IR 05000416/1998001
| ML20197B279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197B276 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-98-01, 50-416-98-1, NUDOCS 9803100267 | |
| Download: ML20197B279 (9) | |
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ENCLOSURE
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50416 License No.:
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Report No.:
50-416/98-01 j.
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Facility:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station i
Location:
Waterloo Road Port Gibson, Mississippi
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Dates:
January 11 through February 21,1998 i
inspectors (s):
J. Dixon-Herrity, Senior Resident inspector K. Weaver, Resident inspector
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Approved By:
D. Kirsch, Chief, Project Branch F Division of Reactor Projects
I Attachment :
SupplementalInformation
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9803100267 980304 PDR ADOCK 05000416 G
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2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Grand Gulf Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-416/98-01 OoeratiQas Operators responded well to the manual scram due to the high temperature difference
between Moisture Separator Reheaters (MSRs) A and B. Performance was in accordance with standing orders, abnormal operating instructions, and Technical Specifications (Section O1.1).
A noncited violation was identified for a licensee-identified and corrected failure to
perform a Technical Specification Surveillance due to personnel error (Section 08.1).
Maintenance Five of the seven maintenance and surveillance activities observed were performed in
accordance with procedures (Section M1).
A minor noncited violation was identified for the failure of electricians to follow a
procedure requirement to log parts removed from an emergency diesel generator in a Zone 1 foreign material exclusion area (Section M1.2).
Improved attention to detail by maintenance personnel was identified regarding the
prohibited use of safety equipment for foot supports (Section M1.3).
Enaineering Engineering performed well with regard to the operability resolution of the Division 1
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standby diesel generator jacket water cooling system gasket leak and the test to assess the plant readiness to return to 100 percent power without seand stage reheat.
Engineering analyses were technically thorough and and based on sound engineering principles (Section E1.3).
Plant Succort Locked high radiation doors were properly controlled, high radiation and contamination
areas were properly posted, and radiological area survey maps accurately reflected radiological conditions in the respective areas (Section R1.1).
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e Reoort Details Summarv of Plant Status The plant operated at 100 percent power from the beginning of the inspection period until January 28,1998, when operators manually scrammed the reactor due to a temperature difference of g;aater than 25'F between MSRs A and B. Following troubleshooting activities and engineering evaluations, the reactor was taken critical on January 30,1998. The plant was returned to 95 percent power on February 2, with the MSR second stage reheaters isolated.
The plant remained at 95 percent power until February 19,1998, when the licensee commenced a test during which they would slowly return to 100 percent power with the MSR second stage reheaters isolated. At the close of the inspection period, the plant was operating at 98 percent power.
l. Operatlant
Conduct of Operations 01.1 Manual Scram Due to a Temoerature Difference Between MSRs A and B a,
lasoection Scoce (93702. 71707)
The inspectors responded to the control roam, following the manual reactor scram, to conduct control room observations and review of the circumstances surrounding the manual scram.
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Observations and Findinas On January 28,1998, operators manually scrammed the reactor from 100 percent power because of a temperature difference greater than 25'F between MSRs A and B.
The temperature difference was because of tube leaks in MSR A and loss of power from inverter 1Y98 to the MSR temperature controllers. After discovering tube leaks in the -
MSR A second stage reheater, the licensee initiated Standing Order 98-0001 in response to the potential for damage to the low pressure turbine blades. The standing order required operators to insert a manual reactor scram and to trip the turbine if the temperature difference between the computer points for the hot reheat temperatures for MSRs A and B reached 25'F.
The inspectors verified stable plant parameters and found that operator response to the manual scram was in accordance with operations standing orders, abnormal operating procedures, and Technical tipecifications, c.
Conciusions Operator response to the manual reactor scram due to the high temperature difference between MSR A and B was in accordance with standing orders, abnormal operating instructions, and Technical Specifications.
