ML20203D558
| ML20203D558 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203D508 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-97-21, NUDOCS 9712160224 | |
| Download: ML20203D558 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000416/1997021
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ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.: 50-416
License No.: NPF 29
Report No.: 50 416/97 21
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Lncation: Waterloo Road
Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150
Dates: October 19 through November 29,1997
inspectors: J. Dixon Herrity, Senior Resident inspector
K. Weaver, Resident inspector
Approved By: D. Kirsch, Chief, Project Branch F
Division of Reactor Projects
Attachment: Supplemental Information
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9712160224
DR 971205
ADOCK 05000416
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Grand Gulf Nuclear Station l
NRC Inspection Report 50 416/97 21
Qeerations ,
- Operations shift turnovers were thorough and conducted professionally
(Section 01.1).
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- (Jonlicensed operators were knowledgeable of the equipment and their duties and j
responsibilities (Section 01.2). !
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Maintenance
-* Workers were knowledgeable of equipment and tha scope of the planned work ;
activities. Foreign material exclusion controls were good during work activities in
and around the spent fuel pool area (Section M1.1).
- * The licensee identified a second maintenance preventable functional failure on the -
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Division 2 standby diesel generator due to the failure of the jacket water couplings
(Section M1.1).
- Control roorn operators demonstrated good independert verifications, self checking
techniques, and communications during the observed s Jrveillance testing activities
(Section M1.2).
- One example of a violation was identified for the failure to ensure that a -
procedurally required clearance between scaffolding and safety-related equipment
was either maintained or approved by engineering (Section M4.1). 1
Enoineerino
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- Reactor engineering personnel provided continuous oversight and good support
during the irradiated control rod blade processing (Section M1.1).
Plant Support
- In general, housekeeping and component material condition in the plant were good.
_However, housekeeping and combustible material controls were in need of much
improvement in the hot machine shop (Section M2,1).
- Health physics provided good support during the waste processing in and around
the spent fuel pool area. Workers appropriately adhered to radiological work permit
requirements and demonstrated good radiation worker practices (Section R1.1).
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- A second example of a violation was identified regarding the failure to obtain
engineering approval prior to securing three steel stanchions to an overhead
safety-related cable tray and its associated supports (Section R1.2).
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fleport Details
Summarv of Plant Status
The plant remained at or near 100 percent power throughout this inspection period.
I, Opergligng
01 Conduct of Operatiort
01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations, attanded
daily operations shif t turnovers, plan-of the-day meetings, and performed plant
tours. Daily operations shift turnovers were thorough and conducted professionally.
However, the inspectors observed that, generally, numerous telephone calls came
into the control room during shift turnovers. Operations management had
determined that shift turnover times were to be considered quiet time end had
directed the plant staff to refrain from contacting the control room during these
periods. The inspectors discussed this concern with the operations superintendent.
During one of these observations, the superintendent observed and recognized the
same concern and stated that management was discussing plans on how to
eliminate these distractions.
01.2 Nonlicensed Operator Rgynds (71707)
On November 9,1997, the inspectors accompanied the nonficensed operators in
charge of the outside areas on their routine rounds to the plant radial well pump
houses, switchyard, and meteorological tower. The inspectors found the
nonlicensed operators knowledgeable of the equipment and their duties and
responsibilities. The nonlicensed operators appropriately documented all equipment
parameters and instrument readings in accordance with procedures. The inspectors
found that housekeeping and material condition in the switchyard and
j meteorological tower areas were good.
01.3 Conclusions
Operations shift turnovers were thorough and conducted professionally.
Nonlicensed operators were knowledgeable of the equipment and their duties and
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responsibilities.
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07 Quality Assurance in Operations
07.1 Safety Review Committee Meetino (71707)
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On October 21,1997, the inspectors attended a safety review committee meeting.
The inspectors observed good discussions among safety review committee
members on the presentations made during the meeting. Contractors on the
committee were appropriately critical of the licensee's actions. The members met
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the quorum requirements specified by the Technical Specifications. The inspectors
concluded that the safety review committee activities were effective.
II. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 General Maintenance Comments
a. Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities, as specified by the
following work orders (WOs):
- WO 00195697 Blowdown / clean standby liquid control system tank
levelindication bubbler tube
- WO 00197427 Troublerhoot/ replace Division 2 standby diesel
generator solenoid Valves 1P75F537B and 1P75F538B
- WO 00196569 Perform Division 2 standby diesel generator pneumatic
control simulated engine run
- WO 00194183 Process, package, and ship for d;sposal: irradiated
control rod blades, incore detecto.s, jet pump beams,
etc.
- WO 00197629 Division 2 standby diesel generator jacket water
coupling leak repair
- WO 00111897 Bench test of failed Agastat control relays
b. Observations and Findinns
in general, the inspectors found this work to be well planned and performed
satisfactorily. Workers were knowledgeable of the equipment and the scope of the
work activities. In general, foreign material exclusion controls were good during the
processing of the irradiated control rod blades in and around the spent fuel pool
area. However, the licensee did identify, and document in Condition Report
(CR) 19971150, that an unmarked clear plastic wrapping was found in the spent
fuel pool area during the evolution. Reactor engineering personnel proWed
l continuous oversight and good support during the irradiated control rod plade
processing.
During the postmaintenance test of the Division 2 standby diesel generator,
operators identified that the jacket water couplings on the diesel were leaking
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approximately 80 drops per minute. The operators had maintenance personnel
tighten the couplings, then started the diesel for a surveillance run. The leakage
increased to approximately a pint to a quart per minute. The operators secured the
diesel. The licensee identified this event as a valid maintenance preventable
functional failure of the diesel. The inspectors observed the replacement of the
coupling on November 12,1997. The licensee replaced the coupling with a
modified coupling from the same manuf acturer that had better sealing capability.
This was the second maintenance preventable functional failure identified on the
Division 2 standby diesel generator due to Jacket water coupling leakage. The first
maintenance preventable functional failure was described in NRC Inspection
Report 50-410/97 12. The licensee ran the Division 1 standby diesel generator to
verify that there was not a potential for common mode failure. The operators
observed that there was no leakage from the Jacket water couplings. The licensee
plans to replace all of the jacket water couplings through a design change in the
near future; however, the parts had not arrived at the site at the time of this failure,
c. Conclusions
Workers were knowledgeable of equipment and the scope of the planned work
activities. Foreign material exclusion controls were good during work activities in
and around the spent fuel pool area. Reactor engineering personnel provided
continuous oversight and good support during the irradiated control rod blade
processing. The licensee identified a second maintenance preventable functional
failure on the Division 2 standby diesel generator due to the failure of the Jacket
water couplings.
M1.2 General Surveillance Comments
a. Inspection Scone (617_231
The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillance test,
Procedure 06 JP-1E21-0 0006, " Low Pressure Core Spray Quarterly Functional
Test," Revision 100,
b. Observations and Findinas
Control room operators performed well during the surveillance tests. Good
communications were observed between personnel in the field and the control room
operators. independent verifications were properly performed. All equipment
acceptance criteria specified in the test procedure were verified to be in compliance
with Technical Specifications and were met with no discrepancies,
c. Conclusions
Control room operators demonstrated good independent verifications, self-checking
techniques, and communications during the observed surveillance activities.
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M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Faci" ties and Equ'.pment
M2.1 General Plant Tours
a. Inspection Scope (71750)
During tours of the plant, the inspectors reviewed the areas for proper
housekeeping, components for material condition, and any nonconforming
conditions.
b. Observations and Findinat
The general housekeeping and material condition continued to be good throughout
the plant. However, during a tour of the hot machine shop in the turbine building
on November 9,1997, the inspectors found weaknesses regarding housekeeping in
the area. For example, bags of contaminated and noncontaminated trash had not
been removed from the area. In addition, work incomplete tags, used cotton
gloves, plastic material, and various trash were scattered on the floor and in the
surrounding area. A container of liquid combustible material was found lef t
unattended with no matenal safety data sheet label. The inspectors had previously
found weak housekeeping in this area and documented this concern in NRC
inspection Report 50 416/97-06. The inspectors notified maintenance personnel
and CR 19971158 was initiated. The area was subsequently cleaned and a 1
material safety data sheet label with the combustible classification was affixed to
the container.
