IR 05000338/1997011

Insp Repts 50-338/97-11,50-339/97-11 & 72-0016/97-04 on 971102-1213.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Engineering,Maintenance & Plant Support

ML20199B115
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	01/12/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199B096	List: IR 05000338/1997011 ML20199B093
References
50-338-97-11, 50-339-97-11, 72-0016-97-04, 72-16-97-4, NUDOCS 9801280185
Download: ML20199B115 (25)

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U.S- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION 11 Docket-Nos: 50-338, 50-339, 72-16 License'Nos: NPF-4, NPF-7 Report Nosi 502338/97-11, 50-339/97-11 and 72-16/97-04

. Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Location: 1022 Haley Drive Mineral, Virginia 23117 Dates: November 2 through December 13, 1997 Inspectors: M. Morgan, Senior Resident Inspector R. Gibbs, Resident Inspector

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L.- Garner Project Engineer (Section 08.2)

R. Chou, Reactor Inspector-(Sections E2.3, E2.4 and-E2.5)

Approved by: R. Haag, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North An'la Power Station. Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-338/97-11. 50-339/97-11 and 72-16/97-04 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident ins)ection. In addition, it includes the results of announced inspections )y regional inspector Doerations

. The Unit 1 evolution to secure a third condensate pump was carefully controlled. The engineer 1ng transmittal that supported the evolution was appropriate (Section 01.2).

. The licensee properly notified the NoC of two 10 CFR 50.72 four-hour non emergency events involving noti m ations of other government agencies (Section 01.3).

. Technical Specification requirements were met during an operability test for the Unit 1 Hydrogen Recombiner. A non-cited violation was identified for failure to close the hydrogen recombiner enclosure door during the test (Section 04.1).

. The Oversight Department was active in self-identifying plant program problems. Appropriate access to upper plant management was afforded to the department for conveying problems (Section 07.1).

Maintenance

. The licensee promptly responded to a degraded ventilation stack flexible connection and imediately repaired the degraded connection. A non-cited violation was identified for not adequately monitoring ventilation stack releases. The licensee is evaluating the need for preventive maintenance on heating, ventilation and air conditioning flexible connections (Section M1.1).

. A non-cited violation was identified for inadequate work instructions fo" troubleshooting energized equipmen Inadequate work instructions resulted in the loss of safety-related Electrical Bus 2J1 (Section M1.2).

. A Unit 1 control room chiller pump and valve test was properly performed and Technical S)ecification requirements were met. Overall housekeeping conditions in tie chiller room area were good (Section M1.3).

Enaineerina

. The licensee identified and took appropriate corrective actions for two missed Technical Specification Solid State Protection System logic surveillance tests. This issue was identified as a non-cited violation (Section E1.1).

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. The licensee had taken prudent actions to address recently identified Microbiologically Induced Corrosion in Service Water System )iping with welds repaired with Inconel. Two Inconel weld repairs have )een selected for more frequent monitoring and inspections (Section E2.1).

. The Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation construction activities and subsystem modifications were adequately performed. Construction was approximately seven weeks behind the original schedule (Section E2.2).

• The licensee performed adequate installation of concrete rebars and form work for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation except for the rebars located around the electrical light boxes and in the top main rebar layer. An Ins)ection Followup Item was identified to review actions to address t1ese exceptions and Quality Control personnel not detecting the exceptions (Section E2.3).

• During Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation construction, the licensee placed and tested the concrete in accordance with specifications, industrial practices and codes. The concrete was placed by skilled personnel with good workmanship (Section E2.4).

• Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation construction records and related documents were adequate (Section E2.5).

. The licensee initiated appropriate actions to determine the root cause of the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator cooling fan failure. Preliminary results of the root cause examination appeared reasonable (Section E8.1).

Plant Suncort

. The licensee adequately performed an " phouse Emergency Preparedness exercise. One drill objective invo .g treatment and transport of injured personnel was only partially met (Section P4.1).

. An Emergency Preparedness exercise demonstrated that an 1996 exercise weakness had been satisfactorily addressed (Section P8.1).

. Weaknesses in a November 18, 1997, fire drill were noted involving conmunications during the initial phase of the drill and unfamiliarity with the turn out and donning of fire protection equipment. During a subsequent fire drill the inspectors noted that these weaknesses had been corrected (Section F4.1).

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Recort Details St u ary of Plant Status Excluding the power reduction on November 21 to approximately 91 percent to remove a condensate pump from service, Unit 1 o.oerated at or near full power during the inspection period, Unit 2 operated at or near full power during the inspection perio I. Ooerations 01 Conduct-of Operations 01.1 Daily Plant-Status Reviews (71707)

The inspectors conducted control room tours to verify proper staffing, operator attentiveness, and adherence to approved procedure The inspectors also attended daily plant status meetings to maintain awareness of overall facility operations and reviewed logs to verify safety and compliance with Technical Specifications (TSs).

Instrumentation and safety system lineups were periodically reviewed-from control room indications to assess optrability. Frequent plant tours were conducted to observe equipment status and housekeepin Deviation Reports (DRs) were reviewed to assure that potential safety concerns were properly reported and resolved. The inspectors found that daily licensee operations were generally conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements and plant procedure .2 Unit 1 Power Reduction To Secure A Condensate Pumo a. -Insoection Stone (71707. 37551)

The inspectors observed: operations reduce power to 95 percent, remove a condensate pump from service and return the unit to full powe ~

Engineering Transmittal (ET) SE 97-154 _" Increasing HP Heater Drain Flows by Securing Third Condensate Pump." Revision 0, was also reviewe Observations and Findinos On November 21, the inspectors observed operations reducing Unit 1 load  ;

-using normal: operating procedures and guidance contained in ET SE 97- '

154. Load-was reduced in order to lower feedwater demand. This allowed a third condensate pump, which had been operating since the May 199T refueling outage, to'be secured. Normally, two condensate pumps-operate: however, the third pump was started during provide additiual feedwater pump suction pressur Thisplant startup pressure was to observed to be lower than normal during startup and was believed by the licensee to have been caused by new Moisture Separator Reheaters (MSRs)

that had been installed during the May 1997 refueling outage. The new HSRs-have a known'shell drain loop deficiency resulting in a lower feedwater pump suction pressur Operations _ personnel believe additional pressure margin was needed to prevent or reduce the potential

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of a feecWater pump trip or auto start of the standby condensate pum !

