IR 05000416/1997019

Insp Rept 50-416/97-19 on 970803-0906.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20216J225
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	09/12/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216J183	List: IR 05000416/1997019 ML20216J179 ML20216J208
References
50-416-97-19, NUDOCS 9709170198
Download: ML20216J225 (17)

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ENCLOSURE 2

- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '-

REGION IV-

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Docket No.:

'50-416

.- License No.:

NPF 29

. Report No.:

50-416/97 19

. Licensee:

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Location:

Waterloo Road Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Dates:-

August 3 through September 6,1997 Inspectors:

- J.- Dixon Herrity, Senior Resident inspector K. Weaver, Resident inspector D, Proulx, Resident inspector, River Bend Station Approved By:

D. Kirsch, Chief, Project Branch F Division of Reactor Projects

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W Attachment:-

Supplemental Information

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• EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Grand Gulf Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-416/97-19 QPEsttipJ11 The licensee responded satisf actorily to the trip of balance-of plant Transformer 23

(Section 01.1).

Although the limiting conditions for operations were entered and the logboc,ks were

filled out in accordance with procedures, inspectors identified one example where a senior reactor operator was not knowledgeable of the actions for a limiting condition for operation the plant was in (Section 01.2).

The failure c4 operations personnel to identify the mispositioned standby diesel

generator fuel oil filter selection lever during operations rounds was identified as an example of inattention to-detail (Section O2.1).

The failure to procedurally require that chain operated locked valves be secured in a

manner to restrain them from being moved was identified. Licensee review identified no instances where mispositioned valves were found (Section 08.1).

Maintenance Instrumentation & controls technicians demonstrated good communications and

attention to detail (Section M1,1).

A poor and unsafe work practice occurred by the failure of craft to stop work

immediately when an electrical conduit was unearthed and damaged during excavation inside the protected area (Section M1.2).

Ooserved surveillance testing activities were properly performed (Section M1.3).

• Enaineering A violation was identified for failure to position the Division 1 and high pressure

core spray standby diesel generator fuel oil filter selector levers in accordance with the system operating procedure. System engineering f ailed to document the initial finding using the licensee's corrective action process and documented the concern in a memorandum, resulting in incomplete action to assure that all applicable procedures were revised (Section 02.1).

The inspectors Ider.tified several gaps between the battery cells and end rails on the

safety-related batteries. The licensee appropriately determined that the gaps were nonconformances that had to be addressed, but that the gaps did not affect the operability of the batteries (Section E1.1).

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e 3-NRC inspectors identified a failure to have procedures to control power cords to

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ensure the required minimum separation nonsafety and safety-related cables (Section R1.1).

Plant Suonort Radiation protection activities were performed in accordance with procedures

(Section R1.1).

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flep_gtt Details jipmmarv of Plant Status The plant began it.is inspection period at 100 percent power and operated at that level until August 4,1997, when operators lowered power to 82 percent in response to the trip of balance-of-plant Transformer 23. Power was raised back to 100 percent August 4, 1997, and remained there the rest of the report period, l. Operations

Conduct of Operations 01.1 Trio of Balance of Plant Transformer a,

jmpaction Scoce (71707)

Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the trip of the transformer, b.

Observations and Findinas On August 4,1997, balance of plant Transformer 23 tripped. Operators entered Off Normal Procedure 05102 V-11, " Loss of Plant Service Water," Revision 21, and lowered power to approximately 82 percent. The trip was similar to the trip that occurred on May 22,1997, as documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/97-08. A branch which fell across overhead power lines was identified as the root cause for tile previous trip. No root cause could be identified for the trip that occurred on August 4. The licensee reconvened the incident review board involved with the previous trip to identify the root cause of the transformer trips. The transformer was instrumented to allow the documentatien of information to determine a cause if the unit trips again.

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Conclusions The licensee responded satisfactorily to the trip of balance-of plant Transformer 23.

01.2 Limitinn Conditions for Operations Status Review a.

Inspection Scope (717011 During daily reviews of operational status, the inspectors reviewed the limiting conditions for operation (LCO) log in the control room and discussed these entries with the operating crews.

