IR 05000416/1998015
| ML20199H925 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199H908 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-98-15, NUDOCS 9901250376 | |
| Download: ML20199H925 (15) | |
Text
_.-
.
.
_-
-
.- -
. -.._.
.-.
. - -.
.-
.
.
ENCLOSURE
'
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-416 License No.:
{
Report No.:
50-416/98-15 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Location:
Waterloo Road Port Gibson, Mississippl 39150 Dates:
November 1 through December 12,1998
inspector (s):
Jennifer Dixon-Herrity, Senior Resident inspector
!
Peter Alter, Resident inspector i
Approved By:
Joseph Tapia, Chief, Project Branch A
!
!
ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information i
!
'
i 9901250376 990120
'
PDR ADOCK 05000416
G ppg
.
i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Grand Gulf Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-416/98-15 This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant j
support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
i Operations Control room staff continued to exhibit effective communications, a high level of
operator knowledge, and good oversight of plant activities. Operator response to a i
turbine building ventilation high radiation alarm was timely and in accordance with procedures. The actions taken by operations personnel in response to predictions of cold weather were prompt and thorough (Sections 01.1,01.2, and 01.3).
i Maintenance j
The eight maintenance and testing activities observed were properly performed.
.
Actions taken by the licensee to address questions about the correct level of Jute oil that i
should be maintained in the reactor core isolation cooling system turbine were initially j
inadequate and less than prompt (Sections M1.1 and M1.2).
The reactor core isolation cooling system turbine experienced an overspeed and failure
.
to trip during postmodification testing. The licensee investigation and corrective action recommendations were not complete at the end of the inspection period. This matter will be reviewed during a future inspection to determine if maintenance rule provisions were met (Section M1.1).
l Enaineerina
)
The design engineering decision to perform postwork testing of a modification on the
off-gas hydrogen analyzer Train A sample cooler by placing the system in service prior to a leak test was a poor work practice that resulted in a minor release of radioactive j
'
gasses to the environment and personnel contamination (Section E1.1).
Engineering's failure to address the temperature difference across the standby liquid
.
control (SLC) system tank in a procedure change was a poor engineering practice (Section E1.2).
Plant Support Observed activities involving radiological controls were well performed. Health physics
l department response to and support of the emergency repairs to the main condenser outlet water box were very good (Section R1.1).
'
During the fourth quarter emergency preparedness training drill, the licensee staff
.
demonstrated acceptable performance in the operations support center. Although the communications had improved between the different facihties, the practice of t
I l
!
,
-
.
-
.
.
-2-
,
communicating solely through a single three-point communication link between three facilities was identified as limiting for management of the event. The method of assigning tasks in the operations support center was inefficient in that personnel were pulled from areas, in which they were proficient, to perform tasks they had not been trained to perform (Section P4.1).
The end-of-drill critique was open and self-critical. However, not including all
.
participants and allowing personnel running the drill to provide input prior to the participants were identified as poor practices. The continued existence of weaknesses identified by the licensee during previous quarterly drills indicated a need for continued attention to this program (Section P4.2).
,
l L
!
l l
,
.
.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant operated at 100 percent power until November 20,1998, when operators lowered power to 50 percent to secure circulating water Pump B for repairs to a main condenser outlet water box. After conducting repairs, the plant was returned to 100 percent power on November 21,1998, and operated at that level for the remainder of the inspection period.
I. Operations
Conduct of Operations O1.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors performed control room observations to ascertain operator knowledge and performance. Operators exhibited good three-way communications and peer review. Shift turnovers and briefings were thorough and well performed. Operators were knowledgeable of the status of equipment, and applicable Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations were properly satisfied and documented.
01.2 Turbine Buildina Ventilation Hiah Radiation a.
Insoection Scope (71707)
On November 30,1998, turbine building ventilation high and high-high radiation alarms were received in the main control room. The inspectors were present at the time and observed the operating crew's response.
b.
