ML20151C130
| ML20151C130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1988 |
| From: | Butcher R, Dance H, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151C122 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-88-03, 50-416-88-3, NUDOCS 8804120171 | |
| Download: ML20151C130 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000416/1988003
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:p Ct00 UNIVED ST ATES [[I - o, WUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 p g , j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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t ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 \\, +..../ Report No.: 50-416/88-03 Licensee: System Energy Resources, Inc. Jackson, MS 39205 Docket No.- 50-416 License No.: NPF-29 Facility Name: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted: February 20, 1988 through March 18, 1988 d'!/ W Inspec ors: . 6 cm R. . Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector Da'te' Signed e v ( b 'I I f W w J. athis, (Resident Inspector Dat Signed Approved by: , de" / H. C. Dance, Section Chief Dite' Si gned Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors at the site in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matter >, Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Observation, ESF System Walkdown, Reportable Occurrences, Operating Reactor Events, Inspector Followup and Unresolved Items, and Regional Management Meeting. Results: One violation was identified with two examples: failure to follow procedures resulting in the inadvertent actuation of Residual Heat Removal Pump B and failure to document work performed on permanent plant equipment. 8804120171 880405 PDR ADOCK 05000416 o DCD
_ - _ - _ - _ _ _ . . . ! i REPORT DETAILS 1. Licensee Employees Contacted +0. D. Kingsley, Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Operation +T. H. Cloninger, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering & Support +J. G. Cesare, Director, Nuclear Licensing +S. M. Feith, Director, Quality Programs +J. E. Cross, GGNS Site Director +C. R. Hutchinson, GGNS General Manager R. F. Rogers, Manager, Special Projects A. S. McCurdy, Manager, Plant Operations J. Summers, Compliance Coordinator
- M. J. Wright, Manager, Plant Support
- L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent
- D. G. Cupstid, Start-up Supervisor
- R. H. McAnuity, Electrical Superintendent
J. P. Dimmette, Manager, Plant Maintenance W. P. Harris, Compliance Coordinator J. L. Robertson, Licensdag Superintendent L. G. Temple, I & C 5uperintendent J. H. Mueller, Mechanical Superintendent L. B. Moulder, Operations Superintendent J. V. Parrish, Chemistry / Radiation Control Superintendent
- J. W. Yelverton, Technical Asst. Plant Operations Manager
- S. A. Saunders, PM&C Superintencent
- W. A. Russell, Technical Asst, Operations Superintendent
- S. F. Tanner, Manager, Quality Services
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security force members, and office personnel. NRC Representatives +L.A. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects +0.M. Verre111, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects
- Attended exit interview
+ Attended Management Meeting on March 4, 1988 2. Exit Interview (30703) The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 18, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee had no comment on the following inspection findings. 88-03-01, Viciation. Failure to follow procedures resulting in the inadvertent actuation of Residual Heat Removal Pump B and failure to document work performed on permanent plant equipment. (paragraph 9) __
. . 2 88-03-02, Inspector Followup Item. Correct the installation of cover on forced balance strong motion accelerometer SC85-N004. (paragraph 4) 3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702) (Closed) Violation 416/86-37-01. Examples 1 and 2 were addressed in LER 86-032 which was closed in Inspection Report 416/86-41. For example 3 the licensee revised step 5.11.1 of procedure 06-ME-1821-R-0008, Revision 22, Main Steam Safety / Relief Valve Operability Test, to require reverification of the prerequisites and plant conditions prior to operating the solenoids. Example 4 was addressed in LER 86-043 which was closed in Inspection Report 416/86-41. For example 5, procedure 06-IC-SC85-0-1003, Revision 23, requires installing the accelerometers using a scribed line referenced to Plant North for alignment. Also, Data Sheet II for paragraph 5.43 requires the technician draw the connector plug on a sketch to document the accelerometer orientation in the plant. Example 6 was addressed in LER 86-044 which was closed in Inspection Report 416/86-41. 4. Operational Safety, Radiological Prctection and Physical Security Verification (71707, 71709 and 71881) The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that it was visited at least daily when an inspector was onsite. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet entries, ' control room manning, and access controls. This inspection activity , included numerous informal discussions with operators and their j supervisors. l , Weekly, when the inspectors were onsite, selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation is made by verifying the following: accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, major component leakage, lubrication, cooling and general condition, and instrumentation. General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside i areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifications, shif t turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, problem identification systems, and containment isolation. The licensee's onsite emergency response facilities were toured to determine facility readiness. !
