IR 05000416/1998009

Insp Rept 50-416/98-09 on 980628-0808.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20238F545
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	08/31/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20238F544	List: IR 05000416/1998009 ML20238F542
References
50-416-98-09, 50-416-98-9, NUDOCS 9809040011
Download: ML20238F545 (17)

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. 4 ENCLOSURE I I

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-416 License No.: NPF-29 Report No.: 50-416/98-09 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.~ l Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Location: Waterloo Road Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Dates: June 28 through August 8,1998 Inspectors: Jennifer Dixon-Herrity, Senior Resident inspector Ronald Kopriva, Senior Project Engineer Approved By: Joseph Tapia, Chief, Project Branch A i l

Attachment: Supplemental Information

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Grand Gulf Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-416/98-09 This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Operations

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Control room operator performance during normal operations and during a minor grid disturbance was very good. Operations personnel exhibited very good oversight, effective communications, and a high level of operator knowledge (Section 01.1).

Equipment availability, material condition, and housekeeping were found to be very good. The inspectors identified an example where attention to detail on the part of operators on tour could be improved, in that two scaffolds had remained in the residual heat removal pump room for a month after work was complete (Section O2.1).

The licensee effectively addressed an operator qualification concem, which resulted from assigning the shift supervisor to work outside the control room during the day shift (Section O5.1).

Maintenance

The six maintenance and testing activities observed were properly performed. The inspectors identified an isolated deficiency in the vendor manuals, in that the instructions for overhauling the safety-related control room air conditioner compressors were not in ,

the centrolled vendor manual (Section M1.3).

Both trains of the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system were well maintained and in good material condition. The system was accurately reflected in the procedures and drawings with the exception of several drawing discrepancies and incorrect restoration guidance in an off-normal procedure (Section M2.1).

= . On September 10,1997, the licensee identified that operations personnel failed to declare a containment isolation valve inoperable and enter the limiting condition for operation when the packing was retorqued to address a packing leak. This was a noncited violation (Section M8.1).

• On September 9,1997, the licensee identified that personnel failed to perform an ASME Section XI air seal system test or maintenance leak test after repairs were made to an inner containment airlock door in December 1996. This was a noncited violation

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The drain systems for the safety-related rooms are designed to prevent cross flooding between spaces. The inspectors identified an example of inattention to detail when a system engineer used a drawing that was not current to answer questions about the system (Section E4.1).

Plant Suocort

Observed activities involving radiological controls and security were performed in a professional manner with one exception. After observing two survey maps that had not been updated in 56 days, inspectors determined that the practice of allowing up to 60 days between updates of monthly survey maps had the potential to not capture changing plant conditions. The licensee acknowledged the concern and responded by changing their practice to that the survey maps were updated every 30 days (Section RI.1 and S1).

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Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant operated at 100 percent power throughout the inspection perio . Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Control Room Observations Inspection Scoce (71707)

The inspector routinely observed the conduct of operations in the control roo Frequent reviews of control board status, observations of operator performance, and -

reviews of control room logs and documentation were performe Observations and Findinos During routine observations and interviews, the inspectors determined that the control room operators were continually aware of existing plant conditions. Operators

responded to annunciator alarms in accordance with approved procedures and demonstrated good three-way communications. Operations shift turnovers were thorough and conducted professionally. Operators were knowledgeable of the status of equipment, and applicable Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation were appropriately documented. The control room operators controlled ongoing surveillance activities well. The inspectors verified that safety-related systems were aligned in'

accordance with Technical Specification requirements. During discussions with the control room supervisor, the inspector noted that the operators had been sensitized to the hot outside air temperatures and the affects on the plant. An increased awareness -

of risk significant surveillance and maintenance work due to maximum electrical grid loading was also noted. The operators were carefully controlling those activities that could cause perturbations to the plan On June 28,1998, the inspector observed operators respond to numerous control panel halon system alarms that came in as a result of a moderate disturbance on the gri The response of personnel was very good. Operators maintained three-way communications throughout the response and were knowledgeable of the potential causes of the alarms. After responding to the initial alarms, operators conducted detailed control panel walkdowns and identified no further concerns. The disturbance was due to the loss of a capacitor bank on the grid, l

