IR 05000416/1989017
| ML20248C964 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1989 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Christensen H, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248C942 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-89-17, NUDOCS 8908100196 | |
| Download: ML20248C964 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES 1t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.-
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REGION 11.
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 M
Report No.: 50-416/89-17
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Licensee:
' System Energy Resources, Inc.
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Jackson, MS' 39205 Docket No.: '50-416
. License No.: NPF-29 Facility Name:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Inspection Conducted: June 17 through July 14, 1989 f
. Inspectors:
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H.CChristensen, S6p Fj(siderit Inspector
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[ Tate Signed
JApproved by:
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F. 3. Tantrell, Sectio VC (f D6te Si'gned'
Division of Reactor Pro s
Scope:
I LTh'e resident. inspectors conducted a routine inspection in the following areas:
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operational safety verification; maintenance observation; surveillance observr. tion; engineering safety features (ESF) system walkdown; action on previous inspection findings; and reportable occurrences.
The inspectors conducted backshift inspections on June 25 and July 11, 1989.
Results:
. ithin the areas inspected two violations were identified.
Failure to W
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implement the RCIC system operating instruction which resulted in a RCIC and RWCU isolations, paragraph 3; and failure to take adequate corrective action to prevent clogging of a RHR suction strainer, paragraph 3.
This failure to take adequate corrective action is 'the third violation in this category this year (NRC Inspection Report 89-14 and 89 16).
These violations-appear to be an indication of past performance as compared to present performance.
.Present performance has demonstrated a more root-cause determination attitude.
This attitude has_ been reflected by the corrective actions associated.with the replacement' of the disk and stem for RHR A heat exchanger outlet valve, E12-F003A, NRC Inspection Report 89-13 and 89-14; the replacement of the A.
recirculation pump internals, Inspection Report 89-15; and the actions taken to correct-the post accident sample system, Inspection Report 89-16.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. Buckalew, Mechanical Superintendent, Acting
- J. G. Cesare, Director, Nuclear Licensing W. T. Cottle, Vice President of Nuclear Operations D. G. Cupstid, Superintendent, Technical Support L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Supervisor
- J. P. Dimmette, Manager, Plant Maintenance S. M. Feith, Director, Quality Programs
- C. R. Hutchinson, GGNS General Manager F. K. Mangan, Director, Plant Projects and Support R.-H. McAnulty, Electrical Superintendent A. S. McCurdy, Technical Asst., Plant Operations Manager L. B. Moulder, Operations Superintendent
- W. R. Patterson, Technical Asst., General Manager
- S. F. Tanner, Manager. Quality Services a
L. G. Temple, I & C Superintendent F. W. Titus, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering
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M. J. Wright, Manager, Plant Support J. W. Yelverton, Manager, Plant Operations
- G. A. Zinke, Superintendent, Plant Licensing Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security force members and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview C. W. Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, was on site July 6,1989, to conduct a plant tour and hold discussions with the resident inspectors.
i 2.
Plant Status j
The plant operated at power during the entire inspection period.
3.
Operational Safety (71707)
The inspectors were cognizant of the overall plant status, and of any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions l
were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room.
Observations included the verification of instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on
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equipment controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily jcurnals and data sheet entries, control room manning and access controls.
This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
On a weekly basis selected engineered safety feature (ESF) systtms were confirmed operable. The confirmation was made by verifying that accessible i
valve flow path alignment was correct, power supply breaker and fuse i
status was correct and instrumentation was operational.
The following systems were verified operable: HPCS, LPCS, SSW A.
General plant tours were conducted on a weekly basis.
Portions of the control. building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside areas were visited.
The observations included safety related tagout J
verifications, shift turnovers, sampling programs, housekeeping and general plant conditions, the status of fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, problem identification systems, and the readiness of the onsite emergency response facil'ities.
The inspectors observed health physics management involvement and awareness of significant plant activities, and observed plant radiation controls.
Additionally, the inspectors verified the adequacy of physical security control.
The' inspectors reviewed safety related tagout 893034, TIPS machine, to ensure that the tagout was properly prepared and performed. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the tagged components were in the required position.
The inspectors have noted that Senior Plant Management makes routine tours to the plant and the control room.
The inspectors reviewed the activities associated with the below listed events.
On June 20, 1989, at approximately 5:00 a.m., during a RCIC post maintenance run the plant received a RCIC isolation on high steam line
delta flow for both channels.
