ML20216H671
| ML20216H671 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216H649 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-98-01, 50-338-98-1, 50-339-98-01, 50-339-98-1, 72-0016-98-01, 72-16-98-1, NUDOCS 9804210211 | |
| Download: ML20216H671 (25) | |
See also: IR 05000338/1998001
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-338. 50-339. 72-16
Report Nos: 50-338/98-01. 50-339/98-01, and 72-16/98-01
Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
Facility: North Anna Power Station. Units 1 & 2
Location: 1022 Haley Drive
Mineral. Virginia 23117 ,
Dates: January 25 through March 7. 1998
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Inspectors: M. Morgan. Senior Resident Inspector
R. Gibbs. Resident Inspector
P. Fillion. Reactor Inspector (Sections E2.1 and E8.1)
L. Garner. Senior Project Engineer (Section 08.4)
W. Stansberry. Security Specialist (Sections S2.2. S2.9.
S3.2. S4.1. S5.2. 56.3 and S7.3) J
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Approved by: R. Haag. Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
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ENCLOSURE
9804210211 980403 E
PDR ADOCK 05000338 !
G PDR ;
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
North Anna Power Station. Units 1 & 2
NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-338/98-01. 50-339/98-01, and 72-16/98-01
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six-week
period of resident ins)ection. In addition, it includes the results of
announced inspections ]y regional inspectors.
Doerations
- Receipt. inspection, and storage of new fuel was acceptable. Issues l
regardirig personnel safety practices and procedure usage were noted and
corrected (Section 01.2).
- Response to increased Lake Anna level met Technical Specification
requirements and operation of the Lake Anna spillway was proper
(Section 01.3).
- The decision to remain at a reduced power level while the B condensate
pump was repaired was prudent (Section 01.4).
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Six non-emergency NRC notifications were accurate. timely, and proper
(Section 01.5).
. Tag out of the Unit 1 charging pump was adequately performed. A
disabled annunciator was not added to the disabled annunciator list
(Section 02.1).
- Proper actions were taken to meet Technical Specification requirements
when a Unit 1 service water pump was removed from service. Operator
knowledge of the limiting condition for operation and required service
water system pressures was good (Section 04.1).
Maintenance
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Communications self-checking practices, and procedure adherence during
the Unit 1 train 8 solid state protection system test were good (Section
M1.1).
. The operability test for the steam generator power operated relief
valves was properly performed. Technical Specifications and other
techriical requirements were satisfied (Section M1.2).
- Overall maintenance activities on the Unit 1 charging pump were good.
Improved work practices associated with charging pump seal repair were
noted (Section M1.3).
. The Maintenance Rule program effectively monitored charging pump
performance criteria (Section M1.3).
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Enaineerina
. Weather-related problems were not prevalent during this inspection
period for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
construction. The observed ISFSI activities were adequately performed
(Section E1.1).
. A review of open engineering work items indicated that the licensee was
timely in resolving safety significant issues (Section E2.1).
Plant Sucoort
. Survey maps used to inform workers of radiological conditions were
accurate and were )osted properly. Several other effective practices
used to inform worcers of radiological conditions were noted (Section
R1.1).
. Posting and control of high radiation areas was appropriate (Section
R1.1).
. The licensee's alarm stations and communication equipment were in
compliance with the criteria in Chapters 1-6. 8. and 9 of the Physical
Security Plan and appropriate Security Contingency Plan Implementing
Procedures and Security Plan Implementing Procedures (Section S2.2).
. Chapter 8 of the Physical Security Plan described an adequate security
protection plan for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
Construction implementation was appropriate (Section S2.9).
. A random sam)le of Security Plan Implementing Procedures and Security i
Contingency )lan Implementing Procedures adequately met the Physical l
Security Plan commitments and practices (Section S3.2).
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. Security personnel possessed appropriate knowledge to carry out their l
assigned duties and responsibilities, including response, use of deadly 4
force and armed response tactics (Section S4.1).
. The security force was being trained in an excellent manner and in
accordance with the Training and Qualification Plan and regulatory
requirements (Section $5.2).
