IR 05000416/1998011

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Insp Rept 50-416/98-11 on 980809-0919.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support
ML20154M156
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/14/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20154M135 List:
References
50-416-98-11, NUDOCS 9810200187
Download: ML20154M156 (14)
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. ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i REGION IV Docket No.: 50-416

License ~ No.: NPF-29 Report No.: 50-416/98-11 I

Licensee: Entergy Operations, In Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

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Location: Waterloo Road Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Dates: August 9 through September 19,1998

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Inspectors: Jennifer Dixon-Herrity, Senior Resident inspector

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Peter Alter, Resident inspector Norman Garrett, Resident inspector, River Bend

Approved By: Joseph Tapia, Chief, Project Branch A Attachment: Supplemental information

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Grand Gulf Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-416/98-11 l

l This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Operations

Centrol room operator performance during r.ormal operations and during a minor event was very good. Operations personnel exhibited good oversight and effective communications. The immediate response to the air leakage event of reducing pour to 80 percent was acknowledged as a confbrvative decision that effectively used lessons learned from industry events. The observation made by the reactor operator of the change in trend of the air pressure in the drywell was identified as good attention to detail and an example of a good questioning attitude (Section 01.4).

Equipment availability, material condition, and housekeeping were found to be very good during plant tours. The inspectors identified an example where attention to detail on the part of operators on tour could be improved, in that operators had not identified indicating lights that were out on the local emergency diesel control panels on two separate occasions (Section O2.1).

Maintenance

The eight maintenance and testing activities observed were properly performed with one exception. The licensee conducted repairs on the safeguards switchgear and battery room air handling unit sheave twice after finding it failed before repairing the equipment properly. The inspectors identified an example where the vendor manuals did not contain guidance for equipment repair and the licensee's work package'did not provide sufficient detailed guidance to perform the task (Section M1.4).

Train B of the residual heat removal system was properly maintained and aligned to satisfy Technical Specification requirements (Section M2.1).

Enaineerina

The engineering evaluation conducted in response to a 10 CFR Part 21 Notification on potential inoperability of the diesel engines was thorough and well performed (Section E4.1).

Plant Succort

Observed activities involving radiological controls and security were performed in a professional manner (Sections R1.1 and S1).

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over the second quarter training drill with respect to licensee's self-critique proces Personnel were self-critical and identified a number of programmatic and performance

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ReDort Details Summary of Plant Status The plant operated at 100 percent power until September 12,1998, when the licensee lowered power to 50 percent to repair a seal on main circulating water Pump B. The licensee returned the plant to 100 percent power on September 13,1998. The plant operated at 100 percent power until September 14,1998, when the licensee lowered power to 5 percent in response to increasing pressure in the drywell as a result of an instrument air leak. The licensee conducted

. repairs and returned the plant to 100 percent power on September 18,1998, and remained there through the end of the inspection perio . ODerations 01 Conduct of Operations O1.1 Control Room Observations

' Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors routinely observed the conduct of operations in the control roo Frequent reviews of control board status, observations of operator perfoimance, and reviews of control room logs and documentation were performe Obsen/ations and Findinas During routine observations and interviews, the inspectors determined that the control room operators were continually aware of existing plant conditions. Operators responded to annunciator alarms in accordance with approved procedures and demonstrated good three-way communications. Operations shift turnovers were .

thorough and conducted professionally. Operators were knowledgeable of the status of '

equipment, and applicable Technical Specificatior "miting conditions for operations were appropriately documented. The control room operators controlled ongoing surveillance activities well. The inspectors verified that safety-related systems were aligned in accordance with Technical Specification requirement .2 Scheduled Downoower to Reoair Main Circulatina Water Pumo Seal Insoection Scoce (71707)

On September 12,1998, the plant conducted a downpower for a planned control rod pattern exchange, control rod scram time testing, corrective maintenance to steam plant

, components, and repairs to the seal on main circulating water Pump B. The inspectors observed the downpower evolution in the control roo . , - - _

