IR 05000416/1990020
| ML20058E897 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1990 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Christensen H, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058E894 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-90-20, NUDOCS 9011080019 | |
| Download: ML20058E897 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAn nEGULATORY COMMIS$10N
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ATLANTA,OEOR0l A 30323 S ' '*
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Report No.:eL50-416/90-20
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93m dicensee: ;Entergy Operations Inc.
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. ' '; Docket No.:i:50-416 License No.: NPF-29
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1 Facility :Name:. Grand Gulf Nuclear. Station
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? #" 11nspection Conducted: ^ September 15 through 0ctober Lw,
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19, 1990
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.WJ C H. 0. Christensen.,.Seni$r Resident Inspector Date Signed a
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J.-L.< Math 1, Senior Rghident Inspector Date Signed j
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JnF.S._fantrell, Chief-
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, Reactor Projects Section IB
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SUMMARY'
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lThe?residentlinspectorstconducted'aroutinoifnspection(in(the.followl.ngiareas:
a" TM operationalbsafetyiverification; maintenance observation';; surveillance observa-d fMjk 4 tion;Nengineeringisafety; features ? (ESF)isystem walk'down;z pre 6arationj for.
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%;y7. Mrefueling;trefueling! activ'ity; J and?reportabled occurrencest T aeB inspectors q
RQR o Jconducted.b~ ckshift; inspections,onj Sep.tember?17,118;:19,n30;'and October 1E6,.
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' "*ly In ;-.the inspecti6n aareas; of L safetys verif.ication6 maintenance e observation, a
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surveillance observation and ESFesistemLwalkdowneparagraphs73, 4,;50 6, the s E
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o o up"N,, OSeptemberl16k1990Wdueltou a3 failure with the LdivisionTone?lo'ad5 shedd J11censee met ithelsafetymobjectives :of. these areas. ! fThelplantiscrammedfonf
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- sequencerbParagraph 53. L BTheblicensee; performed La ;thoroughijob of" trouble r Es@; E
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" shooting? MtheJproblem andLreturned the: plantTto power on SeptembeW19C1990!-
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4 ; on October?1,V1990. The licensee:
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db :' d Thelplante entered 7 refueling t cutage:
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- encountered ; problems 1with the; removal of the : vessel. dryer land separatori p '{Additio'nal.ly.ithelrefueling1 bridge thasJfailed;severalitimes. - Thelotherdoutage -
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activities;have' proceeded smoothly with minimumtproblems.,
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted a
. Licensee Employees 9(. T._ Cottle, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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.D. G.>Cupstid Manager. Plant Projects
- L. F.-Daughtery,' Compliance Supervisor
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M._ A. Dietrich, Sirector,~- Quality Programs.
J. P. Dimmette, Manager,. Plant Maintenance
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- C..W. E11saesser, Operations Superintendent
- C.J. Hutchinsen,_GGNS: General Manager
.F. K. Mangan, Director,oPlant Projects and Support
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- M. J. Meisner, Director, Nuclear Licensing-L. B.: Moulder,-Acting Manager, Plant Support J.-V.:Parrish, Manager, Plant Operations
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LJ. C.- Roberts, Manager, P.lant & System Engineering.
J.fE. Reaves,-Manager, Quality _ Services-t. W.yTitus,> Director, Nuclear-Plant Engineering.
G. W.LVining. Manager, Plant Modification and Construction
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G.12inke, Superintendent, Plant. Licensing n
0ther. 1.icen'see ~ employees contacted included superintendents, supervisors, technicians,. operators', security. force-members, and' office
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-* Attended ~ exit' interview
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m F. Cantrell, Section LChief, Division of Reactor Projects, was. on site :
October?l8:and::S, 1990,:to tour the: site'and conduct discussions'with?
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the: resident inspectors and plant management.
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PlantiStatus
The plant began the ninspection ~ period in modet 1,'powerf operations.
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4 September 16, 1990,.the' unit scrammed. due ' toiloss1 of ' power : to the.
