procedures.
The inspector noted that procedures that provide instructions and prescribe requirements and limits for special work are approved by the Plant Safety Committee. The licensee conducts biennial review of selected standard operating procedures. In response to inspector concerns the licensee acknowledged that procedures affecting emergency brigade operations are in need of review.
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The inspector concluded that the licensee's system for reviewing and approving procedures enables the licensee to maintain current programs for evaluating major operational safety matters.
Safety Committees The inspector examined the minutes of the monthly meetings held by the Plant Safety Committee. The Committee approved the review /
revision of several standard operating procedures, to include 50P-16-11, Revision 4, Basin Leak Detection Alarm Compliance Test.
The Committee also reviewed plans to combat seepage into the basin from perched water formed by heavy rains. Approval by the Morris Operation Manager allowed corrective action by introducing a surge pump to discharge the water. The Manager, Morris Operation noted
-that no seepage has occurred since the sump pump was last inspected.
The Committee continues the practice of selecting monthly topics for discussion that relate to rad protection and industrial safety concerns. Other Safety Committee actions may be found in Section 3(d) Internal Reviews and Audits.
- d. Internal Reviews and Audits The inspector noted that the licensee utilizes routine inspections /
audits and tests to assess operating capability of spent fuel casks.
The inspector reviewed minutes of safety committee meetings and verified that the licensees level of inspection performed in the annual maintenance of shipping casks is sufficient to detect problems nonconforming to technical specifications. During annual 3
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inspection of an IF-300 cask the licensee discovered that due to excessive wear of the casks head seal surface the cask failed the technical specification for allowable head seal leakage at 200 psi water pressure. The cask had been in service for 12 years and the condition was corrected by remachining the seal surfaces.
In accordance with 10 CFR 71.95, the licensee is required to report to the Director, NRC NMSS:
(a) Any instance in which there is significant reduction in the effectiveness of any authorized packaging during use; and (b) Details of any defects with safety significance in the packaging after first use, with the means employed to repair the defects and prevent their recurrence.
The licensee concluded that there was no significant reduction in the
' effectiveness of packaging during use, and since the cask had been in service for 12 years, failure of the head seal to pass the hydro pressure test was probably due to " fair wear" and not a defect in cask design. For the reasons stated, the licensee concluded that the internal inspection disclosed an item nonconforming to technical specifications, but not identified as an item reportable to NRC NMSS.
4 The licensee performed an inspection on a second IE-300 cask and discovered that neutron shield fluid (glycol) was weeping through a 1/8 inch thick seal plate. The failure was apparently caused by thermally induced expansion and contraction over the years the cask has been in service.
i The Plant Safety Committee concluded that the condition did not constitute a significant reduction in the effectiveness of the packaging, and that the inspection did not reveal a condition caused by design fault. The licensee brought in a specialist, who recommended rewelding the seal. The licensee corrected the i leak by rewelding the seal. There was no apparent structural l significance in the licensee's inspection findings nor was there any compromise to lessen the safety or increase exposure to the public.
The inspector and licensee acknowledged that during future inspections, it may be desirable for the licensee to communicate those instances to the NRC that surface during programmed reviews or inspections, showing an anomalous quality that may lead to safety considerations.
The inspector concluded that internal reviews and inspection or audit findings receive additional reviews by the Plant Safety Committee, with final review and determination by the Morris Operation Manager.
. No violations or deviations were identified.
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- 4. Radiation Protection The inspector reviewed the licensee's internal and external exposure control programs, including the required records, reports and notifications, and the licensee's program for maintaining occupational exposure ALARA.
- a. Internal Exposure Control The inspector reviewed the results of routine urinalysis performed on 43 Morris Operation personnel since the last inspection (Inspection Report No. 72001/85001). No significant detectable activity was found. The highest reported urinalysis for gamma emitters showed about 0.12 percent of a body burden equivalent detected as cesium-137.
The annual whole body count for mixed fission, corrosion, and activa-tion products had been delayed by the vendor until late September 1985. Whole body count results will be reviewed during a future inspection.
- b. External Exposure Vendor supplied film badge reports from March 1985 to date were reviewed. Due to maintenance performed on a leased IE-300 cask about 16 persons at Morris Operations received an accumulative exposure of about 1.2 r/ hour. The maximum exposure received by an individual was about 350 mrem. Total man-rem for 1984 was reported as 11.9 man-rem.