. The total number of trained security officers and armed personnel
immediately available to fulfill response requirements met Physical
Security Plan requirements (Section S6.3).
. The documented problem analyses for five security-related deviation
reports were adequate (Section S7.3).
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Reoort Details
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l Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100-percent reactor power. Power was
reduced to 88 percent on February 12 when the B high pressure heater drain
) ump and the B condensate pump experienced motor bearing failures and had to
)e secured. 'On February 16, power was increased to 92 percent after the
B heater drain pump was repaired and placed in service. On February 21. the
B condensate pump was. repaired, placed in service, and power was increased to
100 percent. Power remained at or near 100 percent for the remainder of the
inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period. Unit
coastdown for the April 1998 refueling outage began on March 1.
I, Operations
01 Conduct of Operations
01.1 Daily Plant Status Reviews (71707. 40500)
The inspectors conducted frequent control room tours to verify proper
-staffing, operator attentiveness, and adherence to approved procedures.
The inspectors attended daily plant status meetings to maintain
awareness of overall facility operations and reviewed operator logs to
verify operational safety, and compliance with Technical Specifications
(TSs). Instrumentation and safety system lineups were periodically
reviewed from control room indications to assess operability. Frequent
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)lant tours were. conducted to observe equipment status and housekeeping.
Jeviation Reports (DRs) were reviewed to assure that potential safety )
concerns were properly reported and resolved. The inspectors found that-
daily operations were conducted in accordance with regulatory
requirements and plant procedures.
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01~2 Receint. Insoection. and Storace of New Fuel
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a. Insoection Scone (71707. 60705)
On February 3 and February 5, the inspectors observed receipt,
inspection and temporary storage of new fuel designated for the April
1998 Unit 2 refueling outage.
b. Observations and Findinos
Operations personnel conducted the new fuel receipt activities
in accordance with 0-0P-4.2, " Receipt and Storage of New Fuel,"
Revision 12. Fuel received was in good condition and the shipping
containers did not show indications of damage or improper handling.
Appropriate rigging and handling of the containers and proper movement
of the fuel from its horizontal storage position.to a vertical .
inspection position was observed. . Appropriate use and control of the I
new fuel handling tool and crane / hoist was also observed. The operators l
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and Health Physics (HP) technicians who inspected the fuel were
knowledgeable. Communications between the new fuel handling coordinator
and other members of the fuel handling team were good. Use of
industrial safety and HP equipment (i.e. use of cotton gloves, safety
glasses, and hearing protection) was adequate. After inspection of the
fuel by the coordinator and a corporate refueling engineer, the fuel was
properly stored in the new fuel storage sites.
The following deficiencies were observed by the inspectors. immediately
reported to operations, and promptly addressed by management:
- Movement of the refueling crane / bridge required about six feet of
movement over a stairwell which runs between the fuel container
receipt and new fuel storage area. This stairway area was not
appropriately roped-off or designated as an " Caution Area" during
bridge movement. Ropes and caution signs were subsequently placed
in these areas shortly after the February 5 inspection.
- Hard hats were not routinely worn by the bridge crane o)erators
and the new fuel handling coordinator because the hats lampered
wearing of communications equipment. Clarification of hard hat
use in the new fuel handling areas was addressed by management.
During a subsequent inspection. the inspectors noted that
personnel were following the guidance for use of hard hats in the
area.
- A checkoff sheet, which was used as a place-keeping tool by the
new fuel handling coordinator. was not appropriately used.
Procedure steps were initialed, however. several steps were not
checked-off on the checkoff sheet upon completion. This oversight
did not negatively affect fuel handling and inspection activities.
The coordinator immediately corrected the oversight and no further
problems were noted.
c. Conclusions
Receipt. inspection and storage of new fuel was acceptable. Issues
regarding personnel safety practices and procedure usage were noted and
corrected.
