IR 05000416/1997009
| ML20149F878 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149F870 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-97-09, 50-416-97-9, NUDOCS 9707220349 | |
| Download: ML20149F878 (21) | |
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Entergy Operations, In Vice President, Operations Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Entergy Operations, In I P.O. Box 756 I Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 -
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' 9707220349 970716 7-PDR ADOCK 05000416 G ppR i
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b ENCLOSURE
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
Docket No.: 50-416 ,
License No.: NPF-29 Report No.: 50-416/97-09
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Licensee: Entergy Operations, In l Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station :
Location: Waterloo Road l Port Gibson, Mississippi l
. Dates: June 23-27,1997 Inspectors: Gail M. Good, Senior Emergency Preparedness Analyst Plant Support Branch Stephen L. McCrory, Reactor Engineer, Operations Branch ,
Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch !
Division of Reactor Safety
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ATTACHMENTS:
Attachment 1: Supplemental Information i
Attachment 2: Scenario Narrative Summary j
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-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Grand Gulf Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-416/97-09 A routine, announced inspection of the operational status of the licensee's emergency preparedness program was conducted. The inspection included the following areas:
emergency plan and implementing procedures, emergency facilities and equipment, i organization and management control, training, audits, and effectiveness of licensee controls. Emphasis was placed on changes that had occurred since the last routine emergency preparedness inspectio Operations
- The overall performance of both crews was satisf actory. The operators communicated effectively and promptly conveyea information relevant to plant conditions that affected the emergency action level classification. The operators used the emergency operating procedures to effectively respond to plant conditions (Section 04).
Plant Support
- Emergency events were correctly classified. As previously documented, the licensee's assessment was critical, thorough, and effectively identified recommendations for improvement (Section P1).
- Emergency response facilities, equipment, instrumentation, and supplies were operationally maintained. The process used to designate new backup locations for the technical support center and operations support center was systematic and controlled. Off-hours testing of the VIP 2000 (automatic dialer) was infrequent and degraded the licensee's ability to verify that personnel estimated arrival times would support timely emergency response facility activation (Section P2).
- Known program changes were appropriately incorporated into the emergency plan and procedures. Emergency action levels were reviewed with offsite agencies as required. Documentation was detailed and retrievable (Section P3).
- Overall, shift crew performance during the simulator walkthroughs was satisfactor Plant conditions were promptly recognized and classified, and offsite a0ency notifications were timely. Emergency action levels in the plant hazards category were not clearly worded and contributed to inconsistent emergency classification Two exercise weaknesses were identified: one for failure to satisfactorily perform dose assessment activities to support emergency classifications and protective action recommendations, and one for failure to satisfactorily implement site evacuation procedures (Section P4).
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- Emergency response personnel were trained in accordance with the emergency plan, and required drills were performed. Drill / exercise documentation was generally detailed and complete (Section PS).
- The emergency preparedness staff was sufficiently staffed with well-qualified individuals who had expertise in reactor operations, health physics, and chemistr The management tracking system was thorough and clearly linked corresponding documentation. The emergency response organization duty roster contained a
- sufficient number of trained personnel. Offsite agreement letters were reviewed and certified as required, and all agreements were current (Section P6).
- The audit scope met regulatory requirements and was performed by knowledgeable individuals. The offsite interface was effectively evaluated, and a positive method was used to make the results available to offsite authorities (Section P7.1).
- The emergency preparedness action tracking system was an effective tool for tracking issues in need of corrective action. Corrective actions were not always implemented in a timely fashion. Self assessments were performed by knowledgeable individuals and provided valuable program insights (Section P7.2).