- c. Source Leak Tests The licensee performed leak tests on radioactive sealed sources in accordance with requirements listed in technical specification 4.3.1.
The maximum level of removable contamination from each tested source was less than 0.005 pCi using dry-wipe testing techniques.
- d. Posting, Labeling (.cd Control The inspector confirmed that the licensee had posted the September 1984 revised edition of Form NRC-3, which is required by 10 CFR 19.11(c), in a sufficient number of places to permit individuals engaged in licensed activities to observe them on the way to or from any particular licensed activity.
- e. Airborne Releases and Quantification The inspector selectively reviewed licensee records of area air sample analysis. Alpha and beta / gamma measurements of airborne radioactive concentrations performed in the fuel basin area were less than the MPC allowed in 10 CFR 20. While performing maintenance on an IF-300 cask two operators in full face respirators were exposed to concentrations of airborne radioactivity that exceeded the licensee's action level of IE-08 pCi/ml. The airborne concentration was determined by high volume grab samples, but ARM instruments did not detect airborne concentrations above the action level.
5
The health physics review of the incident disclosed that the radioactive airborne emission did exceed the licensee's action level of 1E-08 pCi/ml, but that the elevated activity was localized which prevented the ARM instruments from detecting the increase.
The two operators were appropriately wearing full face masks that offered a protective factor that limited the effect of the exposure to less than one MPC.
- f. ALARA Activities The inspector examined licensee records that documented the use of engineering controls in reducing occupational exposures. The licensee installed several new air driven torque-socket wrenches. These were identified to the inspector during a tour of the basin decontamination pad. By employing air powered torque wrenches, operator time required to remove a spent fuel cask head is reduced from about two hnurs to less than one hour. Personnel exposure levels were also reduced by using lead shielding when performing cask maintenance. Other actions performed by the licensee to reduce exposure levels include the following:
- Clean-up and disposal of crud samples submitted for laboratory analyses.
- Video critique of practiced dry runs of cask waste liner removal.
The inspector observed the licensee video taping spent fuel arrivals. Video critique is useful in improving operator l performance, and as an added benefit saves operator or man-hour time and subsequently reduces exposure levels.
- The licensee has limited the number of intrusions into the LAW vault by installing a LAW liquid level indicator for digital read out from the control room panel display.
- g. Survey, Contamination Control /Off-site Releases The inspector observed licensee performance in requiring visitors to perform exit monitoring procedures from the cask unloading facility.
Licensee Operators and Safety Technicians are cognizant of the requirement to control the trafficking of radioactive contamination from area to area. The inspector observed a Safety Technician instructing four members of the Canadian Broadcast Corporation (CBC-TV) in the proper way of exiting the cask unloading facility.
The licensee conducts frequent plant tours. Plant personnel are trained to instruct and or caution visitors and vendors about contamination control. In addition, the licensee's vendor supplied security guards conducted careful contamination surveys on all persons exiting the plant.
The licensee also decontaminated several items for release offsite, including:
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- Spanner wrench decontaminated by the electropolishing technique, which reduced hot spots from over 6000 dps/100 cm2 to less than i 2200 dpa/100 cas ,
- Poster rugs were decontamir.ated to release limits of less than i
2200 dpm/100 cm2 ,
Activities performed in the basin decon area caused survey readings as high as 118,000 dps/100 cm 2 , but subsequent cleanup efforts l
! brought the contamination level to fixed hot spots of about
(- 1900 dps/100 can ,
l During the course of this inspection, the licensee prepared a redundant yoke for shipment. The yoke used in IF-300 cask handling programs was decontaminated to acceptable levels of less than 2
2200 dpm/100cm . The yoke was packaged as three separate components and placed into wooden crates. Contamination survey data showed I
fixed smear counts on yoke components of less than 2200 dep/100cm2 ,
whilethegackagedwoodencreatesshowedsmearcountsupto220 dpa/100 cm The inspector concluded that the licensee is complying with regulatory i requirements related to radiation protection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 5. Operations Review The inspector reviewed with the licensee the status of operations at the Morris Operation.
- a. Fuel Storage Activities The inspector reviewed the licensee's fuel storage activities including current and proposed fuel receipts and shipments.
