IR 05000416/1998004

Insp Rept 50-416/98-04 on 980414-16.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Maint & Plant Support

ML20247B913
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	05/05/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247B907	List: IR 05000416/1998004 ML20247B905
References
50-416-98-04, 50-416-98-4, NUDOCS 9805110147
Download: ML20247B913 (11)

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i ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

, Docket No.: 50-416 l

License No.: NPF-29 Report No.: 50-416/98-04 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Location: Waterloo Road Port Gibson, Mississippi Dates: April 14-16,1998 l Inspector: William P. Ang, Senior Reactor Inspector, Maintenance Branch Approved By: Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief, Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety l

Attachment: Supplemental Information l l

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9805110147 990505 PDR ADOCK 05000416 G PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

. Grand Gulf Nuclear Station l NRC Inspection Report 50-416/98-04

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A routine, announced inspection of the implementation of the inservice inspection program was performed at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. The inspector used NRC Inspection Procedure 73753, " Inservice Inspection," to determine whether the inservice inspection, and replacement of Class 1,2, and 3 pressure retaining components, were performed in accordance with applicable requirements. The inspector determined, by observation of the limited ongoing inservice inspection and ASME Code replacement activities, and by review of records, that the L inservice inspection program was being adequately implemented in accordance with licensee

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procedures, ASME Code requirements, and NRC regulatory requirements.

I Maintenance

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The licensee appropriately dispositioned changes to the inservice inspection progra The inservice inspection program procedures were adequate. The scope of inservice inspection examinations and inspections planned for the outage was small, but acceptable (Section M1.1).

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• The observed inservice inspection visual examination of three attachment welds was performed in a thorough and deliberate manner. Good inspection performance was also observed during the inspection when the examiner visually inspected the remainder of the pipe supports and anchors beyond the scope of the assigned inspection (Section M1.2).

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The prefabrication activities for the replacement reactor water cleanup system Check Valve 1G33F052B subassembly were appropriately performed. The work order and administrative procedure provided substantial and detailed guidance for the replacement activities (Section M1.3).

The records for the observed inservice inspection visual examinations of the pipe supports and anchors and the qualification records for the observed Level ll examiner were appropriate (Section M3.1).

- The records for the completed welds and nondestructive examinations for the prefabricated replacem 3nt reactor water cleanup system Check Valve 1G33F052B subassembly and the qualification records for the associated examiners and inspectors were appropriate with one minor exception (Section M3.2).

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Housekeeping on Elevation 147 inside the drywell was poor due to unattended tools and materials (Section M2.1). j l

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L -3-i Report Details Summarv of Plant Status The plant was in Mode 5 and was in its ninth refueling outage during the inspection perio ;

i 11. Maintenance 1 l

M1 Conduct of Maintenance

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M1.1 Inservice insoection Proaram ' I l Insoection Scoos

. The inspector reviewed licensee submittals, NRC responses, and implementing documents for the inservice inspection progra Observations and Findinos Grand Gulf Nuclear Station started commercial operation on July 1,1985. Based on the commercial operating date, 'he ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1989 Edition, required the inservice inspection plan to be updated for the second l 120-month intervalin June 1995. The NRC approved a licensee request for the l extension of the first 120-month inservice inspection interval to include one additional refueling outage beyond the end date by means of Letter GNRI-94/00184 dated

. August 1,1994, j Based on a subsequent licensee relief request, the NRC, by ineans of -

Letter GNRI-96/00244 dated December 12,' 1996, authorized the licensee to

update to the 1992 Edition of ASME Section XI, use the pressure testing requirements of the 1993 Addenda of ASME Section XI, and defer the 10-year program update until l June 1,1997. The licensee submitted to the NRC the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station i' updated inservice inspection program, for the second 10-year interval, by means of Letter GIRO-97/00062, dated July 1,1997. The letter submitted the program for information, stated that no NRC approval was required, and that the program had been

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o The licensee provided the NRC a copy of " Inservice inspection Program Plan,"

j' Revision 11, by means of Letter GIRO-98/00008, dated January 14,1998. The plan revision was provided for information only. The revision resulted from the adoption of ASME Code Cases N-416-1, "Altemative Pressure Test Requirements for Welded Repairs or installation of Replacement items by Welding Class 1,2 and 3 - Section XI, Division 1," and N-532, " Alternative Requirements to Repair and Replacements Documentation Requirements and Inservice Summary Report Preparation and

. Submission as Required by 1.A.-4000 and I.A.-6000."