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l l Observations and Findinas The control room supervision maintained positive control of all planned evolutions and conducted pre-evolution briefs before all major activities. Periodic briefs were used to keep the operating crew aware of plant status and maintenance activities. Operations crew personnel conducted all activities according to plan using approved procedures, specific guidance, and support from reactor engineering. All reactivity control evolutions were performed using peer review and self-checking techniques. All control rod ,

activities were directly supervised by the plant supervisor and verified by a second i licensed operato )

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O1.3 Unexoected Pressure increase in the Drvwell inspection Scope (7170Z}  !

l The inspector observed the actions taken in the control room and the troubleshooting and mitigation efforts conducted by the licensee in response to an unexpected pressure i increase in the drywel ! Observations and Findinas l

On September 14,1998, while conducting rounds, a licensed operator identified that the drywell pressure was slowly increasing. The drywell pressure was normally stable at approximately 0.1 psig and was noted to have slowly increased to 0.3 psig. The operator discussed the concern with control room supervision and power was lowered to 80 percent . The operators were concerned that the increase in drywell pressure was due to leaking instrument air and could result in the closure of the main steam isolation valves. Operations personnel in the control room immediately assumed the positions that would be taken during an emergency response until the suspected cause of the drywell pressu~: increase was identified. Through evaluation of a computer trend, personnel noted that the instrument air supply pressure indicated a drop at the same time that the pressure in the drywell started increasing. The drywell was vented to the containment which was then vented through filters to the atmosphere. The operators performed this task approximately every 35 minutes as the drywell pressure approached

.5 psig (the plant was designed to automatically shut down at 1.23 psig drywell pressure) as a compensatory action until the root cause of the problem could be identified and repaire Engineering personnel reported immediately to the control room to assist with the troubleshooting effort. After identifying the instrument air supply lines to the drywell, the licensee conducted a meeting to determine an action plan to identify and repair the lea After entering containment, personnel were able to verify that the leak was in the drywell due to the increased flow on an air regulator on the line going into containrnent. The indicated flow was 270 scfm rather than the normal 120 to 180 scfm that had been trended in the past.

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Operations personnel lowered power to approximately 5 percent in a controlled manner to allow entry into the drywell. The team found that the solder had failed on a 90 degree elbow in the supply line to the inboard drywell purge isolation valve. The elbow and the attached line had been forced up away from the fitting. Maintenance personnel took

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pictures of the failed area and replaced the elbow. Prior to exiting the drywell, licensee personnel completed the tour of the drywell to verify that there were no additional air leaks. Operations personnel returned the plant to 100 percent powe The licensee plans to conduct a root cause analysis of the failure. The elbow had been installed in the plant since construction and was oblongated on the side that failed. The licensee observed that the flow through the regulator, which measured instrument air flow into the drywell, decreased to below 10 scfm after the repair. This indicated that i

the elbow had been leaking since before the regulator was installed in 199 O1.4 Conclusions to Conduct of Operations Control room operator performance during normal operations and during a minor event was very good. Operations personnel exhibited good oversight and effective communications. The immediate response to the air leakage event of reducing power to 80 percent was acknowledged as a conservative decision that effectively used lessons learned from industry events. The observation made by the reactor operator of the change in trend of the air pressure in the drywell was identified as good attention to detail and an example of a good questioning attitude. With the exception of the discussion in Section R1.1, all activities involved with the troubleshooting effort were well I

planned and conducted in accordance with the pla O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O Plant Tours l Insoection Scope (71707)

l The inspectors routinely toured the accessible portions of the plant containing safety and risk significant structures, systems, and components. The inspectors performed a general walkdown of the Train C reactor core isolation cooling and residual heat removal systems, Observations and Findinos The inspectors found that plant equipment was maintained in very good material l condition. Plant housekeeping and area lighting were good. The systems reviewed l during the general walkdown were correctly aligned and in good condition. During a tour i

of the diesel rooms on August 17,1998, the inspectors noted that the indicating lights were out for lockout relays on the local diesel control panels for both Division I and 11 diesels. The inspectors discussed whether the lights should be lit with the shif t superintendent who then had auxiliary operators check the panels. The operators found that the indication lights for two lockout relays and one compressor were burned out.