From November 20, 1984, through October 7, 1985, Region III USNRC inspectors performed monthly onsite inspections of Morris Operation activities during receipt of spent fuel shipments from Northern l State Power's Monticello Nuclear Generating Station. The frequency I
of spent fuel- shipments is bi-weekly; by October, 684 fuel bundles of Monticello fuel will be stored at Morris Operation's spent fuel facility. The October shipment will represent the last shipment from Monticello for 1985. In November, the Nebraska Cooper Station will renew their series of spent fuel shipments for storage at Morris Operation.
l 'The inspector reviewed documentation of an incident involving the l_ radioactive concentration in the cask coolant as determined by i
analysis of the first cask flush of an air cooled cask. Initial radioactive concentration of the cask coolant showed 1.19 pCi/ml.
On the second and third flushes the analysis showed a concentration of 0.7 and 0.6 pCi/m1, respectively. The consistent values shown 7
in the second and third flush analyses indicated that the radioa-ctive concentration of the coolant was below the action level, additional samples were taken and a composite was made of the first three samples. The final or composite analysis showed a concentration below the 1.0 pCi/ml technical specification requirement, hence, the concentration of radioactive material indicates that no failed fuel existed in the cask, and no breach of spent fuel occurred during transit. The inspector concluded that the documented account of licensee performance and discussions with licenses personnel showed that the transfer of the spent fuel to the basin pool occurred according to procedure and licensee requirement.
- b. Housekeeping The inspector observed that railroad tracks leading to the cask receiving area were clear and that the licensee had adequately l prepared the area to receive each shipment. Railroad officials disclosed that during the course of transporting spent fuel from Monticello to Morris Operation there were no delays caused by licensee performance. Delays that did occur were off site, caused
, by track and or draw bridge maintenance and represented incidents l germane to railway transport. In response to other inspector concerns, a railroad official also noted that there were no problems from intervenors that caused delays in transit or a breach in security.
The inspector concluded that the potential for accumulating fissile materials in unauthorized locations or exposing the public to unnecessary levels of radiation was minimized, because of the implementation of planned approved procedures.
- 6. Criticality Safety Commensurate with the requirements of 10 CFR 72, the licensee's spent fuel handling and storage systems were designed during plant construction and or prior to plant operation to meet parameters derived from criticality safety bench mark calculations.
During the course of the inspection period March 14 through October 7, 1985, there were no facility modification and changes, or spent fuel inquiries that required the licensee to perform nuclear criticality safety analyses.
No violations or deviation were identified.
- 7. Waste Generator Requirements, 10 CFR 20 and 61 The inspector reviewed waste generation activities to determine whether the licensee has established and is maintaining adequate management controlled procedures which reasonably assure compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 61 applicable to low level radwaste form, waste characterization and classification, stabilization, and 8
shipment manifests and tracking. The inspector also reviewed licensee actions related to a shipment of solidified radwaste shipped in June 1985, to the burial facility located at Barnwell, South Carolina.
The Plant Operations Unit backed with approval by the Plant Safety Committee has the responsibility for establishing and maintaining adequate management-controlled procedures in accordance with 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR
- 61. The licensee's waste handling (50P-I-52, Revision 10) and shipping
. procedures (50P-I-53) appear to address the regulatory concerns for carrying out various radwaste packaging and shipping activities. By procedure the licensee performs quality control inspections for container integrity and surveys the shipment for radistion levels. There appeared to be a clear delineation of authority and responsibility of those individuals assigned to radwaste processing for low level land burial.
Licensee records appeared adequate to document a manifest tracking system to include waste form and classification, as required under 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 61. The inspector verified that the licensee maintained a current copy of the disposal site Rad Waste Transport Permit.
The inspector noted that the Field Services Specialist is the cognizant person required to effect an investigation in any instance where receipt of shipment has not been verified within the specified period.
! No violations or deviations were identified.
- 8. Transportation l The inspector reviewed the transportation activities to determine whether the licensee is maintaining an adequate program to assure radiological l
safety in the receipt; packaging, and delivery of licensed radioactive i materials.