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-4 Administrative Procedure 01-S-07-10, "Preservice and inservice Inspection,"

l- Revision 101, provided the administrative requirements for preservice and inservice .

. inspections at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1. The procedure specified the t

responsibilities and controls for the inservice inspection program. The procedure t

specified the app!icable inspection and testing requirements for inservice inspection.

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The procedure specified the requirements for nonconformances/ deficiencies resulting from inservice inspection examinations. The procedure specified the requirements for j inservice inspection reports and Quality Assurance records.

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Performance and System Engineering instruction 17-S-05-15, " Inservice Inspection,"

Revision 3, provided the necessary guidance and work instructions for implementing inservice inspections. The instruction provided the prerequisites and preparation needed L for performing inservice inspection. The instructions provided the processing requirements for documentation for the performance of inservice inspection. The instructions provided the requirements for system restoration after performance of inservice inspection.

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Licensee Memorandum GIN 98/00373, dated March 3,1998, from the Testing / Inspection Programs Supervisor to Quality programs, listed the inservice inspection scope for Refueling Outage RF09. The scope consisted of 17 volumetric examinations,2 surface L examinations, and 25 visual inspections. The inspector observed that the 44 total i

inservice inspection examinations and inspections planned for the first period of the !

second inservice inspection interval during Refueling Outage RF09 was smal I i Conclusions l The licensee appropriately dispositioned changes to the inservice inspection program.

l The inservice inspection program procedures were adequate. The scope of inservice ;

) inspection examinations / inspections planned for the outage was small, but acceptabl {

M1.2 Performance of Visual Inspections . Insoection Scooe The inspector observed the performance of visual examinations of the attachment welds ;

for the following main steam relief valve pipe supports and anchors inside the drywel The inspector was informed by licensee inservice inspection personnel that those were the only inservice inspection examinations and inspections performed during the inspection perio .

Pipe Support B21G022R16 - Drawing Q1821G022R16, " Pipe Supports, Containment, MSRV Line - 4," Revision 5

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Pipe Anchor B21G025A01 - Drawing Q1821G025A01," Pipe Anchors, Containment, MSRV Line - 15," Revision 3 L _- _ - _-__ - _ __ - ___ __ _ _ - _

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Pipe Anchor 821G032A01 - Drawing Q1821G032A01, " Pipe Anchors, Containment, MSRV Line - 18," Revision 3 Observations and Findings The observed visual examinations were performed by a quality programs contractor Level 11 examiner. The visual inspections were performed in accordance with Quality Assurance instruction 9.59, "VT-3 Visual Examination," Revision 0. The Level ll examiner used appropriate portable lighting (flashlight) and a mirror to perform the surface examination. The Level ll examiner positioned himself appropriately to allow the maximum direct observation of the surfaces of the welds, despite the relatively difficult accessibility conditions surrounding the welds. Where necessary, a mirror was used to provide better visibility of the surface of the weld The Level 11 examiner performed a thorough and deliberate visual inspection of the surface of the welds. The NRC inspector noted that the Leve! ll examiner did not limit himself to the assigned visual examination of the welds. The Level ll examiner also visually inspected other components of the pipe supports and anchors being inspecte The Level 11 examiner found and reported tie-wraps and a corroded wire loosely wrapped around Pipe Support Q1821G022R16. The tie-wrap and wire did not appear to interfere with the function of the pipe suppor Conclusions The observed inservice inspection visual examination of three attachment welds were performed in a thorough and deliberate manner. Good inspection performance was also observed during the inspection when the examiner visually inspected the remainder of the pipe supports and anchors beyond the scope of the assigned inspectio M1.3 MME Code Replacement Activities Insoection Scoce The inspector reviewed licensee activities associated with the replacement of reactor water cleanup system Check Valve 1G33F0528. The inspector reviewed the work order and the administrative procedur Observations and Findings The inspector determined that Condition Report 1996-490 reported on November 20, 1996, that reactor water cleanup system Check Valve 1G33F052B had been disassembled for performance of a check valve surveillance and the pressure seal gasket leaked subsequent to reassembly of the valve. Machining and repair of the cap sealing surface were unsuccessfully attempted. The valve cap was temporarily sealed using the Furmanite process and scheduled for replacement during a subsequent outage. Replacement of the valve was being performed during Refueling Outage RF09.

