IR 05000416/1997020

Insp Rept 50-416/97-20 on 970907-1018.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint & Plant Support Re Emergency Post Accident Sampling Sys Drill

ML20198Q038
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	10/31/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198Q026	List: IR 05000416/1997020 ML20198Q022 ML20198Q029
References
50-416-97-20, NUDOCS 9711120090
Download: ML20198Q038 (18)

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ENCLOSURE 2, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50 416 License No.: NPF 29 Report No.: 50 416/97 20 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Location: Waterloo Road Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Dates: September 7 through October 18,1997 Inspectors: J. Dixon Herrity, Senior Resident insp*<: tor K. Weaver, Resident inspector Approved By: D. Kirsch, Chief, Project Branch F Division of Reector Projects Attachment: Supplemental Information

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97111 971C31 PDR A K 05000416-0 PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Grand Gulf Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50 416/97 20

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Qp.grations

• Operator response to a transient induced by a secondary steam system failure was good (Section 01.1).

• A minor noncited violation was identified for failing to follow the locked valve procedure for certain nontafety related fire protection system valves. In addition, the f ailure to properly lock the valves was an example of incomplete corrective actions for a previously identified noncited violation (Section 01.2).

• The inspectors identified one step in two alarm response instructions that had the potential to mislead operators responding to an enclosure building low negative pressure alarm in the control roorn (Section 03.1).

• Although operators appropriately identified procedure weaknesses during the performance of a diesel surveillance proceaure, they f ailed to discuss the weaknesses with supervision prior to performing the tasks (Section M1.4).

Maintenan * Maintenance and surveillance activities were generally conducted in accordance with the procedures, with one exception. Minor weaknesses in clarity were identified in one procedure. (Section M1.4).

• As a result of the failure of the licensee to identify similar condition _ reports during a quality audit, the inspectors determined that the process used by quality programs to trend condition reports and identify similar problems may not consistently assure that similar condition reports were identified (Section M7.1).

Plant Sucoort

• Although an emergency post accident sampling system (PASS) drill was performed satisfactorily, the practice of interrupting emergency drills to perform other activities and the f ailure of the procedure to provide for this practice was identified as having a potential to deemphasize the importance of the emergency drill (Section P1.1).

• The critique following a PASS emergency driS was thorough and the players

provided very good and effective insights (Section P1.1).

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• Lighting requirement' . in the protected area and isolation zone * were generally met. A violation was entified for the isnure of security patrols to identify dark areas in a temporary m. ,tenance work area located in the protected area. The

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failure to identify the lig .;ng deficiences in the work area and under several parked vehicles in the designated licensee parking aret in the protected area indicated a need for greater attention to detail during security patrols (Section S4.1).

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Reoort Details Summarv of Plant Status The plant began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On September 16,1997, the steam supply valve for Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) A failed and, during the resulting transient, Main Feedwater Pump B tripped. The plant was stabilized at approximately 60 percent power. After troubleshooting and repairing the equipment, the plant was returned to 100 percent power on September 19,1997, and operated at that level during the remainder of,the perio l. Operations l

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01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Forced Downoo.ver Due to Eaeloment Failure insoection Scope (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to balance-of plant equipment failure Observations and Findinas On September 16,1997, operators appropriately responded to an alarm indicating

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that there was a problem with the SJAE A steam supply. The effect on the plant

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was that the condenser hotwell level increased. The problem corrected itself, but as the plant responded to the transient, by increasing the feedwater pump speed demand signal, Feedwater Pump B failed to respond to the demand and trippe This caused a recirculation flow control valve runback and power reductio Operators appropriately performed the immediate actions in off normal event procedures and stabilized the plant at approximately 60 percent power.

l The licensee returned the plant to 100 percent power on September 19,1997, after

' replacing a servo-valve and a logic card in the feedwater pump controls and bringing

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SJAE B on line. The inspectors reviewed the root cause analysis for the event. The gaskets and o-rings in the SJAE steam supply valve positioner failed because of use beyond the expected life for the material. The licensee reviewed the history for the positioners on SJAE A and B steam supply valves. The Train A positioner was replaced in 1989 and Train B in 1993. The failed positioner was replaced before returning SJAE A to standby mode. Because the positioner on the SJAE B steam

, supply valve had recently been replaced and the gasket and o ring material were still

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within their service life, the licensee planned to replace the positioner during the next refueling outage, Conclusions Operator response to a transient induced by a secondary steam system failure was good.

