ML20148D450

Insp Rept 50-416/97-06 on 970323-0510.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Including Emergency Procedure,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20148D450
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	05/27/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148D420	List: ML20148D415 ML20148D445 ML20148D450
References
50-416-97-06, 50-416-97-6, NUDOCS 9705300211
Download: ML20148D450 (15)

See also: IR 05000416/1997006

Text

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ENCLOSURE 2

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION IV

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Docket No. 50-416

License No.- NPF-29

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Report No.- 50-416/97-06

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Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

Location: Waterloo Road

Port Gibson, Mississippi

Dates: March 23 through May 10,1997

Inspectors: K. Weaver, Resident inspector

D. Proulx, Resident inspector, River Bend Station

S. Freeman, Resident inspector Trainee

Approved By: P. Harrell, Chief, Project Branch D

Division of Reactor Projects

ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information

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9705300211 970527 i

PDR ADOCK 05000416 i

G PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Grand Gulf Nuclear Station j

NRC Inspection Report 50-416/97-06 '

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The inspectors evaluated aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and

plant support activities. This report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.

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Operations

Plant operations was conducted both safely and professionally (Section 01.1).

Operations personnel conservatively suspended on-going work activities and took  !

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appropriate precautionary measures during severe weather conditions

(Section 01.2)

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The inspectors identified poor implementation of procedure requirements while

observing operators in the simulator. The operators f ailed to complete the required

emergency procedure steps for the appropriate reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)

system alignment (Section 05.1).

Maintenance

Performance of observed maintenance work was satisfactory. Workers were

knowledgeable of the equipment and the scope of work that was performed

(Section M1.1).  !

Instrumentation and control technicians performing surveillance activities

appropriately stopped work, consulted with their supervisor, and obtained further

information, when it was not clear where to install a jumper. The instrumentation

and control technicians had established good communications with the control room

operators (Section M1.3).

Severe corrosion and flaking of the Standby Service Water (SSW) Loops A and B

return piping to Cooling Towers A and B was noted (Section M2.1).

Enaineerina

Tho licensee implemented appropriate corrective actions for Condition Report

(CH) 97-0295 and performed a techically sound engineering evaluation. A prompt

operability determination was made and prompt corrective actions were

implemented (Section E1.1).

System engineering had intented that a standing order be immediately issued by

operations to all on-shift personnel for the increase in the wait time from 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />

to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> before running the standby fresh air units prior to commencing painting

activities in the control building. No standing order was issued, and operators

remained unaware of the increased waiting period approximately 1 week later

(Section E1.2).

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Plant Support

Poor housekeeping was noted in the auxiliary building hot machine shop

(Section M2.1).

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A health physics technician demonstrated poor performance by not checking out a

count rate meter and by not returning the meter to the health physics laboratory in

accordance with the established controls, which resulted in the meter exceeding its

j calibration check period while lef t in the auxiliary building (Section R1.2).

Failure to ensure that a qualified individual was available to respond for the

emergency organization (ERO) position of Offsite Emergency Coordinator was a

violation (Section P1.1).

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Report Details

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Summarv of Plant Status

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4 The plant remained at or near 100 percent power throughout this inspection period.

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J 1. Operations

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) O1 Conduct of Operations

i 01.1 General Comments

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations, attended

plan-of-the-day meetings, and performed plant tours. The inspectors found that

j plant operations were conducted both safely and professionally.

l 01.2 Operations Performance Durina Severe Weather

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j a. Inspection Scoce (71707)

The inspectors observed operator performance during severe weather conditions.

b. Observations

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On April 22,1997, the inspectors observed operators enter

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Procedure 05-1-02-VI-2, " Hurricanes, Tornados, and Severe Weather,"

Revision 101, because of impending severe weather reported from the Pine Bluff

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dispatcher. The inspectors reviewed this procedure and noted that operators had

performed all the required procedure steps. The inspectors noted that operators

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continuously monitored the severe weather and appropriately announced on the

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plant communication system to all personnel of the impending severe weather. The

inspectors also noted that the shift superintendent had conservatively suspended

on-going work activities until the severe weather had ceased and passed out of the

immediate area.

c. Conclusions

Operators conservatively suspended on-going work activities and took appropriate

precautionary measures during severe weather conditions.

01.3 Locked Valve Proaram

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the locked valve program to ascertain if the program met

regulatory requirements and commitments. This evaluation included a review of

Procedure 02-S-01-2 " Conduct of Operations," Revision 28.