Prior to this event the system was tagged
out on June 19 for periodic maintenance which included replacement of oil j
filters; lubrication and inspection; rework of valves E51F219, F220,
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FX077, and F077; and perform coupling lubrication. The S01 04-1-01-E51-1, i
RCIC System, was used.to place the system in standby mode.
However, the i
steam supply valves were restored in the incorrect sequence.
The S0I l
specified opening the E51-F064 (RCIC steam supply drywell outboard isolation valve) then throttling open the E51-F076 (RCIC steam line warmup valve).
Once the RCIC inlet pressure equals reactor pressure, the 50I instructs the operator to open the RCIC steam supply drywell inboard i
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isolati'.i valve, F063.
The operators failed to follow the S01 valve lineup sequence causing a RCIC isolation.
This is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 on failure to implement procedures and will be documented as violation 89-17-01.
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The isolation was Nset and the RCIC test was restarted. At approximately 5:30 a.m., RWCU isolated due to a RWCU equipment area delta temperature-high isolation signal.
It was determined that valves E51-F219 and E51-F220, RCIC steam line drain valves, were approximately 5 turns gen. These two valves were reworked during the RCIC outage mentioned above.
During the
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time of the RWCU equipment area delta temperature high isolation, RCIC was j
being warmed up as part of the retest after the RCIC isolation that H
occurred at 5:00 a.m.
The floor drain for RCIC is tied to the floor drains to RWCU pump room, by having the RCIC steam line pot drain valves E51-F0219 and E51-F220, not fully closed some of the steam was diverted through the ficor drains to the RWCU pump room causing a high temperature
isolation.
This is another example of failure to follow procedures
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(89-17-01).
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On July 2, 1989, during the performance of the LPCI/RHR quarterly functional test (06-0P-1E-12-Q-0023), the RHR A pump suction pressure went
to a negative value.
The system was declared inoperable.
It was
determined that the reduction in suction pressure was caused by clogging of the pumps suction strainer.
The strainer was cleaned and the system returned to service on July 3,1989.
The licensee video mapped the suppression' pool to determine pool sediment conditions and the possible affects 'to the other ECCS pump suction strainers.
The pools sediment appeared to be small particles that were loose and easily placed in j
suspension.
The sediment coating appeared thin with some buildup located j
in low flow areas.
The licensee concluded that the deposit of particles j
on the RHR A suction strainer was probably due.to settling of particles on j
the top of the strainer causing a filter precoat effect when the system
ran.
To prevent reoccurrence the following actions were or are being i
performed:
all ECCS suction strainers were cleaned; the suppression pool j
is being vacuumed to remove the sediment; suction strainer differential l
I pressure limits will be established to initiate strainer cleaning; and a periodic task to vacuum out the suppression pool will be established.
A similar event occurred in March 1988, the RHR A suction strainer showed signs of clogging during a quarterly functional test.
The licensee cleaned the strainer and returned the system to service. The Plant Safety Review Committee met on June 15, 1988, to discuss the personnel safety concerns of using a diver to clean the suppression pool.
'n this meeting the committee stated that the removal of sludge would be a complished at the end of the next outage (Refueling Outage 3).
The suppression pool
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sludge removal was not performed. The failure to remove the sludge in the suppression pool resulted in the RHR A suction strainers reclogging.
The
PSRC administrative procedure was recently chenged to assign action item l
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responsibilities and due dates.
The sludge removal. action item was not assigned to a responsible group, so the cleaning was not accomplished.
The' failure to adequately prevent clogging of the RHR A suction strainer is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,' Criterion XVI, Corrective Action
'(89-17-02).
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
During the report period, the inspectors observed portions of the main-tenance activities listed below.
The observations included a review of the MW0s and other related documents for ' adequacy; adherence' to procedure, proper tagouts, technic &l specifications, quality control; and l
radiological controls; observation of work and/or retesting; and specified retest requirements.
MW0 DESCRIPTION 194061 Replace pressure switch for HCU 36-53.
194330 Replace solenoid valve for Q1T42F020.
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M94012 Disassemble and.
install new outboard / inboard seals on A TBCW pump.
M94079 Replace bearing / rework pump as necessary for primary plant chilled water pump.
ME3559 Remove condensate from fuel oil tank on diesel generator III.
E94580 Replace plant chiller C terminal insulators.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectars observed the performance of portions of the surveillance listed below.