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Observations and Findinat The inspectors observed that LCOs were entered correctly, tog books were updated appropriately, and, in most cases, operators were aware of plant status. However, on August 11,1997, the inspectors observed one exception while discussing plant

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status with the shift supervisor. The shif t supervisor stated that the licensee was in the LCO action statement for Technical Specification 3.7.1 " Standby Service Water," because one ultimate heat sink fan in Train A of standby service water tripped of f while in use. The shift supervisor explained that the action required after 7 days was to declare one train of standby service water inoperable. The inspector questioned whether this was accurate. The LCO requires that if one ultimate heat sink fan was inoperable in one train, to return the fan to service within 7 days or be in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The supervisor checked the Technical Specifications (TS) and corrected his statement-The inspector observed that the LCO log sheet for the standby service water LCO had not been filled out completely in that Block 13 had been left blank.

Procedure 02 S 01-17, " Control of Limiting Conditions for Operation,"

Revision 102, Section 6.1.14, stated that if equipment f ailure will cause a TS plant shutdown in 7 days or less, unless repaired, notify the Duty Manager and document in Block 13 of the LCO log sheet. After being informed of the discrepancy, the licensee documented that the duty manager was notified at 9:30 a.m. on August 11.

The inspectors observed that shifts filled out the LCO report form differently.

Block 10 (Condition) sometimes did not contain all of the conditions that could be entered. Some shifts documented required surveillances under Block 21 (comments), some did not. The inspectors observed that the procedure did not address the level of detail that was to be documented in the different blocks. The inspector observed that the failure to complete Block 13 and the differences between the methods of filling out the form were not identified as problems to dete, but had the potential to cause operators to miss information during turnover.

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The inspector discussed these concerns with the operations manager. The manager stated that it was his expectation that senior reactor operators be knowledgeable of the LCOs in affect and possible required actions and that the duty manager be contacted more promptly, when required by the procedure. The manager acknowledged the insoectors' observations about the procedure and planned to address them, c.

Conclusions Although the LCOs were entered and the logbooks were filled out in accordance with procedures, inspectors identified one example where a senior reactor operator was not knowledgeable of the actions for an LCO the plant was i...

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Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment i

02.1 Dinel GenerateLLlatVPJi a.

jmnection Scope (71707)

The inspectors walked down the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) using Inspection Procedure 71707 as guidance.

Procedure 041-01 P81 1 "High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator,"

Revision 43, was used to ensure that the system was lined up properly, b.

Ohtpiy.ations and Findinns On August 11,1997, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the HPCS SDG to ensure that the SDG was maintained in a state of operational readiness. The inspectors observed that housekeeping and the overall materim condition of the HPCS SDG was good, Minor oilleaks that were observed were promptly wiped up.

During performance of lineup checks done per Procedure 04101 P811, the inspectors observed that the system was lined up properly to support operability

with one exception. The inspuctors observed that the duplex filter selection lever was not in the required positio.s. This three-position lever was used to select the fuel oil filter to be used. The three positions were "L," "R," and "Both."

Procedure 04101 P81 1, Section 4.1.2.d (7), stated: " Verify all fuel oil duplex strainers and filters are selected to one strainer / filter at a ume." Contrary to this procedure requirement, the inspectors found the duplex ber selection lever in the

"Both" position. The inspectors notified the shift supervisor and Condition Report (CR) 97 0898 was initiated.

Following notification by the inspectors, the licensee checked for similar problems on the Division 1 and 2 SDGs The licensee identified that the Division 1 SDG fuel oil filter selector lever was improperly in the "Both" position. This information was added to the CR written for the HPCS SDG. The licensee performed an operability evaluation that demonstrated that despite the levers being out of position, the SDGs were operable. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's asaessment and determined that it was satisf actory,- The f ailure to position the duplex filter selection levers in the positions required by Procedures 04101 P81-1 and 04101 P751 is a violation of TS 5.4.1.a (50-416/9710 01).

Licensee investigation revealed that in July 1997, maintenance personnel replaced the fuel oil filters and strainers for all three SDGs However, the selr.ctor levers were not included in the restoration lineup following maintenance. The licensee observed that these levers were within the maintenance boundaries during the filter / strainer changeouts. Therefore, these levers were not controlled at that time.

Procedure 07 S 24-P75 E001 AB 37, " Priming and Venting of Standby Diesel

Generator Fuel Oil Systems," Revision 0, Step 7.1.2.e, required that levers be moved as needed to fill both sides of the duplex strainers and filters. The licensee

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stated that normally, during maintenance, all components within maintenance boundaries were verified in the proper position prior to returning the equipment to service. However, in the case of the SDG fuel oil strainer / filter selector levers, this was not done.