The inspectors contacted fire protection personnel to ascertain whether the trash
and combustibles could exceed the fire protection heat load calculations for the
area. Fire protection personnel walked down the area on November 10 and
determined that the heat load calculations for the area had not been exceeded.
The fire protection personnel performed a walkdown of the area again on
November 18 and found (1) weaknesses in housekeeping with rubber gloves, rubber
mats, and plastic bag material scattered on the floor, (2) paint spray cans with no
combustible permits, (3) polyethylene plastic combustible material with no permit,
and (4) two fire extinguishers that had not had a monthly inspection. The fire
protection personnel initiated CR 1997-1212 to document these concerns. The
licensee determined that CR 1997 1212 should be classified as a station level CR,
which would require a formal root cause evaluation in accordance with their
corrective action process.
During a tour of the auxiliary building on November 10,1997, the inspectors
identified a paper suit that had been inappropriately discarded in a cable tray with
energized cables in the Division 2 safety 4 elated switchgear room. The inspectors
notified health physics personnel and the paper suit was removed and surveyed for
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contamination. The inspectors were informed that no contamination was found on
the suit.
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c. Conclusion 1 k
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In general, housekeeping and component material condition in the plant were good;
however, housekeepir,g and combustible material controls in the hot machine shop
were in need of improvement.
M.4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance
M4.1 Scaffold Constructed Next to Safetv Related Comoonent
a. Inmoeolon Scope (627071
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The inspectors reviewed equipment material condition related to maintenance during
tours of the plant.
b. Observations and Findinns
On October 28,1997, the inspectors observed that one member of a scaffold built
under electrical penetrations on the 166-foot level of the auxiliary building contacted
the insulation of a small gauge pipe just under containment atmosphere sample inlet
Valve 1P33F572A, a safety-related valve. The inspectors reviewed
Procedure 15-S-01-106, " Scaffolding Erection," Revision 0, and
Standard GGNS-CS-05, " Standard for Erection of Scaffolding in Safety-Related
Areas," Revision O. These procedures required nuclear plant engineering approval
for scaffolding with clearances less than 6 inches from safety-related systems or
components.
The inspectors discussed the concern with modification and construction personnel
and requested a copy of the engineering evaluation performed. The inspectors
observed that the evaluation did not address the concern identified and that the
independent inspection required by Procedure 15 S-01 106, Step 7.4, for
Seismic 11/1 scaffolding had not been signed off on the scaffold roquest form. The
inspectors discussed the concerns with a modification and construction supervisor.
The supervisor explained that the carpenters were aware that an evaluation had
been performed and thought that the proximity to safety-related equipment had
already been addressed. The supervisor initiated CR 1997 1129 to document and
resolve the conccrns.
The inspectors discussed the general process of scaffolding construction and
approval with engineering personnel. The nuclear plant engineer, who approved
deviating from Standard No. GGNS-CS-05, walked down the area with modification
and construction personnel to plan the scaffold. However, there was no
requirement for the engineer who approved the deviation to review the scaffold
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af ter it was constructed to ensure it met the plans. The inspectors observed that
this was a potential weakness in the licensee's program, i
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-The licensee acknowledged that the clearances between the scaffold and the valve
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should have been evaluated by engineering. The licensee had the scaffold modified
- to provide 6 inches of clearance from safety-related equipment and performed a >
review of all scaffolding that was erected at the site. The remaining scaffolding
was constructed in accordance with the procedure.
