IR 05000416/1998008
| ML20236Q971 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236Q970 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-98-08, 50-416-98-8, NUDOCS 9807210159 | |
| Download: ML20236Q971 (20) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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Docket No.: 50-416 l
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License No.: NPF-29 Report No.: 50-416/98-08 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Location: Waterloo Road Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Dates: May 17 through June 27,1998 inspector (s): J. Dixon-Herrity, Senior Resident inspector K. Weaver, Resident inspector P. Alter, Resident inspector Approved By: J. l. Tapia, Chief, Project Branch A ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information l
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Grand Gulf Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-416/98-08 This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Ooerations
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The operations department final walkdown of the drywell following the outage was thorough and detailed and material condition of the drywell was good because of the overall condition of the equipment and structures (Section O1.2).
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Operations personnel exhibited very good oversight and direction of activities during the restart following Refueling Outage 9 (Section 01.3).
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The material condition of the high pressure core spray and low pressure core spray system components and the pump room areas was good because of the overall condition of the equipment and system availability and health (Section O2.1).
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The licensee identified that the low-low set logic for all six safety relief valves was inoperable for approximately 10 seconds on June 19,1997, as a result of test switches being erroneously being placed in the test position. This was a noncited violation (Section 08.1).
Maintenance
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Seven maintenance and surveillance tasks observed were performed satisfactorily and in accordance with procedures with one exception. The inspectors identified one poor work practice where electrical technicians used trial and error by pushing buttons to try to get a new measuring and test equipment meter to work while it was connected to safety-related equipment. The technicians had not received formal training on the use of the meter (Section M1.2).
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The inspectors found that the procedures for starting the reactor core isolation cooling
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system and for operator rounds did not meet the vendor's guidance for ensuring that the l turbine oil level was at the correct level for operation and that the operators were not
! aware of the acceptable operating or shutdown levels (Section M1.4).
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- The root cause and corrective actions taken in response to a problem with steam
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admission valve seat leakage in the reactor core isolation cooling system were thorough
! and exhibited good coordination between engineering, planning, and maintenance (Section E4.1).
l Plant Sucoort
l * During observations of a quarterly training drill, the inspectors found that the technical support center (TSC) was not laid out in a manner which facilitated management of the
, event or clear communication between the disciplines. The status boards provided were l not placed or used well and there was no guidance on how the boards were to be used (Section P2.1).
- The TSC's performance was marginal during an emergency preparedness training drill.
l Personnel in the center were not aware of or did not perform the responsibilities l assigned in the emergency response plan. The coordination of the event response that occurred in the TSC was poor and management did not have a good understanding of or control over the corrective actions being taken (Section P4.1).
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The emergency preparedness self-critique process following a quarterly training drill identified some areas for corrective action and was conducted in an open forum,
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however, the results were not self-critical. The process failed to point out that personnel involved were not aware of the different position responsibilities in the TSC or that training opportunities were missed by the failure of controllers to intervene to ensure the scenario ran according to plan (Section P4.2).
- Fire protection equipment observed in the plant was in good material condition and good controls were maintained over combustible materials in safety-related areas (Section F1.1).
