IR 05000416/1998005
| ML20248E755 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248E749 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-98-05, 50-416-98-5, NUDOCS 9806030439 | |
| Download: ML20248E755 (19) | |
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l l ENCLOSUREJ l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
REGION IV
Docket No.: 50-416 License No.: NPF-29 i
Report No.: 60-416/98-05 l
Licensee: Entergy Operations, In I i
Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Location: Waterloo Road j Port Gibson, Mississippi j Dates: April 5 through May 16,1998 l
Inspector (s): J. Dixon-Herrity, Senior Resident inspector
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K. Weaver, Resident inspector i Approved By: D. Kirsch, Chief Project Branch F Division of Reactor Projects ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information l
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9806030439 980528 gDR ADOCK 05000416 PDR (
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-2-EYAC1)_TIVE SUMMARY Grand Gulf Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50 416/9605 This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio DoeratioD1
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Operations personnel exhibited very good oversight and direction of activities during the reduction in power and scram to start Refue:i;,g Outage 9 (Section 01.1).
The licensee's response to a shroud inspection tool ring lifting rig failure during a heavy lift over the reactor vessel was conservative and well managed (Section 01.2).
Operators demonstrated a safe and conservative approach to changing and placing decay heat removal systems in service (Section 01.3).
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The failure to ensure that standby diesel generator control cabinet doors were closed or attended while open, as required by the procedure, was identified as a violation. The failure of personnel to contact the control room prior to performing work on equipment associated with the only operable diesel generator was identified as poor communications and a poor work practice. The failure of the auxiliary operator to take any action when he noted the cabinet doors open was identified as an example of a need for improvement in the area of operator knowledge (Section 02.1).
Maintenance
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An electrical worker cleaning in an incorrect electrical cabinet was identified as a noncited violation (Section M1.2).
A quality inspector's initiative to have maintenance personnel open up a closed standby diesel generator crankcase manway to check on a discrepancy in the paint was identified as an example of a good questioning attitude (Section M1.3).
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The failure of maintenance personnel to identify a leaking jacket water coupling on the standby diesel generator was identified as an example of inattention to detail (Section M1.4).
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The inspections and repairs conducted after the identification of welding and cleanliness concerns on the essential core cooling suction strainer segments were detailed and thorough (Section M2.1).
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l The general housekeeping and material condition throughout the plant during the i
refueling outage was observed to be very good (Section M2.2).
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A violation was identified for the failure to ensure that a procedurally required clearance i
between scatiolding and safety-related equipment was either maintained or approved by l engineering. Concerns and problems identified by the licensee on 29 of 51 s . Tolds
} built for the outage indicated that there was a problem with the scaffolding pregism l implementation with regard to ensuring scaffolding was built in accordance with the i . procedure requirements (Section M4.1).
Engineering
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i Engineering support provided in the design and repair of the essential core cooling system suction strainer and the modification of the residual heat removal valves was thorough and technically sound (Section E1.3).
Plants!tppart l
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Health physics personne! demonstrated poor attent.!on to detali and communication by not ensuring that the current area survey rnaps were made available at the containment entrances for review by personnel entering the containment building (Section R1.2).
I a i With one minor exception, the licensee exhibited good radiological posting, health ;
physics oversight, and radiological worker practices. The radiological posting of one l contamination area was identified as being inconspicuous (Section R1.3).
