IR 05000416/1989007
| ML20244D837 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1989 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Christensen H, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20244D821 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-89-07, 50-416-89-7, NUDOCS 8904240142 | |
| Download: ML20244D837 (11) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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Report No.:
50-416/89-07'
Licensee: System Energy Pesources, Inc.
Jackson, MS 39205 Docket No.:
50-416 License No.:
NPF-29-Facility Name:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted:
February 18 through March 17, 1989 Inspectors:
//[N/)hl9 H.~0. Christensen, p orj esident Inspector Da'te Signed R
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6'fS'1
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J. L. Mathi s, Residenfl'nspector D' ate 'Si gned
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N/6d9 Approved by:
x F.S' tantre'll Sec'ciori/Cpfeff Di' vision Difte 61gn6d of Reactor Projects '
SUMMARY Scope:
This routine,_ announced inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors onsite in the areas of operational safety verification, maintenance observation, surveillance observation, engineering safety features (ESF) system walkdown, and other areas.
The inspectors conducted backshift inspection on February 20, 1989 and March 12, 1989.
Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations. were identified.
A walkdown of the HPCS diesel generator and the fire water pump house indicated a large number of labelling errors, particularly in the electrical panel area.
This reporting period ended by the unit shutting down for refueling outage 3.
8904240112 890412 PDR ADOCK 05000416 g g G
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f REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J.G. Cesare, Director, Nuclear Licensing W.T. Cottle, Vice President of Nuclear Operations
- D.G. Cupstid, Superintendent, Technical Support
- L.F. Daughtery, Compliance Supervisor
- J.P. Dimmette, Manager, Plant Maintenance S.M. Feith, Director,-Quality Programs
- C.R. Hutchinson, GGNS General Manager R.H. McAnuity, Electrical Superintendent A.S. McCurdy, Technical Asst., Plant Operations Manager
- L.B. Moulder, Operations Superintendent J.H. Mueller, Mechanical Superintendent J.V. Parrish, Chemistry / Radiation Control Superintendent
- J.C. Roberts, Manager, Plant System Engineering J.L. Robertson, Superintendent, Plant Licensing
- S.F.-Tanner, Manager, Quality Services
- L.G. Temple, I & C Superintendent F.W. Titus, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering
- M.J. Wright, Manager, Plant Support
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- J.W. Yelverton, Manager, Plant Operations
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Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Plant Operating Status The plant started the report period at 100% power. On February 26, 1989, the unit achieved All Rod Out (AR0) core pattern and on March 17, 1989 the plant commence shutdown for a refueling outage.
3.
Operational Safety (71707)
The inspectors kept cognizant of the overall plant status, and of any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room.
Observations included the verification of instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access controls.
This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
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On a weekly bases selected; engineered safety feature (ESF) systems were confi rmed operable.
The confirmation was made by verifying that accessible valve flow path alignment was correct, power supply breaker and fuse status were correct, and instrumentation was operational.
The following systems were verified operable: LPCI ' C', LPCS, LPCI
'B', RPS,
and HPCS.
Additionally, the inspectors conducted a modified system walkdown on the SSW and SBLC systems.
The walkdown used the Grand Gulf Probabilistic Risk Assessment Based System Inspection Plan as a guide.
General plant tours were conducted on a weekly basis. Portions of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside areas were visited.
The observations included safety related tagout verifications, shift turnovers, sampling programs, housekeeping and general. plant conditions, the status of fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, problem identification systems, and cor.tainment isolation was also verified. Additionally the licensee's onsite emergency response facilities were toured to determine facility readiness.
A review of the LCO log on March 1, 1989, indicated that 38 fire protection LCOs were in effect. Of these, two were originated in 1986, one in 1987, and 17 in 1988.
The action statement for the majority of these LCOs requires an hourly check by a firewatch. A computer is used to keep track of the LCOs and to aid the shift supervisor in determining if a continuous fire watch is needed. On a daily basis: an hourly fire watch checksheet is printed out and used to document the TS required surveillance.
To increase management attention in this area, a fire penetration work list was developed and the status o/ the outstanding items is being tracked on the daily plant status report.
The inspector conducted a walkdown of the fire water pump house using SOI 04-S-01-P64-1, Revision 24, Fire Protection Water System, and P&ID M-0035A, Revision 25.