Observations and Findinas The operating crew's response to the alarms was time!/ and made use of available procedural guidance. Quick diagnosis of the alarm led to the identification of the cause as a leak in off-gas hydrogen analyzer Train A. The system was being returned to service following a design modification to the sample cooler. Crew supervision had the turbine building operator and maintenance technicians return to the hydrogen analyzer i
room with health physics coverage to isolate the sample lineup. The chemistry department was immediately notified and technicians determined that no measurable release occurred due to the short duration of the event. Procedures were reviewed and department supervision was consulted to determine reportability. The crew's response and actions were determined to be in accordance with approved procedures. Condition Report 98-1423 was written to document poor work instructions to place the system in service prior to leak testing the modification. This event is discussed further in Section E1.1.
i
!
-
-
-
.
-.-
..
,
-2-01.3 Cold Weather Preparations a.
Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed Procedure 04-1-03-A30-1, " Cold Weather Protection,"
Revision 10, reviewed the actions the licensee took in preparation for cold weather, and toured the site to verify that protective actions were taken.
b.
Observations and Findinos The inspectors noted that cold weather was predicted early in the season. The procedure required that cold weather protection be put in place at the beginning of the cold weather season (around November 1). Operations personnel tracked the weather and started implementing Procedure 04-1-03-A30-1 at the beginning of October when temperatures below freezing were predicted. Although temperatures did not drop to that level, the licensee promptly completed the actions required by the procedure. The inspectors toured the site and found that temporary equipment had been installed and was operating and found no cold weather concerns that could affect safety-related or
,
important-to-safety systems.
J O1.4 Standbv Liauid Control Tank Low Temoerature Alarm j
a.
Inspection Scooe (71707)
<
On November 24,1998, a standby liquid control (SLC) tank high/ low temperature alarm was received in the main control room. The inspectors were present at the time and observed the operating crew's response.
b.
Observations and Findinas The operating crew's response to the alarm was good with one exception. The alarm response instruction was consulted and the auxiliary building operator was dispatched to determine system temperature. Operators determined that the alarm was for low temperature and identified a problem with the storage tank automatic temperature controller. The shift superintendent directed that the temperature controller be placed in manual to clear the low temperature alarm. After reviewing the remainder of the alarm responso instruction, the shift superintendent consulted with the chemistry department and determined that s sodium pentaborate solution sample was not needed. This decision was in contradiction to the associated alarm response instruction step 4.5,
"Have Chemistry sample the storage tank to ensure proper sodium pentaborate concentration." The same actions were taken again on December 1, in response to the i
same alarm.
!
The shift superintendent explained that there were known problems with the temperature controller so the alarm was expected. However, the temperature control ler (1C41-R002) did not cause the alarm, but was fed by a separate temperature switch (1C41 N003). On November 24, the shift superintendent wrote a condition identifier (Cl-074830) on the temperature alarm. Instrument and controls technicians subsequently
!
l
!
.
-3-determined that the high/ low temperature alarm was functioning properly, but that the tank temperature controller was out of calibration. It was recalibrated and has worked properly since.
The licensee stated that it was known that the low temperature alarm setpoint of 80 F was well above the minimum saturation condition for sodium pentaborate at a concentration below 15.2 percent by weight. Chemistry records indicated the concentration was between 15.1 and 14.6 percent since March of 1998. The procedure guidance in the alarm response instruction was not considered applicable with tank temperature greater than the Technical Specification limit of 75*F. Although the shift supervisor did not recommend a procedure change to the alarm response procedure to provide clarification, after further discussion, a change request was initiated on December 15,1998.
The shift superintendent's decisions neither to sample the standby liquid control sodium pentaborate solution following a storage tank low temperature alarm on two separate occasions nor to recommend a change to the alarm response instruction were minor violations of low risk and safety significance and therefore not subject to formal enforcement action.
O1.5 Conclusions for Conduct of Operations The control room staff continued to exhibit effective communications, a high level of operator knowledge, and very good oversight. Operator response to a turbine building ventilation high radiation alarm was timely and in accordance with procedures. The actions taken by operations personnelin response to predictions of cold weather were prompt and thorough.