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From November 12 through November 21. Unit 1 had been limited to 99 percent power due to high water levels in the High Pressure (HP) heater drain tanks. The licensee suspected that the high level condition was

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caused by operation of the third condensate pump and the onset of cold weathe The load reduction was carefully performed. The inspectors observed that an additional operator was assigned to the control board. This

practice had been observed during previous evolutions and continued to represent a sound approach to plant operations. Procedure adherence and communications between operators and their supervision were good. The system engineer who prepared ET SE-97-154 was in the control room and supported the evolution as necessar The inspectors reviewed ET SE-97-154 and concluded that it was useful for operators during the evolution. The ET discussion, evaluation, and recomendations were appropriate. The inspectors discussed the evolution with the system engineer who prepared the ET. The engineer stated that securing the third condensate pump was the correct action for the observed high level condii. ions in the HP heater drain tank The inspectors noted that no subsequent high levels occurred in the HP heater drain tanks once load was increased to 100 percent or for the remainder of the inspection period. Also, during the remainder of the inspection period, feedwater pressure margins were sufficient to preclude a feedwater pump tri Conclusions The Unit i evolution to secure a third condensate pump was carefully controlled. The engineering transmittal that supported the evolution was appropriat .3 NRC Notifications Insoection Scone (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the following notifications to the NRC to determine if the reports were adequate, timely and proper for the event Observations and Findinas On November 4. a Federal Energy Regulatory Comission regional engineer was notified concerning a small leak in the concrete spillway at the main Lake Anna dam. The licensee determined that the structural integrity of the dam was not compromised. Since another federal agency was notified,10 CFR 50.72 required a four-hour non-emergency notification to the NRC. The licensee initiated DR 97-3034 to address the cause and evaluate corrective actions for the spillway leak. The-inspectors found that the licensee *s reporting actions were appropriat .

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On November 7, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality was notified by the licensea concerning a small amount of concrete that had entered Lake Anna during an ongoing eros n abatement project. Station personnel had been using concrete to stabilize an area of erosion on a small section of the lake bank. Since another government agency was notified. 10 CFR 50.72 required a four-hour non-emergency notification to the NRC. The licensee initiated a DR to address the cause and evaluate corrective actions for the concrete spill. The inspectors found that the licensee's reporting actions were appropriate, Conclusions The licensee properly notified the NRC of two 10 CFR 50.72 four-hour non-emergency events involving notifications to other government agencie Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 1) nit 1 Hydroaen Recombiner 00erability Test Insoection Scooe (71707. 61726)

The inspectors observed portions of 0-PT-68.1.1 " Hydrogen Recombiner 1-HC-HC-1 Functional Test," Revision 10. A walkdown of the system was also performe Observations and Finding On November 7 during the day shift. the inspectors observed portions of 0-PT-68. The inspectors independently checked hydrogen recombiner temperature control settings and verified that system flow and recombiner tem]eratures met TS requirements. The inspectors verified that the recom]iner heater gas temperature increased to greater than or equal to 1100 F within fiva hours and was maintained at that temperature for at ledst four hours. System flow was verified to be greater than 50 standard cubic feet per minute. Previous performances of various tests associated with TS 4.6.4.2.a through 4.6.4.2.e were checked to ensure the surveillance requirements were met and no problems were foun U)on arriving at the hydrogen recombiner area, the inspectors noticed tlat the rolling steel door to the recombiner enclosure was partially ope The inspectors reviewed the precautions and limitations of 0-PT-68.1.1 and discovered that Step 4.9 required the door to be closed except for egress, when the recombiner was in operation. The ins)ectors discussed the open door with the operator conducting the test. T1e operator was unaware of the precaution to keep the door closed except for egress. The operator immediately contacted the Shift Supervisor (SS) who directed the operator to close the door. The inspectors also discussed with the SS and the local operator that procedure step 6.1. initially required the door to be closed before the recombiner was placed in operation. The inspectors discussed with several personnel involved with the test whether the rbor had been open during the test

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for other than egress. Several individuals stated that the door had been open since they had become involved with the test. The test had begun on the previous shift (i.e.. night shift) and had been turned over to the oncoming dey shift crew. The licensee initiated DR 97 3105 to determine the cause of the event and evaluate the need for the requirement to close the door during the tes The inspectors discussed whether the door had been initially closed by personnel from the previous shift. lhe irsolved operator stated that the door had been closed in Step 6.1.4.c. but was opened shortly alterwards to permit system monitoring by engineering personnel. The o]erator stated that the door was left open for the remainder of the slift to allow entries into the enclosure area. The operator also stated that the pre-brief for the test discussed the door and it was the operator's belief that the door was to remain o)en. According to the operator, there were extended periods of time w1en no one was in the enclosure area while the door was open. The operator also stated that testing was performed the day before and the door remained open for the duration of that testing. The inspector discussed the issue with the night shift unit Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) who stated that the intent was to open the door for entries as required, but to close it when exitin The inspectors evaluated the safety significance of the failure to keep the rolling steel door closed during the test. The hydrogen recombiner system is leak tight, however, in the event the system leaks, the system is designed to ensure that an unmonitored radioactivity release path does not exist. A ventilation duct is provided for the recombiner enclosure which discharges to the central area of the Auxiliary Building where it is monitored for radioactivity before exiting through the "A" ventilation stack. When the rolling door was open for the test. this normal ventilation flow path was not assured. The inspectors discussed the potential of an unmonitored release with the licensee who stated that the potential was insignificant because there were no radiological conditions which posed a potential for a release. Additionally, the licensee provided documentation which showed that the intent of closing the door to prevent an unmonitored release was applicable only during post-accident conditions and not during system testing. The licensee stated that an evaluation was being performed to delete the requirement to close the door during the test. The inspectors concluded that the safety significance of the door being open for the duration of the test was low. The failure to close the door as required by 0-PT-68. constitutes a violation of minor significance. It is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is identified as NCV 50-338/97011-0 During the test, a walkdown of the Unit 1 Hydrogen Recombiner system was also performed. The inspectors checked for correct valve positions, placement of equipment identification labels, and consistency with the