The walkdown consisted of verifying correct valve
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positions, equipment condition and proper electrical lineups. During the walkdown the following deficiencies were identified:
- 12 valves had missing labels
- Valve NSP64-FX006 was missing a hand wheel
- The jockey fire pumps inlet and outlet piping was corroded and the pump has a seal leak
- Fire pump A and B seal area is corroded
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- Valve NSP64-PCV-F507 is labelled with two different valve
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numbers
- Valve NSP64-F058H is missing its valve cap and a piece of tubing is attached to the drain line
- The following valves according to the electrical lineup checksheet breaker position should be energized.
However, the breaker were deenergized:
F282A, F283A, F282B and F283B.
- There were several labelling discrepancies where the breaker and the electrical check sheet had different names.
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The electrical checksheet for MCC 14P12 described components as heat tracing, however the label was named panel D/G bid sprinkler system and SSW.
The valves were aligned in accordance - with the procedure.
The correction of the above deficiency will be an inspector followup item (416/89-07-01).
The inspectors observed health physics management involvement and awareness of significant plant activities, and observed plant radiation controls. The inspectors verified licensee compliance with phyrical security manning and access control requirements.
Per L coii;r the inspectors verified the adequacy of physical security detection and assessment aids. The inspectors reviewed the following safety related tagouts involving the inboard MOV thermal overload bypass switch, TIP and E12F410.
The review ensured that the tagout was properly prepared and performed, and that the tagged components were in the required position.
On March 8,1989, during a routine plant tour, the inspectors noted that a radiation area - on the southwest corner of the 93 foot level of the auxiliary building was inadequately pasted. An individual could enter the area from stairway 1A12 and not see a radiation area posting. The highest-radiation level in the area was 35 millirem per hour.
The entry into this area was originally posted on the back of door IA107, however, the door was propped open to support the alternate decay heat removal system
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hydrostatic test. With the docr propped open the radiation area posting
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was not visible. 10 CFR 20.203 (a) (2) (b), Radiation Area, states, each radiation area shall Le conspicuously posted with a sign or signs bearing the radiation cautio symbol and the words: Caution; Radiation Area. The licensee immediately reposted the. area, counseled the individuals who propped the door open without notifying health physics, and conducted l
training on the event. The licensee was informed that the lack of posting was a violation of 10 CFR 20.203, but it will not be cited because this violation meets the criteria specified in section V of the NRC Enforcement
Policy for not issuing a Notice of Violation.
The inspectors have noted that senior plant management makes routine tours I
l to the plant and.the control room.
l The inspectors reviewed the activities associated with the below listed events.
On February 20, 1989 the site received a tornado warning. The operators j
started the division 1 and 2 diesel generators per Off-Normal Event Procedure (0NEP) 05-1-02-V1-2, Revision 16, Hurricanes, Tornados and
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Severe Weather, at 3:26 p.m. and 3:41 p.m.,
respectively. The diesels were paralleled to the offsite power sources, loaded for testing, and then a
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separated from the offsite power source. At 4:35 p.m., the Tensas Parish, Louisiana Sheriff's Department reported a tornado touchdown, no damage to l
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l the plant was reported.
The operators secured the unloaded diesels per S0I 04-1-01-1P75-1 and exited ONEP 05-1-02-VI-2 at 6:09 and 6:15 p.m. for diesel 1 and 2 respectively.
On February 24, 1989 at approximately 12:05 a.m. the "A" recirculation flow control valve had a runback from approximately 73 percent open posi-tion to the 20 percent open position.
Reactor power decreased from 100 percent to 80 percent during the runback.
During the event, reactor water level increased to 42 inches then decreased to 28 inches due to the FCV runback. The FCV runback was reset in accordance with S0I 04-1-01-B33-1, Reactor Recirculation System, and the loop flow was return to within TS 3.4.1.3 limits within two hours as required.
All actions associated
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with ONEP 05-1-02-III-3, Decrease in Recirculation System Flow Rate, and ARI 04-1-02-1H13-P680-4Al-C4, Recirculation FCV A Partial Close/RFP Trip, were performed.
Feedwater level control operated properly to maintain reactor water level in the normal band. The licensee has written an MWO
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to investigate the cause of FCV "A" runback. Follow-up inspections will be performed by the inspectors after the licensee's evaluation is complete.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
During the report period, the inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below.
