IR 05000416/1997022

Insp Rept 50-416/97-22 on 971130-980110.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering

ML20199B368
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	12/15/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199B350	List: IR 05000416/1997022 ML20199B345
References
50-416-97-22, NUDOCS 9801280250
Download: ML20199B368 (14)

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I ENCLOSURE _1

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION IV

Docket No.: 50 416

License No.

NPF 29 Report No.: 50-416/97 22

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Licensee: Entergy Operations, In l

Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Location: Waterloo Road  ;

Port Gibson, MissisPi ppl 39150

! Dates: November 30,1997 through January 10,1998

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Inspectors: J. Dixon Herrity, Senior Resident inspector K. Weaver, Resident inspector

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Approved By: D. Kirsch, Chief, Project Branch F l Division of Reactor Projects "

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. Attachment

Supplemental Information i

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9901290250 971215 PDR ADOCK 05000416 G PDR 3-

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Grand Gulf Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50 416/97 22 Operations

• c Operations personnel dononstrated inattention to detail, by not observing that the '

reactor core isolation cooling system had no flow after they started the pump, and a weakness in shllt communications, shift turnovers, and oversight by not being aware of the status of the reactor core isolation cooling system when they took responsibility for the shif t (Section 04.1).

The failure of operators to recall or verify how a nonsafety related valve controller functioned prior to manipu'ating it resulted in a minor plant transient (Section 04.2).

Maintenqngg

One inadequate work practice was observed during one of the five maintenance or surveillance activities examined. Personnel used a safety related cable tray, for a short period, as a platform to perform work without completing an engineering evaluation to determine if the tray would be affected (Section M1.1).

The inspectors concluded that the Magneblast breakers had been adequately

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maintained and refurbished (Section M3.1).

EnaineHng

An isolated weakness was identified in tb area of configuration control because of the failure to assign unique component identification numbers for eight uninterruptable power supply control panel breakers and incorporate this information in controlled electrical drawings, system operating instructions, and equipment labeling (Section E2.9).

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Report Details Symmarv of Plant Statua The plant operated at 100 percent power from the beginning of the inspection period until December 14,1997, when the licensee reduced power to 55 percent to allow repair of a I condenser tube leak. The r's 'vas returned to 100 percent power on December 10, 1997, but power was re-tut . > 80 percent on December 21,1997, in response to a loss of feedwater heating. P(sva - sas returned to 100 percent that same day and remained there the rest of the inspection perio LQperations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Planned Power Reduction for Cp3 denser leak Renair (717071 On December 14,1997, the licensee reduced power to approximately 55 percent to allow for an emergent planned repair of a leaking tube in the turbine condense The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plan for the repair and observed that the licensee had adequate contingency plans in the event that the leak could not be repaired as planned. The repair of the condenser was completed as planned and ahead of schedule. The licensee returned the plant to 100 pe' -t power on December 16,1997. The inspectors concluded that the pc , duction was well planned and coordinate Operator Knowledge and Performance

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04.1 Control Room Observations inspection Scone (71707)

The inspectors performed control room observations to ascertain operator knowledge and performance, ObservationLand Findinng On December 4,1997, the inspectors observed the control room staff during routine activities. During this observation, ope,ations personnel prepared to manually start the reactor core isolation coolina (RCIC) system pump for Instrumentation & Control Surveillance Procedure 07 S 53 E512, *RCIC Turbine Governing Valve Control," Revision 9, performed under Work Order (WO) 1928 The operators started the RCIC pump from the control room. The inspectors observed that the RCIC pump flow was indicating zero on the control room panel flow indicator following the start of the nump and questioned the operators involve During the investigation l the inspectors found that the control room staff was not aware that the RCIC flow controller selector switch on Panel 1H122P150, located in

