ML20245D548
| ML20245D548 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1989 |
| From: | Conlon T, Fillion P, Mark Miller NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245D519 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-01.097, RTR-REGGD-1.097 50-338-89-11, 50-339-89-11, NUDOCS 8906270152 | |
| Download: ML20245D548 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000338/1989011
Text
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Sa Rfc
Uh3tTED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
.
REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTT. GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.: 50-338/89-11 and 50-339/89-11
Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company
Glen Allen, VA 23060
Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339
Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: April 3-7,1989
Inspectors: P
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e
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[
P. Fillion
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Date Signed
C
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W
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M. Miller
Dats Sitjned
Approved
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T. Cdnlon, Section Chief
._
'Dat'e Signed
Plant Systems Section
Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was in the area of the licensee's
conformance to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, Instrumentation for Light-Water-
Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and
Following an Accident.
Results:
With the exception of two URI's and one deviation the plant is in compliance
with RG 1.97.
There were no major weakness or strengths identified in the
areas inspected.
- UP.I C9-11-01, Possible unreviewed deviation from RG 1.97 in the
area of process computer isolation (paragraph 2.C).
- URI 89-11-02, Specific identification of RG 1.97 Indicators
(paragraph 2.C)
- Deviation 89-11-03, Deviation from RG 1.97 (neutron flux)
paragraph 2.c).
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- Violation 89-11-04, Failure to identify deficient conditions (not
related to RG 1.97) (paragraph 2. c)
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8906270152 8906?O
ADOCK 05000338
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- D. Blankenship, I&C Engineer
- G. Kane, Station Manager
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- P. Kemn Supervisor of Licensing
P. Knutsen, Supervisor of Nuclear Engineering
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- H. V. Le, Systems Engineer
M. Marino, Systems Engineer
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G. Mocarski, Loss Prevention Coordinator
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- R. Woodall, III, Systems Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
engineers, operators, security force members, technicians, and'
administrative personnel.
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- Attended exit interview
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2.
Inspection of Licensee's Implementation of Multiplant Action A-17:
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Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs
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Conditions During and Following an Accident (Regulatory Guide 1.97)
(25587).
Criterion 13, " Instrumentation and Control," of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 includes a requirement that instrumentation be provided'to monitor
variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for accident
conditions as appro
Regulatory
Guide 1.97 (RG 1.97)priate to ensure adequate safety.
describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for
complying with the Commission's regulations to provide instrumentation to
monitor plant variables and systems during and following an accident.
The purpose of this inspection was to verify that the licen,ee has an
instrumentation system for assessing variables and systems during and
following an accident, as discussed in RG 1.97.
Under accident conditions
it is necessary that the operating personnel have (1) information that
permits the operator to take preplanned actions to accomplish a safe plant'
shutdown; (2) determine whe;her the reactor trip, Engineered
Safety-Feature System (ESFS), and that other manually initiated safety
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systems important to safety are performing their intended functions; and
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(3) provide information to the operators that will enable them to
determine the potential for causing a gross breach of the barriers to
radioactivity release and to determine if a gross breach of barrier has
occurred.
For this reason multiple instruments with overlapping ranges
may be necessary.
The required instrumentation must be capable of
surviving the accident environment for the length of time its operability -
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is required.
It is desirable that components continue to function
following seismic events.
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As a result, five types of variables have been specified that serve as
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guides in defining criteria and the selection of accident-monitoring
instrumentation.
The types are:
Type A - Those variables that provide
information needed to permit the control room operating personnel to take
specified manual actions for which no automatic control is provided and
that are required for safety systems to accomplish their functions for
design basis accident events; Type B - Those variables that provide
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information to indicate whether plant safety functions are being
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accomplished; Type C - Those variables that provide information to
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indicate the potential for barriers being breached or the actual breach of
barriers to fission product release; Type D - Those variables that provide
information to indicate operation of individual safety systems and oth(.r
systems important to safety; Type E - Those variables to be monitored in
detennining the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials and for
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continuously assessing such release.