The observations included a review of the maintenance work orders (MW0s), and other related documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, technical specifications, quality controls, and radiological controls; observation of work, retesting; and specified retest requirements.
MWO M84627 Install Replacement Inner Seal for Spent Fuel Pool Gate MWO ME0752 HPCS Jockey Fump Oil Change MWO ME5234 Check LPCS Jockey Pump Coupling Wear NWO ME4485 Clean PSW Side of CCW Heat Exchanger A No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillance listed below.
The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy; conformance to technical specifications and limiting conditions for operations (LCOs); verification of test instrument calibration; observation of all or part of the actual surveillance; removal from service and return to service of the system or components; and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.
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06-IC-1C51-V-0001, Revision 25, Attachment VIII, IRM Calibration Channel H l
06-MR-1M23-V-001, Revision 28, Attachment II, Lower Containment Airlock Seal Leak Test
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06-IC-1C11-R-2001, Revision 20, Attachment II, Scram Discharge Volume High Water Level (RPS) Calibration Channel B 06-ME-1M61-V-0001, Revision 32, Attachment II, Local Leak Rate Test (Water Replacement Test-Appendix B), for SSW Valve 41P41F159A 06-IC-1E30-M-0001, Revision 22, Attachment, Suppression Pool Level Wide Range Functional Test for Channel B 06-ME-1000-V-0001, Revision 27, Snubber Visual Inspection 06-IC-1E31-M-1003, Revision 23, RHR Area High Temperature /High Differential Temperature Function Test 06-0P-1C61-R-0002, Revision 24, Remote Shutdown Panel Control Check 06-IC-1C51-W-0006, Revision 25, APRM Calibration l
During the performance of surveillance 06-IC-IC11-R-2001, the inspector noted that the IC technicians were not in continuous communications with the control room. The' technicians had a sound powered phone setup and was using the pager system to receive an alert message then to pick up the sound powered phones to communicate with the control room.
The surveillance procedure requires the establishment of communications l
between the control room and the technicians performing the test.
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Discussion with plant management indicated that continuous communication with the control room was intended when activities that could effect the operation of the plant (i.e., generation of a half scram or ESF actuation)
could be expected.
The licensee stated that Administrative Procedure 01-S-06-14, Use of Communications Equipment, will be revised to clarify the managements expectation for establishing continuous communications.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)
l The inspectors conducted a complete walkdown on the accessible portions of l
the high prassure core spray diesel generator. The walkdown consisted of the following:
a.
Confirm that the system lineup procedure matches the plant drawing for the as-built configuration.
b.
Identify any equipment conditions or items that n.ight degrade plant performance.
c.
Verify that valves in the flow path are in correct positions as required by procedure by either visual observation or remote position indication; that power, if required, is available to the valve; that valves are locked as appropriate; and that local and remote position indications are functional.
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Verify the proper breaker position at local electrical boards and indications on control boards.
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Verify that instrument calibration dates are current.
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System Operating Instruction 04-1-01-P81-1, Revision 33, High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator and Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&ID)
M-1093 A, B and C, HPCS Diesel Generator System were used.
The operating instruction electrical lineup checksheet, Attachment III, component description differed from the actual equipment label for numerous breakers as follows:
Breaker No.
Component Description Breaker Label 52-125135 Mtr Driven Air CPRSR HPCS Power Supp Sys Air Compressor 52-125105 Dryer After Cooler Fan HPCS After Cooler Fan 52-1P25127 Diesel Driven Air CPR GE HPCS Diesel Driven Battery Charge Air CPR 52-17021 Outside Air Fan HPCS D. Gen Room 0/A Fan 52-170118 Engine A Heater HPCS Diesel Gen Immersion HTR A 52-170113 Engine B Heater HPCS Diesel Gen Immersion HTR B 52-170115 Eng B Soakback Pump HPCS D.G CIRC. Oil Pump B 52-170119 Eng A Soakback Pump HPCS D.G. CIRC. Oil Pump A 52-1P71128 Gen Stator Monitoring HPCS Power Supply Sys Engine Control 52-1P71131 Mtr Sp HTR for X77-C002 Motor Space Heat for D/G Room Vent Supply The following ALARM was not on the system Alarm Index, Attachment IV, of procedure 01-1-01-P81-1.