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the remote shutdown room, had been previously placed in the " Emergency" position. This position disabled the RCIC flow controller in the control room and placed the control functions at the remote shutdown panel. The inability to control RCIC turbine speed from the control room was not anticipated and was not recognized by operations personnel until the inspectors questioned RCIC flow indication following the RCIC pump start. The controller selector switch had been positioned to the " Emergency" position during the performance of Procedure 07 S-53 E512 during the previous shift. This was not known by the control room supervision in charge and was not communicated or emphasized during the control room shift turnover The performance of Procedure 07 S 53 E512 took place over a span of three operating shifts. During this period the RCIC system was declared inoperable and the Technical Specification limiting condition for operation was entered, therefore, no operability issue existed. However, the inspectors were concerned with respect to configuration control and oversight, shift communications, and the subsequent operation's shift turnovers. The licensee initiated Condition Report 1997 125 The inspectors discussed these concerns with licensee.tnanagement and were informed that Procedure 07 S 53 E512 would be revised to inform operations personnel that the RCIC pump must be started from the remote shutdown panel during the surveillanc Operations management stated that the inattention to detail on the part of operations personnel concerning the configuration control, shift communications, and the shift turnovers, regarding the status of the RCIC system prior to the pump start, was unacceptable and did not meet their expectations. Operations management stated Conditien Report 19971250 would rec:uire a formal root cause for this event and that additional necessary corrective actions would be implemented, Conclusions Operations personnel d.smonst'ated inattention to detail, by not observing that the reactor core isolation t.aoling system had no flow after they started the pump, and weaknesses in shift communications, shift turnovers, and oversight by not being aware of the status of the reactor core isolation cooling system when they took responsibility for the shif .2 Transient Due to Operator ActioD insocction Sco The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to a plant transient that resulted from operator action.

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3 Observations and Findinas On December 20,1997, control room opurators received an annunciator indicating that Moisture Separator Reheater A second stage drain tank level control Valve N35F505A had failed open. On December 21,1997, in an effort to determine if the annunciator would reflash to indicate other failures in the systern, operators changed the controller for Moisture separator Reheater A second stage drain tank dump Valve N35F504A from automatic to manual and back to automatic

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again. The operators failed to recall that switching this type of controller, a type of controller that was not often used, to manual, caused the controller to go from the desired setpoint to a new setpoint based on the levelin the tank at the time of the controller position change. When returned to automatic, the controller started controlling the tank level at approximately 2 inches, rather than the desired 18 inches. When levelincreased above this new setpoint, the controller caused the Valve N35F504A to open, so that the contents of the second stage drain tank were dumped to the condenser rather than the sixth stage heater, where it would have been used to heat feedwater, Upon observing a small, unexplained increase in reactor power, operators entered Offnormal Event Procedure 05102-V 5, " Loss of Feedwater Heating,' Revision 100, eri immediately reduced power to 80 percent, as required by the procedure. . Af t6 t.ermining the cause of the transient, the licensee returned the valve controller setpoint to the correct setting and increased power to 100 percent, Conclusions The failure of operators to recall or verify how a nonsafety related valve controller functioned prior to manipulating it resulted in a minor plant transien Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 (Closedi Licensee Event Reoort 96 006: manual teactor scram due to loss of control rod drive pump. This event was previously documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/96020. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's associated corrective actions and verified that the corrective actions were complete, ll. Maintenance M1 . Conduct of Maintenance

'M1.1 General Maintenance Comments Inspection Scone (62703)

The irqpectors observed portions of maintenance aciivities, as specified by the following WOs:

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• WO 00192031 Residual heat removal Train A motor inspection and bearing oil change

• WO 00184545 VOTES test of residual heat ternoval Valve 1E12F290A

• WO 00199658 Division I diesel generator postmaintenance test b. Observations and Findinas In general, the inapectors found this work to be well planned a.)d performed satisfactorily. Workers were knowledgeable of the equipment and the scope of the work activities. However, the inspectors observed one poor work practice. To reach the rootor on the residual heat removal pump to change the oil, an electrician climbed up the structure holding up the cable tray for the motor and finally used the cover on the cable tray as a platform to work. The electrician was wearing a safety belt tied off to the floor grating above. The inspectors questioned whether an evaluation had been done to allow using a safety related cable tray as a platfor The worker said that. one had not been done and stopped work. The inspectors l

observed that no damage was done to the cable tray and that the safety-related

! c%le within the tray had not been out under any stress. The inspectors discussed the work practice with the electrical superintendent and noted that the problem was similar to previously identified situations (NRC Inspection Reports 50 416/97-12 and l 57-21) where equipment had been attached to safety-related equipment without an I