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The design and qualification criteria are separated into three separate
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categories that provide a graded approach to requirements depending on the
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importance to safety of the measurement of a specific variable, Category 1
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provides the most stringent require:aen ts and is intended for key
n riables .
Category 2 provides less stringent requirements and generally
applies to instrumentation designated for indicating systems operating
status.
Category 3 is intended to provide requirements that will ensure
that high-quality off-the-shelf instrumentation is obtained and applies to
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backup and diagnostic ins trumentation.
A key variable is that single
accomplishment of a safety function (Types B and C), or the operation of a
safety system (Type D), or radioactive material release (Type E). Type A
variables are plant specific and depends on the operations that the
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designer chooses for planned manual actions.
Inspection of Categories 1
1
and 2 equipment was performed as described below,
a.
Category 1 Instrumentation
The instrumentation listed in the Category 1 Table, of this section,
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was examined to verify that the design and qualification criteria of
pG 1.97 had been satisfied.
The instrumentation was inspected by
reviewing drawings, procedures, data sheets, other documentation, and
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performing walkdowns for visual observation of the installed
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equipment. The following areas were inspected:
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(1) Equipment Qualification - The EQ Master Equipment List and the
Q-List were reviewed for confirmation that the licensee had
addressed environmental qualification requirements for class 1E
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equipment.
(2) Redundancy - Walkdowns were performed to verify by visual
observations the specified instruments were installed and
separation requirements were met.
In addition, drawings were
reviewed to verify redundancy and channel separation.
(3) power Sources
Drawings were reviewed to verify the
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instrumentation is energized from a safety-related power source.
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(4) Display and Recording - Walkdowns were performed to verify by
visual observation that the specified display and recording
instruments were installed.
Drawings were reviewed to verify
there was at least one recorder in a redundant channel and two
indicators, one per division (channel) for each measured
variable.
(5) Range - Walkdowns were performed to verify the actual range of
the indicator / recorders was as specified in RG I.97 or the SER.
Review of calibration procedures verified sensitivity and
overlapping requirements of RG 1.97 for instruments measuring
the same variable.
(6)
Interfaces - The drawings and Q. List were reviewed to verify
that safety-related isolation devices were used when required to
isolate the circuits from non-safety systems.
(7) Direct Measurement - Drawings were reviewed to verify that the
parameters are directly measured by the sensors.
(8) Service, Testing, and Calibration - The maintenance program for
performing calibrations and surveillance
was reviewed and
discussed with the licensee.
Calibration and surveillance
procedures and the latest data sheets for each instrument were
reviewed to verify the instruments have a valid calibration.
CATEGORY 1 TABLE
Variable
Instrument No. (Loop)
Drawings
LT-1474
6007D07
Narrow Range
L1-1474
Level
MUX
Computer
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LT-1475
6007D23
LI-1475
MUX
Computer
LT-1476
6007D41
LI-1476
L-1476-
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FR-1478
MUX
Computer
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LT-1484
6007D07
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LI-1484
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MUX
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Computer
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Variable
Instrument No. (Loop)
Drawings
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LT-1485
6007D23
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LI-1485
MUX
Computer
LT-1486
6007D42
LI-1486
FR-1488
,
MUX
Computer
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LT-1494
6007008
LI-1494
4
MUX
Computer
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LT-1495
6007D42
Narrow Range
LI-1495
Level
MUX
Computer
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LT-1496
6007D43
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LI-1496
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FR-1498
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MUX
q
Computer
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RCS Cold Leg
TE-1410
6007D13
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Temperature
TR-1410
T-1410
MUX
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Computer
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T2-1420
6007D20
TR-1420
T-1420
MUX
Computer