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l l-4-The lights provided an indication function only and did not affect diesel operability. On August 25,1998, the inspectors noted that the light for one lockout relay and two lights on the compressor control panel were out and notified the control room. Operators verified that the bulbs were burned out and changed the bulbs. The inspector discussed why operators had not identified these burned out lights during operator rounds with the shift superintendent and the operations superintendent. Operations supervision provided training to the auxiliary operators on the need to check the lights and initiated Condition Report 1998-0927 to identify the high burnout rate for this type of bul Conclusions Equipment availability, material condition, and housekeeping were found to be very good during plant tours. The inspectors identified an example where attention to detail on the part of operators on tour could be improved, in that operators had not identified indicating lights that were burned out on the local emergency diesel control panels on two separate occasion Quality Assurance in Operations 0 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities (71707)

During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed multiple licensee self-assessment activities. Three plant safety review committee meetings and the condition reports generated during the inspection period were included. The inspectors determined that the effects on plant safety and reportability were correctly evaluated and that the need for a root cause determination was identified where required by procedures. The inspectors reviewed several closed condition reports and noted that the corrective actions effectively addressed the concerns. The three plant safety review committee meetings were held to address revisions to safety-related procedures and the corrective action plan for the repair of the instrument air line in the drywell. The committee members exhibited a good understanding of the concerns addressed and asked pertinent questions about the changes and the actions being taken with regard to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the Technical Specifications. The inspectors concluded that the self-assessment activities reviewed were effectiv Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

O8.1 (Closed) ViolaNon 50-416/9805-02: Failure to follow Diesel System Operating Procedure. This item involved the inspectors finding the Division 1 standby diesel generator local control cabinet doors open and unattended, causing the diesel to be technically inoperable. The licensee identified the apparent cause as a failure to comply with the system operating instruction. The long-term corrective action was to reinforce the need to ensure the doors were closed with the auxiliary operators. To further enforce the training, the operator rounds were revised to specifically check the cabinet doors, rather than relying on the general area checks that called for this action previously. The inspectors determined that the corrective actions addressed the concern l

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-5-08.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 98-002: Failure to maintain standby diesel generator seismically qualified as required by Technical Specifications. This item was discussed in Section 0 . Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Maintenance Comments Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities, as specified by the following work orders:

= 202138 High pressure core spray motor oil sample and change a 212470 Replacement / troubleshooting of reactor protection system Train B fuse

  • 212445 Safeguards switchgear and battery room air handling unit sheave replacement Observations and Findinas All work observed was well performed and conducted !n accordance with the instructions and procedures provided in the work packages. With the exception of the concern discussed in Section M1.3, the technicians performing the tasks were knowledgeable of the equipment and used good work practices. The inspectors observed that the technicians adhered to electrical safety precautions and that the interiors of cabinets were clean and in good conditio M1.2 General Surveillance Comments Inspection Scope (61726)

The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the following tests and surveillances:

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  • Surveillance 06-OP-1C71-0-0001-TEMP 1, "MSIV Closure Functional Test"
  • Surveillance 06-OP-1T48-M-0002, " Standby Gas Treatment B Operability"

- TSTI 1P73-98-006-O-N, " Injection of Oxygen into Offgas System" Observations and Findinas t

The inspectors noted that the test procedures provided clear guidance and properly implemented Technical Specification requirements. Measuring and test equipment was verified to be within its current calibration cycle. Instrumentation was properly removed and returned to service. The operators and technicians were knowledgeable and l qualified. As-found test data was within the tolerance established for the equipment.

l Personnel involved demonstrated good communications and attention to detai M1.3 Safeauards Switchaear and Batterv Room Air Handlina Unit Failure The inspectors observed as the sheave and belts on the safeguards switchgear and

battery room air handling Unit 2Z77B001B were replaced on August 26,1998. The l

work was completed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors reviewed the

