IR 05000338/1991004

Insp Repts 50-338/91-04 & 50-339/91-04 on 910128-0201.Major Areas Inspected:Observation of Inservice Insp Work Activities & Reactive Issues Re Relief Request for Noncode Repair on Unit 2

ML20217C046
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	03/06/1991
From:	Blake J, Chou R, Coley J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20217C036	List: IR 05000338/1991004 ML20217C029
References
50-338-91-04, 50-338-91-4, 50-339-91-04, 50-339-91-4, NUDOCS 9103120344
Download: ML20217C046 (14)

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Report Nos.: 50-338/91-04 and 50-339/91-04 Licensee: Virginia Electric and power Company Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos.: NPF-4 and NPF-7 Facility Name: North Anne 1 and 2 Inspection Co  : January 28 - February 1, 1991 Inspector :

Coley

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Date Signec kJ J2L zAA/

t ~ iou Date Signed Approved by: m u U. Blakg, Chief

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Date Signed

/aterialy'and processes Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of licensee actions on previous inspection findings, observation of inservice inspection (ISI) work activities and reactive issues relating to a relief request for a non-code repair on Unit 2, and Westinghouse Letter No. VRA-90-643 dated July 12, 1990, which dealt with the applicability of a reported welding deviation to the Centrifugal Charging Pumps at North Ann Results:

This inspection detected strengths as well as weaknesses in engineering and in ISI nondestructive examination (NDE). Strengths noted were in the licensee's steam generator eddy current operation These operations were being conservatively performed, samples had been expanded, multiple eddy current probes were being used, computer and computer software used to conduct the analyzes were fast and user friendly and data was being evaluated by well qualified examiners. Weaknesses observed included failure of NDE examiners to follow procedural requirements relative to dispositioning non-relevant liquid penetrant indications (Non-cited Violation 50-338/91-04-01 paragraph 2.a.) and failure of the licensee to obtain prior NRC approval in accordance with Generic

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9 Letter 90-05 before making _ a non-code repair on a ASME Class 2 Component, paragraph In the areas examined one non-cited violation was identified, paragraph 2.a.,

no deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS

, Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• G. Bischof, Supervisor, Civil Engineering

• M. Bowling, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Programs B. Britt, ISI Engineer, Snubber Maintenance S. Hamill, ISI Engineer ,

• W. Harrell, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• L. Hartz, Manager ISI/NDE and Engineering Programs

• D. Heacock, Superintendent, Station Engineer

• G. Kane, Station Manager

• P. Kemp, Supervisor Licensing

• J. Leberstien, Licensing Engineer

• J. Smith, Manager, Quality Assurance

• A. Stall, Assistant Station Manager

• T. Travis, Supervisor, NDE C. Zalestd, Civil Engineer Other 11,insee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, security force members, technicians, and administrative personne Otner Organizations Westinghouse K. Ingram, Eddy Current Lead Analyst W. Spence, level III Eddy Current Analyst (Day Shift)

B. Curtis, Level III Eddy Current Analyst (Night Shift)

NRC Resident Inspector

• Lesser, Senior Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities (73755)

a-Unit 1 The inspector observed work activities, reviewed documents and records, as indicated below, to determine whetner ISI was being conducted in accordance with applicable procedures, regulatory requirements, and licensee commitments. The applicable code for ISI, for Unit 1 is the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME B&PV) Code,Section XI,1983 Edition with addenda through summer 1983 (83S83) for the second ten year interval (December 24, 1988 - December 24, l

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1998). The licensee, Virginia Electric Power Company (VEPCO) conducts

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business in Virginia under the name of Virginia Powe VEPCO's nondestruction examination personnel provided by Westinghouse (W) and Virginia Corporation of Richmond (VCR), are performing the liquid

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penetrant (PT), magnetic particle (MT), radiographic (RT) ultrasonic (UT)

visual examinations (VT) and steam generator eddy current (EC) examina-tion Liquid Penetrant Examination The inspector observed two examiners perform PT examinations as indicated belo The observations were compared with Virginia Power's Liquid Penetrant Examination Procedure No. NDE-PT-301, Revision 1 and the ASME B&PV Code in the following areas: penetrant materials were specified and certified; surface cleaning and applicatioii cf the test materials; dwell time; interpretation and evaluation of indications; and final cleaning methods. Liquid penetrant examination processes were. observed for the following welds:

Weld ID N System Isometric Dwg. N A Pressurizer Spray Piping ISI-WMKS-0110A SW-66 Pressurizer Spray Piping ISI-WMKS-01108-1 SW-67 Pressurizer Spray Piping ISI-WMKS-0310B-1 As a result of observing the examination surfaces during the evaluation time period, and subsequent to the examination by the licensee, the following procedural violation was identified. The inspector noted that Weld 45A and SW-66 both had two bleed-out indications which would exceed the length requirements of the examination procedur When the inspector questioned the examiners as to how they accepted the indications, they replied that the -

indications were non-relevant indications caused by scratches on the pipe and grinding marks. When further questioned as to whether their examination procedure would allow them to make that assumption without additional surface finishing or re-examination, the examiners stated that the procedure did not require any additional action to be taken. However, the following definition and requirements were found in paragraph 2.2.6b and c of the approved procedure:

" Discontinuities at the surface will be indicated by bleed-out of penetrant; however, localized surface irregularities due to machining marks or other surface conditions, may produce non-relevant indication ."

"Any indication which is believed to be non-relevant shall be j regarded as a defect and shall be re-examined to verify whether I or not actual defects are present. Non-relevant indications and l broad areas of pigmentation which would mask relevant indica-tions are unacceptable. Such areas shall be cleaned and l

re-examined."

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The examiners subsequently re-examined the areas questioned, using more thorough cleaning techniques and upon completion of the re-examinotion no penetrant material was lef t in the crevices caused by scratches and grinding mark The licensee subsequently tested other liquid penetrant examiners to determine if they knew the definition of an non-relevant indication and what actions had to be taken when these indications are found. All of the examiners tested, answered the questions correctly. Since immediate corrective action was taken by the involved PT examiners when the procedure requirement was pointed out to them and subsequent corrective action was also taken by VEPC0 management to ensure that all examiners are aware of their responsibilities to re-ext .ne indications classified as non-relevant, Region 11 managemeLc decided that the finding would be reported as a Non-cited Violation 50-338/91-04-01. The violation is not being cited because the' criteria specified in Section V.A of the Enforcement Policy were satisfie Subsequent review of the examiners qualification records and test material certifications appeared satisfactor Volumetric Examination of Welds Using Manual (A-Scan) Ultrasonic Technique The inspector also observed the in process ultrasonic examination of two of the welds addressed above (Welds SW-65 and SW-67). The inspector observed that approved procedure NDE UT-301 Revision I was being followed for the examination method anc operation of the test equipmen In addition, examination results were recorded and additional transducers were used to evaluate a recorded indicatio The inspector concluded that ultrasonic f xaminations were conducted in accordance with the approved procedure and the ASME B&PV Cod Subsequent review of the examiners qualification records and equipment calibration records appeared satisfactory, Magnetic Particle Examination of the Reactor Vessel Closure Head Nuts

- The - inspector observed in-process florescent magnetic particle examinations of two reactor vessel closure nuts (No. 2 & 3). These examinaticns were observed to determine if the examinations were being conducted in accordance with VEPC0's Procedure NDE-MT-302, Revision 1, " Magnetic Examination of Bolting." The examiners were knowledgeable of the examination method and operation of the test equipmen Examination coverage and evaluation of the test results were also performed effectively. Subsequent review of the examiners qualification and equipment calibration records appeared satisfac-tor . Volumetric Examination of Feedwater Breakpoint Welds Using the Radiographic Technique

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The inspector evaluated radiographs for the welds listed below to determine whether radiographic quality and the evaluation of discontinuities was performed in accordance with VEPC0's approved Procedure NDE-RT-101, Revision 1, Radiographs for the following welds were reviewed:

Weld N Pipe Diameter & Line N NDE Log N BPL-582 6 inches /18-901 90-387 BPL-569 4 inches /18-901 90-387 BPL-551 6 inches /18-901 90-387 BPL-581 6 inches /18-901 90-387 BPL-571 4 inches /18-901 90-387 During the inspector's review it was noted that Weld hos. BPL-569 and BPL-571 had used No. 17 film side penetrameter when No.10 penetrameters were required to meet the ASME Class 2 criteria delineated on the film recorders shee Discussions with supervision revealed, however, that the records had been changed from the B31.1 Code to the ASME Code, Class 2, after the radiographs _ had been performed and in fact the B31.1 Code was the correct code of record. Therefore, the No. 12 film side penetrameter !