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-2- Conclusions Control room operator performance duiing normal operations and during a minor event was very good. Operations personnel exhibited very good oversight, effective communications, and a high level of operator knowledg Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Plant Tours Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors routinely toured the accessible portions of the plant containing safety and risk significant structures, systems, and component Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that plant equipment was maintained in very good material condition. Plant housekeeping and area lighting were good. On June 30,1998, the inspectors questioned why two scaffolds, used 4-weeks before to allow the performance of preventive maintenance on motor-operated valves in the overhead, had not been removed from the residual heat removal Train A pump room. Although the scaffolds were seismically constructed, the inspector considered that once the maintenance had been performed, the scaffolds should have been removed. The inspectors discussed the concerns with the shift superintendent. The superintendent verified that no other work was scheduled which would require use of the scaffolds and had them removed the next day. The maintenance supervisor responsible for the scaffolding explained that it was their normal practice to remove the scaffolding from a safety-related space prior to the end of the next work week on the affected division (within 2-weeks). The inspector observed that scaffolds were not normally left in safety-related room On July 16,1998, the inspectors observed that a dust pan, mop, and dust mop had been left on the floor in a safe storage area in the low pressure core spray pump roo The inspectors were concerned at the practice of leaving light materials in a safety-related pump room because of the potential for the materials to block the floor drains during a flooding situation. The inspectors discussed the concern with the shift

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superintendent and he had the equipment remove The inspector discussed the concerns with the operations superintendent and questioned the level of detail auxiliary operators should be questioning while they toured the plant. The superintendent explained that he expected the operators to question anything abnormal in the plant and that the concerns described fit into that descriptio The inspector noted that the scaffolding in the residual heat removal room had been in place a month and had not been questioned and that the shift superintendent, although he removed the light equipment, claimed that he did not understand the concern. The operations superintendent stressed the expectations to operations personnel in an electronic mail.

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-3- Conclusions Equipment availability, material condition, and housekeeping were found to be very good during plant tours. The inspectors identified an example where attention to detail on the part of operators on tour could be improved, in that two scaffolds had been installed in the residual heat removal pump room for a month after the work was complet Operator Training and Qualification 0 Licensed Operator Qualification Insoection Scooe (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the portions of the licensee's qualification program for licensed operator Observations and Findinas The inspectors discussed the process for ensuring that licensed personnel were actively

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performing the functions of an operator or senior operator as required to maintain their license with the operations superintendent. The licensee had changed their work control program so that the shift supervisor assigned to the shift was located in a work control center separate from the control room several weeks prior to the start of Refueling Outage 9 in April 1998. The inspectors discussed the concem that this position may not meet the requirement to actively perform the functions of a senior operator as required in 10 CFR 55.53(e) with the operations superintendent. The inspectors found that the requirement was met by shift supervisors normally on-shift because, during the last 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of the 12-hour watch and during the night shift, the shift supervisor performed the functions of a senior operator in the control room. The superintendent acknowledged that there was a concern for licensed senior operators, not normally on-shift standing watch in the shift supervisor position, to meet the quarterly watch requirement. The licensee changed their process so that licensed operators not on-shift could not maintain their license by standing the day shift supervisor position and verified that no licensed personnel were affected by this concer Conclusions

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The licensee e'fectively addressed an operator qualification concern, which resulted from assigning the shift supervisor to work outside the control room during the day shif Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities (71707)

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During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed multiple licensee self assessment I activities, including three plant safety review committee meetings and the condition L-

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-4 reports generated during the inspection period. The inspector determined that the effects on plant safety and deportability were correctly evaluated and that the need for a root cause determination was identified where required by procedures. The inspectors reviewed several closed condition reports and noted that the corrective actions effectively addressed the concerns. The three plant safety review committee meetings were held to address scheduled issues and concerns that developed as a result of air conditioning Unit B tripping, as discussed in Section M2.1. The committee members exhibited a good understanding of the concerns addressed and asked pertinent questions dealing with the purpose of the temporary alteration to the air conditioning system with regards to the Technical Specification limiting condition for operation and the effect of the alteration on system operability. The inspectors concluded that the self-assessment activities observed were effectiv Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

08.1 LQlosed) Licensee Event Report 98-001: Manual reactor scram due to moisture ,

separator reheater differential temperature. The event was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/98-01. The cause of the scram was manual operator action in response to a transient brought on by the loss of a balance-of-plant inverter. The inverter tripped due to the failure of personnel to identify one of four fuses that blew when the clearance was placed on the inverter for maintenance. The root causes and contributing causes identified included the failure of personnel to document that the fuses had blown in a condition identification and the lack of indication in the inverter to allow identification of fuses that were blown or functions that were lost. Corrective actions included revising procedures to insure that blown fuses were properly l documented through the corrective action program, providing personnel with training on the event and the expectations for documentation of blown fuses, and properly labeling the inverters to better allow the identification of blown fuses. The inspectors determined that the operators' response was in accordance with the standing order in place for high differential temperatures between the moisture separator reheaters and that the corrective actions taken, or planned, addressed the cause of the even il. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Maintenance Comments  ! Inspection Scoce (62707)