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i 2-01.2 Fire Protection Valves Not Locked In Accordance with Procedures ingoection Scone (71707)

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the turbine building and radwaste building to examine system lineups and general plant conditions, Observations and Findinas During a routine tour of the turbine and radwaste buildings on October 9,1997, the inspNtor found three chain-operated fire protection system valves that were not locked in accordance with procedures. The three valves found were the Turbine Building 1.oop Header Isolation Valves P64 F088 and P64 F006 and Header Isolation Valve P84 311 in the radwaste building. Procedure 04 S-01 P641, " Fire Protection Water System," Revision 37, a safety related procedure, required all three valves to be locked open. Procedure 02 S-012, " Control and Use of Operations Section Directives," Revision 30, Attachment lil, " Component Position Verification,"

required that locking devices on chain operated valves be installed such that the valve be physically restrained from movement (i.e., chain is tie wrapped to eyelet or handrail). The three valves were locked by tie wrapping the end of the chain together, but not to an eyelet or handrail to ensure the valves were physically restrained from movement. The licensee properly secured the valves and issued Condition Report (CR) 971075 to document and identify further corrective action This observation demonstrated that licensee corrective actions, in response to a noncited violation documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/9719, were incomplete. The licensee found that they had verified that all the safety related valves were physically restrained from movement, but f ailed to verify that nonsafety related chain-operated valves were locked in accordance with the revised procedur Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires the licensee to establish and implement procedures as recommendad in Regulatory Guide 1,33, Revision 2, Appendix A,

" Typical Procedures for Pressurized Water Reactors and Boiling Water Reactors,"

February 1978, which lists equipment control (e.g., locking and tagging). The inspectors corwidered this a violation for failing to follow Procedure 02 S 01 However, the ilves were not safety related and were found in the correct positio The licensee's corrective actions for this finding were thorough and complete. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50 418/9720 01).

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3 . Conclusions A minor noncited violation was identified for failing to follow the locked valve procedure, in addition, the failure to properly lock the valves was an example of incomplete corrective actions for a previously idantified noncited violatio Operations Procedured and Documentation 03.1 Alarm Resoonse instructions for Enclosure Buildina Neoative Pressure Alarms jDantrJion Scone (717071 During a contrul room board walkdown on October 9,1997, the inspectors reviewed the Alarm Response instructions (ARIs) 041-021H13 P870 2A E3 and 041-021H13-P870 8A E3, " Enclosure Building Negative Pressure Low," Revision 10 Observations and Find!nas The USFAR Section 6.2.3.1.1, provides that, the secondary containment, in conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS),is designed to maintain 0.25 inches of water gauge vacuum pressure in the boundary region, and prevents exfiltration at wind speeds less than or equal to 10 mp Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 required verification that each SGTS subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to k O.25 inch of water gauge vacuum in s 120 seconds. The SR 3.6.4.1.3 bases provide that SR 3.6.4.1.3 verifies that the SGTS will rapidly establish and maintain a pressure in the secondary containment that is less than the lowest postulated pressure external to the secondary containment boundary. This is confirmed by demonstrating that one operable SGTS subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to > 0.25 inch of water gauge vacuum in .s.120 seconds. This cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary is not intac Paragraph 4.2 of the ARIs stated: "If alarm does not clear, Enclosure Building pressure does not approach 0.25 inch WC (water column) with both SGTS trains in service, and no apparent SGTS equipment malfunction, secondary containment integrity has been breached." This statement would indicate that a positive 0.25 inch water gauge was the acceptance criteria instead of the negative 0.25 inch water gauge. However, operators clearly understood the requiremen This was an example of an unclearly worded procedure. The inspectors observed that the alarm procedure allowed use of both SGTS trains, while secondary containment integrity was based on the use of only one SGTS train. The inspectors considered that the unclear wording could mislead operators responding to the alarm by causing them to not question secondary containment if both trains could maintain the required negative pressur , a

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4-The inspector discussed this concern with the licensee. The licensee agreed that the alarm response procedures should be clarified and documented the concern in CR 971077. The operations department planned to revise the procedures.

