IR 05000416/2016001
| ML16119A289 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/2016 |
| From: | Greg Warnick NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C |
| To: | Kevin Mulligan Entergy Operations |
| Warnick G | |
| References | |
| IR 2016001 | |
| Download: ML16119A289 (35) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ril 28, 2016
SUBJECT:
GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2016001
Dear Mr. Mulligan:
On March 31, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1. On March 31, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Greg Warnick, Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-416 License No. NPF-29
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000416/2016001 w/ Attachments:
1. Supplemental Information 2. Inservice Inspection Document Request
REGION IV==
Docket: 05000416 License: NPF-29 Report: 05000416/2016001 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Location: 7003 Baldhill Road Port Gibson, MS 39150 Dates: January 1 through March 31, 2016 Inspectors: M. Young, Senior Resident Inspector N. Day, Resident Inspector L. Brandt, Project Engineer J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector M. Stafford, Project Engineer C. Young, Senior Project Engineer Approved By: Greg Warnick Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects-1- Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000416/2016001; 01/01/2016 - 03/31/2016; Grand Gulf Nuclear Station; Integrated
Inspection Report The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and March 31, 2016, by the resident inspectors at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station and inspectors from the NRCs Region IV office. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.
No findings were identified.
PLANT STATUS
The Grand Gulf Nuclear Station began the inspection period at 87 percent power.
On January 1, 2016, the operators reduced power to approximately 59 percent to perform power suppression testing. Upon completion, operators performed power ascension activities to reach 100 percent power on January 9, 2016.
On Februrary 19, 2016, the operators commenced a planned shutdown from 95 percent power for Refueling Outage 20.
On March 28, 2016, the licensee completed Refueling Outage 20. Operators commenced power ascension and restart activites.
On March 29, 2016, at approximately 35 percent power, a turbine trip occurred that resulted in a reactor scram. The turbine trip was due to indication of a high differential current on phase B of the main transformer.
On March 30, 2016, operators commenced power ascension, and on March 31, 2016, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station was at approximately 49 percent power.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
On January 21, February 23, and March 17, 2016, the inspectors completed inspections of the stations readiness for impending adverse weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed plant design features, the licensees procedures to respond to tornadoes and high winds, and the licensees implementation of these procedures. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant.
These activities constituted three samples of readiness for impending adverse weather conditions, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems:
- February 23, 2016, fuel pool cooling and cleanup system, trains A and B
- March 16, 2016, engineered safety features transformer 12, switch and breaker lineup while engineered safety features transformer 21 was removed from service
- March 30, 2016, high pressure core spray valve alignment due to a Level 8 on reactor water level wide range indicator The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems or trains were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
These activities constituted three partial system walkdown samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Complete Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
On March 1-2, 2016, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown inspection of the alternate decay heat removal system. The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct system lineup for the existing plant configuration. The inspectors also reviewed open items tracked by the licensees operations and engineering departments. The inspectors then visually verified that the system was correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
These activities constituted one complete system walkdown sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on four plant areas important to safety:
- January 22, 2016, fire area 25A, fire zones OC702 and OC712, upper cable spreading room and HVAC room
- February 16, 2016, fire area 19, fire zone 1A403, 166 elevation corridors
- February 16, 2016, fire area 6, fire zone 1A201, 119 elevation corridors
- March 15, 2016, fire area 10, fire zone 1A119, low pressure core spray room For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.
These activities constituted four quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
On March 28, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of the readiness and availability of risk-significant heat exchangers. The inspectors observed the licensees inspection of the residual heat removal train B heat exchangers and the material condition of the heat exchanger internals. Additionally, the inspectors walked down the residual heat removal train B heat exchangers to observe their performance and material condition.