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,-balance 3 off plant busses...The' plant; returned tonpower. operation _ nn.
O September:19,L1990.
On' September 30,1990,7the plant' shutdown _ to.. start w
the fourth' refueling: outage and remained in the outageithrough. the end
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"l 3.: 10perationalysafetyr(71707,93702)
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Th'e inspectors were ' awareEof"the 'overallfplant! status, and ? of.~any 1 significant Dsafety matters. related to plant operations.
Daily.
'discussionsowereiheld lwith plant management and various members of: the'
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- plantjoperating L staf...
Therinsper+ ors made frequent visits to the
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control room.
Observations included:
the verification of instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; the review of operating system status and the tagging of equipment; the verification of annunciator
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m alarms, the limiting conditions for operation, and the temporary e
alterations; and the review of daily journals, data sheet entries, i
control room marni g and access controls.
Weekly selected engineered safeb feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable.
The -inspectors ve ified that accessible valve flow path alignment was correct, power supply breaker and fuse status was correct and = instrumentation was operational.
The inspectors verified _ the following systems operable:
LPCS, LPCI C, LPCI B, and ADHR.
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The inspectors conducted ' plant tours weekly. Portions of. the control
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building,: turbine building, auxiliary building and outside areas were l
visited.
The ~ observations included safety related tagout verifications,
= shif t - turnovers, sampling programs, housekeeping and general plant
' conditions.._ Additionally, the inspectors observed the status of fire
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protection equipment, the control of activities in progress, the problem
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identification systems,, and the readiness of the onsite emergency
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.The inspectors ' observed health physics managements involvement and
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awareness of significant plant activities, and observed plant radiation
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K controls; Periodically the inspectors verifled the: adequacy of physical
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securityj control.1 Additionally,. senior plant management was observed -
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making routine tours of the plant.
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The inspectors reviewed safety related tagouts, 903111" (HPCS/SLC
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. injection 1 Valve.B22F036) and. 903175 (RHR A E12F011A) to ensure that th'e
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tagouts were : properly. prepared, and : performed..
Addi_tionally, the _
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s Linspectors verified that the tagged components were in :thef required j
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posi tion.
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f The. ii.pec+ ors > reviewed the activities associated with theLlisted below
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' On September 16,1990,: Grand Gulfcwas operating at. approximately' 93%
/ core thermalxpower and 1098. MWE output. reactor. scrammed on Turbine 1 Co
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fast-closure, At the ' v
> time of' the scramt a Load: Shedding Sequencer (LSS)' monthly. surveillance, y
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06-0P-1R21-M-0001,Lwas being performed <for Division II.
A loss of power
. to the Balance Lofi Plant- (BOP) busses 11HD,12HE,13AD: and - 14AE had.
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occurred without - the Lauto-initiation -(LOCA) signal present.
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. shedding of lthe B0PLbusses resulted in;the loss of? plant. equipment which
included 1 condensate ' and. condensate booster pumps. : Reactor vessel' water
J:levelf began to. decrease.
HPCS automatically initiated at leve102 and-m
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RCIC was' manually started to restore and maintain reactor water level.
e All 6 low-low set SRVs' actuated and an additional 5 relief valves lifted to control reactor pressure.
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Once the plant was stabilized an investigation was commenced by plant-staff. When the MSIVs were reopened to establish condenser cooling, a reactor vessel level decrease occurred causing another. scram on low w
level at 2057 on September 16, 1990.
This was reported per 10.CFR
' 50.' 72.
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Inspection of the division I LSS panel, after the scram, indicated that both the'#1 and #2 0FFSITE POWER AVAli.ABLE status lights were out.
The division I LSS panel was declared inoperable and the LC0 was entered which, required the plant to be in cold shutdown by 1800 on September 18, 1990.
Investigation of the logic circuit in the panel revealed that one.
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m circuit board (XA62) contained chips ccmmon to the Offsite Power
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. Available #1, OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE #2, LOCA, and 3P status lights.