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Report Details !
l. Operations
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04 Operator Knowledge and Performance Insoection Scope The inspectors conducted walkthroughs with two operating crews using a dynamic simulation on the plant-specific control room simulator. The inspectors assessed the ability of control room teams to recognize accident conditions. The inspectors also observed the interactions of the crew members to verify that authorities and responsibilities were clearly defined and understood. Each walkthrough lasted approximately 90 minute Observations and Findinos The scenario used for the walkthroughs was developed by the licensee's operations training department and was reviewed by the inspectors. The inspectors established certain objectives for the scenario. The scenario consisted of a sequence of events requiring an escalation of emergency classifications, culminating in a general emergency. Scenario developers planned for an alert declaration based on a helicopter crash into the Unit ll warehouse, a site area emergency declaration based on an anticipated transient without scram, and a general emergency based on emergency director discretion or offsite doses. A full description of the scenario is ,
contained in Attachment 2 to this report. The inspectors determined that the !
scenario content was adequat Conclusions The overall performance of both crews was satisfactory. The operators communicated effectively and promptly conveyed information relevant to plant conditions that affected the emergency action level classification. The operators used the emergency operating procedures to effectively respond to plant condition IV. Plant SuDDort P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities Insoection Scoce (93702)
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- The inspectors reviewed event notifications made since February 25,1996, to determine if events were properly classified. The following declared emergency event was previously reviewed and documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/96-13, dated August 28,1996:
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- July 10,1996 Loss of Communications - Notification of Unusual Event l (Event Report 30730)
b. Observations and Findinas l After reviewing the event notifications made to the NRC operations center, the inspectors concluded that none of the events were misclassified. One nt,tification of unusual event was declared on July 10,1996, for a loss of the operational hotline (primary offsite notification link), commercial telephone lines, and emergency notification system in the control room and technical support center due to a cable cut. As discussed in the aforementioned NRC inspection report, the licensee's assessment was critical, thorough, and included appropriate recommendations for i improvement. Eight areas for improvement were added to the emergency preparedness action tracking system. The event was properly classified; however, the licensee's assessment documented some problems with the timeliness of offsite notifications (notifications had to be conducted from the emergency operations l facility). !
c. Conclusions l
l Emergency events were correctly classified. As previously documented, the licensee's assessment was critical, thorough, and effectively identified recommendations for improvemen P2 Status of Emergency Preparedness Facilities, Equipment, and Resources Inspection Scope (82701-02.02)
The inspectors reviewed the status of emergency response facilities, equipment, instrumentation, and supplies to ensure that they were maintained in a state of operational readiness. The inspectors toured the following facilities:
- Operations support center
- Emergency operations facility Observations and Findinas l
The inspectors found that all emergency response facilities were tidy and contained l necessary communications equipment, supplies, and computer terminals. Position-specific procedure books contained current emergency plan procedure revision j The inspectors examined the content of facility emergency equipment lockers and i offsite field team kits. The kits and lockers contained appropriate items, such as I calibrated survey instruments, dosimeters, potassium iodide, respirator facepieces )
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(various sizes), and facepiece eyeglass inserts for certain personnel. The inspectors determined that the emergency response facilities were operationally maintaine . - -. _ _ . . _- - -.
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l During the facility tours, the inspectors were informed of planned changes in the backup technical support center and operations support center location. Currently, the emergency plan designated the emergency operations facility as the backup location for'both facilities. The licensee conducted practice drills using a conference room in the maintenance and engineering building as a backup for the technical support center and using the "fix it now" team room as the backup operations support center. The ernergency preparedness manager stated that corresponding j changes to the emergency plan would be made once the procedures and training were completed, inspectors concluded that the planned changes appeared to be an improvement, due to location (the emergency operations facility is 0.6 miles from i the plant) and that the process (identifying new locations, conducting confirmation i drills, preparing procedures, etc.) was approached in a systematic and controlled manne The inspectors reviewed communication drill and emergency equipment inventory {
records to verify that the required maintenance system was implemented. All l communications drills and equipment inventories were conducted as required, including a quarterly test of the VIP 2000 (automatic dialer). The inspectors questioned the licensee about off-hours testing of the VIP 2000. The licensee i produced documentation to show that the last off-hours test was performed in i October 1994. The licensee explained that quarterly tests conducted during normal work hours verified system operability and personnel responses to system prompt The inspectors concluded that the off-hours testing of the VIP 2000 was infrequent ;
and degraded the licensee's ability to verify that personnel estimated arrival times j would support timely emergency response facility activation. To meet emergency l plan requirements, the licensee plans to conduct an unannounced, off-hours staffing l I
drill in 199 I
' Conclusions Emergency response facilities, equipment, instrumentation, and supphes were )
operationally maintained. The process used to designate new backup locations for j the technical support center and operations support center was systematic and j controlled. Off-hours testing of the VIP 2000 (automatic dialer) was infrequent and l degraded the licensee's ability to verify that personnel estimated arrival times would !
