ML17285A291
| ML17285A291 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1989 |
| From: | Sorensen G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17285A292 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-88-14, GO2-89-025, GO2-89-25, NUDOCS 8903090017 | |
| Download: ML17285A291 (157) | |
Text
<gg Cp~ ~TED D1 ~BUTIOY DER ON STRl 0."i SYs TEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTXON SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:8903090017 DOC.DATE: 89/02/24 NOTARIZED: YES DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME ~ AUTHOR AFFILIATION SORENSEN,G.C. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATXON k
Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Forwards status rept re Generic Ltr 88-14, "Instrument Air Supply Sys Affecting Safety-Related Equipment."
Qualification+
DISTRXBUTXON CO : AO D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR f ENCL SIZE: /
TITLE: OR/Licensing Submittal: Equipment NOTES RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 0 PD5 PD 1 0 SAMWORTH,R 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 6 6 ARM/DAF/LFMB 1 0 NRR/DEST/ADE 8H 1 0 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 OGC/HDS2 1 1 E 01 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 EXTERNAL: LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1 h
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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 February 24, 1989 G02-89-025 Docket No. 50-397 U. S. Nuclear, Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl-137 Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
GENERIC LETTER 88-14, "INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY SYSTEM PROBLEMS AFFECTING SAFETY"RELATED EQUIPMENT;" STATUS REPORT
Reference:
Generic Letter 88-14, "Instrument Air Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment;" dated 1/30/89 The subject Generic Letter. requested that each licensee perform a design and operations verification of their instrument air, system. A reply within 180 days was requested which for, WNP-2 would be February 23, 1989 based upon an August 23, 1988 receipt date. In the reference we indicated that the February 23 date could not be met but that by this date a status report would be provided.
This report is attached. Because this report provides information on a currently ongoing effort, the contents of the report are subject to change.
Significant changes that would relate to the information requested by the Generic Letter, will be reflected in our final submittal.
Very truly yours, G. C. Sorensen, Manager Regulatory Programs lw Attachment cc: JB Martin - NRC RV NS Reynolds - BCPER RB Samworth NRC DL Williams - BPA/399 NRC Site Inspector - 901A 89030900i7 890224 PDR ADOCK 05000397 PDC
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0 STATE OF WASHINGTON)
Subject:
Generic Letter. 88-14
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COUNTY OF BENTON )
I, G.C. Sorensen, being duly sworn, subscribe to and say that I am the Manager,, Regulatory Programs for, the WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, the applicant herein; that I have full authority to execute this oath; that I have reviewed the foregoing; and that to the best of my knowledge, information and belief the statements made relative to the status of this effor,t are tr,ue.
DATE+5 /BP,1989 G.C. So, nsen, Manager.
Regula ory Programs On this day per sonally appeared before me G.C. Sorensen to me known to be the individual who executed tHe foregoing instrument and acknowledged that he signed the same as his free act and deed for, the uses and purposes herein mentioned.
GIVEN under my hand and seal this ~@ day of 1989.
o ryPu ic nan orte State of Washington Residing at
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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 1
February 24, 1989 G02-89"025 Docket No. 50-397 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl-13?
Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
GENERIC LETTER 88"14, "INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY SYSTEM PROBLEMS AFFECTING SAFETY"RELATED EQUIPMENT;" STATUS REPORT
Reference:
Generic Letter 88-14, "Instrument Air Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment;" dated 1/30/89 The subject Generic Letter requested that each licensee perform a design and operations verification of their instrument air system. A reply within 180 days was requested which for, WNP-2 would be February 23, 1989 based upon an August 23, 1988 receipt date.
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~ In the reference we indicated that the February 23 date could not be met but that by this date a status report would be provided. ~
This report is attached. ~ Because this report provides information on a
~
currently ongoing effort, the contents of the report are subject to change.
Significant changes that would relate to the information requested by the Generic Letter, will be reflected in our final submittal.
Very truly yours, G. C. Sorensen, Manager Regulatory Programs lw Attachment cc: JB Hartin - NRC RV NS Reynolds - BCP&R RB Samworth
- NRC DL Williams - BPA/399 NRC Site Inspector - 901A N'0 090017 90224 Pbh AOOCK C~>.
000397 PDC
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i <<~ ~ TABLE OF CONTENTS REPORT
SUMMARY
. ~ ~ 1 BACKGROUND . ~ ~ 3 2.1 History of NRC Air, Systems Concerns. . . . . . . . . . . ~ ~ 3 e; 2.2 Summary of Generic Letter, DESCRIPTION OF ACTION TAKEN.
DESCRIPTION OF AIR SYSTEMS .
4.1 88-14. . .
Control and Service, Air, Systems. . . .
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7 4.2 Containment Instrument Air Systems . . 8 4.3 Emergency Diesel Starting Air, Systems. . . 9 SAFETY"RELATED AIR OPERATED CONTROL VALVES AND ACCUMULATORS. .10 5.1 Air, Operated Control Valves. .10 5.2 Accumulators . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 5.2.1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)
Accumulators ( Inboard and Outboard). .12 5.2.2 Main Steam Relief Valve (MSRV) Accumulators. .13 5.2.3 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Accumulators . .13 5.2.4 Backup Nitrogen Cylinder Banks . .14 5.2.5 Remote Nitrogen Bottle Station . . .14 5.2.6 Reactor, Outside Air, (ROA) and Reactor Exhaust Air, (REA) Accumulators . .15 5.2.7 Containment Vacuum Breaker. Accumulator, Tank. .15 5.2.8 Containment Vacuum Breaker, Bottle Station. . ~ ~ ~ ~ .15 5.2.9 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Starting Air, Receiv ers . . .15 5.2.10 Emergency Diesel Generator,. Starting Air, Receivers. ~ ~ ~ ~ .15 TESTING CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES. .16 RESULTS OF TESTING . .18 8.1 8.2 Criteria......................
EVALUATION OF APPLICABLE PLANT PROCEDURES.
Eval uati on Operating Procedures .
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.19 8.3 Training Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 8.4 Maintenance Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION. .21 TABLES Table 4-1'-2; CAS Design Criteria Table CIA Design Criteria Table 4-3 Starting Air, System Design Criteria Table 6-1; Air, ()uality Test Criteria Table 8-1; Operating and Training Procedures Criteria Table 8-2; Maintenance/Testing Criteria FIGURES Figure 4-1; Control and Service Air, System; Dwg M510 Figure 4-2; Containment Instr ument Air, System; Dwg M556 Figure 4-3; Diesel oil and Miscellaneous Systems; Dwg M512-1 Sheets 1, 2, 3 and 4 APPENDICES Appendix 1; Safety-Related Control Valve Database Appendix 2; Safety-Related Control Valve Filter. Regulator, Database Appendix 3; Safety-Relayed Air. Accumulators
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1 REPORT SUHHARY 0 The Nuclear
" Instrument August 8, with the Regulatory Air 1988.
possible Commission The generic adverse impact of (NRC)
Supply System Problems Affecting letter was issued issued failures of to Generic address plant Letter instrument (GL)
Safety-Related Equipment" on 88-14, the NRC's concerns air systems on safety-related equipment. In accordance with the requirements of this generic letter, and the commitments made in the Supply System's letter to the NRC dated January 30, 1989, the following is a preliminary response to GL 88-14. As stated in the January letter, the submittal containing the final results of the air systems review will be made on April 14. The results of any'ir system tests which must wait until the spring outage, will be submitted on July 7.
This summary briefly describes the scope of work as required by GL 88-14, and the progress made to date. A detailed description is provided in the following sections.
The plant'instrument air systems have been evaluated to determine their criteria. Included in this evaluation were the Control Air System, Containment Instrument Air System, and each of the Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air Systems. A description of each of these systems and their performance criteria are presented herein.
All safety-related air actuators in the plant have been identified. The manufactures of these actuators were consulted in order to determine the components minimum air quality requirements. From these minimum air quality requirements, instrument air quality test criteria were developed. Air quality tests are currently being performed and the results of these tests and recommendations for additional tests will be presented in the final submittal.
The normal operating position, fail-safe position and fail-safe function of the tion is presented herein. The fail-safe position 'f safety-related actuators identified above have been determined. This informa-each of these valves is currently being evaluated to assure that the as-built fail-safe position reflects the design intent. The results of this evaluation will be presented in the final submittal.
The air supply to safety-related actuators has been reviewed (by drawing review or walkdown) to determine which have in-line filters. Hanufacturers have been contacted to determine the performance of these filters. This information is presented herein.
All of the safety-related instrument air accumulators have been identified. The majority of these accumulators have been evaluated to determine their safety function, verified that they were sized for the worst case event, and reviewed to determine the type of check valve included in the design. The evaluation of" these accumulators is included herein. The evaluations for the remaining accumulators will be included in a later submittal.
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Last, a criteria for evaluating the plant operating, maintenance and testing procedures has been developed and is included herein. All of the plant operating, maintenance and testing procedures have been identified. A database of these procedures is included herein. These procedures are currently being evaluated. The results of this evaluation will be included in a later submittal.
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2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION The following is a historical description of the NRC's air systems concerns.
This description does not include all NRC published documents on the subject, however it does cover the more important ones. Following this historical description is a detailed summary of Generic Letter 88-14 emphasizing the recommendations described therein.
- 2. 1 History of NRC Air Systems Concerns The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Information Notice (IN) 87-28, "Air Systems Problems at U.S. Light Water Reactors," on June 22, 1987. The notice was issued to alert licensees to potentially significant problems associated with air system failures. The notice referenced a study, AEOD/C701 "Case Study Report, Air System Problems at U.S. Light Water Reactors", that was issued by the NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data. The study provided a comprehensive review and evaluation of the potential safety implication associated with air system problems. Information Notice 87-28 indicated that the majority of the problems discussed in AEOD/C701 were traceable to air system design and/or maintenance deficiencies.
Supplement 1 to NRC IN 87-28 was issued to transmit a copy of NUREG-1275, Volume II "Operating Experience Feedback Report - Air System Problems." In addition, the Supplement requested recipients to review NUREG-1275, Volume 2 for appli-cability and consider actions as appropriate.
NUREG 1275, Volume 2, published in December 1987, essentially reiterated the findings of the AEOD/C701 Study, with the addition of three safety significant events which had occurred in the interim. The NUREG analyzed operating data from a number of safety significant events, focusing upon the degraded air systems, and the vulnerability of safety-related equipment to common mode failures associated with air systems. As a result of this analysis, the following five recommendations were developed:
- 1. Licensees should ensure that air system quality is consistent with equipment specifications and that it is periodically monitored and tested.
- 2. Anticipated transient and system recovery procedures and related training for loss of air systems should be reviewed for adequacy and revised as necessary.
- 3. Plant staff should be trained regarding the importance of air systems.
- 4. The adequacy of safety-related back-up air accumulators for safety-related equipment should be verified.
- 5. All operating plants should be required to perform gradual loss of instrument air system pressure tests.
4 In May of 1988. the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) issued Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) 88-1, " Instrument Air System Failures", SOER 88-1 evaluated many of the safety significant events identi<fied in NUREG 1275 Volume 2.
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When the NRC Staff made their presentation to the Committee to Review Generic Requirements concerning the issue of Generic Letter 88-14 (proposed), the staff regarded recommendation 5 of NUREG 1275, Volume II (the gradual loss of air test) to be a new requirement that needed further justification (cost/benefit).
A NUHARC letter dated November 8, 1988 provides additional details concerning the NRC presentation.
2.2 Summary of Generic Letter 88-14 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Generic Letter 88-14, " Instrument Air Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment" on August 8, 1988. The generic letter was issued to address the NRC's concerns with the possible adverse impact of failures of plant instrument air systems on safety-related equipment.
In the generic letter, the NRC requests that each licensee review NUREG 1275, Volume 2 and perform a design and operations verification of plant instrument air systems. Specifically, this design and operations verification should include:
- 1. VeriFication by test that actual Instrument Air quality is consistent with manufacturers'ecommendations for individual components served.
- 2. Verification that maintenance practices, emergency procedures and training are adequate to ensure that safety-related equipment will function as intended on loss of instrument air.
Verify that the design of the entire instrument air system is in accordance with its intended function, including verification by test that air-operated safety-related components will perform as expected in accordance with all design-basis events including the loss of the normal instrument air system.
The actions requested in Generic Letter 88-14 closely parallel the recommenda-tions included in NUREG 1275, Volume 2. However, the gradual loss of air test (NUREG 1275, Volume 2, Recommendation 5) is not explicitly included in the generic letter.
In addition to the requirements delineated above, the licensee should:
- 1. Provide a discussion of their program for maintaining proper instrument air quality.
- 2. Identify components that cannot accomplish their intended function and state the corrective action taken or the corrective action scheduled to be taken and identify the components in the response to the Generic Letter.
- 3. Prepare a letter to the NRC describing the actions taken in response to this generic letter.
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3 DESCRIPTION OF ACTION TAKEN In response to Generic Letter 88-14, Washington Public Power Supply System (WNP-
- 2) has undertaken the following actions to verify that the design, construction and maintenance of the instrument air systems at WNP-2 is in accordance with the recommendations presented therein:
The equipment number, the equipment name, the supplier name and model number of all safety-related air actuators have been tabulated in a database.
- 2. The manufacturers of the components tabulated above have been consulted to determine the required instrument air quality for the supplied components.
This information has been identified in the database.
- 3. The failure position of each of the air users tabulated above have been determined from the applicable system documentation and are identified in the database.
Upstream components (such as filter/regulators and solenoid valves) associated with each safety-related actuator, along with their manufacturers and model numbers have been identified. The manufactures have been consulted to determine the performance characteristics. This information has also been added to the database.
- 5. All the safety-related instrument air accumulators have been identified and tabulated in a separate database. This database includes:
- a. The accumulator equipment number and equipment name.
- b. The equipment number of the associated valve actuator.
- c. The check valve type, manufacture and model number.
- d. The accumulator size and the sizing design basis ,(i.e., sizing calculation', General Electric documentation).