"ystem drawings. The inspectors found that all com3onents were properly labeled and in their required positions. While walcing down the system trip valves, the inspectors observed that system trip valve,

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1-HC-TV-105B' which was open during the test, was leaking air at its

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diaphragm flange. The inspectors reported the air leak to the licensee who took 1 mediate corrective action to repair the leak. UpA cmpletion of the maintenance, the licensee ensured the valve stroked as required by the appropriate operability tes The inspectors discussed the operability of the valve with the SS who stated that the valve was operable because it was a fail safe valve (i.e., when air is lost it closes to the isolated position). -The

. inspectors discussed later with system engineering that opertbility of the valve should also include the valve's ability to open. It was determined that operability of the valve was not affected beceuse sufficient air pressure was available to ke n the valve o)en. The licensee initiated DR 97-3104 to determine ' ne cause of t1e air leakage and address appropriate corrective action to prevent recurrence. The

inspectors concluded that a)propriate action was taken by the licensee to repair and investigate t1e diaphragm air leakage, Conclusions TS requirements were met during the operability test for the Unit 1 Hydrogen Recombiner. An NCV was -identified for failure to close the hydrogen recombiner enclosure door during the test.

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07 Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Oversiaht Deoartment Audit Activitigi Insoection Scooe (40500)

The inspectors attended a brief provided by Oversight Department personnel from both the North Anna and Surry Power Stations. Recently completed audits were also reviewe Observations and Findinas On-November 20. the inspectors were briefed-on the results of several'

audits conducted by the Oversight Department. These audits were required by TS 6.5.2.8. The inspectors noted that the audits for the

'Surry and North Anna Power Stations were performed together using audit personnel from both stations and industry peers. -The 'ollowing program audits had been completed:

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-* ' Audit 97-08 (TS License Requirements)

• - Audit 97-09 (In Service Inspection)

• = Audit 97-10 (Corrective Action Progra.9)

• -. Audit 97-11 (Nuclear Training)

Thel inspectors ~found that;all of the. lead audit personnel were

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knowledgeable of their assigned areas and of the audit results. The scope and results of the audits indicated that the licensee had placed a)propriate emphasis on self-identifying problems, particularly during t1e Corrective Action Program Audit. The inspectors were informed that, at any given time, two program audits were ongoin The inspectors and lead audit personnel discussed the Oversight Department's access to upper management, (i.e., those above plant management). Audit personnel stated that findings and recommendations are routinely presented to plant management. If plant management is not receptive to audit findi%s, or there is disagreement between the two organizations, the Oversight De)artment can raise concerns directly to higher levels of management. T1e individuals interviewed felt that the Oversight Department's efforts were appropriately reviewed and acted upon by plant and upper managemen Conclusions The Oversight Department was active in self-identifying plant program problems. Appropriate access to upper management was afforded to the department for conveying problem Miscellaneous Operations Issues (71707, 92903)

08.1 Visit to North Anna By the Actino Deouty Executive Director For Reaulatory Effectiveness On November 19. the Acting Deputy Executive Director For Regulatory Effectiveness visited the North Anna site. The Acting Deputy Executive Director was accompanied by the Acting Deputy Regional Administrator -

Region II the Project Director - Project Directorate 11-1 of the Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), the North Anna Project Manager of NRR, %1d the Acting Senior Regional Coordinator. The purpose of the visit wat ' gain information from the licensee about self-assessment practites. The Acting Deputy Executive Director was particularly interested in how the licensee monitors its performance using the North Anna Annunciator Panel Progra He observed an Operations Department shift briefing. toured many areas of the facility with the licensee a the resident inspectors, and interviewed operators. He discussed several issues with the operators including operator workarounds. The licensee formally presented the Annunciator Pat'l Program and results from a recent employee surve .2 (Ocen) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-338. 339/96003-05: review Final Safety Analys1s Report discrepancies. The ins)ectors reviewed various documents concerning actions taken >y t1e licensee to address specific discrepancies comprising this item. Additional reviews are necessary to complete inspection activities associated with the individual parts of this UR l i

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j II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Unmonitored Release from the "A" Heatina. Ventilation and Air Conditionino (HVAC) Venti lation Stack Flexible Connection Insoection-Scooe (62707)

. The inspectors performed an examination of a repaired Unit 1 Safeguards -

Building HVAC exhaust flexible connection. The inspectors also performed a general walkdown of nearby ventilation systems, including ,

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_the "A" HVAC Ventilation Stack ductwork, b, Observations and Findinas On November 17, an operator during routine rounds discovered a six-inch

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hole in the Unit 1 Safeguards Ventilation Exhaust Flexible Connection, 1-HV-REJ-15. The licensee initiated DR 97-3149 to determine the root

' cause and evaluate appropriate corrective actions. An operability

. assessment was performed and it was determined that adequate negative pressure in the Safeguards Building was maintained. A temporary repair was performed on November 19 in accordance with Work Order (WO) 3784606-4 01, A permanent repair was scheduled for the next Unit I refueling outage scheduled for September 1998.

On November 26, the inspectors performed an examination of the flexible connection temporary re) air and found no problems. The inspectors also performed a general walcdown of nearby miscellaneous ventilation systems. During this walkdown, the inspectors discovered a five-inch rip / tear and three small-holes in the "A" HVAC Ventilation Stack

~r Flexible Connection,1-HV-REJ-28. The flexible connection material presented other signs of degradation, (i.e., stress areas, " dimpling",

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discoloration, and general weathering).

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The inspect ( rs irmediately notified control room operators. The

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licensee pr, m'.iy and properly responded to the identified problem.