The shift superintendent's decisions neither to sample the standby liquid control sodium pentaborate solution following a storage tank low temperature alarm on two separate occasions nor to recommend a change to the alarm response instruction were poor practice but were considered to be of low risk and safety significance.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Plant Tours (71707)
The inspectors routinely toured the accessible portions of the plant containing safety and risk significant structures, systems, and components. The inspectors found that plant equipment was maintained in good material condition and that plant housekeeping was good.
Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)
08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 98-004-00 and 98-004-01: Containment penetration opened contrary to the Technical Specification requirement. This event occurred on June 25,1998, and involved operations personnel failing to realize that a test connection l
-__
. - -
..
-.
.-
.
- -..-
.-
.
-
- - _. -
I
-4-valve in drywell purge compressor Train B was a containment isolation valve when tagging the system to perform repairs on a stop check valve. As a result, the valve lineup created a potential leakage path through containment. This flow path, which was prohibited by Technical Specification 3.1.6.3, was in existence for 10.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
The licensee identified the root cause of the event as a failure of personnel to follow procedures in that self-checking and independent verification were not used to ensure that the impact of the work was properly reviewed and understood. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence of this event. All operations personnel were made aware of the event and operations management stressed the event through issuance of a memorandum and night orders to ensure that the existing protective tagging procedures were followed. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and j
corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-416/9815-02).
II. Maintenance i
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
'
M1.1 General Maintenance Comments i
a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities, as specified by the following
-
work orders:
201526 Installation of rubber boot on standby gas Fan B inlet vane
-
actuator 2071/2 Unit 2 instrument air compressor pressure control loop calibration
.
215898 Troubleshoot Train A control room air conditioner compressor low
-
pressure trip 216041 Unit 2 instrument air compressor rebuild
+
960334 Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine tube oil change and
-
installation of oil sample valves b.
Observations and Findinas All observed work was satisfactorily conducted in accordance with the instructions and procedures provided in the work packages. The technicians performing the tasks were knowledgeable of the equipment and used good work practices. Instrument and control
,
technician troubleshooting efforts on the control room air conditioner compressor j
-
- _ _ _ ~_ -
._.
-
. - _ - -
- - - ___ - -
_.
. - - -. _. - - - -
'
l
.S.
Train A low pressure trip and on the Unit 2 instrument air compressor pressure control loop following the compressor rebuild were thorough and resolved minor maintenance problems with the associated equipment.
The inspectors observed as mechanical technicians disassembled and checked the
,
RCIC system turbine tube oil site glass gauge. The turbine lube oil system was completely drained to allow the installation of sampling lines at system low points. The system engineer observed and provided guidance throughout much of this work. The licensee found that the level marked on the lube oil sight glass gauge was the minimum level allowed for the system.
In NRC Inspection Report 50-416/98-08, on June 18,1998, the inspectors identified that operations personnel were not checking this level prior to running the pump, as suggested by the vendor. At that time, the system engineer explained that discussions between the user's group and the vendor were to be held to determine what the preferred level should be. The inspectors noted that guidance was available and had been referenced in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/95-98 for another site. The licensee had documented a review of that report in Operational Assessment OA-96-04, " Safety Related Steam Turbine-Driven Pumps." The vendor required that the turbine oil level be maintained at a minimum level of 1/4 inch above the oil slinger ring and a maximum level'>f 5/8 inch above the oil slinger ring, which corresponds to the high and low marks on the site glass gauge.
The immediate corrective action in June 1998 was to provide direction to the operators to check the level and verify that it was within an inch of the line on the gauge. As a result of that direction, the turbine tube oil system has potentially been maintained at less than the required minimum oil level. Although this had the potential to damage the bearings during pump starts due to lack of oil on the bearings until the shaft-driven oil pump came up to speed, the licensee tested the oil, examined the bearings, and found no damage.
At 4 a.m. on December 3,1998, during postmodification testing for Work Order 96-0334, the RCIC system turbine experienced an overspeed condition and failed to trip automatically. The operators were also unable to trip the turbine remotely from the main control room. The turbine was secured by closing the turbine trip throttle valve from the main control room. The RCIC system was declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.2. Following extensive maintenance to the RCIC trip throttle valve and troubleshooting of the turbine oil system, RCIC was declared operable at 6:13 am on December 12,1998. A significant event response team was established to investigate the event and make corrective action recommendations. The final results of that investigation were not available at the end of the inspection period and will be reviewed during a future inspection to determine if maintenance rule provisions were met. This issue will be tracked as an unresolved item (URI 50-416/9815-01).