01.3 Doeration of the Lake Anna Soillway (71707)
On February 5. the inspectors toured the Lake Anna Spillway area. Due
to heavy rains. lake level increased and exceeded the local area
resident notification level of 250.9 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL) and TS 4.7.6.1.B surveillance requirement level of a 251 feet MSL. Entry into
I TS 4.7.6.1.8 required the licensee to measure lake level every two
hours. The inspectors verified the TS requirement was met. Because
call-outs were made to local area residents and local highway department
officials, both the NRC Operations Center and the resident inspectors
were notified. During the tour, the inspectors noted that the spillway l
dam gates were opened to urgency level control positions of three feet
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! generators located at the base of the dam were secured in accordance -
L with spillway operating procedures. While touring the area, the
inspectors examined spillway diesel conditions following February 3
troubleshooting and repair activities (Reference Section 01.5). The
inspectors noted.that the spillway diesel was in good condition. The -I
-inspectors also noted that overall spillway operation was appropriate
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and in accordance with the operating procedure. Response to_ increased
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Lake Anna level met TS requirements and operation of the Lake Anna
spillway was proper.
L 01'.4 Unit 1 Power Reduction Review
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l a. InsDeetion scooe (71707)
The inspectors reviewed an operational transient caused by lower motor
l bearing failures'of a high pressure heater drain pump and a condensate
l- pump. The inspectors also discussed with operations management the
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decision to remain at a reduced power level while the condensate pump
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i ;b. Observations and Findinas
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L On February 12 while the plant was operating at 100 percent power.'the
L B high pressure heater drain pump lower motor bearing. failed, requiring l
L the pump to be secured. In order to compensate for the decrease in
suction pressure to the main feedwater pumps, the B condensate-pump,
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which was in standby, was manually started. Shortly afterwards, its
L lower motor bearing also failed resulting in its shutdown by operator's.'
Reactor power was quickly reduced to.88 percent in accordance with
abnormal procedures. -DRs N-98-370 and N-98-371 were initiated for the
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L bearing failures to determine the causes_'and evaluate appropriate-
l corrective actions. The B high pressure heater drain pump was repaired -I
and power-was increased to 92 percent on February 16. On February 21.
l repairs were completed for the B. condensate pump and power was returned
L to 100 percent. The actions taken by the licensee in response to these
equipment failures were appropriate.
r The inspectors discussed with the Operations Superintendent why power
% was limited to 92 percent during the time period the standby condensate
pump was out of service for repair. Power could have been increased to
nearly 100 percent once the heater drain pump was returned to service.
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The superintendent indicated that the decision to remain at 92 percent
-power _was prudent. He stated that the loss of another high or low
t pressure heater drain pump or failure of a high level divert valve could
possibly cause a steam generator level transient and challenge plant 1
operation. The decision was, in Jart, based on simulator observations
and.' reduced output of one of the ligh pressure heater drain pumps that
had been observed since the May 1997 refueling outage. The inspectors
had noted previously in Inspection Report Nos. 50-338, 339/97011.
Section 01.2, that there had been increased attention by operators
regarding operation of the secondary plant. Specifically, maintaining
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! adequate feedwater header pressure had been an operator concern since
the Moisture Separator Reheaters (MSRs) had been replaced during the May
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1997 refueling outage.
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c. Conclusions
The decision to remain at a reduced power level while the Unit 1 B
condensate pump was repaired was prudent. Increased operator attention
of secondary plant operations continued as a result of the moisture
separator reheater replacement project completed during the May 1997
refueling outage.
01.5 NRC Notifications
a. Insoection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the following NRC notifications to determine if
the reports were accurate, timely, and proper for the events.
b. Observations and Findinas
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On January 28. February 4. and February 17, 4-hour non-emergency
notifications were made because the licensee contacted local county
highway departments and local downstream residents concerning rising
Lake Anna water level. Plant procedures required local notifications
when lake level reached 250.9 feet MSL. Heavy rains had caused the lake
level to increase. Because local officials were contacted. 10 CFR
50.72(b)(2)(vi) required the licensee to notify the NRC. DRs N-98-212.
N-98-290, and N-98-407 were initiated. Reporting actions were
appropriate.