The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities, as specified by the following work orders (WOs):

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• 00209592 Inspection of control room fresh air Unit A filters l

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= 00192278 Control room air conditioning Unit A compressor rebuild l

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• 19919052 Removal of humidity controls from control room fresh air Unit A (DCP 1052)

• 19960102 Modification of fuel handling area damper wiring for standby gas treatment Unit A to address dualindication

• 00211236- Troubleshooting of control room air conditioning Unit B trip Observations and Findinos The inspectors found the performance of this work to be satisfactory. All work observed was conducted in accordance with the instructions and procedu.es provided in the work packages. The technicians performing the tasks were knowledgeable of the equipment and, with the exception of the concern discussed below, used good work practice The inspectors observed that the technicians adhered to electrical safety precautions and that the interiors of cabinets were clean and in good conditio While observing the rebuild of the air conditioning compressor, the inspectors questioned the use of an impact wrench to install the bolts on the compressor head after the compressor head was installed and seated using two bolts. The work instructions called for the use of an impact wrench to bring the remaining bolts to finger tight condition prior to using a torque wrench to tighten the bolts to 76 ft-lbs. The controlled vendor's manual referred to a compressor service and overhaul section, but did not contain this part of the manual. The vendor had provided the maintenance shop with a copy of the vendor's manual that contained this instruction. This version of the manual did not go into detail on how the bolts were to be tightened, only that the bolts were to be torqued to 76 ft-lbs. The inspector questioned why an impact wrench was called for and whether the technicians had the control to stop when the bolts were finger tigh The supervisor for the task explained that the licensee had a vendor representative onsite when this task was performed and that this was the vendor's common practic ,

As a result of the inspectors concern, the mechanical maintenance superintendent I stated the work instructions would be reworded to remove the finger tight statement, i since the technicians could not maintain that level of control over an impact wrenc M1.2 General Surveillance Comments Insoection Scope (61726)

i The inspectors observed the performance of portions of l Surveillance 06-EL-1L11-O-0001, "125 Volt Battery Bank All Cell Test" and portions of control room surveillance tests being performed by instrument and controls technicians i and control room operators.

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The inspectors noted that the test procedures provided clear guidance and properly 1 implemented Technical Specification requirements. Measuring and test equipment was I

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6-verified to be within its current calibration cycle. The instrumentation was removed from service, applicable limiting conditions for operation entered, and properly returned to service. Technicians were very knowledgeable and qualified. As-found test data was within the tolerance established for the equipment. Personnelinvolved demonstrated good communications and attention to detai M1.3 Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance The six maintenance and testing activities observed were properly performed. The inspectors identified an isolated deficiency in the vendor manuals, in that the instructions for overhauling the safety-related control room air conditioner compressors were not in the controlled vendor manua M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Enaineered Safetv Feature System Walkdown Insoection Scope (71707)

The inspectors performed detailed system walkdowns of the accessible portions of Trains A and B of the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)

system. The inspectors verified proper valve, control board, and electrical alignment in accordance with System Operating Procedure 04-S-01-Z51-1," Control Room HVAC System," Revision 32, and piping and instrumentation diagram, Drawing M-0049,

" Control Room HVAC System Units 1 and 2," Revision 3 l Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that the system was properly aligned to assure system operability in accordance with the procedure and drawing, and that these alignments satisfied )

Technical Specification requirements. Valves were properly aligned and the major I components were properly labeled, lubricated, and free of identifiable leakage. The inspectors noted that the insulation on the ducting on the air handling unit for the Train B system was saturated and that the condensation was dripping onto the floor, iridicating !