.
.. -. -. -
- - -
_ _ - -
... -
..
-
-- -
.. _ - _ -
-. -.
.
- > -
-6-
'
M1.2 General Surveillance Comments e
a.
inspection Scope (61726)
The inspectors observed portions of the following surveillances:
06-OP-1E21-O-0002, Low Pressure Core Spray Quarterly Pump Run
06 RE-1C51-0-0001, Local Power Range Monitor Calibration
.
06-OP-1N32-V-0002, Main Turbine Mechanical Overspeed Trip Operability
=
b.
Observations and Findinos The inspectors noted that the test procedures provided clear guidance and properly implemented Technical Specification requirements. Measuring and test equipment was verified to be within the current calibration cycle. As necessary, instrumentation was removed from service, applicable limiting conditions for operation were entered, and the instrumentation was properly returned to service. The operators and technicians were
,
'
knowledgeable and qualified. As-found test data was within the tolerance established i
for the equipment. Personnel involved demonstrated good communications and
attention to detail.
,
,
M1.3 Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance The eight maintenance and testing activities observed were properly performed.
.
Actions taken by the licensee to address questions about the correct level of lube oil that
'
should be maintained in the RCIC system turbine were initially inadequate and less than
,
prompt.
.
The RCIC system turbine experienced an overspeed condition and failed to trip during postmodification testing. The licensee investigation and corrective action recommendations were not complete at the end of the inspection period. This matter will be reviewed during a future inspection to determine if maintenance rule provisions were met (URI 50-416/9815-01).
.
--
.
. _ _ _
-
...
. - _ _
_
. - - -.
_
....
- -_.
-
.
.
-7-111. Enoineerina t
E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Off-cas Hydrocen Analyzer Samole Cooler Modification l
a.
Insoection Scope (37551)
'
The inspectors reviewed the work order for installation of a design modification to the off-gas hydrogen analyzer Train A sample cooler. The postmodification test resulted in a turbine building exhaust high-high radiation alarm and minor contamination of three plant personnel.
b.
Observations and Findinas On November 30,1998, during restoration of the off-gas hydrogen analyzer Train A following Modification ER 96-0936-04 to the sample cooler, turbine building exhaust high and high-high radiation alarms were received. The operating crew isolated hydrogen analyzer Train A, and the turbine building radiation monitor readings returned to normal over the next hour. The operator who restored and then isolated the system and two l
maintenance technicians who were present to perform the inservice leak test were contaminated to roughly 1,000 cpm above background. The highest reading on the l
turbine building exhaust radiation monitor was 20,000 cpm. Although this reading was equivalent to approximately 75 percent of the release rate limit specified in plant Technical Requirement Manual Limiting Condition for Operation 6.1.4, the duration was so short that an actual release could not be calculated. The operators initiated Condition Report 98-1423 to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the event.
The inspectors reviewed the work order (19960936-00-04) used to install the design change to the sample cooler which was part of the new hydrogen injection program.
l The postmodification " recovery test" was specified to be an inservice leak test with
,
radioactive off-gas pretreatment sample flow. This test was inadequate in that it led to the minor release and contamination of personnel. Following the event, on December 1, 1998, a pen and ink change was approved to the work order to correctly leak test the modification. This change pressurized the sample tubing to 5 psi with nitrogen before restoration of off-gas sample flow. This method verified adequate completion of the installation of the modification.
!
c.
Conclusions The design engineering decision to perform postwork testing of a modification on the l
off-gas hydrogen analyzer Train A sample cooler by placing the system in service prior l
to a leak test was a poor practice that resulted in a minor release of radioactive gasses to the environment and contamination of personnel.
'
.
l l
.
-8-E1.2 Standbv Liauid Control Sodium Pentaborate Solution Temoerature Monitorina a.
Insoection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the current method used to monitor SLC sodium pentaborate solution temperature to satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.7.2.
b.