- 6. The design air quality performance of each of the plant air systems has been documented based on manufacturer data for the installed equipment.
The following air systems are included in the evaluation:
- a. The Control Air System (CAS)
- b. The Containment Instrument Air System (CIA)
- c. The Diesel Generator Starting Air Systems (DSA)
The plant service air system does not serve any safety-related equipment.
Therefore; it is not included in this evaluation.
- 7. A procedure was developed to test the air quality of each of the systems defined above. The air quality test criteria was based on the air quality requirements of the actuators and associated components. Air quality tests will be performed at key points in each system. The initial tests will be PAGE 5
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completed and the results will be included in the final report. The frequency of additional testing will be established once the initial test data has been evaluated.
- 8. The operation of all safety-related actuators will be verified to ensure that they fail to their fail safe positions upon a loss of instrument air.
This verification will be done by one of the following methods:
- a. The preoperational test reports will be reviewed to assure that during startup each applicable valve actuator was subjected to a loss of air test.
- b. Any valve actuators that were not tested during startup will be tested.
- c. All system design changes will be reviewed to establish the associated impact on . the failure position of the applicable valves. Any valve actuators impacted by design changes after the preoperational tests will be retested.
- d. Valves which are not required to change position on loss of air will not be tested.
- 9. The plant operating, maintenance and training procedures will be reviewed to assure that they are responsive to the design and installation characteristic of each of the instrument air systems.
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4 DESCRIPTION OF AIR SYSTEMS
- 4. 1 Control and Service Air Systems The Control and Service Air Systems (CAS & SA) function to supply control and service air at appropriate flowrates and pressures. The systems consist of two distribution systems and common air compressors, air dryers, filters and receivers. The system flow diagram is presented in Figure 4-1. The description centers on the Control Air System, as Generic Letter 88-14 does not address Service Air Systems.
The CAS is designed to supply clean, dry, oil free compressed air to station instrumentation, controls, and various remote accumulators for valve actuators.
The system is not safety-related but is designed to provide uninterruptable service during normal plant operation.
Control air is supplied by three electric driven, oil free, reciprocating compressors;.CAS-C-1A ,B & C. The compressors are packaged units complete with water-cooled intercoolers, aftercoolers and cylinder jackets. The three compressors discharge into a common header which in turn supplies air to three receivers, CAS-AR-IA, B & C. The receivers serve two functions; to dampen the pulsation inherent in reciprocating compressors, and to store a supply of compressed air adequate to prevent the compressors from cycling on and off at an unacceptable rate.
In the event of a loss of offsite power, compressor 1A and 1B and their associated cooling water system can be powered from the emergency diesel generators. Compressor 1C can not be powered from the generators.
The receivers discharge to a header which is common to the SA and CAS distribu-tion systems. Control air then passes through prefilters, CAS-F-2A & B, dual tower desiccant dryer CAS-DY-1A & B, and afterfilters, GAS-F-3A & B, before being distributed to the different control air users throughout the plant. In the event of low CAS pressure downstream of the drying towers, a bypass valve CAS-PCV-1 will automatically open allowing instrument air to .bypass the dryer towers.
A fourth compressor, SA-C-1, was recently installed in the southwest corner of the 467 foot elevation of the radwaste building. This new compressor is a single stage rotary screw compressor complete with aftercooler and controls. The compressor discharges into a new refrigerated air filter-dryer and a new receiver before discharging into the radwaste building service air header.
Design data for the SA and CAS equipment described above is provided in Table 4-1.
Control valve SA-PCV-2 is located in the common section of distribution piping downstream of receivers CAS-AR-1A, B & C. This control valve functions to isolate the flow of air from compressors CAS-C-IA, 1B, and 1C to the service air header whenever the pressure in the control air system falls below 80 psig. The new service air compressor SA-C-1, will normally supply air to the CAS through this intertie. However, if the intertie isolates, this ,new compressor will supply the service air header only.
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The CAS distribution piping is routed throughout the main power block and to a number of the outlying buildings to serve some safety-related and non-safety-related air users as required. In addition to serving these users, the CAS also serves as a source of purge air for the Containment Instrument Air System during plant shutdown.
The distribution system is constructed of carbon steel pipe and fittings. All safety related take-off connections are piped off the top of the header to minimize the carry over of any entrained moisture or particulate matter. In addition, the majority of the safety-related air users are equipped with filter regulator sets to filter out any foreign material and thereby assuring proper valve operation.
4.2 Containment Instrument Air System The Containment Instrument Air (CIA) System functions to supply compressed nitrogen to all the gas operated components inside the primary containment vessel. The system is primarily a pressurized nitrogen system as shown in Figure 4-2. During normal operation the Containment Nitrogen (CN) System supplies pressurized nitrogen from an 11,000 gallon (1 million standard cubic feet) cryogenic storage tank as required to meet the requirements of the following valves inside the primary containment vessel:
Full supply pressure (150 psig) loads:
o The seven dedicated accumulators to support the Automatic Depressuriza-tion System (ADS) Mode of seven specific Hain Steam Safety/Relief Valves (MSRVs).
Reduced pressure (100 psig) loads:
o The four accumulators associated with the inboard Hain Steam Isolation Valves (HSIVs).
o The eighteen HSRVs associated with the power assisted pressure relief mode actuators.
o The two Reactor Recirculation Cooling (RRC) pump seal staging drain valve pilot control valves.
In the event that the cryogenic system should fail, the seven accumulators associated with the ADS HSRVs are automatically isolated from the reduced pressure loads and supplied by two backup high pressure nitrogen cylinder banks.
A bank of 15 cylinders supplies three of the ADS accumulators, and a separate set of 19 cylinders supply the other four ADS accumulators. These backup cylinders automatically provide 30-day supply of nitrogen for ADS function during a postulated LOCA.
An intertie with the CAS system is provided to supply the remaining reduced pressure CIA loads in the event that the cryogenic system should fail ,This manually initiated intertie is also used to purge the CIA system during plant shutdown. The CAS intertie consists of two 100 percent capacity prefilters, a dual tower desiccant type dryer, two 100 percent capacity after filters, and an air receiver.
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The design criteria for the CIA system components described above is presented in Table 4-2.
The CIA distribution system is constructed of carbon steel pipe and fittings.
Accumulators equipped with soft seat, spring loaded check valves, are located adjacent to the loads served in containment. All piping and accumulators downstream of the accumulator check valves are stainless steel. All piping inside containment is guality Class I and Seismic Class,l.
4.3 Emergency Diesel Starting Air Systems The standby power systems at WNP-2 consist of 3 diesel generator sets. Two sets consist of 2 diesel engines driving a common generator. The third set, serving the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system, consists of a single diesel engine driving a generator. The systems are shown schematically in Figure 4-3.
Each of the five diesel engines is equipped with an independent, redundant starting air system. The starting air systems function to compress, filter, dry and store a sufficient volume of air, at a sufficient pressure, for a minimum of five engine start attempts, assuming a single failure in one starting air train.
In addition, each starting air system provides air to the safety-related actuators identified in Appendix l.
Each divisional starting air system consists of two redundant reciprocating compressors which draw air from within the diesel generator room. One compressor is motor driven, and the second is motor driven with a diesel engine backup. The compressors discharge into a common header. The compressed air then passes through a prefilter and a dryer. The dry filtered air is then distributed through two independent headers to two banks of four air receivers.
Each bank of air receivers has sufficient storage capacity for a minimum of five diesel engine starting attempts. Each bank of receivers serves two of the four air start motors on each engine. The receivers also serve the actuators and controls described above.
The HPCS diesel generator starting air system is identical to the one described above with the following exceptions:
- a. The system includes two receivers. Each receiver stores a sufficient volume of air for three diesel start attempts.
- b. The redundant compressor is engine driven only.
- c. The distribution piping consists of a single header.
The design data for the Diesel Generator Starting Air System components described above is presented in Table 4-3.
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5 SAFETY-RELATED'IR OPERATED CONTROL VALVES AND ACCUMULATORS
- 5. 1 Air Operated Control Valves Appendix 1, Safety-Related Control Valve Database, is a database of all the safety-related air operated actuators served by the plant instrument air systems. This database was developed as a tool to accomplish the following tasks:
To summarize the normal (operating) position, identify the .fail-safe position of each of the safety-related actuators and to verify that the failure positions are consistent with the original design intentions.
- 2. To determine the air quality requirements (i.e. particulate, moisture and hydrocarbons) of the different safety-related users.
- 3. To determine which safety-related air users require upstream in-line filters to assure reliable operation.
- 4. To determine the air quality test criteria for the air systems.
- 5. To determine the locations in the air distribution systems where air quality tests should be performed.
To this end, the database includes the following information:
The component identification number.
A brief description of the component and its intended function.
- 3. The components location on an applicable flow diagram.
- 4. The actuators normal operating position, its fail safe position, and a description of its safety function.
- 5. The air quality requirements (i.e. particulate size, humidity and hydrocarbon) in accordance with the manufactures'ecommendations.
- 6. The supplier purchase order number and the applicable vendor print number.
- 7. Any comments required to clarify the information described above. These comments are included in the back of the appendix.
From the information gathered in the process of developing this database, the following conclusions were reached:
- l. All of the safety-related which provides the highest degree built failure positions are being of plant safety. 't actuators are designed to fail to the position this time the as-verified. As described in Section ~3 of this report, this verification is being done in the following ways:
- a. The preoperational test reports are being reviewed to assure that during startup each applicable valve actuator was subjected to a loss of air test.
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- b. Any valve actuators that were not tested during startup are currently being tested or will be tested during the next scheduled outage.
- C. All system design changes are being reviewed to establish the associated impact on the failure position of the applicable valves.
Any valve actuators impacted by design changes after the preopera-tional tests are currently being retested or will be retested during the next scheduled outage to verify that the actual failure position reflects the current fail safe design philosophy.
- d. Valves which are not required to change position on loss of air will not be tested.
- 2. The air quality requirements for all of the plant safety-related air actuators have been determined. Based on this information the air quality test requirements discussed in Section 6 were developed. As described below, the air supplies to air actuators which have more stringent air quality requirements than the air quality test criteria requirements have been checked to see that they have an in-line filter to assure proper air quality.
- 3. As presented in Section 6, different air quality test locations have been identified based on the air quality requirements of the specific actuators and their intended safety function.
Appendix 2, Safety-Related Control Valve Filter Regulator Database, is also a database of the safety-related actuato} s along. with a description of the associated in-line filters. This database was developed to accomplish the following:
- 1. To identify the actuators which have in-line filters (or in-line filter/
regulators) installed in the instrument air supply lines.
- 2. To summarize the performance characteristics of each of these filter/
regulators and compare these characteristic to the air quality requirements of the associated actuators.
- 3. To determine which actuators require in-line filters on the supply air line and identify those actuators that may need in-line filters with higher particulate removal efficiencies.
Like the database presented in Appendix 1, this data base includes the component identification number, a brief description of the component and its intended function, the components location on the applicable flow diagram, and the actuator air quality requirements (i.e., particulate size, humidity and hydrocarbon) in accordance with the manufactures'ecommendations. In addition to these items, this database also includes the filter/regulator manufacture and model number, if one exists, the filter's removal efficiency, and any comments required to clarify the information described above. These comments are included in the back of the appendix.
From the information gathered in the process of developing this database, the following conclusions were reached. These conclusions are based on the PAGE 11
I J assumptions that the quality of the" air supplied by the plant instrument air systems is within the boundaries of the test criteria presented in Section 6.
- 1. Only those valves whose air quality requirements are more stringent than the test criteria need filter/regulators. There are a number of valves that have filter/regulators, even though they are not technically required (i.e., the valve's maximum allowable particulate size is 40 microns or greater).
- 2. The following actuator s are currently being walked down to verify the existence of a filter/regulator:
02-SW-AO-214 Diesel Cooling Water Supply 02-SW-AO-215 Diesel Cooling Water Supply 02-SW-AO-216 Diesel Cooling Water Supply 02-SW-AO-217 Diesel Cooling Mater Supply 02-FPC-AO-1 Fuel Pool Flow Control
- 3. In-line filters are required on the air supply to the following actuators to assure adequate air quality:
None at this time. To be reaccessed once the valves listed above have been walked down.
The in-line filter/regulator on the air supply to the following actuators removes particles 40 microns and larger. Currently, the actuators require air with a maximum particulate size of 35 microns. To date there have been no problems with valve operators. The valves and operators will be replaced within the next two years due to a design change associated with the leakage characteristics of the existing containment isolation valves.
The new operators will be designed in conformance with the upstream filter specification.
02-EDR-AO-19 Drywell Sump Drain 02-EDR-AO-20 Drywell Sump Drain 02-FDR-AO-3 Drywell Floor Drain 02-FDR-AO-4 Drywell Floor Drain 5.2 Accumulators This section will discuss the functional and design requirements of the safety-related air receivers, accumulators, bottles and associated check valves that are used in the WNP-2 design. The individual tanks and associated design data are listed in Appendix 3, Safety-Related Accumulators.
e 5.2. 1 Hain Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Accumulators PAGE 12
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lg
(Inboard and Outboard)
GE Specification 23A1886, Revision 0 requires that a pneumatic accumulator be located close to each HSIV to provide pneumatic pressure for the purpose of assisting in valve closure when isolation is desired or in the event of failure of the pneumatic supply pressure to the valve operator system.
GE Specification 23A1886 also requires that the accumulator volume be adequate to provide full stroking of the valve through one-half cycle (open to close) when gas supply to the accumulator has failed. The required accumulator volume of 35 gallons was determined by GE and specified in GE Data Sheet 23A1886AA, Revision 11.
I The check valves associated with each of the HSIV accumulators were provided to prevent leakage of gas out of the accumulator in the event of a pneumatic supply failure. The check valves. are required by design to have resilient seats, be spring loaded and provide "bubble tight" shut-off. Since redundant HSIVs are used on each line, the redundant means of effecting valve closure (i.e.,
pneumatic pressure or spring force) is intended to improve valve reliability, rather than accomplish a safety-related design function. Horeover, since HSIV isolation would follow a postulated loss of pneumatic pressure, postulated leakage through the check valves is a negligible consideration.