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The plant began this inspection period at Mode 4 in the process of preparing for startup at the end of Refueling Outage 9. The plant was taken critical at 9:57 p.m. on May 19,1998,and l
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reached Mode 1 at 4:03 p.m. on May 21,1998. The plant operated at 100 percent power during the remainder of the inspection perio l 1. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations
01.1 General comments (71707) l The inspectors performed control room observations to ascertain operator knowledge and performance. Operators exhibited good three-way communications and peer l review. Operations shiit turnovers were thorough and conducted professionall l Operators were knowledgeable of the status of equipment and applicable Technical l
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Specification limiting conditions for operations were appropriately documente Inspectors observed as operators and auxiliary operators conducted operator round Operators were knowledgeable of the equipment and of the acceptance criteria identified in the round sheets. Auxiliary operators were cognizant of equipment material condition and of housekeepin .2 Drvwell Walkdown for Refuelina Outaae 9 Closeout Insoection Scoce (71707) l The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the drywell prior to drywell closeou Observations and Findinas On May 19,1998, the inspectors attended the prejob briefing and walkdown of the j drywell for closecut at the end of Refueling Outage 9. The briefing conducted was detailed and all necessary personnel attended. The walkdown was performed in i accordance with Procedure 03-1-01-1, Data Sheet II, "Drywell, Closeout Check sheet,"
Revision 108. The inspectors observed that the drywell had been left in good material condition and that most of the equipment and scaffolding used during Refueling Outage 9 had been removed from the drywell. The auxiliary operators conducting the walkdown were thorough in identifying all items left behind and in covering all areas of the drywell. All material that had not been removed prior to this walkdown was identified by the operators and subsequently removed by the licensee. These items included l electrical cords, temporary lighting, health physics posting stanchions and step off pads, and danger flagging materia ,
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-4-01.3 Startuo Followina the Refuelina Outaae Insoection Scoce (71707)
The ine.pectors observed the startup from Refueling Outage Observations and Findinas On May 19,1998, tha inspectors attended the shift briefing and the briefing held prior to continuing the increaa in power after the shift change. The power increase was appropriately stopped during shift turnover. The briefings held were thorough and personnel were knowledgeable of their responsibilities. The control room was maintained quiet with minimal disruptions throughout the evolution. Two operators were assigned to move the rods and a third was assigned to address the remainder of the plant. All actions involving rod movement were in accordance with the rod move sheets and were peer checked and verified. Shift supervision and the reactor engineers in the control room maintained a close watch over the evolution. The approach to criticality was slow and well controlled. The plant went critical at 9:57 .4 Conclusions for Conduct of Ooerations The operations department final walkdown of the drywell following the outage was thorough and detailed .nd material condition of the drywell was good because of the overall condition of the equipment and structures. Operations personnel exhibited very good oversight and direction of activities during the restart following Refueling Outage O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O Enaineered Safetv Feature System Walkdown Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the low pressure core spray and hth pressure core spray systems following Refueling Outage 9 to ascertain component material condition, appropriate valve and electrical breaker alignment, and housekeeping in the pump room area Observations i The inspectors used Procedure 04-1-01-E22-1, "High Pressure Core Spray System, "
! Revision 103, and Procedure 04-1-01-E21-1, " Low Pressure Core Spray System,"
l Revision 31, to verify appropriate valve, electrical breaker, and control room panel hand switch alignment. All valves, electrical breakers, and control room hand switches were positioned and locked in accordance with the procedures. The inspectors found that the
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I-5-component material condibon was good for these systems. All scaffolding and materials that were previously in the pump room areas had been removed. The pump room areas were found clean of debris and no adverse conditions were foun Conclusions The material condition of the high pressure core spray and low pressure core spray system components and the pump room areas was good because of the overall condition of the equipment and system availability and healt O8 Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 97-002: Both divisions of relief / low-low set logic inoperable. This event involved a control room operator taking the test switch for the Division 2 relief / low-low set logic to test during normal rounds on June 19,1997, causing the system to be inoperable while the Division 1 switch was in test for a surveillanc The licensee identified the apparent cause of this event as operator error. The inspector reviewed the corrective actions taken as a result of the event. Procedure 06-OP-1000-D-0001, " Daily Operating Logs," was revised to require a sign-off to confirm that the opposite division test switch was in the normal posl tion prior to uking the division to test, The licensee provided training on the event to all operatora. Shift superintendents stressed the need to discuss annunciators that were in during shift turnovers, as a result of the failure of the shift to discuss the annunciator that was in for the surveillance test during turnover. The inspector observed that the annunciators were discussed during each of the numerous shift turnovers observed since the even Technical Specification 3.6.1.6 requires that the low-low set function for six safety / relief valves be operable in Modes 1,2, and 3. The act of taking both test switches to test caused the low-!cw set logic for all six valves to be inoperable for approximately 10 seconds, resulting in an unplanned entry into the action statement. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-416/9808-01).
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Maintenance Comments Insoection Scooe (62707)
The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities, as specified by the following work orders (WOs):
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WO 00205360 Residual heat removal suction line check valve 10-year inspection
WO 00205519 Replacement of Valve E51F095, reactor core isolation cooling steam supply bypass valve
WO 00209560 VOTES test of Valve E51F095 WO 00202145 !