was correct. The licensee assured the inspector that the RT readers

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sheet would be corrected to reflect the correct acceptance criteri The inspector's review of all of the above radiographs indicated they met the minimum requirements of the approved procedure. Examiner Certifications and equipment calibration records were subsequently reviewed and found to be satisfactory, Volumetric Examination of Steam Generator Tubes Using the Eddy Current Technique The inspector observed W steam generator plug removal operations in Steam Generator C, W ed'dy current data acquisition activities in Steam Generator B, and concurrently evaluated recorded eddy current -

data with a W analyst. The applicable procedure for the examination activities was W Procedure MRS 2.4.2. Evaluations of data taken with a 360 degree r6'tating probe coil for the following tubes in Steam

' Generator B were observed:

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Row Column Reel N (cont'd)

14 53 118 13 57 118 11 68 118 9 69 118 5 70 118 7 70 118 The inspector was impressed with the W data analysis software and the Hewlett Packard 400 Series Appollo Processor. The equipment was fast, the program user friendly and the graphics were excellen Data taken in the field on magnetic tape was transferred to opical disk for long term storage consideration The examinations were performed utilizing the absolute method of acquiring data and 400, 300, 150, and 10KHz test frequencies. Two analysts were audited, one on day shif t and the other on night shif Both were certified Level III examiners and both were very knowledgeable in answering the inspector's questions concerning the basis for their evaluation of tube discontinuities. The 360 degree rotating probe coil was being used to verify indications previously found during the bobbin coil examination Significant cracking was observed in some of the selected examinations. Percentages were assigned to the length of the indications and voltage measurements taken across the separation in the indications. The depth of the indication was not established in percentages because the examination was only being used to confirm the type of indication observed during the previous bobbin coil examinatio However, data taken will be compared to data taken with other' probes and also with data taken during the previous outage to >

determine the tube plugging criteri During the inspector's examination of W personnel certifications-maintained by the licensee, minor discrepancies were noted in the records for both of the Level 111 examiners audited. One error identified by the inspector consisted of licensee certified records indicating that one of the W examiners was a Levei II analyst when in fcct, certifications records subsequently provides by W indicated the examiner was a Level 111 analyst. The other error revealed by the inspector's audit was that the licensee had no record of qualifica-tion for the other W Level III examiner and he was in fact on site and performing evaluation work without having been receipt inspected by Virginia Power's ISI Management personnel in accordance with site administrative procedure Discussions with Virginia Power's ISI/NDE supervisor indicated that all vendor examiners are tested by Virginia Power for knowledge of procedural requirements and competency prior to releasing them to work on equipment at the-sit Records however, maintained by W revealed the individual to be an experienced Level III analyst. The supervisor of ISI/NDE agreed to change the examiners certification list to reflect records of additional certification furnished by W for one of the examiner In addition, the supervisor committed to

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write a nonconformance report on W for not notifying him that the other examiner was on site so that proper administrative procedures could be followed. The inspector considered neither of these items to have any safety :ignificance, therefore, no violation was issued on these administrative discrepancies. The licensee should however, verify the accuracy of records furnished by vendor Visual Examinations on Pipe Supports and Snubbers (1) Pipe Supports The licensee's ISI program contains a total population of 2068

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pipe supports which are subject to VT-3 visual examination under t

requirements of ASME Section X Of the 2068 supports, 644 were scheduled for examination during this inspection period and 166 were scheduled for examination during this refueling outage. At the time of the inspection the licensee had completed the examination of about 120 pipe support The inspector observed in-process visual examinations being conducted on four pipe supports: 1-RC-15-16, 1-RC-15-17, 1-RC-15-18, and 1-FPH-CH-68- These observations were compared with the applicable procedures, ISI 160, " Visual Examination Procedure of Inservice Inspection", dated May 31, 1990. The visual inspection included a check on configuration; defects such as distortion, cracks, or bent members, or weld tailures induced by operation; condition of connections to supporting structures; and/or component setting The inspectors'

observation generally agreed with the information being reported by the examiners except for missing jam nuts on support 1-FPH-CH-68-2. The jam nuts are required by the drawing and the general construction procedure. After the inspector told the examiner about the missing jam units on this support, the examiner recorded the missing jam nuts as defects en the inspection shee (2) Snubbers .