support timely emergency response facility activatio I I
P3 Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation l l
1 inspection Scooe (82701-02.01)
The inspectors used inspection Procedure 82701 to determine whether the emergency plan and procedures were maintained, l
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b. Observations and Findinas )
1 The inspectors reviewed portions of the emergency plan and selected emergency '
plan procedures and found that known program changes were appropriately incorporated. One aspect of Emergency Plan Change 28-001-95 (health physics personnel augmentation times) remained unsettled. The licensee submitted the plan change on June 30,1995. The emergency plan change was transferred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for review via Task Interface Agreement 95-15 from NRC, Region 11. The Emergency Preparedness and Radiation Protection Branch's evaluation was provided to the licensee by letter dated April 24,199 The evaluation stated that the change decreased the effectiveness of the licensee's emergency plan. On May 22,1997, the licensee requested a meeting with the NRC to discuss the evaluation results. This meeting was scheduled for July 10,199 The inspectors examined the licensee's process for reviewing emergency action levels with offsite authorities, in accordance with Appendix E.IV.B of 10 CFR Part 50, these reviews are required annually and upon revision. The licensee maintained detailed and retrievable records to show that the required reviews were conducte c. Conclusions Known program changes were appropriately incorporated into the emergency plan and procedures. Emergency action levels were reviewed with offsite agencies as required. Documentation was detailed and retrievable.
P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness Insoection Scoce (82701-02.01)
The inspectors conducted walkthroughs with two operating crews using a dynamic simulation on the plant-specific control room simulator. During the walkthroughs, i the licensee was evaluated on the ability to: I
- Evaluate plant conditions,
- Identify respective emergency action levels,
- Evaluate or, where appropriate, perforrn dose calculations,
- Classify the emergency using the latest procedures,
- Recommend appropriate protective actions, and
- Make timely notifications to offsite agencie The scenario consisted of a sequence of events requiring escalation of emergency classifications, culminating in a general emergency. Section 04 above includes a brief description of the scenario. A full narrative scenario description is contained in Attachment 2 to this report. Each walkthrough lasted approximately 90 minute l l
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b. . Observations and Findinos Overall, shift crew performance during the simulator walkthroughs was satisfactory.