l The inspector reviewed licensee shipping records and confirmed that health physics surveys were documented. The inspector noted that a system is in place to maintain a record of each shipment of licensed material in accordance with 10 CFR 71. In addition, shipping records disclosed that the licensee performed radwaste program requirements that covered:
- Monitoring for radiation and contamination of radwaste packages and transport carrier,
- Package marking and labeling, and vehicle placarding,
- Instructions that provide disposal site acceptance criteria,
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- And shipping paper documentation in accordance with licensee procedures.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for receipt and/or shipment of radioactive materials. The review included inspection of six incoming rail shipments of spent reactor fuel shipped from Monticello Nuclear Generating Station, during the months of April through the 7th of 9
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October 1985. For each incoming shipment, the inspectors reviewed I
shipment records, observed cask receipt preparations, performed independent radiation contamination surveys, and verified implementation of the licensee's transportation activities procedures. The inspectors dis-i covered that the level of non-fixed radioactive contamination on the external surface of one incoming cask exceeded the NRC contamination limit of 22,000 dpm/100 cm2 , for one smear. The licensee observed the same problem during receipt of an incoming cask. In both cases the contamination level was less than 30,000 dpm/100 cm2 . By applying smear efficiency techniques to each cask it was adequately demonstrated that I the 22,000 dpm/100 cm2 contamination limit was not exceeded. No problems were noted.
Since the last inspection (Inspection Report No. 72-001/85001) three Morris Operation Personnel identified as the Operating Engineer, Field i Services Specialist and the Senior Engineer Licensing and Rad Safety, attended a workshop on specific transportation programs. The four-day session or Radioactive Material Transportation Workshops was conducted for DOE by Science Applications International Corporation, and included discussions describing the characteristics of radwaste material, implementation of IAEA standards, and hazardous waste. The inspectors concluded that licensed performance during the receipt of incoming spent i
fuel shipments adequately demonstrates that minor contamination levels can be corrected. No problems were noted.
The licensee's shipping records also disclosed that about 1,100 cubic
- feet of low level waste was shipped to the Barnwell disposal site. This represented the licensee's first shipment of LLW since 10 CFR 61 became effective.
No violation or deviations were identified.
- 9. Maintenance and Surveillance Testing
- The inspector examined the licensee's maintenance operations to determine if records are maintained on plant systems pertinent to safety.
The required measurements for the determination of basin water quality disclosed that the concentration of radioactivity was less than the action level of 0.02 pCi/ml beta. Other chemical parameter concentrations were well within technical specification limits, and the required measure-1 ments were performed within the specified frequency. Records also 1 disclosed that criticality detectors were checked for operability and area radiation monitors (ARM) were calibrated within the frequency required by Table 4-2, technical specification 4.4.1. The licensee noted that other than the replacement of a criticality horn no other problems were '
identified. In response to inspector concerns, the licensee confirmed that spare criticality systems were onsite and available to place in service.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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- 10. Training The inspector reviewed the licensee's provisions for training visitors and contractors who may enter or have work assignments in controlled areas.
The inspector noted considerable visitor / contractor activity at Morris Operations, including:
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- Filming of spent fuel activity by representatives of the Canadian .
- Broadcast Corporation news television team, [
- Contract painting of the facility water tower. i 1
In response to inspector concerns the licensee noted that initial training in safety and radiation protection was provided and temporary certification
- was assigned to visitors and contractor
- . This training covers facility alarm system, emergency procedures, security and 10 CFR 19.12 requirements. [
t The-inspector verified through observation, record review and interviews with the Plant Safety Supervisor that the licensee is conducting radiation safety training for visitors, contractors and employees commensurate with Morris Operations policy and 10 CFR 19 requirements.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
- 11. Emergency Preparedness The inspector verified that emergency equipment including fire extinguishers, respiratory protection devices and radiation survey insi.ruments is checked on a periodic basis.
Emergency equipment is compared to checklist items on a monthly basis.
The inspector noted that expendable items, such as batteries arc replaced on.a predetermined frequency, and radiation detection survey instruments are calibrated at the frequency prescribed by Appendix A, Technical Specifications. Currently, the emergency coordinator is the Operatix i
Shift Supervisor. The OSS has the authority and responsibility in an emergency for the welfare and safety of Morris Operation personnel and equipment.
In response to inspector concerns, the licensee acknowledged that the emergency procedure should be reviewed in order to determine if any changes are necessary.
'The inspector recommended an early review of the emergency procedure.
This was further discussed during the exit meeting.
- 12. Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1) at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on September 13, 1985. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection and stated l
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that there were no violations or deviations identified within the scope of this inspection. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concern about reviewing emergency preparedness procedures in order to determine if changes that affect personnel assignment and equipment are necessary.
During the course of this inspection and the exit meeting, the licensee did not identify any documents or inspector statements and reference to specific processes as proprietary.
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Enclosure.3B.