On January 29. a 1-hour non-emergency notification was made to the NRC
because the Emergency Response Facility Computer System (ERFCS) failed
and could not be restored within one hour. The system was subsequently
repaired and returned to service several hours later. 10 CFR
50.72(b)(1)(v) required the ERFCS failure to be reported within one hour
to the NRC. DR N-98-218 was initiated to determine the-cause and
address appropriate corrective actions. Reporting actions were
appropriate.
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On February 3. the Lake Anna spillway emergency diesel generator failed
c to start during its operability test. A fuse holder for a control
circuit fuse had lost its spring tension causing the fuse to become
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loose. The fuse holder was repaired and the diesel was returned to
service later that day. Plant procedures required notification to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Because an offsite agency was
contacted.10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(vi) required a 4-hour non-emergency
( notification to the NRC. DR N-98-263 was initiated to determine the
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cause and address appropriate corrective actions. Reporting actions
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On February 17. a 1-hour non-emergency notification was made because
both data links to the local emergency off-site facility and the central
emergency offsite facility were lost and not restored within 1-hour.
The system was repaired and. returned to service the following day.
10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(v) required the communication capability loss to.be
reported within one hour to the NRC. Reporting actions were
g appropriate
c Conclusions
l Six non-emergency NRC notifications were accurate, timely, and proper.
'02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
! 02.1 Unit 1 Charcina Pumo 1-CH-P-1 A'Taa Out Review
l a. Insoection Scooe (71707)
, The inspectors reviewed tagging activities associated with charging pump
l 1-CH-P-1A. The pump was removed from service for routine preventive
l maintenance and seal leak repair.
b.. Observations and Findinas
On February 23. the inspectors verified that the tag out of 1-CH-P-1A
L was properly performed:. tagging record 1-98-CH-0007 was referenced. All
tags were in place and all equipment was in the recuired positions. The
tagging record had.been properly signed off, inclucing independent
i verification, and properly authorized by licensed operators. The
ins)ectors evaluated the tagging record to ensure it was proper for the
wort and no problems were found.
, During the review, the inspectors found that one of the tagged items
L disabled a low lube oil temperature annunciator. The disabled
l annunciator was not. on the disabled annunciator list. The inspectors
L discussed this observation with the Operations Superintendent who stated:
that the individuals involved with the tag nut had attempted to add the.
L annunciator to the list. The individuals however, had not properly
b . saved the changes to the computerized list. The licensee initiated DR
N-98-466 to determine why the annunciator was not properly added to
list.
c; Conclusions
Tag out of the Unit 1 charging pump'was adequately performed. A
disabled annunciator was not added to the disabled annunciator list. !
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04 Operator Knowledge and Performance
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04.1 Service Water (SW) System Throttlina Alianment Review (71707)
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On January 30. the inspectors performed a review of the SW system
configuration and the required system pressure to ensure TS and
procedural requirements were met. Operators were also interviewed to
determine their awareness of the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)
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and system operating limits. Because a Unit 1 SW pump had been removed
from service. TS action 3.7.4.2.a was in effect. This action required
throttling of component cooling water heat exchanger SW flows within 72
hours after the SW pump became inoperable. The licensee properly
adhered to this requirement. The operating procedure required the pump
discharge pressure to be maintained between 54 and 70 psig. The
inspectors verified SW system pressure was within this pressure range.
0)erators displayed a good knowledge of the system pressure limits and
t1e LCO action statement requirements. Proper actions were taken to i
meet TS requirements when a Unit 1 service water pump was removed from '
service. Operator knowledge of the LCO and required SW system pressures ,
was good. '
08 Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901, 92700, 92903)
08.1 (Closed) URI 50-338. 339/97002-01: review compliance with TS 6.5.1.6
requirement for SNSOC review of programs. On March 6. 1997, the
licensee identified that no process existed to ensure that TS 6.5.1.6.a
would be satisfied for changes to the Primary Coolant Sources Outside
Containment program. Specifically. TS 6.5.1.6.a requires, in part, that
the Station Nuclear Safety And Operating Committee (SNSOC) shall be
responsible for review of all programs required by TS 6.8.4 and changes
thereto. The above program is listed in TS 6.8.4. The licensee had
initiated DR N-97-577 to determine the root cause and address
appropriate corrective actions.