The inspectors reviewed the history of problems with thu lever and observed that this issue was similar to one in December of 1994. The system engineer identified that operators had been lining up the SDG fuel oil strainer / filter levers to the "Both" position. The system engineer questioned this practice because the purpose of the selector lever was to allow switching between strainers / filters if one became clogged and required changeout. The system engineer issued Memorandum GIN 94/04050, which requested that operations revise the system operating procedures to reflect this requirement. The procedures were revised in 1995. The inspectors observed that the actions taken to ensure that the SDG fuel oil strainer / filter levers remained in the proper position were not complete because all procedures addressing the Irrors were not revised, c.

Cpncjhdipal A violation was identified for failure to position the HPCS SDG fuel oil filter / strainer selector lever in accordance with the system operating procedure. This violation was one example of incomplete corrective actions in response to a system engineering concern System engineering f ailed to document the initial finding using the licensee's corrective action process and documented the concern in a memorandum, resulting in incomplate action to assure that all applicable procedures were revised.

Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 (Closed) Unresolved item 50 416/9706-01: further evaluation of the treatment of locked valves in the overhead. This item was written to further review the licensee's practice of locking chain operated valves using a tie wrap through the chain. This practice allowed the valve to be operated until the tie wrap reached the sprocket on the valve in the overhead. TS 3.5.1.2 required that each valve in the emergency core coohr.9 system flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, to bc tenfied in its correct position every 31 days. Procedure 02 S-012, " Control and Usc of Operations Section Directives," Revision 28, Attachment lli, " Component Position Verification," f ailed to require locked chain operated valves to be secuted in a manner that they are restrained from being I

moved, The licensee acknowledged the concern, initiated CR 97-0646, and performed a tour and verified that the subject valves were in the required positions.

The inspector reviewed the CR history and found that there were no examples where these valves were found out of position. The licensee revised the procedure

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to require that locking devices on chain operated valves be installed such that the valve is physically restrained from movement. The failure to have a procedure to ensure Iccked chain operated valves were secured in position was identified as a i

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6-violation for failure to have an adequate procedure. This f ailuto constitutos a violation of minor significanco and is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50 416/9719 02).

lidelutfDenat M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Denpal -

nignaDco Comment a.

lDMAG1!DILEG9DL102292)

The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities, as specified by the following work orders (WOs):

WO 19070313:

Modify and install Channel F Reactor Pressure Safety Helief Valve Trip Units

WO 00193783:

Troub!cshooting of Division 1 Drywell Pressure Trip Unit 02N004A b.

Qhscrvations and Findinas The maintenance craf t conducted the maintenance activities in accordance with the instructions provided in the work packages. The inspectors observed that maintenance craf t supervisors and system engineers were present at the job site and continuously monitored these activities. The inspectors observud the maintenanco craft remove the existing trip units and independently verified each of the new trip unit serial numbers. The maintenance craft also independently verified that the jumpor and switch positions on the new trip units were positioned to the configuration of the existing trip units before installation. The inspectors observed that the instrumentation and controls technicians continuously used three way communications during those activities, c.

Conclusions Instrumentation and controls technicians demonstrated good communications and

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attention to detail.

M1.2 Poor and U.ngafe Work Practices identified Durina Excavation Activities (627071 On August 5,1997, during observations of ongoing work activities inside the protected area, the inspectors observed maintenance craft digging up dirt in front of the control building using a backhoe. This work was performed under WO 178251, which was written to install a now road bed. The inspectors observed a conduit that appeared to have been uprooted by the backhoe. The conduit was

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7-damaged and a portion of this conduit was approximately 3 feet in the air. The inspectors questioned the craf t at the job site and found that the conduit contained energized electrical cable. The inspectors determined that the craft did not know what loads the energized cable was feeding or exactly which direction the rest of the underground conduit ran.

Operations personnel who were also observing these activities immediately directed the craf t to shut down the backhoe, stop work, and leave tha area. The licensee initiated CR 97 0071 and verified that no safety related equipment was fed by this cable. The licensee initiated Clearance Authorization 97 1178 and tagged out the feeder breakers for the cable.

The inspectors considered the f ailure of craf t to stop work immediately when the conduit was unearthed and damaged to be a poor and unsafe work practice.