Plant conditions were promptly recognized and classified and offsite agency
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notifications were timely. The first event [ helicopter crash into a warehouse (not in protected area)] was classified differently by both crews. One crew classified the l event as an alert, and the other crew classified the event as a notification of
' unusual event. As indicated in Section 04 above, the scenario developers planned for an alert classification. Based on the outcome of the walkthroughs and a review
of Emergency Plan Procedure 10-S-01-1, " Activation of the Emergency Plan,"
Revision 101, Temporary Change Number 16, the inspectors concluded that the
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emergency action levels were not clearly worded and contributed to the inconsistent I emergency classifications. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments and indicated that the emergency action levels would be clarifie l l
Dose assessment activities were not satisfactorily performed by the shift chemists l during the walkthroughs; some dose projections were untimely, incorrect, and i incomplete, and some results were not correctly communicated to the emergency director. The level of performance degraded the crews' efforts to make timely ;
emergency classifications and formulate accurate protective action l recommendations. The following examples were observed:
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- The first shift chemist used the wrong isotopic mix (core damage versus steam cycle). As a result, total effective dose equivalent and thyroid I committed dose equivalent values were inaccurate. Although the error did not affect the emergency classification or protective action recommendations in this scenario, such an error could have a detrimental effect on emergency response decisions. The shift chemist did not complete a correct dose calculation (using the right isotopic mix) until 30 minutes after the start of the releas * The first shift chemist did not immediately inform the emergency director of completed dose projections. A dose projection existed for 14 minutes before ,
it was communicated to the emergency director. The emergency director had to call for the information. The dose projection indicated that conditiuns warranted the declaration of a general emergency. The emergency director declared the general emergency, using discretionary emergency action levels, several minutes after the dose projection was complete Moreover, when the dose assessment results were communicated to the emergency director, the shift chemist only communicated site boundary doses. Since values at other locations were not communicated, the emergency director could not determine the full extent of protective action recommendations. If the guidelines were exceeded at 5 miles, protective action recommendations were required out to 10 mile ,
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- The second shift chemist did not use all available information when computing dose projections. Positive values were displayed on two turbine building monitors: the General Electric (GE) effluent monitor and the super particulate, iodine, and noble gas (SPING) Channel 7 monitor. Although the 4 two readings were inconsistent with one another (a scenario design problem), the chemist did not question the differences or compute dose projections using both monitors. The shift chemist used the GE monitor which underestimated the doses (the doses did not exceed the general emergency levels at the site boundary). If the SPING Channel 7 monitor had been used, the site boundary doses would have exceeded the general emergency level * To compound the error, the shift chemist provided incorrect and conflicting information to the emergency director. The shift chemist reported that the general emergency levels were exceeded at 5 miles and that a new protective action recommendation was needed. As indicated above, the levels were not exceeded at the site boundary (using the non-conservative monitor value). However, the shift chemist read the correct millirem values from the calculation form which indicated that the general emergency levels were not exceeded at the site boundar The emergency director attempted to clarify the discrepancy during a subsequent telephone call but was not successful. As a result, the emergency director classified the general emergency based on miscommunicated dose projections and unnecessarily evacuated the public to 10 miles in the affected sector The failure to satisfactorily perform dose assessment activities was identified as an exercise weakness due to the potential impact on emergency classifications and protective action recommendations (50-416/9709-01).
Both crews did not satisfactorily impleme - 9 evacuation procedures in accordance with Emergency Plan Procedure ay-S-01-11, " Evacuation of Onsite Personnel," Revision 10, as discussed belo * Step 6.1.1 stated that the emergency director should consider conducting a site evacuation when hazardous conditions, such as radiological conditions, threaten the health and safety of personnel. Both crews had core damage and an uncontrolled /unmonitored release for 23 minutes before sounding the site evacuation alarm. Inspectors used 15 minutes as a reasonable time frame for notifying plant personnel, since it was consistent with the requirements for notifying offsite authorities of the need to implement public protective actions and, therefore, could be reasonably applied to plant personnel protectio .