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Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
08.1 (Closed) Licensec Event Reoort 97-0.Q.t standby service water system subsystem (missed Technical Specification surveillance). The report involved the failure of operators to realize that a change to a work order which required the installation of temporary annubars in standby service water Train A caused the system to be inoperable. As a result, the operators failed to perform Technical Specification Surveillance 3.8.1.1 to verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.1, " Standby Service Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink." The inspectors reviewed the root cause analysis report and the corrective actions completed. The licensee determined that the root cause was that the operator's error detection practices were less than adequate. The contributing causes were: (1) work planning was not coordinated, (2) the impact statement in the work package was not located well in the package for easy reference, and (3) the operations shift tumover was less than adequate. The correctit e actions included: (1) moving the -
impact statement to the front of the package, (2) modifying the work control procedure to require that changes to the impact statement be reviewed and approved at the daily scheduling meeting and to require a more detailed review of the affect of the work on the operability of a system or component, and (3) developing a principle of operation guideline to provide guidance to operators on control-of-work issues. The inspectors
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- determined that the corrective actions addressed the event and were completed. The failure to perform Technical Specification Surveillance 3.8.1.1 was a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.1. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
11. Maintenance
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M1 Conduct of Maintenance l
M1.1 General Maintenance Comments a.
Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities, as specified by the following work orders (WOs):
WO 179925 Pipe connection beside high pressure core spray (HPCS)
diesel turbocharger WO 200555 Change diesellube oil filter
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WO 194877 Change HPCS standby diesel generator slip rings
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WO 19970280 Wiring modification to Standby Service Water Pump A
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discharge valve
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3-WO 19970282 Wiring modification to Division 2 diesel heat exchanger
inlet valve b.
Observations and Findinos The inspectors found the performance of this work to be satisfactory. With the exception of the discussion in Sections M1.2 and M1.3, work observed was conducted in accordance with the instructions and procedures provided in the work packages.
M1.2 Foreian Material Exclusion (FME)
On January 23,1998, while cbserving the disassembly of the HPCS diesel generator coverplates to perform WO 194877, the inspectors observed that the electricians were depositing the removed cover fasteners on the horizontal surface below the coverplate.
The work was occurring within an area posted as Foreign Material Exclusion (FME)
Zone 1. The inspectors questioned whether the parts being removed within the zone should be 99ged. The technician explained that the fasteners did not need to be logged because they would be going right back on the panel and that they had an individual posted to ensure nothing was introduced into the open generator.
The inspectors reviewed Procedure 01-S-07-44, " Foreign Material Exclusion,"
Revision 2. The procedure required that all parts being removed and/or replaced within an FME Zone 1 must be logged on the FME area log. The inspectors discussed the concern with the supervisor for the work that was ongoing. The supervisor understood that all material that was removed from the zone was to be logged, but was not aware of the requirement to log all parts removed. The supervisor verified that all material should have been logged and initiated Condition Report 1998-0048.
The inspectors observed that the electricians had control of the material that had been removed the entire time that the cover was removed and that the area of the generator where the panel was removed could be completely visually inspected for foreign material. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-416/9801-02).
M1.3 HPCS Diesel Lav Shaft On January 23,1998, while observing work occurring on the HPCS diesel, the inspectors observed a mechanic standing on the lay shaft while changing a gasket on a turbocharger flange. The HPCS diesel generator consists of two diesel engines that drive a common generator. The lay shaft is a shaft that goes from the governor on the end of one diesel to the fuel racks on the end of the second diesel.,
two-inch diameter shaft, which is supported by pillow block bearings, is used to provide load
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standing on the shaft. The mechanic explained that he had discussed this concern with his supervisor prior to beginning work, and that the supervisor had evaluated the shaft and said it was permissible to stand on the shaft while performing the task assigned.
The inspectors discussed the concern with the mechanical maintenance supervisor responsible for the work. The supervisor explained that engineering guidance had been provided to allow the supervisors to determine whether equipment and plant structures could be used to support personnel while performing work. The guidance was temporary until the corrective actions in response to NRC Violation 50-416/9721-01 was complete. The supervisor explained that the guidance stated that personnel could use safety-related and nonsafety-related piping two inches and larger as footholds while performing work. The lay shaft was two inches or a little larger, so the supervisor determined that the shaft could be used as a foothold. The inspectors questioned whether the supervisor had considered what effect the loading would have on the bearings supporting the shaft. The supervisor stated that he had not considered this.