Calibration of Division 2 diesel generator frequency meter
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WO 00198975 Seal weld Division 2 diesel generator jacket water support Observations and Findinac The inspectors found the performance of this work to be satisfactory. With the exception of the discussion in Sedion M1.2, work observed was conducted in accordance with the instructions and procecures provided in the work packages. The technicians pedorming the tasks were knowledgeable of the equipment and used good work practices. The coordination between operations and maintenance personnel was good. Personnel followed the radiation work permit for the tasks and the heath physics technicians assigned to the tasks maintained good communications with the mechanic !
I M 1.2 Itaipino for Measurina and Test Eauioment i On June 23,1998, the inspectors observed electricai ?.echnicians attempt to calibrate the Division 2 standby diesel generator local control panel frequency meter. The technicians experienced difficulty using the measuring and test equipment. A 1040C panel meter calibrator was hooked up to the frequency meter but the equipment did not appear to be 1 functioning correctly. The technicians pushed different buttons on the equipment during numerous efforts to get the equipment to operate correctly. The inspectors asked why ;
the meter was not working. The technician explained that it was new measuring and test '
equipment and that they could not recall how it worked. A technician had used the device once before and was trying to remember how he had set the meter up at that time. The inspectors questioned whether any training had been provided for the i equipment. The technicians stated that some informal training had been provide l The inspectors observed that the technicians were not using a manual for the equipment and that the procedure, Procedure 07-S-12-7, " Calibration Checks of Frequency Meters,"
dated July 28,1983, d.d not address the new equipment. The procedure referred to a l frequency generator, a Multi-Amp FG-50-DM or equivalent. In reviewing the procedure, the inspector found that it did not provide specific guidance on use of the measuring and test equipment. After trying numerous times to get the equipment to operate as expected, the technicians called another electrical technician, who programmed the equipment to perform the correct task. The calibration of the meter then proceeded
! smoothly. The meter could not be calibrated to within the plus or minus 0.2 hertz, as I
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! prescribed in the work package. The technicians contacted their supervision, as required l by the procedure, and the gauge was replaced with a gauge that could be cilibrated
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properl The inspector discussed the deficiency in training on measuring and test equipment with the electrical superintendent. The superintendent explained that it was his expectation that personnel would refer to the manual and seek assistance if they had questions on how test equipment was to be operated and that the practice of using trial and error to get test equipment to work while it was connected to safety-related equipment was not acceptable. The supenntendent stated that some technicians had used the equipment at another site during a recent outage. These personnel had the necessary skills to use the l equipment and had provided the informal training. The licensee planned to provide i formal training on the specific equipment in August 1998 and to discuss management l expectations on the use of measuring and test equipment with personnel during the first l week of Jul M1.3 General Surveillance Comments Instection Scooe (61726)
The inspectors observed portions ci me following surveillance tests:
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- 06-IC-1C51-0-0002 * Digital Flow Control Trip Reference Card Calibration"
- 06-CP-1E51-0-0003 " Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Quarterly Pump Operability Verification" Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that the test procedures provided clear guidance and properly implemented Technical Specification requirements. Measuring and test equipment was verified to be within its current calibration cycle. With the exception of the discussion in Section M1.4, technicians and operators conducting the tests were knowledgeable and qualified. The as-found data was within the acceptance criteria specified by the
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instructions for the equipment. Personnel involved in the surveillance tests demonstrated good communications and self-checking skill Operations personnel took appropriate cautions by ensuring that no other work was being performed in Division 1 that could be affected by the card calibration on the Division 2 system. The inspector observed that planning for this task could have been better in that the desired data and minimum and maximum values acceptable could have been copied and calculated prior to placing the average power range monitor in bypas The inspector noted that this was the first time that the test was performe I i
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-8-The inspector discussed this observation with the supervisor for the task and he l acknowledged the observatio M 1.4 Beactor Core Isolation Coolina Turbine Lube Oil Siaht Glass -