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions for DR N-97-577 and found
that the program procedure was revised to ensure that subsequent changes
would require SNSOC approval. Past procedure revisions to the program
procedure were reviewed by the inspectors and no changes had been made
without SNSOC approval. Other plant programs listed in TS 6.8.4 were
also reviewed to determine if a process existed which required SNSOC
approval before changes were made to the programs. These other programs
had required SNSOC approval and changes to the programs had received
SNSOC approval.
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08.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort_.(LER) 50-338/97006: entered TS 3.0.3 due
to inoperable control rod indicators. On July 31, 1997, with Unit 1 at
100 percent power. TS 3.0.3 was entered because two Individual Rod
Position Indicators (IRPI) in the same group were ino)erable.
Saecifically, the IRPI for control rod M4 was inoperaale due to testing
w1en the IRPI for control rod M12 failed. This condition was outside
the requirements of TS 3.1.3.2.a. The IRPI for control rod M4 was
immediately returned to operable status and TS 3.0.3 was exited. The
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IRPI for control rod M12 was repaired shortly afterwards. Because TS 3.0.3 was entered. an LEP,was required in accordance with 10 CFR
50.73(a)(2)(i). The licensee initiated DRs N-97-2210 and N-97-2294 to
determine the root cause and address appropriate corrective actions.
The inspectors reviewed operating logs, responses to the DRs. and
discussed the event with several personnel including a licensing
engineer. the system engineer, and the Instrument and Control (I&C)
supervisor. The inspectors determined that the LER accurately reflected
the event and was timely. The cause and corrective actions were also
reviewed. Engineering and the maintenance departments concluded that
the cause of the event was aging of the operational amplifier. Part of
the corrective actions included immediate replacement of the failed
ampli fier.
The inspectors discussed with the system engineer and the I&C supervisor
if consideration had been given to replacing amplifiers that had reached
a certain service life. They stated that because the amplifiers had
been very reliable since their original installation and since the IRPI
system was being monitored in accordance with the licensee's Maintenance
Rule program, it was decided to address individual failures as they
occurred. The engineer and supervisor also stated that if more failures
occurred in the future causing performance criteria to be exceeded,
consideration would be given to more aggressively evaluate amplifier
replacements.
The licensee properly responded to the event and issued an appropriate
LER. The cause of the event was understood and appropriate corrective
actions were taken.
08.3 (Closed) VIO 50-338. 339/97002-03: failure to assure that control room
chart recorders were marked. On March 28, 1997, during a control board
walkdown, the inspectors identified that operators had not correctly
verified proper o)eration of the Units 1 and 2 Reactor Coolant Pumps'
Number 1 Seal Leacoffs and the Unit 2 Nuclear Power Range chart
recorders. The control room operator turnover checklist and logs and
operating records procedures required the operators to verify recorder
operation. I
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the violation dated
May 23. 1997. The response addressed the reason for the violation and
discussed corrective steps that were taken and the results achieved.
l The root cause of the violation was improper emphasis on verification of
l proper chart recorder inking. The operators had relied upon redundant
indications. Corrective actions included:
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. initiation of a DR I
e adjustment of the recorder pens * upscale travel and subsequent l
recorder pen re-priming j
e implementation of a daily general operating procedure to ensure i
control room recorders function properly l
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.- operator coaching to emphasize th'e importance of verifying
recorder function.
L - Since the violation occurred, the inspectors have on numerous occasions
i checked control room recorders for proper operation. The inspectors
- . have not identified any instance where recorders-had not been inking as
l required. The inspectors have also noted daily operator log entries
which documented performance of the recorder operability verification
l procedure. Proper actions were taken to ensure control room chart
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-recorders function as required.
