IR 05000416/1988001

Insp Rept 50-416/88-01 on 880116-0219.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observation, Surveillance Observation & Unresolved Items & Mgt Meeting

ML20196K463
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	03/02/1988
From:	Butcher R, Dance H, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196K431	List: IR 05000416/1988001 ML20196K427 ML20196K441
References
50-416-88-01, 50-416-88-1, NUDOCS 8803150331
Download: ML20196K463 (10)

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(~ p tic oq'o, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l g .

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<r 101 MARIETTA STREET. N5 -f ATLANT A. GEORGI A 30323

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Report No.: 50-416/88-01 Licensee: System Energy Resources, In Jackson, MS 39205 Docket No.: 50-416 License No.: NPF-29 Facility Name: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Inspection Con eted: anuary 16 thru February 19, 1988 Inspectors: fD C k bs-/ 3 FP Ri C. Butcher) Senior R sident Inspector la~te 51 ned Mc J. L.yMathis,

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Resident Inspector

>lt er Date 51 ned Approved oy: b fl. C. Dance, Section Chief, Division 3!L 6 Date 51gned ofReactorProjects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors at the site in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Observation, ESF System Walkdown, Repor+able Occurrences, Operating Reactor Events, Inspector Followup and Unresolvec'7tems and a Management Meetin Results: One violation was identified: Failure to follow procedure for properly storing nitrogan charging bottles inside containmen ..

8803150331 880303 PDR ADOCK 05000416 G PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted

+0 .D. Kingsley, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

+J. E. Cross, GGNS Site Director

• +C.R. Hutchinson, GGNS General Manager R. F. Rogers, Manager, Special Projects

• A. S. McCurdy, Manager, Plant Operations

• J. Summers, Compliance Coordinator M.J. Wright, Manager, Plant Support

• L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent D. G. Cupstid, Start-up Supervisor R. H. McAnuity, Electrical Superintendent J. P. Dimmette, Manager, Plant Maintenance W. P. Harris, Compliance Coordinator J. L. Robertson, Licensing Superintendent L. G. Temple, I & C Superintendent J. H. Mueller, Hechanical Superintendent L. B. Moulder, Operations Superintendent J. V. Parrish, Chemistry / Radiation Control Superintendent S. M. Feith, Director, Quality Programs

• C W. E11saesser, Operations Coordinator

"S. C. Mooney, Assistent I & C Superintendent

• F. Titus, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering

• S. F. Tanner, Manager, Quality Services

+J. G. Cesare, Director, Nuclear Licensing Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security force members, and office personne NRC Representatives

+ N. Grace, Regional Administrator

+ W. Herschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety

+ C. Dance, Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects

• Attended exit interview

+ Attended Management Meeting on February 2, 1988 Exit Interview (30703)

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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 19, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee had no comment on the following inspection findings:

416/88-01-01, Violation. Failure to follow procedure for properly storing nitrogen charging bottles inside containment. (paragraph 5)

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416/88-01-02, Inspector Followup Item. Define allowable tolerances for voltage readings in surveillance procedure. (paragraph 7)

416/88-01-03, Unresolved Ite Determine significance of potentially unmonitored releases from the Standby Service Water basi (paragraph 10) Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 50-416/87-29-02. The licensee revised Equipment Performance Instruction 04-1-03-A30-1, Cold Weather Protection, to provide sign offs for individual activitie This should ensure that cold weather protection activities are completed when require No further action is require . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. Unresolved items identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 1 . Operational Safety, Radiological Protection and Physical Security Verification (71707, 71709 and 71881)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staf The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that it was visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for operation,

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temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisor Weekly, when the inspectors were onsite, selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operabl The confirmation is made by verifying the following: Accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, major component leakage, lubrication, cooling and general condition, and instrumentatio General plant tours were conducted on at least a bi-weekly basi Portions of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifications, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in

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problem identification systems, and containment isolation. The progress,s licensee onsite emergency response facilities were toured to determine facility readines The inspectors reviewed at least one Radiation Work Permit (RWP), observed health physics management involvement and awareness of significant plant activities, and observed plant radiation control The inspectors verified licensee compliance with physical security manning and access control requirements, Periodically the inspectors verified the adequacy of physical security detection and assessment aid The following comments were noted:

~ On January 16, 1988 the results of a fuel oil sample from the Division 1 Diesel Generator (DG) fuel oil storage tank indicated that the total insoluables was 2.9 mg per 100 ml. Technical Specification 4.8.1.1. requires at least once per 92 days that fuel oil samples from the fuel oil tanks be tested in accordance with ASTM-02274-70 and contain an impurity level of less than 2.0 mg of insoluables per 100 ml. Since there had been no trend to indicate declining fuel oil quality and since all fuel oil added to the tank had tested acceptable prior to being added, the sample results were questioned. After discussions with Regional Management and the NRC Project Manager the resident inspectors concurred with the licensee that final determination of required actions could be made af ter obtaini',g the results of a second verification sample. The noted analysis is performed off site and generally requires 5 to 7 days to obtain results. The licensee also coordinated fuel oil sampling with their fuel oil supplier who uses different test methods to evaluate fuel oil quality, i

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Followiag the plant scram on January 20, 1988 the results from the suppliers analysis indicated that the fuel oil showed some degradation but was still acceptable. No direct correlation can be made between the analysis done by the fuel oil supplier and TS requirements. The licensee

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then decided to replace the fuel oil with fresh oil from the supplie ,

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The Division 1 fuel oil tank was drained into a Unit 2 fuel oil sto"ige tank and new fuel was trucked in. The total insoluables for the fuel trucked in had been determined to be acceptable. The Division 1 DG was declared operable again on January 22, 1988. The results from the second sample of the Division 1 fuel oil came back as acceptabl On February 3, 1988 at approximately 10:50 a.m. while touring the containment building, the inspector noted an empty nitrogen cylinder on

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the floor next to the Hydraulic Control Units (HCUs) of the control rod drive system. The inspector notified the licensee about the nitrogen bottle, which was used to charge the HCUs. A similar incident occurred on February 12, 1985, which resulted in a violation for failure to perform a safety analysis for the storage of nitrogen bottles inside containmen For further details refer to inspection report 416/85-03. The licensee's response to violation 85-03-03 dated April 8, 1985 (AECM-85/0104) outlined corrective steps which were taken to avoid further violation The auxiliary building round sheets were revised to include a verification ooce every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> that the nitrogen charging bottles are properly stored

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and secure A review of the auxiliary building round sheet by the inspectors during the time frame of February 1-3, 1988 revealed that on February 2,1988 operations during their rounds in the auxiliary building comented on the round sheet that there were loose nitrogen bottles on the containment floor. It was not until February 3,1988 when the inspector brought the loose nitrogen bottle inside containment to the licensee's attention that they were removed. Procedure 04-1-01-C11-1, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System, was revised to add a step that the CR0 Nitrogen charging cart is to be returned to its storage location and chained as a result of violation 85-03-03. Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be established, implemented arid maintained covering the activities recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, February 197 Regulatory Guide 1.33 recommends procedures to cover the control rod drive syste Section 4.4 of System Operating Instruction (501) 04-1-01-1011-1, Revision 26, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System, addresses the hydraulic control unit nitrogen charging metho Step 4.4.2.v, of this procedure, ensures that the nitrogen bottles are returned to their storage location. Contrary to the above the licensee failed to follow the procedure on February 2,1988 to properly store a nitrogen bottle. This will be identified as violation 416/88-01-01. MaintenanceObservation(62703)

During the report period, the inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below. The observations included a review of the Maintenance Work Orders (%0s) and other related documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality controls,

% D E80508, Rework "A" Plant Chille HWO E74944, I & C to Replace Air Dryer Logic Rela MWO M77418, Clean Screens and Rework Spare Filter Removed from N5G17-000 %'O ME1014, Clean Lube Oil Separator Educte S'O M80538, Replace all Manway Gasket on West IP A Trai %D 180844, Rework, Replace, Trouble Shoot Suppression Pool Temperatur %0 180537, Trouble Shoot Hotwell Circui %'O M71306, Replace Mechanical Seal on A Turbine Building Cooling Water Pum i