TE-1430
6007D46
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TR-1430
T-1430
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MUX
Computer
Refuelin9 Water
LT-QS-100A
7383D29-
Storage Tank
LI-QS-100A
LQS-100A
Level
MUX
3
LT-QS-100B
7383D33
LI-QS-100B
LQS-1008
MUX
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Variable
InstrumentNo.(Loopl
Drawings
LT-QS-100C
7383D39
LI-QS-100C
LQS-100C
MUX
RCS Wide Range
PT-1402
6007D89
Pressure
PI-1402A & B
P-1402
MUX
Computer
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PT-1403
6007070
PI-1403A & B
6008D39
MUX
P-1403
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Computer
Containment
PT-LM-100A
7382D10
Intermediate
PI-LM-100A
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Range Pressure
MUX
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Computer
PT-LM-1008
7382021
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PI-LM-100B
MUX
1
Computer
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PT-LM-100C
7382026
PI-LM-1000
MUX
Computer
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PT-LM-1000
7382031
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PI-LM-1000
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MUX
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Computer
Neutron
NFD-190 Channel 1
NF-NM190
Flux
NFI-190A
NF-NM290
NFI-190B
MUX
NFD-1270 Channel 2
NF-NH1270
NFI-1270A
NF-NH2270
NFI-12708
MUX
Core Exit
TE-1E
TESK-RC022
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Temperature
TE-51E
TESK-RC023
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MUX A
TESK-RC024
MUX B
ICCM A
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ICCM B
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Variable
Instrument No. (Loopl
Drawings
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Pressurizer
ZS-PCV-1455C
11715-ESK-60N
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A1, A2, B1, B2
11715-ESK-6NR.
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Position Indicator
ZS-PCV-1456
PVC-1456
A1, A2, B1, B2
PVC-1455
Containment
H A-HC-101-1
A-HC101-1
H I-HC-101-1 & 2
Concentration
H R-HC-101-1
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H A-HC-201-1
A-HC201-1
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H I-HC-201-1 & c
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H R-HC-201-1
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Notes:
(1) MUX is multiplexer input for SPDS and computers other
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than the plant process computer.
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(2) Computer is plant prncess computer.
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(3) The instruments listed are for Unit 1, the same Unit 2
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instruments were reviewed.
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b.
Category 2 Instrumentation
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The instrumentation listed in the Category 2 Table, of this section,
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was examined to verify that the design and qualification criteria of
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RG 1.97 had been satisfied.
The instrumentation was inspected by
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reviewing drawings, procedures, data sheets, other documentation, and
,
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performing walkdowns for visual observation of the installed
equipment. The following areas were inspected:
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(1) Equipment Qualification - The EQ Master Equipment List and the
Q-List were reviewed for confirmation that the licensee had
addressed environmental qualification requirements for Class 1E
equipment.
(2)
Power Sources
Drawings were reviewed to verify the
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instrumentation is energized from a high quality or safety-
related power source.
(3) Display and Recording - Walkdowns were performed to verify by
visual observation that the specific display and recording
instruments were installed.
Drawings were reviewed - to verify
there was at least one recorder, where required by RG 1.97, in a
redundant channel and two indicators, one per division (channel)
for each measured variable.
(4) Range - Walkdowns were performed to verify the actual range of
the indicators / recorders was as specified in RG 1.97 er the SER.
Also calibration procedures were reviewed to verify sensitivity
and overlapping requirements of RG 1.97 for instruments
measuring the'same variable.
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(5) Interfaces - The drawings and Q-list were reviewed to verify
that safety-related isolation devices are used when required to
isolate the circuits from computer systems (not safety-related).
(6) Direct Measurements - Drawings were reviewed to verify that the
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parameters are directly measured by the sensors.
(7) Service, Testing, and Calibration - The maintenance program for
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performing calibrations and surveillance
was reviewed and
discussed wit!. the licensee.
Calibration and surveillance
procedures and the latest data sheets for each instrument were
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reviewed to verify the instruments have a valid calibration.