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The plant was at 98 percent power at the beginaing of the inspection period. On April 9,1998, the licensee lowered power to 55 percent. On April 10,1998, the licensee lowered power to 26 percent power and operators manually scrammed tne reactor to start Refueling Outage )
The plant was in Mode 4 and in the process of p"eparing for startup at the end of the inspection perio I LQpEat!Qna 01 Conduct of Operations 0 Reactor Shutdowa I l spg@n Scooe (7170 A The inspector observed as control room operators decreased reactor power, then manually scrammed the teactor in preparation for Refueling Outage Observations.and Findin.gg i On April 10,1998, the inspectors observed prejob briefings held for the shutdown. The briefings were detailed and individuals involved had a very good understanding of the planned evclution. The operators lowered power from 55 percent to 26 percent using control rods and by decreasing recirculation flow. The operators inserting the rods maintained very good control over the evolution, performitig self checks and independent verifications to ensure the correct rods were inserted. Reactor engineering personnel closely monitored the effects of the rod movements on the core and provided the ncy.t rods to be moved to the operator At midnight, the licensee cerammed the reactor. This evolution was carefully planne Each operator had a task to be performed. There were more personnelin the control room dunng this evolution, but the shift superintendent was aware, and maintained control of the situation by directing where people were to stand prior to the end cf the briefing. The noise level in the control room was not affected by the additional personnel. All systems responded as expected and operators maintained good control of the plant. The reactor vessel water level reached Level 8, and operators appropriately entered the emergency procedures, then exited them as the reactor level stabilize Conc!usions Operations personnel exhibited very good oversight and direction of activities during the reduction in power and scram to start Refueling Outage _ _ - -
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O1.?. ficavy I.iftMEhtogsLTrol Ring
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n j jnfag.gdif .0fmope (93702) 1
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The inspectors observed licensee activities in response to the failure of the shroud tool ring lift rig over the reactor vesse I Observationsandfjndings '
At approximately 10:30 a.m. on May 7,1998, a core shroud inspection tool ring became
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dislodged from the strong back being used to lift the ring during a planned heavy lift to remove the ring from the reactor' vessel. The licensee had completed all fuel movement. The lift was being perforrned by a contractor using the contractor's
procedure. The tool ring was dislodged at two adjacent suspension points, of the four i suspension points on the strong back. The ring was beanng against the top of the j
drywell flange, the drywell manway covers, and the drywell head studs. The load did not :
impact any vesselinternals as it shifted. The ring weighed approximately 850 lbs and )
the strong back assembly used to secure the tool ring to the polar crane weighed !
approximately 640 lbs.. Immediate licensee actions included stopping work in the area, I halting all operations that could affect flow into the reactor, ensuring that secondary .
containment was available, and securing the ring to the polar crane and refueling bridge structure with ropes. The inspectors verified that the ring was secured so as to prevent it from falling into the cor i i
During the licensee's review of the event, management determined that the ring had i becorne dislodged when operations personnel changed a systern alignment so that a
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large volume of air rose from the reactor core. When the volume of air struck the ring and [fting rig, they shook violently. After the bubbles cleared, the workers observed that the ring had been dislodged. When the lift occurred, secondhr/ containment was not - ;
operable because of the failure of an inverter that supplied Standby Gas Treatment l System (SGTS) Train A the night before. Both trains of the SGTS were requ; red to be operable for secondary containment to be operabla The licensee ensured that !
secondary containment was functional and returned SGTS Train A to operable pnor to
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the completion of the recovery pla !
L The inspectors observed the p' ant safaty review committee meetings held to discuss the l' i
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event and to approve the lift plan to recover the ring. The committee members asked pointed questions that improved the method with which the ring was secured and brought out the details of the lift plan. One exam;de was a question of whether the ropes securing the ring should be tied off to hano roys on the refueling bridge. As a result of this questior, the ropes were tied off to structural r.1 embers on the refuel bridg The work instructions and the briefirigs held prior to rigging the ring for the lift and the actual lift were detailed and effectively addressed the activity that was to occur. The second brief;ng was held on the spent fuel floor. The inspector observed that it was y difficult to hear due to the background noise, but that all personnel involved were L
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-3-knowledgeable of the tasks that they were to perform. The rigging and lift activities were well orchestrated and went according to plan. Personnelinvolved used good radiation protection practices and worked in accordance with the work instructions and the radiation work permit The licensee tcok a series of photographs of the rig and ring to allow determination of the root cause of the failure of the rig. Review and evaluation of the lifting rig and photographs provided no information as to why the rig failed. The latching mechanisms on the two points that released the ring were still engaged and there was no indication of what caused the ring to be released. The contractor planned to perform testing offsite to develop a root cause for the event. Further review of the licensee's investigation, the cause, and the licensee's corrective actions will be conducted through an inspection Followup item (50-416/9805-01). C.gncAls_i !QnS The licensee's response to a shroud inspection tool ring lifting rig failure during a heavy lift over the reactor vessel was conservative and well manage .3 fibuidown Coglin. a Uneups_aD_d Operability Insng. tied 1.S_cgpe (7170Z)
The inspectors observed as operators tested and placed alternate shutdown cooling systems in service nbs.e.0cclionsand Find.n On April 12,1998, the licensee ran the alternate decay heat removal (ADHR) system to verify that it would maintain desired shutdown cooling temperatures. The system, which is normally maintained in a shutdown condition, was lined up properly and was maintaining the desired temperature. The inspectors toured the system in tl'e field and found that the pumps were running smoothly and that the system was functioning properly. In all cases, shutdown cooling was lined up properly and maintained the expected temperature in the reactor coolant syste On April 16,1938, the inspectors observed operations personnel change shutdown cooling systems from Residual Heat Removal (RHR) A to the ADHR system. The inspectors observed that operations personnel had RHR A shutdown ccoling in service while aligning and placing the ADHR system in service. After the ADHR system was brought on line, operators subsequently secured RHR A. Through discussiorm with the operators, the inspectors found that, after discussions with the shift superir.tendent, the operators decided to use this method of shifting shutdown cooting so that there would be no loss in shutdown cooling if ADHR failed to function properly.