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b. Observations and Findinas

The inspectors noted that Procedure 02-S-01-2, Attachment 111, " Component

Verification," provided directions for locking valves. This attachment states that red

colored tie-wraps of a substantial material were to be placed on throttle valves.

Blue colored tie-wraps were to be placed on valves fully opened or closed. The

inspectors toured the facility to determine the effectiveness of this methodology.

The inspectors noted that for most valves the tie-wraps provided an effective

method for controlling locked valves. The inspectors noted that severallocked

valves were located approximately 20 feet above floor level in the overhead. The

licensee had placed tie-wraps on the valve chains such that the tie wraps were not

required to be disturbed to operate these valves. The inspectors questioned if these

valves could be considered locked since the locking devices provided no barriers to

preclude inadvertent operation. Further, the inspectors noted that this method

would not indicate whether or not the valves had been tampered with. The licensee

stated that the tie-wraps for locked valves were not intended to secure the valve in

place or serve as a barrier to prevent inadvertent operation. The licensee further

stated that the locked valve program served to inform employees that certain valves

were important and should only be operated under special care. Therefore, the

licensee stated that their methodology for locking valves in the overhead was

sound.

The inspectors questioned the licensee's interpretation of the purpose of locked

valves. _ Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.5.1.2

and 3.7.1.3 require the licensee to verify, on a monthly basis, that each valve in the

emergency core cooling and SSW systems that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise

secured in oosition is in its correct position. The bases for these TSs indicate that

the locked or sealed valves need not be verified because they were verified and

secured in position prior to installation of the locking or sealing device.

The inspectors expressed concern that, because valves in the overhead could be

operated without removing the tie-wraps, the licensee could not ensure that the

valves were not tampered with or inadvertently operated. The inspectors concluded

that further evaluation of the treatment of locked valves in the overhead was

warranted in that the locking methodology did not secure the valve in position or

provide indication that personnel did not tamper with the valve. This further

evaluation is considered an unresolved item (50-416/9706-01),

c. Conclusions

The method of locking valves located in the overhead and operated by chain falls

warranted further evaluation. The inspectors noted that placing tie-wraps on the

chains did not secure the valves in position or provide positive indication that the

position of the valve had not been changed since verification.

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01.4 Taaout Walkdown (71707)

The inspectors walked down Clearance GG-97-0611 to verify that all tags were

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attached to the proper components, that components were in the correct position

and that the tags were not defaced. No discrepancies were identified. ,

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05 Operator Training and Qualification

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! 05.1 Sirnulator Observations Durina Emeraency Drill Scenario

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a. inspection Scope (71707)

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The inspectors observed operator performance in the simulator during an emergency

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b. Observations l

During an emergency drill conducted on April 9,1997, the inspectors observed

operator performance in the simulator. The inspectors noted that the drill scenario

included a loss of offsite power. The inspectors had previously reviewed

Procedure 05-S-01-EP-2, " Reactor Pressure Vessel Control," Revision 24, and noted

that the procedure required that reactor pressure vessel water level be maintained

by the RCIC system with suction from the condensate storage tank. The inspectors

also noted that Procedure 05-S-0-EP 2, Attachment 1, " Defeating RCIC High

Suppression Pool Water Level Suction Transfer Interlock," provided instructions to I

defeat the RCIC high suppression pool water level suction transfer interlock by

removing Relay E51 A-K79. The procedure also required operators to open

Valve E51-F010, RCIC pump suction from condensate storage tank, and to close

Valve E51-F031, RCIC pump suction from suppression pool.

During the observation, the inspectors noted that the RCIC system maintained

reactor vessel water level with suction from the suppression pool instead of the

condensate storage tank. The inspectors questioned the assigned evaluator

concerning why the RCIC system was not aligned in accordance with

Procedure 05-S-01-EP-2. The evaluator investigated and replied that this was

considered a weakness and would be included in the critique following the drill.

The inspectors subsequently interviewed operations management concerning the

failure of the operators to appropriately perform Procedure 05-S-01-EP-2,

Attachment 1. Operations management investigated the error and concluded that

the operators had requested that Attachment 1 be performed but had not actually

read the attachment; therefore, they were not aware that further actions were

required to be performed on the simulator control panels. Operations management

stated that, in the future during emergency procedure training conducted on the

simulator., operators would be required to retrieve, read and request that emergency

procedure attachments be performed.