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The inspectors identified one step in two ARls that had the potential to mislead

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operators responding to an enclosure building low negative pressure alarm in the control room.

, 08 M6scellaneous Operations lesues

08.1 (Closed) Violation 50-416/9617-01: failure to perfoim required Technical

Specification surveillance. This violation involved the failure of operations personnel

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to perform a required Technical Specification surveillance as a result of identifying

the incorrect recorder on an information tag used as a compensatory measure while the normal recorder was out of service. The licensee identified the root cause as the failure of the operator who placed the tag to implement self verification techniques or to request a peer check. Inadequate supervisory oversight was

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identified as a contributing cause. The corrective actions included discussing the event, stressing the importance of the self verification and the peer check program with operations personnel and the installation of permanent labels next to each recorder to identify alternate recorders for data collection. The inspector reviewed i the corrective actions taken and found that they were adequate and implemented as stated.

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II. Maintenance

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M1 Conduct of Maintenance M 1.1 General Ma;atenance Comments f

- Insoection Scoce (62707)

The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities, as specified by the following work orders (WOs):

• WO 00195164 Troubleshooting and replacement of Division ll safety relief valve test switch

• WO 19970313 Channel B low low set logic modification

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t 5 Qhurvations and Findinas

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The insp;>ctors found that the work performed under these activities was thoroug All the work activities observed were performed in accordance with the WO Technicians were knowledgeable and professional. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progres M1.2 General Surveillance Comments Insoection_ Scone (61726)

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The inspsetors observed the performance of portions of the curveillance tests listed below:

• 06 lC 1E61 R 1002, " Containment /Drywell Differential Pressure Calibration Test," Revision 100

• 06 OP 1P81 M-0002, "High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Diesel Generator 13 Functional Test," Revision 102

• 06 OP-1T48 M-0001, " Standby Gas Treatment System A Operability,"

Revision 102 Observations and Findinas Surveillance testing activities observed during the inspection period were conducted satisfactorily in accordance with the licensee's approved programs and Technical ,

Specifications with one minor exception, as discussed in Section M1.3. The inspectors observed that the test procedures provided clear guidance and properly

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implemented Technical Specification requirements. Measuring and test equipment was verified to be within its current calibration cycle. The instrumentation was removed from service, applicable limiting conditions for operation entered, and properly returned to service. Technicians were very knowledgeable and qualifie As found test data was within the tolerance established for this instrumentation.

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M1.3 tdPCS Diesel Surveillance i

Prior to performing the functional test on the HPCS diesel, operators performed the i quarterly inservice test on the fuel oil transfer pump. During the performance of this i test, the inspector questioned a small amount of air in the line to the temporary gauge installed to measure the discharge pressure. The operator pointed out that the venting portion of Procedure 06 OP 1P81 M 0002 had recently been revise The revised procedure did not require that the gauge be located at the high point and that the pump be running when the gauge was vented, so not all air was removed. The instrumentation & contro! technician explained that such a small amount of air would not affect the gauge reading. The inspector acknowledged that (

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6-the small amount of air in the line during this test probably had little affect on the reading; however, the procedure revision needed y 5e evaluated to ensure that the line was properly vented. The operator had proped, documented the concern so that the procedure could be changed later, but performed the procedure as writte The operator also identified that the prelubrication section of the procedure was not well written and was not as easy to follow as Procedure 04 S-03 P81 1, "HPCS Diesel Generator Prelube," Revision 16. The inspector observed that the operators had not discussed the weaknesses they identified with their supervision prior to continuing on with the procedur While observing the performance of the functional test of the HPCS diesel, the inspectors observed that an operator changed the governor load limit setting. The procedure only required the operator to observa that the setting was at a minimum and did not contain provisions for changing the setting. The inspectors questioned why the setting was changed. The operator explained that they were supposed to change it at that point and then return it to maximum later in the procedure. The inspectors verified that the limit was returned to maximum after the air roll was completed. The inspectors discussed the concern with the system engineer. The engineer 6xplained that the goveinor setting was changed to minimum to limit the amount of fuel that was pumped into the cylinders during the air roll. The inspectors agreed that the load limit setting should be changed. The licensee planned to revise the procedur M1.4 Conduct of Maintenance Conclusions Maintenance and surveillance activities were generally conducted in accordance with the procedures, with one exception. Minor weaknesses in clarity were identified in one procedure. Although opeators appropriately identified the weaknesses, they failed to discuss the weaknesses with supervision prior to performing the task M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities M7.1 Audit of Corrective Actions insoection Scone (62707)