! history of the failure and learned that on August 19,1998, maintenance personnel discovered that the belts and sheave on the air handling unit had failed. Maintenance l'

personnel replaced the sheave and belts on August 21,1998. After returning the unit to service, the belts were found broken on August 22,1998, and replaced. On August 25,1998, personnel found the sheave and belts broken agai The inspectors reviewed the work instructions documented in the work package for the

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two sheave replacements. During the first sheave replacement, the directions provided l were to replace the sheave (no further details were provided) and to check the fan l speed and vibration after the work was complete. During the second sheave

replacement, the licensee had contacted the vendor. The instructions used were

! detailed instructions provided with the sheave. Guidance was also provided for l performing vibration and alignment checks immediately after the work was complete, l after 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of run time and, again, after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of run time. The licensee initiated Condition Report 1998-0893 on August 19,1998, to document the initial failure and

conduct a root cause analysis. The inspectors reviewed the vendor manual and found ti.at it did not contain guidance for replacing the sheave or for conducting any type of overhaul activit The inspectors discussed the activity with a mechanical maintenance supervisor. The supervisor explained that the licensee had discovered that the sheave originally installed i in the air handling unit was not the same size as that in the other three trains. As a result, the fan tumt at a slower speed. In April 1998, the licensee replaced the original sheave with the sar type sheave used in the other trains. No further work or adjustments were mWo at the time, beyond verifying the fan speed and checking for vibration. The supervisor identified a number of potential root causes that would be reviewed, including the setpoints for the temperature switches which turn the unit on and off, the original sheave change out, and the maintenance practices used to replace the i

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7-sheaves. The supervisor explained that this was the first time that they had performed anything more than preventive maintenance on the unit M1.4 Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance i The eight maintenance and testing activities observed were properly performed, with l one exception. The licensee conducted repairs on the safeguards switchgear and i battery room air handling unit sheave twice after finding it failed before repairing the equipment properly. The vendor manual did not contain guidance for equipment repair j and the licensee's work package did not provide sufficient detailed guidance to perform the tas !

i M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment )

l M Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdown j

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l Inspection Scoce (71707)  ;

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Train B Residual Heat Removal system. The inspectors verified proper valve, control

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board, remote shutdown panel, and electrical alignment in accordance viith System i Operating Procedure 04-1-01-E12-1 and Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&lD) M-1085A & I Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that the system was properly aligned to assure system operability 4 I

in accordance with the applicable procedure and P&lDs and that the alignment satisfied Technical Specification and UFSAR requirements. Major components were properly

, labeled, lubricated, and free of identifiable leakage.

l The inspectors identified minor discrepancies in the system manual valve lineup checksheet. The actual valve location and locked valve status that did not agree with  ;

l the P&lD. The discrepancies were reported to the operations department for correctio i Conclusions l Train B of th" residual heat removal system was properly maintained and aligned to ,

i satisry Teianical Specification requirement )

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8-lil. Enaineerina E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance E4.1 Standby Diesel Generator Ooerability Inspection Scoce (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the engineering operability evaluation conducted in response to a 10 CFR Part 21 Notification titled " Enterprise DSR-4 and DSRV-4 Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air Pressure Switch." Observations and Findinas The notification desci.ued the potential for nonessential automatic safety shutdowns to be reactivated after an emergency start if the starting air tank pressure fell below the pressure switch low pressure limit. The li;ensee immediately initiated Condition Report 1998-0910 to document the concern. The system engineer reviewed the logic and found that the identified concern did not apply. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation, the Class 1E start circuit logic diagram for the diesels, and the information provided in the notification. The inspectors noted that the pressure switch that would open upon sensing low pressure in the air start tanks was not in line with the solenoid that deactivated the nonessential automatic safety shutdown The system engineer identified a potential for the diesels to trip if starting air decreased to less than 40 psig due to loss of pneumatic control. The engineer detailed compensatory actions already in place to address this potential concern. The described event would require the failure of a trip parameter, the failure of the motor-driven air compressor, and the failure of operators to respond to alarm response instructions. In this case, an alarm would sound in the control room when the tank pressure decreased below 200 psig and existing procedures would require operators to start the diesel driven air compressor. The diesel driven air compressor would return the air storage tanks to the correct pressure and prevent the diesels from tripping. The engineer stated that the condition report would remain open to allow further review of the latter issue and the identification of additional potential corrective action Conclusions The engineering evaluation conducted in response to a 10 CFR Part 21 Notification on potentialinoperability of the diesel engines was thorough and well performe E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)