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CATEGORY 2 TABLE
Variable
Instrument No. (Loop)
Drawings
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FT-1940
7392008
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Flow
FI-1940
SI-036
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FT-1940-1
7392D18
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FI-1940-1
SI-053
FT-1943
7392D18
FI-1943
SI-037
FT-1943-1
7392008
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FI-1943-1
SI-054
Computer
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FT-1945
6008D08
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F1ow
FI-1945
F-1945
MUX
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FT-1946
6008D37
FI-1946
F-1946
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MUX
FT-1110
6007D90
Charging
FI-1110
F-1110-
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Flow
MUX
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Component
TE-SW-111
7382053
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Cooling Water
TI-SW-111
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Temperature
MUX
Containment
TE-RS-150A
7382D11
Sump Water
TI-RS-150A
T-RS150A
Temperature
MUX
TE-RS-150B
T-RS150B
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TI-RS-150B
MUX-
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Variable
Instrument No. (Loop)
Drawings
PT-1921
6008D06
Tank Pressure
PI-1921
PT-1923
5008D41
PI-1923
PT-1925
6008008
PI-1925
Ti- 927
6008D41
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PI-1927
MUX
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PT-1929
6008007
Tank Pressure
PI-3929
PT-1931
6008D42
PI-1931
MUX
4160 VAC
0-5KV Voltmeter
11715-FE-1D
BUS IH and IJ
Voltage
Notes:
(1) MUX is multiplexer input for SPDS and computers other
than the plant process computer.
(2) Computer is the plant process computer.
(3) The instruments listed are for Unit 1, the 'same Unit 2
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instruments were reviewed.
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c.
Discussion
In RG 1.97, Rev. 3,
the design and qualification criteria for
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instrumentation include the following three requirements:
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(1)
Redundant channels should be electronically independent and
physically separated from each other and from equipment not
classified important to safety in accordance with RG 1.75,
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" Physical Independence of Electric Systems," up to and including
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any isolation device.
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(2) No single failure within the accident-monitoring
. being
instrumentation should prevent the operators frora
presented the information necessary for them to determine the
safety status of the plant etc.
(3) The transmission of signals. for other use should be' through
isolation devices that are. designated as part of the monitoring
instrumentation and that meet the provisions of this document.
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In the North Anna design, qualified isolation devices located at the
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Reactor Protection System process racks isolate the protection
portion of the circuitry from the indication portion. The indication
portion of. the circuitry includes the transmission of signals to
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instruments on the main control board and the plant process computer.
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Since the computer is not electrically isolated from the: instrument
signal, the computer is, in effect, part of the accident-monitoring
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instrumentation.
Wiring from each of the process cabinets, for the
four redundant channels, to instruments on,the main control board was-
designated as non-safety-related in the original plant design.
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Therefore, physical separation was not required, and does not exist
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between redundant channels in the indication portion or the
circuitry.
The NRC does not require back-fitting" of- accepted -
original plant designs to meet the requirements of RG'1.75' for
. physical separation.
Criteria (2) 'and (3) stated above are. violated by virtue of the fact
that the plant trocess computer is connected to the accident-monitoring :
instrumentation.
The computer . represents a potential . common mode
failure.
All conputer input cards are powered from a common power
stfply which means that a _ voltage surge appearing on the computer
power supply could. propagate to all redundant channels.
In Tuch a
scenario, the surge could damage the isolator at the protection
system / indication interface' for multiple redundant channels. Damage
to the isolators would result in loss of indication.
The issue
reduces to whether or not isolation devices are required at the
computer input points.
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' Neither the licensee's RG 1.97 submittal nor the NRC's. Safety
Evaluation Report ' address the. apparent deviation from. RG 1.97
described . above,
i.e., plant process computer not isolated ,from
accident-moni toring instrumentation.
Therefore, the inspector-
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concluded that the particular design at North Anna may not have been
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reviewed in relation to RG 1.97 at 'the time the SER was written.
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This matter is called .an Unresolved Item pending' further review by
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the NRC.
Unresolved Item 89-11-01, Possible Unreviewed Deviation
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from RG 1.97 (process computer isolation).
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RG 1.97 Revision 3 states that the instruments designated as Types.A,
B, and C'and Categories 1 and 2.should be specifically. identified on
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the control panels so that the operator- can eas fly discern that they
are intended for use . under accident conditions.