l The inspectors observed the quarterly run of the reactor core isolation cooling system pump on June 18,1998. As auxiliary operators prepared to run the test, the inspectors noted that the oil level in the turbine sight glass was only a half inch above the bottom of the glass. The level was approximately an inch and a half below the painted white line on the glass and three quarters of an inch below a line marked on duct tape on the gauge. The inspectors questioned the operator to determine what the lesel should b After looking at the glass, the auxiliary operator stated that it was low and that they needed to have mechanics add oil. He went on to explain that, when the pump starts, the oillevel would go down at least a half an inch. The inspectors questioned where the level should be. The auxiliary operator stated that he was not sure. The inspectors discussed the concern with the shift superintendent. The superintendent explained that the daily operator rounds only require that the operators verify that there is oil in the sight glass. Procedure 06-OP-1E51-0-0003, Revision 105, did not require that the oil level on the turbine be checked, only the oil level on the pump. The shift superintendent initiated Condition Report (CR) 1998 0729 to document the use of duct tape to provide a minimum level mark and the ta'.:k of any requirements for a band in the procedure The inspectors reviewed the vendor manual for the turbine. The manual stated that the oil level gauge in the coupling and bearing box is marked to indicate the proper Iml and 4 that the level should be maintained to ensure that the oil rings are dipping. We stion that dealt with operating the turbine required that the level be checked to verity that oil was up to the mark on the level gauge before starting the turbine. The inspectors discussed the concern with the system engineer. The engineer explained that the manufacturer had claimed that the oil rings were not needed for this version of the turbine and that the minimum level mark on the oil gauge was to be a topic of discussion at the next user's group meeting scheduled in July 1998. The engineer indicated that an industry document discussed this concern. The inspector questioned who ensured the oil level was maintained at the appropriate level since the operators were not required to take any action as long as there was oilin the glass. The system engineer indicated that he had at times requested that oil be added and maintenance had placed the request in the past. The inspectors reviewed the industry document and found that it indicated that governor speed control problems had resulted from excessive or insufficient oil levels and that operations personnel should be aware of operating and shutdown level indication The inspectors discussed the concerns that the operations and surveillance procedures did not require that the level be verified at the manufacturer's suggested mark and that
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the operator was unable to identify the expected level with the operations superintendent. The superintendent acknowledged the concern and planned to place L
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. minimum and maximum level marks on the level gauge and to revise the procedures to reflect the correct level rang M 1.5 Conclusions on Conduct of MaiWnance Seven maintenance and surveillance tasks observed were performed satisfactorily and in accordance with procedures with one exception. The inspectors identified one poor work practice wherein electrical technicians used trial and error by pushing buttons to try to get a new measuring and test equipment meter to work while it was connected to safety-related equipment. The technicians had not received formal training on the use of the meter. The inspectors found that the procedures for starting the reactor core isolation ccoling system and for conducting operator rounds did not meet the vendor's guidance for ensuring that the turbine oil level was at the correct level for operation and that the operators were not aware of the acceptable operating or shutdown level M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-416/9719-01: Failure to properly position the diesel generator fuel filter lever. This violation involved the licensee's failure to position the filter lever in the procedurally required position. The licensee determined that the system engineer had the operations department change the system operating procedure to identify that neither was an optional position for the filter lever, but failed to note that maintenance procedures also positioned the lever. The licensee's corrective actions included revising all procedures that manipulated the filter lever to ensure the lever was returned to the procedurally required position, providing training to engineering support personnel, and included the event in the required reading program. The inspector reviewed the four preventive maintenance procedures and determined that the revision addressed the concerns. All maintenance personnel and engineering support personnel completed the required reading / training. The inspectors concluded that the corrective actions were appropriat )
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lll. Enaineerina E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance E Reactor Core Iso!ation Coolina System Valve Seat Leakaae ; Insoection Scoce (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the engineering evaluation completed in response to CR 1998-0108, which identified a problem with excessive seat leakage through the ;
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reactor core isolation cooling steam admission valves.