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b. Conclusions

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A weakness was identified during the operations simulator observations in that

operators failed to complete the required emergency procedure steps for the

appropriate RCIC system alignment,

ll. Maintenance

M1 Conduct of Maintenanco l

M 1.1 General Maintenance Comments

, a. Insoection Scoce (62703)

The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities, as specified by the

following work orders (WOs):

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• WO 00185756: RCIC Warm Up Line Valve 1E51F094: Furrnanite Fitting

• WO 00185429: Room Cooler 1T4680018: Thermal Performance Test

b. Observations and Findinas

! The inspectors found the performance of this work to be satisfactory. All work

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observed was conducted in accordance with the instructions and procedures

provided in the work packages. Workers were knowledgeable of the equipment and

the scope of work that was performed. in addition workers appropriately adhered

to radiation work permit requirements and demonstrated good radiological

contamination controls.

M.1.2 Incorrect Confinuration of Rosemount Transmitters (71707)

On Apnl 15,1997, the inspectors noted that Rosemount Transmitters N00-3A and

N00-38, which are nonsafety-related transmitters installed in the fuel pool cleanup

system, had plastic shipping plugs installed in their spare conduit ports. The

conduit ports of Rosemount Transmitters contain plastic plugs for foreign material

exclusion during shipping. The licensee was required to discard the plastic plugs

and replace them with stainless steel plugs, upon installation, to preclude moisture

intrusion into the transmitters. The licensee initiated a condition identification and

replaced the plastic plugs. The licensee also performed walkdowns of safety-related

areas and identified no further concerns with Rosemount Transmitters. The

inspectors concluded that although this issue was not safety significant, this issue

indicated weak personnel knowledge of transmitter configuration.

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M1.3 General Surveillance Comments

a. Insnection Scope (61726)

The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillance tests listed

below:

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Procedure 06-lC-1C51-R-0004, " Average Power Range Monitor (APRM)

Reactor Protect;on System (RPS) Response Time Test and 6-second Thermal

Power Time Constant Verification"

Procedure 06-OP-1E22-O-0005, "High Pressure Core Spray Pump Quarterly

Functional Test

• Procedure 06-EL-1 R21-M-0001-02, "4.16 KV Degraded Voltage Functional

Test and Calibration Division 2 Bus 16AB"

b. Observations and Findinas l

The inspectors noted that in general, the test procedures provided clear guidance

and properly implemented TS requirements. However, the inspectors noted that i

during the performance of Procedure 06-IC-1C51-R-0004, the instrumentation and I

control technicians performing the test stopped work at Step 5.5.5. Step 5.5.5 of i

Procedure 06-IC-1C51-R-0004 required removing the Thermal Trip Unit card from l

the average power range monitor and connecting a jumper in the circuit card. The

instrumentation and control technicians did not utearly understand from the

statement in Step 5.5.5 where to install the jumper. The instrumentation and i

control technicians appropriately stopped work and obtained a figure from another I

procedure, which clearly identified the jumper termination. An instrumentation and

control supervisor stated that Procedure 06-IC-1C51-R-0004 would be revised to

include this figure. The inspectors noted that the measuring and test equipment l

was within calibration. The instrumentation was removed from service, applicable l

limiting conditions for operation entered, and properly returned to service.

c. Conclusions

instrumentation and control technicians appropriately stopped work, consulted with

their supervisor, and obtained further information, when it was not clear where to

install a jumper as described in the procedure. The inspectors found the technicians

knowledgeable of the applicable equipment. The instrumentation and control

technicians had also established good communications with the control room

operators.

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' M 1.4 Surveillance of SSW Fans

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a. Inspection Scope (61726)

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The inspectors reviewed Surveillance Procedure 06-OP-1P41-M-004 " Standby

Service Water Loop A Operability," to determine if the surveillance properly  !

implemented TS SR 3.7.1.2.

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b. Observations and Findinas

The inspectors noted that the surveillance implemented the TS as written; however,

the inspectors identified that Procedure 06-OP-1P41-M-0004 did not include all of

the tests as stated in the TS bases. The bases for TS SF.: 3.7.1.2 states that

operating each cooling tower fan for greater than 15 minates ensures that fan or l

, motor f ailure or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. However, i

. Procedure 06-OP-1P41-M-0004 only required the user to start the fans, run them

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for 15 minutes, and then secure them. No vibration monitoring or other predictive

i actions were performed during performance of Procedure 06 OP-1P41-M-0004.