5.2.2 Hain Steam Relief Valve (HSRV) Accumulators GE Specification 23A1886 requires that a pneumatic accumulator, be provided for each HSRV for the "relief function. The relief function allows valve operation at pressures below the safety setpoint to minimize the number and frequency of challenges involving the HSRVs spring-loaded mode of operation. The required accumulator volume of 10 gallons was determined by GE and specified in GE Data Sheet 23A1886AA, Revision 11. The document states that for the relief function, a 10 gallon accumulator is required for *each valve to provide one actuation against normal drywell pressure with reactor pressure at approximately 1000 psig. The document further indicates that the function of the accumulators is to provide the surge capacity needed during the instantaneous opening of all HSRVs and closure of all (inboard) HSIVs in the air distribution header.
The check valves associated with each of the HSRV accumulators were provided to prevent leakage of gas out of the accumulator in the event of a pneumatic supply failure. The check valves are required by design to have resilient seats, be spring loaded and provide "bubble tight" shut-off. The check valves are not periodically leak rate tested because loss of gas pressure to the HSRV actuator does not preclude the valve's spring-loaded mode oper ation. The valves will still pop open when the valve inlet pressure force exceeds the spring force.
Horeover, since HSRV relief function would generally be 'required immediately following a postulated loss of pneumatic pressure, postulated leakage through the check valves is a negligible consideration.
5.2.3 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Accumulators GE Specification 23A1886 states that an additional pneumatic accumulator shall be provided for each HSRV used for automatic depressurization during an assumed loss-of-coolant accident condition. The accumulators allow the HSRVs to reduce the reactor pressure to the point where the residual heat removal and/or the low PAGE 13
WP 4
i
pressure core spray system can adequately cool the core. The required accumulator volume was determined by GE and specified in GE Data Sheet 23A1886AA, Revision 11. The document states that for the ADS function, a 42 gallon accumulator for each ADS valve is required to provide one actuation against maximum drywell pressure with reactor pressure a 0 psig. The document indicates that the function of the accumulators is to provide the surge capacity needed for the instantaneous opening of all the ADS valves on the same air distribution header.
Check valves are provided on the safety-related pneumatic line supplying the ADS accumulators. This prevents leakage of gas out of the accumulator in the event of a pneumatic supply failure. The check valve is seat leak tested as part of the ASME Pump and Valve Program. Postulated loss of the guality Class I pneumatic gas supply system, concurrent with the need to provide ADS valve operation, is not considered credible due to the multiple failures required and the separate CIA bottle racks and pneumatic piping.
5.2.4 Backup Nitrogen Cylinder Banks Once open, the ADS valves are not expected to be cycled during the post-accident period. However, a back-up gas supply has been provided to allow for extra cycles of operation if they are needed for alternate shutdown cooling.
The long-term gas demands of the ADS valves are provided by two backup nitrogen cylinder banks. A bank of 15 nitrogen cylinders supplies three of the ADS valves and a separate bank of 19 nitrogen cylinders supplies the other four ADS valves. These two subsystems provide a 30-day supply of nitrogen for the ADS function following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.
Calculations have been performed to show that all 7 ADS valves can be cycled, (closed-open) 14 times during the first 30 days after a loss of the normal gas supply source.
This conclusion is based on the following assumptions:
- 1. The 34 cylinders are charged to the minimum pressure of 2200 psig . (This is based on Technical Specification limits on allowable pressure in each cylinder).
- 2. A leakage rate of 1 SCFH per ADS.
- 3. An additional leakage rate of 1 SCFH per cylinder bank.
- 4. A requirement of 6.7 SCF per actuation (closed-open) against high drywell pressure coincident with zero reactor pressure.
The results of this calculation are documented in Supply Steam Calculation 5.46.05 and summarized in FSAR Section 9.3. 1. Periodic leak rate test are performed on each bank to confirm that system leakages are consistent ,with calculation assumptions.
5.2.5 Remote Nitrogen Bottle Station The extended-term gas demands of the ADS valves are provided by two remote PAGE 14
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nitrogen cylinder connections. The manual connection of nitrogen cylinders at these stations allows the ADS function to be maintained for at least 100 days following a postulated LOCA event.
Periodic leak rate tests on each Backup Nitrogen Cylinder Bank assure that system leakage will be consistent with the ability to provide replacement cylinders following an accident.
5.2.6 Reactor Outside Air (ROA) and Reactor Exhaust Air (REA) Accumulators These accumulators allow the associated reactor building isolation valves to open without excessive pressure fluctuations (drops) in the branch piping.
Although the associated isolation valves are safety-related, neither the accumulators nor the accumulator check valves have any safety-related function.
5.2.7 Containment Vacuum Breaker Accumulator Tank To be added later 5.2.8 Contaiment Vacuum Breaker Bottle Station To be added later 5.2.9 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Starting Air Receivers To be added later e 5.2.10 Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air Receivers To be added later PAGE 15
1 I
TESTING CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES A procedure for testing the air quality in each of the instrument air systems has been developed.
The air quality test criteria for each of the instrument air systems are presented in Table 6-1. The basis for these criteria is as follows:
Particulate Size The maximum allowable particulate size for the containment instrument air and control air systems, as stated in Table 6-1, was based on the air quality requirements for each of the safety-related air actuators. These requirements are presented in the Safety-Related Air Actuator Database (Appendix I). There are rare exceptions where the requirement for maximum particulate size is more restrictive than the test criteria. In these rare cases the air supply line has been examined to assure that a filter regulator, sized to provide the proper filtration, is installed upstream of the actuator.
larger The diesel starting air systems are designed to function on service air quality air. Therefore, no filtration is required. Yet, for conservatism, the starting air systems are equipped with in-line filters which are designed to remove all particles 1 micron and . As a check, the starting air systems will be tested to verify that particulate matter does not exceed 40 microns. This is the same criteria as that use'd for the Control Air System.
Dew oint Tem erature Humidit
--.The dewpoint is the compressed air temperature at which moisture in the compressed air would begin to condense and form water droplets. Compressed air dryers are usually rated by the dewpoint and air flowrate. Since the only moisture in the air system is that entrained in the ambient air before entering the compressor, the dewpoint measured at the dryer discharge would reflect the dewpoint temperature throughout the system. Therefore, the dewpoint test criteria for the control air system was based on the rated dryer performance.
The primary gas supply for the Containment Instrument Air System is the cryogenic liquid nitrogen tank. By definition, liquid nitrogen does not contain any moisture Therefore there should not be any moisture in the CIA, and for this reason, the CIA system is not tested for excess moisture.
The diesel starting air systems are designed to function with service air quality air. That is, air that is free of entrained moisture but not necessarily dried to a specified dewpoint. It is expected that any moisture entrained in the compressed air stream at the discharge of the compressor aftercoolers would settle out in the air receivers before being transported into the engine air start motors. For conservatism, the starting air systems are equipped with deliquescing type dryers which are capable of lowering the dewpoint by 30 degrees F. Based on'his e conservative design approach, the starting air systems do not require a moisture test.
PAGE 16
I
- 3. H drocarbon Contamination Hydrocarbons can be int roduced into a compressed air stream at the compressor. All of the compressors installed in the WNP-2 air systems are oil free. Therefore, no oil should be present in the compressed air piping. To verify this, the CAS air system will be tested for the presence of hydrocarbons in accordance with the criteria presented in ANSI Standard ISA-S7.3, "guality Standard for Instrument Air."
The air quality in each system will be tested at a number of key locations.
These locations will be selected to be close to the compressors, and to important safety-related actuators such as the ADS Valves, HSRV's, and the HSIV's.
The results of the testing effort are presented in the following section.
PAGE 17
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7 RESULTS OF TESTING This section will be completed once the air quality tests are completed.
PAGE 18
i1 8 EVALUATION OF APPLICABLE PLANT PROCEDURES e 8.1 Evaluation The Criteria plant operating, training and maintenance procedures are currently being reviewed for acceptability and completeness. The criteria developed to review these procedures and to assess the necessity for additional procedures are pre-sented in Table 8-1; Operating and Training Procedures Criteria, and Table 8-2; Maintenance/Testing Criteria.
A summary of the procedures review follows. This summary is divided into 3 sections; operating procedures, training procedures, and maintenance proce-dures. To date, each of these sections include the procedures which are being reviewed. The recommended changes to these procedures as a result of the review, and recommendations for the development of additional procedures required to address review criteria not currently covered by the existing procedures will be added once the evaluation is complete.
8.2 Operating Procedures The following operating procedures are being reviewed in accordance with the criteria presented in Table 8-1. Recommendations for change to the procedures and additional procedures, required so that operating procedures for the different plant air systems fully envelope the criteria presented in Table 8-1, will be added later.
Reviewed Procedures Procedure 4.8. 1. 1 Loss of Control Air Recommended Additional Procedures Recommendations for additional procedures will be added later.
8.3 Training Procedures The following training procedures are being reviewed in accordance with the criteria presented in Table 8-1. Recommendations for changes to procedures and additional procedures required for the different plant air systems, will be added later. The changes will be established on the basis of the guide criteria presented in Table 8-1.
,Reviewed Procedures Procedures reviewed will be added later Recommended Additional Procedures Recommendations for additional procedures will be added later.
8.4 Maintenance Procedures PAGE 19
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The following maintenance procedures are being reviewed in accordance with the criteria presented in Table 8-2. Recommendations for change to the procedures and additional procedures, required so that so that maintenance procedures for the different plant air systems fully envelope the criteria presented in Table 8-2, will be added later.
Reviewed Procedures Procedure 10. 1. 13 System Cleanliness Control Procedure 10.2.40 Installation/Hodification of Instrument and Process Tubing Procedure 10.2.55 Compressor Testing Procedure 10.2.56 Air Operated Valve Testing Procedure 10. 17. 1 Hain Steam Relief Valve Removal and Replacement Procedure 10. 17.6 Hain Steam Relief Valve Solenoid Replacement and Overhaul Procedure 10. 17.7 Hain Steam S/RV Actuator Rebuild Procedure 10.20. 10 Diesel Air Start Hotor Haintenance Procedure 10.23.5 Heating and Ventilation Damper Testing Procedure 10.24. 121 PH Cal/Test - Fisher Hodel 4160 Controller Procedure 10.24. 122 PH Cal/Test - Fisher Valve Positioner Hodel 3580 Procedure 10.24. 159 PH Cal/Test - Fisher Valve Positioner Hodel 3570 Recommended Additional Procedures Recommendations for additional procedures will be added later.
PAGE 20
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9 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION e Once areas:
I.
all work has been completed, Additional air quality testing recommendations and will be made the frequency of such tests.
in the following
- 2. Modifications (if required) to the air systems to assure adequate air quality.
- 3. Changes to plant operating, maintenance and training procedures as required to assure proper system operation.
PAGE 21
TABLE 4-1 CONTROL AIR AND SERVICE AIR DESIGN DATA Service Control Air, S stem Compressors:
Equipment Numbers CAS-C-1A CAS"C-1B CAS-C-1C Type 2 Stage Reciprocating Design Flowrate 450 scfm Design Pressure 125 psig Hosepower, 100 hp Receivers:
Equipment Numbers CAS-AR-1A CAS-AR-1B CAS-AR"1C Volume 96 ft Filters:
Prefilters:
Equipment Numbers CAS-F-2A CAS-F-28 Type Note 1 Filter, Area 9 ft Removal Rate 9 microns Removal Efficiency 99.9+5 After,filter,:
Equipment Numbers CAS-F-3A CAS-F-3B Type Removal Cartridge Filter, Area 8 ft Removal Rate 9 microns Removal Efficiency 99.9+%
Dryer,s:
Equipment Numbers CAS-DY-1A CAS" DY-1B Type . Regenerative Desiccant Design Flowrate 750 scfm Dew Point Rating -40 degrees
I TABLE 4-1 (con't)
CONTROL AIR AND SERVICE AIR DESIGN DATA Service Air S stem:
Compressors:
Equipment Numbers SA-C-1 Type Single Stage Helical Design Flowrate 620 scfm Design Pressure 100 psig Horsepower 125 hp Receivers:
Equipment Numbers SA-AR-1 Volume 140 ft3 Filters:
Equipment Number SA-F-1 First Stage:
Type Coal escing Fil ter/
Separator Removal Rate .3 microns Removal Efficency 99.9+ %
Second Stage:
Type Coalescing Filter Removal Rate .Ol microns Removal Efficency 99.9+ %
Dryers:
Equipment Numbers SA-DY-I Type Refrigerant Design Flowrate 750 scfm Dew Point Rating 40 degrees F Notes: 1. Prefilters are combination moisture separator with removable cartridges.
/ filters
TABLE 4-2 CONTAINMENT INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM DESIGN DATA Containment Instrument Air. S stem Cryogenic Tank:
Equipment Number, CN-TK-1 Tank Size 11,000 Gallons Storage Capacity 1,000,000 Std. Ft Fluid Liquid Nitrogen Pur,.i ty 99.99+5
/
Backup Storage Bottles:
Equipment Numbers CIA-TK-1A through 15A t
CIA-TK-1B thr ough 19B Storage Capacity 223 Std. Ft Fluid Compressed Ni trogen Purity 99.99+5, Filters:
0 Prefilters:
Equipment Numbers Type CIA-F"1A CIA-F-1B (to be submitted later)
Filter Area Removal Rate microns Removal Efficiency After,filter,:
Equipment Numbers CIA-F-2A CIA-F-2B Type (to be submitted later.)