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-10- Observation and Findinas The CR was written to document the repeat failure of the seats in Valves E51F045 (the steam admission valve) and E51F095 (the steam admission bypass valve) to seal following testing that occurred after the outage. The failure of the valves to seal was allowing steam to enter the room through a known minor trip throttie valve leak. The inspector observed the trip throttle valve during the pump run on June 18,1998. There ,
was a small steam plume when the pump started, then the plume stopped. Following surveillance after the outage, the leaks became worse, heating up the room and increasing the humidity. Through tests, personnel verified that both valves were leakin The engineering evaluation reviewed the work history on the valves and performed a detailed root cause analysis. The root causes were thermal contraction of the valve stem / disc for Valve E51F095 and a thrust setting below the minimum required thrust setting for Valve E51F045. The corrective actions included replacing Valve E51F095 and increasing its torque setting, checking the seat of Valve E51F045 for proper centering and alignment, and adding insulation to both valves to maintain the valves at a hotter steady state condition. All of this was to be completed by July 31,199 The inspector noted that all the work had been completed during the system outage on June 18,1998, with the exception of checking the seat on Valve E51F045. The inspector discussed this with planning personnel and the system engineer, The engineer explained that, in planning the outage, they had determined that increasing the thrust on
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Valve E51F045 should address the leakage problem, and, by reviewing the prior history of the two velves, that the leak through Valve E51F095 was the greater problem. The task to check the seat was planned during the next system outage which was scheduled for December 1998 in case the repairs did not address the problem. The room temperature did not reach a point where system operability was affected, however, personnel stay times in the room were limited because of heat stress concerns. The system engineer planned to revise the condition report after further observation of the 0,yste Conclusions The root cause and corrective actions taken in response to a problem w;th steam admission valve seat leakage in the reactor core isolation cooling system were thorough and exhibited good coordination between engineering, p!anning, and maintenanc E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-416/9719-03: Failure to include Ltructions to assure safety-related battery racks. This violation involved the licensee's failure to return the ( Divisions 1 and 2 battery racks to the seismically tested configuration after replacing the batteries. The licensee revised the vendor manual to require that no gap be left between the battery cells and the end or side rails and restored the battery racks to the seismically l
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tested configuration during Refueling Outage 9. The inspectors reviewed the revised vendor manual and inspected the rebuilt racks in the field. The inspectors concluded that the corrective actions were appropriat IV. Plant Suonort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R General Comments (71750)
Using Inspection Procedure 71750, the inspectors made frequent tours of the !
radiological controlled area and observed radiological postings and worker adherence to l protective clothing requirements. The inspectors found that locked high radiation doors !
I were properly controlled, high radiation and contamination areas were properly posted, and the radiological area survey maps accurately reflected radiological conditions in the respective areas. The health physics technicians observed during the maintenance tasks were aware of radiological conditions and the work being performed and ensured that personnel doses were maintained ALAR R8 Miscellaneous issues
R8.1 (Closed Violation 50-416/9721-01: Failure to ensure clearance from safety-related equipment was evaluated. This violation discussed two exampbs. The first example involved installing scaffolding within 6-inches of safety-related equipment without j
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performing an engineering evaluation. The corrective actions for this example were not effective, as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/98-05. This example is considered closed and will be tracked through the corrective actions for Violation 50-416/9805-04. The second example involved hanging sign stanchions from safety-related cable trays without performing an engineering evaluation. The licensee determined that the cause of this event was the failJre to provide training to health physics personnel after a similar event that occurred earlier involving a ladder secured to safety-related equipment. The licensee provided training to personnelin the health physics department covering the requirement not to secure loose items to safety-related components and management's expectations in this area. The inspectors verified that the training was completed. During tours of the plant, both before and during the outage, the inspectors observed that equipment was stored in accordance with the procedure The inspector concluded that the corrective actions were appropriate.
