IR 05000338/1985005

Insp Repts 50-338/85-05 & 50-339/85-05 on 850304-31.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint, Surveillance,Lers,Ie Bulletins,Followup of Previously Identified Items & ESF Sys Walkdowns

ML20128A189
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	05/01/1985
From:	Branch M, Elrod S, Luehman J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128A150	List: IR 05000338/1985005 ML20128A145
References
50-338-85-05, 50-338-85-5, 50-339-85-05, 50-339-85-5, NUDOCS 8505240149
Download: ML20128A189 (11)

Text

-- .

.

UNITED STATES

'

[A Kirog'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[" n REGloN 11 101 MARIETTA STREET, .g

• I *j ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

.....' (

Report Nos.: 50-338/85-05 and 50-339/85-05 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos.: NPF-4 and NPF-7 Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: March 4-31, 1985 Inspectors:Tk

~

h f/2'E[IT M.' Brpfch, Senior Resid{nt Inspector 6 ate 6igned

$NJ'

Y *//L1 l I"

/ fate / Signed G.' Lphean Resident Irfspector Approved by: /!/ [!/!I

'

$/ Elrod, Sectiort Chief Dete Signed r

Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection by the resident inspectors involved 222 inspector-hours on site in the areas of surveillance, maintenance, Licensee Event Reports (LER), IE 8ulletins, Followup of Previously Identified Items, Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings and Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown ,

Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were

identifie $$$ g

o

&,

.

'

REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted i

or

• E. W. Harrell, Station Manager  !

G. E. Kane, Assistant Station Manager

• M. L. Bowling, Assistant Station Manager

'*J. A. Stall, Superintendent, Technical Services

• J. R. Harper, Superintendent, Maintenance

• R. O. Enfinger, Superintendent, Operations

• A. L. Hogg, Jr. , Quality Control (QC) Manager

• S. B. Eisenhart, Licensing Coordinator

~J. R. Hayes, Operations Coordinator

_J. P. Smith, Engineering Supervisor-R. C. Sturgill, Engineering Supervisor D. E. Thomas, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor A. H. Stafford, Health Physics Supervisor

• E. C."Tuttle, Electrical Supervisor R. A. Bergquist, Instrument Supervisor F. P. Miller, Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor F. T. Terminella,-QA Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security-force members, and office personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope _ and findings .were summarized on April 1,1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Deviation 338, 339/84-06-15 Failure To Implement Controls' As Specified In Response To IE Bulletin 80-05. -The inspectors verified that the! licensee _has placed administrative controls on the Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) vents and that a performance test,1-PT-147.3 (01-30-85), for the boron evaporator bottoms tank vacuum breaker (PCV-BR-161) is in plac (Closed) Deviation 338, 339/84-04-01 Control of Compressed Gas Bottles. The inspectors have reviewed the procedures the licensee has implemented. With L both plants operating the procedures appear to be adequate.

l (Closed) Violation 338,-339/84-06-01 Inoperable Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

"

Vent The inspectors have reviewed the licensee's response dated March 4, 1985, and have no further questions.

L p

..

'

,

.. ,

. . .

(Closed)< Violation '339/84-06-08 Valve 2-FW-327 . Verified ' As ' Shut When Actually .The - Valve . Did Not Exist. The inspectors have reviewed the-

' licensee's response ? dated March 4,1985, . and the- latest . revision of the

~

"

. valve line-up checklist-(2-0P-31.2A) and have.no further question (Closed). Deviation 338,~ 339/84-06-03 Containment Atmosphere Hydrogen. Content

~ Indication Not Available In The Control Room Within 30 Minute In additio to reviewing '-the licensee's response .to this deviation (dated March 4,'

1985),ctheDinspectors = verified that the appropriate procedures have' been revised and-that training has been complete . (Closed)' Violation 338, 339/84-06-09 Material False Statements (EA-84-57)

Concerning The RCS . Vent System And Rea'ctor Tripc Breaker Maintenance Information. In' the , response to this violation the licensee explained-the '

-circumstances which allowed - this incorrect -information to be submitted to .

thel Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The inspectors -have. reviewed the~

H

~ corrective actions-taken by the licensee and have no further question . Unresolved Items

~ 0ne' unresolved item was identified during -this inspection .(paragraph 11).