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- Step 6.1.2, "Immediate Actions," required the emergency director to inform security of evacuation routes, areas to be evacuated, and the destination of evacuees. This step was not performed by either emergency directo Moreover, neither emergency director reviewed the evacuation procedure referenced by the emergency director / control room checklist. The inspectors noted that the requirement to reference the evacuation procedure was added to the emergency director's checklist on June 17,1997, the week before the inspectio In reviewing this matter, the inspectors noted that the licensee's site evacuation proce" m described in the emergency plan and procedures, was not fully cons vith industry standards described in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, " Criteria foi .n and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Pret in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1. Section 6.5.1.a.6 of the u 1ency plan was consistent with NUREG-0654, Evaluation Criterion J.2, in that it p.ovided for consideration of weather conditions, traffic, or radiological i
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impediments. The licensee differed with regard to Evaluation Criterion J.4 which states, "Each licensee shall provide for the evacuation of onsite non-essential personnel in the event of a Site or General Emergency. . . ." As indicated above, the licensee tied site evacuation to the presence of " hazardous conditions," rather than to the declaration of a site area or general emergency. The licensee acknowledged the difference. The inspectors noted that, depending on how it is implemented, the licensee's process may not fully capture the anticipatory aspect described in NUREG-065 i in response to the site evacuation issue as a whole, the licensee expressed some i sensitivity, since this was the first time it had used the simulator to perform this type of inspection. The licensee indicated that the crews may not have been aware i of the extent to which the procedures were to be demonstrated and that the I scenario time compression may also have had an effect on performance. The inspectors noted that prior to the walkthroughs, both crews were told to perform and implement procedures as if they were in the real control room. With regard to j the time-compression aspect, the inspectors observed that both crews contacted i security and sounded the site evacuation alarm, two major elements of the site I evacuation procedure. The emergency directors did not consider wind direction and failed to notify security of evacuation routes, areas to be evacuated, and the destination of the evacuee i The failure to satisfactorily implement site evacuation procedures was identified as an exercise weakness due to the potential impact to plant personnel l (50-416/9709-02).
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-11-l Conclusions Overall, shift crew performance during the simulator walkthroughs was satisfactor Plant conditions were promptly recognized and classified, and offsite agency -
notifications were timely.. Emergency action levels in the plant hazards category I were not clearly wurded and contributed to inconsistent emergency classification ,
Two exercise weaknesses were identified: one for failure to satisfactorily perform H dose assessment activities to support emergency classifications and protectiv j action recommendations,' and one for failure to satisfactorily implement site evacuation procedure I P5 Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness '
i Insoection Scope (82701-02.04) ~ . i 4 .
The inspectors reviewed training records for selected individuals and ' records and J documents associated with emergency drills / exercise ;
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The inspectors reviewed training records to ensure that emergency response personnel received training required by Procedure 01-S-04-21, " Emergency Preparedness Training Program," Revision 101'. The inspectors focused on new emergency response organization members. The records indicated that the training program was properly implemente l I
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's drill and exercise program, including .
j completion of required specialty drills (e.g., post-accident sampling system, j radiological monitoring, and communications), documentation, and drill / exercise i objectives matrix (objectives tested over a 6-year period). The inspectors I determined that the licensee was fully implementing the drill / exercise program -
. required by its emergency plan, in general, the licensee maintained very good documentation to support completion of required specialty drills. Documents to demonstrate completion of a June 199 radiological monitoring drill (Drill Report GIN-97/01115, dated June 2,1997, and supporting drill package) did not contain sufficient evidence concerning environmental sample collection and analysis. The inspectors' determined that the requirement to conduct an annual radiological monitoring drill was fully satisfied in ;
1996. Licensee emergency planning personnel agreed with the inspectors' .j observations concerning the drill documentation and stated that the drill report ;
would be amended or another drill would be conducted 'in 1997. The licensee's I response satisfactorily addressed the inspectors' concern !
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-12-environmental sample collection and analysis. The inspectors determined that the requirement to conduct an annual radiological monitoring drill was fully satisfied in 1996. Licensee emergency planning personnel agreed with the inspectors'
observations concerning the drill documentation and stated that the drill report would be amended or another drill would be conducted in 1997. The licensee's response satisfactorily addressed the inspectors' concern The inspectors reviewed the licensee's drill / exercise objectives matrix to determine whether it included the objectives identified in inspection Procedure 82302, " Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors." The inspectors noted I
that a successful accountability drill had been performed in March 1997 (accountability established in 19 minutes) and that an unannounced drill / exercise was required in 1997 to test onshift and augmentation capabilities. The inspectors l concluded that the matrix was complete and showed that major elements of the !
