IR 05000416/1986040
| ML20207L855 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 01/02/1987 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207L850 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-86-40, NUDOCS 8701130005 | |
| Download: ML20207L855 (18) | |
Text
p"82 9 UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR RE2ULATORY CO^~'ISSlHN o,
REGION il
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SulTE 2900
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JAN 0 21987
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i Report No.: 50-416/86-40 Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Jackson, MS 39205 Docket No.:
50-416 License No.: NPF-29 Facility Name: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Inspection Condu ed: December 8-12, 1986 Inspector:
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[7 A. L. Cunningham g/
Date '51gned Accompanying Personnel:
A. Gooden J. M. Will, Jr.
B. Haagensen S. Merwin T. Lynch Approved by:
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Mg/td
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T. R. Decker, Section Chief
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Datd 51gned Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved evaluation of the annual radiolcjical emergency preparedness exercise.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
8701130005 870102 PDR ADOCK 05000416 O
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i REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- 0. D. Kingsley, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- L. F. Dale, Director, Nuclear Licensing and Safety
- J.
E. Cross, Site Director
- F. W. Titus, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering
- C. Morgan, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness
- J. L. Robertson, Plant Licensing Superintendent
- J. C. Vincelli, Chemistry / Radiation Superintendent
- L. G. Temple, Instrumentation and Control Superintendent
- J. G. Hurley, Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- C. K. Brown, Staff Health Physics, Emergency Planning
- L. Warren, Manager, Corporate Communications
- J. D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator
- R. Pogue, Senior Communications Specialist NRC Resident Inspector
- R. Butcher
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 12, 1986, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas evaluated and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed herein.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection. An additional finding was discussed with the licensee via telephone on December 18,1986 (paragraph 3 below).
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters t
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-416/86-12-01:
Failure to provide emergency response personnel training in accordance with Administrative Procedure 01-S-04-21.
Review and discussion of Licensee Training Division print-out and selected personnel training records disclosed that personnel training was implemented in accordance with Administrative Procedure 01-S-04-21.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-416/86-12-02:
Documentation of the review of agreement letters with _ offsite support groups.
Detailed review of procedures disclosed that specific documentation of licensee review of
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subject agreement letters was not required.
Inspection disclosed, however, that review of agreement letters with offsite support groups is included in the annual audit of the emergency preparedness program.
In view of the i
latter disclosure, the item was closed.
The above finding was discussed with a licensee representative via telephone on December 18, 1986.
The licensee representative, however, was informed that their review of agreement letters with offsite support groups should be documented to chronicle any changes therein, and to assure that requirements
~ of such agreements continue to be implemented. The licensee representative was further informed that the subject finding would be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
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Inspection Followup Item 50-416/86-40-01:
Document all reviews of agreement
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letters with offsite support groups. The licensee acknowledged this finding
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and committed to implement corrective action.
4.
ExerciseScenario(82301)
l The scenario 'for the emergency response was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
t The scenario was reviewed and discussed in detail with licensee representa-
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tives on several occasions in advance of the scheduled exercise date. While
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no major scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became-apparent during the exercise.
The inconsistencies, however, failed to
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detract from the performance of the licensee's emergency organization.
i l-The scenario devek ved for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised i
the onsite emergency organization.
The scenario provided sufficient information to the States, counties, local government and Federal agencies consistent with their participation in the exercise.
l The licensee demonstrated a significant commitment to training and personnel
through the use of controllers, observers, and specialists participating in j
the exercise.
The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the
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exercise.
The inspectors observed neither prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and players.
The scope and objectives of the exercise were fully satisfied, i
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.
The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.
Discussions with licensee representatives and detailed review of the site Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
The inspectors also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (0SC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F).
At the response facilities cited, required staffing and assignment of responsi-bility were consistent with the licensee's Emergency Plan and approved Implementing Procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's offsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsi-bilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organization l
interactions.
The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the organization.
Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personnel.
The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Station Manager.
Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response organization and State and local support agencies were adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identifie '
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7.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to assure that the following arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and guidance promulgated in Section II.C of NUREG-0654, namely:
(1) accommodation of selected State emergency response representatives at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility; and (2) identification of organizations capable of augmenting the planned response.
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Licensee interaction with offsite support agencies was limited to notifica-tion of emergency classifications and associated dispatch of followup messages.
Licensee notification of offsite organizations was prompt, effective, and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
Assistance resources from State and local agencies were available to the licensee consistent with the scope of their participation in the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Classification System (83201)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended
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in IE Information Notice 83-28.
An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to promptly identify and properly classify an emergency, and escalated it to more severe emergency classifica-tions as the simulated accident sequence progressed.
Licensee actions in this area were timely and effective.
Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system was effectively used and was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
The system was observed to be adequate for classification of the simulated accident sequences.
The emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated en'ergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Notification Methods and Procedures (83201)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations were established. This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR
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50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
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T An inspector observed that notification ' methods and procedures.were established and available for use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizations, if required.
Notification of the State of Mississippi and other designated offsite response organizations was completed within 15 minutes following declaration of each emergency classification identified.
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Telephone notification of the State and local response organizations was promptly followed by transmission of hard copies of the respective notification.
Such copies included prevailing meteorological information,
average release rate (source terms in uC1/sec) where applicable, site boundary integrated dose projections, and recommended protective actions when necessary.
Consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise,
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the prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the i
plume exposure EPZ was not actuated.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-0654.
L The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, OSC,-and E0F), between the licensee and offsite support agencies, and between the offsite environmental monitoring teams and the TSC and E0F.
The inspectors also observed
information flow among the various groups within the-licensee's emergency response organization.
Communications wita offsite support agencies were
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prompt, eFective, and consistent with the scope and objectives of the
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exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
l 11. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
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This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and
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equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
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and specific criteria defined in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.
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The inspectors observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency l
response facilities, and evaluated the equipment provided for emergency use during the exercise.
a.
Control Room - The inspector observed that following review and analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room operations
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personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergency.
Emergency. procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises.
Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational duties.
Effective management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.
The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of
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their duties, responsibilities, and authorities.
Control Room
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personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification t
system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare the proper emergency classification.
It was observed that data and information provided as the scenario's initial sequence of accident events and conditions were readily
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interpreted by the Control Room staff and factored into comencing the exercise in a timely manner.
the Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to effectively assess the initial conditions and implement required mitigating actions.
The inspector also observed, however, that no formal control room log was maintained following transfer of-the Emergency Director's log to the Technical Support Center.
This observation was discussed with licensee representatives as a suggested improvement.
Control Room and emergency response facility logs which
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chronicle accident conditions and corresponding mitigating actions,
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including required notifications and protective action recommendations, assume legal significance during actual emergencies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated and staffed following
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notification by the Emergency Director of the simulated emergency
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conditions leading to the Alert classification.
The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and j
responsibilities.
Required operation of the facility ?roceeded in an
orderly manner.
The TSC was provided with adequatr nuipment for i
support of the assigned staff.
TSC security was promptly established and maintained.
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During operation of the TSC, radiological habitability was routinely monitored.
Status boards and related visual aids were strategically
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Dedicated comuni-j cators were assigned to the facility and all required notifications.
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were promptly implemented.
Status boards were frequently updated as plant conditions and parameters changed.
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Inspection disclosed the following additional findings, namely:
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(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions were readily implemented and factored into problem solving exercises; (2) assumption of duties by the Emergency Director was definite and firm; (3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the Control Room to the TSC was firmly declared and announced to the TSC staff; (4) briefings of the TSC staff were frequent, and consistent with changes in plant status and related emergency conditions; and
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(5) TSC controllers were effective in identifying minor scenario problems and interacted with players without prompting.
i Inspection also disclosed that the initial and followup offsite i
notification messages attending the Alert and Site Area Emergency
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classifications did not report that a release was in progress resulting from an open containment access hatch. Releases and the source thereof should be included in initial and all followup messages as required by Attachment IV of emergency preparedness Procedure EPP-10-S-01-6.