The inspectors reviewed Quality Programs Audit Report OPA05.02 97,

" Effectiveness of Corrective Action." Observations and Findinos The inspectors reviewed the audit report and observed that it reviewed 11 CRs or quality deficiency reports (ODRs) that had been closed for a period of time to determine if the trective actions had been effective in preventing recurrence. The report docume? 2at no deficiencies were identifie I

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f The inspector observed that QDR 96115, " Prevent Electrical Shock to Electricians in GGNS Facilities," and CR 96 289, " Accidental Electrical Shock," both dealt with incidents involving electricians being shocked while performing maintenance. The

inspector reviewed the root causes of the two incidents and the corrective actions l taken. Both reports identified the failure to thoroughlv assess the job in a prejob briefing as either a root cause or an indirect cause of the incident. The corrective actions dealing with projob briefings for ODR 96115 were implemented as of

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September 23,1996. The electrical shock described in CR 96 289 occurred on October 27,1996, after the corrective actions for ODR 96115 were in place. The _

inspectors considered that the corrective actions for ODR 96115 were not fully

effective, based on the subsequent shock documented in CR 96 289.

The inspectors discussed this concern with the quality auditor who performed the i

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audit. The auditor explained that the repeat occurrence had not been identified because of the method they used to trend CRs. The computer data base was

searched using key words to identify similar incidents and the use of different key

words would result in the observed condition.

In order to test the explanation, the inspector noted that ODR 95 66, which dealt l with a problem with loose items in the plant, had been one of the reports in the

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audit and questioned whether the CR documenting a ladder that had been left in containment (addressed in NRC !e.;,ection Report 50-416/97 12) had been identified in the review. The auditor verified that the CR was not identified in the

search. The auditor explained that this was because none of the key words used in

the search were similar.

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Tim auditor acknowledged the discrepancies and stated that a review of the process for identifying similar problems was planned to determine if improvements could be

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made to the trending system. The licensee also planned to review the audit to

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determine if a revision was necessary.

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As a result of the failure to identify similar CRs during a quality audit, the inspectors i determined that the process used by quality programs to trend condition reports and

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identify similar problems may not consistently assure that similar condition reports l were identified, i

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Ill. Enoineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering .

E1.1 UFSAR Discreoancies identified with the Containment Electrical Penetrations Nignaen Suoo!v Pressure insoection Scooe (37551)

Using inspection Procedure 37551, the inspectors reviewed the Technical Specifications, UFSAR, and procedures associated with the containment electrical penetration o. Observations and Findinas Dui:ng a routine tour of the auxiliary building on September 23,1997, the inspectors identified potential inconsistencies in nitrogen pressure on three containment electrical penetrations. The Electrical Penetrations 1Z001,1 ZOO 5, and 1ZO10 were found pressurized to approximately 9,8, and 7.5 psig, respectivel The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR and found that Table 6.2-49, " Primary Reactor

. Containtnent Penetration and Containment Isolation Valve Leckage Rate Test List,"

Note 14, stated: " Modular type electrical penetration with header plate bolted to penetration nozzle. Double o-ring seals with test cor.nection are provided at interface. Test volume continuously pressurized with Na at a pressure > P,.

Instrumented to provide monitoring of nitrogen supply pressure." P, for Grand Gulf is 11.5 psig. Preliminarily, the inspectors considered that Note 14 required the pressure be maintained at all times and not just during testin During the inspectors' review of the UFSAR, no other documentation could be found concerning any safaty related function of the nitrogen blanket applied to the conminment electrical penetrations. The inspectors questioned operations personnel concerning whather the containment electrical penetrations were monitored on the non-licensed operator daily rounds. Operations personnel q indicated that the nitrogen pressures were not monitored during operator round The inspector found that the nitrogen pressure caused a computer point alarm if the nitrogen bottle regulator pressure went below 5 psig. However, there was no alarm response procedure and operators were not uniformly aware that the condition ,

provided an alar The inspector discussed the potential difference between the UFSAR requirement and the actual plant practices with the licensee. The licensee initiated CR 1997-1024 to document that the containment electrical penetration nitrogen supply system pressure had been allowed to drop lower than P, (11.5 psig) and that the system was not designed to alarm until the pressure decreased to 5 psig. The