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'o, Operators demonstrated a safe and conservative approach to changing and pl acing l decay heat removal systems in service i
02' Operationa5 Status of Facilities and Equipment ;
O MineLQperahi!!1y I
' ' Jasmi!pn Scone (71707) i
, The irspectors watked down the diesal generator rooms on a number of occasions EL during the outag , Obserygiions and Findings The inspectors observed that equipment was well ma;ntained and in an operable condition during all but one tour. On Aprii 21,1998, the inspectors toured the Division 1 ,
standby diese! Denerator room. The room was appropriately posted as a high ri:.xk area j because the Division 2 diesel was out of service for maintenance. The inspector observed that the back doors on Control Cab; net 1H22-P400 were standing wide open !
and that there was no one in the room. The doors contained an operator aide, which l noted that the doors were not to be left open and unattended withcut declaring the i dieselinoperable or having an engineering evaluation done. The inspectors asked the shift superintendent in the control room if they were aware that the cabinet doors were open. The shift superintendent indicated that they were not aware that the doors were open and immediately sent an auxiliary operator to secure the door The inspector reviewed System Operating' Instruction 04-1-01-P75-1, " Standby Diesel !
Generator System," Revision 50. S*.ep 3.33 required that the diesel be declared inoperable if the control cabinet doors were left open and unattended. The licensee explained that the cabinet was not seismically qualified when the doors wers open and that this was why the diesel was inoperable with the coors open and unattended. The inrpectors were concerned that work had been conducted without the control room or work control personnel being aware ofit and that the diesel ws3 left in a procedurally inoperable condition while the diesel was the sole emergency power source for shutdown cooling. The inspectors explained this concern to the assistant operations superintendent. The assistant superintendent initiated Condition Report (CR) 1998-0391 and started an investigation to cetermine how long the doors were open and why they were o.oene t Through discussions with personnel who had been in the room, the licensee identified E
one auxiliary operator who had been in the room on April 20,1998, and observed that the doors were open, but was not aware of the requirement thSt the doors be close . _
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The inspectors determined that the failure to encure that the control cabinet doors were
. closed or attended while open was a violation of the Technical Specification required procedure (50-416/9805-02).
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with the only operable diesel generator was identified as poor communications and a poor work practice. The failure of the auxiliary operator to take any action when he {
noted the cabinet doors open was identified as a need for improvement in operato knowledg i
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't ll. Maintenance
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M1 Conduct of Maintenance i M1,1 General Maintenance Comments IDfoection Scope (62707)
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The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities, as specified by the following work orders (WOs):
4 WO 00192723 Calibration of Division 2 standby diesel generator vibration-switches
, . WO 00205626 ' Division 2 standby diesci generator postmaintenance
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retest
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WO 00205625 Division 1 standby diesel generator postmaintenance retest
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WO 19970089 Installation of essential core cooling system cuction
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strainer segments and spooi pieces j, -
-WO 00206978 Inspection / repair of welds on essentia! core cooling system
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WO 00196455 Clean and inspect Load Center 168B4 and transformer
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WO 00208067 Tool ring removal
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WO 19960222 Backup scram valve modification
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The inspectors found the performance of this work to te satisfactory. With the exception of the discussion in Sections M1.2 and M1.4, work observed was conducted in accordance with the instructions and procedures provided in the work package M1.2 Work Performad in Wrona Electrical Panel The inspectors observed as workers were cleaning and inspecting de-erergized load centers during the safety-related Division 2 Bus 16 AB outage. A contract e'ectrical worker was working mside the energized anticipated transient without scram / alternate rod insertion Panel 1H22P076. The inspectors observed the electrician in charge instruct the contract electrical worker to stop work on Panet 1H22P076 because the panel was not a part of the work scope. The inspectors questioned electrical supervision personnel concerning the observation. The licensee stated that while the worker was performing WO C0196455 to clean and inspect Lead Center 16884, the worker entered and began cleaning the adjacent Panel 1H22P076 without a work authorization document. The licensee initiated CR 1998-0326. The inspector concluded that the contract electrical worker displayed poor attention to detail by not verifying that he was working on the appropriate panel and that the panet was de-energize Technical Specification 5.4.1.a required procedures to be implemented for those procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision Procedure 01-S-07-1, " Control of Work on Plant Equipment and Facilities," Revision 32, required that maintenance discipline journeymen / craft ensure they are on the correct equipment and they have documentation to work on it before starting. The failure to follow Procedure 01-S-07-1 and WO 00196455, such that the correct de-energized panel was inspected and cleaned was a violation of Technical Specification 5.4. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Po! icy (50-416/9805-03).
