IR 05000416/1989011

Insp Rept 50-416/89-11 on 890410-14.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Inservice Insp, Including Review of Procedures,Nrc Bulletin 87-001,Generic Ltr 88-01,Info Notices88-003 & 89-001 & Feedwater Valves

ML20246H818
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	04/26/1989
From:	Blake J, Coley J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246H806	List: IR 05000416/1989011 ML20246H802
References
50-416-89-11, GL-88-01, GL-88-1, IEB-87-001, IEB-87-1, IEIN-88-003, IEIN-88-3, IEIN-89-001, IEIN-89-1, NUDOCS 8905160206
Download: ML20246H818 (8)

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' UNITED STATES -

AFf00f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION :

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-j' 101 MARIETTA STREET, ' ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323 A.u../

. Report ~No,':':50-416/89-11

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. Licensee: System' Energy Resources, In '

' Jackson, MS- 39205 sDocketLNo.: ;50-41 License No.: .NPF-2 ' Facility.Name: . Grand Gulf Inspection o uc e April 10-14, 1989 Inspect r ~ 7 N4 67

' e ' Date Signed Approved b : .

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Date Signed a erials &. Processes Section

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E ineering'. Branch Division of, Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas of inservice inspection - review of procedures observation of work activities and review of data and evaluations,Bulletin 87-01, Generic Letter 88-01, Information Hotices 88-03, and 89-01. and feedwater Check Valves B21aF010B ant' F032 Results: Based on inspection of licensee inservice inspection activities during the current outage. lhe licensee has a strong program for

- ' preventior, ard detectf on of problems that could negate the integrity of plant systems and components. Resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint was considered to be the licensee's strong point based on- the mitigating actions taken by the licensee to prevent intergranular stress corrosion crackin Responsiveness to NRC initiatives was demonstrated in the licensee response and corrective actions to NRC Bulletin 87-01, Generic Letter 88-01 and Information Notice 88-03. Plant Management was actively' involved in efforts to ensure quality are revealed in their comprehensive knowledge ' of

, details relating to specific problems addressed- by the inspecto Training and qualification effectiveness appeared to be good based on observation of w'ork activitie In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie $k$$

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted .

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Licensee Employees PR. Courtney, Supervisor, Quality Programs ,

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fD.Cupatid, Manager,PlantModificationandConstruction -

PL. Daughtery., Supervisor, Compliance PS. Feith, Director Quality Programs PR. Hutchinson, Plant General Manager L. Moulder, Operations Superintendent

[J. Roberts, Manager,PerformanceandSystemEngineering

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PS. Saunders, Engineering Support Superintendent *

PR. Strickland, Senior Quality Assurance Representative lJ.Yelverton, Manager,PlantOperations

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Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, technicians, and administrative personne Other Organizations -

e R. Brinkman, Project Supervisor, General Electric (GE)

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NRC Resident Inspectors (aH. Christensen, Senior Resident Inspector y s

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• J. Mathis, Resident Inspector ,

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,* Attended exit interview Inservice Inspection (ISI) ('i The inspector reviewed tne licensee's ISI activities to determine whether \

these activities are being performed in accordance with regulatory requirements and licensee commitment The initial ISI interval examination program must comply (10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4)(1) with the requirer..ents of the latest edition and addenda of Section XI to the ASME Code incorporated into 10 CFR 50.55a on the date 12 months before the date

' of issuance of the operating license. Based on a June 16, 1982 operating

< license for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 (GGNS-1), the code

! applicable to the first internal program is the 1977 Edition with Addenda through Summer 1979. GGNS-1 is presently in the third refueling outage of the first interva r

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a. Review of Procedures (73052)

The inspector reviewed the ISI procedures indicated below to determine whether the procedures adequately covered the required aspects of the approved ISI progra <

(1) Radiography standard No. M-RT-XG-2 Revision 3, Nondestructive '.