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MWO 176662, Calibrate / Replace Oil Temperature Switch on Division 3 Diesel Generato No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillances listed below. The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteri IC-1H71-R-0003, Revision 24, Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring Instrumentation Calibraho ,

06-0P-IP75-H-0001, Revision 33, Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) 11 Functional Tes IC-1C71-H-0001, Revision 25, Drywell High Pres; ure Functional Tes IC-1E31-H-0023, Revision 28, RCIC/RHR and RCIC Steam Line High Flow (RCIC Isolation) Functional Tes The inspector witnessed the performance of the Drywell High Pressure Functional Test, 06-IC-1C71 M-0001, on February 4,1988. The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy and a review of the data for acceptability. Step 5.14.14 of the procedure directs the I &

C technician to increase the stable current until the Master Trip unit trips and record the as found trip value from the readout assembly on Data Sheet IV. Step 5.14.15.b directs the I & C technician to verify that the fluke indicates 0 VAC at contact 2 and ground. On Data Sheet I, channel A, step 5.14.15.b requires approximately 0 (zero) voltage between contact 2 and ground. The actual voltage measured was 20 VAC. The technician initialized the step as being satisfactory. However, the inspecter questioned the licensee about 20 VAC being approximately zer Approximately was not defined nor did the inspector feel 20 VAC was acceptable the way the procedure was written; furthermore; SERI management standard number 4 states that verbatim compliance to procedures is required. The inspectors felt that it is not the responsibility of the I

& C technician out in the field to define the ranges of voltages that satisfy the word approximately as used in the procedure. This issue is being tracked as Inspector Followup Item 416/88-01-02 for resolution of the use of the word approximately in the noted procedur No violations or deviations were identified, a

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i i Engineered Safety Features System \laikdown (71710) ,

A complete walkdown was conducted on the accessible portions of the  !

Standby Service Water (SSW) System. The inspector verified all SSW basin i valves, all control room switches, all electrical line ups and the .

Division 3 valves outside the SSW basin are The walkdown consisted of '

an inspection and verification, where possible, of the required system valve alignment, including valve power available and valve locking where ,

required, instrumentation valved in and functioning; electrical and

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instrumentation cabinets free from debris, loose materials, jumpers and .

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evidence of rodents, and system free from other degrading condition '

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j No violations or deviations were identifie l Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700) I The below listed event reports were r1 viewed to determine if the  !

, information provided met the NRC reporting rec uirements.

The determination included adequacy of event descript'on and corrective i t

action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the  ;

j relative safety significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and t

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, discussions with plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for the

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reports indicated by an asterisk. The event reports were reviewed using

the guidance of the general policy and procedure for NRC enforcement  ;

actions, regarding licensee identified violation !

! The following License Event Reports (LElis) are close LER N Event Date Event

c 1 1 *87-013-01 August 7, 1987 Ventilation duct  ;

sections not designed to Withstand l

)l a design basis tornad [

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• 87-017 October 5, 1987 Drywell integrity 1 inspectica not completed due to [

procedural inadeouacie [

l * 87-021 November 30, 1987 Shutdown cooling [

suction valve isolated due to [

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! * 87-023 December 8, 1987 Inadvertent Division 2 [

] LOCA signal during restoration  !

from a surveillance procedur l

• 87-024 December 12, 1987 RPS actuation caused by

procedural erro I I

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• 87-025 December 19, 1987 RPS actuation caused by incorrect installation of fuse during A surveillanc * 88-002 January 10, 1988 Reactor scram due to failure of main output transforme * 88-005 January 11, 1988 Reactor Scram (while in hot shutdown) due to inadvertent turbine bypass valve openin For LER 87-013 the licensee safety analysis indicated that the duct work would have probably remained intact and no leakage would have occurre See Inspection Report 416/87-22 for management meeting regarding this issu The events of LER 87-021, LER 87-023, and LER 87-024 were discussed in Inspection Report 416/87-35 and violation 416/87-35-0 The event of LER 87-025 was discussed in Inspection Report 416/87-4 The event of LER 88-001 was discussed in Inspection Report 416/87-4 .