Examples 'of
acceptable methods-for accomplishing this requirement are ident4 fica-
tion labels having a different background color than other labels or
instrument bezels color coded to . indicate RG 1.97 instruments.
The
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licensee's RG 1.,97 . correspondence does not address s'pecific
identification of instruments o'n the control panels, nor is specific
identification of RG 1.97 instruments incorporated into the ' control
panels.
The licensee stated during: the inspection thatr
"The
Virginia Power approach for compliance with EQ requirements was ato
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provide qualified signals to . the: instrumentation racks ' for all.
channels associated with each variable.
Accordingly, all instrument
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channels for each variable met the same criteria, and special
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demarcation for RG 1.9'I compliance was not_ necessary.
The Control
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Room Design Review performed in response to NLfREG-0737 Supplement l'
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evaluated control room labels for human factors considerations.
A
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[ internal] memo requested that CRDR evaluate the specific criteria of
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The response to that memo was that this would be further
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evaluated and addressed by Corrective Action CA29E identified as an
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commitment in letter SN 85-268C dated June _30,1986." This matter is
identified as an unresolved item pending the completion of CA29E and
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subsequent NRC review.
Unresolved Item 338, 339/89-11-02, Specific
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Identification of RG 1.97 Indicators.
The design and qualification criteria for Category 1 variables
requires that recording of instrumentation readout information should '
be provided.
Where direct and immediate trend or transient
information is essential for operator information or action, the
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recording should be continuously available on dedicated recorders.
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Otherwise, it [ recording information] may be continuously updated,
stored in computer memory, and displayed on demand.
Intermittent
displays such as scanning recorders may be used in some cases. The
RG defines neutron flux as a Type B, Category 1 variable and,
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therefore, at least one channel should be recorded.
The licensee's
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submittal dated January 31, 1984, also defines neutron flux as a
Type B, Category 1 variable, and states that the control room display
requirements are met.
The submittal also states that a new excore
flux monitoring system will be installed to meet the environmental
qualification criteria.
This new system was installed and, since it
does not include a dedicated (strip chart) recorder, apparently the
intention was to rely on the safety parameter display system to
provide the recording function.
The NRC inspector asked the Software
Analyst Engineer to demonstrate the recording function for the
neutron flux qualified channels, but he was not able to do so. The
neutron flux qualified channel signals were transmitted to the SPDS;
however, the SPDS was not programmed to record this input data for
display on demand.
The conclusion reached during the inspection was that trend
information for the neutron flux channel was not available on
dedicated recorders nor stored in computer memory for display on
demand.
Furthermore, it was not detennined whether or not this
variable is an isolated case of that problem.
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The failure to provide recording for neutron flux constitutes a
deviation from RG 1.97 and, therefore, a deviation from the
licensee's commitment to comply with the regulatory guide.
Deviation
338, 339/89-11-03, Deviation from RG 1.97 (neutron flux).
RG 1.97 defines component cooling water temperature to ESF system as
a Type D, Category 2 variable.
The licensee, in his RG 1.97
submittal dated January 31, 1984, stated that the instrumentation for
compnnent cooling water temperature to ESF systems did not meet
RG 1.97 with respect to range, environment 7 qualification, power
source nor control room display.
The submittal also indicated that
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they would install a temperature channel to monitor operation at the
charging pump cooling system.
In a supplementary submittal dated
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May 10, 1985, the licensee stated the following:
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"The Service Water System provides cooling water to Engineered
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Safety Feature (ESF) systems.
Therefore, service water
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temperature is the North Anna equivalent variable for the
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' component cooling water temperature to ESF system' variable
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specified in Regulatory Guide l.97.
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" Service water temperature instrument channels will be modified
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to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97.-
These
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modifistions are now in the design stage and will provide
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Service Water Temperature information to th- TSC and E0F in
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addition to the existing temperature indicating meter on the
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main control board.