emergency plan, such as use of backup emergency response facilities, personnel accountability, etc., were being demonstrated and evaluated, c. Conclusions Emergency response personnel were trained in accordance with the emergency plan, and required drills were performed. Drill / exercise documentation was generally detailed and complet P6 Emergency Preparedness Organization and Administration Insoection Scope (82701-02.031 The inspectors reviewed:
- Emergency planning organization staffing
- Management controls
- Changes in key onsite emergency response personnel
- Changes in offsite support organization agreements Observations and Findin2S Although there had been two personnel changes, the number of personnel to support the licensee's emergency preparedness program had not changed since the last emergency preparedness inspection. The department still consisted of a manager, clerical support personnel, four emergency planners, and one individual assigned unrelated duties. The inspectors determined that the staff was well qualified, with expertise in areas such as reactor operations, health physics, and chemistr .
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's most recent emergency response l organization duty roster and the process for maintaining a sufficient number 1 of trained personnel. The licensee's process was well documented in Procedure 01 S-10-6, " Emergency Response Organization," Revision 7. The l procedure described the use of f acility process owners to designate personnel to )
fill emergency response organization facility positions and ensure that f acility personnel were initially qualified and remained qualified. With one recent exception discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/97-06, dated May 27,1997, the licensee's system appeared successfu There were four individuals assigned to most duty roster positions, and none were listed in more than one position. The roster identified six,30-minute "on-call" health physics technicians (two called-in when needed). The inspectors interviewed all six to determine whether the individuals could respond within 30 minutes. With the exception of one individual who stated that it might take 40 minutes to arrive at the site, all of the health physics technicians reported 30-minute response time The inspectors concluded that a sufficient number of trained individuals were identified on the duty roste The inspectors reviewed the licensee's process for maintaining current letters of agreement with offsite support organizations. Section 8.5 of the licensee's emergency plan stated that the agreement letters were reviewed during the annual emergency plan review. The inspectors determined that offsite agreements were reviewed and certified in accordance with the emergency plan; all offsite agreements were curren Conclusions The emergency preparedness staff was sufficiently staffed with well-qualified individuals who had expertise in reactor operations, health physics, and chemistr The management tracking system was thorough and clearly linked corresponding documentation. The emergency response organization duty roster contained a sufficient number of trained personnel. Offsite agreement letters were reviewed and certified as required; all agreements were curren P7 Quality Assurance in Emergency Preparedness Activities P Indeoendent and Internal Reviews and Audits (8270102.05) Inspection Scope Using inspection Procedure 82701, the inspectors examined the latest emergency preparedness program audit report to determine compliance with NRC requirements and licensee commitment '
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i Observations and Findinas l
The last program audit was conducted July 9 through August 29,1996 !
(GIN-96/02358). The audit was performed by knowledgeable personnel, including a j technical specia!ist from Waterford 3. One positive finding, one negative finding, i seven observations, and five recommendations for improvement were identified in I the audit report. The inspectors verified that action had been taken to correct the negative finding. The audit scope met regulatory requirement The audit team evaluated the offsite interface during a regularly scheduled meeting with offsite authorities. To facilitate an open dialogue, the audit team participant asked the licensee emergency preparedness representatives to leave the meeting during this evaluation. The portion of the audit that discussed the offsite interface was made available during a subsequent meeting with offsite authoritie j l
The inspectors concluded that the audit was conducted in accordance with i regulatory requirements by knowledgeable individuals. The offsite interface was l effectively evaluated, and the licensee made a positive effort to make the evaluation l available to offsite authoritie l Conclusions The audit scope met regulatory requirements and was performed by knowledgeable individuals. The offsite interface was effectively evaluated, and a positive method was used to make the results available to offsite authoritie I P7.2 Effectiveness of Licensee Controls (82701-02.06) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's process for identifying, resolving, and preventing problems by reviewing the corrective action tracking system and emergency preparedness self assessment Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the emergency preparedness action tracking system to determine if issues identified during drills, exercises, audits, and events were identified and tracked to completion. At the time of the inspection, there were 36 open items on the tracking list, including 1 from 1994,6 from 1995, and 12 from 1996 (approximately 1 year old). The inspectors noted that the e.ight areas for improvement discussed in Section P1 above (from the July 10,1996, notification of