M 1.3 Diesel Cleanliness While observing the post maintenance testing on the Division 2 emergency diesel generator, the inspectors observed the cleanliness inspection performed prior to closing the crankcase. The quality inspector performing the inspection observed what looked like a chip in the paint finish on the other side of the diesel crank case after that side had been closed up. The quality inspectors had the maintenance personnel open the crankcase manway and check the discrepancy. The maintenance personnel discovered that the chip was actually a piece of gasket. The inspectors determined that this was an example of good attention to detail.
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[ -7-M1.4 Jacket WaterjyMgmhioclification During tours of the Division 1 standby diesel generator during the rnaintenance outage, the inspectors observed the install. '. ion of the modification to replace the jacket water dresser couplings with hoses. After the licensee filled and coinpleted the leak check of the jacket water system, the inspectors observed a constant drip from the hose connection over the left bank Cylinder No. 7 at eye level. The inspectors discussed the concern with maintenance personnel. The maintenance personnel had operations personnel lower the jacket water level and repaired the leak. The inspectors found that the failure of personnel to 'dentify the leak was an example of inattention to detail on the part of the maintenance personne M1.5 General Surveillance..C_qaments Inspg.clion S.cgp_e (61726)
The inspectors observed potions of the following surveillance tests: I
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Procedure 06 lC-C71-R-2005, " Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure (RPS and EOC RPT) Functional Test"
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Procedure 06-OP-1P81-R-0001, "High Preswre Core Spray Diesel Generator 18-Month Functional Test," Loss of Offsite Power Test a
Procedure 06-OP-1P75-R-0003, " Standby Diesel Generator 11: 18 Month FunctionalTest," Loss of Offsite Power / Loss of Coolant Accident Test
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Procedure 06-OP-1E21-0-0024, "LPCl/RHR Subsystem B Quarterly Functional Test"
Procedure 06-RE-SC11-V-0402, " Control Rod SCRAM Testing" Qhsg.rvations and Findings The inspectors found that the test procedures provided clear guidance and proparly implemented Technical Specification requirements. Measuring and test equipment was verified to be within its current calibration cycle. Technicians and operators conducting the tests were very knowledgeable and qualified. The as-found data was withir, the acceptance enteria specified by the instructions for the equipment. Personnelinvolved demonstrated good communications and attention to detai M1.6 Conclusions on ConducLof Maintenan_c.g l
An electrical worker cleaning the incorrect electrical cabinet was identified as a noncited violation. A quality inspector's requirement to open up a standby diesel generator
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-8-crankcase manway to check on a discrepancy in the paint was identified as an example of a good questioning attitude. The failure of maintenance personnel to identify a leaking jacket water coupling on the standby diesel generator was identified as an example of inattention to detai M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Reoair and installation pit,he Suction Strainer I lHSgqction Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed the inspection, repair, and installation of the new essential core cooling system suction straine Observations and Findinos During the receipt inspection of the suction strainer segments, the licensee identified concerns with the level of cleanliness of the segments and the quality of some of the welds. Licensee personnel were aware of some cleanliness concerns prior to the arrival of the strainer onsite because of observations conducted during the manufacturing process. After further inspection, personnel noted that there was weld spatter on various surfaces within the strainer, weld slag, metal shavings, and other debris. In addition, personnel found welding concerns which included undersize welds, underlength welds, improper weld spacing, and missing welds. The licensee responded to the concerns by establishing a team to inspect the strainers and repair or address the problem The inspectors observed the inspection and repair of the strainers. During inspection of the strainer segments, the inspector noted that the strainers had an oily coating and found an anti-seize looking grease on the underside of one of the segments. The inspectors discussed the concern with the personnel performing the inspections. They, too, had noted an oily coating on the strainers. The inspector discussed the concern with the licensing superintendent who brought the concern up during a plant safety review committee meeting being held to discuss the action plan to address the strainer concerns. The licensee had the sections cleaned with a solvent that would remove the oil, but leave no residu The licensee found several additional concerns during the inspections that were conducted. Some of the perforation holes had been eiongated during the welding process and a number of the spot welds that held the perforated plate to the strainer structure had not adhered properly. As new concerns were identified, all segments were inspected to identify all occurrences of the concerns. The inspections observed were thorough. The inspectors reviewed the work orders which documented the inspections and the repairs performed. Inspections for all of the different concerns identified were documented for each individual strainer segment.