< *

An unresolved item is -a matter about which more information is required to l

, _ ~ determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation'or deviatio . Plant Status Unit 1

. LU' nit 1 entered the inspection period operating at 30% as a result of an intrusion of lake. water into the steam generator secondary side due to . leaks-in the condenser water box.- The unit ended the inspection period at-or-near

~.100% powe '

(

'

' Unit 2

!- JUnit'2 entered the inspection period operating at or near 100%. However, on' -

j- March.5',1985 the unit was' ramped down to 30% power as a result of an

. intrusion of lake wateriinto the steam generator secondary side due to-leaks H in'the condenser water box. Also on March 18, 1985, Unit 2 was~ shutdown'as p (required by Technical Specification due to failure of the 2J Emergency

? Diesel Generator. 1The unit returned to power on March 20, 1985 after

. replacement of two cylinder liners and several pistons. Later, the unit was manually tripped fron 100% power at 2308 on March 23, 1985, wnen an off-site

[,, perturbation interrupted pcwer' to the Unit 2 semi-vital bus, resulting ,in a

temporary . loss of rod position . indication and control room . lighting. The b ~ unit "was subsequently restarted and returned to power operations March 24~ 198 ,

'

-

The off-site power perturbation occurred when the protection scheme for the

[ ,

1500/230KVL Gordonsville line transformer deenergized one of the two 500KV L . busses- (bus -2). 500KV bus 2 supplies power through a transformer to the

s

.

.

34.5 KV bus 4 which powers two of the three reserve station service transformers (A&B). Reserve station service (RSS) transformer A supplies preferred power to the 4.16KV vital bus 1J and RSS transformer B supplies preferred power to the 4.16 KV vital bus 2H. The semi-vital buses are powered from the vital busses. The inspectors followup of the partial loss of off-site power event revealed the following:

The Gordonsville transformer was installed during the 1984 outage and

-

was not provided with a line side breake However, it was provided with an automatic . disconnect which is not designed to open under loa The use of automatic disconnects necessitated the complete deenergization of the 500KV bus to isolate a fault. This isolation scheme was discussed with NRR and determined to be acceptable per General Design Criteria 17 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix "A".

~ Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The following LER's were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete._ Additionally, for those reports identified by an asterisk, a more detailed review was performed to verify that_ the

'

licensee had reviewed the event, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification (TS) conditions had been identifie *338/84-05 Rev. 1 Improper Electrical Sealing of Solenoid Valves

• 338/84-26 Rev 1 Unit 1 Reactor Trip, December 31, 1984 339/85-01 Fire Detector Technically Inoperabl (Closed) LER 339/82-52 and 339/83-51 Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor Faile In both cases, the monitors were subsequently returned to service. The licensee performed an engineering evaluation and

determined that the present mounting orientation of the monitor drawers is a problem. The long range plan is to relocate the monitor (Closed) LER 338/84-06 Application of Unqualified Protective Coatings on

!' Containment Ventilation Ductwork. This event was discussed in inspection reports 338,339/84-27 and 338,339/64-30. A Notice of Violation for making unanalyzed modifications to the facility was issued along with report

338,339/84-3 (Closed) LER 338/84-22 Revision 1 Fire Main Ruptur The inspectors have reviewed the event and verified the licensee's immediate actions were proper. The material failure discussed as the initiating event has been brought to the attention of the NRC Region II Materials and Processes Section for further evaluation.

i m

-

.

.

(Closed) LER 338/85-02 Missed Surveillances In The Valve Inservice Testing Program.- The inspectors have reviewed this event and the licensee's corrective actions. As stated by the licensee in the report, the failure to perform these tests is a violation of TS. Because the event was identified tar the. licensee .it was evaluated against and found to meet the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C, and therefore no Notice of Violation will be issue (Closed) LER 339/83-39 and 339/85-03 Failure ~of.Undcrvoltage Output Boar .The failures discussed in these reports resulted in IE Notice 85-1 :(Closed) LER 338/84-04 10 CFR 50 Appendix ~ R Reanalysis Equipment Discre-pancies. These discrepancies have been included as part of the licensee's Appendix R upgrade program and the correction of them will be reviewed as i part of.the NRC Region II Appendix R inspection which is presently scheduled for.later this yea . ESF System Walkdown The following selected ESF systems were verified operable by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the system Unit 1 March 19, 1985 Auxiliary Feedwater AFW (1-0P-31.2A)

Unit 2 March 18,'1985 AFW (2 0P-31.2A)

The inspectors had the following comments: PCV-159A and B are not on the valve lineup sheet FW-326 is not on the valve lineup sheet FW-299, 168 and 276 have no labels

Socket weld upstream of 1-FW-147 (gauge isolation) leaking L The following valves are-locked in their required position as required by station Administrative Proceoure 19.29, however, the requirement i that they be locked is not reflected on the valve lineup shee s Unit 1 FW-187, 184, 94, 128 and 278

, Unit 2'

FW-144, 145, 162, 180, 193, 174, 96, 130 and 278.