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-12-P2 Status of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Facilities, Equipment, and Resources P LSG i Insoection Scooe (7175Q)
The inspectors observed d,e con iition of the TSC during a dril Observations and Findings The TSC layout was acceptable, but the use of the space was not efficient for the tasks being performed. The space was divided into thirds. The administrative communications area was in the first third and was set aside with glass partitions to block it from the rest of the room. This area was large for the number of people assigned. The glass partitions kept some of the background noise down. Most of the personnel working in the room were gathered around tables formed into a "T"in the center third of the roo All the dose assessment, communicators, management, arid NRC staff were gathered around these tables. The noise level around this center area was high. Access around the tables was crowded and difficult. The emergency director's and the NRC's assigned seating and two of the status boards were in the path used to access the back of the room. A separate table was set up in the back third of the room with an almost unused block of cabinets (used to store emergency water supply) taking up space along the wal The technical manager was the only individual assigned to the tabl The status boards were not well placed in the room; the task and technical priority boards were behind the emergency director. The radiation protection status board provided wind direction and speed, but gave no indication of time so that one knew how old the information was nor did it have any method of trending to know if the wind was changing. The technicalissues board was not used. The board used to track tasks was not updated so as to know the status of the tasks. All teams sent out during the drill went up on the board and stayed there, whether they were still out in the field er riot, causing additional confusion. There was no board to address the time line of the events during the accident. As a result of the confusion and questions asked by drill participants, the inspectors questioned whether there was guidance on how and when to update the boards. The emergency preparedness manager acknowledged the concerns about the room layout, indicating that he was aware o' them and explained that there was no guidance on the use of the status board Conclusions During observations of a quarterly training drill, the inspectors found that the TSC was l not laid out in a manner which facilitated management of the event or clear
! communication between the disciplines. The status boards provided were not placed or used well and there was no guidance on how the boards were to be used.
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-13-P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP P Second Quarterly Trainina Drill Insoection Scoce (71750)
On June 24,1998, the inspectors observed and evaluated the TSC staff as they performed tasks necessary for response during the second quarterly training drill. These tasks included staffing and activation, accident assessment and mitigation strategies, event classification, facility management and control, internal and external communications, assistance and support to other activated eraergency response facilities, and prioritization of response activities for accident mitigation. The inspectors reviewed app!icable emergency plan sections, emergency plan implementing procedures, checklists, and log Observations and Findinos i The TSC was promptly staffed, with the exception of the emeroe~j Wetor mad +5e TSC communicator. These individuals were de!qcJ cue to the location of the simulator and a procedural requirement to receive a brief from personnel in the control room prior to reporting to the TSC. The licensee has recognized this deficiency and the inspectors noted that it was drill related. The simulator is less than a mile from the protected are During an actual accident, the individuals would receive their brief in the control room one floor below the TSC in the control building onsite. The TSC was declared operational at 8:59 a.m., approximately 45 minutes after the Alert was declared, within the required 60 minute The emergency director participated in a conference call with the shift superintendent and the offsite emergency coordinator during a large portion of the drill. He stopped the conference call for briefings of the TSC. These briefings consisted of his announcing the current status that he had and having the TSC coordinator and the radiation protection manager brief the informati(,n that they had. One of the more prominent topics was priority of tasks. These were not officie"v assigned on the board until an hour into the drill, however, each brief ended with a question of what the priorities were and a desire l that priorities be assigned. The inspector observed that the organization in the
! emergency plan required the TSC coordinator, the radiation protection manager, and the
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operations support center coordinator to repcrt directly to the emergency director. Most discussions between these parties occurred during the briefings, with very little i
communication before or after the briefings. The priorities for the different teams did not actually get assigned until 10:22 The TSC coordinator took up the task of communicating with the control room upon assuming his position in the TSC. The inspector observed that he performed this communication task throughout the drill and that he did not perform some of the responsibilities for the position. Section 5.4.6 of the Emergency Plan states that the TSC C------------__ - - - - . - - - - - - - - - _ - - -
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- prioritization of corrective actions, and coordination of mitigation efforts. The tasks that I