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that the insulation had broken down and could no longer perform its function. The concern did not affect operability or functionality of the system, but the insulation was located over the air conditioning unit motor, creating the potential for condensation to fall on the motor. The system engineer acknowledged the concern and stated that he i pianned to complete a condition repor i The inspector reviewed the system engineering system health report on the system, the j

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maintenance history on the system, and NRC Inspection Report 50-416/96-06. The j

! inspectors noted that, with the exception of the concerns identified in the NRC report, i the system was being effectively maintained and that the licensee did not have a history of problems with the system. The system health report noted that the system was maintained in satisfactory condition, but that there were two items open on the l operation's work around list and that there had been one unplanned automatic initiation )

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-7-of the system as a result of a personnel error. Both of the operator work arounds were addressed in the NRC Repor The only system failure noted occurred during the inspection period. Control room air conditioning Unit B tripped unexpectedly. The unit tripped intermittently, so the licensee had difficulty tracing the root cause of the trip. The licensee installed a temporary alteration after 6 days to allow control room fresh air Unit B to be returned to operable status. The limiting condition for operation requires action for the fresh air unit within 7 days while the air conditioning unit's limit is 30 days. The alteration removed the air conditioning compressor from the system so that the air handling unit and ventilation system could be returned to operable status since the fresh air unit depended on this flow path. The plant safety review committee closely monitored the alteration and the repairs. The licensee responded by putting together a team of people to address the concern. The vendor was contacted, the air conditioner motor tested, and the compressor rebuilt in an effort to identify the problem. System engineering personnel used a new piece of digital measuring and test equipment and were able to identify a discrepancy between the electrical phases of the motor. As a result, the starter for the motor was reviewed more closely and the licensee identified that a hinge pin had come loose from a weld, causing the contactor to sit unevenly depending on the position of the loose pin. The starter was replaced and the system was returned to servic The inspectors were concerned that the licensee failed to recognize that an operator work around dealing with a loss of instrument air requiring operator intervention in operating the air conditioning system placed the system outside of the Updated Final 1 Safety Analysis Report design basis. After performing research, the inspector found l'

that in addition to a loss of instrument air, when the site experiences a loss of offsite power or a loss of offsite power coincident with a loss-of-coolant accident, the ,

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temperature control valve on the air conditioning system had the potential of failing to open due to a loss of instrument air or loss of control power. Material Nonconformance Report 0251-89 was previously written to address this concern. The disposition of this >

matter found that the air conditioning units would initially have effective capacity with the capacity decreasing to zero as the standby service temperature gets lower than the ,

design value of 90*F. The calculated standby service water temperature is I approximately 72"F at the onset of a design basis accident. The material nonconformance report was closed with a disposition which stated that administratively required operator action to adjust the cooling water flow addressed the nonconformance. The inspector found that requiring operator action outside the control room to address the loss of the component with a loss of offsite power was not a change to the facility as described in the Final Safety Analysis Repor i Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 6.4.1.1.m, which provides the safety design basis for the control room HVAC system, states that ths components of the control room HVAC system, except for nonsafety-related components, are operable 1 during a loss of offsite power. The temperature control valve is a safety-related )

component. Section 9.4.1.5 states that all instrumentation and controls for the HVAC i system are designed for automatic operation with manual starting of the fans and that the alarms and manual controls for the fans are located in the control room. The l corrective action for the concern was to have an operator use a manual valve outside i

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-8-the control room to retain air conditioning system operability. The inspectors opened an inspection followup item to allow further research on the adequcy of this corrective action in light of the design basis (IFl 50-416/9809-01).

The inspector identified a number of less significant discrepancies while reviewing the

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procedures and drawings for the system. Off-normal Procedure 05-1-02 V-9, " Loss of Instrument Air," Revision 28, directed that control room HVAC be restored to normal following restoration of instrument air and referenced System Operating Procedure 04-S01-Z51-1. In reviewing the two procedures, the inspectors noted that the only valve that was repositioned was a standby service water valve and that the HVAC system operating procedure did not address this valve. The air conditioning systems would be able to function and cool the control room, but would not have the ability to adjust to an increase in the temperature of the cooling water. This would not affect the ability of the system to perform its design function as long as the control room temperature was maintained at less than 90F. Technical Specifications require action to address the deficiency once the temperature increases above this limi Drawing M-0049 did not show temperature control Valves Z51-F073A and B, which are HVAC system valves nor the relationship with instrument air, in addition, two vent valves were not depicted in the same position as they were actually installed in the plan Conclusions Both trains of the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system were well maintained and in good material condition. The system was accurately reflected in the procedures and drawings with the exception of several drawing discrepancies and incorrect restoration guidance in an off-normal procedur M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event ReDort 97-004: Failure to declare valve inoperable during work requiring inservice inspection required stroke time retest. This event involved the failure of operations personnel to declare a containment isolation valve inoperable and enter the limiting condition for operation when the packing was retorqued to address a packing leak on September 10,1997. The root cause was identified as a failure to follow the work control process. The ambiguously written revised impact statement for the task was identified as a contributing cause. The inspectors reviewed the training records and verified that operations, maintenance, and planning personnel were provided with training on the event. The failure to isolate the affected flow path within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> as required by Technical Specification 3.6.4.2 is identified as a violation. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy l (50-416/9809-02).

