ML20151C130

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Insp Rept 50-416/88-03 on 880220-0318.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observation, Surveillance Observation,Ros & Operating Reactor Events
ML20151C130
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/01/1988
From: Butcher R, Dance H, Mathis J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151C122 List:
References
50-416-88-03, 50-416-88-3, NUDOCS 8804120171
Download: ML20151C130 (9)


See also: IR 05000416/1988003

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                                               REGION 11
                                       101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
                                        ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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     Report No.:     50-416/88-03
     Licensee:    System Energy Resources, Inc.
                  Jackson, MS 39205
     Docket No.-     50-416                                      License No.:   NPF-29
     Facility Name:       Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
     Inspection Conducted:       February 20, 1988 through March 18, 1988
     Inspec ors:
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                         . Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector
                                                                            d'!/     W
                                                                            Da'te' Signed
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                            athis, (Resident Inspector                      Dat Signed
     Approved by:                   , de"                                       /
                   H. C. Dance, Section Chief                               Dite' Si gned
                   Division of Reactor Projects
                                                  SUMMARY
     Scope:     This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors at
     the site in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matter >,
     Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance
     Observation, ESF System Walkdown, Reportable Occurrences, Operating Reactor
     Events, Inspector Followup and Unresolved Items, and Regional Management
     Meeting.
     Results:    One violation was identified with two examples:       failure to follow
     procedures resulting in the inadvertent actuation of Residual Heat Removal Pump
     B and failure to document work performed on permanent plant equipment.
  8804120171 880405
  PDR    ADOCK 05000416
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                                      REPORT DETAILS
     1.  Licensee Employees Contacted
        +0.  D. Kingsley, Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Operation
        +T.  H. Cloninger, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering & Support
        +J. G. Cesare, Director, Nuclear Licensing
        +S. M. Feith, Director, Quality Programs
        +J. E. Cross, GGNS Site Director
        +C.  R. Hutchinson, GGNS General Manager
         R. F. Rogers, Manager, Special Projects
         A. S. McCurdy, Manager, Plant Operations
         J. Summers, Compliance Coordinator
        *M.  J. Wright, Manager, Plant Support
        *L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent
        *D.  G. Cupstid, Start-up Supervisor
        *R.  H. McAnuity, Electrical Superintendent
         J. P. Dimmette, Manager, Plant Maintenance
         W. P. Harris, Compliance Coordinator
         J. L. Robertson, Licensdag Superintendent
         L. G. Temple, I & C 5uperintendent
         J. H. Mueller, Mechanical Superintendent
         L. B. Moulder, Operations Superintendent
         J. V. Parrish, Chemistry / Radiation Control Superintendent
        *J. W. Yelverton, Technical Asst. Plant Operations Manager
        *S. A. Saunders, PM&C Superintencent
        *W.  A. Russell, Technical Asst, Operations Superintendent
        *S. F. Tanner, Manager, Quality Services
         Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
         security force members, and office personnel.
         NRC Representatives
        +L.A. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
        +0.M. Verre111, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects
        * Attended exit interview
        + Attended Management Meeting on March 4, 1988
     2.  Exit Interview     (30703)
         The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 18, 1988, with
         those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not
         identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by
         the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee had no comment on the
         following inspection findings.
         88-03-01, Viciation.     Failure to follow procedures resulting in the
         inadvertent actuation of Residual Heat Removal Pump B and failure to
         document work performed on permanent plant equipment. (paragraph 9)
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      88-03-02, Inspector Followup Item. Correct the installation of cover on
      forced balance strong motion accelerometer SC85-N004. (paragraph 4)
   3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
      (Closed) Violation 416/86-37-01. Examples 1 and 2 were addressed in LER
      86-032 which was closed in Inspection Report 416/86-41. For example 3 the
      licensee revised step 5.11.1 of procedure 06-ME-1821-R-0008, Revision 22,
      Main Steam Safety / Relief Valve Operability Test, to require reverification
      of the prerequisites and plant conditions prior to operating the
      solenoids. Example 4 was addressed in LER 86-043 which was closed in
      Inspection Report 416/86-41. For example 5, procedure 06-IC-SC85-0-1003,
      Revision 23, requires installing the accelerometers using a scribed line
      referenced to Plant North for alignment.          Also, Data Sheet II for
      paragraph 5.43 requires the technician draw the connector plug on a sketch
      to document the accelerometer orientation in the plant.          Example 6 was
      addressed in LER 86-044 which was closed in Inspection Report 416/86-41.
   4. Operational Safety, Radiological Prctection and Physical Security
      Verification (71707, 71709 and 71881)
      The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall
      plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant
      operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various
      members of the plant operating staff.
      The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that it was
      visited at least daily when an inspector was onsite.             Observations
       included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of
      operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches,
      annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for operation,
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      temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet entries,
      control room manning, and access controls.          This inspection activity   ,
       included numerous informal discussions with operators and their                j