were ongoing were discussed with the operations coordinator over the communication link, but no priorities were assigned in the TSC and no discussions of priorities occurred between the TSC coordinator and his staff. The TSC coordinator did not coordinate mitigation efforts within the TSC and actually had little or no conversation with the l
technical manager as to what engineering effort should occur or what the plan of attack should b The inspector observed that the TSC maintained very little knowledge of the status of the different teams sent out in the field. One team was sent into the field to look at a
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spurious initiation of engineered safety features. This team remained out in the field for l 13/4 hours without discussion or status being provided. The situation was similar for two teams sent to address tripped control rod drive pumps. At one point, during discussions of priorities, it was reported that teams were supporting emergency
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operations procedure attachments when, in actuality, only one team was supporting one l attachment. There was a voiced belief within the TSC that there was a shortage of ;
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The TSC coordinator's assistant, per Section 5.4.7 of the Emergency Plan, was l responsible for monitoring the progress of the implementation of the emergency procedures, providing plant status and corrective actions status, and communicating with the control room, operations support center, and the emergency operations facilit During the critique, he claimed that he could not perform the communication task because the TSC coordinator was in continual contact with the control room and they had a shared communications link. The information specialist questioned who was responsible for updating the plant status board early in the drill. He was assigned the task, even though it was the TSC coordinator assistant's responsibility. The inspector did not observe anyone monitoring the progress of the implementation of the emergency procedures at any point during the dril The inspectors observed that the technical manager did not do anything early in the dril Later, the two i.arsonnel under his instruction provided guidance on mitigation efforts directly to the emergency director. The technical manager wes act involved in this communication. Section 5.4.8 of the emergency plan directs that the technical manager report directly to the TSC coordinator and that the individual be responsible for the activities of the engineering staff, for providing information concerning plant status, and for developing recommendations and procedures for plant operation. The inspector did not observe the technical manager performing these functions and there was no 9gineering staff in the TSC to address engineering or technical issues. The technical istues status board was not use As discussed above, communications within the TSC were not effective. The TSC coordinator spent little time communicating with the staff in the TSC and the emergency director only communicated with the staff during the briefings that were held. No L ____ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ .
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l l communications were heH prior to the briefing, with the exception of a 5-minute waming
' hat the briefing % to be held, and little followor, cb;urred on open items identified dunn3 P. Wefing until the next briefing was held. Most communications that occurred were with the outside facilities. The TSC staff went through the motions of maintaining i boards, but was little involved in the drill otherwis Conclusions The TSC's performance was marginal during an emergency preparedness training dril Personnel in the center were not aware of or did not perform the responsibilities assigned in the emergency response plan. The coordination of the event response that occurred in the TSC was poor and management did not have a good understanding of or control over the corrective actions being take P4.2 Licensee Self-Critioue Insoection Scoce (71750)
The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's end-of-drill facility critique in the TSC and the controller and evaluator critique on June 25,1998, to determine whether j the process would identify and characterize weak or deficient areas in need of corrective j
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actio Observations and Findinos The TSC end-of-drill critique was open and a number of good issues were discusse Personnel identified many concerns dealing with equipment not working as expected, failure to use two and three-way communication, and a number of concerns where the scenario did not go as expected. The tone of the meeting was not overly positive, and, although no real strengths were identified, the inspector noted that much of the '
discussion that occurred was not self-critical. The inspector noted that the issues addressed in Section P4.1 were not brought out or were not discussed thoroughly to identify the problem. During this meeting, the inspector noted further indications that personnel were not fully aware of the responsibilities of the different positions in the TS The TSC coordinator's assistant brought out that he felt he needed a separate line of communications because the TSC coordinator had been constantly on the line communicating with the control room. No one brought out that this was not the coordinator's job in either critique. During the TSC critique, an evaluator brought out that the radiation protection rnanager was not being informed of high dose tasks being planned. A player corrected the individual in this case, saying the health physics coordinator in the operations support center had this responsibility. The senior emergency planner leading the critique on June 25 did not understand the sequence of events that occurred when the shift superintendent turned the responsibilities for emergency director over to the on-call manager.