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-9-i The inspectors observed a portion of the installation and testing of the strainer. Care l was taken to protect the suppression pool liner and the installation was conducted in a very organized manner. Close contact was maintained with the divers installing the segments at all times. The foreign niaterial exclusion controls maintained during the work were good. The inspectors observed a glove and a red cap that had been dropped in the suppression pool during work that was being done. The licensee tracked these items and allitems on the list were verified to be removed or analyzed prior to the end of the outag Conclusions The inspections and repairs conducted after the identification of welding and cleanliness concerns on the essential core cooling system strainer segments were detailed and thoroug M2.2 General Plant Condition Durino the Outagg Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors conducted tours of the plant throughout the outage and reviewed the condition of areas where maintenance was in process and the general condition of the sit Observations and Findings During tours through the plant, the inspectors observed that areas were being well maintained. Tools were being staged in areas marked for storage. Trash and unneeded equipment was appropriately removed. Posted contamination areas, including containment and the drywell, were maintained in good condition. In the drywell and containment, the licensee exhibited good coordination for setting up times when unneeded equipment could be removed. Foreign material controls were very goo The inspector observed that maintenance personnel bagged and tagged spare parts after removing them and that parts that were not needed were staged away from ongoing work. Scaffolding was removed when it was no longer needed (other concerns with scaffolding are discussed in Section M4.1.). Personnel maintained good controls of power cords and appropriately documented separation concerns identified on CR Conclusions The general housekeeping and material condition throughout the plant during the outage was observed to be very goo !
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The inspectors completed general tours of safety-related areas of the auxiliary building to verify the operability of equipmen Observations and Findings On April 9,1998, the inspector toured the reactor core isolation cooling pump room during a general tour of the auxiliary building. The inspector observed that a scaffold had been built over support equipment for the pump. The floor of the scaffold was touching instrument lines off the exhaust line for the pump turbine. The inspectors
. questioned the licensee to determine whether an engineering evaluation had been done to allow the scaffold to be within 6 inches of safety-related equipmen The licensee determined that no evaluation had been done and that an independent review of the scaffold had not been completed. The licensee initiated CR 1998-0298, immediately had the scaffold removed, and completed a walkdown of scaffolds in i safety-related areas that had not been independently reviewed. The inspectors toured J the auxiliary building to verify that the scaffolds being built in preparation for the outage were in accordance with Standard GGNS-CS-05," Standard for Erection of Scaffolding in Safety-Related Areas,". Revision O. The inspectors identified four additional scaffolds that did not appear to meet the criteria in Standard GGNS-CS-05 and the inspectors discussed the scaffolds with the license Due to the discrepancies identified during the licensee's review, the licensee conducted a review of all scaffolding in safety-related areas on site. The licensee conducted a walkdown of 51 scaffolds and identified 29 that had clearance problems with safety-related equipment or were missing supports required by Stendard GGNS-CS-0 The licensee reworked the scaffold discrepancies, or removed the scaffolds, and retrained personnel responsible for building scaffolds. In addition, two individuals with knowledge of scaffold construction and no involvement with the actual construction of scaffolding were assigned to perform independent verifications of scaffolding during the outage. Engineering personnel were assigned to walk to down scaffolding that they had done evaluations on after construction to verify that it met the standar The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions teken in response to NRC Violation 50-416/9721-01, which documented the failure of the licensce to perform an l- engineering evaluation for a scaffold built within 6 inches of safety-related equipmen The licensee had completed all of the corrective actions in that the procedure was l~ changed so that the need to maintain the 6-inch clearance was clearly identified in the scaffolding evaluation request and personnel responsible for building scaffold onsite had l