       supervisors.                                                                  l
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      Weekly, when the inspectors were onsite, selected Engineered Safety
       Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation is made
      by verifying the following:       accessible valve flow path alignment, power
       supply breaker and fuse status, major component leakage, lubrication,
      cooling and general condition, and instrumentation.
      General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions
      of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside      i
       areas were visited.       Observations   included safety related tagout        I
      verifications, shif t turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general      l
       plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in
       progress, problem identification systems, and containment isolation. The
       licensee's onsite emergency response facilities were toured to determine
       facility readiness.
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                                   The inspectors reviewed at least one Radiation Work Permit (RWP), observed
                                   health physics management involvement and awareness of significant plant
                                   activities, and observed plant radiation controls.         The inspectors
                                   verified licensee compliance with physical security manning and access
                                   control requirements. Periodically the inspectors verified the adequacy
                                   of physical security detection and assessment aids.
                                   The following comments were noted:
                                   During a walk through of the A basin Standby Service Water (SSW) pump
                                   room, the inspector observed that the protective metal cover on the forced
                                   balance strong motion accelerometer (SC85-N004) was not secured in place
                                   but laying on top of the accelerometer. The. licensee was notified of this
                                   discrepancy. Correction of this discrepancy will be Inspector Followup
                                   Item 416/88-03-02.
                              5.   Maintenance Observation (62703)
                                   During the report period, the inspectors observed portions of
                                   the maintenance activities listed below.       The observations included a
                                   review of the Maintenance Work Orders (MW0s) and other related documents
                                   for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to
                                   technical specifications, radiological controls, observation of all er
                                   part of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest
                                   requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
                                   MWO-ELO239 Clean and Inspect Breaker
                                   MWO-ME0123 Clean PSW Side of Plant Chiller
                                   M0W-181194 Investigate in accordance with Instruction Reactor Pressure
                                                     Analog Trip Units
j                                  MWO-I81312 Rework APRM E Count Rate Circuit
                                   MWO-E81414 Rework MCC 11851 Power Cable and Check Breaker
                                   MWO-M81465 Install Temporary Plug in Overflow Line per MNCR-0048-88        i
                                   MWO-MS1509 Drain Diesel Driven Fire Pump Diesel Fuel Oil Tank               j
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                                   MWO-I81525 Trouble Shoot Cause of Reactor Scram                            1
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                                   No violations or deviations were identified.
                              6.   Surveillance Observation (61726)
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                                   The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillances
                                   listed below. The observation included a review of the procedure for
                                   technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification
                                   of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual
                                   surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or
                                   components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon
                                   the acceptance criteria.
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                06-IC-1C51-V-0001       Rev. 25, Intermediate Range Monitor Calibration
                06-IC-1E51-M-0022       Rev. 24, Drywell Aircooler Condensate Flow Rate
                                        Monitoring Function Test
                06-0P-1P75-M-0001       Rev. 33, Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) 11 Functional
                                        Test
                06-RE-1833-D-0001       Rev. 28, TCN 5, Jet Pump Functional Test
                06-IC-1E32-M-1001       Rev. 21, MSIV Leakage Control Pressure Functional                                     l
                                        Test                                                                                  '
                On February 24, 1988 the residents witnessed the jet pump functional test                                     j
                and Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs) test. ApRMs B and F failed due                                       i
                to the recirculation flow input to the flow biased APRM surveillance.
                Technical Specification 3.3.1, action item a, was entered by LC0 88-168.
                The LCO was lifted on that same day af ter corrective maintenance was
                performed.
                No violations or deviations were identified.
             7. Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)
                A complete walkdown was conducted on the accessible portions of the                                           ;
                Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator. The walkdown consisted of an
                inspection and verification, where possible, of the required system valve
                alignment, including valve power available and valve locking where                                            :
                required, instrumentation valved in and functioning; electrical and                                           '
                instrumentation cabinets free from debris, loose materials, jumpers and
                evidence of rodents, and system free from other degrading conditions.
                No violations or deviations were identified,