Observations and Findinos On November 24,1998, the inspectors observed the auxiliary building operator performing daily Technical Specification SR 3.1.7.2 to verify that the temperature of SLC sodium pentaborate solution was within the limits required by Figure 3.1.7-2 (Sodium Pentaborate Solution Temperature / Concentration Requirements). This surveillance was performed using a hand held pyrometer to measure SLC storage tank external surface temperature. The inspectors asked the on-shift operators what correlation existed between this temperature and actual sodium pentaborate solution temperature.
The operators replied that this temperature was at least cooler than the tank contents'
temperature. At the time, room air temperature was 77.5*F and the storage tank external surface temperature was 82.5*F as measured using a hand held pyrometer.
The storage tank temperature indicating controller (1C41-R002) reading was 87*F. This installed temperature indication had not been used for the surveillance for some time.
Additionally, the hand held pyrometer was used to monitor SLC pump suction piping temperature for Technical Specification SR 3.1.7.5. Auxiliary building operator's and daily Technical Specification rounds sheets indicated that both of these surveillance requirements were met using the hand held pyrometer.
The inspectors investigated Temporary Change Notice (TCN) 108 for Revision 40 of Procedure 06-OP-1000-D-0001, daily Technical Specifications rounds sheets, and Engineering Analysis ER 92/6169 justifying the change. This TCN was incorporated into Revision 41 of the procedure. The TCN initiated the use of a hand held pyrometer measurement of SLC storage tank external surface temperature to satisfy the Technical Specification SR 3.1.7.2 to monitor SLC sodium pentaborate solution temperature. The reason given for the change to the hand held pyrometer was the lack of accuracy of the installed temperature indicating controller (1C41-R002). The inspectors discussed the use of storage tank external surface temperature vice actual SLC solution temperature with engineering personnel. The design engineer indicated that the temperature monitored was conservative with respect to the minimum temperature required for saturation conditions for a given concentration of sodium pentaborate. He also acknowledged that it was not conservative with respect to the maximum solution temperature limit for SLC pump net positive suction head. The system engineer stated that the margin between the storage tank high temperature alarm at 110*F and the Technical Specification Figure 3.1.7-2 maximum temperature of 130*F created the margin needed to meet pump net positive suction head limits.
The 10 CFR 50.59 screening done for the TCN stated that Technical Specifications does not specify "the method of measuring SLC storage tank temperature." SLC system Technical Specification SR 3.1.7.2 states " Verify temperature of sodium i
.
. _..
.
__
._
.
. _ - _
. _. _
_
._._. _. _..____ _ _ _._.
i-9-i pentaborate solution...." On December 2,1998, the operations department initiated Condition Report 98-1512 to have engineering re-analyze the use of the hand held
'
pyrometer. The inspectors considered the engineering analysis for the TCN to be faulty
,
in that it did not account for the temperature difference across the tank and the effect of local area temperature on the hand held pyrometer reading.
c.
Conclusions i
i The inspectors identified that engineering's failure to address the temperature difference across the SLC system tank in the procedure change was a poor engineering practice.
IV. Plant Suonort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments a.
Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors made frequent tours of the radiological controlled area and observed radiological postings and worker adherence to protective clothing requirements.
l b.
Observations and Findinas
Personnel followed radiation protection procedures, locked high radiation doors were i
locked, and radiation and contamination areas were properly posted. The health l
physics department response to and support of the emergent repairs made to the main condenser outlet water box were of particular note. Radiation surveys, stay time, dose monitoring, and work coverage allowed work to be completed in a timely and effective manner. The adaptation of the steam affected areas radiation work permit was an efficient use of resources.
f c.
Conclusions Observed activities involving radiological controls were well performed. Health physics i
department response to and support of the emergency repairs to the main condenser l
outlet water box were very good.
l-P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness P4.1 Fourth Quarterly Trainino Drill a.
Insoection Scope (71750)
i On November 18,1998, the inspectors observed and evaluated the operations support center (OSC) staff as they performed tasks necessary for response during the fourth
.
_
_
.
_._
__ _ _ _ _
.