Filter Area Removal Rate microns Removal Efficiency Dryer,s:
Equipment Numbers CIA-DY"1A CIA-DY-1B Type Regenerative Desiccant Desi gn Fl owrate 50 scfm Dew Point Rating -40 degree F Receivers:
Equipment Numbers CAS-AR-1A Yolume 34 ft
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TABLE 4-3 DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING AIR SYSTEMS DESIGN DATA Startin Air S stems:
Compressors:
Equipment Numbers DSA-C-1A1 DSA"C-1B1 DSA-C-2A1 DSA"C-281 DSA-C-1C TYpe Two Stage Reciprocating Motor. Driven Design Flowrate 42 acfm Design Pressure 250 psig Horsepower 15 hp Equipment Numbers DSA-C" 1A2 DSA-C-1B2 DSA-C-2A2 DSA-C"2B2 DSA"C-2C TYpe Two Stage Reciprocating Motor/Engine Driven Design Flowrate 42 acfm Design Pressure 250 psig Horsepower. (Motor) 15 hp (Note 1)
(Engine) 13.5 to 20 bhp Filter:
Equipment Numbers DSA"F-1A2 DSA-F-182 DSA-F-2A2 DSA"F-282 DSA"F"1C Type (To be submitted later)
Desi gn Fl ow Rate 46 scfm Design Pressure Drop 2 psl Particle Removal Rate 1 micron Removal Efficiency 100 percent Aerosol Removal Rate .04 microns Removal Efficiency 95 percent
I t,4~
TABLE 4-3 (Con't)
DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING AIR SYSTEMS DESIGN DATA Dryer:
Equipment Numbers DSA-DY-1A2 DSA"DY-1B2 DSA-DY"2A2 DSA-DY-2B2 DSA-DY"1C Type Coalescing Filter.
Design Flowrate 46 scfm Dew Point Suppression 30 degrees F NOTES:
- 1. The redundant air compressor for the HPCS diesel generator, starting air, system is engine driven only.
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TABLE 6-1 EQUALITY AIR TEST CRITERIA Naximum Naximum Particulate Naximum Hydrocarbon Instrument Size Dewpoint Content Air'ystem (microns) (degrees F) (PPN)
Control Air System 40 -40 Containment Instrument 40 NA Air System Diesel Generator 40 Starting Air Systems
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TABLE 8-1 OPERATING AND TRAINING PROCEDURES CRITERIA 0 eratin Procedures Criteria The following criteria are based on the recommendations contained in INPO SOER 88-1, Instrument Air System Failures, and EPRI document NSAC-128, Pneumatic Systems and Nuclear Plant Safety. After reviewing these documents it was determined that, as a minimum, the operating and training procedure addressing the loss and restoration of instrument air should address the following considerations:
- 1. Shall be "staged" so that specific operator actions are to be taken at various air supply header pressure (i.e. when the pressure drops to x psi, the operator should initiate actions a, b, & c).
- 2. Have a list describing the symptoms associated with the various loss-of-air scenarios (e.g., dryer purge open, turbine header broken).
,3. Identify the location of main air line isolation valves and the portions of the system affected by their closure.
0 Contain the stability
'a ~ Manual following types when air is lost:
reactor decreasing of activities trip or verification of air pressure.
intended automatic to achieve trip at a plant specific
- b. Verification of plant stability.
- c. Location, detection, and isolation of branch line failures.
- d. Preservation of air pressure to critical components by isolating various usage paths.
- e. Shutdown of operating components (using air) if their continued use could cause equipment damage and/or difficulty with core cooling or steam generator heat removal.
- f. Corrections for containment isolation effects.
- g. Corrections for failures that could permit radioactive release (i.e.
gaseous waste).
- 5. Instructions for starting and aligning all available air compressors should be clearly defined.
J J yP 1
TABLE 8-1 (con't)
OPERATING AND TRAINING PROCEDURES CRITERIA
- 6. List and identify all air-operated valves and their expected failure position (identifying the effects of bottled air supplies) and at which pressure movement to the failure position occurs.
- 7. List all pneumatic instrumentation and its expected failure indication or control output.
- 8. Include instructions on how to recover from a partial and/or total loss of instrument air. Equipment that could lock up should be identified along with the method for restoration. If a transient can be created by restoration, the procedure should advise the operator.
Trainin Procedures Criteria Operators and plant personnel will be trained for the various loss of air scenarios. Attention will be placed on identifying the symptoms of loss of air, locating isolation valves to minimize the systems lost, and knowing the failure positions of key valves associated with decay heat removal.
Plant personnel will be trained on the importance of the instrument air system, why its use for tools is prohibited, and the necessity of immediately reporting air system damage.
- 3. A "Loss of Instrument Air" simulator scenario is included as a portion of regularly scheduled Licensed Operator Requalification Training on an annual basis.
p TABLE 8"2 MAINTENANCE/TESTING CRITERIA COMPONENT TESTING SUGGESTED PERIODICITY Control Air, System Dew point verification in accor,- Weekly Dryer, Outlet dance with ASN I/ISA-S7.3-1975.
Control Air, System Particulate and hydrocarbon quarterly Dryer, Outlet content verification in accor,-
dance with ANSI/ISA-S7.3-1975.
CAS Dryer 8 Associated Perform regular, maintenance and Per vendor recommendations Filters desiccant replacement and operating history.
Service Air, System Inspect contaminant indicator. for Weekly (Particulate and signs of compressor, lubricant Coalescent Filter Outlet)
Safety-Rel ated and Particulate verification to main- To be established based Random Remotely tain air, quality within specifi- on evaluation of initial Located Component cations of equipment/component plant air, quality tests Locations (CAS, vendors. (See Table 6.1).
CIA 8r DSA)
Water inspection/draining. To be established based Inspection of condensate trap on history of water, operation. accumulation, season, and operating history.
Service 8 Control Air, General compressor, performance ()uarterly Compressor, trending (vibration, etc.)
CAS Backup Compr essors Sequencer, checkout 8 general quarterly Startup 8 Run/Load compressor, performance for trending (vibration, etc.)
CAS Compressor, Protec- Verify setpoint for, equipment Refueling tive Trips/System protection to ensure protection Alarms trips do not inadvertently shutdown the system.
Bottled Air Reservoirs Integrity and pressure holding Alternate refueling periods.
ability.
TABLE 8-2 (Con't)
MAINTENANCE/TESTING CRITERIA Piping 8 Drains Leakage walkdown 8 inspection. To be established based Hater accumulation 8 blowdown. on operating history 8 dryer performance.
Safety-Related Verify capability of performing Refueling Receivers, Accumu- intended function on loss of air .
lators 8 Associated Check Valves.
Satellite Filters Particulate verification. To be established based Pressure drop/accumulation. on history and delta-P.
Assess contaminant level in system and replace in-line filters if required.
(Appendix 2).
Backup Cross- Verify that all interties down- Heekly connections to Service stream of the dryers are Air 8 Other Air, normally closed.
Sources (CAS 8 CIA)
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APPENDIX I SAFETY-RELATED CONTROL VALVE DATABASE
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t,
APPENDIX 1 Conponent ID Ho.
Conponent Dug.
Loc Homal Position Fail Safe Position Fail Safe Fnnctncn ttaxinun Allou Part Size plicrcgn n ttaxinun Allow Hoisture Du Pt}
Haxinun Allow Oil Content Supplier CUI Ho. Connents 02-SU-AO-214 <<>> DIESEL COOLIHG H-14 CLOSED OPEN SERVICE FREE OF NO SPCFD C630 (15)
UTR SUPPLY HE AIR LIQ HTR L IHITS 02-SM-AO-215 >> DIESEL COOLING H-2 CLOSED OPEH SERVICE FREE OF HO SPCFD LIIIITS C630 (15) llTR SUPPLY HE AIR LIQ llTR 02-Sll-AO-216 <<>> DIESEL COOLING H-14 CLOSED OPEN E SERUICE FREE OF NO SPCFD C630 (15)
UTR SUPPLY HE AIR LIQ l)l'R LIHITS 02-SU-AO-21? <<>> DIESEL COOLIHG N-1 CLOSED OPEN E SERVICE FREE OF HO SPCFD C630 (15)
UTR SUPPLY NE AIR LIQ llTR L IHITS nVSTEtl: ..nnin: ii'.,'i; ." -'-:n~'n".ii-.ncr ..-:!.:n,.".:;"-nc!~nLBf Dl~nCRSI: ii B- IIMXIIB'.E'6:."."n.. -:.cci;..i'ir '.-::,:"
02-RCIC-AO-4 RCIC COHD PUIP B-10 OPEN CLOSED S, R 40 tl0 SPCFD H-322 02-68-00-30 (2).(3)
DISCH TO DRH NE LIHITS 02-RCIC"AO-5 RCIC COND PUtlP B-10 CLOSED CLOSED S, R HO SPCFD tl-322 02-68-00-30 (2).(3)
DISCH TO DRH HD LIIIITS 1 02-RCIC-PCU-15 RCIC PUttP DISCll F-10 ttODLT'D OPEN CLEAtl DRY OIL FREE F-130 02-42A-01,13 (10)
TO LUBE OIL CLR 02-RCIC-AO-25 RCIC DRAItl POT OPEH CLOSED S, R HO SPCFD tl-322 02-68-00-30 (2)n(3)
TO lOl COHD ISOL HE LIHITS 1 02-RCIC-A0-26 RCIC DRAIH POT D-9 OPEH CLOSED S ~ R 40 HO SPCFD HA H-322 02-68-00-30 (2).(3)
TO llN COHD ISOL HE LIHITS 1 02-RCIC-AO-54 RCIC DRAIH POT CLOSED CLOSED HD SPCFD H-322 02-68-00-30 (2).(3)
ST BYPASS HD LI HITS 1 02-RCIC-AO-65 OUTBOARD RCIC H-6 (1? )
llEAD SPRAY VALVE 02"RCIC-AO-66 INBOARD RCIC J"4 ( I?)
HEAD SPRAY VALUE PAGE I
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1tk
APPENDIX 1 flax aun Hax nun Allou Part Allou Haxiaua Coaponent Conponent Dug. Horaal Fail Safe Fail Safe Size Hoisture Allou Oil CUI ID Ho. Descri tion Loc Position Position Function Iticron Du Pt Content Su lier Ho. Coaaents isYYf~!PcsHD'1C'csfz!un>T~M4~,o,'.x>>>"..-'r w;. "aww~ ~'> LDTIFDIAG A 0 '-:A~</!~A:='-c'..<~v?6':mi&smxr$'pA~>Y."a wJ i>> 03; 'i~ ocr w~i*aaligk<w~~~uw&<~~.Q:
02-NPCS-AO-5 HPCS INJECTIOH H-10 (17)
TO RPU 02-LPCS-AO-6 LPCS IHJECTIOH H-7 (17)
TO RPU SfN"; RR3tu@~XiVPZVi~WA~"'inffh".~~l9~~3!0 - lN~>Yi ~'.W~'N>"~",4": 0 '. AGRA 'I~< 214 i 'n'a"n&+i~r-F~kn~.~i'i":"i i.~u M..)A'4VRX';lA:3!X"-Z~~~~.ai~~=",Afd~4~@Pig'i'jT<.