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             8. Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)
                The below listed event reports were reviewed to determine if the
                information provided met the NRC reporting requirements.                                 The
                determination included adequacy of event description and corrective action
                taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative
                safety significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and
                discussions with plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for the
                reports indicated by an asterisk. The event reports were reviewed using
                the guidance of the general policy and procedure for NRC enforcement

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                actions, regarding licensee identified violations.
                The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) are closed.
                LER No.         Event Date           Event
                *88-006         January 20, 1988     Condenser Manway Leakage on Hotwell low
                                                     Level Switches Tripped all Condensate and
                                                     Condensate Booster Pumps Resulting in a
                                                     Reactor Scram.
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                                            *88-001       January 03, 1988    RPS Actuation Due to Inadvertent Grounding
                                                                              of a Power Supply.
                                            The event of LER 88-006 was discussed in Inspection Report 416/88-01.
                                            No violations or deviations were identified.
                                         9. Operating Reactor Events (03702)
                                            The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the belcw listed
                                            reactor events.     The review included determination of cause, safety
                                            significance, performance of personnel and systems,- and corrective action.
                                            The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts,
                                            operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with
                                            operations, maintenance and engineering support personnel as appropriate.
                                            On February 27, 1988, while in the process of swapping from steam jet air
                                            ejector B to A, che plant experienced a burn of hydrogen in the offgas
                                            system. The swapping of Steam Jet Air Ejectors (SJAE) began by placing
                                            the standby unit A in an air purge mode as instructed in accordance with
                                            System Operating Instruction (SOI) 04-1-01-N62-1, Steam Jet Air Ejector
                                            Operation. Both stages of the A SJAE were then placed in service, steam
                                            supply pressure to the unit was being raiseo per the SOI to the normal
                                            operating range of 120-135 psig. Due to the receipt of a low steam flow
                                            alarm, supply pressure was reduced to 80 psig while I&C technicians vented
                                            the steam flow transmitters to insure steam flow indication was accurate.
                                            After venting was completed, the licensee proceeded by opening the suction
                                            valve to the main condenser. Shortly thereafter operations personnel
                                            noticed spiking of both hydrogen analyzers and loss of offgas flow. It
                                            was noticed by Operations personnel that the A train hydrogen recombiner
                                            temperature was approximately 600 F.       The Shif t Superintendent concluded
                                            that a hydrogen ignition had occurred and requested that power be
                                            immediately reduced to 75%. Offgas system loop seals were checked and no
                                            increased radiation levels or lost loop seals were discovered.
                                            Observation of elevated temperatures in the first charcoal beds of the A
                                            and B offgas trains confirmed that a hydrogen ignition had occurred and
                                            that charcoal had ignited. Power was further reduced to 55% and the first
                                            charcoal beds were bypassed. The licensee began purging the charcoal beds
                                            with nitrogen. Charcoal temperatures peaked at 443 F in the A bed and
                                            700* F in the B bed. As the nitrogen purge was placed on the charcoal
                                            beds temperatures started trending down. Incident Report 88-2-13
                                            documented the offgas system hydrogen ignition problem. A licensee task
                                            force was assembled following the event to implement unit recovery, review
                                            all data available, and to determine the cause and required corrective
                                            actions. The conclusion made by the task force suggested that the
                                            hydrogen buildup was caused by the initial failure of the A hydrogen
                                            recombiner to properly function due to wetting of the catalyst during the
                                            air ejector startup sequence. According to the licensee wetting of the
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            catalyst could be contributed to the piping configuration between the
            preheater and recombiner, poor procedural sequencing of drain valve
            operation, low preheater pressure and high level in the intercondenser.
            The hydrogen ignition caused damage to the inline dew point meter during
            this transient.    After the plant put recovery measures in place,
            Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 181296 was written to install a dewpoint
            meter at the offgas inservice afterfilter line. In addition, the licensee