AFd 0 2 iwa Docket No.72-001 General Electric Company -
ATTN:- Mr. J. E. Van Hoomissen Manager, Spent Fuel Services Operation 310 De Guigne Drive t
!- Post Office Sox 508 Sunnyvale, CA 94086
- Gentlemen:
This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. G. M. France, III of this office on February 22-28, 1985, of activities at Morris Operation and to the inspections conducted by Mr. G. M. France, III and others of this i
office between November 20, 1984 and March 13, 1985, of spent fuel shipments, authorized by NRC Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-2500 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. E. E. Voiland and Mr. J. D. Kesman at the
- conclusion of the inspection.
The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during i
the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of' procedures and representative records, observations, and
, interviews with personnel. The inspection also included a review of the circumstances surrounding excessive non-fixed contamination found on a NLI-1/2 cask received by Babcock and Wilcox's Research Lenter in Lynchburg, Virginia j following shipment from Morris Operation.
l During this inspection, certain of your activities appeared to be in noncompli- i ance with NRC requirements, as specified in the enclosed Appendix. A written I response is required.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
A e e r A Q 12 G(^A LH4-Y W V/
. 0 General Electric Company 2 M02E We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.
Sincerely, r
arl J. aper ello, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 72-011/85001(DRSS) ,
cc w/ enc 1:
DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)
R , RII RIII RIII RIII , RIII e/1d Grant ll ueter
- ld V Nicholson a
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er r llo 03/28/85 g[
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Appendix NOTICE OF VIOLATION G. E. Morris Docket No.72-001 Morris Operation As a result of the inspection conducted on February 22-28, 1985, and in accordance with the General Policy and Procedures for.NRC Enforcement Actions, (10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C), the following violation was identified:
10 CFR 71.87(i) requires that non-fixed radioactive contamination on the external surfaces of transport packages offered for shipment be kept as low as practicable, and that for packages transported as exclusive use shipments by rail or highway, the non-fixed beta gamma radioactive contamination at anytime during transport not exceed 220 dpm/cm2 (22,000 dpm/100 cas ),
Contrary to the above, following the shipment of an NLI-1/2 cask, containing nine irradiated fuel rods, from GE Horris of Illinois to Babcock and Wilcox Research Center, Lynchburgh, Virginia, a survey of the surface of the NLI-1/2 cask performed upon receipt showed one smear that exceeded 22,000 dpm/100 cm2 .
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement IV).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit to' this office within thirty days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply, including for each item of noncompliance: (1) cor-rective action taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective action to be taken to avoid further noncompliance; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Consideration may be given to extending your response time
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for good cause shown.
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l Dated '
Carl J. 8Paperis(10, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch
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C U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0094ISSION REGION III Report No. 72-001/85001(DRSS)
Docket No.72-001 License No. SNM-2500 Licensee: General Electric Cosipany ~
175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA 95125 Facility Name: Morris Operation Inspection At: Morris Operation, Morris, Illinois Inspection Conducted: November 1984 through March 13, 1985 Principal Inspector:
hima.4s G. M. France, III If N I y j$ h Fuel Shipment Inspectors: W. B. Grant I Date Y$
L. Hueter Date
- /II Y((cW &hs Dite' R. Pau Date Approved By: L. Chief Facilities Radiation Protection Mk8I Date Section Inspection Summary Inspection on Novembei- 20, 1984 through March 13, 1985 (Report No. 72-001/85001(DRSS))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of fuel shipping activities; fuel storage activities; radiation protection procedures, exposure control, surveys; organization, audits and nuclear safety; and environmental protection.
The inspection involved 51 inspector-hours onsite by five NRC inspectors.
i wa cAr- cr n ilff
l Results: The licensee was found in compliance of H E requirements within the areas examined, with the following exception: Contamination Control, following shipment of an NLI-1/2 cask survey showed nonfixed contamination in excess of DOT /NRC requirements - Section 4.
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i DETAILS
- 1. Persons Contacted l
- R. G. Damm, Senior Engineer, Licensing and Radiological Safety "L.- L. Denio, Supervisor, Quality Assurance and Safeguards )
T. E. Ingels, Manager, Quality. Assurance and Safeguards "J. D. Kosman, Manager, Plant Engineering and Maintenance
- J. E. McGrath, Supervisor Plant Safety ~
S. P. Schmid, Specialist, Field Services E. E. Voiland, Plant Manager
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting.