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-G This-board was pulled from the par,el, tested by computer technicians, and; determined to: have failed all gates in chip V1 and it had one L<'
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1 leaking 1 gate-in/ chip U4.-
After lifting 8 output leads to the B0P feeder
' breakers, to prevent.an inadvertent. trip, a new board was installed. The
! panel was 're-energized andLin less than a minute smoke was observed and
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the panel. was ' deenergized.-- After re) lacing various cards in line with
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- the 0FFSITEL POWER AVAILABLE status
- ight, the auto-test circui' was -
repaire'diand the ' operations monthly surveillance was successi,11y.
1 Jcompleted.. ;The Llicensee' determined that an operator replaced the power available1#1 light : bulb, believing it was blown, with a defectite bulb
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lcontaining anlinternal short.
The defective bulb caused an overcurrent
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condition which resulted in circuit' board. failures - and the: invalid 3actuationbof"thet BOR ' bus shedding relays.
At 1733 on: September 18,
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"Planti startup from the? scram commenced and criticality was achieved at r
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LOO:llion J September 19,199.0. Criticali.ty was achieved in aL. control
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OnL f 0ctober 1,L1990, {the~ licensee ' demonstrated that the alternate decay
y;f theat Jremoval system.was i capable of performing. its shutdown Jcooling t
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,yo function. : The ADHR; system was lined: up and ' operated iin accordance with
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system operating ~' procedure?04-1-01-E12-1, Residual. Heat Removal System.:
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The; system 1 was. ables to maintain 1a 132LdegreeF. reactor coolant-
. temperature.with aiflow: rate of approximately 3300- gpm.
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"Duringl the nreport' period,.the Linspectors observed.~ portions of the l
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1 maintenance activities 111sted below.
The observations ~ included a review:
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procedure, proper tagouts, technical specifications, quality controls,
and radiological controls; observation of work and/or retesting; and
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specified retest requirements.
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MWO DESCRIPTION
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l 18753 Perform 25% disassembly and l
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inspection of division 1 D/G.
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- 20421 HPCS_ diesel engine 'A'
power pack
replacement.
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.24118 Troubleshoot division I LSS circuit.
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07-S-24-P75-E001A8-26 Division I cylinder head stud rocker-arm capscrew and starting
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air valve capscrew inspection.
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07-S-34-B13-D008-1 CRD A5673 maintenance.
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- DCP 88/0027 Install ESF BUS status lights on HPCS-
-j panel H13-P601.
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23965-Disassemble'and rework mechanical seal for condensate booster pump 'A'.
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Theidivision lll. diesel generator power pack replacement was performed ;
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The hwintenance crew maintained.
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~ control over tools entering the work area; control of and labeling all-
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removed, parts;: and. control of personnel access.
Additionally, the1 crews l
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material.
The maintenance activities on the' division :1 diesel generator:
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were performed in-a controlled and orderly manner.
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No. violations.'or deviations 'were identified.;
The results of-. the-
inspection in1 this area indicate :that the. maintenance ' program was (+
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<The. observed; activities were conducted in a satisfactory
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(manner and the work was _ properly ' performed in accordance. with _ approved j
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. maintenance < work orders.
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? Surveillance _0bservation(61726)
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=The Jinspectors observed the performance of; portions of, the. surveillances
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'technicalc adequacy, _conformance to technical specificationst and LCOs;
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verification of! rest instrumentL calibration;: observati.on _of: allior part j
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- , b,.e ,, .- 9 S ' - x hy P' of-the actual' surveillances; removal and return to service of ~ the system or-component; and review of-the data for acceptability based upon the '
acceptance criteria, i 06-IC-1821-M-1009, Reactor Vessel Water Level (ADS L3) &
(RCIC L8) Functional Test, Channel B.
c ' 06-IC-1821-M-1014, ADS Air Receiver low Pressure Functional Test, Channel B.
< 06-IC-1E31-A-1002, Main Steam Line Tunnel High Differential Temperature Calibration, Channel B.
' 101-1-03-N21-6, Reactor Feed Pump Turbine "A":0verspeed . Trip Annual Test.