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-9-licensee documentsd that there was a potential conflict between the design requirements for the system and UFSAR commitments in Note 14 of Table 6.2-4 i NRC Inspection Report 50-416/83 46 identified that the continuous leakrate -

monitoring system wasn't functioning as a continuous monitoring system. The licensee later determined the system did not meet the requirements for classificatiori as a continuous leakage monitoring system and committed to local leak rate test the penetrations. A licensee document, "A Review of Containment Panetrations for Technical Specification Compliance," dated July 14,1996, File No. 0290/5010, Response to PMI 86/2233.1.h, provided that the electrical penetrations were designed for continuous nitrogen pressurization between the seals and recommended a more frequent surveillance to ensure that the nitrogen pressure was maintained. Attacnment 3 to that document was a clarification from Bechtel, the Architect / Engineer for Grand Gulf, which documented that the test connection between the two o-rings should be isolated or left pressurized and the pressure between the seals monitored. The inspectors observed that this was a missed-opportunity for the licensee to identify and correct the potential discrepancy with the UFSA The inspector reviewed Engineering Evaluation EERR W2/D8383, dated November 11,1992,~ which was generated to evaluate the like for like replacement of the nitrogen pressure regulator for the leak detection system. The inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation performed in this package and determined that it was completed appropriately for the like-for like replacement of the regulator. The -

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evaluation documented that the maintenance of nitrogen for the containment electrical penetrations was not related to the penetrat:an's safety function and the i nitrogen blanket was not part of the penetration's environmental qualifications; nor required for containment isolations; nor necessary for the continuation of electrical circuits. Engineering Evaluation EERR 92/D8383 documented that the nitrogen supply system did not perform a safety-related function. This was a second missed

= opportunity for the licensee tn identify that the UFSAR requirement may not have been implemented by the plan Pending further NRC review of the purpose and meaning of Note 14 to UFSAR

. Table 6.2-49, this item will remain Unresolved (50-416/9720-02).

, Conclusions The inspectors identified a potertial difference between the UFSAR and actual plant practices concerning the electrical penetration nitrogen supply syst'e j

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t 10-IV. Plant Spoport P1 Conduct of EP Activities P Post Accident Samolino System (PASS) Drill Inspection Scoos (71750)

The inspectors observed the PASS emergency drill conducted on October 7,1997, Observations ared Findinas The inspectors observed that the players involved in the drill appropriately followed procedures and met the objectives of the drill. However, the inspectors observed that the PASS drill was stopped twice in oider to perform surveillance activitie The drill was stopped approximately one hour into the drill to perform Procedure 17-S-05 P33, " System Pressure Test Post Accident Sampling System." The drill was subsequently restarted and, after the PASS sample was taken, the drill was stopped again in order to take a routine sample from the Residual Heat Removal, Train The inspectors were concerned that the drill was stopped to perform other work and surveillances. The inspectors questioned emergency preparedness personnel at the site daring the drill about the potential of de-emphasizing the importance of the emergency drill and causing confusion on the part of the players due to these additional activities. The inspectors reviewed Procedure 01 S 10 4, " Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises," Revision 4, to determine if the observed interruptions for the work activities were allowed by this procedure. Although the procedure permitted stopping the drill for on-the-spot correction of erroneous performance, the procedure did not address stopping drills in order to perform other activitie The inspector obsorved the critique fo!L, wing the drill. Health physics and chemistry personnel all stated that stopping the drill produced confusion in communications and had an adverse effect on the overall performance of the drill players. After the critique emergency planning personnel indicated that future drills would be run without interruptions, Conclusions

. Although an emergency PASS drill was performed satisfactorily, the practice of interrupting emergency drills to perform other activities and the failure of the procedure to provide for this practice was identified as having a potential to de-emphasize the importance of the emergency drill. The critique following the drill was thorough and the players provided very good and effective insight .