The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications and LCOs, verification of test instrument calibration; observation of all or part of the actual surveillance; removal and return to service of the system or component; and review of the data for acceptability based upon tho acceptance criteria.
l 06-IC-1C71-M-2003, Turbine Control Valve fast Closure (RPS/RPT-E0C)
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06-0P-1E51-Q-0003, RCIC Quarterly Operability Verification Test i
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06-0P-1T48-M-00011, Standby Gas Treatment System A Operability Test 06-0P-1P75-V-0001, Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) II Functional Test 06-IC-1B21-M-1007, ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level Functional Test
.q 06-IC-1E51-M-0003, Suppression Pool High Level (RCIC) Functional Test 06-IC-1E32-M-1001, MSIV Leakage Control Functional Test No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors conducted a complete walkdown on the accessible portions of i
the combustible gas control system.
The walkdown consisted of the
following:
confirm that the system lineup procedure matches the plant drawing and the as-built configuration; identify equipment condition and items that might degrade plant performance; verify that valves in the flow path are in correct positions as required by procedure and that local and remote position indications are functional; verify the proper breaker position at local electrical boards and indications on control boards; and verify that instrument calibration dates are current.
The inspectors walked down the system using system operating instruction 04-1-01-E61-1, Revision 19, Combustible Gas Control System, and piping and instrument diagram (P&ID), M-1091.
The inspectors noted several labelling deficiencies on electrical breakers.
The electrical lineup, annunciator and valve positions were in accordance with the system operating instruction.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)
The below listed event reports were reviewed to determine if the informa-tion provided met the NRC reporting requirements.
The determination included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each event.
Additional inplant reviews and discussions with plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for the reports indicated by an asterisk. The event reports were reviewed using the guidance of the general policy and procedure for NRC enforcement actions, regarding licensee identified violations.
(0 pen) LER 89-008, Two redundant secondary containment isolation valves
failed to close.
On May 23, 1989, operators manually initiated Standby i
Gas Treatment System (SGTS) A and B.
This planned initiation was taken as
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l a precautionary measure while transporting the contaminated B recirculation pump upper shroud' from the cask washdown area to the refueling floor.
When the SGTS was initiated two secondary containment isolation dampers failed to close within the four second time limit of Technical Specification 3.6.6.2.
The two dampers, Q1T42F019 and Q1T42F020, are installed in series to isolate the outside air supply to the fuel pool sweep fans.
Approximately 15 seconds after initiation, the operator placed both damper handswitches to the close position.
The F020 damper closed slowly, but the F019 damper did not close initially.
The exhaust valve associated with the actuator of each damper was replaced and successfully retested.
On June 16, 1989, the operator manually initiated Standby Gas Treatment System B as a retest following scheduled preventive maintenance.
Upon initiation the Q1T42F020 isolation damper again failed to close within the four second time requirement of Technical Specification.
The damper actuator was disassembled for inspection.
The lubricant and 0-rings will be analyzed to determine if either may have affected closure time as described in a : February 1984,10 CFR 21 report submitted by GH Bettis Company.
The Bettis Company reported that Mobil grease 28 used as a lubricant could cause swelling of the seals in certain type actuators.
The model of actuator installed on the fuel pool sweep dampers was not
projected to degrade in stroking time.
In addition to sending the exhaust valve to the vendor for assessment, System Engineering will evaluate the need for a preventive maintenance program for actuator exhaust valves of this type.
(Closed) LER 87-011, Redundant isolation valves share common power source due to design error.
The following corrective actions have been completed:
divisional power has been changed for both valves; the control room annunciators were reworded to indicate the divisional power; the UFSAR was updated to describe the post-pump and pre-pump mode of RWCV i
operaticns; and valve G33F253 was leak rate tested. This item is closed.
I No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701,92702)
(Closed) Violation 87-18-05, Failure to notify the NRC within one hour of a major loss of the alert notification system. The licensee responded to the violation in a letter dated September 25, 1987.
The following corrective actions have been completed:
Emergency Preparedness Administrative Procedure 201, Emergency Preparedness Program was revised to require the determination of siren operability percentages and if less than 70 percent available, to report that to the NRC; deportability training was conducted; and a new activation and monitoring system was placed in operations. This item is closed.
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(Closed) T2515/93, Inspection for verification of quality assurance request regarding diesel generator fuel oil multi-plant action. item A-15.