._
\\
'
l-10-l i
i quarterly training drill. These tasks included staffing and activation, in-plant emergency j
response team dispatch, coordination in support of control room and technical support center requests, and internal and external communications. The inspectors reviewed i
applicable emergency plan sections, departmental procedures, logs, and forms generated during the drill.
I b.
Observations and Findinos -
j r
The OSC was quickly staffed and activated within 14 minutes of the alert declaration, i
although this was due to a management decision to staff the technical support
,
center (TSC) and the OSC before the alert was required by plant conditions. The center
'
setup and communication links with other facilities were established in accordance with i
procedures.
I
!
The inspectors observed that only three positions in the OSC were identified and specified to be manned by Procedure 10-S-01-29, " Operations Support Center Operations," Revision 11: the OSC coordinator, the OSC health physics coordinator, j
and the OSC communicator. All other positions were directed to be manned by the
'
OSC coordinator from a pool of people on the call out list. These personnel were not
,
necessarily trained to hold the positions into which they were directed. During this drill,
'
or,e of two engineers was pulled from engineering duties to update the plant status
'
board, a supervisor was pulled to update the team status board, and a mechanic was
,
pulled to be the team communicator. The inspectors observed that the individuals were delayed in performing their functions and did not perform wellin some areas because l
they were not aware of what had to be done. Several examples included lack of three-
way communications and intemal communications on the status of the teams, failing to i
update the status of the teams on the board promptly, and listing on the plant status
'
l board every plant status item discussed regardless of its importance, in the case of the engineering staff, there was too much work left for the one engineer, so a second
'
I engineer had to be called in during the drill. These inefficiencies had the potential to affect the effectiveness of OSC operation during an actual event because personnel were pulled away from tasks they were trained to perform and assigned to positions for which they had no training.
The inspectors observed that the one engineer left to perform engineering was not maintaining close contact with the TSC and, in many cases, received instruction from
!
the OSC coordinator. The inspectors discussed this practice and the purpose of this l
position with the engineer and the OSC coordinator at the conclusion of the drill. The l
engineer and the coordinator explained that the engineering staff worked for the OSC
,
coordinator and was there to support the OSC. The inspectors pointed out that the engineers were not discussed in Procedure 10-S-01-29 and that Procedure 10-S-01-30,
" Technical Support Center Operations," Revision 6, states that the technical manager in
- '
the TSC is responsible for the activities of the engineers and technical staff. During the previous drill held in August 1998, the licensee identified during the self-critique that the
engineers were actually performing the function of planners. The OSC coordinator stated that planners were no longer assigned to the OSC. The inspectors discussed
.
)
'
!
i i
__ ___ _
_ _ _ _ _ _.
_.
.. _ _..___ __ _ _ __ _._ _ _ _ _
'
.
i l
.
-11-l l
concerns similar to this in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/98-08.- At that time, the i
inspectc,rs noted that the technical manager did not have a staff supporting him in
mitigation of the event.
l I
During the drill, the inspectors observed that the OSC coordinator did not have a l
telephone in the area where he worked. The only telephone / communication device
available in the room was in the engineering office at the back of the OSC. The i
coordinator used this phone a number of times during the drill to communicate with the l
TSC. During this period of time, the engineer was left without a method of l
communication. The OSC coordinator explained that the existing communication link (a
communicator on headsets in each of the TSC, the OSC, and the control room) was set i
!
up to communicate task priorities, team status, plant status, and communicate between j
l the coordinators of the different emergency facilities. No further communications were
'
l supposed to be required. The inspectors observed that this method of communication l
had the potential to miss important information and events due to shear volume of
l activity occurring at each of the facilities.
,
i l
The inspectors noted that the site was evacuated, but that no accountability was l
performed or discussed in the OSC. The OSC coordinator stated that they did not do l
l this, although it was his responsibility to see that accountability was performed in the l
OSC. A second responsibility not discussed was a schedule for extended OSC operations. No arrangements for relief personnel were made or discussed.
i
'
The inspectors observed that the layout of the OSC was not effective in some aspects.
t
'
l Both the team and OSC communicators were located in the center of the room against I
the wall. The individual updating the team status board was located on the other side of the room and could not easily hear the team status or communicate with the team j
communicator. The health physics coordinator and his communicator were located between the team status board and the team communicator in the opposite corner of the room from the briefing room where health physics briefings were held, creating a traffic path which was not necessary.
c.