The
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initial notification message for the NOUE cited breach of containment integrity and the cause thereof. Thereafter, problems with containment
were not reported to offsite authorities until repairs were initiated
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during termination of the exercise.
Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-416/86-40-02:
Failure to consistently report offsite releases in initial and followup notification messages as required by Attachment IV of EPP-10-S-01-06.
This item was discussed with licensee representatives during the critique.
The licensee committed to implement required corrections.
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c.
Operations Support Center The OSC was promptly staffed following activation of the emergency plan by the Emergency Coordinator.
An
inspector observed that teams were promptly assembled, briefed, and dispatched.
A health physics technician accompanied each team
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dispatched to radiation control areas.
The OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant of his duties and responsibilities.
During operation of this facility, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and i
documented.
The OSC Coordinator demonstrated effective management and control practices.
The Coordinator frequently updated the staff regarding
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plant status, and assured that each investigation and repair team was thoroughly briefed prior to deployment to the accident areas.
It was observed that the team responsible for sampling and analysis of
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containment air was dispatched without a Controller.
The mission of team, however, was accomplished, and data was reported to the OSC.
This item was discussed with the licensee as a suggested improvement; i.e., to assure that each tei.m dispatched from the OSC is provided with a cognizant controller.
d.
Emergency Operations Facility Consistent with the exercise
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objectives, the E0F was promptly staffed and activated following declaration of the Site Area Emergency.
The Emergency Director demonstrated effective management and control of the facility.
The staff was frequently updated regarding plant status and progress in accident mitigation.
Communications between the E0F and TSC were effective. Exchange of technical information and frequent consultation with the TSC was routinely implemented by the staffs.
Dose assessment and projections were effectively performed.
The dose assessment group demonstrated proficiency in both manual and computerized dose assessment.
Close contact between assessment groups in the EOF and TSC were maintained.
Offsite dose projections were accurate and performed in a timely manner.
Results were incorporated in followup notification messages which originated from the radio-logical assessment group.
The dose assessment staff demonstrated a significant commitment to training throughout the exercise.
Access and contamination control were effectively maintained throughout the exercise.
Notification of participating offsite agencies was consistently performed in a timely manner.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.I of NUREG-0654.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing plant status and providing recommendations to the Emergency Director regarding mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment, prevention and/or control of radioactive releases, and prompt termination of the emergency condition.
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Radiological assessment activities involved several groups.
An inplant group was effective in projecting the radiological impact within the plant based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements. Offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in areas within the path of the plume. Radiological effluent data was received in the TSC and E0F where dose calculations were computed and factored into the exercise.
All resultant data were consistent with projected scenario parameters.
Offsite radiological monitoring teams (0MT) were staged and later dispatched from the site access point (SAP).
Frequent OMT briefings were provided by the SAP Coordinator regarding plant status, meteorological data, and periodic request for personnel dosimetry readings.
Radio communications between the OMTs, SAP, and EOF was of high quality throughout the exercise.
OMT personnel training cards were checked and verified prior to deployment.
Additionally, personnel biosensitivity to potassium iodide (KI) was checked prior to assignment / deployment. OMT personnel demonstrated familiarity with sampling locations and routine map reading.
The following items requiring improvement were identified by licensee and NRC observers, namely:
delay in activation of the SAP; delay in deployment of OMTs; breach of contamination control practices by Red Team's donning of protective clothing after exiting the SAP. The inspector also observed the Red Team's failure to monitor and estimate beta dose as required by Procedure EPP-10-14, Rev. 6.