1 Corrective actions included: 1) initiation of Abnormal Procedure (AP)-54, " Accidental. Unplanned or Uncontrolled Radioactive Gaseous Waste Release," Revision 2, 2) immediate-reduction of the flow rate

, through the ventilation stack to minimize the release. 3) grab

, sampling by the riealth Physics group, 4) initiation of DR 97-3228 L and. 5) temporary repair of the flexible connection in accordance with

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WO 267156-0 The grab samples that were taken were normal. The release rate was L about 65 standard cubic feet per minute. This flow rate was determined

to-be about one-tenth of one percent of the total flow through the stack-c which resulted in a radiological gaseous material release of about

1.07 E-7 microcuries per milliliter. This resulted in a release which

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was approximately-2.29 E-4 percent of the licensee's TS limi ;

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The tear / holes were located on the discharge side of the Auxiliary Building HVAC system exhaust fans and upstream of the taps used for

. ventilation stack radidtion monitoring. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Lafety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 9.4.2.2, which states that the Auxiliary Building exhaust, which is filtered prior to release, is exnausted to atmosphere through two continuously monitored ventilatica vent stacks, discharged upward at elevation 387 feet. The location of the rip / tear and holes in Flexible Connection.1-HV-REJ-2 was well below 387 feet and upstream of radiation monitoring instrumentation. The location and configuratiot of the rip / tear and holes therefore resulted in an unmonitored radioactivity release pat The inspectors determined the safety significance of the unmonitored release was low because the release flowrate was low and the release activity was minimal. This failure comply to the monitoring reruirements of 10 CFR 20.1302 for radiological releases from the "A" HVAC Ventilation Stack constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Polic This NCV is identified as 50-338, 339/97011-0 The circumstances surrounding the discrepancies described above concerned the inspectors. The Engineering Department did not take aggressive actions to identify other potential deficiencies similar to

+he Unit 1 Safeguards flexible connection problem identified on r / ember 17. An evaluation. performed by the system engineer for similar problems, was not sufficiently thorough to identify the November 26 problem. The licensee d'es not have a Preventive Maintenance (PM)

program to evaluate physical degradation of HVAC systems flexible connections. The licensee had previously recognized the need to evaluate a PM program and had assigned a cummitment tracking item as part of the HVAC Corrective Action Plan. This evaluation had been scheduled for completion on December 31, 1997 but due to personnel problems the evaluation had not been performed. The system engineer stated that the evaluation would be performed by March 31, 199 Conclusions The licensee promptly responded to a degraded ventilation stack flexible connection and inmediately repaired the degreded connection. A non-cited violation was identified for not adequately monitoring ventilation stack releases. The licensee is evaluating the need for preventive maintenance on HVAC flexible connection M12 - Loss of Unit- 2 Electrical Bus 2J1 Durina Troublesnootino Activities Insoection Scooe (62707)

During performance of troubleshcoting activities following the loss of a Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) cooling fan, electrical maintenance

_ personnel inadvertently de-energized Motor Control Center (MCC) Bus 2J The inspectors performed follow-up inspections of the even .- .

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9 Observations and Findinas On November 24 two electricians were directed by the Unit 2 SS to troubleshoot the breaker for CRDM Fan 2-HV-F 37F. The electricians proceeded to the breaker cubicle and noted that the breaker had not tri) ped. Due to the nature of the problem the electricians were autlorized by oper3tions to perform " energized" troubleshooting of the breake The breaker's MCC cubicle door was opened by defeating the handle interioc The breaker and the CRDM fan control room switch were left in their "as found" positions during the initial " energized circuit" troubicshooting activitie Fan )ower circuit end load side voltage readings were taken and voltage to t1e contacts was verified. Circuit bridge and megger readings were also performed. The technicians determined that the breaker's thermal overload had tripped to isolate a ground on the fan motor. While closing the cubicle door, the thermal overload reset push rod, which is located on the door, was inadvertently pushed. This reset the breaker's thermal overload and resulted in the upstream protection breakers to trip cpen to clear the ground on the electrical system. When the MCC Feeder Breaker 24J5 tripped open, the MCC Bus 2J1 was de-energize The inspectors and licensee event investigators noted that the original troubleshooting investigation sheet failed to adequately provide detailed instructions and appropriate precautions to the electrician While the investigation sheet allowed for work on energized equipment, the sheet failed to provide adequate directions for removing the CRDM fan circuitry from service once the readings were taken. The licensee indicated that for this condition, their standard electrical practice was to open the CRDM fan circuit breaker before closing the MCC Lo Licensee corrective actions to preclude similar problems include: 1)

field presence of Operations personnel for any work involving energized equipment 2) isolation of loads as soon as practical after taking initial bridge /megger readings, and 3) allowance for electricians to manipulate breakers once authority has been granted to perform breaker or cubicle maintenance. These corrective actions address the causes associated with not providing adequate work instructions to the technicians. This non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected Violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is identified as NCV 50-339/97011-0 Conclusions A non-cited violation was identified for inadequate work instructions for troubleshooting energized equipment. The inadequate work instructions resulted in the loss of safety-related Electrical Bus 2J _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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M1.3 Unit 1 Control Room Chiller Pumo and Valve Test Insoection Scooe (61726. 71707)

The inspectors observed portions of 1-PT-77.11A, " Control Room Chiller 1 HV-E-4A Pump and Valve Test," Revision 10. The inspectors also checked test records from previous test performances, and )erformed a general walkdown of the area. The inspectors noted that t1e control room chillers were risk-significant as defined by the licensee's Maintenance Rule Progra Observations and Findinas On November 17, the inspectors observed operations and maintenance personnel perform portions of 1-PT-77.11A. The test was performed to satisfy TS 4.0.5 and 3.7.7.1 requ.rements. During the test, the inspectors verified that test instruments were calibrated and properly configured to provide accurate results. Pumo differential pressure and flow data were verified to be within acceptdble ranges. The inspectors observed that procedural compliance during the test was appropriat Procedure steps were performed in a step-by-step manner and independent verification was properly perterme The inspectors checked housekeeping conditions of the chiller room are There were several work requests that had been generated, but none were more than 6 months old. No unusual leakage from the system was observed. System components were properly labeled and general lighting conditions were good. Considering the level of maintenance activity in the area, overall housekeeping conditions were goo Past rerformances of the test during 1997 were reviewed. The surveillance interval requirement of every three month:: had been satisfie During the review. the inspectors noted that vibration measurements for pump 1-HV-P-20A had increased since the surveillance performed in June. An analysis was performed which supported new-reference vibration values that were obtained from an August test. The inspectors discussed the analysis with engineering personnel and found that appropriate actions were taken. The new values remained well below industry standards for normal vibration reading The unavailability performance criterion for the chillers was 300 hour0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> The inspectors verified that the criterion had not been exceede Conclusions The Unit 1 control room chiller pump and valve test was properly performeo and TS requirements were met. Overall housekeeping conditions in the chiller room area were good.