02-RNR-AO"41A LPCI PATII G-6 (17)
TO RPU 02-RIIR-AO-50A RIIR SHUTDOllN F-7 (17)
COOLING RETURH fsYsTE "aR Rw~.> 4'!PM~@~r!ii;+d~w~~l+w>'-'--."Air.r r "'fM'Aw lf975TAGCIA~iR 5~1)'s I 02i 0 0 " >I".w4:~ ~~3 ~vc'.~P"~I:o~tw~r! '-.4> '-.rr~P!P=ief >>rrÃr!ifÃm .'>R~N!PkuH- @&i@
02-RHR-AO-41B LPCI PATH H"12 (17)
TO RPU 02-BHR-AO-41C LPCI PATH D-11 (17)
TO RPU 02-RHR-AO-50B RHR SIIUTDOIN F-12 (17)
COOLING RETURN 02-BNR-AO-89 SERUICE QTR J-10 (17)
IHTERT IE SVsM~~P. I; CtlatiKVXLfAAP~~;-=-..=!.~=. D=~e-".~~~~- Lo:0 BA:e 2 -: v 0 .-
w .e.~~".-~-.~~:;e ~~II-."-*'~~~~=-~~an, ~i =.*~=.~I.~+;v..-:.~ =-1~'>.>>.~i~p, 02-FPC-AO-1 FUEL POOL FLOQ C-9 IIODLT'D OPEN C CLEAN DRY OIL FREE F130 (1 0)
COHTOBL HD PAGE 2
S APPENDIX 1 Hax nun Hax nun Allow Part Allow Haxinun Conponent Conponent Dwg. Homal Fail Safe Fail Safe Size Hoisture Allow Oil CUI ID Ho. Descri tion Loc Position Position Function (Nicron Dw Pt Content Supplier Ho. Connents CO~HRG&:MD Olf ~~~":1='~'f L'0 j IAGRA .n'28'MSIOH: '.+>~vK~~o<4~M<H":<~wMP'~ & '~".!ci."ih*~"l's~>'+>-n "v~~'%4~ ~"-6s salmi".i:
02-CRD-AO-10 SDU VENT K-6 OPEH CLOSED F 50 20 DEG.F. OIL FREE I 208 HE 9 100 PSIG 02-CRD-AO-11 SDU DRAIH F-6 OP EH CLOSED 20 DEG.F OIL FREE I 208 HE 9 100 PSIG 02-CRD-AO-180 SDV VENT K-6 OP EH CLOSED 20 DEC.F OIL FREE 1208 HE 9 100 PSIG 02-CRD-AO-181 SDU DRAIN F-6 OPEN CLOSED F 50 20 DEG.F OIL FREE I208 HE 9 100 PSIC 02-CRD-U-126 SCRAH CHG UALUE C-4 CLOSED OPEH 20 DEG.F OIL FREE (16)
(HCU TYP OF 185) HE 9 100 PSIG 02-CRD-U-127 SCRAH DSCRG ULU C-3 CLOSED OPEH 10 20 DEG.F OIL FREE (16)
(KCU TVP OF 185) HE 9 100 PSIG v I 'eiHOcL'AAv80 Re-;3 I i T ".h=..<ac~~v@&iMp".m '0 '~D G Af e:f822 vR Is 0 i i . Fa >wA~oim ."u.".~":a 6,"'"..;>x>M~)ri"'x'Yx~~xrTK~'r>>s~ao.=a)'i<",:>pi}.e".~.n."w<~."~
02-IIS-AO "1A > STEAN LIHE A F-11 CLOSED CLOSED 50 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE C710 02-02822-08, (822-F013J) NSRU HD 9 0 PSIG 7~ 2 02-ltS-AO "18 > STEAN LIHE 8 0-11 CLOSED CLOSED H 50 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE C710 02-02822-08, (822-F013E) NSRU HD 9 0 PSIG 7~ 2 02-N"RO-1C > STERN LIHE C CLOSED CLOSED 50 "24 DEG.F . OIL FREE C710 02-02822-08 ~
(822-F 013L) HSRU HD 9 0 PSIG 7, 2 02-IIS-AO-1D > STEAN LINE D D-7 CLOSED CLOSED "24 DEG.F OIL FREE C710 02-02822-08, (822-F013K) HSRU HD 9 0 PSIC 7~ 2 02-HS-AO-2A ~ STEAH LINE A F-10 CLOSED CLOSED -24 DEG.F OIL FREE C710 02-02822-08, (822-F013A) NSRU HD 9 0 PSIG 7~ 2 02-HS-AO-28 STEAN LINE 8 D-11 CLOSED CLOSED H 50 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE 0710 02-02822-08, 822-F013F HSRU HD 9 0 PSIG 7 2 PAGE 3
1 S
APPENDIX 1 tlax Ciiun ttaxlnun Allow Part Allow Naxinun Conponent Conponent Dwg. Noraal Fail Safe Fail Safe Size Hoisture Allow Oil CUI ID Ho. Description Loc Position Position Function (llicron Dw Pt SOSIYH:'IIICLCAII COLLAR .:Ilhllls'SAI:-:..:..-.: .": L::w;.:.,;"-:7LCrOIACllAli:-::.ACSC.:II5llSRIFC:Call! sy'- A~~:- -
at t'- S1 IA.~.' +<<as +a aa 02-IIS-AO-2C % STEAII LltlE C CLOSED CLOSED 50 -24 DEC.F OIL FREE C?1O 02-O2822-08, (822-F 013D) IISBU HD 8 0 PSIG ?, 2 02-HS-AO-2D > STEAII LINE 0 D-7 CLOSED CLOSED 50 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE C?10 02-02822-08, (822-F013C) IISRV HD 8 0 PSIC 7, 2 02-tls-AO-3A >> STEAII LIHE A CLOSED CLOSED -24 DEG.F OIL FREE C710 02-02822-08, (822-F0138) llSRU HD 8 0 PSIG 7, 2 02-its-AO-38 STEntl LIHE 8 CLOSED CLOSED 50 "24 DEC.F OIL FREE C?10 02-02822-08, (822-F 013N) tlSRU HD 8 0 PSIG 2 02-IIS-AO-3C AA STEAII LIHE C F-7 CLOSED CLOSED -24 DEG.F OIL FREE C710 02-02D22-08, (822-F013G) HSRU ND 8 0 PSIG 71 2 02-IIS-AO-3D > STEAII LINE D D-8 CLOSED CLOSED -24 DEG.F OIL FREE C710 02-02822-08, (822-F013V) IISRU HD 8 0 PSIG 7, 2 02-IIS-AO-40 >> STEAN LINE A F-9 CLOSED CLOSED "24 DEG.F OIL FREE C?10 02-02822-08, (822-F013S) NSRV ND 8 0 PSIG 7. 2 02-NS-A0-48 oo STEAII LINE 8 CLOSED CLOSED 50 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE C? 1 0 02" 02822-08, (822-F013R) llSRV HD 8 0 PSIC 7~ 2 02-HS-AO-4C OA STEAII LINE C F-8 CLOSED CLOSED 50 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE C?10 02-02822-08, (822-F 013N) NSRU HD 8 0 PSIG ? ~ 2 02-IIS-AO-4D STEAII LlttE D D-8 CLOSED CLDSED 50 -24 DEC.F OIL FREE C710 02-02822-08, (822-F 013P ) IISRU HD 8 0 PSIG 7, 2 02-IIS-AO-58 OA STEAII LIHE 8 D-9 CLOSED CLOSED -24 DEG.F OIL FREE C710 02-02822-08, (822-F013U) HSBU ND 8 0 PSIG ?. 2 02-llS-AO-5C co STEAII LINE C F-8 CLOSED CLOSED -24 DEC.F OIL FREE C?10 02-02822-08, (822-F013N) IISRV HD 8 O PSIC 7, 2 02-HS"AO"22A STEAII LIHE A F-12 OPEN CLOSED 35 DEC.F HO SPCFD S157
)IS I U HE at O PSIC L IIIITS PAGE 4
l f
APPENDIX 1 Ifenf aua Ihxfaun Allow Part =Allow Haxinun Conponent Coaponent Dwg. Normal Fail Safe Fail Safe Size ~
Hoisture Allow Oil -. CUI Io Ho. oescri cion Loc posieion pea!cion pallccion Hicron ou pe content su lier Ho. concento siisISfl. :IHeTSLS'sn.-. Tiii~rth -,lifnA< le isnil':"-:..!i I~i&i:.a=I I; s r PHLSHP pl aaciiiff:,T!SOii u SflisfocHW::. O~on..<i:.~a:-;.f;:::.':.::!.:r=.:-: I LI::.,"uia,.;,>> o: -,nc::.:;
02-HS-AO-220 > STEAII LINE 8 E-12 OPEN CLOSED 0 40 35 DEG.F NO SPCFD $ 157 (6),(12)
ILSIU . HE at 0 PSIG LIHITS 02-tlS-AO-22C STEAN LIHE C F-5 OPEH CLOSED D 40 35 OEG.F HO SPCFD $ 157 (6) o(12)
IISI U HE at 0 PSIG LIIIITS 02-IIS-AO-22D << STEAL4 LIHE D E-5 OPEH CLOSED D 40 35 DEG.F NO SPCFD $ 157 (6) o(12) llSIU HE at 0 I SIG LIHITS 02"llS-AO-28A STEAH LIHE 1 F-13 OPEN CLOSED D 40 35 OEG.F HO SPCFD $ 157 (6) . (12) l4SIU HE at 0 PSIG L IHITS 02-llS-AO-288 STEAH LIHE 8 E-13 OPEN CLOSED D 35 DEG.F HO SPCFD $ 157 (6)o(12)
NSIU HE at 0 PSIG LIHITS 02-ILS-AO-28C STEAll LIHE C F-4 OPEN CLOSED D 40 35 DEG.F HO SPCFD $ 157 (6),(12)
ILSIU NE at 0 PSIG LIHITS 02-llS-AO "28D STEAN LIHE D E-4 OPEH CLOSED D 40 35 OEG.F HO SPCFD $ 157 (6) o(12)
HS IU HE at 0 PSIG LIHITS 02-RFW-A0-32A REACTOR FEEDLlTR 0-13 OPEN CLOSED 8 40 NO SPCFD LL322 (3)o (13)
LINE 1 NF LILLITS 02-RFLl-AO-328 REACTOR FEEDLITR G-4 OPEH CLOSED 8 40 HO SPCFD H322 (3) ~ (13)
LIHE 8 HE LIHI TS SOS Sr!I!',"SIIOfP f!SIfi Osll'fflS il.'.i'...!:: a-::u::::
". :er.:.o.".::: l c",-,:,:-.~L'Off:.OIfTIIf,;f!SO~~IUTST5lrussl'.! ~iw ':.:,'19'. 0,:,". -'-'::;: P .I Ln!:-.-"Laf:.:::o..:;Fane 02-EDR-10-19 DRYUELL SUILP D-9 OPEN CLOSED 35 FREE OF OIL FREE K-125 (8)
DRAIH NE LIL) LITR 02-EDR-A0-20 DRYUELL SUNP 0-9 OPEN CLOSED 35 FREE OF OIL FREE K-125 (8)
DRAIN HE LIO VTR 02-EDR-AO-394 RB SUHP DSCHG C-15 OPEN CLOSED H CLEAH DRY 8350 (7)
ISOL HE 02-EDR-10-395 RB SUllP DSCKG C-15 OPEN CLOSED CLEAH DRY HA 8350 (7)
ISOL HE jsYftETI: <'. LLI0OL5811 t8:AEAGTlfA<8 DG.">>'---.' ="= -.5':."1,',<".='- --'= OH - F'loKDOAGIWA:4 K=.;KQJIQa s58 >.";~;-',W~::.::.:.~ "u! -..S.<<~.-:o.".~I 9 <<: I: Vs.;LL~Lfa'~e. ~=:. -.: S>L'f:=0~='=-I-~a~.-~~.;.c:~ ..! I 02-FDR-AO-3 DRYLLELL FLOOR E-6 OPEN CLOSED A 35 FREE OF OIL FREE K-125 (8)
PAGE 5
t I
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'fl
APPENDIX 1 0
ITaanun 'Haxinun Allow Part Allow Haximun Conponent Conponent Dwg. Homal Fail Safe Fail Safe Size Hoisture Allow Oil CVI ID No. Descri tion Loc Position Position Function Hicron Dw Pt Content Su lier Ho. Connents S unc-.Wnc~o;s 02-ROA-Ao-1D llVAC DAHPER To E-15 OPEH CLDSED CLEAN Ho SPCFD Ho SPCFD DIV ~ II HCC RH HE LIHITS LIHITS 02-ROA-Ao-11 HVAC DAllPEB To E-7 OPEN CLOSED CLEAH Ko SPCFD HO SPCFD H139 DIV. I HCC BH HE LIHITS LIHITS 02-ROA-AD-12 llVAC DnlIPER TO C-7 OPEN CLOSED CLEAN No SPCFD No SPCFD H139 DIU I D.C.HCC RH HE LIHITS l. I HITS 02-Ron-Ao-13 IIVAC DAIIPER To G"15 OPEH CLOSED CLEAN No SPCFD No SPCFD I'l139 DIU I ll2 RECOll8 NF LI HITS I. IHITS 02-Ron-Ao-14 "llVAC DnllPER To G-13 OPEN CLOSED CLEAN ND SPCFD No SPCFD H139
-DIV II 82 BECOHO HE L I HITS LIHITS 02-ROA-Ao-15 HVAC DAl!PER To G-13 OPEN CLOSED CLEAN No SPCFD No SPCFD H139 SANPLING AHALYZER NE LINITS LIHITS 02-Ron-Ao-17 Nunc DANpER To G-14 OPEH CLOSED CLEAN Ho SPCFD NO SPCFD N139 SAttPLIHG AHALYZER HE LIIIITS LINITS CVETUi: ; EiSA1HHNCTHAlimiHiM 02- C I A-Ao-39 A IHST AIR FB DRYER J-11 OPEH CLOSED CLEAN DRY CLEAN 8237 02-586"00-2, (4)
To ACCUHULATORS HF 1 02-CIA-Ao-398 + IHST AIR FB DRYER E-10 OPEN CLOSED cLEnN DRY CLEAN 8237 02-586-00-2, (>>)
To nccUHULnToRS tlE 1 PAGE 6
b J
APPENDIX 1 ttaxxnun Haxinun Allow Part Allow Haxinun Conponent Conponent Dwg. Noraal fail SaFe Fail Safe Size lfoisture Allow Oil j!lier CUI SD Ho. Desc~rt tion Loc Position Posl lion punctlon +Hlcron) Du Pt Content Su Ho. Coruontc 02-SGT-A0-2A SGTS REACTOR K"15 CLOSED OPEH K 40 NO SPCFD HA ll-322 02-68-00-80, (3)
BUILDING INTAKE NE LIHITs 1 02-SCT-AO-28 SOTS REACTOR D-15 CLOSED OPEN HO SPCFD II-322 02-68-00-80, (3)
BUILDIHC INTAKE tIE LI HITS 1 02-SGT-AO-F16 SGT CKRCOAL FLTR F-12 CLOSED CLOSED CLEAN DRV CLEAN 8-237 02-586-00 2D (¹).(5)
DELUDGE VALVE ND 1 02-SCT-AO-F26 SGT CKRCOAL FLTR F-11 CLOSED CLOSED CLEAN CLEAH 8-237 02-586-00-2, (4) . (5)
DELUDCE VALVE ND 1 02-SGT-AO-F36 SCT CKRCOAL FLTR F-10 CLOSED CLOSED CLEAH DRV CLEAN 8-237 02-586"00-2, (4).(5)
DELUDGE VALVE ND 1 02-SGT-AO-F46 SGT CKRCOAL FLTR 8-12 CLOSED CLOSED CLEAN DRY CLEAN 8-237 02-586-00-2, (4).(5)
DELUDGE UALUE HD 1 02-SCT-AO-F56 SCT CBRCOAL FLTR 8-11 CLOSED CLOSED CLEAH DRV CLEAH 8-237 02-586-00-2, (4).(5)
DELUDGE VALUE ND 1 02-SGT-AO-F66 SCT CKRCOAt. FLTR 8-9 CLOSED CLOSED CLEAN DRY CLEAN 8-237 02-586"00-2, (4).(5)
DELUDGE VALVE HD 1 01I! DTRRRonltrcr'RRDBIR I%1:: -
m:::::.'.s n."... e 02-BEA-A0-1 flEA REACTOR BLDG K-3 OPEN CLOSED N 40 NO SrCFD ll322 02-68-00-30 (3)
ISOL UALUE NE LIHITS 1 02-BEA-AO-2 REA REACTOR BLDC K"3 OPEN CLOSED H 40 Na SPCFD H322 02-68-00-3 0 (3)
ISOL UALUE HE LII IITS 1 02-ROA-AO-1 ROA BEAC'TOB BLOC C-4 OPEH CLOSED II 40 NO SPCFD H322 02-68-00-30 (3)
ISOL VALVE NE LIHITS 1 02-ROA-flO-2 ROA REACTOR BLDG C-4 OPEN CLOSED H 40 NO SPCFD NA ll322 02-68-00-30 (3) tSOL VALUE NE LI HITS 1 PAGE 7
APPENDIX 1 ax nun xinun Allou Part Allow Haxinun Conponent Conponent Dug Homal Fail Safe Fail Safe Size Noisture Allon Oil CUI ID Ho. Descri tion Loc Position Position Function (Hicron) Dw Pt Content Su lier No. Connents I'~. ": KT- %>>-Bpmss00871 g>>, ~g %'i '>> ) ))'2"";<'u+;-'l>>%)+
. ' 4vqg l" iLnlfzw 4~~>>>>'.f '>>>>>>y'.,)
02-CSP-AO-B UETUELL VAC BREAIIER 8-15 HA (17) . (18)
D2-CSP-A0-9 METMELL UACUUH 8-6 CLOSED OPEH NO SPCFD HA H-322 02-68-00-80, (3)
RELIEF UALVE HE LINITS 1 02"CSP-A0-10 METMELL VAC BREAIIER C-6 (17),(18) 02-CEP-AO-1A DRYMELL PURGE J-13 CLOSED CLOSED 40 NO SPCFD EXHAUST VALVE HD LIMITS 02-CEP-AO-18 DRYMELL PURGE J-13 CLOSED CLOSED FILTERED HO SPCFD HU SPCFD I-208 (9)
BYPASS EXHST VLV HD LIHITS LIHITS 02-CEP-A0-2A DRYUELL PURGE J-13 CLOSED CLOSED HO SPCFD H-322 02-68-00-80) (3)
EXHAUST VALVE HD L IHITS 1 02-CEP-A0-28 DRYMELL PURGE J-13 CLOSED CLOSED FILTERED HO SPCFD HO SPCFD I-208 (9)
BYPASS EXHST ULV HD LIHITS LIHITS 02-CEP-AO-3A UETMELL PURGE C-14 CLOSED CLOSED 40 HO SPCFD HA H-322 02-68-00-80, (3)
EXHAUST VALUE HD LINITS 1 02-CEP-AO-38 METMELL PURGE J-13 CLOSED CLOSED FILTERED HO SPCFD NO SPCFD I "208 (9)
BYPASS EXHST ULU IID L I IIITS LI HITS 02-CEP-A0-4A UETUELL PURGE J-13 CLOSED CLOSED HO SPCFD NA II-322 02-68-00-80, (3)
EXHAUST VALVE HD LINITS 1 02-CEP-AO-48 METMELL PURGE J-13 CLOSED CLOSED FILTERED NO SPCFD HQ SPCFO I-208 (9)
BYPASS EXHST VLU HD LIHITS LIIIITS 02-CUB-AO-1AB UETUELL DDMNCOHER 87-13 (17) . (18)
(TY~P18 UACUUH BREAHERS PAGE 8
APPENDI Allow Part Allow Naxinun Conponent Conponent Dug. Homal Fail Safe Fail Safe Size Hoisture Allow Oil CVI ID Ho. Descr~ition Loc Position Position Fnnct(cn ((I(crcn (nn Ft) Content ~su plier Ho. Connents DRAIN lZ LIQ Tt TR 02-FDR-A0-4 DRYMELL FLOOR E-6 OPEH CLOSED 35 FREE OF OIL FREE R-125 (8)