Replacement of the existing RTD's will not'
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be necessary because they are located in the Turbine Building
and the Service Water Pump House and were originally specified
to function in the areas in which they are located."
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The Safety Evaluation Report found this commitment acceptable.
In
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providing indication for this variable, qualified temperature
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transmitters were installed to monitor temperature of the auxiliary
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service water pump discharge.
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Telephone conversation with the licensee on June I and 2,1989,
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disclosed that qualified temperature and flow elements are installed
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in the Servie Water System that meet the intent of F31.97.
These
instruments are as follows:
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- TE-SW-111 and -211 on discharge of Aux Service Water Pumps
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- FE-SW-100A, -1008, -100C, and -100D on discharge flow of
RSHX.
The power supply meets requirements for type D
variable.
- TE-SW-108 and 109 on discharge from main Service Water Pumps.
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- FT-SW-109A and 109B from charging pump gear box and seal
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cooler
- FT-SW-108A and 108B from charging pump lube oil cooler.
In the course of performing plant walkdowns related to RG 1.97
equipment, the following deficient conditions were identified:
(1)
In the main control room, the control board on which most of the
RG 1.97 indicators were mounted is an open-back type of panel.
The panel is about 20 feet long and seven feet high for each
Unit.
Because of previous events that involved workers-
inadvertently short-circuiting wiring terminal points, a
decision was made by the responsible manager to not allow
cleaning and vacuuming work to take place in the area behind the
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main control board.
Consequently, the interior of .the' main
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control panel, including the terminal blocks, had not been
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cleaned for several years.
The amount of. dust buildup had
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reached the point where it could affect the integrity of the
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wiring.
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(2) The Nuclear Instrumentation System Cabinets which contain the
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excore neutron flux instruments were opened for inspection after
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finding condition (1).
Two of these NIS cabinets per Unit
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contained an un-terminated, un-taped multiconductor cable. One
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of these cables was tagged INMS2WX110.
It was later determined
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that the cable was actually a spare cable.
To have an
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un-terminated, un-taped, improperly tagged cable in the NIS
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cabinet represents a deficient condition, and a departure from
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plant procedures.
(3) The control room floor is a false floor er computer floor type
construction which provides a cabla routing space.
Behind the
main control panel at a point where the Units 1 and 2 panels
meet, one of the removable floor boards was loose or not.
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properly supported.
This constituted a deficient condition
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because a person could fall on the loose board and injure
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himself or fall into the open-back control board.
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(4) Panels located at the opposite side of the control room from the
main control board were also inspected.
The NRC inspector
i
noticed that the bottom of the panel was not properly sealed.
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The panels themselves had large openings in the bottom to allow
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cable entry from the raised floor cable routing space (as
!
defined by NFPA Std 75).
According to the original design, fire
retardent boards had been installed at the bottom of these
panels, after the cable work was complete.
The purpose of the
boards may be to help maintain halon gas concentrations
!
discharged from the halon fire suppession system installed in
the raised floor cable routing space.
In nine of these panels,
the bottom sealing bocrds were badly broken or missing.
The four deficient conditions described above. '.e., the heavy dust
in the control panel, the improperly spared ca .es, the loose floor
boards and the broken sealing boards, had sufficient safety
significance to constitute a violation of NRC requirements in the
area of identifying and correcting deficient conditions.
It is
identified as Violation 338, 339/89-11-04, Failure to Identify
Deficient Conditions.
The licensee made several plant modifications or equipment upgrades
in order to comply with RG 1.97.
Part of the work of the NRC
inspection was to determine the scope of these plant modifications
for the audit sample.
The relevant modification packages were
reviewed to the extent of verifying the scope of work and status.
The inspector was satisfied that the necessary work had been
accomplished.
The plant modifications for the audit sample are
summarized below:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
4
4
1
' *
,
=
.
.
13
SUMMARY OF MODIFICATIONS
U1 *
Variable
Package No.