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l The inspector determined that the replacement of Check Valve 1G33F052B was being performed in accordance with Work Order 00197744 and Administrative Procedure 01-S 07-28, "ASME Section XI Repair / Replacement Program," Revision 10 The inspector determined that the replacement instructions for the check valve were appropriate.. The work order and administrative procedure provided substantial and detailed guidance for the replacement activitie The inspector was informed by licensee inservice inspection personnel that the existing check valve had not yet been removed from the system but the replacement subassembly was being fabricated in the maintenance shop. The inspector visually inspected the replacement subassembly. The workmanship associated with the welding l of pipe spool pieces to the disassembled check valve visually appeared to be good. The inspector reviewed the records for the welding and nondestructive examinations for the subassembly. The welding and nondestructive examinations appeared to be appropriat Conclusions

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The prefabrication activities for the replacement reactor water cleanup system Check Valve 1G33F0528 subassembly were being appropriately performed. The work order and administrative procedure provided substantial and detailed guidance for the replacement activities.

L M2- Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment  !

M2.1 Drvwell Insoection Scooe The inspector observed housekeeping inside the drywell during the observation of inservice inspection examination activitie Observations and Findinas I'

The inspector observed that housekeeping inside the drywell was poor. Specifically the i inspector observed, on Elevation 147 of the drywell, in the vicinity of Pipe l Anchor QlB21G025A01, that a wrench, a ball peen hammer, and other tools were left in I a work location where no work was being performed for approximately 30 minutes. The inspector observed three different rolls of tape. The inspector also observed small pieces of insulation debris on main steam relief valve pipe flanges and a corroded wire, wrapped around a main steam relief valve pipe support. The wire did not appear to affect the function of the pipe support. The inspector informed the quality program inspector and other licensee personnel of the poor housekeeping conditions observe _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ ____ _______ _- _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _

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-7- Conclusions Housekeeping on Elevation 147 inside the drywell was poor because of unattended tools

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and material.

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! M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 Review of Inservice insoection Records Insoection Scooe l

l The inspector reviewed the records generated for the observed visual examination The inspector reviewed the qualification records for the observed Level 11 examiner.

. Observations and Findinas i

The inspector determined that appropriate records were generated for the observed inservice inspecticn visual examinations of the pipe supports and anchors noted abov The item examined, the type of examination, the results of the examination, the procedure used for the examination, the examiner, and the level of certification of the

examiner were documented in the records.

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l The inspector determined that the qualification records for the observed Level 11 examiner were appropriate. The records included an evaluation and acceptance of the contractor's visual examiner certification by the licensee's quality programs supervisor.

! Conclusions The records for the observed inservice inspection visual examinations of the pipe supports and anchors, and the qualification records for the observed Level ll examiner were appropriat M3.2 Review of ASME Code Replacement Activity Records Insoection Scooe l

l The inspector reviewed the documentation for the completed welds and nondestructive examinations for the prefabricated replacement reactor water cleanup system Check Valve 1G33F0528 subassembly.

l Observations and Findinas The inspector determined that the records for the completed welds and nondestructive examinations for the prefabricated replacement reactor water cleanup system Check Valve 1G33F0528 subassembly were appropriate. The procedures used for

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8-l performance of the work activities, the welder, the nondestructive examiners, and the level of certification of the examiners were appropriately documente Except for one Level 111 examiner, the inspector determined that the qualification records for the nor4 destructive examiners that performed visual, magnetic particle, and radiographic examinations on the prefabricated subassembly, documented appropriate qualifications for the examiners. The inspector determined, through review of records, that a Level lli examiner, who performed ultrasonic test examinations for Field Welds FW 901 and 902 of the subassembly, failed the color blindness test documented in the individual's physical examination record dated October 2,1997. Another licensee l