DRAIH HE LIq 'tITR 02-FDR-no-219 REAGTDR BLDG D-14 OPEN CLOSED CLEAH DRY Hn 8350 SUHP DRAIN HE 02-FDR-A0-220 REACTOR BLDG D-15 OPEH CLOSED CLEAH DRY 8350 SUHP DRAIH HE 02-FDR-AO-Z21 REACTOR BLDG C-14 OPEH CLOSED CLEAH DRY B350 SUItv DRAIH HE 02-FDR-A0-222 REACTOR BLDG C-15 OPEN CLOSED II CLEAH DRY HA 8350 (T)
SUNP DRAIH HE
= VER~IHnnn:cc~t6KI~It A Kf .'RUJEHFYE 4'). 8'.'l,l 'nc) (rg,(NC '-,@t;4$ 4kt4f~(F~. I.i~rt 8 -~ PXC(;:(:"--'i::"::8..88W~VF oz-csv-no-1 DRYt!ELL PURCE D-5 CLOSED CLOSED 40 HD SPCFD IIA N-322 02-68-00-80, (3)
SUPPLY VLU Ito LIHITS 1 02-CSP-AO-2 DRYIIELL PURCE D-6 CLOSED CLOSED HO SPCFD H-322 O2-68-OO-BO, SUPPLY VLU HD LIHITS 1 02-CSP-AO-3 UETtlELL PURCE C-5 CLOSED CLOSED HO SPCFD NA H-322 02-68-00-80, (3)
SUPPLY VLU HD LIHI TS 1 02-CSP-AO-4 tIETUELL PURGE C-5 CLOSED CLOSED NO SPCFD H-32Z D2-68-00-80, (3)
SUPPLY ULU HD LIHITS 1 02-CSP-A0-5 tIETUELL UACUUM C-5 CLOSED OPEH HO SPCFD HA N-322 02-68-00-808 (3)
RELIEF VALVE HE LIHITS 1 02-csv-A0-6 tIETlfELL VACUUN 8-15 CLDSED OPEN 40 ND SPCFD H-32Z 02-68"00-80, (3)
RELIEF VALVE HE - LINITS 1 02-CSV-AO-T IIETUELL Vnc BREARER c-5 ~(7),((8)
PAGE 9
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APPENDIX 1 NOTES I. General Note s :
- 1. All equipment part numbers (EPNs) identified in the "Component ID No." Column are pneumatically powered from the Control Air System (CAS), unless otherwise indicated.
- 2. All EPNs identified with an (*) in the "Component ID No."Column are pneumatically powered from . the Containment Instrument Air (CIA) System.
- 3. All EPNs identified with an (**) in the "Component ID No. "Column are pneumatically powered from the Diesel Starting Air System.
P "Filtered" air is interpreted to mean a requirement for air that does not contain particles greater than 40 microns in size. This is based on standard industry practices for the specification of satellite filters.
II. Fail Safe Function s:
A. Isolates to provide Containment Isolation. Isolation of the primary containment is effected in order to assure that public radiation exposures are maintained, below the guideline limits of 10 CFR 100 following a loss-of-coolant accident inside the primary containment.
B. Changes state to support containment and reactor coolant system isolation. The feedwater isolation valves are spring-loaded piston-actuated check valves. The actuator is intended to prevent the valve from "sticking" in the open position.
When the valve operator is in the open position, the operator will not resist valve closure. In this position the valve will function much like a simple check valve. In the de-energized posi,tion, the spring-loaded piston will assist in closing- the valve. However, it will not close the valve against flow from the normal direction. This allows the condensate and condensate booster pumps to continue to supply feedwater to the reactor pressure vessel (if available).
C. The function of this valve is not safety-related. The valve is designated Seismic Category I and guality Class I because it was purchased after January 1, 1980. This safety class designation is intended to be part of an upgrade of systems required for the safe storage of spent fuel.
D. Isolates to provide containment and reactor coolant system isolation. The valve isolates to limit public radiation exposure below 10 CFR 100 limits and isolates to maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
Page 1
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APPENDIX 1 NOTES On a loss of air pressure, the actuator spring and the remaining pressure in the valve actuator accumulator act together to close the valve.
Allows Standby Service Water flow to provide safety system support to the Emergency Diesel Generators.
Isolates to prevent a loss of reactor coolant inventory after a reactor scram.
Allows flow to provide reactor shutdown and reactivity control.
Isolates the Reactor Building to provide secondary contain-ment isolation. Isolation of the secondary containment is effected in order to maintain reactor building integrity during Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGS) operation and thus assure that public radiation exposures are maintained below the guideline limits of 10 CFR 100 following a loss-of-coolant accident inside the primary containment.
Isolates to maintain a controlled environment in areas that house safety-related support equipment.
Isolates to maintain the pressure boundary integrity of the safety-related portions of the Containment Instrument Air (CIA) upon loss or low supply pressure.
Allows SBGS operation needed to maintain secondary contain-ment integrity and thus assure that public radiation expo-sures are maintained below the guideline limits of 10 CFR 100 following a loss-of-coolant accident inside the primary containment.
The fail safe function of this valve is not safety-related.
The valve isolates to prevent inadvertent actuation of the STGS filter deluge system. The deluge spray systems in atmosphere cleanup systems are installed to perform the following functions:
(1) Provide automatic fire suppression in an area with high combustible loading.
(2) Prevent fission product releases due to desorption caused by radioactivity-induced auto-ignition of the carbon adsorber following a single-failure in the SBGS.
Because the postulated loading of the carbon adsorber is much less than what is required for the auto-ignition of the charcoal filter, the SBGS filter deluge system is merely required to provide a fire protection function (Item 1 above). During a fire the non-safety-related Control Air Page 2
APPENDIX I NOTES System is assumed to be available to (remote-manually) initiate the deluge flow.
Isolates to maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB).
The fail safe operation of the actuator does not prevent the self-actuated operation of the relief valves for reactor pressure vessel overpressure protection.
Isolates to maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB).
The fail safe operation of the actuator does not prevent the self-actuated operation of the relief valves for reactor pressure vessel overpressure protection. Horeover, the valve is backed by a safety-related pneumatic supply that is needed to achieve its emergency core cooling function (i.e.,
automatic depressurization system (ADS) function).
Isolates to maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB).
The fail safe operation of the actuator does not prevent the self-actuated operation of the relief valves for reactor pressure vessel overpressure protection. Horeover, the valve is backed by a safety-related pneumatic supply that is needed to achieve its emergency core cooling function (i.e.,
automatic depressurization system (ADS) function) and the residual heat removal alternate cooling path.
Isolates to maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB).
The fail safe operation of the actuator does not prevent the self-actuated operation of the relief valves for reactor pressure vessel overpressure protection. The normal (non-safety-related) pneumatic supply is assumed to be available following events that require the use of this valve for the residual heat removal alternate cooling path.
Allows air flow for containment vacuum protection.
The valve has two different mutually exclusive safety-related functions:
(I) It must open to allow containment vacuum protection.
(2) It must isolate to provide containment isolation.
The valve is backed by safety-related air supplies to allow the valve to remain closed for containment isolation when the driving forces seek to expel gases from the containment.
When the driving forces seek to imploded the containment, Page 3
tl APPENDIX 1 NOTES the actuator is design to allow containment vacuum protection. (Further review of the system design required.)
R. Isolates to support Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) operation needed to support decay heat removal.
S. Isolates to support RCIC operation needed to maintain reactor pressure vessel level.
T. The fail safe function of this valve is not safety-related and there is no preferred fail direction.
Failure in the open position bypasses the steam trap and allows reactor steam to discharge directly to the condenser, lowering the work output of the plant.
Failure in the closed position allows condensate to overfill the drainpot and possibly allows a slug of water to enter the RCIC turbine. This is not a design concern because the turbine has been designed to initiate operation under entrained liquid conditions.
U. Valve fails open to maintain cooling to the lube oil cooler.
An in-line orifice keeps flow from becoming excessive.
III. Comments
- 1. The air quality requirements for these valves are documented in the following documents:
(a) CVI 02-02C12-05,72,0, 1 (GE Drawing 112D3231, Revision 0).
(b) CVI 02-02C12-18,2 (GE Specification 23A1331, Revision 2).
(c) GE Topical Report NEDE-30525 (Contained in (ID-361403 and (ID-361501).
(d) CVI 02-02C12-13,19,2.
- 2. Air quality requirements are assumed to be identical to those of other Hiller actuators (i.e., ROA-V-1, ROA-V-2, REA-V-1, etc.).
- 3. CVI No. 02-68-00-30-1 states: "Prove an oiler, filter, and water separator in the air line, and use a light mineral oil as a lubricant. Use a pressure regulator to conserve air and provide a smoother action." Air qualities are based on the telephone call between H>R>/A>T> Osborne (BPC) and Bob Franc (Hiller Air Cylinder) in December 1988.
- 4. CVI No. 02-586-00-2-1 states: "Good instrument practices are also recommended. Clean, dry air or gas is essential for long service life and satisfactory operation. It should be noted that new air line often have scale and other debris in them. This debris can damage control valves, solenoids, seals, etc."
Page 4
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APPENDIX 1 NOTES Air quality requirements for these actuators are assumed to be identical to those identified for valve actuators 02-CIA-AO-39 A and B per GH Bettis Valve operation manual P/N 65043.
Air supply requirements are based on the telephone call between W. Sarakbi (BPC) and Dave Borick (Sheffer Corp. /Ralph Hiller Co.)
on January 12, 1989.
Air supply requirements are based on the telephone call between W. Sarakbi (BPC) and William Klenner (BW/IP International Inc.)
on January 12, 1989.
Air supply requirements are based on the telephone call between W. Sarakbi (BPC) and Ed Lund (Keiley Hueller Inc.) on January 12, 1989.
Air supply requirements are based on the telephone call between W. Sarakbi (BPC) and Rich Hessemino (Hammel Dahl) on January 12, 1989.
Air Supply requirements are based on the telephone call between W. Sarakbi (BPC) and Kay Gowdy (Fisher Controls) on January 10 ,
1989.
Air Supply requirements are based, on the telephone call between W. Sarakbi (BPC) and Rick Evans (Marks Control Corp.) on January 13, 1989.
Air supply requirements per GE Purchase Specification ,No.
21A9257, Revision 4, Section 4.3.7.2 (02-02B22-2,4) are for a supply system that provides oil-free, filtered air, died to a dew point of -40 degrees F.
Air supply requirements are based on the telephone call between W. Sarakbi (BPC) and Philip Howell (BPC) on January 30, 1989.