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, ,o-11-received training on the event. The inspectors determined that the failure to build scaffolding in accordance with Procedure 15-S-01-106 was a vio!ction of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (50-416/9805-04). Conclusions A violation was identified for the failure to ensure that a procedurally required cle.arance between scaffolding and safety-related equipment was either maintained or approved by engineering. Concerns and problems identified by the licensee on 29 of 51 scaffolds built for the outage indicated that there was a problem with the scaffolding program implementation with regard to ensuring scaffolding was built in accordance with the procedure requirements, liklinatnRaring E1 Conduct of Engineering E Engineering Evaluation of the EssentiaLC.qm Coolino System (ECCS) Suction Strainer Modification Insoection Scoce (37551)
i The inspectors reviewed the design documentation, the 10 CFR 50.59 Safety '
Evaluation, and construction of the ECCS sucCon strainerinstalled during the outag Observations and Findinas The licensee had committed to install a new design of ECCS suction strainer prior to j startup from Refueling Outage 9 in response to NRC Bulletin 96-03, " Potential Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers by Debris in Boiling Water Reactors."
The new design is a toroidal strainer, which consists of one structure encircling the circumference of the suppression pool. The separation of the different ECCS divisions, and reactor core isolation cooling and high pressure core spray are maintained through the use of internal perforated divider plates so that all pumps have access to the entire strainer to maintain a low approach velocit The inspectors reviewed Specification GGNS-M-927.0, " Technical Specification for ECCS Suction Strainer," Revision 3, and the Safety Evaluation for Engineering -
Request 97/0089. The inspectors determined that the documents were thorough and l
technically sound. As discussed in Section M2.1, during receipt inspection of the strainers onsite, the licensee discovered numerous discrepancies. Engineering
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personnel responded to these concerns in Engineering Request 98/0198. The inspectors reviewed the response and found that each concern was thoroughly i evaluated and addressed through repair or an evaluation to use-as-i f
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E1.2 Modif!.caliptof Resictual Heat Removal Valves to Prevent Pressure Lockina InstsJtion. Scope 07551)
The inspectors rev swed Minor Change Package 96/1002, " Elimination of Pressure Locking of Residut i Heat Removal System Valves 1E12F004C,1E12-F064A, and ;
1E12-F0648," Rm ision ;
l Observations and Findinas This examination included a review of the applicable Technical Specifications, Updated Final Safety Analysis Raport, and System Operating Procedures for the RHR Syste ;
In addition, the inspectors walked down and verified the field modifications to these l valves were in accordance with Minor Change Package 96/1002. The engineering i evaluations were thorough and technically sound and no discrepancies with the field modifications for these valves were found. Appropriate procedure revisions were incorporated in system operating procedures prior to system alignment for standby operability condition i E1.3 Rgnelusions to Conduct of Enaineerina i Engineering support provided in the design and repair of the essential core cooling system suction strainer and the modification of the residual heat removal valves was thorough and technically soun ly. Plant Suppj;trt R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R General Comments on Radiation. Protection Insoection Scoce (71750)
The inspectors toured the controlled access area and reviewed area postings, survey maps, and radiation worker practice Qbagnations a_0d_Eindings With the exception of one area, discussed in Section R1.3, all posted areas toured during the cutage were posted properljand in accordance with site procedure Radiation workers followed r.,ite procedures and used good practices while working in the controlled access area. Heulth physics technicians exhibited good oversight of the j work that was ongoing. Health physics control points were set up at key work areas and
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provided good support. The inspectors identi5ed several concerns with survey maps, as discussed in Section R1.2. The total dose obtained during the outage was maintained
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approximately 8 rem below the licensee's goal of 245 rem for the outage.