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III. Enaineerina El Conduct of Engineering El.1 Missed Surve111ances for Solid State Protection System (SSPS)

a. Insnection Scooe (37551. 71707)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions when it was determined that certain aspects 01 the SSPS had not been adequately tested. The inspectors also revlev,ed the licensee's response to Generic Letter (GL) 96-01, "Testino of Safety-Related Logic Circuits, a b. Observations and Findinas On November 18 at 5:07 p.m., the licensee determined after an extensive review that the automatic logic testing for the main feedwater isolation on Steam Generator High-High Level (P-14) .nd the Source Raage Automatic Block (P-10) were not properly tested. The licensee discovered the potential problem on November 17 while reviewing Operating Experience (DE) 8636, " inadequate SSPS Surveillance Testing." The issue had been identified by another utility on November 11 and was subsequently entered into the OE system by that utility on November 14 The discussion of OE 8636 also addressed the failure to adequately test the safety injection signal in)ut to the feedwater isolation logic. The licensee determined that tle safety injection logic testing deficiency was not applicable due to design differences. The licensee initiated DR 97-3162 to determine the root cause of the missed surveillance test and address appropriate corrective action The P-14 and P-10 logics are required to be operable in accordance with TS 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.1.1, respectively. Because adequate testing of the P-14 and P-10 logics had not been performed. TS 4.0.3 was entered on November 18 at 5:07 This specification required the licensee to 3roperly test the associated logics to prove their operability within 24 lours or declare the logics inoperable and follow the appropriate TS action statements. The licensee revised the existing test procedure to incorporate the needed testing. Successful Unit 2 testing for both logic trains was completed on November 18 at 11:47 p.m. and Unit 1 testing was completed satisfactorily on November 19 at 9:54 On January 10. 1996, the NRC issued GL 96-01-which requested that all licensees perform two actions. The first was to compare electrical schematic drawings and logic diagrams for the Reactor Protection System, Emergency Diesel Generator load shedding and sequencing, and actuation logic for Engineered Safety Features (ESF) systems against appropriate plant surveillance test procedures to ensure that all portions were adequately tested. The second action was to revise surveillance procedures as necessary for complete testing to comply with TS Additionally, licensees that had already performed the requested reviews should review any safety related modifications made to the systems since their review. The licensee's response to GL 96-01 stated that the

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recuested reviews had been completed in June 1993 and no modifications hac been implemented since that time which would have invalidated the 1993 review result The inspectors discussed with the licensee the missed surveillances and the actions taken. The testing performed to prove o)erability satisfied the surveillance requirements and was performed in t1e required 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> constraint, The inspectors asked the licensee why the missed surveillance had not been identified during the review performed in 1993. The licensee believed that the technical aspects of the missed surveillance were very complex and were not readily evident to the technical reviewer at that time. The licensee also stated that the issue was very subtle and was difficult to identify even for an individual highly knowledgeable of the SSPS. One of the suspected causes for not identifying the issus earlier was the vendor (Westinghouse) supplied drawing did not provide the needed detail to identify the issue. The inspectors considered these positions were vali These self-identifled missed surveillances for the P-10 and P-14 logics were aggressively pursued by the licensee. Once the issue was known, timely and appropriate corrective actions were performed. Corrective actions included a review of the SSPS drawings to determine if similar problems existed within the SSPS. No similar problems were found. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified, and corrected violation is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy and is identified as NCV 50-338, 339/97011-04, Conclusions The licensee identified and took appropriate corrective actions for two missed TS SSPS logic surveillance test This issue was identified as an NC E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 Reoairs of Service Water System (SWS) Pinina Exposed to MicrobioloaicaD 2 Induced Carrosion (MIC) (37551)

On November 3 the inspectors noted that licensee engineering personnel had inspected SWS piping and found three suspected MIC sites. One of the MIC sites was a weld joint repaired with Inconel approximately seven months ago. Inconal was used between October 1996 to June 1997 to repair welds in the SWS. Since June 1997, the licensee has repaired similar suspected MIC sites with 316 stainless-steel. Although 316 stainless-steel weld material is more susceptible to MIC than Inconel, the 316 stainless-steel weld 3rocess produced smaller heat-affected zones in the base metal and t1us are overall less susceptible to MI As a result of the MIC in the recently Inconel repaired weid, the licensee has enhanced their MIC SWS piping insper. tion by selecting two l

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other welds repaired with Inconel for an increased frequency of ,

inspection. Initially, this frequency was every two week t t

On December 2 anothe routine six week inspection of SWS piping was performed. Although two more weld joints presented evidence of MIC (and were repaired at the end of the inspection period) neither weld was identified as a 3reviously repaired Inconel weld joint. The inspectors concluded that t:e licensee had taken prudent actions to address the recently identified MIC in SWS piping with welds repaired with Incone I E2.2 Indeoendent Soent Fuel Storace Installation (ISFSI) Enaineerina (60853) 1

At various times during the inspection period, the inspectors continued to visit the ISFSI area and observe construction activities. On December 3, inspectors observed pouring cf concrete around the ISFSI electrical duct work and placement of steel rebar for the ISFSI pad. On December f>, the inspectors observed the pouring of concrete for the first 20 foot d

aection of the ISFSI pad. From December 6 through 12. further pad pours were hampered due to rain and related proolems of driving concrete trucis into the muddied areas surrounding the pad. Weather related dela."s continued to affect construction of the 15FSI roadway.