Air supply requirements per GE Test Specification No. 23A1331, Revision 2 are for a supply system that provides 50 micron (filtered) and oil-free air.
Air supply requirements are based on the telephone call between W. Sarakbi (BPC) and Jim Horehouse (Contromatics) on January 24, 1989.
The particulate size requirement per GE Operating Manual GEK-71317A is 5 microns. The CRD-F-6 filter requirements (CVI 02-215-03, 29) are for the removal of 10 microns. This discrepancy needs to be reconciled. Standard GE recommendations for moisture and oil content have been assumed for the actuators.
,The actuator is designated guality Class II and non-safety-related.
Page 5
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APPENDIX 1 NOTES The testable check valves are designed for remote opening (i.e.,
stroking the valve) with zero differential pressure across the valve seat. The valves will close on reverse flow even though the actuator may be in the open position. The valves open on forward flow when discharge pressure exceeds the downstream pressure.
- 18. The swing check valves have opening and closing air operators for testing purposes only. The valves operate independently of the air operators which are only used for periodic testing. The closed air operator is only used for emergencies and is not capable of preventing the valve from opening on high differential pressure.
Page 6
tl APPENDIX 2 SAFETY-RELATED CONTROL VALVE FILTER REGULATOR DATABASE
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APPENDIX 2 Naxinun llaxinun FTlter Falter Allow Part Allow Haxicen Regulator Perfornance Conponent Conponent Dug. Size Noisture Allow Oil Hanufacture Characteristics ID Ho. ~oescrS tIon Loc ~I!In~ran (Dw P+t Content O Nodal G~I!Icrans~sonnents isUSTENlr!IEHSEL'IL'AIIO 8!SG.."."L '-"-:.".":."...:~'.;!ALAI!'ETIICIINMRUSIIEEW! RETTISTEN!5 .: ". ",.Nr nn"-o I N';B'K;; ~
2 02-Sll-AO-214 <Go DIESEL COOLIHC H-14 SERUICE FREE OF NO SPCFD (5)
UTR SUPPLY AIR LIQ IITR LIHITS 02-Sll-AO-215 << DIESEL COOLIHC H-2 SERVICE FREE OF NO SPCFD (5)
MTR SUPPLY AIR LIQ IITR LI NITS SCSTEIT:r!SntSEL!dIL!ATIOLIITSC. .e-; .,! ei",. ':;:"'i'ELFEEEOO!AORRTI::-:.i!N12:SIIYET.CASU!SIC:nn!1!INcr.,:,':-.%<<,<<:::-.',"a-. !%% !T..c"n. '.
02"SII-AO-216 <> DIESEL COOL INC H-14 SERVICE FREE OF NO SPCFD (5)
UTR SUPPLY AIR LIQ IJTR LIHITS 02-SU-AO-217 DIESEL COOLING H-1 SERUICE FREE OF ND SPCFD (5)
UTR SUPPLY AIR LIQ IITR LINITS
.'EMRTE I..;"'IIOTOO!d.%:.: r%.W44~.'....'!s':, . -". I:; .~~sl".~L- CORI:AIAARATI IE1!I-~REUIRIATT."Orig!= 5" :::L".'. r'- r2 NNrt:L):." <e eod .;:! P.-,
02-RCIC-A0-4 RCIC COND PUIIP B-10 40 HO SPCFD FISHER 40 (1)
DISCH TO DRH LINITS 6?FR 02-RCI C-AO-5 RCIC COND PUHP HO SPCFD FISHER DISCH TO DRN LIHITS 6?FR 02-RCIC-PCU-15 RCIC PUIIP DISCH F-10 CLEAH OIL FREE FISHER TO LUBE OIL CLR 67FB 02-RCIC-AO-25 RCIC DRAIN POT NO SPCFD FISHER TO IN COND ISOL LINITS 67FR 02-RCIC-AO-26 RCIC DRAIN POT D-9 NO SPCFD FISHER TO NH COND ISOL LI II ITS 6?FR 02-RCIC-AO-54 RCIC DRAIH POT E-9 40 HO SPCFD FISHER ST BYPASS LIIIITS 6?FR 02-RCIC-AO"65 OUTBOARD RCIC H-6 FISHER (1)A (7)
HEAD SPRAY VALUE 67FB 02-BCIC-AO-66 INBOARD RCIC FISHER (1). (?)
HEAD SPRAY VALUE 67FR PAGE 1
1 APPENDIX 2 It~ax nun Ha~inun Allow Part Allow Haxinun Regulator Perfornance Conponent Cog}ponent Dwg. Size Itoisture Allow Oil Nanufacture Characteristics ID Ho. Description Loc ~I!inrun~De FC} Content 8 hocel c~llicrons} con!Ienco YVSTRILIL lP5S AND LPCS FEODI 818688fit ',EEO Oi!IISIODD 68 02-HPCS-AO-5 HPCS ItlJECTIOH H-10 (7)
'E TO RPU (7) 02-LPCS-AO-6 LPCS INJECTION H-7 S SIDING:.IIIIII:::"': TO RPU
!6 " " ': .FCOO DIEOB~h: .
T n:Sss~f;I . EDISII}H 68 02-RtlR-AO-41A LPCI PATH G-6 (7) TO RPU 02-RHR-AO-50A RHR SHUTDOLIH (7) COOLING RETURN
'"'l='enon 02-RHR-AO-418 LPCI PATH H-12 (7)
TO RPU 02-RHR-AO-41C LPCI PATH D-11 (7) TO RPU 02-RIIR-AO-508 RHR SHUTDOLIH F-12 (7) COOLIHG RETURH 02- R tlR- A0-89 SERVICE LITR J-10 (7) INTERTIE Sttf}ufEf: FUf(.,0(IL.CNITfAQ"0 ALEAUt} .. ',:" PIALRALI:"'2 REASTOtPW FLttW FUEL POOL FLOW C-9 CLEAH DRY OIL FREE
'2-FPC-AO-1 (5)
COHTORL -SFsfsii'.- Eiii}FOOiciff}IODTOE:.;...: ' Esf! DTEOaiiii: IiSSO i}Su<STOO~ih . 02-CRD-AO-10 SDU UEHT K-6 50 20 DEG.F OIL FREE CRD-F-6 10 (8) 11 100 PSIG PAGE 2
APPENDIX 2 Conponent ID Ho. 02-CRD-AO-11 Conponent Description SDU DRAIH Dwg.
~Lac F-6 l)axinun Allow Part Size sterno)
I'lax 1 nun Allow Iloisture (Dw Pt) 20 DEC.F llaxinun Allow Oil Content OIL FREE Filter Regulator CRD"F-6 s" *'~ Falter Perfornance Ilanufacture Characteristics 10 Q 100 PSIG 02-CRD-AO-180 SDU UENT K-6 20 DEG.F OIL FREE CRD-F"6 Q 100 PSIG 02-CRD-A0-181 SDU DRAIH f-6 20 OEG.F OIL FREE CRD-F-6 10 8 100 PSIG 02-CRD-V-126 SCRAH CHG UALUE "'-4 20 DEG.F OIL FREE CRD-F-6 (HCU TYP OF 185) 8 100 PSIG 02-CRD-V"127 SCRAH DSCHG ULU C-3 20 DEG.F OIL FREE CRD-F-6 (HCU TYP OF 185) 8 100 PSIG 02-HS-AO-1A pp STEAN LINE A F-11 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE NO F/R (822-F013 J) IISRU 8 0 PSIG 02-IIS-AO-18 op STERN LINE 8 D-11 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE HO F/8 (822-F013E) HSRU 8 0 PSIG 02-IS-AO-1C STEAN LINE C F"6 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE NO F/R (822-F 013L) HSRU 8 0 PSIG 02-I IS-AO-1 D STEAN LINE D D-7 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE NO F/R (822-F013K) NSRU 8 0 PSIG 02"IIS-AO-2A pp STEAII LINE A -24 DEG.F OIL FREE HO F/8 (822"F013A) NSRU 8 0 PSIG 02-NS-AO-28 > STEAN LINE 8 D-11 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE HO F/R (822-F013F) NSRU 8 0 PSIG 02-IS-AO-2C it STEAN LINE C F-7 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE NO F/8 (822-F013D) HSRU 8 0 PSIG 02-IIS-AO-2D STEAII LIHE D D-7 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE HO F/R (822-F013C) NSRU 8 0 PSIC PAGE 3
I APPENDIX 2 llaxlmum Filter Filter Allow Part Allow IIaximum Regulator PerFormance Component Component Dwg. Size Noisture Allow Oil Ilanufacture Characteristics ID Ho. Description Dw Pt Content '"*"'J tST SE EI:',I :' I:H-'HCLTA~StAIIR,-.,.'- IIIAW,SIA T "I-:".FE ..A-II ASTIR~El:4 IfS~EITISIAHT5T~G~Gn.t 4!..:,."':~,-SLANG.G"...,,"q:'! I Al SG; .'.::;.. ".:. 02-HS-AO-3A STEAN LINE A F-9 50 -24 DEC.F OIL FREE HO F/R (2) (822-F0138) NSRU 8 0 PSIC 02-IIS-AO-38>> STEAN LINE 8 D-10 50 -24 DEC.F OIL FREE NO F/R (2) (822-F0138) NSRU 8 0 PSIG 02-HS-AO-3C STEAII LINE C F-7 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE NO F/8 (2) (822-F0130) IISRV 8 0 PSIC 02-IIS-AO-3D STEAII LIHE D D-8 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE HO F/8 (2) (822"F0130) IISRV 8 0 PSIG 02-HS-AO"4A >> STEAN LIHE A 50 -24 DEC.F OIL FREE HO F/8 (2) (822"F013S) HSRU 8 0 PSIG 02-HS-00-48 STEAII LINE 8 D-9 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE NO F/8 (2) (822-F 013R) HSRU 8 0 PSIG 02-HS-AO-4C STEAII LINE C F"8 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE HO F/8 (2) (822-F 013ll) HSRU 8 0 PSIG 02-HS-AO-4D STEAN LINE D D"8 -24 DEG.F OIL FREE HO F/R (2) (822-F013P) HSRU 8 0 PSIC 02-HS-AO-58 STEAN LINE 8 D-9 -24 OEG.F OIL FREE HO F/8 (2) (822-F013U) NSRU 8 0 PSIG 02-HS-00-5C STEAII LINE C -24 OEC.F OIL FREE HO F/R (2) (822-F 013 N) HSRU 8 0 PSIG 02-NS-AO"22A >> STEAH LINE A F-12 40 35 DEC.F HO SPCFD HO F/R (2) HSI V 8 100 PSIG L I HITS 02-I IS-A0-228 STEAII LIHE 8 E-12 40 35 DEC.F NO SPCFD HO F/R (2) IISI V 8 100 PSIG LI HITS 02-IIS-AO-22C STEAII LINE C 35 DEG.F HO SPCFD NO F/R (2) HSI V 8 100 PSIG L I HITS PAGE 4
APPENDIX 2 lla&xnun Haxxnuv F TIter Falter Allow Part Allow Haxinun Regulator Performance Conponent Conponent Owg. Size lloisture Allow Oil Hanufacture Characteristics ID Ho. Descri~tion Content e Hodel 0 ~Hicrons} Connents 02-llS-AO-22D + STEAII LIHE D 35 DEG.F NO SPCFD NO F/R (2) HSI V 8 100 PSIC LIHI TS 02-tlS-AO-28A STEAN LIHE A F"13 40 35 DEG.F HO SPCFD HO F/R (2) llSIU 8 100 PSIC LIHITS 02-HS-AO-288 STEAN LINE 8 E-13 40 35 DEG.F NO SPCFD NO F/R (2) llSIU 8 100 PSIC LIHITS 02-HS-AO-28C STEAII LIHE C F" 4 40 35 DEC.F NO SPCFD HO F/8 (2) NSI V 9 100 PSIG LI HITS 02-l IS-A 0-280 STEAN LINE D E-4 40 35 DEG.F HO SPCFD NO F/R (2) llSIV 8 100 PSIC LIHITS 02-RFU-AO-32A REACTOR FEEDUTR C-13 40 HO SPCFD F ISIIEB LINE A LIHITS 67FR 02-RFU-AO-328 REACTOR FEEDUTR G-4 40 NO SPCFD FISHER LIHE 8 LIHITS 67FR ~sos'le:, EEEI IRKED.fllBflswi.'::i:t: -=; ':::.': "i LLBAC All:.:lYlf/.: IIWtsTOOIT9.-".-*-.':.:-: ".::::=:-: 02-EDR-AO-19 DRYUELL SUllP D"9 FREE OF OIL FREE FISHER 40 (4) DRAIN LIQ UTR 67FB 02-EDR-80-20 DRYUELL SUNP D-9 35 FREE OF OIL FREE FISHER ¹0 (4) DRAIN LIQ UTR 67FR 02-EDR-AO-394 RR SUHP DSCllC C-15 CLEAN FISHER ISOL 67FB 02-EDR-A0-395 RU SUllP DSCNG C-15 CLEAH DBY NA FISHER 40 (1) ISOL 67FR 02"FDR-AO-3 DRYUELL FLOOR 35 FREE OF OIL FREE FISHER ¹0 (4) DRAIN LIQ UTR 67F 02-FDR-AO-4 DRYUELL FLOOR E-6 35 FREE OF OIL FREE FISHER (4) DRAIH LI UTR 67F PAGE 5