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t unusual event) were still open, even though some corrective actions were relatively straight-forward. Although the licensee produced additional records to show that many open items from previous years had been closed (71 from 1994,30 from 1995, and 26 from 1996), the inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified problem areas were not always implemented in a timely fashio The inspectors reviewed two emergency preparedness self assessments. One was conducted in September 1996, and the other was conducted in May 1997. The primary focus of the second self assessment was recent NRC inspection finding Both assessments were performed by knowledgeable individuals and provided valuable program insight c. Conclusions The emergency preparedness action tracking system was an effective tool for tracking issues in need of corrective action. Corrective actions were not always implemented in a timely fashion. Self assessments were performed by knowledgeable individuals and provided valuable program insight V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The lead inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 27,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identifie .. _ - - .- _.._ _. _ _.__ _ . _ - _._- . .. _ ..._ .. _,_ ._.. ,
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. ATTACHMENT 1 i
l SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED L Licensee J. Hagan, Vice President, Operations D. Bost, Director, Design Engineering L.' Calvery, Emergency Planner G. Coker, Superintendent, Chemistry C. Cresap, Supervisor, Training L. Dale, Director, Plant Projects & Support D. Ellis, Senior Emergency Planner C. Ellsaesser, Manager, Performance and System Engineering C. Hayes, Director, Quality W. Hughey, Director, Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs R. Moomaw, Manager, Maintenance A. Morgan, Manager, Emergency Preparedness J. Owens, Licensing Specialist B. Raines, Emergency Planner J. Smith, Senior Specialist, Emergency Preparedness C. Stafford, Superintendent, Operations D. Townsend, Senior Emergency Planner J. Venable, Manager, Operations IL J. Dixon-Herrity, Senior Resident inspector LIST OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 82701 Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program 93702 Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Reactors LIST OF ITEMS OPENED Opened 50-416/9709-01 IFl Exercise weakness - Failure to satisfactorily perform dose assessment activities (Section P4)
50-416/9709-02 1FI Exercise weakness - Failure to satisfactorily implement site evacuation procedures (Section P4)
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-2-LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Emeraency Plan Imolementina Procedures 01-S-04-21 Emergency Preparedness Training Program Revision 101 01-S-10-3 Emergency Preparedness Department Revision 3 Responsibilities 01-S-10-4 Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises- Revision 3 01-S-10-5 Control of Emergency Response Equipment - Revision 3 and Facilities 01-S-10-6- Emergency Response Organization Revision 7 01-S-10-8 Emergency Preparedness Action Revision 0 Tracking System 10-S-01-1 Activation of the Emergency Plan Revision 101, TCN-16 10-S-01-6 Notifications of Offsite Agencies and Revision 29 Plant On-Call Emergency Personnel 10-S-01-11 Evacuation.of Onsite Personnel Revision 10 10-S-01-12 Radiological Assessment and Protective Revision 21 Action Recommendations Other Documents Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Emergency Plan, Revision 31 Emergency Preparedness Activities 1996 Ernergency Preparedness Activities 1997 Exercise Objectives, dated June 17,1997 1996 Fourth Quarter Drill Report, dated February 4,1997 (GIN-97/00255)
. Emergency Notification System List Rotation Schedule, dated June 3,1997 (GIN-97/01121)
Letter from NRC Region II (Cline) to Entergy Operationt,, Inc. (Cottle), dated March 27,1992 (GNRI-92/00067)
Letter to Region 11 (Cline) from Entergy Operations, Inc. (Hutchinson), dated May 7,1992
. (GNRO-92/00051)
Letter from Region 11 (Stohr) to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Cottle), dated June 20,1992 (GNRI-92/00140)
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-3-Internal Certification Memorandum from A. Morgan to M. Meisner, dated July 1,1992 (GIN-92/03134) -l Letter from Region 11 (Cline) to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Hutchinson), dated August 3,1993 (GNRI-93/00136) i Emergency Preparedness Action Tracking System Printout, dated June 17,1997 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Emergency Preparedness Self Assessment, dated October 4,1996 l
I Emergency Preparedness Assessment, dated June 3,1997 (GIN-97/01131) .