- 2. General The inspection of the onsite licensee activities, which began at 12:00 p.m.
on February 22, 1985, was conducted to examine routine operations of spent fuel storage activities. Also, the inspectors performed independent surveys on each shipment of spent fuel received from Monticello Nuclear Plant during the months of November and December _1984, and January through March 1985. In addition, the inspector reviewed recent test results on
, the REA 2023 dry storage cask for BWR spent fuel. During facilities tours, the inspector observed that area postings, access controls, and i
general housekeeping was good.
- 3. Organization The inspector reviewed the licensee's organizational structure with emphasis on health and safety support.
The most significant organization change since the last inspection report (72-001/84-02(DRSS)) was the hiring of a replacement for the Senior Engineer, Licensing and Radiological Safety. The new Senior Engineer will also provide support by performing nuclear criticality safety analyses. To date the radiological health and safety program continues under the direction of the Plant Safety Supervisor, who is supported by four safety technicians.
The current radiation protection organization appears to have onsite management support to ensure implementation of an effective control program.
No violations were identified.
- 4. NLI-1/2 Cask Contamination The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding the nonfixed radio-active contamination found on the surface of an NLI-1/2 Spent Fuel Cask, containing nine irradiated fuel rods. The surface contamination level exceeded D0T/NRC regulatory limits of 22,000 dpm/100 cm2 . Regulatory 3
l officials were notified by Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) of Lynchburg, Virginia, the receiving licensee, who discovered the contamination while performing surface smears on the NLI-1/2 cask.
G. E. Morris, acting as consignee for G. E. San Jose, accepted pe:.ession of the cask at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, for subsequent shipment to 88W. Dresden released the cask to G. E. Morris.after perfoming contam-ination surveys showing non-fixed contamination to be less than 1,000 dpm/
100 co8 Apparently, at the time the NLI .1/2 cask was dispatched by exclusive use truck shipment from Dresden. . surface contamination levels were well within DOT /NRC limits. After the cask. arrived at B&W, about 50 smears were made on the cask surface. One of the 50 smears showed non-fixed contamination at a level of 25,000 dps/100 cm2 . This smear level, without actual smear efficiency information (DOT assumes 105 smear efficiency), indicates that the DOT /NRC limit of 22,000 dpm/100 ces was exceeded by approximately 15 percent. A smear efficiency determination, which presumably would have allowed use of a higher smear efficiency thereby demonstrating compliance with the surface contamination limits, was not performed because the receiving licensee was unaware of the need for such a determin4 tion before decontamination of the cask.
In accordance with the NRC certificate of compliance, the NLI-1/2 cask was mounted on a skid en a truck trailer for the shipment. The trailer was equipped with an aluminum mesh personnel barrier that enveloped the cask. The fitted personnel barrier is locked in place with padlocks.
With these precautions in place cask contamination did not present a i hazard to the public because of the personnel barrier enclosure and l because only a very small portion of the cask surface exhibiter excessive contamination levels.
Historically, the non-fixed contamination on the surface of the cask is not related to leakage of the contents, but to contaminated pool water
{ absorbed in the cask surface seeping out during transit. However, it is possible that some of the surface area of the cask may have been missed during cleaning before shipment.
This is a violation of 10 CFR 71.87(i) which requires that non-fixed beta gamma radioactive contamination at any time during transport not exceed 220 dpm/cm a (22,000 dpm/100 cm a ) for exclusive use shipments.
One viciation was identified.
! 5. Radiation Protection The inspector reviewed the licensee's internal and external exposure controls and personnel dosimetry programs; including the use of special work permits or procedures.
- a. Internal Exposure Control l
Invivo counting for mixed fission, corrosion and activation products was rescheduled for September 16 and 27, 1984, and performed on four 4
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individuals who were absent during the August counting period. The l highest bonafide result was 20.5 qCi of Cs-137, which is significantly 1 less than 40-MPC hours. '
The inspector reviewed the results of routine urinalyses performed on G. E. Morris personnel during the last quarter of 1984. The maximum concentration noted was 66 pC1/ liter of Cs-137 which is not indicative of a significant intake. No.ather gamma emitters were i reported.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- b. External Exposure Control Film badge data for the October 1984 through February 1985 operating period disclosed that the highest whole body dose to any individual was less than 1,000, millirem. The licensee's spiked data compared with the vendor's data showed an average difference of less than 35 areas for spiked TLD's. The vendor's Form NRC-5 equivalent meets regulatory requirements.