Based on this finding, IFI 50-416/85-04-02 remains open, and will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
These items were discussed during the licensee's Controller /0bserver critique and the NRC/ Licensee Critique.
The inspector assigned to the Red Team (OMT) observed that a habitability survey was conducted in the SAP sign-in area.
It was also observed that routine surveys of the entire SAP as required by Sections 6.4.2 of EPP 10-S-01-17, and 6.3 of EPP 10-S-01-15 were not conducted.
Inspector Followup Item 50-416/86-40-03:
Failure to conduct periodic habitability surveys of the entire SAP consistent with requirements of Procedures EPP 10-S-01-17 and EPP 10-S-01-15.
This item was discussed with licensee representatives prior to and during the exercise critique.
The licensee committed to implement corrective actions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Protective Response (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines established for protective actions consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and that protective actions for emergency workers including evacuation of non-essential personnel, are promptly implemented pursuant te 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654.
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Protective measures _ decision making process was observed by the inspectors.
For each emergency classification defined, appropriate inplant and offsite protective measures were reviewed. Protective measures recommendations were consistent with the limited scale and scope of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
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This area was observed to determine that methods for controlling radio-
logical exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for j
emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure guidelines
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consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-0654.
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An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout
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the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers and i '
conducting periodic radiological surveys in the energency response facilities.
Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions.
Adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection
were available for use as required.
i Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared adequate.
Health Physics Supervisors were observed to thoroughly brief survey, investigative, and repair teams prior to their deployment into radiation controlled areas.
Dosimetry was available and effectively used.
High range dosimeters were also available in case they were needed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether information concerning the
simulated emergency had been made available for dissemination to the public
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as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
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i Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the i
exercise.
The licensee established a near-site Media Center and provided
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periodic news announcements.
16. Recovery Planning (82301)
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This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13),
Paragraph IV.H of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and the specific guidance promulgated in Section II.M of NUREG-0654.
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The licensee conducted a recovery planning meeting prior to termination of the exercise.
Licensee planners discussed and established the following:
administrative and logistical support, manpower and engineering services; radiological surveillance; development and assignment of a recovery organization consistent with the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
A comprehensive review of reentry plans and status was also conducted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
17. Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
The inspectors observed the licensee's Controller / Evaluator critique following termination of the exercise.
The subject critique involved a detailed discussion and analysis of improvements and weaknesses, identified
during the exercise.
All findings were documented for review and required correction where indicated.
Positive findings were also discussed and recorded for presentation during the formal NRC/ Licensee critique.
The licensee's controller / evaluator and final critiques were effectively managed, controlled, and directed to identification / documentation of substantive findings and indicated improvements. The conduct and content of the cited critiques were consistent with regulatory requirerrents and guidance cited above.
No violations or deviations were identified.
18.
InspectorFollowup(92701)
(Closed) IFI 50-416/85-44-02:
Failure to implement Procedure CEPP-49 regarding E0F air sampling consistent with scope of exercise.
Inspection disclosed representative zone of EOF was sampled as required.
(Closed) IFI 50-416/85-44-03:
CEPP-4.5 requiring activation of the E0F H&V recirculation is inadequate.
Inspection disclosed that subject procedure was revised to indicate activity levels at which subject recirculation system is actuated.
(Closed) IFI 50-416/85-IN-98:
Offsite Medical Services.
Inspection t
disclosed that Section 6.7.3 and 6.7.4 of the licensee's Emergency Plan and Annex J of the State of Mississippi Emergency Plan provide for arrangements with local medical facilities for care of emergency workers and the general public.
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(Closed) IFI 50-416/86-16-01:
Screening of KI sensitive personnel from assignment to Field Monitoring Teams.
Inspection of a printout dated 11/7/86, listed personnel capable of receiving KI.
Further, personnel assigned to field monitoring teams during the subject exercise were checked regarding KI sensitivity prior to deployment via review of the cited list.