The event of LER 88-005 was discussed in Inspection Report 416/87-4 No violations or deviations were identifie . Operating Reactor Events (93702)

The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the celow listed reactor events. The review included determination of cause, safety significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective actio The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations, maintenance and engineering support personnel as appropriat The reactor tripped from 97% reactor power at 4:40 a.m. on January 20, 1988 on a reactor vessel low water level. A condenser hotwell low level l signal was sensed from the Intermediate Pressure (IP) condenser hotwell and a two out of three logic signal tripped the condensate pumps which i lead to condensate booster pump and feedwater pump trips. The loss of feedwater to the reactor vessel then resulted in a low reactor vessel water level scram. Investigation by the licensee indicates that a manway gasket on the IP condenser shell for the A circulating water system failed

, allowing water to spray down on the IP condenser hotwell level switches

' causing a false low condenser hotwell level signal. This false signal tripped the condensate pumps creating the scenario described abov On January 28, 1988 at 2:00 p.m. the licensee determined that the Standby Service Water (SSW) basin overflow line had been siphoning water from the J

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basin to the storm drai Chemistry had noted that the SSW B basin concentration of molybdate was decreasing for unknown reasons. Incident Report 88-2-5 was written to document this event. It was determined that the SSW basins each have an overflow line with a gooseneck trap with a vent line off the top of the gooseneck. The vent line had been blocked allowing the overflow line to siphon water from the basin to the storm drains. The vent line has apparently been blocked for quite some time without being noticed. The vent line is not shown on Piping and Instrumentation Diagram M-1061. The licensee determined that the overflow would not allow the SSW basins to decrease below TS allowed minimum leve Technical Specification 3.7.1.3 requires a minimum water level at or above elevation 130'3" Mean Sea Level, USGS datum, equivalent to an indicated level of 87 inches. Based on the decrease in molybdate concentration, the recent siphoning action resulted in an estimated 80,000 gallon release to the storm drain. A sample of the basin water revealed no detectable activity. Technical Specification Table 4.11.1.1.1-1, Radioactive Liquid Waste Sampling and Analysis Program, requires sampling the SSW basin prior to each blowdown and defines the allowable activity limits. Since the overflow release path was not monitored by the licensee and siphoning action may or may not have been occurring, no sampling of this release path has been accomplishe The licensee has been taking weekly samples

to measure gross gamma with results showing no detectable activity. The licensee is still reviewing the SSW basin design requirements with the overflow line design in respect to TS requirements. Until the licensee has completed their investigation of this event and determined the significance of potential unmonitored releases, this will be Unresolved Item 416/88-01-0 No violations or deviations were identifie . Inspector Followup and Unresolved Items (92701)

(Closed) 416/86-08-02 and 416/86-26-03, Inspector Followup Items. The noted Inspector Followup Items and the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) report for May 1,1985 through October 31, 1986 noted numerous discrepancies in drawings including illegibility. As noted in the licensee's February 23, 1987 letter (AECM-87/0042) in response to the SALP report, they had initiated a major program to upgrade the As-Built Drawing program as well as other areas identified as needing improvement The licensee's letter dated February 3,1988 (AECM-88/0024) documents the completion of actions taken under the As-Built Drawing Program Improvement Plan. There were 21 problem areas identified by the licensee and correc-tive actions were taken to resolve known programmatic problems. Addi-tional drawing improvement efforts will be accomplished as an on-going progra The inspectors have verified that drawing quality is much improve It is recognized that drawing quality improvement will be an on going effort and the licensee's programmatic changes should result in continuing improvement in drawing quality. No further action is require .-

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1 ManagementMeeting(30702)

On February 2,1988 the NRC Region II Regional Administrator, the Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety and the cognizant Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects visited the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station to review the current status. Attendees are identified in paragraph 1. The licensee's management presented an analysis of leasons learned from the second refueling outage which ended on January 3,1988, a preliminary review of proposed organizational changes in Operations, and details of a maintenance improvement plan, A plant tour was conducted following the noted presentation An awards dinner was held in the evening and the Regional Administrator presented operator licenses to eight rectntly licensed operators.

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