Quality program Audit Report OPA 06.01-96, Dated September 25,1996 (GIN-96/02358) l
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Quarterly VIP-2000 Test - 4th Quarter 1994, dated October 28,1994 (GIN-94/03332)
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't ATTACHMENT 2
{ SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUMMARY
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- - 0800- Scenario Begins t'
0805 Company Helicopter crashes into old Unit II warehous !
Only the pilot was on board. There is no fire at the time but fuel is leaking from the ruptured tan Alert declared. Offsite Dose calculations will be required. TSC, ENMC
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and OSC activation should begin.
- 0810 Fire Brigade Dispatched-(Discretionary Call)
j 0820 (20 Still no fire and the fuel is being contained. Minor damage to warehous minutes All MPC personnel accounted for and relocated. Pilot in route to
, after Alert) Vicksburg. Scene is quarantined until FAA officials arriv Health Physics will call the control room and tell them it appears one of the
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d turbine building roof hatches is open again. Ask if Operations would get i someone to go up on the roof and close it? (panel does not get closed by l
- Operations therefore the TSC will have to dispatch a team to close it later) 1 0825 The running CRD pump (A) trips. Standby CRD pump started f 0827 Two control rods start drifting in when standby pump is started. More than
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one control rod will require a manual scra ;
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0827 An ATWS will occur and the main Turbine will remain on line. (Turbine
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may trip on high reactor water level.
0830 Attachments 18,19 and 20 will be initiated to shutdown reacto i 0832 Site Area Emergency declared based on ATWS 0832 Lockout of bus 16BB4 will occur 0833 NLO contacts control room on radio to inform them that he has exited the turbine building through the emergency door (IT302) in the stairway by the main tube oil reservoir. When he exited the lube oil room, he encountered what he thinks was steam clouding up in the buildin A steam leak in turbine building will occur. High-High radiation alarms for Turbine Building Ventilation system will occur and turbine load should drop offindicating steam that should be going to main turbine is exiting the system somewhere in the turbine building. Several Turbine building area radiation monitors will be in alarm along with high floor drain sump levels 0836 The crew should attempt to close the MSIVs to stop the leak but the "B"
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l MSL will fail to isolate. The turbine building should be evacuated and an
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accountability check run. Motor Operated shutoff valves (B21-F-098's)
will not close due to loss of powe !
. Repair teams will have to be dispatched to attempt to recover l 16BB4, Ways to close the stuck open MSIVs should also be i I
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i . With only one steam line still open, turbine load may decrease.
- 0837 As security, call the control room and inform them that someone has exited )
1T302 and the door appears to be still open due to the alarm statu .!
0837 Fuel Failure malfunction increased to 100% to give MSL radiation Alarms and entry into EP-4. (Discretionary General Emergency may be j classified with core damage recognition) i l
TBD Decision to Emergency Depressurize the RPV may be made prior to the l
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step in EP-4 to stop the steam leak in the turbine buildin Offsite Dose Calculator will inform the control room that the site boundary l dose reading is 1140 mr/hr TEDE l 0853 A General Emergency will be declared based on offsite radioactive dose commitment q 0855 Emergency Depressurization will be required by EP- Control Rods will continue to be driven and alternately scramme I 0905 All control rods will insert on subsequent scram attempt. EP-2A will be j exite j
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0910 Electrician (if dispatched) will inform Control Room that a spare breaker I
has been installed on bus 16BB4 and that they can attempt to close it i Power is restored to the B21-F098's and the valves can be closed stopping the radioactive releas l 0920 Drill terminated after PARS made.