Panel Actual Name Name in 501 IH22-P118-00-F3 Low Room Air Temp None The following discrepancies were identified during HPCS diesel walkdown:
-Valve missing labels; PCV-506B, F067B, D0022B, TCV-F600, F085, F086, F087, F088, F030A, F031A.
-Valve N1P81F066A had a broken hand wheel. A deficiency tag had been hung.
-On P&ID M-1093A, the drawing reference flag refers valves F003A to the engine driven fuel oil pump. Actual system valve goes to the motor driven fuel oil pump.
-On P&ID M-1093A, the drawing reference flag refers valve F002A to the motor driven fuel oil pump.
Actual system valve goes to the engine driven fuel oil pump.
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-Drawing M-1093B shows a small line going to the C008A engine driven jacket water pump from the jacket water heater (B003A). The actual line goes to the C007A engine driven jacket water pump.
-Drawings M-1093B and C shows a spring loaded check valve (F026A and F0268) between the soak back pump and lube oil filter (D024A). These valves appear to be missing from the line.
-Drawing M-1093B show (B50015) as a single basket strainer in the fuel oil line to the motor driven fuel oil pump.
The actual equipment appears to be a duplex line filter.
The correction of the above items will be a inspector followup item (416/89-07-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Repcetable Occurrences (90712, C2700)
The below listed event reports were reviewed to determine if the information provided met the NRC reporting requirements.
The determination included adequacy uf event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussions with plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for the reports indicated by an asterisk. The event reports were reviewed using the guidance of the general policy and procedure for NRC enforcement actions, regarding licensee identified violations.
(Closed) LER 416/87-02, Spurious Control Room Isolation and Standby Fresh Air Unit Start. On February 3,1987, the control room SFAU
"A" spuriously started in the isolation mode from a shutdown condition. The licensee was unable to positively identify the cause of the spurious Start, they hypothesize that a spurious high chlorine detector signal caused the start.
The detectors have been deleted from the requiremerits of TS and the licensee is implementing a modification to remove the detectors. This item is closed.
(Closed) LER 416/88-15, Potential Common Failure Mechanism in Redundant Emergency Diesel Generators.
On September 15, 1988, an operator discovered water draining from Division 2 diesel engine lef t bank intake manifold drain line. The cause of the water was a ruptured intercooler tube.
A diffuser plate had partially broken loose and caused tube fretting. Division I diesel intercooler was inspected, it also had cracks in the left tiank intercooler diffuser plate.
New diffuser plates with minor modifications to provide additional rigidity were reinstalled in the diesels. This item is closed.
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(Closed) LER 416/88-17, Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Due to Personnel-
- Error During Surveillance Test. The isolation was caused by a lack of attention to detail by the operator.
The licensee states that the procedures are clear and explicit on what action to perform. The operator and an I&C technician received disciplinary action.
This event was discussed with the control room licensed personnel and I&C technicians.
This item is closed.
(Closed) LER 416/88-19, Inadvertent High Pressure Core Spray Initiation Causes Reactor Scram on Low Water Level. On October 10, 1988, the HPCS system and the HPCS emergency diesel generator automatically initiated
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when an operator keyed a radio in the vicinity of the low level instrument transmitters.
Corrective actions included prohibiting the use of radios on the 139 foot elevation area of containment; and posting the RWCU '
instrument rods area of containment to prohibit radio transmission. Other plant areas have been checked and posted as needed.
This item is clos'ed.
(Closed) LER 416/88-20, Entry Into the Limiting Condition for Operation of I
Technical Specification 3.0.3.
On December 6, 1988, Division I Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) was declared inoperable to perform routine maintenance.
Later that day, the breaker for the HPCS minimum flow valve tripped during valve stroking operations. This made HPCS inoperable. The-breaker was reset and the valve operated normally. The valve was declared L
operable 5 minutes later. No-problem could be found with the breaker or valve.
Further investigation into this event revealed that a midnight l
I shift operator had mar.ually torqued the HPCS minimum flow valve closed to ensure the valve was not a source of leakage into the suppression pool.
Operations personnel were instructed to initiate a maintenance work order to control evolutions for manually seating motor operated valves. This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
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(Closed) P2188-02, Defect in Calcon Control Devices Supplied with DSR and DSRV Diesels. The licensee completed an evaluation of IMO Delaval 10 CFR Part 21 report on November 2, 1988. All Calcon items have been returned to IMO Delaval for inspection and testing, and all the installed devices l
on Division I and II diesel generators which are not byp6ssed during emergency starts of the diesel were replaced (MWO's 183933 and 183932).