These activities constituted completion of one heat sink performance annual review sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.07.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities
.1 Nondestructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors directly observed the following nondestructive examinations:
SYSTEM WELD/COMPONENT EXAMINATION TYPE IDENTIFICATION Low Pressure Core N5 B Automated Phased Spray Array Ultrasonic Test Recirculation 1B33C001B-B3LUG1 Penetrant Test Feedwater 1B21G030-15-8-1 Ultrasonic Test Feedwater 1B21G030-15-8-2 Ultrasonic Test Steam Dryer SD-OD-HAD H2 Electronic Visual Test 1 Low Pressure Core LPCI-6-1d Electronic Visual Injection Test 1 The inspectors reviewed records for the following nondestructive examinations:
SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Feedwater 1B21G001W1 Ultrasonic Testing Reactor Core Isolation 1E51G004W4 Ultrasonic Testing Cooling Residual Heat Removal 1E12G015W58 Ultrasonic Testing Reactor Water Cleanup 1G33G011-3-11-2 Ultrasonic Testing Reactor Pressure Flange Ligaments 26-76 Ultrasonic Testing Vessel Emergency Diesel 1P75B004B Visual Testing Generator Division II Reactor Core Isolation HBB-259 FW-904 Radiographic Testing Cooling Reactor Core Isolation HBB-259 FW-938 Radiographic Testing Cooling Reactor Core Isolation HBB-259 FW-939 Radiographic Testing Cooling Reactor Core Isolation HBB-259 FW-940 Radiographic Testing Cooling SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Reactor Core Isolation HBB-259 FW-942 Radiographic Testing Cooling During the review and observation of each examination, the inspectors verified that activities were performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements and applicable procedures. The licensee identified two relevant indications that were previously examined. The licensee evaluated and accepted the indications in accordance with ASME Code requirements. The inspectors also verified the qualifications of all nondestructive examination technicians performing the inspections were current.
The inspectors observed one weld on main steam line drain valve F049. No welds on the reactor coolant system pressure boundary were observed.
The inspectors directly observed a portion of the following welding activity:
SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION WELD TYPE Main Steam 1N11F049 Weld 902 Gas Tungsten Arc Welding The inspectors verified, by review, that the welding procedure specifications and the welders had been properly qualified in accordance with ASME Code,Section IX, requirements. The inspectors also verified, through observation and record review, that essential variables for the welding process were identified, recorded in the procedure qualification record, and formed the bases for qualification of the welding procedure specifications.
The inspectors reviewed weld data sheets for the following welding activities:
SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION WELD TYPE Main Steam 1N11F049 Weld 902 Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Reactor Core Isolation HBB-259 Weld 900 Gas Tungsten Arc Cooling Welding Reactor Core Isolation HBB-259 Weld 900 Gas Tungsten Arc Cooling Welding Reactor Core Isolation HBB-259 Weld 901 Gas Tungsten Arc Cooling Welding Reactor Core Isolation HBB-259 Weld 902 Gas Tungsten Arc Cooling Welding Reactor Core Isolation HBB-259 Weld 941 Gas Tungsten Arc Cooling Welding These activities constituted completion of one inservice inspection sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.08.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71111.08-02.05)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six condition reports that dealt with inservice inspection activities and found that the corrective actions taken or proposed were appropriate. The specific condition reports reviewed are listed in the List of Documents Reviewed section at the end of this report. From this review, the inspectors concluded that the licensee has an appropriate threshold for entering inservice inspection issues into the corrective action program and has procedures that direct a root cause evaluation when necessary.
The licensee also has an effective program for applying industry inservice inspection operating experience.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On Febrary 2, 2016, the inspectors observed simulator training for an operating crew.
The operating crew completed a training scenario that included establishment of shutdown cooling, loss of shutdown cooling and entry into the associated off-normal event procedure, and withdrawing control rods to reach criticality. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators critique of their performance.
These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the operators performance of the following activities:
- On February 19, 2016, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity and risk due to a scheduled plant scram for the start of Refueling Outage 20.
- On March 25, 2016, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity and risk because of reactivity manipulations to start the plant up following Refuleing Outage 20.
In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures, including Procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations, Revision 16, and other operations department policies.