External exposures for 129 persons including employees and visitors was 11.92 person-rem for 1984 which is 6.6 percent lower than the total person-rem averaged over the last 5 years.
- c. ALARA Activities The licensee's basic program for maintaining personnel exposures as low as reasonably achievable include the following: decontamination of plant areas and systems, installation and use of local shielding, and minimizing the time required to work in radiation areas.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's analysis of basin water and air samples. The radioactive concentration in basin water remained below the licensee's action level of 2E-02 uCi/mi beta. A review of 54 air samples showed the highest reported value for airborne radio-activity measured in the basin area was 5.5E-11 uCi/cc compared to an action level of IE-8 uCi/ml be+a.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- d. Safety Survey Report The inspector selectively reviewed the licensee's radiation survey file to determine compliance with 10 CFR 20.201(b). In addition, the inspector performed independent surveys by counting smears near the exit of the cask receiving area; REA cask area step-off pad and outside doorway entrance to employee break / lunch room. Inspector surveys showed no significant detectable activity. Licensee surveys appeared adequate to assess radiological hazards.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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- e. Special Work Permits (SWP)
The inspector selectively observed licensee fuel handling activities around the basin pool and determined that personnel were performing tasks in accordance with specified (SWP) safety requirements for each job having radiation safety significance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- f. Posting. Labelina and Control -
During a tour of the fuel pool and cask receiving areas the inspector observed posting and labeling of radiation areas, high radiation areas, and radioactive material. No posting or labeling problems were ,
identified. '
The inspector noted that the licensee had yet to post the September 1984 revised edition of Form NRC-3. In response to this matter, the Supervisor, Plant Safety noted that the current posted 1982 version of Form NRC-3 would be replaced as soon as possible.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- g. Respiratory Protection The inspector reviewed the licensee's respiratory program including examining the licensee's test equipment for performing quantitative respirator fit tests. In addition, the inspector reviewed IE information notice NRC No. 85-06 " Contamination of Breathing Air Systems," and discussed with the Supervisor, Plant Safety the potential for radioactive contamination of compressed air systems.
~, In response to the discussion, the Supervisor, Plant Safety noted that compressed air systems are maintained and inspected and seldom used as backup to supply breathing air to respirator wearers. It was also noted that a RWP/SWP would be issued prior to using add-on air handling equipment.
The licensee's maintenance of compressed air systems includes air purging of the lines to remove contaminants and rust.
No violations or deviations were noted.
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- 6. Operations Review The inspector reviewed the status of operations at G. E. Morris i Operations.
- a. Fuel Storace Activities The inspector reviewed the licensee's fuel storage activities including current and proposed fuel receipts and shipments. On November 20, 1984, the first shipment of fuel arrived from Northern State Power's Monticello Nuclear Generating Station. Five additional 6
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shipments were made during the months of December through March.
These shipments represent about one-sixth of the 1060 fuel assemblies expected from Monticello. According to licensee audits there are 915 BWR and 350 PWR fuel bundles currently stored at Morris Operation.
Since the last inspection report (72-001/84-02) the licensee has completed the original set of cask characterization tests on the REA 2023 Dry Storage cask. The inspector viewed a 9-minute film which demonstrated licensee techniques for measuring temperature changes of spent fuel stored in the REA cask. As part of the ori-ginal test requirement the film showed licensee operators mounting thermocouples in the REA cask, for the measurement of spent fuel temperatures with the cask in vertical orientation and with the cask in horizontal orientation. During the inspection the licensee wrapped the outside of the cask in insulation paper in order to make additional thermal measurements on spent fuel with the cask in vertical orientation.
The inspector also observed licensee operators relocating spent fuel bundles into an underwater storage basin grid. The inspector concluded that the licensee's performance in fuel storage activities provides reasonable assurance that spent fuel at Morris Operation can be received, handled, stored and retrieved without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- b. Housekeeping The inspector observed that material was stored in designated
, storage areas, evacuation pathways were clear, railroad tracks leading to the cask receiving area were clear, and the potential for accumulating fissile materials in unauthorized locations was minimized.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 7. Maintenance Surveillance Testina The inspector examined documentation of surveillance tests required by the technical specifications of Appendix A to license No. SNM 2500. The required measurements of stack effluent air and basin water quality were both performed at the specified frequencies. The radioactive concentra-tion in basin water is also discussed in Section 5.(c) under ALARA activities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 8. Environmental Protection The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation of environmental monitoring results, and verified that reports of sampling data have been submitted to the NRC in accordance with Materials License No. SNM-2500, Technical Specification 8.2.1.