04-1 03'-N32-3.. Turhine Actual Overspeed Trip Test.
, , . No violations' or deviations were identified.
Ths surveillance tests- .r a were performed in a satisfactory manner and met ithe requirements of TS.
.! S 6.- Engineered Safety Features' System Walkdown (71710) , . The. inspectors. conducted a complete walkdown on the accessible portions ~ of the Combustible Gas Control' System.
The walkdown consisted of the' ,' following: confirm that the -system lineup procedure matches the plant L drawing and the as-built configuration; identify equipment condition and - items that might degrade' plant, performance; verify, that; valves -in the.
flow path are.in correct positions as required - by procedure and -that , > localjand remote ' position indications are functional;- verify the: proper breaker. position atLlocal electrical boards and -indications on control-- , ? boards;' and verify,that instrument calibration dates are current.. . -. , The inspectors walked down-the system using system operating instruction- , -04-1-6 -261 11and' piping and1 instrument diagram (P&ID) M-1091.
(Tiieflicensee :was L given :a list ofimissing: 1abels from components 'during-l ' thersystem walkdown.
A. discrepancy noted"during thei walkdown was the ' ' electrical Tchecklist for breaker, Y71-12 ~1n ' the ' procedure (SOI- ' - > "y~ .
- 04-1-01-E6111)fwas1abeled-Y71-10
- inthef.ield.
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- " c!Thei correction of L these, discrepancies 1will?.be ; identified as, inspector 4
. followupLitem(90-20-01).
~; ' * . No violations oor.. deviations' were ; identified.; The results Lof c the( f'
- inspection in 'thisJarea tindicate
- that the conbustibic gas control system -
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Preparation'forRefueling(60705) . On September 30,1990, at 1800 the plant entered hot shutdown and on the following day: at 0420 it was placeC in cold shutdown, mode 4.
The plant . - shutdown was orderly and in accordance with-plant operating procedures.
- The forth refueling outage started with-the following major activities scheduled: replace 284 fuel assemblies; replace 25 control rod drive mechanisms; conduct maintenance and inspection on the emergency diesel ' - generators;' conduct motor operated valve testing; tear down and inspect the t'B' low pressure turbine; perform SRV replacements; conduct stress , - improvement on the reactor vessel nozzles; and perform approximately 96 - plant-design changes.
For the 46 day scheduled outage, the licensee implemented an outage = organization-which 'will function 24 hours a day, with two '12 hour - shifts.
Each shift-consists of an outage director, two outage managers, " L two' outage coordinators, plus maintenance, operations, engineering and - support services: coordinators.
Additionally, each majer project has a + y responsible individual designated.
.,- To' improve radiation exposure tracking, the licensee implemented an-electronic dose monitoring' system (Dositec) 15 days before the start of-m thel outage., This system is a computer. based. system, which has electronici dose ' monitors that record the dose received, record ' the highestJradiation field the individual entered and provides the alarming dosimetry function.. Additionally,.if an individual is ' not on a RWP it ' ,
- will~_ not issue a monitor.
The system operated satisfactorily prior to the outage,'however on the first day of, the outage a. computer software t . problem developed; and the licensee had -to-_ shift oack to the manual' " system.- The1 switch to pocket dosimetry was smooth with-only. minimum , problems.
0n -October 8, 1990, the licensee ! corrected i the computer " x . problem:and started.a gradual shif t back to the electronic. system.
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- Priore to the.-' unit shutdown for; refueling ' the inspectors verified the technical ade'uacy of approved procedures-for the following~ areas:
' / q ' ii Receipt, inspection, and st' rage'on new fuel, l - n - . < ' 2 '. - nF0el handling.. transfer, and core-verification.
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3: _. Handling)and' inspection of any other core internals.
' L8'.3 defuelingActifity.(60710)l .
', On October 3, L1990, at' approxiinately 1633 GGNS;detensioned the first istudibolt: thereby1 entering mode 5 (Refuel).. The - controlling, procedure: o , - for. refueling, 101. 03-1-01-5, was reviewed by the inspectors -prior to.