Conclusions During the fourth quarter emergency preparedness training drill, the licensee staff demonstrated acceptable performance in the OSC. Although the communications had improved between the different facilities, the practice of communicating solely through a single three-point communication link between three facilities was identified as limiting for management of the event. The method of assigning tasks in the OSC was inefficient in that personnel were pulled from areas in which they were proficient to perform tasks
'
they had not been trained to perform.
l
!
!
l l_
_.
. - -..
.-.
.
. _..
_
. ___- _ _._.-.__ _.._ _. _ _ _. _
__
_._._
l
.
-12-P4.2 Licensee Self-Critiaue a.
Infoection Scooe (71750)
The inspector observed and evaluated the licensee's end-of drill facility critique in the OSC and the controller and evaluator critique held on November 19,1998, to determine whether the process would identify and characterize weak or deficient areas in need of corrective action.
,
i b.
Observations and Findinas The end-of-drill critique in the OSC was open and self-critical. A number of good issues
,
j were discussed. The inspectors noted that the critique did not include all individuals i
involved in the drill. Only a few of the maintenance personnelinvolved attended. in addition, the inspectors noted that the controllers and evaluators discussed their j
concerns before the players had an opportunity to speak. This had the tendency to take i
some of the responsibility for self-critique away from the players and was not a good practice.
The controller and evaluator critique was thorough, open, and self-critical. However, the inspectors noted that numerous issues discussed had been identified during previous i
drills. Examples included the prioritization of tasks, communications between the i
different facilities, the use of engineering staff, and coordination and timeliness of getting work teams into the field. The inspectors noted that the licensee had a self-
assessment team onsite during the drill as a result of management's concerns with emergency preparedness. That team's report was not complete prior to the end of the inspection period, but emergency planning management noted that many of the l
inspectors' concerns were also identified by the self-assessment team, c.
Conclusions
!
The end-of-drill critique was open and self-critical. However, not including all
.
participants and allowing personnel running the drill to provide input prior to the l
participants were identified as poor practices. The continued existence of weaknesses identified by the licensee during previous quarterly drills indicated a need for continued i
attention to this program.
l S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities On a daily basis, the inspectors observed the practices of security personnel and the condition of security equipment. Protected and vital area barriers were in good condition. The isolation zones were free of obstructions and the protected area
'
illumination levels were good. The inspectors concluded that the daily security activities were conducted in a professional manner.
!
l
.
l i
_.. _.
_ -.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
..
.
_. _
__m
__. _ _
.. _ _._. _ _ _
_ _
. _..._
l'
l'
.
i-13-V. Manaaement Meetinos j
a X1 Exit Meeting Summary i
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the l
conclusion of the inspection on December 17,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings
'
presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
I
'
,
!
I l
!'
I
>
l I
i
l l
l l
,
I l
I
!
i i
.
.
ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensge C. Bottemiller, Superintendent, Plant Licensing W. Eaton, Vice President, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station K. Hughey, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs D. Janecek, Director, Training C. Lambert, Director, Design Engineering R. Moomaw, Manager, Maintenance and Modifications J. Roberts, Director, Quality Programs C. Stafford, Manager, Plant Operations R. Wilson, Superintendent, Radiation Control J. Venable, General Manager, Plant Operations i
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551 Onsite Engineering IP 61726 Surveillance Observations IP 62707 Maintenance Observation IP 71707 Plant Operations IP 71750 Plant Support Activities IP 92700 Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Open 50-416/9815-01 URI Reactor Core isolation Cooling System Turbine Overspeed and Failure to Trip (Section M1.1)
50-416/9815-02 NCV Containment penetration opened contrary to Technical Specification requirement (Section 08.1)
Closed 98-004-00, 98-004-01 LER Containment penetration opened contrary to the Technical Specification requirement (Section 08.1)
50-416/9815-02 NCV Containment penetration opened contrary to Technical Specification requirement (Section O8.1)