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The average concentration of stack release for7esium-137 during 1984 was 23 percent less than the previous year, while cobalt-60 level increased about 30 percent. However, at these posted concentration levels there did not appear to be any violations or deviations.
- 9. Transportation Activities i The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for receipt and/or ship- i ment of radioactive materials. The review included inspection of six incoming rail shipments of spent reactor fuel shipped from Mo'nticello Nuclear Generating Station, during the months of November through March.
For each incoming shipment, the inspector reviewed shipment records, observed cask receipt preparations, performed independent radiation
- contamination surveys, verified implementation of the licensee's QA
, program, and reviewed safeguards measures and procedures.
The inspector noted that'the level of non-fixed radioactive contamination on the external surface of one of the incoming casks exceeded 22,000 dps/
100 cm8 for one smear (33,000 dpm/100 cm8 ). Licensee operators performed repetitive smear measurements until smears reached less than 105 of the original smear activity. Based on these smears, it appears that the i
original smear efficiency exceeded 50% and therefore adequately
, demonstrated that the 22,000 dpe/100 cm2 contamination limit was not exceeded.
Except for the violation noted in Section 4 (NLI-1/2 Cask Contamination) no problems were identified concerning transportation.
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- 10. Trainino The inspector reviewed the licensee's provisions for training and periodic retraining of employees related to employee work assignments with radioactive materials.
The inspector verified that "A" and "B" shift workers receive annual training in selected subjects, which include radiological protection and
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plant emergency alarm systems. A written exam was given and test results showed most workers scored above 90 percent. In other training activities video tape recordings are used for workers that need specialized training j in fuel handling operations. Film / taping sessions are made and then l critiqued to improve fuel handling techniques and to maintain radiation exposures ALARA.
The inspectors noted through record review and observation of workers involved in spent fuel handling activities that the licensee appears to be conducting an effective training program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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- 11. Criticality Safety .
The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation of facility chenges requiring criticality considerations, including. determination of whether the licensee has positive management controls to ensure that facility ,
operations are conducted within nuclear criticality" safety limits. The inspector also reviewed documentation of the licensee's nuciear safety analysis performed since the last inspection report (72-001/84-02).-
The REA 2023 dry storage cask was loaded with 52 assemblies o'f spent fuel from Nebraska Cooper Nuclear Station. The storage is temporary and the spent fuel contains less than the 3.5 percent enrichment allowed by the criticality safety analysis. The licensee is conducting a series of temperature measurements and test characterization of the fuel bearing cask in both the vertical and horizontal storage positions. No problems were identified.
. 2 The licensee performed an NSA on spent fuel shipped from.the Monticello -
Nuclear Generating Station. Appropriate conversion factors and/or >
criticality parameters were confirmed by Monticello as part of the QA ' x review of data for fuel storage compliance. No problems were identified. -
The inspector noted that the licensee has hired a cognizant person to fill the vacancy of Senior Engineer, Licensing and Radiological Safety.
The newly hired Senior Engineer became familiar with ccmputer codes '
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, useful to nuclear safety calculations while employed at Argonne hational Laboratory.
The inspector concluded that the addition of the new Senior dngineer should strengthen the management of the licensee's nuclear criticality [
safety program. ,
No violations or deviations were identified. ,'
- 12. Quality Assurance ,
Through observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of' records of transportation activities the inspector verified that the '
licensee is conducting surveys on systems and components important to '
safety and that QA sign offs were documented. 3 ,
In addition, the inspector reviewed the following requests for corrective action derived from an audit published by the licensee's QA section:
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- a. Shipment of Empty Irradiated Fuel Casks
- b. Receipt and Handling of Loaded IF-300 Cesk
- c. Shipment of Empty Irradiated Fuel Casks.
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The inspector confirmed that the Field Services Specialist updated the above procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 13. E,xit Meetine
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The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1) at the conclusion of the safety inspection on February 28, 1985. The violation noted in Section 4 was discussed on March 13, 1985~ In response to certain matters discussed by the. inspector, the licensee:
- a. Stated that contamination control on shipping casks is not routinely reviewed by the QA program.
- b. Stated that corrective action requests are based on QA audit i
findings. .
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. During the course of the inspection and the exit meeting, the licensee did not identify any such documents or i inspector statements and references to specific processes as proprietary.
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