. ' Tdetensioning, the reactor vessel - head. -During the liftingtof the steam ' ', , % dryer Hit became lodgedi approximately: five feet, aboveL its seated- ' , - <g, w positi.on. L Thel dryer,had rotated slightly out of alignment with11ts ,'
- guide rods Lpreventing further lifting.
At this point the -lifting i -
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evolutbri was. terminated and a team of Entergy and General Electric . Company experts was assembled to develop an alternate inspection and . ' removal plan.
The licensee used an underwater remote TV to inspect the ~ > - steam dryer.
It was observed that interference between the two guide rods and dryer o.mDy existed.
Early attempts to rotate the dryer back into alignment using hydraulic jacking. tools were unsuccessful.
Special remote tools were designed and' fabricated to attempt to dislodge the dryer assembly.
The dryer was re-aligned with the guide rods and r successfully removed on October 7,1990.
Inspections by the licensee on , October 8,- 1990, revealed that during the lif ting 'of the steam dryer, a . '1 - stiffener bar on the inside circumference at the bottom of the dryer ' skirt caught on the underside of the upper guide ring of the separator, bending 'the guide ring upward.
Six of 36 shroud head stud extension + J
E bolts were also bent inward.
The bending prevented use of the extension
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bol.ts for:detensioning' the shroud head studs. The seven bolts could not '! 'be rotated sufficiently to back-out the shroud head studs.
Special " . underwater tools were designed and fabricated to allow the cutting and v removal. of, the bolts and detorquing of the studs.- The separator was successfully. removed on October 16,.1990 and placed in the storage area.
' ' Further inspection and repairs will-be conducted prior to , , reinstallation.
Refueling has continued to be delayed by-severai break. ' downs-of the ' refueling equipment.
At 'the end of the: inspection period , r the outage was 9 proximately 140 hours behind schelude.
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Reportable' Occurrences (90712 & 92700) ' ~ , . . The1 event Lreports listed below-'were reviewad to: determine if the a information-.provided met the NRC. reporting requirements.
The '
1 determinationcincluded adequacy ~of Devent description, the corrective ' action-taken or. planned.: the existence' of potential generic problems and ths; relative. safety significance of each; event. The: inspectors used the - NRC enforcement. guidance.to determine if'the event. met the criterion _for.
.( - iicenseeLidentified violations.
, , (Closed)' LER - 90-15,p Controlt Building-Penetration not Properly. Sealed.
, a ~ ~ The: licensee discovered a' fire rated. assembly penetration _not properly;
o sealed, during. the1 implementation of 'a minor c change _ package. _ The 1 ~
' ' penetration was useal-on-August 24, 1990. JThe 1icensee believestthis is ~ < Ean' isolated case.
in November' 1984,: theilicensee implemented., controls.- - requiring a-MW0. for~ opening aiid closing. penetration eseals,othese -
' controls sstill;appearLadequate to prevent' recurrence..This-item:is m ' %'" 1closedL' ' ' ' , n n ~; - Med' L'ER.90-016 Entry. into Technical' Specification 3.0.3L Action. .; . Sta tement ~. On~ September-12,1990, ' prior to restoring the division ~ 1 purge. system stoL theroperable status,.an < attempt _ was made to stroke the _ W , > division ll? purge: compressor cooling water outlet. valve' in preparation j a
' ' -forlan inservice inspection' pressure test on thegcooling water system.
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- m This event was, documented in
'.The ' outlet valve ~ failed Eduring: the.'. stroke.
, NRC ;lnspection Report 90-176 The probable cause of the valve's failure ^ y , ' ' tn y > > ,n-q < ' , . > _ ,
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E i was determined to be the dynamic effects of the cooling water system and-the excessive drag on-the valve due to.the original asbestos valve packing.
The valve was repacked with graphite packing and successfully retested. This item is closed.
- 0n October 5,1990, the licensee reported that a fish kill occurred in
. sediment-basin A.