The inspectors determined that the failure to build the scaffold in accordance with
Procedure 15 S-01 106 was the first example of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50,-
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Appendix B, Criterion V (50 416/9721-01). The second example is identified in
Section R1.2. ,
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c. Conclusions
! One example of a violation was identified for the failure to ensure that a
procedurally required clearance between scaffolding and safety related equipment
was either maintained or approved by engineering.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-416/9617-02: f ailure to revise work packages in accordance
with procedures on work scope. An electricien was efectrically shocked as a result
of the failure to revise the work package to reflect the current equipment status in
the plant. The licenseo determined that this event resulted from the failure to
update the work packegn, an inadequate prejob briefing, and a failure to thoroughly
check the panel to verify n at it was deenergized. % addition, the licensee
determined that the perwnnel had failed to follow the procedure for flagging
temporarily onergized equipment and that a temporary alteration package should
have been used to route temporary power in this case, rather than a temporary
procedure.
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken and discussed how the
corrective action would prevent recurrence with the electrical and instrumentation
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superintendent. The licensee had determined that the barriers to prevent recurrence
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included insuring that the temporary alteration process was used in the future. The
licensee revised Procedure 01 S-07-1, " Control of Work on Plant Equipment and
Facilities," Revision 31, to require the impact statement be revised to reflect
changes in work scope or plant conditions. With the information provided by the
temporary alteration process, supervisors reviewing packages to be placed on the
schedule would be able to identify changes and would be required to have the '
packages revised. The prejob briefing procen was changed to require a 30 minute
supervisor turnover time. F.lectrical maintenance personnel were given training to
stress tho importance of voltage checks and flagging. The inspectors concluded
that the licensee's corrective actions were acceptable.
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111. Enoineerina
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-416/9606-02: unsecured locker in remote shutdown p nel
room. The licensee determined that Procedure 01 S-07-43, " Safe Handling o1
Loose items inside the Plant," did not contain adequate direction for ensuring that
safety-related equipment would not be affected by loose, nonsafety-related items in
the plant. The licensee conducted an extensive tour and identified 59 different
items which did not meet the criteria specified in the procedure. The inspectors
reviewed the corrective actions taken in response to these items and concluded that
the loose items had been acceptably addressed. The inspectors reviewed the
revised procedure and performed walkdowns of the plant to determine if the
corrective actions were effective. Although the inspectorr, identified no similar
loose items, as documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/9712 and
Section R1.2 in this report, the failure to ensure an engineering evaluation is
conducted prior to securing items tn safety related equipmt,nt was still a concern.
The inspectors concluded that the corrective actions taker adequately addressed
the concern of leaving items unsecured in the plant.
E8.2 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-416/9703 02: evaluation of licensee conformance
with regulatory guide. This item was opened to further evaluate the licensee's
conformance with Technical Specification 5.5.7 for testing of ventilation filters and
to review the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's response to the licensee's
request for an interpretation of the wording in Regulatory Guide 1.52, " Design,
Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Post Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature
Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of
Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants." The inspectors reviewed the response
from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to Mr. Jerrold Dewease dated
September 11,1997. In the letter, the staff determined that the licensees were
expected to develop interpretations of the terms in regulatory guides to limit the
high efficiency particulate air and charcoal filter testing to situations which have the
potential to degrade engineered safety featurre filtration system efficiency. The
interpretations must be based on a well-documented, sound, and conservative
technical basis. The staff also documented that painting, fire, or chemical release is
not comrnunicating with a ventilation system if the ventilation system is not in
operation and the isolation dampers for the system are closed and leak tight,
thereby preventing air from passing through the filter.