evaluation. In this case, the individual was standing on safety related equipment without an evaluation. The superintendent stated that this was not an acceptable work practice. The inspectors observed that the electricians se' up a ladder to complete the tas Once informed of the concern, the general manager issued a memorandum to personnel documenting the problem of using plant structures and components inappropriately as steps, access platforms, or as tie-off points. The memorandum directed that supervisors review, sign, and return the memorandum to the general manager. The licensee also initiated Condition Report 1997-1275 and management dispositioned the problem as significant, so that a root cause determination would be required. The inspectors observed that the corrective actions for Violation 97-416/9721-01, which identified a failure to perform a required evaluation prior to hanging sign stanchions from a safety-related cable tray, had not been complete The licensee stated that resolution of the inspector's observations regarding the residual heat removal pump would be included in the corrective actions for Violation 97 416/9721-0 j

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5-M1.2 general Surveillance commerna l Inspection Scoce (6172hl The inspectors observed portions of the following surveillance tests: ,

• Procedure 06 OP-1P75 M 0001, " Standby Diesel Generator 11 Functional Test," Revision 103

• Procedure 06 EL 1L110 0001, "125 Volt Battery Bank All Cell Check "

Revision 101 Observations and Findinas Generally, personnel performed well during the surveillance observed tests. Good communications were observed between personnel in the field and the control room operators. All equipment acceptance criteria specified in the test procedure were verified to be in compliance with Ter'anical Specifications and were met with no discrepancie M1.3 Conclusions for Conduct of Maintenance One inadequate work practice was observed during one of the five maintenance or surveillance activities examined. Personnel used a safety related cable tray, for a short period, as a platform to perform work without completing an engineering evaluation to determine if the tray would be affecte M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 General Electric Maaneblast Breakers Insoection Scone (627031-As a result of equipment failures at other facilities and the discovery that the required lubrication frequency at Grand Gulf was longer than the vendor recommended frequency, the inspectors reviewed the preventive maintenance program for General Electric Magneblast breakers, Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the vendor manual and the preventive maintenance Procedure 07 S 12 61, " Inspection of GE Magne Blast Circuit Breakers," Revision The vendor recommended a five year refurbishment cycle for breakers located in harsh anvironments, but provided no guidance for non harsh environments. The vendor stated that the frequency of inspection and maintenance should be determined by each operating company and recommended that the lubrication

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l 6-period be no more than 2 years. The lubrication pedod specified in the licensee's procedure was 5 years. The inspectors observed that the luricatn. . period documented in the tracking program was 6 years on several of the breakers, in

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addition, several minor differences were observed between the maintenance l

f practices called out in the vendor manual and those required in the licensee's procedur The inspectors discussed the lubrication period and the minor differences between the manual and the procedure with two assistant electrical superintendent Through this discussion, the inspectors determined that the licensee was aware of industry problems. There are only six breakers vi this type used onsite. Two of the six breakers (the Division til standby diesel generator and the Division til motor control center breakers) were recently refurbished and the licensee plans to refurbish two others (the high pressure core spray service water pump and a Division ill feeder breaker) during the refueling outage scheduled to start in April 1998. Tne licensee plans to refurbish the last two (Division til feeder breakers) prior to the end of 1999. The superintendents indicated that Entergy was currently working on common refurbishment and preventive maintenance procedures that would meet industry guidelines. The superintendents stated that the discrepancies identified by the inspectors would be used during the development of the revisio The superintendents explained that the vendor recommendations had been used at first, but that site experience had been used to increase the period of time between the lubrications called icer in the maintenance portien of the vendor manual and that the diesel breaker had always been maintained more frequently. The current period between tubrications for the diesel breaker was 3 years in lieu of 6. The last time that preventi/e maintenance was performed on the diesel breake" was August 1995. The remaining five breakers had last been maintained between 21/2 and 4 1/2 years ago. Although the vendor recommended 2 years as a lubrication interval, the licensee noted that the vendor spoke of servicing the breaker every 1000 operations and that the breakers at Grand Gulf are not operated often. When the diesel breaker was refurbished, it had been operated 871 times. T% aiesel breaker was the most frequently operated breaker. The vendor stated that the breakers should operate 2500 times before requiring parts to be replaced due to part failur The inspector observed that the vendor stated, prior to making recommendations, that the frequency of inspection and maintenance should be determined by each operating company. The inspector determined that the licensee used this criteria to deviate from the vendor suggested maintenance program using site experience and has not had a problem with this type of breaker to date. Although no refurbishment frequency was suggested for the breaker environment at Grand Gulf, with knowledge of the problems experienced in industry, the licensee planned to refurbish the breakers and has refurbished a third of the breakers. The licensee used risk perspectives in deciding the order in which the breakers were to be refurbished and for the periodicity of lubrication. Last, the inspector observed that