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-16-The second concern the inspector noted was the failure of controllers to intervene when the control room classified the site area emergency too early. The classification was i made with one radiation monitor reading high. The shift superintendent used the calculated site boundary dose (calculaied from radiation monitor readings) and the fact '
that there had been an earthquake to determine that an unmonitored release was in progress. Although the controllers had planned on verifications being made, no actions were taken by the control room to verify that the one high radiation monitor reading was l accurate TM hinh C,i,h monnur teading was due to a drum of highly radioactive i material sitting next to the monitor. There was no release in progress. In discussing the occurrence, controllers and evaluators determined that the control room had made the right decision, but did not go on to discuss alternatives to the sequence of events that occurred. As a result, personnel in the TSC did not have the opportunity to classify an emer0ency situation or to notify authorities responsible for offsite emergency measures, one of the objectives of the dril The inspectors discussed these concerns and the ones in Section E4.1 with the EP Manager after the critique. The manager acknowledged the concerns and stated that they were discussing holding a drill debrief with the participants and that the conc..m would be discussed with them at that point. The manager explained that the controllers often did not understand that they could and should stop the drill for training purposes l and agreed that the w ong classification would have been an appropriate point to intervene The inspectors questioned whether the controllers and evaluators received training. The manager explained that they currently did not, but that there were plans to provide such training in the future. The controllers and evaluators were emergency response personnel who were not involved in the drill that quarter. The manager went on to explain that all emergency response personnel received one week of classroom i training in EP per year and attended one quarterly drill per year. The drillincluded tabletop training (discussion of an event, the response, and the expected response within an emergency facility) and the actual training dril Conclusions l The emergency preparedness self-critique process following a quarterly training drill identified some areas for corrective action and was conducted in an open 4"um, however, the resuits were not self-critical. The process failed to bring out the personnel involved were not aware of the different position respons;bilities in the TSC or that j training opportunities were missed because of the failure of controllers to intervene to ;
ensure the scenario ran according to pla j
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S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues l S (Closed) Violation 50-416/9720-03: Security patrols had not reported dark areas in a
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temporary structure. The licensee's corrective actions included giving training to the ;
security shift captains concerning checking for lighting deficiencies ano assessing l questionable areas. The inspector completed numerous tours of tne protected area and l I
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-17-observed no further concerns with lighting. The parking area discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/97-20 was modified with permanently installed lighting. The inspector reviewed procedures the licensee modified as a result of the violation. The procedures were revised to state that unoccupied temporary buildings and storage trailers should be iocked during hcurs of darkness. The inspectoc concluded that the corrective actions were appropriat F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment F Ton Carbcil Dioxide System Test Insoection Scooe 0175Q)
The inspectors observed the control of ignition sources in the plant and the material condition of emergency lights and fire protectior, equipment during tours of the site. The inspector observed the puff test of the Division 2 switchgear room carbon dioxido system, Observations and Findings During tours of the plant, the inspector observed the condition of fire protection equipment, including fire extinguishers, fire hoses, and the fire pump rooms. The equipment was in good material condition, was well maintained, and had been inspected at the appropriate frequency, where required. During tours of safety-related areas, the inspectors noted that the areas were maintained free of conibustible material and that permits were obtained, as required, for welding and grinding work. On June 18,1998, the inspector observed the performance of Procedure 06-OP-SP64-R-0002, "10 Ton CO2 Systerns Puff Test," Revision 101, on the Division 2 switchgear room. The auxiliary operators, electrical technicians, and health physics personnel involved in the task were familiar with their responsibilities and the equipment used. Personnel followed procedures and ensured that safety was appropriately addresse Conclusions Fire protection equipment observed in the plant was in good material condition and good controls were maintained over combustible materials in safety-related area E Managemen? Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the cor:clusion of the inspection on July 1,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should
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ELTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Berryhill, Superintendent, Electrical D. Bost, Manager, Maintenance C. Bottemiller, Superintendent, Plant Licensing B. Eaton, General Plant Manager C. Elisacsser, Manager, Performance & System Engineering R. Moomaw, Manager, Maintenance & Modifications C. Morgan, Manager, Emergency Planning J. Roberts, Director, Quality Programs C. Stafford, Operations Assistant, Plant Operations R. Wilson, Superintendent, Radiation Control
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 61726 Surveillance Observations 62707 Maintenance Observation 71707 Plant Operations 71750 Plant Support Activities ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50-416/9808-01 NCV Both divisions of relief / low-low set logic inoperable (Section 08.1)
Closed 50-416/97-002 LER Both divisions of relief / low-low set logic inoperable (Section 08.1)
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50-416/9808-01 NCV Both divisions of relief / low-low set logic inoperable (Section 08.1)
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50-416/9719-01 VIO Failure to properly position the diesel generator fuel filter lever (Section M8.1)
50-416/9719-03 VIO Failure to include instructions to assure safety-related battery racks (Section E8.1)
50-416/9720-03 Viu Security patrols had not reported dark treas in a temporary structure (Section SS.1)
50-416/9721-01 VIO Failure to ensure clearance from safety-related equipment was evaluated (Section R8.1)
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