E8.1 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item 50-416/9809-01: Design basis for control room air

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, conditioning. This item was opened to review the difference between the description of the control roorn air conditioning system in the UFSAR and procedure changes that resulted from a design problem identified with the system in July 1989. As a result of f

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-9-the design problem, personnel are required to align a manual valve in the standby service water system to allow the system to perform its design function following a loss

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of instrument air or a loss of offsite power coincident with a loss of a coolant acciden The UFSAR description does not include manual action outside of the control roo The inspector discussed the concern with licensing personnel responsible for updating the UFSAR who explained that the engineers were not aware that the UFSAR contained the statement that all instrumentation and controls for the heating, ventilation, and air ;

conditioning system are designed for automatic operation with manual starting of the i fans and that the alarms and manual controls for the fans are located in the control room. As a result, the UFSAR was not changed in 1989. The inspectors considered

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that the current off-normal procedure for loss of instrument air provides adequate l direction to assure proper system operation, and that the licensee currently plans to l modify the system to eliminate the operator workaroun j IV. Plant Suncort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1,1 General Comments (71750)

The inspectors made frequent tours of the radiological controlled area and observed radiological postings and worker adherence to protective clothing requirements. Locked high radiation doors were properly controlled, high radiation and contamination areas were properly posted, and personnel were following procedures. The inspectors observed that survey maps reviewed were posted and up-to-date. Observed activities involving radiological controls were performed in a professional manne R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R Use of Neutron Monitor Insoection Scope (71750)

The inspectors discussed the radiation concerns and the radiation protection plans developed in response to the required entry into the drywell and followed up on licensee identified concems involving the surveys conducted in res 3onse to the plan Observations and Findinas The licensee identified that the technician using a neutron monitor to conduct the survey prior to entry into the drywell had the monitor in the incorrect setting during a portion of the survey. The monitor was inadvertently changed to the dose setting rather than the dose rate setting. As a result of this error, the technician identified a dose rate of 1 to 2 mrem per hour rather than the actual 800 mrem per hour. Both the incorrect dose

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rate and historical dose rates encountered in the areas were used during prejob i briefings to inform workers of the radiological hazards in the job area. During a later

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-10-cntry, radiation protection technicians using the same monitor recognized the error that had been made and assessed the situation. The total dose neceived by personnel as a result of the error was less than the prejob estima't..s, and there were no overexposures. The licensee documented the event in Condition Report 1998-0962, voluntarily reported the event to Region IV NRC personnel, and planned to conduct a root cause determination for the incident This issue, which may represent a violation of NRC requirements, will remain open for a reasonable time to allow the licensee to develop its corrective actions (eel 50-416/9811-01). Conclusions The licensee identified that a radiation protection technician incorrectly used a neutron

monitor during a radiological survey of the drywell, resulting in providing incorrect dose information to radiation workers during prejob briefings. Although this had the potential

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to allow workers to accrue more dose than expected or allowed, no negative consequence resulte P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness P Third Quarter Trainina Drill Inspection Scope (71750)