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APPENDIX 2 I'laKinun ILMax AUA Fi).ter F&Iter Allou Part Allou Llaxinun Regulator PerFornance Conponent Conponent Dug Size lloisture Allow Oil llanufacture Characteristics ID Ho. oeocri~eion ioc~nicron) ~c~wet Content t llodel 0 gllicrons} Connents 02-FDR-AO-219 REACTOR BLDG D-14 CLEAN DRY HA FISHER 40 (1) SUILP DRAIN 67F 02-f DR-AO-220 REACTOR BLDG D-15 CLEAN FISHER SUllP DRAIH 67F 02-FDR-AO-221 REACTOR BLDG C-14 CLEAN DRY NA FISHER 40 SUILP DRAIN 67F 02-FDR-AO-222 REACTOR BLDG C-15 CLEAN DRY HA FISHER 40 (1) 02-CSP-AO-1 SUllP DRAIH DRYUELL PURGE D-5 NO SPCFD e- 67F FISHER (6) (2) SUPPLY ULU LIHITS 95H 02-CSP-AO-2 DRYUELL PURGE D-6 40 HO SPCFD FISHER (6) (2) SUPPLY VLV LI HITS 95H 02.-CSP-AO-3 llETLIELL PURGE C"5 NO SPCFD FISHER (6) (2) SUPPLY ULU LILIITS 95H 02-CSP-AO-4 UEIUELL PURGE C"5 HO SPCFD NA F I SHE R (6) (2) SUPPLY VLV LIILITS 95H 02-CSP-A0-5 UEIllELL UACUUII C-5 HO SPCFD HO F/8 (2) RELIEF UALUE L IIIIIS 02-CSP-A0-6 LlETLlELL UACUUN 8-15 HO SPCFD NO F/R (2) RELIEF VALUE LIHITS 02-CSP-A0-7 LlEIL!ELL VAC BREAKER C-5 FISHER 67AF 02-CSP-AO-8 LlETLIELL VAC BREAKER 8-15 FISHER 67F 02-CSP-AO-9 LlETLlELL VACUUH 8-6 40 NO SPCFD HO F/R RELIEF VALUE LIHII'S 02"CSP-A0-10 UETLIELL UAC BREAKER C-6 FISHER 40 67F PAGE 6
APPENDIX 2 Conponent ID Ho. 02-CEP-AO-1A 02-CEP-AO-18 Conponent Des~cri
C::
DRYUELL PURGE EXHAUST VALUE DRYUELL PURGE tion Dug. iac
':i:."a"-' l- '
J-13 J-13 Haxinun Allow Part Size
~nicrnn}
FILTERED i
~nn Haxinua Allow Iloisture HO SPCFD L I re HITS NO SPCFD Haxinun Allow Oil Content NO SPCFD Filter Regulator Hanufacture Characteristics n lloael n FISHER 95H FISHER Filter Per fornance nicrana)
(6) Caanenea (2) BYPASS EXHST ULU LI HITS LI HITS 67F 02-CEP-AO-2A DRVUELL PURGE J-13 NO SPCFD FISHER (6) (2) EXHAUST VALVE L I HITS 958 02-CEP-AO-20 DRYUELL PURGE J-13 FILTERED tlO SPCFD HO SPCFD FISHER 40 BVPASS EXHST VLV LIHITS LI HITS 67F 02-CEP-AO-3A UETUELL PURCE C-14 HO SPCFD FISHER (6) (2) EXHAUST UALUE LI HITS 958 02-CEP-AO-38 METUELL PURGE J-13 FILTERED HO SPCFD HO SPCFD FISHER BYPASS EXHST VLV L I HITS LIHITS 67F 02-CEP-AO-48 METUELL PURGE J-13 HO SPCFD FISHER (6) (2) EXHAUST VALVE LI HITS 958 02-CEP-AO-40 UETUELL PURCE J-13 FILTERED HO SPCFD HO SPCFD FISHER BYPASS EXHST ULV LIIIITS L INITS 67F 02-CVB-AO-188 METUELL DOUNCOHER C"6 (7) (TVP 18) UACUUH BREAKS NYCTI):< '.STANOM'! GAS: YREATIIETIT:""> ..".','.N".=n.P.': . - 'CLOU.DIAGAAN. "!I%4 IfPVISTOTC41n"".n-""- P:"-.- ';";-"=rk~'."r6=':."-. 02-SGT-AO-28 SOTS REACTOR 8-15 HO SPCFD HA NO F/8 (2) BUILDINC IHTAKE LIHITS 02-SCT-80-28 SOTS REACTOR D-15 4D NO SPCFD NA ND F/8 (2) BUILDING IHTAKE L INITS 02"SGT-AO-F16 SGT CHRCOAL FLTR F-12 CLEAN DRY CLEAN FISHER (6) (2) DELUDGE UALUE 958 PAGE 7
>e APPENDIX 2 4~~ t ~1Ã lail A Allou Part IfaxinuFI Allou Ilaxinun Alter Regulator Filter Perfornance Conponent Conponent Dug. Size tloisture Allou Oil Nanufacture Characteristics ID No. Description Loc tllicron) ~Dw P~t Content 0 llodel 0 gllicrons~ Connents 02-SGT-AO-F26 SGT CHRCOAL FLTR F-11 CLEAN DRY CLEAN FISHER (6) (2) OELUDGE UALVE 95H 02-SGT-AO-F36 SGT CHRCOAL FLTR F-10 CLEAN DRY CLEAN FISHER (6) (2) DELUDCE VALUE 95H 02-SCT-AO-F46 SGT CHRCOAL FLTR 0-12 CLEAN CLEAN FISHER (6) (2) DELUDCE VALUE 95H 02-SCT-AO-F56 SGT CHRCOAL FLTR 0-11 CLEAH CLEAN FISHER (6) (2) DELUDGE VALVE 95H 02-SGT-AD-F66 SCT CHRCOAL FL/R 8-9 CLEAN DRY CLEAN FISHER (6) (2) DELUDGE VALVE 95H SYSTEM:;~itIOAC REACfOR" 5CR.'.:<<':B. '-".~-I>a:w'~e-x~~:-',~ F~L'0 D AGRAIT:.'IT54MRVIK10If:61:.."~,'~-*e 02-REA"A0-1 REA REACTOR BLDG K-3 40 HO SPCFD (2) ISOL VALUE LINITS 02-REA-AO-2 REA REACTOR BLDG HO SPCFD NA (2) ISOL UALVE L I NITS 02-ROA-A0-1 ROA REACTOR BLDG G-4 HO SPCFD NA (2) ISOL VALVE LIIIITS 02-ROA"A0-2 ROA REACTOR BLDG G-4 40 HO SPCFD (2) ISOL VALVE LINITS 02-ROA-AO-10 HUAC DANPER TO f-15 CLEAH NO SPCFD HO SPCFD FISHER DIU. II NCC RH L I I IITS LINITS 67F 02-ROA-A0-11 HUAC DANPER TO E-7 CLEAH HO SPCFD NO SPCFD FISHER 40 DIV. I NCC RN LI NITS LINITS 67F 02-ROA-AO-12 HUAC DAIIPER TO C-7 CLEAN HO SPCFD HO SPCFD FISHER DIV I D.C.HCC AII LINITS LINITS 67F 02-ROA" AO-13 HVAC DAIIPER TO C-15 CLEAH NO SPCFD NO SPCFD FISHER DIU I H2 RECOHB L I HITS LI NITS 67F PAGE 8
APPENDIX 2 lla~xmn Ilaxxauw Allow Part Allow Haxinun Regulator Perfornance Conponent Conponent Dug. Size Hoisture Allow Oil Nanufacture Characteristics ID Ho. Description Loc gllicron} ~Du Pt} Content 0 Hodel 0 ~llicrons} Corments 02-ROA-A0-14 ILUAC DAllPER TO G-13 CLEAN HO SPCFD ND SPCFD FISHER 40 (1) DIU II H2 RECOllO LI HITS L INITS 67F 02-ROA"AO-15 RUAC DAHPER TO G-13 CLEAH HO SPCFD HO SPCFD FISHER <<0 SAllPLIHG AHALYZER LIHITS LI HITS 67F 02-ROA"A0-17 RUAC DAHPER TO G-14 CLEAH HO SPCFD HO SPCFD FISIIER SAIIPL INC ANALYZER LI HITS L I HI TS 67F
- SIETHI:!: CB'~8N'flglTWISIR IE Tlllll&'.,".".C4t:a4-."FLOLI.:DIAA6H:FPEKWIIYflW-,'RBHSZODOB:,if)::::j.. --.".~::.
02-CIA-AO"39A INST AIR FR DRYER J-11 CLEAN DRY CLEAN FISHER 40 (1) TO ACCUHULATORS 67AFR239 02-CIA"AO-39B + IHST AIR FR DRYER f-10 CLEAH DRY CLEAH F ISIIER 40 TO ACCUIIULATORS 67AFR239
'AGE 9
r APPENDIX 2 NOTES 1
- 1. With the installed in-line filter, the quality of the air supplied to the actuator meets or exceeds the air quality requirements dictated by the actuator supplier.
- 2. The air quality supplied to the valve meets or exceeds the air quality requirements dictated by the actuator -supplier. Therefore an in-line filter is not required.
- 3. The air quality supplied to the valve does not meet the air quality requirements dictated by the actuator supplier. Therefore an in-line filter is required and will be installed during the next scheduled outage.
- 4. With the installed in-line filter, the quality of the air supplied to the actuator does not meet the air quality requirements dictated by the actuator supplier. Therefore the existing in-line filter will be replaced with a properly sized filter during the next scheduled outage.
- 5. The air supply to the actuator is currently being walked down or will be walked down during the next outage to verify the existence of an in-line filter.
- 6. Regulator does not include a filter. A strainer is located upstream of the regulator.
- 7. Actuators are not safety related, see Appendix 1 for an explanation.
- 8. The CRD (Control Rod Drive) System actuators are protected by a common filter CRD-F-6 which has a rating of 10 microns.
Page 1
/ APPENDIX 3 SAFETY-RELATED AIR ACCUMULATORS
'I 1
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0 APPENDIX 3 COklPOHENT COIIPOIIENT PROCESS FLOlt SHT REU. DUC. ID ND. DESCRIPT IOH DIACRAH HO. HO. NO. LOC COltllENTS 02-IIS-TK-1A It)BOARD IISIV IlCCUIIVLATOR H556 38 J-4 02-)IS-TK-18 INBOARD IISIU ACCUIIULATOR II556 38 02-HS-TK-1C INBOARD IISIU ACCU)WLATOR II556 38 K-4 02-HS-TK-1D IHBOARD HSTU ACCUIIULATOR 1)556 38 K-3 02-IIS-TK-2A OUTBOARD IISTU ACCUHULATOR II510 65 H-5 02-IIS-TK-28 OUTBOARD IISTU ACCUHULATOR H510 65 H-5 02-)IS-TK-2C OUTBOARD HSIU ACCUHULATOR II510 65 H-5 02-HS-TK-2D OUTBOARD IISIU ACCUIWLATOR II51 0 65 H-5 02-IIS-TK-4A IISRV ACCUIIULATOR H556 38 F-3 02-IIS-TK-48 IISRV ACCUMULATOR II556 38 F-4 02-IIS-TK-4C HSRU ACCUIIULATOR II556 38 D-4 02-HS-TK-4D IISRV ACCUIWLATOR !556 38 C-2 02-HS-TK-4E HSRU ACCU!IULATOR H556 38 F-4 02-IIS-TK-4F HSRV ACCU)WLATOR II556 38 C-3 02-IIS-TK-4G IISRU ACCUHULATOR ))556 38 C-4 02-IIS-TK-4ll IISRU ACCUHULATOR II556 38 H-4 02-HS-TK-4J )ISRV ACCUIIULATOR l556 38 E-3 02-tlS-TK-4K IISRV ACCUIIULATOR H556 38 E-4 02-IIS-TK-4L HSRV ACCUIIULATOR II556 38 02-HS-TK-4H IISRV ACCUIWLATOR tl556 38 8-2 02"HS-TK-4H HSRV ACCUHULATOR H556 38 8-3 PAGE I
APPENDIX 3 COI IP ONE HT COttPONENT PROCESS FLOU SHT REU. DWC. ID NO. DESCRIPT IOH DIAGRAlt HO. HO. HO. LOC COIIIIEtlTS 02-Its-TK-4P ItSRU ACCUIIULATOR tl556 38 C-3 02-IIS-TK-48 ItSRU ACCUHULATOR H556 38 H"3 02-ttS-TK-4S HSRU ACCUNULATOR H556 38 0-3 02-HS-TK-4U lISRU ACCUIIULATOR I556 38 H-4 02-HS-TK-4U IISRU ACCUHULATOR tt556 38 D-2 02-ltS-TK-3H ADS ACCUHULATOR H556 38 C-3 02-ItS-TK-3H ADS ACCUIIULATOR II556 38 8-4 02-HS-TK-3P ADS ACCUHULATOR II556 38 D-4 02-HS"TK-38 ADS ACCUIOILATOR ll556 38 J-4 02-IIS-TK-35 ADS ACCUHULATOR N556 0-4 02-IIS-TK-3U ADS ACCUIIULATOR I 1556 38 02-HS-TK-3U ADS ACCUItULATOR lt556 38 D-3 02-ROA-ACC-1 OUTBOARD ROA ACCUIIULATOR tl545 61 F-3 02-ROA-ACC-2 INBOARD ROA ACCUItULATOR ll545 F-3 02-REA-ACC-1 INBOARD REA ACCUIIULATOR II545 02-REA-ACC-2 OUTBOARD REA ACCUIIULATOR I I545 61 J-3 02-CIA-TK-1A BACKUP NITROGEN CYLINDERS tl556 38 F-11 thru 02-CIA-TK-15A 02-CIA-TK-18 BACKUP HTTROGEN CYLINDERS I556 38 A-11 thru 02-C I A-TK-198 02" CIA "TK-20A REIIOTE NITROGEN BOT'TLES II556 II-13 02-CIA-TK-200 REHOTE HITROGEH BOTTLES H556 38 D-13 PAGE 2
APPENDIX 3 COHPOHEHT COllPOHENT PROCESS FLOM SllT REU. DUG. ID HO DESCRIPTION DIAGRAll'HO. HO. HO. LOC COIUlEHTS 02-CSP-TK-51 COHI'AIHIIEHT UACUUH BREAK TANK H619 161 11 02-CSP-TK-1 BACKUP NITROGEN CYLINDERS N619 161 11 U1PU 02-CSP-TK-10 PAGE 3
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