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            put in place a long term nitrogen purge by routing piping from a nitrogen
            truck to the adsorber beds. Administrative Procedure 01-S-07-1, Control
            of Work on Plant Equipment & Facilities, paragraph 6.3 discusses the
            administrative control of Maintenance Work Orders (Kd0s) and paragraph
            6.3.2.c addresses the need for some work to be initiated immediately,
            based on the Shift Superintendents hdgement, for reasons such as to
            prevent imminent plant shutdown, prevent immediate and severe damage to
            plant equipment, etc. The Shift Superintendent is permitted to contact
            responsible maintenance personnel and verbt.lly communicate what work is
            required. The Shift Supervisor or Shift Superintendent is to enter a
            clear description of work authorized in his log. The Shift Superintendent      !
            is to ensure an Rd0 is initiated immediately in order to document any work
            performed and to expedite the MWO through normal channels. Contrary to
            the above, as of March 10, 1988, a MWO had not been initiated in
            accordance with Administrative Procedure 01-S-07-1 to document the
            nitrogen purge installation. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a states that
            written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained
            covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of R.G. 1.33,
            Rev. 2, February 1978.         Regulatory Guide 1.33 recommends that
            administrative procedures be written covering Procedure Adherence.
            Administrative Procedure 01-5-07-1, Control of Work on Plant Equipment and
            Facilities, paragraph 6.3 discusses the administrative control of
            Maintenance Work Orders.      The licensee's failure to follow procedure
            01-S-07-1 will be documented as the first example of Violation
            416/88-03-01.
            A special inspection, performed by Region II specialists, on this off gas
            event is discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-416/88-05.
            On March 15, 1988, at 00:40 a.m., the Division 2 Diesel Generator tachometer
            spuriously spiked causing the Standby Service Water (SSW) B pump and the       l
            Division 2 diesel generator outside air f an to start. The licensee             l
            declared the Division 2 diesel generator inoperable in accordance with TS      l
            3.8.1. By TS the licensee was required to restore the inoperable diesel        ;
            generator to operable status within 72 hours from the time of initial loss
            or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours and in cold-
            shutdown within the following 24 hours. A Maintenance Work Order (HWO)
            was written to remove the tachometer relay unit and replace the old unit       l
            with a new unit from stock.       The relay unit was then calibrated per
            procedure 07-5-13-10 and 06-0P-1P75-M-002, SDG 12 functional test.       The
             licensee successfully completed retesting on March 15, 1988, and the
            Division 2 diesel generator was declared operable.
            On March 15,1988, at 9:50 a.m. , while operating at 100% reactor thermal
            power the reactor scrammed on reactor vessei low water level.          No
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        emergency core cooling systems actuated and the operators stablized the
        plant in hot standby. A review of scram data by the licensee indicated
        that 29 control rods had inserted when technicians, who were performing
        reactor vessel water level ' surveillance 06-IC-1821-M-1003-2, inserted a
        Division 2 half scram signal into the reactor protection system.                The
        insertion of the control rods gave a very steep power drop and reactor
        vessel water level dropped also giving. a low reactor vessel water level
        scram. All control rods then inserted. The licensee checked the terminal
        box that feeds power to the A solenoids of the scram pilot valves and
        found a loose terminal screw approximately two turns from full in.
        Evidence of shorting could be seen on the metal jumper at the loose
        terminal. It appears that reactor protection system power being fed to
        the A solenoids on the scram pilot valves was interrupted by a loose
        jumper creating an inadvertent scram of 29 control rods when the B
        solenoids on the scram pilot val es w2re de-energized during the
        surveillance. Technicians then checked all similar terminal screws to
        ensure they were tight. The reactor was made critical on March 16, 1988.
        On March 17, 1988, while in the process of performing Surveillance
        Procedure 06-EL-1E12-M-0001, Revision 22, RHR Pump Start Time Delay Relay