. .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, . . . .' ' . 3 The inspectors reviewed at least one Radiation Work Permit (RWP), observed health physics management involvement and awareness of significant plant activities, and observed plant radiation controls. The inspectors verified licensee compliance with physical security manning and access control requirements. Periodically the inspectors verified the adequacy of physical security detection and assessment aids. The following comments were noted: During a walk through of the A basin Standby Service Water (SSW) pump room, the inspector observed that the protective metal cover on the forced balance strong motion accelerometer (SC85-N004) was not secured in place but laying on top of the accelerometer. The. licensee was notified of this discrepancy. Correction of this discrepancy will be Inspector Followup Item 416/88-03-02. 5. Maintenance Observation (62703) During the report period, the inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below. The observations included a review of the Maintenance Work Orders (MW0s) and other related documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical specifications, radiological controls, observation of all er part of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality controls. MWO-ELO239 Clean and Inspect Breaker MWO-ME0123 Clean PSW Side of Plant Chiller M0W-181194 Investigate in accordance with Instruction Reactor Pressure Analog Trip Units j MWO-I81312 Rework APRM E Count Rate Circuit MWO-E81414 Rework MCC 11851 Power Cable and Check Breaker MWO-M81465 Install Temporary Plug in Overflow Line per MNCR-0048-88 i MWO-MS1509 Drain Diesel Driven Fire Pump Diesel Fuel Oil Tank j , MWO-I81525 Trouble Shoot Cause of Reactor Scram 1 J ' No violations or deviations were identified. 6. Surveillance Observation (61726) The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillances ' listed below. The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria. r . - - - . - - - , . . . . -
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. 4 1 06-IC-1C51-V-0001 Rev. 25, Intermediate Range Monitor Calibration 06-IC-1E51-M-0022 Rev. 24, Drywell Aircooler Condensate Flow Rate Monitoring Function Test 06-0P-1P75-M-0001 Rev. 33, Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) 11 Functional Test 06-RE-1833-D-0001 Rev. 28, TCN 5, Jet Pump Functional Test 06-IC-1E32-M-1001 Rev. 21, MSIV Leakage Control Pressure Functional Test ' On February 24, 1988 the residents witnessed the jet pump functional test j and Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs) test. ApRMs B and F failed due i to the recirculation flow input to the flow biased APRM surveillance. Technical Specification 3.3.1, action item a, was entered by LC0 88-168. The LCO was lifted on that same day af ter corrective maintenance was performed. No violations or deviations were identified. 7. Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710) A complete walkdown was conducted on the accessible portions of the
Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator. The walkdown consisted of an inspection and verification, where possible, of the required system valve alignment, including valve power available and valve locking where
' required, instrumentation valved in and functioning; electrical and instrumentation cabinets free from debris, loose materials, jumpers and evidence of rodents, and system free from other degrading conditions. No violations or deviations were identified, l 8. Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700) The below listed event reports were reviewed to determine if the information provided met the NRC reporting requirements. The determination included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussions with plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for the reports indicated by an asterisk. The event reports were reviewed using the guidance of the general policy and procedure for NRC enforcement l actions, regarding licensee identified violations. The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) are closed. LER No. Event Date Event
- 88-006
January 20, 1988 Condenser Manway Leakage on Hotwell low Level Switches Tripped all Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps Resulting in a Reactor Scram. . - . - -
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- 88-001
January 03, 1988 RPS Actuation Due to Inadvertent Grounding of a Power Supply. The event of LER 88-006 was discussed in Inspection Report 416/88-01. No violations or deviations were identified. 