(0 pen) IFI 50-416/85-04-02:
Failure to estimate offsite beta dose as per Procedure EPP-10-14, Rev. 6.
See Paragraph 12 above.
Attachment:
Exercise Scope and Objectives and Timetable
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GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OBJECTIVES DECEMBER 1986
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I.
Onsite Response Objectives
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A.
Actions to be Demonstrated
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1.
Recognition and classification of emergency conditions 2.
Activation of emergency plan 3.
Knowledge, implementation, and use of appropriate emergency procedures 4.
Notification and response of plant emergency response personnel during non-working hours 5.
Notification of offsite agencies 6.
Recognition of more severe conditions and escalation of emergency classification 7.
Activation of Technical Support Center (TSC)
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Activation of Operations Support Center (OSC)
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Activation of Site Access Point (SAP)
10. Transfer of control and Emergency Director duties from Shift
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Superintendent to appropr'iate plant management personnel 11. Control and management of emergency response personnel
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12. Ability of Control Room operations and technical staff to take appropriate actions to control, mitigate, and terminate the emergency and limit releases of radioactive materials to the environment 13. Ability to perform onsite and offsite radiological monitoring and dose assessment 14. Ability to adequately communicate between onsite and offsite emergency facilities B.
Actions Not to be Demonstrated 1.
Shift staffing for long-term operations 2.
Evacuation of Control Room, TSC or OSC
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Total site evacuation or evacuation of any personnel not normally associated with GGNS J12 MISC 86082501 - 1 e
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4.
Decontamination of personnel or vehicles on or departing site
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Response to simulated offsite radiological release involving offsite agencies
- 6 Activation of search and rescue teams
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Medical team response and transportation for a simulated contaminated and injured individual
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Actual use of Post Accident Sampling System
- These items are tested in separate drills.
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J12 MISC 86082501 - 2 m
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V II. Offsite Response Objectives A.
Actions to be Demonstrated 1.
Notification and response of offsite emergency response personnel during non-working hours 2.
Response and assembly of offsite emergency response personnel at appropriate emergency facilities 3.
Activation of the Corporate Emergency Center (CEC)
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Knowledge, implementation and use of appropriate emergency procedures 5.
Ability to adequately communicate between onsite and offsite emergency facilities 6.
Timely release of coordinated news information from CEC and performance of rumor control functions 7.
Control and management of emergency response personnel at CEC
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Ability to transfer emergency response personnel to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Emergency News Media Center (ENMC)
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Activation of the EOF
10. Activation of the ENMC n
11.
Communication and coordination between the TSC and E0F
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12. Ability of EOF to perform technical support services 13. Ability of E0F to direct offsite radiological monitoring and perform dose assessment
14. Ability of E0F to provide timely and accurate notifications and information to offsite agencies 15. Ability of ENMC to provide timely and accurate information to news media personnel 16. Security and access controls at EOF and ENMC B.
Actions Not to be Demonstrated 1.
Notification or requests to non-MP&L organizations to provide technical or logistical support and assistance 2.
Notification of elected public officials 3.
Shift staffing for long-term operations J12 MISC 86082501 - 3
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4.
Provision for lodging and meals in local area for emergency
-
response personnel i
5.
Transfer from EOF and ENMC back to CEC due to de-escalation of emergency classification G.
Use of backup EOF 7.
Performance of offsite radiological monitoring from aircraft or watercraft 8.
Decontamination of personnel or vehicles on or departing site
.
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I J12 MISC 86082501 - 4
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GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION i
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE TIMETABLE FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS Time 1855 UNUSUAL EVENT - Plaat shutdown required due to loss of primary containment integrity. Will.be declared when plant shutdown is commenced.
2010 ALERT - Fire defeating one ESF electrical division.
2210 SITE AREA EMERGENCY - ATkS with reactor power greater than 5%
and no core damage.
0130 ALERT - Reactor suberitical and dose rates decreasing.
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PCOM GGNS EMER EXERCISE - 5 m