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This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/88-08-01, Track the completion of IMO Delaval, Inc., Recommendations. The actions of IMO Delaval, Inc. Part 21 have been completed, see P2188-02 above.
This item is closed.
(Closed) -Inspector Followup Item 416/86-20-03, Investigate a possible design change to allow the HPCS diesel generator to automatically re set the field flashing circuit during the 10 minute cooldown period.
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review determined that a design change is not necessary. The licensee modified System Operating Instruction 04-1-01-P81-1 and Surveillance Procedure 06-0P-1P81-V-0003 to manually depress the voltage shutdown reset
. push button at the beginning of the cooldown period.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/87-26-01, Revise procedures to specify an allowable voltage tolerances.
Maintenance procedure 07-5-03-30, Calibration of Plant I&C Equipment has been revised stating, that a " nominal" value with no other tolerance specified means a tolerance of 25 percent of the value. Training on this item has been conducted.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/88-01-02, Resolve the use of the word
"approximately" in procedures.
Maintenance Procedure 07-S-03-30, Calibration of Plant I&C Equipment has been revised to define the value of
"approximately" as having a tolerance of 25 percent. Training on this-item has been conducted.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/87-01-02, Review actions taken to properly secure loose switchgear breaker panel doors.
The licensee
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conducts weekly checks on switchgear doors.
Tours by the resident inspectors indicate that the doors are properly secured.
This item is closed.
9.
Facility Modifications (37701)
System Energy Resources, Inc.
(SERI)
submitted by letter dated September 23, 1988 a proposed amendment to the Grand Gulf Operating license.
This amendment requested changes to the Grand Gulf Unit 1 Technical Specifications due to the proposed addition of an alternate decay heat removal system ( ADHRS). The intended use of the ADHRS-were presented in a meeting between SERI and the NRC on August 15, 1988.
In addition, on August 31. 1988 a meeting between SERI and the NRC was held to review the ADHRS design criteria, system function and system interaction analysis.
Additional information has been provided in subsequent meetings and formal submittals.
The purpose of design change is to facilitate the outage scheduling by providing alternate decay heat removal capacity.
Modifications are in progress per approved design change packages in anticipation of NRR approval of the requested changes.
In the areas inspected no violations er deviations were identified.
10.
Licensee Quality Assurance Program Implementation (35502)
An internal office evaluation was conducted on January 19, 1989, of the licensee's quality assurance program implementation by reviewing recent inspection reports, SALP reports, open items, licensee corrective actions for NRC inspection findings, and licensee event reports.
Particular emphasis was placed on all new items since the last SALP period (April 30, 1988).
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All functional areas appeared to be sati sf acto ry.
The offsite siren notification system had several spurious actuations during periods when a dual system was on line. A maintenance team inspection was conducted with favorable findings.
11. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 17, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee had no comment on the following inspection findings:
Item Number Description and Reference 89-07-01 Correction of the deficiency noted during fire water pumphouse walkdown.
89-07-02 Correction of the deficiencies noted during the Division III Diesel Generator Walkdown.
12. Acronyms and Initialisms Instrumentation and Control I&C
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IFI Inspector Followup Item
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ESF -
Engineering Safety Feature
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FCV -
Flow Control Valve
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RWP -
Radiation Work Permit Maintenance Work Order MWO
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PSW -
Plant Service Water MNCR -
Material Nonconformance Report LPCI -
Low Pressure Core Injection LPCS -
Low Pressure Core Spray P&ID -
Piping and Instrument Diagram LER -
Licensee Event Report RWCU -
Reactor Water Cleanup SERI -
System Energy Resource Incorporation Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC
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RCIC -
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RPS -
Reactor Protection System RHR Residual Heat Remi/al
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HPCS -
High Pressure Core Spray HPU -
Hydraulic Power Unit QDR -
Quality Deficiency Report Diesel Generator DG
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DCP -
Design Change Package SBLC -
Standby Liquid Control SOI -
System Operating Instruction i
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Standby Service Water TCN -
Temporary Change Notice PDS -
Pressure Differential Switch CRD -
Control Rod Drive Limiting Condition for Operation LC0
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FPCCU -
Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup ADHRS -
Alternate Decay Heat Removal System APRM -
Average Power Range Monitor ECCS -
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