M1.3 Deneral Surveil. lance Comments a.

Insnpetion Scongj6172_6)

The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillance tests listed below:

Procedure 06 IC 1821-01001, " Safety / Relief Valve High Pressure Trip / Low

Low Set Relief /ECCS Vessel Pressure injection Permissive Functional Test Channel F," Revision 102 Procedure 06 OP 1P81 M 0002, "High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator

13 Functional Test," Revision 102 b.

Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that the test procedures provided clear guidance and properly implemented TS requirements. The tests were successfully performed.

Measuring and test equipment was verified to be within its current calibration cycle, The equipment was removed from service, apolicable limiting conditions for operation entered, and properly returned to service. Technicians were knowledgeable and qualified.

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Conclusions The surveillance testing activities were property performed, M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 LC191gdLt)nresolved item 50 416/9706-02: further evaluation of the bases for testing the standby service water cooling tower f ans. This item was opened to

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review the f ailure to inspect or check the standby service water cooling tower f an for excessive vibration during the monthly TS required 15 minute run Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 9.2.1.4.6 requires that operators run each f an for sufficient time to assure proper operability and that operators inspect for abnormal vibration. Procedure 00 OP 1P41 M-0004. " Standby Service Water (SSW) 1.oop A Operability Check," Revision 101, did not require that the f an be inspected to verify there was no excessive vibration. However, the licensee performed vibration testing on the f ans approximately monthly and, recently, approximately once every two months using Procedure 17 S 03 25, " Portable Vibration Monitoring Program," Revision 1. The change in frequency was due to a change in the licensee's practice of running the f ans during chemical treatment of the standby service water system. The licensee found that it was not necessary to run the f ans during this weekly 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> run. The inspector determined that these checks met the UFSAR requirement. However, the TS Bases states that the 15 minute run ensures that excessive fan and motor vibration can be detected for corrective action. The licensee stated that they planned to address this discrepancy by changing the bases, llkEQ93 Rillag R

E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Desinn Change __of Safetv Retnted Batte'ing a.

Inspection Scope (37551)

Using inspection Procedure 37551, the inspectors reviewed the design change package used to modify the safety related batteries, b.

Observations and Findinna On August 21,1997, while touring the control building, the inspectors observed that there was a one inch gap between the battery cell and the end rail on one of the four Division ll battery racks. The safety-related batteries each consist of 4 racks of 15 battery cells plus an additional tack with a single cell. The inspectors reviewed the racks further and observed a Gap that was half an inch at the front of the rack and angled down to a quarter of an inch at the back of the rack between a cell and end rail on a second rack and a one and a half inch gap between a cell and end rail on one Division I battery rack. The inspectors discussed this concern with the shift superintendent. The superintendent contacted engineerin0 and initiated CR 97 928.

The licensee contacted the manufacturer and discussed the concern. Using a calculation based on the overall battery configuration and the low seismic input for the battery locations at the site, the licensee determined that the batteries would perform their safety-related function. However, the licensee determined that the

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gap was a nonconformanco in the rock installation and planned to evaluate a method to climinato the gap. The inspectors determined that the licensee's actions were conservative and appropriate.

The inspectors reviewed the history of the batteries to determino how and when the

racks may have been changed. The licensee had replaced the original batteries with batteries with a larger capacity using Design Change Package 01/0112 in April and

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May 1992. The inspector observed that the packago contained no detailed guidance to assure that the seismically qualified rack was returned to the configuration that was seismically tested. Both manuf acturer Drawings M 6015 3

"Two Stop Rack W/E.P. Battery Type 30 LC 29," and M 87031, " Test Rack 2 Step i

Soismic, Typo L Units," shewed the rails up against the cells. The licensee indicated that the drawings provided no gap measurement between the cells and the end or sido rails, in an information section, the technical manual stated that earth quake protected racks are supplied with special retaining rails to restrict cell movement. The instructions for installation provided in the technical manual (the only instructions for constructing the rack in the design change or work package)

did not address how the rails were to be installeo in regard to the cells to assure they performed their function, although a sketch was shown with the end and sido rails butted against each other in the corner bracket. The inspectors observed that the racks without gaps in the field had the rails butted together as shown in the sketch in the manual. The racks with gaps also had gaps between the side and end rails in the corner brackets.