The supervisor forwarded the concem to engineering for further evaluation.
Engineering evaluated the lay shaft supports and determined that, because of the heavy construction, neither the shaft or the bearing would be adversely affected by having an individual suppod himself on the shaft. Further, the temporary guidance the supervisor used was revised to include information on other equipment and guidance to contact engineering if there were further questions. The change to this document, Specification CS-15, " Civil Standard for Temporary Rigging," was reviewed and approved by the licensee on February 11,1998.
M1.4 General Surveillance Comments a.
Insoection Scoce (61726)
The inspectors obuerved portions of the following surveillance tests:
Procedure 06-IC-1E61-0-1004-01, " Containment and Drywell Hydrogen
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Analyzer Channel A Calibration," Revision 101 Procedure 06-OP-1P75-M 0001, " Standby Diesel Generator 11 Functional Test,"
Revision 104 b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that the test procedures provided clear guidance and properly implemented Technical Specification requirements. Measuring and test equipment was verified to be within its current calibration cycle. The instrumentation was removed from service, applicable limiting conditions for operation entered, and properly returned to service. Technicians were very knowledgeable and qualified. As-found test data was within the acceptance criteria specified by the instructions for the instrumentation. The
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5-evaluation of a jacket water leak identified by the licensee during the second surveillance observed is further discussed in Section E1.1, M1.5 Conclusions on conduct of Maintenance Five of the seven maintenance and surveillance activities observed were perfor
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accordance with procedures. A minor noncited violation was identified for the fx.oro of electricians to follow a procedure requirement to log parts removed from equipment in a FME Zone 1 area. Improved attention to detail by maintenance personnel was identified regarding the prohibitied use of safety equipment for foot supports. However, the inspectors identified one example where the evaluation completed by a supervisor to allow the use of safety related equipment as a support for work was less than adequate.
Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Enoineerina Evaluation of the Division 1 Standbv Diesel Generator (SDG) Jacket Coolina Water Leak a.
Insoection Scoce (37551)
The inspectors observed onsite system engineering support of the Division 1 SDG Jacket cooling water leak investigation and operability determination, b.
Observations and Findinas During a monthly surveillance run of the Division 1 SDG, a jacket cooling vter leak was reported at the inlet flange to the No. 8 left bank cylinder. During a subsec, snt test run of the SDG, the system engineer evaluated the leak rate and its effects on system operability. The system engineer concluded that the SDG was operable because the usable volume of the jacket cooling water standpipe would be available for at least 7 days before operator action would be required to add makeup water to the system.
The system engineer recommended compensatory measures to operations to monitor the jacket cooling water standpipe level and the leak during subsequent surveillance testing of the SDG prior to the upcoming refueling outage.
The licensee determined that the jacket cooling water leak was a nonconforming condition because the SDG jacket cooling water system will no longer meet the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) system description. UFSAR Section 9.5.5.2 required that the jacket cooling water system be able to operate for 30 days without makeup. The licensee had previously identified the UFSAR discrepancy between the SDG jacket cooling water system (30 days of operation without makeup) and the other
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-6-engine support systems, fuel oil and lube oil (7 days of operation without makeup). The licensee had plans in place to incorporate this change in the next revision of the UFSAR.
As a result of the nonconforming condition, the licensee completed a Generic Letter 91-18 Justification for continued operability of the Division 1 SDG.
E1.2 Test to Allow Return to 100 Percent Power with MSR Reheaters Out of Service a.
insoection Scoce (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the test instruction and the 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation and attended operator briefings for the subject test.