        Functional Test, RHR B and SSW B pumps auto started. The cause of the
        pumps starting was contributed to an electrician involved in the                        i
        functional test working on the wrong breabr. Step 5.3.1 of procedure
        05-EL-1E12-M-0001 instructed the electrician to inhibit auto start of RHR               :
        pump 1E12 C0028 by jumping from terminals 9 to 10 of the ground
        overcurrent relay at pump breaker 152-1606 at bus 16AB. Contrary to the                 ,
        above, the electrician jumped contact 9 to 10 of the ground overcurrent                 '
         relay at breaker 152-1609 for pump C.        Failure to follow procefere               ,
        06-EL-1E12-M-0001 is a viciation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.c,                    s
        which requires written procedures be established,                  implemented and      L
        maintained covering surveillance activities of safety related equipment.                ,
        This is the seccnd example of violation 416/88-03-01.                                   !
       -No violations or deviations were identified.
   10.   Inspector Followup and Unresolved Items (92701)
         (Closed) Unresolved Item 416/88-01-03. On February 25, 1988 a telecon was
         held between the licensee, NRC Region II Section Chief and the resident
         inspectors concerning the acceptability of the Standby Service Water (SSW)
        overflow pipe and the unmonitored release of water from the SSW basin.
        The present SSW system design is as described in the Final Safety Analysis
         Report (FSAR). The overflow pipe provision in the SSW basin is described               f
         in paragraph 9.2.1.2 of the FSAR and paragraph 9.2.1.3, Safety Evaluation,             !
         of the FSAR describes the provisions for detection of radioactive                      i
         contamination and provisions to limit releases thru the SSW system to less
         than allowable limits. Other plants have once-through Service Water                    i
         systems where the water is released directly after having been monitored
         for radioactivity, and the GGNS design is similar except water is returned
         to the SSW basin. Af ter review of system alignment and controls by                    .
         cognizant Region II personnel, the residents were informed that the                    !
         release of SSW basin water through the overflow pipe in the manner                     l
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                described was acceptable. Based on their review of -this issue, the
                licensee is initiating several enhancements to their program. On March 16   '
                and March 17 the overflow pipe from the A and B SSW basins were
                temporarily capped.                                                         ,
                '. Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/86-41-03. The licensee has submitted
                ielief requests to the NRC for containment isolation provisions for
                various instrument lines. A letter dated February 12 1988 (AECM-88/0017)    '
                provided the licensee's response to NRC requests for further information.
                By letter dated March 7,1988, the NRC accepted the licensee's alternate
                basis for containment isolation.
                (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/87-29-01. -The licensee issued         ;
                Equipment Performance Instruction (EPI) 04-1-03-A30-2, Area Temperature
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                Monitoring, to determine monthly the temperature in selected plant areas
                to identify whether equipment qualification limits are being exceeded.      ,
           11. Management Meeting (30702)                                                   ;
                On March 4, 1988, the Region II Director, Division of Reactor Projects,
                the Resident Inspectors and the cognizant Branch Chief, Division        of
                Reactor Projects met with Licensee Management to discuss the Grand Gulf
performance overview and objectives. The attendees are noted in

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                paragraph 1 of this report. The licensee briefly discussed performance
                and experience in the plant operations, maintenance, security, training,

l licensing, emergency preparedness, engineering and quality programs areas. '

                A plant tour was conducted following the noted presentations.         The   l

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                 licensee also briefly discussed their preliminary findings of the          i

l investigation into the hydrogen ignition in che offgas system event that = , occurred or. February 28, 1988. This event is discussed in paragraph 9 in i l this report. 1 l l

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