9. Operating Reactor Events (03702) The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the belcw listed reactor events. The review included determination of cause, safety significance, performance of personnel and systems,- and corrective action. The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations, maintenance and engineering support personnel as appropriate. On February 27, 1988, while in the process of swapping from steam jet air ejector B to A, che plant experienced a burn of hydrogen in the offgas system. The swapping of Steam Jet Air Ejectors (SJAE) began by placing the standby unit A in an air purge mode as instructed in accordance with System Operating Instruction (SOI) 04-1-01-N62-1, Steam Jet Air Ejector Operation. Both stages of the A SJAE were then placed in service, steam supply pressure to the unit was being raiseo per the SOI to the normal operating range of 120-135 psig. Due to the receipt of a low steam flow alarm, supply pressure was reduced to 80 psig while I&C technicians vented the steam flow transmitters to insure steam flow indication was accurate. After venting was completed, the licensee proceeded by opening the suction valve to the main condenser. Shortly thereafter operations personnel noticed spiking of both hydrogen analyzers and loss of offgas flow. It was noticed by Operations personnel that the A train hydrogen recombiner temperature was approximately 600 F. The Shif t Superintendent concluded that a hydrogen ignition had occurred and requested that power be immediately reduced to 75%. Offgas system loop seals were checked and no increased radiation levels or lost loop seals were discovered. Observation of elevated temperatures in the first charcoal beds of the A and B offgas trains confirmed that a hydrogen ignition had occurred and that charcoal had ignited. Power was further reduced to 55% and the first charcoal beds were bypassed. The licensee began purging the charcoal beds with nitrogen. Charcoal temperatures peaked at 443 F in the A bed and 700* F in the B bed. As the nitrogen purge was placed on the charcoal beds temperatures started trending down. Incident Report 88-2-13 documented the offgas system hydrogen ignition problem. A licensee task force was assembled following the event to implement unit recovery, review all data available, and to determine the cause and required corrective actions. The conclusion made by the task force suggested that the hydrogen buildup was caused by the initial failure of the A hydrogen recombiner to properly function due to wetting of the catalyst during the air ejector startup sequence. According to the licensee wetting of the - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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. 6 catalyst could be contributed to the piping configuration between the preheater and recombiner, poor procedural sequencing of drain valve operation, low preheater pressure and high level in the intercondenser. The hydrogen ignition caused damage to the inline dew point meter during this transient. After the plant put recovery measures in place, Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 181296 was written to install a dewpoint meter at the offgas inservice afterfilter line. In addition, the licensee put in place a long term nitrogen purge by routing piping from a nitrogen ' truck to the adsorber beds. Administrative Procedure 01-S-07-1, Control of Work on Plant Equipment & Facilities, paragraph 6.3 discusses the administrative control of Maintenance Work Orders (Kd0s) and paragraph 6.3.2.c addresses the need for some work to be initiated immediately, based on the Shift Superintendents hdgement, for reasons such as to prevent imminent plant shutdown, prevent immediate and severe damage to plant equipment, etc. The Shift Superintendent is permitted to contact responsible maintenance personnel and verbt.lly communicate what work is required. The Shift Supervisor or Shift Superintendent is to enter a clear description of work authorized in his log. The Shift Superintendent ! is to ensure an Rd0 is initiated immediately in order to document any work performed and to expedite the MWO through normal channels. Contrary to the above, as of March 10, 1988, a MWO had not been initiated in accordance with Administrative Procedure 01-S-07-1 to document the nitrogen purge installation. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a states that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of R.G. 1.33, Rev. 2, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33 recommends that administrative procedures be written covering Procedure Adherence. Administrative Procedure 01-5-07-1, Control of Work on Plant Equipment and Facilities, paragraph 6.3 discusses the administrative control of Maintenance Work Orders. The licensee's failure to follow procedure 01-S-07-1 will be documented as the first example of Violation 416/88-03-01. A special inspection, performed by Region II specialists, on this off gas event is discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-416/88-05. On March 15, 1988, at 00:40 a.m., the Division 2 Diesel Generator tachometer spuriously spiked causing the Standby Service Water (SSW) B pump and the Division 2 diesel generator outside air f an to start. The licensee declared the Division 2 diesel generator inoperable in accordance with TS 3.8.1. By TS the licensee was required to restore the inoperable diesel
generator to operable status within 72 hours from the time of initial loss or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours and in cold- shutdown within the following 24 hours. A Maintenance Work Order (HWO) was written to remove the tachometer relay unit and replace the old unit l with a new unit from stock. The relay unit was then calibrated per procedure 07-5-13-10 and 06-0P-1P75-M-002, SDG 12 functional test. The licensee successfully completed retesting on March 15, 1988, and the Division 2 diesel generator was declared operable. On March 15,1988, at 9:50 a.m. , while operating at 100% reactor thermal power the reactor scrammed on reactor vessei low water level. No - - - - - - .