Examination Standard - Radiography

(2) Quality Assurance Instruction -(QAI) 9.03 Revision 3, Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Simil

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(3) QAI 9.11 Revision 1, VT-1 Visual Examination (Bolts and Pump i Casing)

(4) QAI-N-0.13 Revision 2, Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) Solvent Removable (ASME,Section XI)

(5) QAI-N9.14 Revision 2, Magnetic Particle Examination (MT) Yoke ,

Method (ASME,Section XI) ,

l l (6) QAI-N9.22 Revision 3, Magnetic Particle Examination (Direct l Magnetization and Coil Methods ASME XI)

i (7) QAI-N9.22 Revision 0, Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Metal Welds For Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)

(8) QA-N9.25 Revision 0, VT-1 Visual Weld Examinations v

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(9) QAI-I 10.12 Revision 2, VT-2 Visual Examination (10) QAI-1 10.13 Revision 2, VT-3 Visual Examination ( ,

(11) QAl-I 10.14 R uision 1, VT-4 Visuel Examination 4 .

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(12) GE Procedure No. UT-21 Revision 3, Procedure For UT Examination of Pressure Retaining Bolting Exceeding Two Inches In Diameter -

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(13) QAl-N9.05 Revision 0, Ultrasonic Thickness Measurement (Digital) \ . $"

(14) General Maintenance Instruction 07-S-14-222 Revision 2, Monitoring For Internal Erosion /Conosion on Piping Components The above procedures were also reviewed to determine the following:

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Compliance with licensee commitments ,

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Qualification of nondestructive examination (NDE) personnel i

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- Method of examination, extent, and technique is adequately described and in conformance with requirements and examination objectives

- Procedure include any special requirements imposed by joint NRC -

or industry initiatives Methods to record and evaluate test results are specified

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In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie Observation of Work and Work Activities (73753)

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The inspector observed inservice examination activities and radiographs of plant modification activities to determine whether these activities which involved repair, replacement, and examination of safety related components and piping welds were performed in accordance with regulatory requirements and licensee procedures. The following components / welds were examined by the inspector:

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Ultrasonic Calibration and examination of reactor vessel studs:

1. 38, #39, #40, #41, #42, #43, and #44

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Radiographs for Class 2 Residual Heat Removal System Welds: '

E12-FW564, E12-FW-563, E12-W502, E-12-W-501 and E12-FW561

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- Calibration and examination of Item 16 in wall thinning program -

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for minimum ultrasonic pipe wall thickness in accordan:e with ,

NRC Bulltin 87-01 and GGNS General Maintenance Instruction 07-S-14-32 The above examinations were performed in ,

accordance with approved examination procedures by personnel * 4

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l knowledgeable of the examination method and operation of the a g' .'

test equipmen ' -

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l QuaMfication and certification records for the following examiners i s s whose work was verified b3 the inspector wes reviewed:

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Examiner Method and Level Vendor UT Level I3 U.S. Testing s 4 s RT Level II U.S. Testing RT Level II U.S. Testing UT and RT Level II U.S. Testing UT Level II GE UT Level II GE UT Level II GE RT Level II SERI -

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Within the areas examined, violations or deviations were not e

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4 Review of Data and Evaluations (73755)

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The inspector reviewed GE's " Smart System" data and the Ultrasonic .

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examiners analysis of the data for the reactor vessel nozzle to safe-end welds listed below. This review was performed to determine

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if the records were consistent with regulatory requirements and .

licensee procedures. Video tapes, smart system presentations, plots J of UT reflectors, examination data sheets, and calibration data 'i'

sheets were reviewed for the following welds:

System Weld ID Feedwater 1B13-N4C-KB I Feedwater IB13-N4B-KB Feedwater IB13-N4E-KB Feedwater IB13-N4F-KB RECIRC 1813-N2H-KB '

RECIRC IB13-N2G-KB ,

RECIRC 1B13-N2J-KB

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RECIRC ,

Examiners performing the above analysis of IGSCC examinations were qualified at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) NDE Center in Charlotte, N.C. in accordance with the NRC/EPRI/ Boiling Water V Reactors Owners Group Coordination Pla Within the areas examined, violations or deviations were not

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). Follow-up Inspection on Bulletins, Generic Letters, Information Notices s s ,

and Other Followup Items (92701)  ; \g 3{

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l (0 pen)Bulletin 87-01, Thinning of Pipe Walls in Nuclear Power ,' '

l Plants. This Bulletin requested licensees to provide NRC information gy- '

i concerning their programs for monitoring the wall thickness of pipes .