Level til examiner evaluated the results of the test and concluded that the deficiency was '

not detrimental to the interpretation of examination result The inspector determined that Quality Assurance Procedure Q.P. 2.52, ' Visual Acuity Exam and Examiner Certification," Revision 8, provided the licensee's procedure for assuring visual acuity of inspection and examination personnel. The procedure required the performance of a color perception acuity examination. Paragraph 5.2.4.d(1) allowed nondestructive examination personnel who failed the test to be evaluated by an appropriate Level Ill examiner. The procedure required the individual to demonstrate to the satis, action of a Level 111 examiner that the deficiency was not detrimental to the interpretation of examination results. The procedure required a comparison to be ]

performed for magnetic particle, liquid penetrant, ultrasonic, and radiographic examire.tions. The procedure required that the results determined by a color deficient individual be compared with those of an individual with normal color vision. The evaluation and certification record for the Level ill examiner in question did not indicate that a comparison had been performe ;

On April 14,- 1998, a quality programs, Level Ill, examiner initiated Condition I Report GGCR1998-0339-00. The condition report identified that insufficient evaluation was performed for nondestructive examination personnel who failed the color perception portion of the annual visual acuity examination. As part of the corrective actions for the condition report, on April 15,1998, the Level lli examiner reperformed and failed the color perception acuity test. The Level lli examiner and an examiner with acceptable color vision were subsequently _ tested for liquid penetrant and magnetic particle '

examinations. The test results of both individuals were compared and found to be in agreement with each other. The Level 111 examiner was also tested for ritrasonic and radiographic examinations and demonstrated to another Level 111 examiner that the color perception deficiency did not hinder the individual's satisfactory performance of the tes The failure to compare and evaluate a color deficient Level lli examiner results in accordance with Procedure Q.P. 2.52, on October 2,1997, constituted a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-416/9804-01).

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-9- Conclusions The records foc tha completed welds and nondestructive examinations for the l prefabricated replacement reactor water cleanup system Check Valve 1G33F0528 subassembly and the qualification records for the associated examiners and inspectors were appropriate with nne minor exceptio X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 16,1998. The licensee personnel acknowledged the results of the inspectio The inspector asked liceme management and staff whether any material examined during the inspection conta:ned proprietary information. No proprietary information was identified. No proprietary information is included in this repor . _

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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Bost, Director, Design Engineering E. Burton, inservice inspection Coordinator, Performance and System Engineering i T. Carter, Technician, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs i W. Eaton, General Manager

. B. Edwards, Mechanical Superintendent, Maintenance K. Hughey, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs B. Lee, Supervisor, Quality Programs S. Lewis, Design Engineer, Nuclear Plant Engineering R. Moomaw, Manager, Maintenance M. Renfro, Testing / Inspection Programs Supervisor, Performance and System Engineering J. Roberts, Director, Quality J. Venable, Manager, Operations

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NflR J. Dixon-Herrity, Senior Resident inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 73753 Inservice inspection ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Ooened 50-416/9804-01 NCV Failure to Follew Procedure for Certification of Level ill Examine Closed 50-416/9804-01 NCV Failure to Follow Procedure for Certification of Level lli Examiner.

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DOCUMENTS AND PROCEDURES REVIEWED Procedures Administrative Procedure 01-S-07-10. "Preservice and Inservice inspection," Revision 101 t

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l I-2-Administrative Procedure 01-S-07-28, "ASME Section XI Repair / Replacement Program,"

Revision 104

' Quality Assurance Procedure Q.P. 2.52, " Visual Acuity Exam and Examiner Certification,"

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Revision 8 Quality Assurance Instruction 9.59, 'VT-3 Visual Examination," Revision 0 l Performance and System Engineering instruction 17-S-05-15, " Inservice inspection,"

l Revision 3 Drawings Q1B21G022R16, " Pipe Supports, Containment, MSRV Line - 4," Revision 5

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- Q1821G025A01, " Pipe Anchors, Containment, MSRV Line - 15," Revision 3 1.

! Q1821G032A01, " Pipe Anchors, Containment, MSRV Line - 18," Revision 3 l- Other Documents

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! Condition Report GGCR1996-0490 ,

.l Condition Report GGCR1998-0339 1

_l Work Order 00197744  !

l NRC Letter GNRI-94/00184 dated August 1,1994  ;

NRC Letter GNRI-96/00244 dated December 12,1996

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GGNGS Letter GIRO-97/00062, dated July 1,1997 GGNGS Letter GIRO-98/00008, dated January 14,1998

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GGNGS Memorandum GIN 98/00373, dated March 3,1998 l

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