, The inspectors noted that ISFSI .onstruction activitici and subsystem modifications were adequately performed. However, ISFSI construction was currently about seven weeks behind the original schedul E2.3 Insoection of Concrete Rebar for ISFSI Pad Insnection Scone (60853)

The inspectors examined rebars installed for the concrete Jad for the lSFSI to verify that they were installed in accoidance witi procedures, drawings, industrial codes, and standards, Obse'vations and Findinas

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The construction instructions fcr the ISFSI project were in DCP No.95-005, "lSFil Project." The applicable codes for rebar installation were American Concrete Institute (ACl) and /merican Society fcr Testing and Materials (ASTM). The licensee excavated and compacted the entire site

.of the ISFSI. The licensee also excavated about 2' deep for the first or central main pad in order to place re ars and concrete. This first-main pad was divided into 6 sections for the convenience of placing concrete. On December 5. 1997, the licensee completed installation of rebars and placement of concrete for the second section from the south end. The licensee installed ,1most all rebars in the sections and the licensee's Quality Cont < WC) inspectors had completed the inspection for rebars installed for the section ready for the next concrete pour, the third section from the north en The inspectors inspected rebars ano concrete form work installed in the section ready for the concrete pour and rebars extending out for splices

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on two sides of the concrete section already poured. The procedure and drawings used for the rebar and concrete form work installation were:

. Specification No. NAl-0021, " Specification for Placing Reinforced Concrete for ISFSI Facility for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2," P vision 0

. Drawing No. 7 651 01, " Dry Storage foundation, Diesel Generator &

Electrical Equipment Pads," Revision 1

. Drawing N 95005 3 S-101, " Plans Sections, 1 Details - Dry Storage facility foundation & Misc. Concrete items for ISFSI," Revision I Specification No. NAl.0021 covered the technical requirements for placing reinforcing steel and concrete for the ISFSI. Drawing No. 7 651 61 was a vender shop drawing for the details of the rebars to be placed for the pad. Drawing No. N 5005 3 S 101 was the design drawing for the details of the rebars. The elements inspected were pad dimension, concrete form work and bracing, and size, spacing, clearante, splice length support, wire tightening, and bending of the rebars.

Overall, the inspectors were satisfied with the installation of the rebars. The bottom layer of rebars were adequately suppo,'ted by concrete blocks and the top layer of rebars were supported from the bottom layer of the rebars by the vertical rebars. The tightening wires did not protrude into the concrete protection zone which was 2 or 3 inches from the surface. However, the inspectors identified the following two discrepancies:

. The rebars installed around the electrical light boxes at the rent.er line of the pad were as far as 6 to 7 inches from the edge of the boxes. Drawings attached to Installation Problem Report (IPR)97-391 specified the rebars around the boxes be installed from the edge of the boxes with a trinimum of 2 inches and the maximum of 3 i. aches spacing.

. The clearance of several rebars on the top layer was measured as 5 inche The maximum allowable clearance in IPR 97-405 was 3 inches The above two discrepancies were found in two sections; one which was prepared for pouring and the one which had alteady been poured. Both discrepancies will reduce the concrete strength or bending moment resistence in the areas where h e rebars were ) laced incorrectly. The licensee imnediately issued Dev otion Report ()R) N-97 3356, delayed the scheduled ccncrete pour, and corrected the rebar problem for the section that had not yet been poured. The DR also recuested an engineering eva'uation for the discrepancies which existec in the concrete section that was already poured. The DR stated the cause of the problem as,

" Misread of drawings." The problem in the rebars installed for the section preparing to be poured was adequately corrected by the licensee and reinspected satisfagtorily by the inspectors before the concrete

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pou The inspectors expressed concern to management about the construction practices and quality controls that allowed these two rebar discrepancies from construction specifications to occur. An Inspection Followup ltem (IFI) 72 16/97004 01 was identified to review the licensee's actions concerning the two rebar discrepancies for the poured concrete section and their root cause determination, Conclusions The licensee performed adequate installation of concrete rebars and form work for the Independent Spent fuel StorJge Installation except for the rebars located around the electrical light boxes and in the top main rebar layer. An Ins)ection Followup Item was identified to review actions to address taese exceptions and Quality Control personnel not detecting the exception E2.4 Observation of Concrete Pour for ISFSI Pad Insoection Stone (60853)

The inspectors observed the licensee pouring concrete for a section of the ISFSI pad to verify that the activities of the concrete pour were performed in accordance with the applicable specifications, procedures, drawings, and industrial practice and code Observations and Findinas The specifications ustd for the concrete pour of the ISFSI pad were:

• Specification No. NAl-0021 " Specification for Placing Reinforced Concrete ISFSI Facility North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2,"

Revision 0

. Specification No. NAl-0022 "S)ecification for Concrete Testing and 1,1spection ISFSI Facility iorth Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2." Revision 0

• Specification No NAP-0086, " Specification 1or Ready Mixed Concrete ISFSI Facility North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2."

