ML19350E260

Forwards Response to SER Open Item 1 Re Draft SER Section 2.4.2.3

ML19350E260
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	06/12/1981
From:	Maurin L LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
W3P81-1470, NUDOCS 8106170212
Download: ML19350E260 (3)

Text

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• l OUISIANA ,4a caAncNce Srneer P O W E R & L i G H T[ P O 90x 6CC8

• NEW CRLeANS LCU!SiANA 70174

• 1504) 366-2345

% COLE SCUM UTtuTIES SYSTEM June 12, 1981 W3P81-1470 Q-3-A29.02 Q-3-A29.09

& If/ '// qh Mr. R. L. Tedesco Assistant Director for Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555  %

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....,,o1 a1991 7

SUBJECT:

Waterford 3 SES "(( i,,

Docket No. 50-382 \ f,

.s Hydrologic and Geotechnical Engineering Branch T .x SER Open Item No. 1 ' I.j-], ;D$cQ

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Dear hr. Tedesco:

Please find enclosed our response to SER Open Item No. I concerning Draf t SER Section 2. 4.2. 3 originated by the Hydrologic and Geotechnical Engineering Branch 'R. Gonzales).

Should you have any additional questions in this regard, please contact l us.

l Yours very truly,

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l i L. V. Maurin l Assistant Vice President l Nur. lear Operations LVM/MPF/dde Enclosure l

cc: Mr. E. L. Blake, Mr. W. M. Stevenson 1

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• Response to Open Item No. 1 Local intense Precipitation (2.4.2.3)

We consider the design of the cooling tower basins to be adequate for.

run off produced from local intense precipitation based on *.he following scenarios: ,

1) For t'ce probable maximum precipitation (PMP) the two 140 gpm pump capacity in each bay is sufficient to remove the runoff water and prevent ponding.

2) Assuming the PMP is concurrent with a loss of offsite power (LOOP) the two 140 gpm pumps per bay are manually loaded on the diesel generators and will remove the precipitation.

3) Even with a PMP concurrent with a LOOP and a single failure of one pump in one bay, function of the other bay is assured by the two 140 gpm pumps and safe plant shutdown is assured.

4) Assuming a PMP and LOOP and a worst single failure of a diesel generator to start, the two 140 gpm pumps aligned to the operable diesel generator ensure that

' one bay remains unflooded the thus functional, and safe ,

plant shutdown is not impaired.

We consider the probability of a PMP and the non-mec!anistic clogging of the roof drainage system to be beyond the bounds of consideration as a

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, . us design basis.' There is no mechanistic means'which we can postulate that results in clogging all of the roof' drains since these drains are located near the top of the Reactor Containment Building and there

. is no potential debris or ' equipment failure which could be realistically assumed to clog the roof drains.

Based on the above, we conclude that the flooding protection for the cooling tower area meets the intent of Regulatory Guide l.59 and the plant design meets the requirements of General Design Criterion 2.

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