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The inspectors discussed this observation with operations management and the

, system engineer. The licensee stated that this description in the basis for TS

1 SR 3.7.1.2 was incorporated using the generic improved TSs and was not intended

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to require any additional site-specific action. The licensee took the position that the

phrase in the bases for TS 3.7.1.2, " vibration can be detected," provided

l permission but did not dictate requirements. in addition, the licensee stated that

i the surveillance detected failures of the SSW cooling tower fans but not degrading

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performance identified by predictive maintenance.

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The inspectors concluded that further evaluation of the licensees position and the

TS bases for TS SR 3.7.1.2 was warranted to ensure that the current testing of the

SSW cooling tower fans met the intent of the TS SR. This is considered an

unresolved item (50-416/9706-02).

c. Conclusions

Further evaluation of the licensee's position and the bases for TS SR 3.7.1.2 was

identified as an inspection followup item to ensure that the current testing of the

SSW cooling tower fans met the intent of the TS SR.

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M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment

i .: General Plant Tours

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a. Insoection Scope (71750)

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During tours of the plant, the inspectors reviewed the areas for proper

housekeeping, components for material condition, and other nonconforming

conditions.

b. Observations and Findinas

During plant tours, the inspectors noted that in general housekeeping continued to

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be good throughout the plant. However, the inspectors noted poor housekeeping in

3 the auxiliary building hot machine shop. In this area the inspectors identified pink

plastic wrap, which was used to wrap contaminated objects, on a shelf wadded up

with a piece of rope and other debris inside. The inspectors also noted several

pieces of soiled muslin, used cotton and surgical gloves, and discarded work

incomplete tags laying on the floor in the surrounding area. The inspectors also

noted soiled wet towels, which had been placed underneath equipment in the area.

The inspectors contacted health physics who surveyed the items for contamination.

The inspectors were notified that no contamination was found. The area was

subsequently cleaned and the debris appropriately discarded.

The inspectors interviewed maintenance management personnel to ascertain why

poor housekeeping conditions were found in the hot machine shop. The licensee

stated that personnel were removing tools and materials out of the area for

upcoming painting activities. The licensee further stated that a trash container was

subsequently placed in the area. During subsequent tours, the inspectors identified

no further problems with housekeeping in this area.

During another plant tour, the inspectors noted that a heavy lifting cart was secured

to a permanent plant Carbon Dioxide fire protection line. The licensee was notified

and, subsequently, removed the lifting cart. The licensee stated that the contractor

personnel involved were counseled on properly securing temporary equipment in the

plant for seismic purposes. The inspectors concluded that this occurrence was

isolated and not indicative of how plant personnel normally secure temporary

equipment.

During a tour of the SSW system on May 1, the inspectors noted severe corrosion

and flaking of the SSW Loop A return piping to Cooling Tower A. The inspectors

also toured the SSW B system and found the same corrosion and flaking of the

SSW Loop B return piping to Cooling Tower B. The inspectors notified the licensee.

Corrosion and flaking of the SSW A discharge piping was previously identified and

documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/97-03. The licensee had initiated

CR 97-0251 and had performed an ultrasonic test on the SSW A discharge piping

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identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/97-03 and had found the pipe wall

thickness to be greater then pipe minimum wall thickness. The licensee stated that

as part of the corrective action for CR 97-0251 a walkdown and a visual and ultra

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sonic examination of the SSW Loop A and SSW Loop B piping penetrations would

be performed.

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The licensee implemented appropriate actions to address poor housekeeping and

incorrectly secored temporary equipment identified by the inspectors.

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111. Enaineerina

E1 Conduct of Engineering

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E1.1 Seismic Qualification of Soare 480 Vac ITE K-600S Circuit Breakers

a. Insoection Scope (37551)

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The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions for CR 97-0295. This CR identified

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that several spare 480 Vac load center breakers were found in the fully racked out

position but were not previously evaluated for seismic qualification in that position.

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b. Observations and Findinas

This CR documented that the licensee found Breakers 52-15605,52-15502,

52-15504, and 52-16504 not in the connect, test, or disconnect position. These

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were spare ITE K-600S 480 Vac breakers located on safety-related load centers.

i The licensee promptly restored the breakers to the disconnect position. The

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licensee determined the as-found breaker position was not previously evaluated for

i a seismic event and entered Procedure 01-S-06-44, " Operability Determination,"

3 Revision 101. Subsequently, the licensee determined a seismic event would not

have resulted in a common mode failure of the load centers nor significantly

affected other components such that plant safety would be compromised. The

licensee did not declare any components inoperable.