There are about 350 hydraulic snubbers in the safety-related systems and non-safety related systems required to protected safety-related systems in each unit. All snubbers are required to 'be operable and 100_ percent inspected during the refueling outage per Technical Specification 3/4.7.10, snubbers, and North Anna Power Station Inservice Inspection Manual, Procedure 151-30.

j Periodic Test Nos. 1-PT-79.1, " Hydraulic Snubbers Accessible for as Found Visual Inspection During Reactor Operations", and 1-PT-79.2, " Hydraulic Snubbers Not Accessible for as Found Visual Inspecti>n During Reactor Operation' were the procedures i used for the snubber visual examinations. The licensee uses l Periodic Test Nos. 1-PT-79.3, "Small Bore Hydraulic Snubber Functional Testing" and 1-PT-79.3T, " Taylor Large Bore Hydraulic Snubber Functional Testing" for the snubber functional testing I

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and seal-life replacements. The licensee had completed all the snubber examinations at the time of the inspectio The inspectors conducted independent visual examinations of 16 snubbers selected at random. These examinations were conducted in order to evaluate the adequacy of the examination procedures being used by the licensee and to assess the validity of the information being reported by the examiners. These verification examinations generally agreed with the findings of the visual examiner During the review of the inspection procedure and the verifica-tion examinations of snubbers, the inspectors noted the following:

- The licensee did not perform an examination on the snubber attachments, for gaps and tolerance between the spherical bearings and washers, or clevis, at each end of the snubber If excessive gaps exist between the spherical bearings and washers or clevis, the pins may be damaged due to wear from constant movement or impact from the sudden lock-up of snubbers, therefore, inspection and established tolerances for the gaps are necessar The snubbers were examined pin to pin, sometimes including end attachments depending on the examiners, but an overall examination was not conducted to include the supporting structures and foundations to ensure that the snubber will perform its intended function Defects or degradation of the structural components can have a safety impact on the system operability and the ability of the snubber to function properl The defects or degradation could-include cracks of welds and members, deformation of members, loose nuts, corrosion, et Snubbers are required to have established hot and c'bJ settings, depending on the system conditions, whf:' cre stated on the snubbers' detail drawings. The licensee did record the cold or hot settings in the inspection sheets to

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allow comparing the actual settings to those stated in the

, drawin If the recording cold or hot settings are within the range of maximur extension minus 1" and minimum contraction plus 1" of the snubber stroke, the snubber settings are considered tc be acceptable by the examiner This comparison is not enough to ensure the actual setting is within the working range of the next snubber movement. The cases of the maximum and minimum piston locations shown above are adequate for construction purposes. But, if the actual settings are not in the proper position the snubbers

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could be damaged (bottom out or top out) during the next hot or cold movement. iherefore, the actual settings being compared to the designed seh ings are very importan To ensure that an adequate examination is accomplished, the licensee agreed to add the above items to the inspection procedures in the next revision,

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Within the areas examined, no violation or deviation was identified, with the exception of.the non-cited violation addressed in paragraph . Follow-up on VEPC0 Relief Request for a Non-Code Repair on North Anna Unit 2 and Westinghouse Letter No. VRA-90-643 DT of Juh 12, 1990 Relative to Unit I and 2 Charging Pumps Weld Deviation Review and observation of licensee actions regarding North Anna Unit 2, ASME Code, Relief Request for a temporary non-code repair to a Class 2 component Per request of Regional Management the inspector reviewed actions taken by VEPC0 for a temporary non-code repair to a 3/4 inch vent line on the "A" main _ steam line between the main steam trip valve and the non-return valve outside of containment for North Anna Unit The repair was made to seal a pin-hole leak in a newly welded pipe-to-elbow and weld at the inlet to the elbow located upstream of valve 2-MS-502. The 3/4 inch pipe at the point of the flow can not be isol ded from the main steam lin The relief request indicated that the temporary repair was an engineered, mechanical (bolted-in-place) enclosure filled with a hardened liquid sealant. The mechanical enclosure was designed for the pressure / temperature rating of the main steam syste The enclosure was fabricated from safety-related ASTM materials and designed for the high temperature service to which it is expose The _ enclosure was designed and _ constructed to act as a pressure i boundary only. An evaluation was perfonned by engineering and _it i concluded the seismic integrity;of the system was maintained with the !

enclosure installe l A " Code" repair in accordance witn ASME Section XI requires the !

removal of the flaw and a subsequent weld _ repair. A Code repair i would have requirej the plant to be shutdow i On June 15, 1990, NRC issued Generic Letter 90-05, " Guidance for Performing Temporary- Non-Code Repair of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 ;