Revision 0 The inspectors discussed with the licensee's engineers the preparation for the concrete pour. The inspectors also examined the installation of rebars, construction joints, and concrete form work and found the rebar problems stated in Section E2.3. The licensee corrected the )roblem The inspectors reinspected the correction of the rebars for t1e section to be poured and were satisfied that the corrections were made before the pouring of concrete on the pad. The inspectors also examined the only concrete section that was completed one week early and were satisfied with the workmanship and quality of the concrete. Expansion joints were provided as required by the drawing _ ._ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

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The inspectors partially observed various air content and slump tests, temperature measurements, placement of concrete with the long arm pump truck, vibrating of the concrete during the pour, and surface finishin Air content and slump tests were performed before and during the concrete placement. Three cubic yards of concrete were rejected and sent back to the supplier after the air content was found to be less than the lower limit specified. The concrete placement location unloaded from this truck was recorded and cylinder samples of the concrete were cast and taken to the laboratory for concrete strength testing. If the concrete is later tested above the design strength, the concrete placement will be accepted Otherwise, the concrete already placed will be replaced with qual 111ed concret Two hand held vibrators were used to vibrate the lower portion of concrete and a long span surface vibrating machine of a trust type was used to vibrate and consolidate the concrete surface up to eight inches deep. The inspectors also observed that each batch of concrete had 6 properly completed batch ticket, that concrete was not dropped greater than six feet, and that concrete was deposited in horizontal layers not exceeding 18 inches in thicknes The inspectors also randomly reviewed the concrete tickets. The licensee told the inspectors that a QC inspector

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was stationed at the concretc mixing plant to review the concrete contents before releasing the concrete to the site, Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licenseo placed and tested the concrete in accordance with specificatior.s. industrial practices and codes. The inspectors also considered that the concrete was placed by skilled personnel with good workmanshi E2.5 Review of Documents for ISFSI Pad Construction Insoection Stone (60853)

The inspectors reviewed concrete pad construction documents to verify that the construction activities were adequately performed and documente Observations and Findinns The inspectors reviewed rebar shop drawings, the licensee % approvals on the vendor subMttals for the project. Deviation Reports (DRs),

Installation Problem Repc ts (IPRs), and Concrete Placement Reports

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(CPRs) for the previous concrete pour. The submittals included concrete placing and curing methods and agents, water reducing admixture, air-entraining admixture, test strength of concrete mix, and the weight and rctio of each component of the concrete mix. The CPRs included the pre-placement inspection checklist, placement inspection checklist, concrete test cylinder report. a DR, field concrete testing data, concrete batch tickets, and field concrete surface temperature readings during curin The DR was written for approximately 28 cubic yards of concrete which was placed with the air content outside the specification limits. The-w--+m-e- y- --

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concrete with the m r content problem was cast and sent to a laboratory for concrete strengt1 testing. The inspectors randomly examined the weight of each aggregate in several concrete tickets and found they were within the sper.ification limits. The ins)ectors .150 reviewed the vendor submittals for their cancrete truct inspection to ensure that specification requirements were met, c. Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the ISFS1 construct 1)n records and related documents were adequat E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues 0 (Onen) Ifl 50-338/97009 01: review of the licensee's final root cause determination for the 1H EDG fan blade failure, insoection Scooe (37551. 92903)

During this inspection period, the inspectors performed follow up inspections of related licensee-oerformed activities initiated subsequenttotheIHEDGfanfailureeventwhichhadoccurredonOctober 26, 199 Observations and Findinas On October 26. the lH EDG Radiator Cooling Fan experienced catastrophic failure and all sixteen fan blades were destroyed. Each blade splintered into several pieces and most of the blades were sheared near the fan hub assembl Metal shards from the fan blades damaged the EDG radiators and caused a partial loss of radiator coolan A 'icensee lab report was reviewed by the inspectors. Visual examination of the blades identified that blade 11 appeared to have a pre-existing crack, Based upon this observation, the blade was sent to the licensee's corporate materials test laboratory. Results of the examination indicated that blade 11 had failed due to a manufacturing flaw. A fatigue crack appeared to have started at or near a shrinkage crack that had formed during the initial casting of the blad The crack had expanded to about 75 percent of the blade's cross sectio The remaining part of the blade experienced overload failure. The failed and separated portion of the blade sheared the other 15 blade A detailed inspection of blade 11 showed a higher shrinkage 6nd shrink porosity than samples taken from another blade. At the end of the inspection period, ether blades from the failed fan assembly were being examined to determine the extent of the blade 11 abnormalit At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was in the process of purchasing other fan assemblies with higher quality bladin The licensee curreraly plans to replace the older fan assemblies on the other three EDGs with newer assemblies during the April 1998 Unit 2 and

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f September 1998 Unit I refueling outa]es. The inspectors noted that a final re) ort about the IH EDG fan failure will be available for review -

during t1e next ins)ection period. The final re) ort will include  !

information about t1e other failed and examined ) ladin l

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The licensee initiated appropriate actions to determine the root cause i

. of the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator cooling fan failure. Pialiminary l results of the root cause examination were reasonabl ,

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IV. Plant Sucoort P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Plan  ;

t P4.1 Emeraency Preoaredness (EP) Orill Observations T InsoectionScooe(717M1 ,

On November 5, the inspectors observed miscellaneous EP drill

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activities. Areas observed during the drill included the local emergency operations facility, control room simulator, technical support center. and the operations support center. The inspectors also reviewed t the drill scenario and its objectives and discussed the drill results l

with an EP representative,

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Observations and Findinos

On November 5, are annual EP exercise was conducted by the licensee. The i plant and corporate Emergency Response Organization Automated Notification System (ER0ANS) failed when activated. The licensee took immediate corrective action and performed the call out manually. The  ;

response time of the organization was delayed, but met the drill

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objective. -The licensee initiated DR 97-3065 to evaluate the cause of the ER0ANS failure and evaluate appropriate corrective action There were 16 drill objectives evaluated: 15 objectives were fully satisfied. Objective number 16, however, was partially met. Objective

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16 demonstrated the ability to rovide basic life support and to prepare-and transport a contaminated in ured person to an off-site medical

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facilit The licensee identif ed that the onsite medical-patient care was not satisfactory due-to command and control deficiencies with the ~

First Aid Team Scene Leader. As a result, the licensee plan!. to provide additional comand and control training for applicable First Aid Team personnel.-

c, Conclusions TheLlicensee adequately )erformed the November 5, in house EP exercis i One drill objective whic1 involved treatment and transpcrt of injured