M8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 97-005: Inadequate retest of containment airlock air seat system. The event involved the failure to perform an ASME Section XI required air seal system test or maintenance leak test after repairs were made to an inner

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. containment airlock door in December 1996. The licensee discovered the error after the door failed a pressure drop test during a surveillance on September 9,-1997. The licensee identified the root cause of the event as inadequate use of administrative controls. The inspector reviewed the revised procedure and verified that maintenance planners received training on the root cause report and the applicable procedures. The failure to insure the door was operable prior to returning it to service caused the licensee to be in violation of Technical Specification 3.6.1.2. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-416/9809-03).

M8.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 97-003: Control room envelope leakage potentially exceeding License Condition 2.C(38) limit. This report involved the licensee's discovery that control room envelope conduit internal seals were missing. Upon completing a 100 percent inspection, the licensee found that 11.5 square inches of open area existed as a result of conduits installed after the 1983 control room envelope test. This test established the basis for the license condition limit of 24 square inches. The licensee could not identify any definitive data to confirm that the limit was exceeded at any poin All open conduits were sealed, the event was discussed with plant modifications and construction electrical field engineers, and a computer database was set up to i document work on penetrations. The inspectors verified that the training and work took plac Ill. Enaineerina E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance  ;

E Floodina in Safetv-Related Rooms . Insoection Scoce (37551)

The inspector reviewed the drainage systems in safety-related rooms to determine if cross flooding between the rooms could occu Observations and Findinos The inspectors reviewed Drawings M-1094, " Floor and Equipment Drains System," l Revision 19 and M-1098," Embedded and Suspended Drains," Revision 12. The inspectors observed that, with the exception of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) l room, the safety-related pump rooms contained separate sumps, the watertight room i doors were maintained closed, and that there was a check valve in the lines for the l sump pumps to prevent flow into the sump from upstream of the pump. The RCIC room  ;

sump received flow from the equipment and floor drains in the RCIC room and from j floor drains in the main steam tunnel. There were also floor drains in the RCIC room that fed the south floor drain sump, which collected drainage from numerous areas in

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The inspector contacted the system engineer for the drain system and questioned whether there could be cross flooding. The engineer explained that he had reviewed the concern as a result of a recent event in industry and had determined that there were i no concerns. The inspectors discussed the interconnections with the RCIC room. The engineer stated that, although he had not reviewed the possibility of flooding back up through the floor drains, flooding from the auxiliary building steam tunnel was not a concern because of a normally locked valve in the line, as indicated on the drawin The inspectors questioned whether the valve (Valve P48-F002) was locked because it was not indicated on Drawing M 1098. The drawing showed an empty bubble, indicating a change had been made to the drawing. The engineer researched the two questions and found that the drawing he was using for reference was not an as-built drawing. Calculations had been performed in 1987 to allow unlocking the valv j Flooding of the RCIC room from the south floor drain sump was not likely because the }

drain in the RCIC room was at a higher elevation. The entire 93-foot elevation would have to flood before the RCIC room could be affecte The inspectors reviewed File No. 0290, dated June 11,1987, and Calculation No. 7.17.006-O, which documented the calculation completed to show that Valve P48-F002 could be left open. The inspectors noted that the calculation determined whether the flow contribution from the 6-inch line would affect pressurization ,

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of the RCIC room, but failed to review the affect from flooding. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to determine how this concern was addressed. Section 3C.4.2.3 stated that the only concern for compartment flooding was the pump suction line. This statement failed to take into account the standby service water lines in the room and the drain line into the sump from the main steam tunne ]

j The inspectors discussed the concerns with the system engineering manager. The manager determined that the calculation should have addressed flooding and that the statement in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not accurate. The manager also indicated that the system engineer should have been referring to a current drawin Engineering found that although the major lines passing through the steam tunnel are i part of a no-break zone, there were smaller lines that could potentially be a flooding l source for the RCIC room. However, the worst case flooding concern would still be the '

RCIC suction line. The manager stated that the calculation was to be revised to address compartment flooding and that the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report would be revised to state that the RCIC suction line was the largest postulated leak for the l RCIC room. The licensee initiated CR 1998-0821 to address these concerns. Because 1 of the period of time since the calculational error was made and the low safety l significance of the effect of the error, the inspector concluded that the failure constitutes ;

a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement actio ! Conclusions i

The drain systems for the safety-related rooms are designed to prevent cross flooding !

between spaces. The inspectors identified an example of inattention to detail when a !