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in condensate, feedwater, steam, and connected high emergency piping system, including all safety-re'ated and r on-safety piping systems fabricated of carbon steel. The inspector reviewed the licensee

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program for implementing the objectives of the Bulletin. In addition the ultrasonic procedure was reviewed and the ultrasonic examination of program item #16 was observed. The inspector concluded that the licensee is aggressively pursuing a systematic program for the detection of wall thinning at GGNS-1 and that inspection procedures and personnel effectively examine the samples selected in the .

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progra (0 pen) Generic Letter 88-01, NRC Position on IGSCC in EWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Pipin Generic Letter 88-01 requested licensee of BWR facilities to evaluate plant systems to criteria published in

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NUREG-0313, Revision 2, to determine what actions are required to ',

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ensure long-term piping integrity and reliability against intergranular stress corrosion cracking. GGNS evaluated the systems comprising the reactor coolant pressure boundary and identified 268 welds that required classification into the seven IGSCC Categorie The results of the classification were 210 welds in category A, 24 welds in category B and 34 welds in category Of the three categories only category "D" welds em fabricated from " nonresistant -

materials with no stress improvement." These welds arerequired to be -

examined at every secord refueling cycle. The 34 Category "D" welds

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at GGNS resulted from the use of Inconel 182 weld material as a ~

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butter layer prior to making the assembly welds. These welds are -

located at the interfaces between the reactor pressure vessel nozzles and the safe end or the safe end to safe end extension / penetration seal. During GGNS first refueling outage, these welds were fully

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r examined for IGSCC, except for limitations addressed by WRC approved i relief request pursuart to 10 CFR 50.55a(g). No flaws indicative of ..

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IGSCC were identified at that time. These welds were also examined ,

this outage (Refueling Outage #3) by GE and no flaws indicative of IGSCC were identified. 17 of the welds this outage were examined with GE's " Smart" automated UT system. As stated in paragraph 2.c of /

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this report the inspector analyzed the data for eight of the 17 welds '

and concurred with GE's evaluations. In addition the inspector verified the licensee's response to NRC/NRR by reviewing a sample of .

5 systems foi boundary Temperature and material compliance. The ,

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inspector discovered that the licensee's review had been very

comprehensive and accurat The inspector also noted that GGNS had -

minimized the ese of nonconforming materials in the detign of the  %

j l plant by substituting carbon steel for 304 stainiers steel in as many . .\ . ,

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systems as possible. The licensee has performed in a outstanding

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manner in controlling issues dealing with IGSC '

l Information Notice 88-03, tracks in Shroud Support Access Hole Cover M N Welds. Jet pump EWRs are designed with access holes in the shroud

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support plate which is located at the bottom of the annulus between , s'

the core shroud and the reactor vessel wall. Eacii reactor vessel has ,

two such holes which are located 180 degrees apart. These holes are ss s .

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used for access during coratruction and are subsequently closed by  %

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welding a plate over the hole. The covers and snroud support ledge '

are Inconel 600 material . The connecting weld material is also .

Inconel 600 (alloy 182 or 82). The high residual stresses resulting * *

from welding, along with a possible crevice geometry of the weld,

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when combined with less than ideal water quality, normally would present a condition conducive to intergranular stress corrosion cracking. However, the inspector's review of GGNS-1 weld joint

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configuration revealed that, the crevice in one access hole was eliminated by placing a seal weld on the underside of the plat .3 Since access to the underside of the second cover for a seal weld is ,,-

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not possible, a Ni-Cr-Fe 316L composite cylinder with a bi metallic weld was fabricated in the shop and welded to the shroud support in the field. A 316L cover was placed over the 316L ring and welded from one side.

I Essentially, this design replaced the Inconel 600 crevice with one l 316L for one access hole cover. The licensee's actions is resolving l this proble.n for GGNS-1 is another example of sound engineering l

planning, to control the IGSCC problem in BWR plants.