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Observations and Findinos The test instruction was written to maximize core thermal power within the licensed power of 3833 MWt with the MSR second stage reheaters out of service. The objective was to increase power slowly by opening the turbine control valves in one percent power increments while maintaining adequate control of reactor pressure and adequate margins in the main turbine contrel valve throttle positions. Both the instruction and the evaluation were detailed and thorough. The operators and engineers performed the increase over a period of 6 days, collecting data to verify the stability of the plant as required by the instruction. The briefings held by engineering for the operators on shift were detailed and stressed the need for the operators to watch the effect on the whole plant. The operators involved exhibited a high level of knowledge about the test and interest in the different parameters that they were tracking. During the briefing held after the inihl power increase, the engineers went over each system being effected by the power increase and provided charts to show system performance. The engineers involved exhibited a good questioning attitude in identifying unanticipated effects on the plant, analyzing them, and providing input to operations on how the change could affect operations. The increase in power was performed in a controlled, conservative manner and the plant remained stable.
E1.3 Conclusions for Conduct of Faineerina Engineering actions in the operability resolution of the Division 1 SDG jacket cooling water system gasket leak and the test to assess the plant readiness to return to 100 percent power without second stage reheat were technically thorough and based on sound engineering principles.
E.8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-416/9703-01: failure to initiate a condition report upon discovery of a deficient condition. The licenses determined that the cause of this occurrence was a failure of management to clearly define policy guidance and management expectations for the prompt reporting of deficie'cies. The inspectors reviewed the training provided to engineering personnel and the memorandum to plant personnel
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defining condition report expectations and determined that the corrective actions adequately addressed the violation and were completed.
IV. Plant Sunnort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)
The inspectors made frequent tours of the controlled access area and reviewed radiological postings and worker adherence to protective clothing requirements. In general, locked high radiation doors were properly controlled, high radiation and contamination areas were properly posted, and radiological area survey maps accurately reflected radiological conditions in the respective areas.
R8 Miscellaneous Radiological Protection & Chemistry lasues (92904)
R8.1 LGb3ed) Violation 50-416/9703-03: two exar'1ples of failure to follow radiological protedion procedures. This violation involved the failure of health physics personnel to properly document a contamination area survey and to update the respective area radiologini survey map. The licensee immediately updated the area survey map to reflect actual conditions in the area and health physics supervision conoucted interviews with health r.hysics personnel to reiterate the requirements and management's expectations on documenting radiological area surveys. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's c orrective actions adequately addressed the violation. The inspectors reviewed area servey maps during frequent tours conducted since identification of the (
violation and idemified no further concerns.
V. Management Meetings X.
Exit Meeting Sumn ary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the cone!usion of the inspection on February 26,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the liceasee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee H. Berryhill, Superintendent, Electrical Maintenance D. Bost, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering C. Bottemiller, Superintendent, Plant Licensing W. Cade, Operations Assistant, Plant Operations L. Daughtery, Technical Coordinator, Plant Licensing W. Deck, Superintendent, Security W. Eaton, General Plant Manager, Plant Operations B. Edwards, Superintendent, Mechanical Maintenance C. Holifield, License Engineer, Plant Licensing K. Hughey, Director, Plant Licensing T. Kriesel, Radiation Control Supervisor, Radiation Protection C. Morgan, Manager, Emergency Planning J. Owens, Licensing Specialist, Plant Licensing
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J. Roberts, Director, Quality Programs J. Robertson, Technical Assistant, Outage Management & Work Control NRC J. Donahew, NRR Project Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 61726 Surveillance Observations 62707 Maintenance Observation 71707 Plant Operations 71750 Plant Support Activities 92901 Followup - Plant Operations 92903 Followup - Engineering 92904 Followup - Plant Support 93702 Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors
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i ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED i
Ooened 50-416/9801-01 NCV Missed standby service water system Technical Specification Surveillance (Section 08.1)
50-416/9801-02 NCV-Failure to log parts being removed within FME Zone 1 (Section M1.2)
Closed 50-416/97-001 LER Standby service water system subsystem (missed Technical Specification surveillance) (Section 08.1)
50-416/9801-01 NCV Missed standby service water system Technical Specification Surveillance (Section 08.1)
50-416/9801-02 NCV Failure to log parts being removed within FME Zone 1 (Section M1.2)
50-416/9703-01 VIO Failure to initiate a CR upon discovery of a deficient condition (Section E8.1)
50-416/9703-03 VIO Two examples of the failure to follow radiological protection procedures (Section R8.1)