These activities constituted completion of two quarterly licensed operator performance samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:
- February 24, 2016, Refueling Outage 20 risk assessment
- March 9, 2016, refueling outage operations with the potential to drain the reactor vessel, a yellow shutdown operations risk potential, while the licensee performed inspection of secondary containment and standby gas treatment system, trains A and B The inspectors verified that these risk assessment were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments.
Additionally, on January 27, 2016, the inspectors observed one emergent work activity that had the potential to cause an initiating event. Specifically, the licensee had to place the reactor protection system train A to the alternate source of power due to high voltage indications on the normal source of power.
The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected structures, systems, and components.
These activities constituted completion of three maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed three operability determinations and functionality assessments that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming structures, systems, or components:
- January 13, 2016, operability assessment for the 119 drywell air lock outer door being inoperable due to degraded seals
- February 18, 2016, operability assessment of the standby liquid control system, trains A and B, due to incorrect inservice test pressure
- February 23, 2016, functionality assessment of the engineered safety features switchgear room cooler, 1T46B005A, due to high vibrations The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded structure, system, or component to be operable or functional, the inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability or functionality. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability or functionality of the degraded structure, system, or component.
These activities constituted completion of three operability and functionality review samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
On March 18, 2016, the inspectors completed their review of the Fukishima FLEX modification for inventory control. The modifications consisted of installation of new valves and piping in the standby service water train C and division III diesel generator systems. The inspectors reviewed the design and implementation of the modifications.
The inspectors verified that work activities involved in implementing the modifications did not adversely impact operator actions that may be required in response to an emergency or other unplanned event. The inspectors verified that post-modification testing was adequate to establish the operability of the structures, systems, and components, as modified.
These activities constituted completion of one permanent plant modifications sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed three post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant structures, systems, or components:
- January 19, 2016, 199 elevation primary containment air lock outer door leakage test following replacement of degraded seals
- March 7, 2016, division I diesel generator following removal, calibration, and reinstallation of sync check relay, 16AB-125
- March 7, 2016, residual heat removal system train B containment spray sparger inlet valve, E12F028B, functional and local leakage rate tests following valve internals inspection, cleaning, and reassembly The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the structures, systems, or components and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures.
The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected structures, systems, or components.
These activities constituted completion of three post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the stations refueling outage that concluded on March 28, 2016, the inspectors evaluated the licensees outage activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee considered risk in developing and implementing the outage plan, appropriately managed personnel fatigue, and developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions.
This verification included the following:
- Review of the licensees outage plan prior to the outage
- Review and verification of the licensees fatigue management activities
- Monitoring of shutdown and cooldown activities
- Verification that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth during outage activities
- Observation and review of operations with potential to drain the reactor vessel
- Observation and review of fuel handling activities
- Monitoring of heatup and startup activities These activities constituted completion of one refueling outage sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed nine risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the structures, systems, and components were capable of performing their safety functions:
Inservice tests:
- January 14, 2016, standby liquid control system pump A, quarterly surveillance and inservice testing
- March 26, 2016, reactor core isolation cooling pump flow verification surveillance test Containment isolation valve surveillance tests:
- March 9, 2016, feedwater isolation check valve B21F032B local leak rate test
- March 14, 2016, residual heat removal outboard suction isolation valve E12F008 Other surveillance tests:
- February 29, 2016, division III 125V DC battery bank 1C3, 24 month battery resistance surveillance test
- March 7-8, 2016, division II simulated loss of offsite power/loss of coolant accident surveillance test
- March 9-10, 2016, division I simulated loss of offsite power/loss of coolant accident surveillance test
- March 22-23, 2016, containment spray trains A and B nozzle obstruction verification surveillance test
- March 23, 2016, control rod scram time testing surveillance test The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected structures, systems, and components following testing.
These activities constituted completion of nine surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports for the period of January 1 through December 31, 2015, to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these licensee event reports to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operating logs and corrective action program records for the period of January 1 through December 31, 2015, to determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator.
Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees basis for including or excluding in this performance indicator each scram that occurred between January 1 through December 31, 2015. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review
a. Inspection Scope
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected one issue for an in-depth follow-up:
- On January 25, 2016, the inspectors reviewed an apparent cause evaluation associated with Condition Report CR-GGN-2015-06047. The apparent cause evaluation assessed Grand Gulfs categorization of adverse conditions and reporting loss of safety functions as required per 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors.
The inspectors focused on the extent of condition review, as well as evaluation techniques used to determine the causes. Overall, the inspectors agreed with the causes, however, questioned some of the techniques that were used to determine the cause. For example, the Barrier Analysis technique was chosen to aide in the determination. However, as described in Procedure EN-LI-118, Cause Evaluation Process, Revision 22, this technique works well in combination with Event and Causal Factor Charting, which was not used as a technique.
Also, the inspectors determined the documented extent of condition was inappropriate in that a condition report search of only reportable conditions for the past five years was used. The documented extent of condition did not discuss a search for equipment failures or other conditions that would result in shift operations making an inappropriate operability determination, that would result in the loss of safety function and require a report. The inspectors concluded these circumstances are how station personnel missed recent reportablility requirements.
The issues with the apparent cause evaluation were discussed with the licensee on January 25, 2016. The licensee initiated condition report CR-GGN-1-2016-00440, and amended the apparent cause evaluation to discuss the additional open corrective action of performing an appropriate extent of condition review, which is due April 28, 2016.
These activities constituted completion of one annual follow-up sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
.1 Undervoltage Condition on Division II 4160 V Bus Resulted in Automatic Start of
Division II Diesel Generator
a. Inspection Scope
On March 17, 2016, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station was in Mode 5 and in Refuelling Outage 20. A lightning strike or equipment malfunction occurred on the Port Gibson 115 kV offsite power line, which caused an undervoltage condition on the safety-related, division II, 4160 V bus, and a subsequent auto-start of the engineered safety features division II diesel generator. During this event, the licensee lost the shutdown cooling train that was supplying cooling. The operators recovered shutdown cooling within four minutes, resulting in no increase in water temperature. The licensee considered this a loss of safety function and made Event Notification 51800. The plant equipment responded appropriately. No emergency core cooling systems actuated. The licensee entered this event into their corrective action process as condition report CR-GGN-1-2016-02513.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Reactor Scram Following a Turbine Trip Caused by Indicated High Differential Current
on Phase B of the Main Transformer
a. Inspection Scope
On March 29, 2016, the inspectors responded to the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station control room to observe recovery actions following the reactor scram. At approximately 11:23 a.m., the reactor was at 35 percent power when a turbine trip occurred that resulted in a reactor scram. The turbine trip was due to indication of a high differential current on phase B of the main transformer. The plant equipment responded appropriately. There were no emergency core cooling systems that actuated and no engineered safety features equipment that activated.
The inspectors independently reviewed data logs, observed prodecure usage, and observed control room indications to confirm the initiating cause of the trip. The preliminary cause was identified to be a current transformer wiring issue on the phase B of the main transformer. The licensee corrected the current transformer wiring and monitored the transformer during power ascension activities, with no anomalies noted.
The licensee entered this event into their corrective action process as Condition Report CR-GGN-1-2016-02950.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
These activities constituted completion of two event follow-up samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On March 4, 2016, the inspectors presented the results of the inservice inspection activities to Mr. P. Williams, Director, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
On March 31, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. K. Mulligan, Site Vice President Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- K. Baker, Supervisor, Engineering
- M. Briley, Corporate Supervisor, Nondestructive Examinations
- R. Busick, Senior Manager, Operations
- T. Coles, Engineer, Regulatory Assurance
- A. Kelly, Implementer, Inservice Inspection Program
- K. Mulligan, Site Vice President Operations
- J. Nadeau, Manager, Regulatory Assurance
- K. Peterson, Project Manager, Engineering
- J. Seiter, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- T. Sherman, Program Manager
- S. Sweet, Licensing Engineer, Regulatory Assurance
- P. Williams, Director, Engineering
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
None Attachment 1