Piping." This Generic Letter describes the NRC staff's position on I temporary non-Code repairs to ASME Code pipin The Generic Letter i states that 1) a Code repair is required to restore the structural-integrity of flawed ASME Code piping and 2) a Code repair is required j independent of the operational mode of the plant when the flaw is i

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detected. However, the required Code repair may be impractical for a

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flaw detected during plant operation unless the facility is shutdow The Generic Letter also stated that, for Code Class 1 and 2 piping, the licensee is required to perform Code repairs or request NP.C to grant relief for temporary non-Code repairs on a case-by-case basis regardless of pipe size. Temporary non-Code repairs of Code Class 1 and 2 piping must have load-bearing capability similar to that provided by engineered weld overlays or engineered mechanical clamp The Generic Letter further specifies that licensee requests based on repairs such as encapsulation of leaking pipes in cans using liquid sealants, clamps with rubber gasketing, or non-engineered weld overlays (patches) will not be approved by the staf Temporary non-Code repairs are not permitted on ASME Code piping without prior relief from the NR VEPC0 had not obtained prior relief from NRC before performing the re' air and the repair may have been classified as encaosulation of a leiki.y nipe in a "can" using liquid sealants which in accordance

with Generic Letter 90-05 relief would not have been grante The tenporary non-Code repair to the ASME Section XI Class 2 was performed on November 11, 199 On December 6, 1990, the repair was identified by the licensee as not having been approved by NRC prior to work being performed. When identified, a deviation report w3s submitted. . As corrective action to ensur that this error does not reoccur, the station procedures are being revised to require that all temporary repair procedures on ASME Code Class systems will be reviewed by station inservice inspection personnel for applicable Code requirement The inspector held discussions with the cognizant ISI engineer, reviewed the engineering work request (EWR No.90-388), -the Safety Evaluation Report (No. 90-SE-M00-151), the Engineering Calculation Report (CE-0829) for the 3/4" drain seismic qualifications, and examined the repair on the pipe. _ All of the preceding actions appeared to be satisfactory. The inspector's examination of the repair further revealed that it appeared to be well engineered and was much more than a "can" with sealan The inspector has also examined Generic letter 90-05 implementation at other utilities and found that during the November 1990 time frame implementation of Generic Letter 90-05 information was in a transitional perio Corporate offices were making changes to upper tier documents for the implementation of Generic Letter 90-0 However, site procedures in many cases had not been revise Therefore, repairs made during this period will have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In this instance, the inspector concluded that the licensee upon recognizing that prior approval had not been obtained took appropriate action in a timely manne . . - - - - - -

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b. Review of Licensee Actions Regarding Westinghouse Letter No VRA-90-643 DT of July 12, 1990, " Centrifugal Charging and Safety Injection Pump Weld Deviation Per request of Regional Management the inspector examined actions taken by the licensee relative to North Anna's Unit 2 charging pumps which were identified in Westinghouse Letter No. VRA-90-643 as having potential weld deviation The welds, which attach the inboard alignment dowel locating lug and the outboard centering fin locating lug to the pump support pedestal were reported by Westinghoua as ones that may not meet the minimum weld size specified by the Cresser Pump Division baseplate manufacturing drawing Pump casing alignment is controlled by a dowel pin and a fin which engage in the locating lugs. Failure of the locating lug welds due to external loads such as nozzle and seismic load could result in pump shaft misalignment. Although the pressure boundary of th. pump is not affected, the misalignment could cause increased vibration levels and potentially affect the mechanical seals, bearings and complexit The centrifugul charging pumps (Model 2.5 inch RL-IJ) for North Anna were listed in the letter as having been manufactured prior to ASME B&PY Code Section III Subsection NF requirements for support desig Therefore,. weld documentation is not available to verify the as-built locating lug welds. The criteria for minimum weld acceptabi;4ty was approved by Dresser using conservative analytical assumption and were based on generic seismic and nozzle loads identifie Westinghouse recommended that an inspection of the locating lug welds be performed to ensure the welds were adequate. It was further recommended that actual plant specific loads be confirmed to be no more than the identified generic loadings in order to demonstrate weld acceptability per the cr' eia stated in the letter. In the