The inspectors had identified that the licensee did not have a basis for the 1.5-hour
required wait time that they identified for the standby fresh air system and that the
licensee had no controls over the amount of paint that was being used in the areas
that communicated with the filtration systems. The licensee changed the 1.5-hour
wait time to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> and instituted controls to limit the amount of paint or volatile
organic compounds that could be taken into the areas to an amount that would not
degrade the filtration systems. The inspectors found that the dampers on the
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standby gas treatment system were not leak tight and questioned whether the
filters could be affected by painting. The licensee addressed this concern and
documented their response to the letter in a package titled, " Programs Package for
Control of Volatile Organic Compounds in the Control Building." The package
documented that the auxiliary building was maintained at a negative pressure in
relation to the outside. The leakage past the dampers was coming from the
discharge vent from the outside, through the filter, and out a drain valve. The
inspectors reviewed the system drawings and concluded that this was the case and
that volatile organic compounds released during painting would not have the
opportunity to pass through the filters.
The inspectors reviewed the results of all of the past tests conducted on the
charcoal. The charcoalin the filtration units has passed tests performed every
18 months, indicating that there is no buildup due to volatile organic compounds.
The inspectors determined that the lack of controls that the licensee had in place
prior to the concerns being identified did not have a safety significant effect on the
plant due to the rewits of past tests. The inspectors concluded that the programs
that the licensee recently put in place, to address Regulatory Guide 1.52, were
appropriate.
E8.3 LQ1gaml) Unresolved item 50-416/9720-02: discrepancies identified with
containment electrical penetration nitrogen supply pressure. This item was opened
to review the purpose of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Table 6.219,
" Primary Reactor Containment Penetration and Containment isolation Valve Leakage
Rate Test List," Note 14, and its relation to the electrical penetrations. The
inspectors discussed the concerns with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
and determined that the note could be interpreted to mean that the electrical
penetrations only had to be continuously pressurized at > P, when leak rate testing
was being performed. Although the electrical penetrations were designed to allow
continuous monitoring, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report does nit address
this function. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation agreed that the inner two
o rings are the safety related seals required for containment isolation and the outer
two o-rings and the nitrogen supply system are nonsafety-related and were installed
to allow testing of the inner two o rings. Maintaining the penetrations pressurized
served no safety related function. The licensee initiated CR 19971024. The
inspectors concluded that the concern was nonsafety-related and would
appropriately be addressed by CR 1997-1024.
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IV. Plant Support
Ri Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R1,1 Eackaaina of Irradiated Waste
a. Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors attended the crew prejob briefing for Radiation Work Permit
(RWP) 9710-001 which was written for the packaging of the irradiated waste in
the spent fuel pool performed under WO 00194183.
b. Observations and Findinas
The crew prejob briefing performed on November 5,1997, for RWP 97-10-001 was
thorough, and the RWP covered all the necessary information. Workers adhered to
the RWP requirements and demonstrated good radiation worker practices in high
contamination areas and high radiation areas during the work activities. Dedicated
health physics personnel continuously monitored the work activities performed
under RWP 97-10-001. In addition, health physics personnel installed additional
area radiation monitors on the fuel handling platform are on the fuel pool heat
exchanger prior to processing the control ro:! blades.
c. Conclusions
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Good health physics support was provided during the waste processing in and
around the spent fuel pool area. Workers appropriately adhered to RWP
requirements and demonstrated good radiation worker practices.
R1.2 HecIth Physics Eauipment Found Susoended From Safetv-Related Plant
Eauinment (71750)
a. Insocction Scope (71750)
The inspectors frequently performed walkdowns of the radiological controlled
access area and assessed radiological postings and worker adherence to protective
clothing requirements,
b. Observations and Findings
in general, radiological areas were properly posted, and area survey maps were
appropriately updated. During a 2 aur of the 139-foot elevation of the auxiliary
b'silding on NovemLer 10,1997, the insps.ctors identified three health physics
stanchions suspended . ; proximately 2 feet from the floor. The stanchions, each
weighing approximately 40 lbs., were tied with a rope to a Division 1 safety-related
cable tray and its associated supports in the overhead. The inspectors questioned
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contract workers in the area to ascertain the reason for securing the three
stanchions to safety related equipment. The contract workers stated that they were
preparing the auxiliary building floor for painting activities and that health physics
personnel had directed them to hang the stanchions from overhead < Jpment in
order to retain the posted radiation area boundary. Nuclear plant w< ating had
not been required to evaluate the praciice. The inspectors informec e a contract
workers and health physics personnel that plant procedures did not allow securing
loose items in the plant to safety-related equipment without nuclear plant
engineering approval. The stanchions were subsequently removed from the safety-
related equipment and CR 1997 1181 was initiated.