.Dersonnel was only partially met by the 11censee, t

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P8 Hiscellaneous EP Issues P (Closed) Exercise Weakness 50 338. 339/96008 01: delayed report of radiological conditions following a release, this exercise weakness involved a delayed dose assessment resulting in the failure to provide a timely report of radiological conditions to the State and County governments. The licensee is rec.11 red to notify the State and local governments within 15 minutes of event initiation and initial classification. The licensee was also required to notify the State and local governments within 15 minutes of condition changes. During the 1996 emorgency drill, there was a delay of greater than 20 minutes before the State and local governments received notification. The inspectors discussed with the licensee this exercise weakness and the licensee's corrective actions. During the Noverrber 5 annual EP exercise, notifications were performed in unwr 12 minutes. This demonstrated to the inspectors evidence of improved conmunications between the licensee and the State and local government F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance F4.1 Unannounced Fire Drill Observations a. Insnection Stone (71750)

The inspectors observed fire team members resoonse to an unannounced fire dril The inspectors also attended the post drill critique, b, Observations and Findinns On Govember 18, an unannounced fire drill was conducted at tha Turbine Oil Room located in the basement. of the Unit 1 Turbine Building. The inspectors observed initial response by fire team members at the turn out gear staging area and subsequent simulated fire fighting activities at the fire scen All turnout gear and Self Contained Breathing Apparatuses (SCBAs) were in good condition and readily available for fire team members. Spare breathing air bottles were also available and taken to the fire scen During the dress out phase of the drill, two of the team members did not know the location of the fire. There were other members who knew tne location, but the location was not relayed to the two team member Consequently, these two team members arrived at the fire scene lat The inspectors concluded that team conniunications during this phase of the drill were ineffectiv All fire team members arrived at the fire scene in about nine minutn after the fire alarm sounded. Prior to attacking the fire, the inspectors observed t"3t one of the fire team members had difficulty donning the turn out gear. The same individual also had difficulty connecting the air supply line from the SCBA once directed to man the fire hose. These issues were discussed with liceilsee managemen .

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The fire team attacked the fire about 15 minutes after the discove"y of the fire. The attack was delayed, in part, by the individual who had difficulty donning the turn out gear discussed above. The inspectors noted that extra personnel ran fire hose lines, ensured a foam cart was available, and assisted fire team members with their turn out gea This support was hel]ful for fire fighting activities. Once fire fighting activities )egan, the drill was conducted well. Fire team members appeared to be properly trained on standard fire fighting techniques. Conmand and control, use of the fire preplan for the affected area, and conmunications were goo During the post drill critique, open discussions took place. Team members and drill evaluators discussed strengths and areas fer improvemen During these discussions one of the team members, who was a security guard, was confused about whether responding to the fire took precedence over assigned security duties (e.g., responding to a security alarm while assigned to an alarm station). Another individual, who was also a security guard, was unclear if th? SCBA air line should be hooked up while manning the fire hose and acting as backup for the team members actually fighting the fire. The evaluator informed this individual that the air line should be attached while manning the fire hos The inspectors discussed with security department management the issue of prioritizing duties between fire team and security responsibilitie The licensee initiated DR 97 3163 to correct this confusion. The licensee also stated that training would be provided to address the identified issue The inspectors performed a follow up inspection of a similar fire drill on December All fire brigade members involved with this fire drill appeared confident and performed all required actions in accordance with

)lant fire protection guidelines. Members of the fire brigade were cnowledgeable in the donning of fire protection equipment /SCBAS, the licensee':, fire protection requirements, preparations for attacking the fire and the location of the fire. Communications between fire team /

brigade members and the Fire Brigade Team Leader were good, c. Conclusions Weaknesses in a November 18, 1997, fire drill were noted involving conmunications during the initial phase of the drill and unfamiliarity with the turn out and donning of fire protection equipment. During a subsequent fire drill the inspector noted that these weaknesses had been correcte Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors ? resented the inspection results to members of licensee management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on December 17, 199/ and January 7, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the r inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identi fie PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee B. Foster Superintendent Station Engineering C Funderburk, Superintendent, Outage Planning E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager, Operations and Maintenance J. Hayes, Director, Nuclear Oversight D. Heacock, Assistant Station Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing H Kansler Vice President, Nuclear Operations P. Kemp, Supervisor, Licensing

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L. Lane, Superintendant O.perations T. Maddy, Superintendent Security W. Matthews, Station Manager H. Royal, Superintendent Nuclear Training D. Schappell, Superintendent Site Services R. Shears. Superintendent, Maintenance A. Stafford, Superintendent, Radiological Protection

, lEC N. Kalyanam Project Manager NRR (North Anna)

J. Lyons, Project Director, NRR (North Anna)

B. Mallett, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator, Ril A. Thadani, Acting Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Effe:tiveness L. Trocine, Acting Senior Regional Coordinator INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 60853: On-Site Fabrication of Components and Construction of an ISFSI IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92903: Followup - Engineering

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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Doened 50-338/97011 01 NCV Failure to Close the liydrogen Reconbiner Door During a Test (Section 04.1)

50-338, 339/97011-02 NCV Unmonitored Release from the "A" HVAC Ventilation Stack Flexible Connection

'Section M1.1)

50-339/97011-03- NCV Use of inadequate Work Instructions While Troubleshooting Energized Equipment (Section M1.2)

50 338, 339/97011-04 NCV Missed Surve111ances for the Solid State Protection System (Section El.1)

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72-16/97004-01 IFl Rebar Mis)lacement for ISFSI Concrete Pad (Section E2.3)

Closed 50-338/97011-01 NCV Failure to Close the hydroger, Recombiner Door During a Test (Section 04.1)

50 338, 339/97011 02 NCV Unmonitored Releast from the "A" HVAC Ventilation Stack Flexible Connection (Section M1.1)

50-339/97011-03 NCV Use of inadequate Work Instructions While Troubleshooting Energized Equipment (Section M1.2)

50 338, 339/97011 04 NCV Missed Surveillances for the Solid State Protection System (Section El.1)

50 338, 339/96008 01 EW Delayed Report of Radiological Conditions following a Release (Section P8.1)

Discussed 50-338, 339/96003 05 URI Review Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Discrepancies (Section 08.2)

50-338/97009-01 IFI Review of the Licensee's Final Root Cause Determination for the 1H EDG Fan Blade Failure (Section ER.1)

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