Engineering personnel explained that the only guidance that they had for constructing the racks was provided in the technical manual. They further explained that gaps could have existed in the racks since the initialinstallation. The manuf acturer claimed in a letter to the licensee that the gaps would have to be filled in with some type of material or eliminated to ensure that the racks met the seismic qualification, but also claimed that no guidance was provided on a gap between the end rail and the cell.

In the design change package on the design input form, item 10, Structural Requirements, states: "The new equipment shall be housed on the same racks as the existing equipment, therefore the Se;smic requirements should be as states in Sections 4.1....of the SDC 1, class 1E equipment." System Design Criteria (SDCl 1, "1 125 Volt DC Class 1E Distribution System Divition 1 and 2,"

Section 4.1 requires that safety related components be designed in accordance with the requirements for Seismic Category I equipment and shall be seismically qualified to the requirements of IEEE 344. IEEE Std 3441975, " Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," Section 0.1.1, Mounting, states: "The orientation of the equipment during the test shall be documented and shall be the only one for which the equipment is considered qualified unless adequate justification cc.n be made to extend the qualification to an untested orientation."

Per the laboratory report for Laboratory Test VL-765 03, Section 3.0, Test Instructions, the battery rack was constructed in accordance with

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Drawing M 07034 *nd applicable manuf acturer specihcations. The inspector reviewed Drawings M 07031 and M 0015 3 and observed that the hawings were similar in dirnent. ions with the exception that the test rack was not sited for as roany battery cells. No drawing or specifications were provided with or referenced m the design package to ensure the battery racks were constructed properly.

The inspectors determined that the f ailure to include instructions to assure that the battery racks were returned to their seismically tested configuration was a violation of 10 CFR 60, Appendix 0, Criterion lli (50 410/0719 03),

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Cpncluk!Ons The inspectors identified several Dops between the battery cells and end rails on the safety related batteries. The licenseo appropriately determined that the gaps were nonconformances that had to be addressed, but that the gaps did not affect the operability of the batteries. The f ailuto to include instructions to assure the safety-related battery racks were returned to their seismically tested configuration was identified as a violation.

Connoluf El cR!cnLSrvaation E1.2 t

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Using inspection Procedure 37551, the inspectors reviewed the controls the licensee had in place to ensure the electncal separation required in the UFSAR was maintained, b.

QhpEynlignLagdltndinmi On August 21,1997, the inspectors observed that an extension cord, being used to power an area radiation monitor on the 208-foot level of the auxiliary buildin0, was in contact with safety related conduit 1 ABRW259. The inspectors notified the shif t superintendent of the concern. The supenntendent contacted systems engineering and documented the concern in CR 97 0926.

The licensee venfied that this practice did not meet Engineering Standard 02 criteria for minimum separation distanco from safety related conduits. The licenseo appropriately moved the area radiation monitor to a location where it could be plu0ged in with adequato separation from safety related conduit. Engineering personnel toured the plant to determino if there was a Generic concert. and identified 20 additional examples where the separation criteria appeared to be not met. This equipment was moved, unplu00ed. or manned and the licensee was evaluating the affect that the lack of separation had on the safety related equipment. The licensco determined that the existing program for ensurin0 minimum separation requirements were met was not adequato in that it did not addmss axtension cords or temporary equipment that was not controlled by a

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l procedure. The licensee planned to develop a procedure to provide guidance for

personnel to ensure thlit separation criteria was met when equipment was plugged

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The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR and found that Section 8.1.4.4.1 required that l

cable separation be maintained in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, " Physical

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Independence of Electrical Systems," January 1975. Regulatory Guide 1.75

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identified IEEE Std 3841974, " Criteria for Coperation, of Class 1E Equipment and -

i Circuits," as setting forth criteria for separation of circuits. IEEE Std 3841974 requires that non. Class 1E circuits be separated from class 1E circuits by the s

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' minimum separation requirements. The inspectors determined that the failure to

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include controls in the licensee's programs to ensure that minimum separation criteria were met was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V

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(50-416/9719 04).