Procedure 01-S-07-43, " Safe Handling of Loose items inside the Plant," Revision 1,
Paragraph 5,11, stated in part, that equipmant; pioing; conduit; tubing; cable trays;
instrumentation; heating, ventilation, and air conditioning; and their associated
supports (safety-related and nonsafety related) are npj considered structural
elements ano cannot be used for securing loose items without nuclear plant
engineering approval.
The failure of health physics personnel to obtain nuclear plant engineering approval
prior to securing the three stanchions to the overhead safety related cable tray and
its associated supports was a second example of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V (50-416/97021-01). The first example is addressed in
Section M4.1.
The inspectors identified a similar violation ia NRC Inspection Report 50-4?6/97-12.
The violation is discussed in Section R8.1 of this report.
c, Conclusionn
Radiological areas were properly posted and area survey maps were appropriately
updated. However, a second example of a violation was identified regarding the
failure to obtain engineering approval prior to securing three steel stanchions to the
overhead safety-related cable tray and its associated supports.
R1.3 Contamination Event and Unmonitored Release
a. insnection Scope (93702)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding the unmonitored release
and contamination event and monitored the licensee's interim corrective actions and
cleanup activities.
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
61726 Surveillance Observations
62707 Maintenance Observation
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71707 Plant Operations
71750- Plant Support Activities
92902 Followup Maintenance
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- 92903 Followup - Engineering
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' 92904 Followup - Plant Support
93702 Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors
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ITEMS OPENED CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Onened
, 97021 01 VIO Failure to ensure clearance from safety-related equipment
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was evaluated (Section M4.1) and is!!ure to evaluate the
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attachment of steel stanchions to a safety-related cable
r tray and the associated supports (Section R1.2)
97021 02 IFl Further review of the licensees investigation, the cause and
the licensee's corrective actions associated with the
unmonitored release and contamination event
(Section R1,3)
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b. 9_bservations and Findinus
At approximately 6 p.m. on November 24,1997, two workers who wera exiting the
protected area, alarmed the portal monitors at the security access point. The
individuals had contamination on their shoes.
Licensee investigation traced the contamination to the area around the condensate
storage tank, where a skid mounted hydrolaser was set up. This hydrolaser was
being used to provide wash water in the cask wash area of tt.e spent fuel pool. The
licensee determined that contaminated water was siphoned from the spent fuel pool
on November 21,1997. The hydrolaser wand had been lowered to the bottom of
the cask wash area and pressurized water was supplied to the wand to stir up
sediment in order that it could be vacuumed from the cask wash area. At one
point, the wand began floating towards the surface. As an emergency action
measure, personnel involved secured the pressurized water for about a two minute
time period until the wand could be removed from the cask wash down area. The
licensee believed that during this two minute period, the static head from the spent
fuel pool may have caused a siphon effect to occur. The licensee estimated that
the amount of contaminated water from the spent fuel pool that could have
migrated outside the radiological controlled access area onto the concrete and
gravel area was apprcximately 1.5 gallons.
Surveys of the area found contamination levels as high as 60,000 counts per
minute. This was the result of a direct frisk of a foot pedal for the hydrolaser skid.
The smearable contamination level for this pedal was approximately 30,000
disintegrations per minute. The licensee roped off the area as a contamination area.
Surveys detected contamination in a gravel area at a nearby storm drain. Upon
opening the drain cover and performing a large area survey in the drain, the licensee
detected contamination levels in the range of 1,500 disintegrations per minute.
This indicated that there was likely an unmonitored release from the radiological
controlled access area. The drain flows to a hold up basin and eventually flows to
the river. Upon further investigation, the licensee found that the contamination was
contained inside the storm drain piping upstream of the basin. The licensee had
implemented interim measures in anticipation of rain. These measures included
sealing the concrete surfaces by painting and digging up and removing
contaminated rocks and gravel around the drain.