The fish kill totaled 147 fish (25 pounds).
The
' cause of the fish kill was a suspected thermal turnover and death due to b lack of oxygen.
On' ' October 8 and 9,1990, with the plant in mode 5, refueling, the licensee made two 10 CFR 50.72 reports.
They discovered that secondary ~containmenti access doors were open when TS required secondary containment be.in effect during core alterations.
On both occasions the doc:s' were secured: and after the October 9th event, watches were placed j at~ each door to _ ensure they were properly secured af ter use.
- - 'On 0ctober 10, 1990, the ~ licensee reported the loss of the operational L hotline' to the ' Louisiana' state _ agencies.
The' loss was caused by a damaged-fiber optic cable.1The cable was repaired and the line returned to service.
g. w > . , , . 0n October 14,1990, ~at 'approximately 2345 during an electrical lineup .,, , ' ' L an operator inadvertently bumptJ the handle to breaker 52-152109, which-Lsupplies power;to panel 15P21.
When the breaker was'denergized'several ,14 - drywell,; containment and auxiliary building isolation valves lost power ' ,
and closed.
The operator immediately reclosedithe power panel feeder ' l breaker /and notified the control room.
At-the time of the isolation the, , L i plant was. shutdown in. refuel mode', none of the valvesL affected shutdown
cooling capability;1 ~ ~ 0n: October 15 at; 1000 :a contracted ; employee.
' inadvertently.J bumped the; same ibreaker -(52-152109). handle 9 causing the! m sameneffect of isolating 1various 'drywellb containment and auxiliary E e ~ a < In both cases an incident report was written' building isolation ~ valves.
i'S,., andlaifourfhour report made.
, No violations:or? deviations were identified.- , , l10b-ExitInterview(30703) i @' iThe Linspection scopeJ and findings wereisummarized on Octoberc 18,.1990, W e
- withi tho;e : persons c indicatedJin: paragraph 1 above. ;: The Llicensee. did-not
< , " ' identify 7 as: proprietary any fof. the' materials provided to or. reviewed by /
the; inspectors 'during thf s cinspection.
The licenseeLhad no comment on- ' ' j.4 ithe'following inspection finding:: . Description and ' Reference-R:p,, Item Numbel . , , y v-IFI 90-20-01' Correction of CGCS Walkdown, Discrepancies, Paragraph 6.
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. m' . . Acronyms and Initialisms .
- 12.
%-. L ADHR :-'. Alternate Decay Heat Removal n ADS - Automatic Depressurization System Balance of Plant B0P - BWR ' Boiling Water Reactor Design CP.ange Package DCP - . Diesel Generator DG - - . .ESF..- Engineering Safety Feature , HPCS - .High Pressure Core Spray i ydraulic Power Unit
HPU. - H I &C - '- Instrumentation and Control a '
- IFI
- Inspector Followup Item LC0 - Limiting Condition for Operation ' Licensee Event Report LER > - ' LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident-
LSS , Load. Shedding Sequencer MNCR -- Material'Honconformance Report MSIV-- - Main Steam Isolation Valve:
MWO -, Maintenance Work;0rder - NPE'J-- l Nuclear Plant Engineering w NRC '
- Nuclear Regulatory Connission
- j LPDS -. Pressure' Differential Switch P&IP.- Piping and Instrument Diagram PSW::- JPlant Service Water-Quality Deficiency Report
QDR: - ., iRCIC.' ' Reactor Core Isolation _ Cooling.
- RHR U - Residual Heat.Removala - (RPS.1-Reactor 1 Protection System.
i .-l RWCU -- . Reactor Water-Cleanup , ' S01 ' System Operating Instruction - ,c SRV, - --Safeti, Relief-Valve ; , c, 'SSW L- ' Standby'. Service Water , /TCNL - Temporary Change Notice <
, ,, ' LTCV '-' . Turbine ~ Control: Valve ?TS- < Technical Specification- ' , ji ' f_ * s - i.[ p 7.. t - ,,
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