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~7-breaker refurbishment was taking place before 1000 operations of the breakers had taken place, the point at which the manufacturer suggested the breakers should be service Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the Magneblast breakers had beer adequately maintained and refurbishe M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-416/9606-01: failure to provide adequate work instructions for personnel assigned to properly perform safety-related activities. The Division 111 standby diesel generator was rendered inoperable due to inadequate work instructions in that the instructions did not provide sufficient information to the craft personnel for obtaining a lube oil sample from the Division 111 standby diesel generator. The licensee determined that the root cause of this event were insufficient work instructions, maintenance personnel assigned were unfamiliar with the task, and no prejob briefing was held, therefore, supervisory oversight was inadequate. The licensee subsequently revised Repetitive Task 10871 to provide specific instructions for obtaining an oil sample from the Division 111 standby diesel generator. in addition, the licensee counseled the responsible maintenance

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supervisors concerning prejob briefings and worker assignments of work based on familiarity and experience. Based on review of the revised Repetitive Task 10871,

' the inspectors concluded that the revised work instructions provided adequate detail to properly perform an oil sample collection. Tne inspectors concluded that the licensee's corrective actions adequately addressed this even M8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-416/9613-01: improper performance of leak rate test. . This violation documented the failure of personnel to follow procedures while performing a localleak rate test on a containment penetration. The licensee determined that

.the root cause of the failure was an inadequate procedur Procedure 06 ME-1M61-V-0001, " Local Leak Rate Test," Revision 103, contained multiple actions per procedure step and contained excessive detail not applicable to the task being performed. Inadequate communication and the absence of a place keeping mechanism were identified as contributing causes. Corrective actions included revising Procedure 06-ME-1M61-V-0001, installing permanent labeling on the local leak rate test rig, training personnel on the event, and developing a memorandum on place keeping and expectations on the use of three-way

_ communication. The inspectors reviewed the four procedures the licensee had developed and observed that they were clear and concise. The inspectors had observed during previous observations that placekeeping and three-way communications techniques were commonly used in the field, most notably in more complex procedures. The inspectors determined the corrective actions adequately addressed the concern .. .. ..

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M8.3 IClosed) Insoection Followun item 50-416/9611-03: review of postmaintenance testing program. This item documented a potential concern that the retest control procedure did not require a postmaintenance test for minor work activities and replacement of components which provided only local functions. The event involved the failure of the standby gas treatment Unit B to start during a surveillance several days after a local position indicator was changed out. No retest was performed af ter this work was completed, The licensee determined that the postmaintenance test deletion was not conducted in accordance with the appropriate procedures. To eliminate a step from work package instructions, Procedure 01-S-07 01, " Control of Work on Plant Equipment and Facilities," Revision 30, required that the peckage be brought back to the planning department for revision. The corrective action consisted of having the mechanical supervisors review the processes detailed in Procedure 01 S-07 01 for revising and properly documenting changes to work package The inspectors reviewed Procedure 01-S-07-02, " Test and Retest Control," Revision 100. This procedure stated that a test or retest may not be required for replacement of components which provide only local functions and gave examples of pressure gauges, thermometers, and valve handwheels. The inspectors observed-that the planner, in this WO, had referred to the attachment to the procedure, l- " Component Test Matrix - Description of Tests," and determined that a retest should be done. This retest was documented in the work instructions in the >

package, but not on the retest control form, p Through discussions with planners, the inspectors found that the practice of documenting retests in the work instruction rather than on the retest control form was considered an option for documenting a required retest in a work packag This would not be a problem as long as the procedure was returned to the same planner for revision. If this were not the case, or if a statement allowing other disciplines to modify the procedure was included in the work instruction, a required