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The inspectors reviewed Procedure 01-S-06-44 and the engineering evaluation to

assess the operability conclusion in the CR. The procedure followed the guidance

of Generic Letter 91-18 in dealing with operability and restoration of qualification

separately. The inspectors did not identify any deficiencies in the operability

determination and concluded that the determination was timely.

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c. Conclusions

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The inspectors concluded that licensee actions in handling CR 97-0295 were

i' appropriate. The inspectors found the engineering evaluation technically sound, and l

that the licensee had made a prompt operability determination and took prompt l

corrective action,

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E1.2 Failure To implement immediate Corrective Actions for the Standbv Fresh Air Units

(71707. 37551) i

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As documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/97-03, the inspectors had

identified a lack of administrative controls for painting activities in areas that

communicated with the engineered safety feature ventilation systems. As part of

the corrective action for CR 97-0195, system engineering determined that the

waiting period following painting of 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> before running the standby fresh air

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units was inappropriate and would be changed to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. System engineering

personnel informed the inspectors that this corrective action would be implemented

prior to commencing painting in the control building.

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The system engineering manager verbally requested that operations issue a standing

order until the permanent plant procedure was updated. However, approximately 1

week later after noticing painting in the control building, the inspectors interviewed

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operators concerning the applicable wait time for running the standby fresh air units

following painting. The operators indicated that the wait time was 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The

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inspectors questioned operations management as to why the new requirements

l were not promulgated to the operators. The manager indicated that the request I

was not performed immediately and, subsequently, was forgotten. A standing ,

order was immediately issued. The licensee initiated CR 97-0446 to address '

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possible programmatic deficiencies for implementation of the immediate corrective

actions. The inspectors determined that no violation of regulatory requirements I

occurred since the ventilation units had not been operated within 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> of the

painting.

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IV. Plant Support

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls

R1.1 General Comments (71750)

The inspectors frequently toured the radiological controlled area and assessed

radiological postings and worker adherence to protective clothing requirements. In

general, radiological meas were properly posted, and locked high radiation doors

were properly Ic0Ked. Workers adhered to radiation work permit requirements and

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displayed good radiological worker practices. However, the inspectors identified

two frisker probes in the hot machine shop face down instead of the face up as

required.

R1.2 Out of Service Instrument Found in Auxiliarv Buildina

a. Inspection Scoce (71750)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee process for controlling radiation protection I

meters.

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b. Observations and Findinas

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During a tour of the auxiliary building on April 8,1997, the inspectors found a

LM12 count rate meter, which had last been calibration checked on April 5. The

count rate meter was required to be calibration checked daily. The inspectors

questioned maintenance workers, who were working in a contaminated area in

close proximity to the raeter, if they had used the meter. The workers responded

that they had not used the meter nor were they aware that it was in the area. The

inspectors questioned health physics personnel as to why the count rate meter was

in the auxiliary building since its calibration check was past due. The health physics i

technicians immediately removed the meter from the area. Also, the health physics

technicians stated that this count rate meter was previously identified as missing

and out of service and that they had previously searched for the meter.

The inspectors reviewed the health physics calibration check sheet to verify that

this count rate meter was previously identified as missing and out of service.

Procedure 08-S-01-70, " Health Physics Instrumentation," Revision 100, required

that instruments outside their calibration che::k be bagged and tagged as out of

service or placed out of service at the health physics laboratory. The inspectors

interviewed health physics personnel concerning their administrative controls for

their instruments and questioned why this count rate meter had not been returned

to the health physics laboratory for a calibration check in accordance with

Procedure 08-S-01-70. The inspectors found that health physics maintained a

computer database, and management expected technicians to check out

instrumentation prior to use. During interviews with radiation protection

management the inspectors found that a qualified health physics technician had

taken the meter from the laboratory without following the established expectations,

in addition, the same health physics technician left the meter in the auxiliary

building until the inspectors subsequently found the meter.

c. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that the health physics technician demonstrated poor

performance by not checking out the instrument in accordance with the established

administrative controls and by not returning the meter to the health physic '

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laboratory after use. The inspectors determined that no violation of regulatory

requirements occurred since no one had used the meter with an out of date source

check, and the procedure did not require checkout or return of the meter.