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Conclusiong

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A violation was identified for the f ailure to have procedures to control power cords

to ensure the required minimum separation from safety related cables, E8 Miscellaneous Engineering lesues (92903)

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{Qnen) Unresolved item 50 416/9703-02: evaluation of licensee conforrnance with

regulatory guide. This itern documented the failure of the licensee to perform TS j-required testing of charcoal filters following painting. The inspectors reviewed the

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status of this issue and determined that the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-had not completed review of the licensee's interpretation of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

tv Plantauppett R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls

R 1.1 Q.eneral Comments 1717501 Using inspection Procedure 71750, the inspectors made frequent tours of the radiological controlled area and observed radiological postings and worker adherence to protective clothing requirements, in general, radiological work areas e

were properly posted and locked high radiation area doors were locked. Workers adhered to radiation work permit requirements and displayed good radiological worker practices, i

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-12 L_ManniementMulinan X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensou management at the

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exit meeting on September 4,1997. The licensoo acknowledged the findings presented with one exception. The licensoo disagrood with the violatit,n for failure to have adequate design control measures to ensure the battery rack was returned to its' seismically tested configuration. The licensoo determined that the rocks were found in a seismically acceptable configuration, as verified by their personnel and the vendor. This would indicato sufficient information was provided in the work package to meet seismic safety requirements. The issue of what in criticalinformation provided by the drawings versun

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what information is simply customary in the vendor drawings was not clear. The licensee planned to continue to review the issue. The inspectors acknowledged the licensco's assertion that the racks were in a seismically acceptable configuration, but the configuration was not the same as the configuration that was testod and no manufacturer drawing was provided for the construction of the battery racks following the installation of the now cells to ensure that the rocks were returned to the seismically tested configuration.

The inspectors asked the licensoo whether any materials examined during the inspection should be contidored proprietary. No proprietary information was identified, s

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E.UPPLEMENTAL INFORMATipqN

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSQNLpONTACTEQ j

Lis;.cnsee

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j C. Bottemiller, Superintendent, Plant Licensing f

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- L. Daughtery, Technical Coordinator, Plant Licensing

W. Dock, Superintendent, Security

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R. Dubey, Technical Assistant, Nuclear Plant Engineering c

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B. Edwards, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent, Plant Maintenance

R. Fill, Supervisor, System Engineering W, Garner, Audit Supervisor, Quality P*ograms

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J. Hagan, Vice President, Plant Operations

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D. Jarnes, Engineering Supervisor, Nuclear Plant Engineering

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T. Kriesel, Radiation Control Supervisor, Radiation Protection E. Langley, Maintenance Technical Assistant, Plant Maintenance

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. W. Long, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Plant Engineering

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R. Moomaw, Manager, Plant Maintenance j

L. Robertson, Technical Assistant, Outage Management

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C. Smith, Manager, Planning and Scheduling

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C. Stafford, Operations Assistant, Plant Operations

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D. Townsend. Senior Emergency Planner, Emergency Planning

j D. William, Superintendent, Security

NBC J. Donahow, NRR Project Manager INSPECTION PR0_CEDURES USEQ

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37551 Onsite Engineering 61720 Surveillance Observations t

02707 Maintenance Observation

-71707 Plant Operations

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r 71750 Plant Support Activities

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I-92901-Followup. Operations

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92902

. Followup Maintenance

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92903-Followup Engineering

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lTEMS OPEtiLD. CL03ED&Q_Qlhic91Q

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Ongned 50 410/9710-01 VIO Failure to properly position the diesel generator fuel filter lover (Section 02.1)

50 410/0710 02 NCV Failure to procedurally require that chain operated locked valvos be secured (Section 08.1)

50 410/0710 03 VIO Failuto to include instructions to assure the safety related battery racks were returned to their solsmically testod configuration (Section E1.1)

50 410/9710 04 VIO Failure to have proceduros to control power cords to ensure the required minimum separation from safoty related cablos

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(Soction E1.2)

C10And 50 410/9719 02 NCV Failure to procedurally require that chain operated locked valvos be secured (Section 08.1)

50 410/9700 01 URl further ovaluation of the treatment of locked valvos in tho

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overhood (Section 08.1)

50 410/9700 02 URI Further evaluation of the of the bases for testing the standby service water cooling tower fans (Section M8.1)

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DiKilliitd 50 410/0703 02 URI Evaluation of licenseo conformance with Regulatory Guido 1.52 (Section E8.1)

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-3-LIST OF ACRONYMS USEQ CR condition report LCO limiting condition for operation HPCS high pressure core spray l&C instrumentation & controls NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PDR public document room RP&C radiological protection & chemistry controls SDC system design critoria SDG standby diesel generator TS Technical Specification WO work order UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

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