Scope
Completed
86-11 & 12
Upgrade to EQ
10/2/87
Tk Pres
HPSI Flow
84-55 & 56
Upgrade to EQ and relocate
12/20/87
82-14
Component
84-49 & 50
Replace equipment
12/5/88
Cooling Water
Core Exit
85-07 & 08
Entire System upgrade to
6/14/87
Temp
meet range, EQ, seismic,
redundancy
RCS Cold
81-54
4/10/87
Leg Temp
RCS Wide
82-14
Upgrade to EQ
5/27/87
Range Pres.
RWST Level
84-47 & 48
Upgrade transmitters to
12/19/85
seismic
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PORV Position 84-17 & 18
Replace limit switches to
6/14/87
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meet EQ, seismic, redundancy
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Cont Inter-
82-14
Upgrade to EQ
5/27/87
l
mediate Pres.
!
\\
Neutron
83-30 & 31
New system installed
6/24/S8
Monitoring
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LHSI Flow
82-14
Upgrade to EQ
5/27/87
- Date that Station Manager signed package for Unit I as being
essentially complete.
3.
Corrective Action Program
With respect to URI 338, 339/89-11-01, Electrical Independence of RG 1,97
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Instrumentation, the licensee's official position is that their design
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meets the intent of RG 1.97 and, therefore, any internal audits would not
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'
have identified problems in this area.
URI 338, 339/89-11-02, Specific
Identification of RG 1.97. Indicators, is being addressed by .the licensee
under their control room design review effort. The licensee deviated from
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{
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
,
.
=
..
.
.
.
14
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the RG for one variable (Deviation '338, 339/89-11-03). This is attributed
"
to personnel error and inattention to detail.
The problems described in
Violation 338, 339/89-11-04, Failure to Identify Deficient Conditions,
should have been identified by the. licensee in the course of performing
plant walkdowns.
Three of the conditions had probably existed for at
least a year.
The improperly spared cables should also have been
identifled at the time the modification work was performed.
4.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were sunnarized on April 7,1989,.with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described; the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed
below.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting connents were not received from the licensee.
338, 339/89-11-01 Unresolved Item - Possible unreviewed deviation from RG 1.97 (Process Computer Isolatio.1)
338, 339/89-11-02 Unresolved Item - Specific Identification of RG 1.97
Indicators
!
338,339/89-11-03 Deviation - Deviation from RG 1.97
338,339/89-11-04 Violation - Failure to Identify Deficient Conditions
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The Station Manager commented on the violation. He stated that failure to
remove dust from the control panel did not represent a shortcoming of
their program but, rather, a failure to implement Procedure ADM-20.48,
4
Station Material Condition and Housekeeping (dated November 23, 1988).
"
The Station Manager also stated that corrective actions for each of the
deficiencies had already been initiated.
"The control panel was cleaned
last evening, but not to .ny satisfaction.
It will be vacuumed again," he -
said.
It was also stated that they determined the halon system would have
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performed its function even though the sealing boards were broken or
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missing.
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5.
Acronyms and Initialisms
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Environmental Qualification
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FI
Flow Indicator
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FT
-
Flow Transmitter
HPSI -
High Pressure Safety Injection
HA -
Hydrogen Analyzer
HI -
Hydrogen Analyzer Indicator
Hydrogen Analyzer Recorder
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I CM -
Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor
Level Indicator
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LPSI -
Low Pressure Safety Injection
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LT
-
Level Transmitter
Multiplexer
MUX
-
Nuclear Flux Detector
NFD
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,
l
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.
.
{
'
.
.
-
,
1
-
15
)
1
NFI
Nuclear Flux Indicator
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Pressure Control Valve
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-
Pressure Indicator
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PORV -
Power Operated _ Relief Valve
Pressure Transmitter
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Reactor Cooling System
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RTD -
Resistance Type Temperature Detector
!
Safety. Evaluation Report
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-
Temperature Element
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Temperature Indicator
.
TI
-
Temperature Recorder
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PS
-
Position Switch
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-1
<
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- _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _
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