P1 Conduct of EP Activities

P1.1 Failure to Provide a Qualified Individual to Fill the ERO Position of Offsite Emeraency

Coordinator

. a. Insoection Scope (71750)

During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed CR 97-0429, which

documented that the licensee was unable to fill the ERO position of Offsite

Emergency Coordinator for approximately 7.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

b. Observations and Findinas

On April 24,1997, licensee management personnel went to the NRC Region IV

Office in Arlington, Texas, for a meeting. Because of the number of managers

away from the site, it was questioned whether they could fill the ERO position of

Offsite Emergency Coordinator with a qualified individual. The inspectors i

determined that three individuals were qualified to fill this position. However, two

of the individuals were in Arlington, Texas, at the meeting and the other individual

was also unavailable. Procedure 01-S-10-6, " Emergency Response Organization,"

Revision 7, required that personnel assigned to the ERO must, during the scheduled

on call period, ensure that they are available to respond within the required time. In I

addition, Procedure 01-S-10-6 required that personnel assigned to the ERO must, if  !

circumstances prohibit response within the required times, ensure that an alternate

(from the same ERO position) has agreed to and is available for emergency response j

coverage. This alternate must notify Emergency Preparedness of the arrangements

made.

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During interviews, the inspectors found that an individual who was " provisionally" l

qualified was available and was notified by the licensee to be on standby for this  !

period. The inspectors reviewed Procedure 01-S-04-21, " Emergency Preparedness

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Training Program", Revision 101, and noted that this procedure stated that all  ;

personnel who respond as part of the GGNS Emergency Plan shall be qualified in j

accordance with this procedure. Further, all personnel who are designated to '

augment station staffing (On-Call ERO) in accordance with Procedure 01-S-10-6

shall meet all qualification requirements of assigned position before being placed on

call. The licensee stated that the individual had completed the required training but i

did not have the appropriate qualification card reviews and signatures and the j

responsible reviewer was not available.

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p Failure to ensure that a qualified individual was available to respond for the ERO

position of Offsite Emergency Coordinator is a violation of Procedure 01-S-10-6 ,

(50-416/9706-03).

S1 . Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities -

I' S 1.1 ' General Comments (71750)

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[ The inspectors accompanied security personnel during.a routine survey of the

security lighting system on April 10. The inspectors found security personnel '

i' knowledgeable of the security lighting requirements for the isolation zones and all

j exterior areas. No problems were identified with the exception that, during the

survey, security personnel and the inspectors found a worker who appeared to be

i sleeping inside a vehicle. The inspectors reviewed Procedure 01-S-11-10, "GGNS

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Employees' Security Responsibilities," which governed the controls for vehicles

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inside the protected area. The procedure required the vehicle to be attended by an

j -- employee with unescorted access. However, no procedural requirements existed

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depicting how attentive the individual must be. Based on review of

j Procedure 01-S-11-10, the inspectors concluded that no procedural violations had

j occurred.  ;

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V. Manaaement Meetinas

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X1 - Exit Meeting Summary

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The inspectors presented the inspection'results to members of licensee management at the ,

i conclusion of the inspection on May 15,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings )

j. presented,

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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection

i should be considered proprietary. No propnetary information was identified.

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ATTACHMENT

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED '

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Licensee

D. Bost, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering

R. Brinkman, Senior Reactor Operator, Plant Operations

W. Deck, Superintendent, Security

B. Eaton, General Manager, Plant Operations

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, C. Elisaesser, Manager, Performance and System Engineering

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J. Hagan, Vice President of Operations l

C. Hayes, Director, Quality Programs

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j W. Hughey, Director, Plant 1.icensing i

i T. Kriesel, Radiation Protection Manager

R. Moomaw, Maintenance Manager, Maintenance

A. Morgan, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

, J. Venable, Operations Manager, Plant Operations

NRC .

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, J. Donahew, NRR Project Manager i

j INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED l

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37551 Onsite Engineering l

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61726 Surveillance Observations

62707 Maintenance Observation

71707 Plant Operations

71750 Plant Support Activities

, ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

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Opened

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50-416/9706-01 UNR Further evaluation of the treatment of locked valves in the

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overhead (Section 01.3)

50-416/9706-02 UNR Further evaluation of the bases for testing the SSW cooling

tower f ans (Section M1.4)

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50-416/9706-03 VIO Failure to have a qualified individual for the Offsite

Emergency Coordinator position available (Section P1.1)

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CR condition report ,

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ERO emergency response organization j

IFl inspection followup item

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation j

RCIC reactor core isolation cooling

SR Surveillance Requirement

SSW standby service water i

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TS Technical Specification

WO work order

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