~ - -

__

-

.

$ .h -'

'5

.

s %.

" '

Correction of these items is identified as inspector followup _ item 338, .

-339/85-05-0 .- ' Followup of Previously Identified Items (Closed) IFI 338, 339/83'-BB-04 License Implementation Of .TMI Item I. The inspection requiredEby this' item was discussed in -inspection ' reports-338,'339/83-23 and. closed.in'inspectionLreports 338, 339/83-2 (Closed)- Unresolved. Item 338, L 339/84-38-01 Reactor Coolant System Average (Temperature - (TAVE) ' Upgrade Design . Change Requirement The. licensee provided the inspectors with documentation showing that procedures in place-at~ the time this project wa.1 initiated. did not require it to- be completed usingz a designi change. The licensee acknowledged that should a similar project be: started today, design change controls would be-use '

,(Closed) IFI 338, 339/84-08-01 Posting Of No Smoking . Signs. The licensee has posted the. required signs for the areas behind the main control boar LIn addition, the licensee has co'vered the access from the control room to the area- behind the control boards in 'an effort to reduce use of this area as a passagewa . IE Bulletin (Closed) 338, 339/80-80-05 " Vacuum Condition Resulting in Damage to Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) Holdup Tanks" (sometimes called " clean waste receiver tanks."). In response to Deviation .338, 339/84-06-16 the licensee outlined the corrective actions that would be' taken. The inspectors have verified these actions have been.taken and had no further question . ' Reactor' Coolant Letdown Gross Activity Monitors

- Paragraph -11.4.2.14 of the North -Anna Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report- (UFSAR) described the radiation monitor that continuously measures the reactor coolant gross activit As' described in the UFSAR the system consists of a low (RM CH-129) and high (RM CH-128) range detecto Further, in -the described system the high range' monitor should ' begin to

~

indicate activity above 10-1 uci/cm2

. . .

11m ' system presently in operation on both units consists of only the high

- range detecto The -10w range detectors were jumpered out because the

~

,

, ,  ; indication was continuously off-scale high. A design change was initiated

.

>' ~to - replace these detectors, however, it has not been implemented. The

~

"

' jumper. for~ the low range detector on Unit I has been in place 'since 4-19-78

- cand 'the jumper on Unit .2 ~ has been in place since 10-27-80. As mentioned earlier, the high range detector should begin to indicate when coolant

'

b activity is above 10-1 uci/cm3 Presently with gross activity levels only slightly above 10-1 uci/cm3 thg high range detector is already indicating at about mid scale (10 cpm to 10 cpm scale). The licensee has committed to h update'the UFSAR to reflect the system as presently installed.

!-

j ..

n '

.

• ^'

s a

.

~ $,

,.

11. IStation Batteries

'During this inspection period, thel inspectors reviewed the . licensee's programs for~ operation, maintenance' and testing of. the station batterie ,

'

The batteries covered in - the North Anna Technical Specifications- (TS)

include the main batteries (125VDC to ' plant D.C. . distribution system), the

~

emergency. dieseligenerator (EDG) batteries, .and the diesel 1 driven fire pump batteries. '. All - of' these batteries were examined . for proper installation, general condition ;and proper ventilation. During the course of .this

. inspection, the following procedures were reviewed:

• 1:and 2.- PT-85'D..C. Distribution Systems 1~and'2 - PT-86A D.'C. Distribution - H Bus 1 and 2 - PT-868:D. C. Distribution - J Bus

• 1 and 2 - PT-87.D. C.-Distribution System Service Tes . l'and 2 - PT-87.1' Diesel Generator Batter '

'*1'and 21 .PT-88A D. C. Distribution Systems Capacity Test for Train "A" Batteries

• 1:and 2'- PT-888 D. C. Distribution Systems Capacity Test for Train "B" Batteries-EMP-C-BY-1 Station Battery Repairs

~

EMP"C-BY-2 Main Station Battery Charging EMP-C-BY-4 -Troubleshooting and Repair of the Station Battery. Chargers

• selected completed procedures reviewed-Additionally, completed Design Change DCP 82-S34 " Replacement of Control . '

Storage Batteries" was reviewed. The following comments are the results of

~

the examination of the above listed' station procedure Technical Specification 4.8.2.3.2.C.3 (Unit 2) requires checking the -

, resistance of each cell-to-cell and terminal connection to verify the resistance <.01 ohms. 2-PT-87 does not. list this requirement under the-

acceptance criteria for ~ the main station batterie It appears that this requirement, which is ; listed under the EDG battery acceptance

' criteria 'as is proper ventilation, should be included in both sections

'

.of the acceptance criteria.