The inspectors verified that the licensee has included DG fuel oil in the quality assurance program.
The licensee has classified fusi oil as nuclear safety-related, and administrative controls are in place to ensure fuel oil quality is maintained. This item is closed.
(Closed)InspectorFollowupItem 88-14-02, Resolution of reactor feed pump turbine A thrust bearing temperature.
The thrust bearing was replaced during the refueling outage.
Additionally, a GE Technical Information Letter (70-8) stated that a maximum metal temperature of 220 F is considered normal. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 87-35-01, Four examples of failure to follow procedures and failure to have adequate procedures for performing maintenance repair, replacement and modification work.
The licensee responded to the violation in a letter dated February 19, 1988.
The following corrective actions have been completed:
system operating instructions were developed to control the operation of electrical buses; instrument sensing lines
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were walked down, all threaded cap ends were removed, the LLRT procedure was revised, and the plant startup procedure was revised to require inspections of sensing lines prior to startup from a refueling or extended maintenance outage; individuals who failed to follow procedures were counseled; and modification special test instruction 15-S-03-2 was revised to establish criteria for the conduct of operational impact reviews. This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresoivcd Item (85-16-01), Structural steel supports for cable raceway fire barriers are not provided with a barrier having a fire resistance rating equivalent to the rating of the barrier.
This item was identified during the Regional Appendix R inspection conducted on May 20-24, 1985.
By letter, dated June 14, 1985, the
d licensee submitted to the NRC/NRR a proposed exception to the requirements i
of Appendix R,Section III.G.2.a, concerning fire protection of structural
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steel supports for safe shutdown cable raceways.
With this exception request was the licensee's analysis to demonstrate that the unprotected steel supports, identified during the inspection, would not fail in a l
one-hour fire.
The NRC technical staff reviewed the June 14, 1985 l
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submittal and concluded that the licensee's analysis was not as conserva-tive or complete as previously accepted analyscs.
By letter dated May 1, 1986, the NRC staff requested the licensee to provide additional information regarding the analysis.
The licensee's response to the request dated June 25, 1986, has been evaluated by the NRR staff and draft input for a NRR Safety Evaluation (SE) has been prepared.
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memorandum (from G. Lainas to A. Gibson, dated June 15,1989), NRR stated that the draft SE input concludes that the licensee's exception for I
unprotected steel supporth is acceptable. Based on this information, this
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item is considered closed.
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ExitInterview(30703)
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The-inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 14, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the-inspectors during this inspection. The licensee had no comment on the following inspection findings:
Item Number Description and Reference 89-17-01 Violation Failure to implement
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procedures, resulting in RCIC and RWCU isolation.
89-17-02 Violation - Failure to take adequate corrective action to prevent clogging the RHR A suction strainer.
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Acronyms and Initialisms ADHRS-Alternate Decay Heat Removal System Automatic Depressurization System ADS
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APRM -
Average Power Range Monitor Boiling Water Reactor BWR
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Control Rod Drive CRD
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Design Change Package DCP
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Diesel Generator DG
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~CCS -
Emergency Core Cooling System Engineering Safety Feature ESF
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Flow Control Valve FCV
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FSAR -
Final Safety Analysis Report HPCS -
High Pressure Core Spray HPU Hydraulic Power Unit
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I&C Instrumentation and Control
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IFI Inspector Followup' Item
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Limiting Condition for Operation LC0
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Licensee Event Report LER
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LPCI -
Low Pressure Core Injection LPCS -
Low Pressure Core Spray MNCR -
Material Nonconformance Report MSIV -
Main Steam Isolation Valve MWO Maintenance Work Order
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NPE Nuclear Plant Engineering
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Nuclear Regulatory Connission i
NRC
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PASS -
Post Accident Sample System l
PDS Pressure Differential Switch
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P&ID -
Piping and Instrument Diagram PSW Plant Service Water
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Quality Assurance Procedure QAP
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Quality Deficiency Report QDR
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RCIC -
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RHR Residual Heat Removal
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RWCU -
Reactor Water Cleanup RWP Radiation Work Permit
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.SBLC -
Standby Liquid Control Standby Diesel Generator SDG
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SERI -
System Energy Resource Incorporation SGTS -
Standby Gas Treatment System System Operating Instruction 501
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Standby Service Water SSW
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Temporary Change Notice TCN
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Technical Specification Technical Support Center TSC
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.UFSAR-Updated Final Safety Analysis Report I
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