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-11-84 Sect:lty and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance

. S4.1 Security Liahtina Insoection Scone (71750)

Using inspection Procedure 71750, the inspectors toured the protected area and reviewed the integrity of the protected area barriers, the maintenance of the isolation zones, and illumination level l i Observations and Findinas Lighting requirements within the protected trea and isolation zones we's generally mot. However, on October 11,1997, the inspectors observed that a temporary covered maintenance work area located north of Unit 2 on a construction pad contained areas dark enough to conceal en individual. The work area consisted of a floorless tent constructed of aluminum panels with large, doorless entries at both ends with a large table in the center. Eased on the location of the area. .t was easily identifiable by an individual at the perimeter and exploitable as a concealment area. The vehicle .oarking area set up next to the work area contained some vehicles that did not have sufficient light under them. The inspector observed that several of the parking spaces contained lights without vehicles over them but that several vehicles without lighting under them, including a large front ers loader, were parkad at the end of the parking area. The inspectors discussed the concerns with the security captain on duty. -The captain reviewed the area and found that the temporary halogen lights installed in the work area were unplugged and that several bulbs in lights m the parking area had bumed out. The captain plugged in the lights and had the bulbs changed, ,

On October 15,1997, security personnel conducted a lighting survey of the-temporary work area with the lights extinguished,. Nine of the ten readings taken at ,

different locations in the work area, during two different surveys, were below the - '

O.2 footcandle light level requirement in Paragraph 7.3 of the Security Plan. The lights were energized again after the survey and the temporary work area was dismantled on October 20,1997. The failure to identify the inadequate lighting in

. the temporary work area is identified as a violation of License Condition 2.E (50-416/9720-03).

This violation was similar to the violation documented in NRC inspection Report 50-416/97-13 in which security patrols f ailed to take compensatory action for security lights that were extinguishe .

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12- Conclusions Lighting requirements within the piotected area and isolation zones were generally met. ' A violation was identified for the failure of security patrols to identify dark .

areas in a temporary maintenance work area located in the protected area. The failure to identify the lighting deficiencies in the work area and under several parked vehicles in the designated licensee parking area in the protected area indicated a need for greater attention to detail during security patrol :\

L.MADASAWADI.MAtiklGR X1 Exit Meeting Summery The inepectors presented the inspr.-tion results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 23,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented, but questioned the regulatory requirements for security lighting. The licensee stated that the requirements to light the inside of a covered work area was not explicitly contained in their security plan or implementing procedures. The licensee recognized that the wording in their security plan was not definitive and reviewed several security related regulatory documents in an effort to find further guidance. The licensee indicated that, taken as a whole, the guidance they reviewed does not provide a clear understanding of the requirement, but realize that their implementing procedures require lighting under covered areas if the area is accessible.-

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie i

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ATTACHMENT 1 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensen D. Bost, Director, Design Engineering

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C. Bottomiller, Superintendent, Plant Licensing W. Cade, Operations Assistant, Operations J. Czaika, Nuclear Specialist L. Daughtery, Technical Coordinator, Plant Licensing W. Deck, Superintendent, Security W. Eaton, General Plant Manager, Plant Operations B. Edwards, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent, Maintenance M. Guynn, Radiation Control Superintendent, Radiation Protection C. Hayes, Director, Quality Prugrams C. Holifield, License Engineer, Plant Licensing K. Hughey, Director, Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Aff airs R. Jacksc.n, License Specialist, Plant Licensing B. Jones, Auditor, Quality Programs C. Smith, Manager, Planning and Scheduling T. Tankersley, Senior Oversight Specialist NRC J. Donahew, NRR Project Manager

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-2-INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 61726 Surveillance Observations 62707 Maintenance Observation 71707 Plant Operations 71750 Plant Support Activities 92901 Followup - Operations ITEMS OPENED CLOSED, AND DISCUSjlQ Opened 50-416/9720-01 NCV Valves not Locked in accordance with procedure /9720-02 URI UFSAR may not be raflected by actual practice for containment electrical penetration N, pressur /9720-03 VIO Security patrols had not reported dark areas in a temporary structure Clos 9d 50-416/9617-01 VIO Failure to perform required Technical Specification Surveillanc /9720-01 NCV Valves not locked in accordance with procedures, t

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3-LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ARI alarm response instructions CR condition reports'

HPCS high pressure core spray PASS oost accident sampling system

OD quality deficiency report

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SGTS standby gas treatment system

SJAE steam jet air ejector 1-UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report WO Work Order i

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