On August 26,1998, the inspectors observed and evaluated the control room and technical support center staffs as they performed tasks necessary for response during the third quarter training drill. These tasks included staffing and activation, accident assessment and mitigation strategies, event classification, facility management and control, internal and external communications, assistance and suppor' to other emergency response facilities, and prioritization of response activities for accident mitigation. The inspectors reviewed applicable emergency plan sections, checklists, andlog Observations and Findinas The personnel in the technical support center and the control room met all of the objectives the licensee identified for the observed drill. The inspectors noted that personnel were aware of their responsibilities and carried out those responsibilities wel The controllers in this drill were noted to be more involved in the training aspect of the drill and in ensuring that the scenario went according to plan. The inspectors observed as controllers stepped in unobtrusively to provide guidance to players on their job responsibilities and on the scenario when things went wrong. The inspectors noted that the licensee had provided the ccntrollers and evaluators for the drill with training on the licensee's expectations and their responsibilities before the drill bega The inspectors noted several concerns that were not addressed during the licensee's self-critique. The control room simulator was not prepared to provide the trainees with all of the information that would normally be available in that charts used in the control l

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-11-room, such as the Technical Specification tracking board, had been left blank. In addition, the inspectors noted that the players immediately staged themselves in the positions they would take during response to an accident before the drill began. During the drill, the control room simulator crew operated residual heat removal Pump A on minimum flow for approximately 31/2 hours while waiting for the failed closed low pressure coolant injection valve to be manually opened. This was in conflict with !

System Operating Procedure 04-1-01-E12-1, " Residual Heat Removal System,"

Revision 107, Precaution 3.2.1, to " limit the time an RHR pump runs on minimum flow l as much as possible, normally not to exceed one hour" and with Emergency Procedure 05 S-01-EP-3, " Containment Control," Revision 25, direction to operate all available Suppression Pool Cooling using those RHR pumps not available for or )

required to assure adequate core cooling when suppression pool temperature is above )

95 l Conclusions During the third quarter emergency preparedness training drill, licensee staff I demonstrated good performance in the control room simulator, improved performance ;

in the technical support center, and improved communications between the control !

room, the technical support center, and the operations support cente j i

P4.2 Ligensee Self-Critiooe j Inspection Scone I Tne inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's end-of-drill facility critique in the l control room, the technical support center, as well as the controller and evaluator critique on August 27,1998, to determine whether the process would identify and characterize weak or deficient areas in need of corrective actio Observations and Findinos The end-of-drill critiques in the TSC and simulator were open and self-critical; a number of good issues were discussed. The controller and evaluator critique demonstrated improved performance over the second quarter training drill. The discussions were open and self-critical, identifying several areas for improvement for all of the emergency preparedness facilities. These included areas for improvement in tracking the repair team activities in the control room, in communications between the d4ferent facilities, and in the use of engineering in the different facilitie Conclusions The third quarter emergency preparedness training drill showed noticeable improvement over the second quarter training drill with respect to the licensee's self-critique proces Personnel were self-critical and identified a number of programmatic and performance problem . .. . . - . . .

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S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities l

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S General Comments (71750)

On a daily basis, the inspectors observed the practices of security personnel and the condition of security equipment. Protected and vital area barriers were in good condition. The isolation zones were free of obstructions and the protected area illumination levels were good. The inspectors concluded that the daily security activities were conducted in a professional manne V. Manaaement Meetinas l

X1 Exit Meeting Summary 1 The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 23,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente !

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie l l

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ATTACHMENT l l

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

' O. Bottemiller, Superintendent, Plant Licensing ,

' W. Cade, Assistant, Operations '

W. Eaton, Vice President of Operations l C. Ellsaesser, Manager, Performance and System Engineering C. Lambert, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering C. Morgan, Manager, Emergency Planning  ;

J. Roberts, Director, Quality Programs 1 C. Stafford, Acting Manager, Plant Operations R. Wilson, Superintendent, Radiation Control  ;

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observation IP 71707: Plant Operations

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IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations IP 92903: Followup - Engineering ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50-416/98811-01 eel incorrect use of Neutron Monitor (Section R4.1)

Closed 50-416/9805-02 VIO Failure to follow Diesel System Operating Procedure (Section 08.1)

50-416/98-002 LER Failure to maintain standby diesel generator seismically qualified as required by Technica! Specifications (Section 08.2)

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50-416/9809-01 IFl Design Basis for Control Room Air Condiibning (Section E8.1)

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