. retect could be eliminated without the required review. In addition, if there was no retest identified on the retest control form, the database may be updated to reflect that no retest had been done. The inspectors considered this a potential weakness in the retest program and discussed the concern with superintendent of planning and scheduling. The superintendent acknowledged the inspector's findings and added these issues to a list being developed by tne working group set up to address postmaintenance testing in response to Licensee Event Report (LER)97-005,

" Inadequate Retest of Containment Airlock Air Seal System." The corrective actions will be evaluated by the NRC during the inspection addressing LER 97-00 {

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. Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E General Comments'(375511 Using inspection Procedure 37551, the inspectors observed selected onsite engineering activitie E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E Review of Safetv-Related Static inverters insoection Scooe (37551)

The inspectors performed an engineering review of the applicable design documentation, electrical drawings and system operating instructions for the safety-related Static inverters 1Y89,1Y84,1Y86, and 1Y85 and their associated control panel Observations and Findinos During a walkdown of the safety-related Static Inverters 1Y89,1Y84,1Y86 and 1Y85, and the associated uninterruptible power supply (UPS) control panels, the inspectors identified that the feeder breakers located on the UPS control panels had no component labels. During review of operations System Operating Instruction I

Procedure 04-1 L62-1, " Static Inverters System," Revision 27, the inspectors found that these breakers were not included in the procedure to allow operations personnel to control the configuration of these breakers. During the review, the-inspectors found that controlled Electrical Drawing E-1026. "One Line Meter and Relay Diagram 120 VAC ESF Uninterruptible Power Supplies," depicted the breakers; however, no component identification number was identified on the drawing. The inspectors questioned licensee operations and engineering personnel concerning this discrepancy and what controls were in place to assure that the breakers were rnaintained in the correct configuration. The inspectors found that, although it was nuclear plant engineering's responsibility to assign unique component identification numbers to the breakers, no unique component identification numbers had ever been assigned. Operations personnel stated that since no number had been assigned to the breakers, the breakers were never incorporated in Procedure 04-1-L62-1 and no labels were installed. The licensee initiated Condition Report 1997-1292 to address these discrepancies. Operations personnel immediately placed information tags on the eight breakers to identify the breaker and the correct positio .

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-10- .Qonclusions An isolated weakness was identified in the area of configuration control because of the failure to assign unique component identification numbers for eight uninterruptible power supply control panel breakers and incorporate this information in controlled electrical drawings, system operating instructions, and equipment labelin IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R 1.1 General Comments (71750)

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The inspectors made frequent tours of the radiologict.1 controlled area and observed radiological postings and worker adherence to protective clothing requirements. in general, radiological work areas were properly posted and locked high radiation area doors were locked. Workers adhered to radiation work permit requirements and displayed good radiological worker practice V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 15,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie ._... . .. . ..

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ATTACHMENT 1 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Bost, Director, Design Engineering C. Bottemiller, Superintendent, Plant Licensing W. Deck, Superintendent, Security W. Eaton, General Manager, Plant Operations B.- Edwards, Superintendent, Mechanical Maintenance C. Elisaesser, Manager, Performance and System Engineering K. Hughey, Director, Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Aff airs T. Kriesel, Superintendent, Radiation Control R. Moomaw, Manager, Plant Maintenance NBC l

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J. Donahew, NRR Project Manager

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2-WSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 61726 Surveillance Observations 62707 Maintenance Observation 7170'7 Plant Operations 71750 Plant Support Activities 92901 Followup - Operations

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92902 Followup - Maintenance 1 i

ITEMS OPENED CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed 96-006 LER Manual reactor scram due to loss of control rod drive pump l (Section 08.1)

96006-01 VIO Failure to provide adequate work instructions for personnel assigned to properly perform safety-related activities (Section M8.1)

96013-01 VIO Improper performance of leak rate test (Section M8.2)

96011-03 IFl Review of post maintenance testing program (Section M8.3)

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