I J d. Information Notice 89-01, Valve Body Erosio During a recent l

refueling outage, at another BWR f acility, inspections of valve body internal surfaces revealed areas of significant, but localized, l erosion in several carbon steel valve bodies. The erosion problem l

j appeared to be unique to valves used for throttling service. The l

obvious safety concern addressed in the notice was that continued i operation without weld repair or replacement could lead to rupture of l safety-related valve bodies.

l The inspector review of the licensee's actions regarding the information notice revealed that no inspections were performed on throttling valves during this refueling outag However triree throttling valves were replaced during refueling outage 2 because of valve erosion (RHR 53 A&B and 37A). The licensee investigation into this matter resulted in reduced throttling limitation The

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licensee's in-house engineering has requested a 30 day extension on

! developing a plan to resolve this issu The inspection was

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concerned over plans for sample expansion and ultrasonic surveillance l of suspected valves. Licensee's actions regarding this information notice will be examined by the inspector during refueling # Feedwater Check Value B21F010 "t3" and F032 "B" Followu On April 4,1989 NRC was notified by the licensee that the valves identified above could not be pressurized (would not seat) during a Type "C" local leak rate tes The inspector reviewed the problem during the inspection with cognizant licensee personnel and discovered that the valve had failed becau;e of a deteriorated resilient back seat. Tne resilient seat in question was installed during refueling outage 2 as an improved replacement since it had a shelf life of 6 years in lieu of the 1.5 year shelf life of the original design. The licensee has replaced the damage seats with the original design seats and will be performing an evaluation of why the long shelf-life seats faile This evaluation will be completed orior to refueling outage #4. The valves in question have passed a subsequent leak test utilizing the original design seats. This item will also be examined by the inspector for resolution of the material problem ciuring refueling #4.

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Within the areas examined, violations or deviations were not

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not possible, a Ni-Cr-Fe 316L composite cylinder with a bi metallic weld was fabricated in the shop and welded to the shroud support in tha field. A 316L cover was placed over the 316L ring and welded from one sid Essentially, this design replaced the Inconel 600 crevice with one 316L for one access hole cover. The licensee's actions is resolving this proble.n for GGNS-1 is another example of sound engineering planning, to control the IGSCC problem in BWR plants, Information Notice 89-01, Valve Body Erosion. During a recent refueling outage, at another BWR facility, inspections of valve body internal surfaces revealed areas of significant, but localized, erosion in several carbon steel valve bodies. The erosion problem appeared to be unique to valves used for throttling service. The obvious safety concern addressed in the notice was that continued operation without weld repair or replacement could lead to rupture of safety related valve bodie The inspector review of the licensee's actions regarding the information notice revealed that no inspections were performed on throttling valves during this refueling outag However three throttling valves were replaced during refueling outage 2 because of valve erosion (RHR 53 A&B and 37A). The licensee investigation into this matter resulted in reduced throttling limitation The licensee's in-house engineering has requested a 30 day extension on developing a plan to resolve this issue. The inspection was concerned over plans for sample expansion and ultrasonic surveillance of suspected valves. Licensee's actions regarding this information notice will be examined by the inspector during refueling # Feedwater Check Value B21F010 "B" and F032 "B" Followu On April 4, 1989 NRC was notified by the licensee that the valves identified above could not be pressurized (would not seat) during a Type "C" local leak rate test. The inspector reviewed the problem during the inspection with cognizant licensee personnel and discovered that the valve had failed because of a deteriorated resilient back seat. The resilient seat in question was installed during refueling outage 2 as an improved replacement since it had a shelf life of 6 years in lieu of the 1.5 year shelf life of the original design. The licensee has replaced the damage seats with the original design seats and will be performing an evaluation of why the long shelf-life seats faile This evaluation will be completed prior to refueling outage #4. The valves in question have passed a subsequent leak test utilizing the original design seats. This item will also be examined by the inspector for resolution of the material problem during refueling # Within the areas examined, violations or deviations were not identifie ___________ - -- - -

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l 3. Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on April 14, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection result Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the license >

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