, system engineer used a drawing that was not current to answer questions about 'he j system.

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E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-416/9719-04: Failure to have procedures to control power cords to ensure minimum separation. The inspectors reviewed Procedure 01-S-07-43,

" Control of Loose items, Temporary Electrical Power, and Access to Equipment,"

Revision 2. The guidance provided was straightforward and thorough. The inspectors verified that personnel had been provided with training on the revised procedure. During tours of the plant prior to and during Refueling Outage 9, the inspectors observed that extension cords and equipment met minimum electrical separation criteria. The inspectors also noted that plant personnel were identifying separation concerns through the plant problem identification program. Although minimum separation concerns were still being identified, none of the cases identified affected the operability of safety-related equipment. The inspectors concluded that the procedure developed and training provided were effective in addressing the concer IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments Inspection Scoce (71750)

The inspectors made frequent tours of the radiological controlled area and observed radiological postings and worker adherence to protective clothing requirement Observations and Findinas Locked high radiation doors were properly controlled, high radiation and contamination areas were properly posted, and personnel were following procedures. The inspectors observed that survey maps reviewed, with one exception, were posted and up-to-dat On June 30,1998, the inspectors questioned why the maps posted on the residual heat removal Pump B room were dated May 6,1998. The maps were labeled as monthly surveys. The technician at the control point explained that the survey had been completed on June 27,1998, but had not been reviewed and approved by the supervisor. The inspectors discussed the concem with the radiation control superintendent. The superintendent explained that the surveys were to be done in the calender month, so that there could be up to 60 days between the surveys without the survey being considered late. The inspectors questioned whether this practice had the potential to not capture changing plant conditions. The superintendent acknowledged the concern and stated that it was not a normal practice. The superintendent changed the routine for the health phyr'es technicians so that the surveys were conducted at least every 30 days.

i Conclusions Observed activities involving radiological controls were performed in a professional

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-12-manner with'one exception.~ After observing two survey maps that had not been updated in 56 days, inspectors determined that the practice of allowing up to 60 days between updates of monthly survey maps had the potential to not capture changing plant conditions.~ The licensee acknowledged the concern and responded by changing their practice so that the survey maps were updated every 30 day S Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities On a daily basis, the inspectors observed the practices of security personnel and the condition of security equipment. Protected and vital area barriers were in good condition. The isolation zones were free of obstructions and the protected area illumination levels were good. Temporary compensatory measures were implemented-as appropriate.' Personnel access measures and equipment searches for contraband were routinely good. The inspectors concluded that the daily security activities were conducted in a professional manne '

V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the ,

conclusion of the inspection on July 31,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente . The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. '

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ATTACHMENT

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee A. Barfield, Manager, Mechanical and Civil Design D. Bost, Manager, Plant Maintenance

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C. Bottemiller, Superintendent, Plant Licensing W. Eaton, Vice President of Operations C. Elisaesser, Manager, Performance and System Engineering W. Hughey, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs J. Roberts, Director, Quality Programs C. Stafford, Superintendent, Plant Operations R. Wilson, Superintendent, Radiation Control INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observation IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance

, IP 92903: Followup - Engineering ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-416/9809-01 IFl Design Basis for Control Room Air Conditioning (Section M2.1).

50-416/9809-02- NCV Failure to declare valve inoperable during work requiring inservice inspection required stroke time retest (Section M8.1).

50-416/9809-03 NCV Inadequate retest of containment airlock air seal system (Section M8.2).

Closed

'50-416/98-001 LER Manual reactor scram due to moisture separator reheater differential temperature (Section 08.1).

50-416/97-004- LER Failure to declare valve inoperable during work having inservice

. inspection required stroke time retest (Section M8.1).

50-416/97-005 LER Inadequate retest of containment airlock air seat system (Section M8.2).

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2-50-416/97-003 LER Control' room envelope leakage potentially' exceeding License Condition 2.C(38) limit (Section M8.3).

50-416/9809-02: NCV Failure to declare valve inoperable during work requiring inservice inspection required stroke time retest (Section M8.1).

50-416/9809-03 NCV ' inadequate retest of containment airlock air seal system =

_(Section M8.2). .i I

50-416/9719-04 VIO Failure to have procedures to control power cords to ensure minimum separation (Section E8.1).

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