At the end of this inspection period, the licensee had establisi.ed a significant event
review team to perform an investigation of this event to determine the root cause
and corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Further review of the licensee's
investigation, the cat.=e, and the ricensee's corrective actions will be conducted
through an inspection Followup Item (50-416/9721-02h
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R8 Miscellaneous Radiological Protection & Chemistry issues (92904)
R8.1 1 Closed) Violation 50-416/9712-01: failure to perform a required engineering
evaluation prior to resting an extension ladder on a safety-related cable tray. In
reviewing the violation, the inspectors noted that Procedure 01-S-07-43, may have
contributed to the violation in that the requirement to obtain engineering approval
could only be found by reading a note in the definition section of the procedure.
The inspectors considered this to be a weakness in the procedure and discussed it
with the licensee. Subsequent to the discussion, the licensee issued an addendum
to its initial response. The addendum was dated October 2,1997, and committed
to enhance the procedure by putting the note in a more visible section of the
procedure.
While reviewing the issue discussed in Section R1.2 of this report, the inspectors
reviewed the changes made to Procedure 01-S 07-43. The licensee had added
Step 6.10, titled " Scaffolding and Portable Ladders," and had placed the note under
this step. The inspectors interviewed the personnel involved in the situation
discussed in Scction R1.2 and determined that the individuals were not aware of
the requirement in Procedure 01-S-07-43 nor did Step 6.10 address securing " loose
items" such as the three stanchions identified in violation 50-416/97021-01. The
inspectors considered that the corrective actions taken in response to Violation 50-
416/97012-01 were too narrowly focused and were not effective in preventing
recurrence of the violation discussed in Section R1.2. Review of this issue will be
included in t'u followup to violation 50 416/97021-01.
P8 Miscellaneous Emergency Preparedness issues (92904)
P8.1 IClosed) Violation 50-416/9706-03: failure to have a qualified individual for the
offsite emergency coordinator position available. The licensee determined that the
root cause for this event was personnel error. The individuals involved and the
emergency preparedness staff were counseled. The inspectors concluded that the
licensee's corrective actions were acceptable.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the :nspection results to members of licensee management on
December 2,1997, following the conclusion of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged
the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
should be considered proprietary ;o propri6tary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED '
Licensee -
D. Bost, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering
_
C. Bottemiller, Superintendent, Plant Licensing .
J. Burton, Technical Assistant, Performance and System Engineering
L. Dale, Director,' Plant Projects and Support '
J. Hagan, Vice President, Plant Operations
C. Hayes, Director, Quality Programs
C. Holifield, Licensing Engineer, Plant Licensing
K. Hughey, Director, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
D. Janecek, Director, Training
E. Langley, Technical Assistant, Maintenance
T. Kriesel, Radiation Control Supervisor, Radiation Protection
L. Robertson,- Outage Management, Maintenance
C. Stafford, Operations Assistant, Plant Operation
- J. Venable, Manager, Operations
HEC
J. Donahew, NRR Project Manager
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3-
Closed
96006-02 VIO Unsecured locker in remote shutdown panel room
(Section E8.1)
96017-02 VIO Failure to revise work packages in accordance with
procedures on work scopo (Section M8.1)
97006-03 VIO Failure to have a qualified individual for the offsite
emergency coordinator position available (Section P8.1)
97003-02 URI Evaluation of licensee conformance with regulatory guide
(Section E8.2)
97012-01 VIO Failure to perform a required engineering evaluation prior to
resting an extension ladder on a safety-related cable tray
(Section R8.1)
97020-02 URI Discrepancies identified with containment electrical
penetration nitrogen supply pressure (Section E8.3)
97012 01 VIO Failure to perform a required engineering evaluation prior to
resting an extension ladder on a safety-related cable tray
(Section R8.1)