. ' . 7 emergency core cooling systems actuated and the operators stablized the plant in hot standby. A review of scram data by the licensee indicated that 29 control rods had inserted when technicians, who were performing reactor vessel water level ' surveillance 06-IC-1821-M-1003-2, inserted a Division 2 half scram signal into the reactor protection system. The insertion of the control rods gave a very steep power drop and reactor vessel water level dropped also giving. a low reactor vessel water level scram. All control rods then inserted. The licensee checked the terminal box that feeds power to the A solenoids of the scram pilot valves and found a loose terminal screw approximately two turns from full in. Evidence of shorting could be seen on the metal jumper at the loose terminal. It appears that reactor protection system power being fed to the A solenoids on the scram pilot valves was interrupted by a loose jumper creating an inadvertent scram of 29 control rods when the B solenoids on the scram pilot val es w2re de-energized during the surveillance. Technicians then checked all similar terminal screws to ensure they were tight. The reactor was made critical on March 16, 1988. On March 17, 1988, while in the process of performing Surveillance Procedure 06-EL-1E12-M-0001, Revision 22, RHR Pump Start Time Delay Relay Functional Test, RHR B and SSW B pumps auto started. The cause of the pumps starting was contributed to an electrician involved in the i functional test working on the wrong breabr. Step 5.3.1 of procedure 05-EL-1E12-M-0001 instructed the electrician to inhibit auto start of RHR
pump 1E12 C0028 by jumping from terminals 9 to 10 of the ground overcurrent relay at pump breaker 152-1606 at bus 16AB. Contrary to the , above, the electrician jumped contact 9 to 10 of the ground overcurrent ' relay at breaker 152-1609 for pump C. Failure to follow procefere , 06-EL-1E12-M-0001 is a viciation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.c, s which requires written procedures be established, implemented and L maintained covering surveillance activities of safety related equipment. , This is the seccnd example of violation 416/88-03-01. ! -No violations or deviations were identified. 10. Inspector Followup and Unresolved Items (92701) (Closed) Unresolved Item 416/88-01-03. On February 25, 1988 a telecon was held between the licensee, NRC Region II Section Chief and the resident inspectors concerning the acceptability of the Standby Service Water (SSW) overflow pipe and the unmonitored release of water from the SSW basin. The present SSW system design is as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The overflow pipe provision in the SSW basin is described f in paragraph 9.2.1.2 of the FSAR and paragraph 9.2.1.3, Safety Evaluation, ! of the FSAR describes the provisions for detection of radioactive i contamination and provisions to limit releases thru the SSW system to less than allowable limits. Other plants have once-through Service Water i systems where the water is released directly after having been monitored for radioactivity, and the GGNS design is similar except water is returned to the SSW basin. Af ter review of system alignment and controls by . cognizant Region II personnel, the residents were informed that the ! release of SSW basin water through the overflow pipe in the manner l ! ! _ - _ - - , . , L
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described was acceptable. Based on their review of -this issue, the licensee is initiating several enhancements to their program. On March 16 ' and March 17 the overflow pipe from the A and B SSW basins were temporarily capped. , '. Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/86-41-03. The licensee has submitted ielief requests to the NRC for containment isolation provisions for various instrument lines. A letter dated February 12 1988 (AECM-88/0017) ' provided the licensee's response to NRC requests for further information. By letter dated March 7,1988, the NRC accepted the licensee's alternate basis for containment isolation. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/87-29-01. -The licensee issued
Equipment Performance Instruction (EPI) 04-1-03-A30-2, Area Temperature ' Monitoring, to determine monthly the temperature in selected plant areas to identify whether equipment qualification limits are being exceeded. , 11. Management Meeting (30702)
On March 4, 1988, the Region II Director, Division of Reactor Projects, the Resident Inspectors and the cognizant Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects met with Licensee Management to discuss the Grand Gulf
performance overview and objectives. The attendees are noted in paragraph 1 of this report. The licensee briefly discussed performance r and experience in the plant operations, maintenance, security, training, l licensing, emergency preparedness, engineering and quality programs areas. ' A plant tour was conducted following the noted presentations. The l l licensee also briefly discussed their preliminary findings of the i l investigation into the hydrogen ignition in che offgas system event that = occurred or. February 28, 1988. This event is discussed in paragraph 9 in , i l this report. 1 l l . . . }}