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-13-R1.2 Survev Mao Timeliness On April 16, inspectors observed that the radiation survey maps posted on the RHR and ADHR room doors were dated April 1,1998. The unit was tripped at just after midnight on April 11, and the plant was put on shutdown cooling soon after that. The radiation levels in the rooms would be expected to change once shutdown cooling was put in service. The maps were updated to maps dated April 12 or 14, when the inspector checked the rooms on April 17. The ADHR system was put in service on April 16, but the survey map was never updated to reflect that the room was surveyed after the system was put in service. The inspectors discussed the concern with the radiation control superintendent. The superintendent explained that there had been a large number of surveys completed in that period of time and that there was a time delay in the supervisory revie The inspectors reviewed the logs maintained at the control points for the rooms of greatest concern. Although the survey maps were not updated, the inspectors observed that a survey of the room was documented during each point of time during the outage when dose levels in the room could have changed. In each of these cases, the logs documented that there had been no change in the dose rates in the rooms. The inspectors determined that as long at the control points were manned, personnel had the most up-to-date surveys, but that the timeliness in posting the surveys to ensure that the most up-to-date survey information was available at the beginning of the outage could have been bette During a subsequent tour, on May 4,1998, the inspectors found that the health physics control points at all entrance points into the containment building (Elevation 133 drywell entrance health physics check point, Elevation 166 equipment hatch, and Elevation 208 refuel floor ) did not have a copy of the cu; rent containment building survey maps nor were the arca survey maps posted at the entrance points. Health physics personnelin charge of the entrance check points did not realize until the inspectors questioned them that they did not have a copy of the current survey maps and that the survey maps were not posted at the entrance to the containment for personnel to review. The licensee immediately issued current survey maps at all locations for entrance into the containment building The inspectors questioned health physics supervision concerning the fact that no survey maps were available for personnel to review prior to entry into the containment building.
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Health physics personnel stated that the previous survey maps had been removed the
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previous night on May 3,1998, with the intention of replacing them with the new updated survey information; however, this was not done nor was it properly communicated to the oncoming shift health physics personne R1.3 B;Ldiation Poslia.gg During numerous tours of the controlled access area, the inspectors observed that radiation postings were performed in accordance with the regulations and the licensee's i
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-14-procedures. On April 28,1998, the inspectors identified one isolated area that was not posted in a clear manner. The area was a contaminated area around Hydraulic Power Unit A in containment. The step-off pad was located between two instrument rack When standing and looking into the area from the step-off pad, the inspector observed that one could not clearly see that the area was posted unless one saw the step-off pad on the floor. The inspector discussed the concern with health physics technicians. The technician acknowledged the concern, posted signs so that they could be seen at eye level when approaching the step-off pad, and documented the concern on CR 1998-052 R1.4 Conclusions to Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls With one minor exception, the licensee exhibited good posting, health physics oversight, and radiological worker practices. The radiological posting of one contamination area was identified as being inconspicuous. Health physics personnel demonstrated poor attention to detail and communication by not ensuring that the current area survey maps were made available at the containment entrances for review by personnel entering the containment buildin V. Manaaement Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary l The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the i
conclusion of the inspection on May 21,1998. The licensu acknowledged the findings presented.
f The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. The proprietary information examined was not discussed in this report.
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,., e ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee A. Barfield, Manager, Mechanical' Civil Design C. Bottemiller, Superintendent, Plant Licensing '
D. Bost, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering W. Eaton, General Plant Manager, Plant Operations C. Elisaesser, Manager, Performance and System Engineering R. Moomaw, Manager, Plant Maintenance C. Stafford, Operations Assistant, Plant Operations J. Roberts, Director, Quality Programs J. Venable, Manager, Operations INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 61726 Surveillance Observations 62707 Maintenance Observation 71707 Plant Operations
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71750 Plant Support Activities 93702 Prompt Oncite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED. GLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50-416/9805-01 IFl Further review of licensee's investigation into loss of k control of heavy lift (Section 01.2)
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l 50-416/9805-02 VIO Failure to follow diesel system operating procedure (Section 02.1)
50-416/9805-03 NCV Failure to follow work instructions (Section M1.2) 1 50-416/9805-04 VIO Failure to ensure clearance from safety-related equipment I
was evaluated (Section M4.1)
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-2-Clplfid 50-416/9805-03 NCV Failure to follow work instructions (Section M1.2)
D.!KLLU /9721-01 VIO Failure to ensure cles.rance froni safety-related equipment was evaluated (Section M4.1)
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