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event that the generic weld u iteria stated in the letter was not met, a plant specific analysis could be performed to establish a plant specific weld criteria based on plant specific loading The inspector held discussions with VEPCO's cognizant supervisor of Civil Engineering and reviewed data relative to actions taken by the lice:see. The following is a summary of these cctions:

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An initial inspection of the welds concluded that they were less than what was specified in the Westinghouse letter using the conservative analytical assumptions and generic seismic and nozzle-load Dresser was contracted to perform the analysis using seismic and nozzle loadings specific to North Ann Dresser analysis concluded that the minimum required welds be as follows: . lug weld - 23.18 degree-inches; fin block weld - 0.35 square inche . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _._-- _ -

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- Three pumps did not meet this criteria, they are as follows:

LUG WELD FIN BLOCK WELD PUMP (DEG-IN (SQUARE INCH)

01-CH-P-1B 10.75 0.22 01-CH-P-1C 22.75 0.50 02-CH-P-1C 8.06 0.56

- In conclusion VEPC0 felt that there was one pump on each unit which would have a failure of the lug weld assuming maximum loadings and seismic accelerations occur simultaneously. The lug weld on the Unit 1 C pump was approximately 97 percent of the value stated by Dresser, and the licensee-concluded that this was acceptable due to the conservatism which had been applied to all calculation North Anna was notified by VEPC0's corporate Design Engineering that Engineering Mechanics (EM) had reviewed the alignment lug and fin lug calculations provided by Dresser and after removing some of the conservatism noted in the calculations concluded that the total required weld length was 7.3 degree inches versus the 23.18 degree inches obtained by Dresser. EM however, could not provide adequate justification for the weld acceptability due to some unknown variables discussed in their letter and due to the required length of weld being so close to the measured welds on the 01-CH-P-1B and 02-CH-P-1C pump VEPC0 issued Engineering Work Request 91-017 to weld repair the above tions p(umps Lug Weldto23.18 the required weld size degree inches andbased on Dresser Fin Weld .35 square calcula-inch).

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VEPC0 also contracted Dresser to reconcile their calculations using data furnished by EM and also determine what credit can be taken for the four 1 3/8 inch diameter bolts which attach the pump to the sle This information was due to be received by February 5,199 On February 13, the inspector contacted by telephone VEPCO's supervisor of Civil Engineering to determine Dresser's position after considering data subsequently furnished by the license Dresser new minimum weld requirement for the aligning lua was l 6.5 degree inche The minimum weld requirement far the centering fin was .15 square inche Dresser a';o concluded

that the distribution of the welds must be approximately symmetrica Presser's letter was suto(quently faxed to Region Il for revie Within the areas ~ examined, no violation or deviation was identified.

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12 Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

(Closed) Unresolved Item (UNR) 50-338,339/89-04-01, Piping Systems Concerns This matter trned the discrepancies found between the field and as-built drbosgs in Inspection Report Nos. 338,339/88-29 and 89-04 The other concern included previously in this open item was resolved and documented in the Inspection Report No. 338,339/89-2 The discrepancies included the material identifications not shown in the drawings, dimension errors, wrong weld symbol, weld symbol and size not shown in the drawings, weld undersize, et The inspectors discussed this metter with the license's engineers and reviewed the information provided. The informa-tion included a licensee's resolution request to its Architect / Engineer firm, CTS 02890503 (001) and a resolution contained Actio1 Plan 3 performed by Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation in the letter No. NAS-19021 for Job Order No. 14938.3028, dated November 30, 198 The resnlution of the discrepancies was accomplished by revisions of the drawings and calculations. No field modifications were require The inspectors randomly selected the following support drawings and calcula-tions f or review. The revised drawings and calculations resolved the discrepancies and reflected the as-built ccaditior.s. Therefore, this item is considered close REVIEW 0F THE REVISED DRAWINGS AND CALCULATIONS Pipe Support N Drawino Review r alculation Review 2-WS-A-21 X X 2-WS-A-23 X 2-WS-R-004 X 2-WS-R-005 X X 2-CC-HSS-415 X X 2-SI-R-12 X 2-SI-R-13 X 2-SI-HSS-106A X Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on February 1,1991, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspectiot results listed belo Proprietary information is not contained in ir is repor Dissenting comments were not received from the license (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-338,339/89-04-01, " Piping System Concerns" (0 pen) Non-cited Violation 50-338/91-04-01, " Failure to Follow Liquid Penetrant Examination Procedure for Dispositioning Non- relevant Penetrant Indications.

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