• The precretions and acceptance criteria of 1 and 2-PT-88A and B only

'

address a rminal voltage. IEEE'STD 450 (which is Attachment 6.4 of the

. . .

procedures) specifies that the evaluation that should be made if low ICV'is recorded in the

'

i

f individual cell voltage (ICV) is recorded -

.

.

.

(m . licensee's procedure but no evaluation is done.

I EMP-C-BY-1 requires' that specific gravity be checked and corrected for t temperature and level. but no correction ' factors are provided in the

% procedur >

' Upon . review :of completed 1-PT-85's the inspectors noted electrolyte

~

temperatures . for the EDG batteries as low as 39 The battery

' manufacturer (Exide) recommends maintaining the battery. temperature

r a

.

,

between 59 F and 86*F (preferably in the lower half of this range).

According to the manufacturer's literature at 40 F the battery only has 78% capacit and 2-PT-85 and 1 and 2 PT-86A and B accer,tance criteria specify that acceptable electrolyte level is between the maximum level and one inch lo If this criteria is applied to the EDG batteries, level could be below the TS specified level but still be satisfactory by the

• procedure The correction factor used for differences in electrolyte level is 15 points for every one-half of one inch. This correction factor is specified for C and D batteries but is also used by the licensee for Exide batteries. This factor is a function of battery desig In -reviewing the completed battery performance tests, the inspectors could not find one instance where the level correction factor for specific gravity had been applied. By visual observation, electrolyte levels in many of the battery cells were clearly below the maximum level. The performance tests require correction _ for level based on

" inches below maximum level". It appears that deviations of one-half and.one quarter inch are rounded to zero inches and so no correction factor is applie (The correction factor on C and 0 batteries for a level deviation of one quarter inch is equal to approximately the same correction made for a 21F temperature deviation). Small deviations in level are significant and must be considere TS 4.8.2.3.2.b.2 and 4.8.1.1.3.b.2 require comparing specific gravities with that of the last tes TS 4.8.1.1.3.b.1 requires voltage to be checked against that of the last tes I and 2 PT-86A and B provide the voltage information from the previous test, however, specific gravity information from the previous test is not provide In EMP-C-BY-4 the acceptance criteria for the diesel battery chargers output voltage is 12911VDC while at the chargers the acceptable range is indicated as 130 to 130.7 VDC (all readings-taken by NQC (controlled calibration) meter). Further, EMP-C-BY-4 calls for a float voltage of 123 1VDC when returning a charger to service, however, these values are not consistent with those specified for the individual batteries in 1 and 2-PT-86A and ' Unit 1 TS 4.8.1.1.3.n.2 requires that the corrected specific gravity for the fire pump diesel battery be checked. A temperature correction is applied to the specific gravity but a level correction is not even considered in the performance tes These items are identified as urresolved item 338, 339/85-05-02 pending completion of NRC Region II evaluation and completion of licensee evaluation of system conditions when correct surveillance procedures are performe . . _- - -- . .. - - _ - - - -

%

.

.

.

For the : visual inspection of the batteries, required by TS, the inspectors . utilized :IEEE -Standard 450-1975 and the Exide and C. and D Vendor Manuals, which were . referenced =in the. licensee's procedure The inspectors noted that although1IEEE 450-1975 specifies a visual-inspection of f the . battery cell and plates for; cracks, plate buckling,

-discoloring, grid cracks and plate growth, 'no acceptance criteria : was specified 'in IEEE '470-1975- or_. the vendor manuals for these condition "

When . questioned by the- inspectors, the licensee stated that any questionable ' condition would be identified to the vendor and a vendor

' representative would resolve all concerns and recommend any corrective

_ action During _. the visual inspection, the inspectors verified general clean-

~

liness - of the- batteries, freedom of . excessive terminal and connector

' corrosion,D electrolyte levels, integrity of battery racks, and general

- cell and cell plate condition ~

The following conditions were noted and identified to the licensee for. resolution:

- The Exide 2H-- emergency diesel generator 125 _ volt batteries had se'veral.. cell . plate dividers that appeared to have- slipped down and were approximately 1/4" lower than the other plate .. The' Exide emergency diesel generator 125 volt batteries had-several cell _ plates that were buckled, however, _ no plates were-touching andE no minimum / maximum distances could be - found in the manufacturers informatio ' The C and D station 125 volt batteries 2-3, 1-1, 1-2 and 2-2 were noted as having build-up ~of material- at the' bottom of many cell Some of - the material was white 'and some was - blac The licensee could not _tell the inspectors :if either material was. conductive or

,. whether bridging of the cells by the material was likely, The C and D station 125 volt battery 2-4 is a relatively new batter The plate insulating material has overlapped between plates forming a " tent-like" condition - trapping gas bubbles between the cell ' . TS 4. 7.14.1. 3. c.1 requires inspection of the cell plates of the diese1~ fire pump battery (1-PT-87). These batteries are in solid black- ' cases and inspection .of the cell plates is not possibl The licensee has committed to ' changing the TS surveillance requirement to reflect that inspection which can actually be don ,

These items are identified as unresolved item 338, 339/85-05-0 The licensee has agreed to review and evaluate the inspectors comments and correct-items as required.

=

-

.

.

1 Feedwater Temperature Indicators During a plant tour on March 7, 1985 the inspectors noted that the Feedwater temperature - elements TE-FW-111A, TE-FW-111B and TE-FW-111C had their electrical connection box covers removed. Additionally, attached to the temperature elements there was rubber insulated electrical wiring connecting all three elements to a selector switch with a single output wire termi-nating with a pair of unisolated electrical lugs lying on the floor. These temperature elements feed computer points T0-418A, T0-438A and T0-548A which-are used in performing the nuclear instrument calorimetric calibration. The licensee evaluated the condition and determined the temporary wiring was connected to_ place in service spare resistance temperature detectors (RTD's)

in the same temperature well with the RTD's feeding the computer. These leads had been installed for several years to provide temperature infor-mation in the event the computer was unavailable. The event was discussed with station management emphasizing that, even though the modification was made to a non-safety related portion of the system, administrative controls (ADM 14.1 Jumper Temporary Modifications) could have been implemented to ensure no adverse effects on equipment necessary for continued safe plant operation. The condition described above also existed on the corresponding sensors on Unit In reviewing the licensee calorimetric calibration procedures (1 and 2-PT-24) it was noted that temperature indicators TI-FW-1254A, B, and C were listed as alternative indicators for feedwater temperature whenever the computer points were not available. The calibration accuracy for these temperature indicators was discovered to be 13%. When table 15.1.4 of-the Updated Final Safety Analysis (UFSAR) was reviewed it showed that a measurement error of only 1.5% was assumed for feedwater temperature when setting the overpower trip setpoin The inspectors could not find any instances where~ the less accurate indicators had been used in calibrating the nuclear instrument The above items were. reviewed with station management and the temporary electrical leads were removed and the connection box covers were reinstalle Procedures 1 and 2-PT-27 (RCS Flow verification) will be modified to direct installation and removal of all necessary temporary equipment. Procedure 1 and 2-PT-24 (Nuclear Instrument Calorimetric Calibration) has been modified to no longer include the use of indicators that are less accurate than those assumed in Table 15.1-4 of the UFSA The issue of instrument accuracy is being evalauted by the licensee in response to Violation 338,339/85-01-0 The licensee has agreed to evaluate this item in conjunction with that revie This item is identified as inspector followup 338,339/85-05-0 . Routine Inspection By observations during the inspection period, the inspectors verified that

-

the control room manning requirements were being me In addition, the inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system

r: -

.

.

status was maintained. The inspectors peric.ii ch!1y questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant condition Through 11og review and plant tours, the inspector verified compliance with selected TS and Limiting Conditions for Operation During 'the course of the inspection, observations relative to protected and vital area security were made, including access controls, boundary integ-rity, search, escort, and badgin On a regular basis, radiation work procedures (RWPs) were reviewed and the specific work activity was monitored _ to assure the activities were being conducted per the RWPs. Radiation protection instruments were verified operable and calibration / check frequencies were reviewed for completenes The inspector kept informed, on a daily basis, of the overall status of both units;and of any significant safety matters related to plant operation Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the Operations staff on a daily basi Selected portions of operating logs and data sheets were reviewed dail The inspector conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in .

progress, verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment, confirming valve positions, instrument and recording readings, annunciator alarms,. housekeeping and vital area control No violations or deviations were identified in these area .