L 08.4 (Ocen) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-338. 339/96003-05: review Final Safety
I Analysis Report discrepancies. The ins)ectors reviewed various
- documents concerning actions taken by t1e licensee'to address specific
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discrepancies comprising this-item. Additional reviews are necessary to
complete inspection activities associated with the individual parts of
this URI and determine their significance.
l;I II. Maintenance-
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M1- . Conduct of Maintenance {
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M1.1 Train B Solid State Protection System Test
a. Insoection Scooe (61726)
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On February 19, the inspectors observed I&C technicians perform portions
of 1-PT-36.1B, " Train B Reactor Protection and ESF Logic Channel
Functional Test." Revision 23. The inspection focused on procedure
adherence.
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L b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors observed implementation of the test in the control room
and at the local test panels. In the control room the inspectors found
that the controlling technician carefully followed the procedure. Steps
were initialed when completed and effectively communicated to those
involved with the test.. The technicians at the local test panels also
carefully'followed their procedure. There were two examples during the
test when the procedure steps and associated notes were somewhat
complex. The technicians stopped the procedure, discussed the steps to
ensure they understood them fully, and then completed the steps without
problems.
Communications were good. The inspectors observed one of the
technicians and the system engineer, who was observing the test to
' address potential problems. effectively assist another technician when
he was out of sequence when repeating back completed steps. The
technicians also used good self-checking practices.
The inspectors verified that the test equipment was in good condition
and calibrated. Expected test responses for the test circuits were also
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veri fied. Switches manipulated during the test were verified to be
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placed in the correct positions. The switches were also verified to be
placed in their proper positions when the test was completed.
c. Conclusions
Communications, self-checking practices, and procedure adherence during
the Unit 1 train B solid state protection system test were good.
M1.2 Unit 2 Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Test
a. Insoection Scooe (61726)
The inspectors observed operators perform 2 PT-213.38. Valve Inservice
Testing Steam Generator PORVs (2-MS-PCV-201A. 2-MS-PCV-201B. and 2-MS-
PCV-201C)," Revision 7. The purpose of the test was to satisfy TS 4.0.5
and Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Sections 3.1 and 7.5
requirements,
b. Observations and Findinas
On February 24. the inspectors observed performance of 2-PT-213.38 in
the control room, at the PORVs in the main steam valve house and in the
cable vault area. The test involved isolation of the PORVs from the
main steam header and subsequent manual cycling of the PORVs both
locally and from the control room. Also during the test. Appendix R
switches were operated to ensure that when the switches were placed in
the " FIRE EMER CLOSE" position that operation from the control room was
inhibited.
The test was properly approved on the Plan of the Day and was evaluated
for on-line maintenance risk in accordance with the licensee's
Maintenance Rule program. The test was performed while the Station
Blackout Diesel and a Unit 1 charging pump were out of service. The
licensee's evaluation showed that the maintenance configuration resulted
in a " green" window for up to seven days, which was acceptable.
The inspectors observed that valve operation was smooth and met open and
close timing requirements. The valves were examined and their condition
was good. All components associated with the test. including the PORVs'
manual isolation and bypass valves, were properly labeled and were
operated without difficulty.
The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the test and found
that procedure execution was good. Operators followed their procedure
in a step-by-step manner and communicated completion of steps
l effectively between the three stations. There was also appropriate
management oversight.
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c. Conclusions
The operability test for the steam generator power operated relief
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valves was properly performed. Technical Specifications and other
technical requirements were satisfied.
M1.3 Unit 1 Charaina Pumo Maintenance
a. Insoection Scooe (62707)
The inspectors observed various maintenance activities associated with
Unit 1 charging pump 1-CH-P-1A. The inspectors also reviewed the
Maintenance Rule program assessment of the pump.
b. Observations and Findinas
On February 23, charging pump 1-CH-P-1A was removed from service to
repair a small seal leak and to perform various preventive maintenance
activities. The inspectors observed maintenance activities on numerous
occasions to evaluate enhanced work practices that had been recently
implemented.
Maintenance procedures were carefully followed. A procedure reader was
dedicated for seal repair maintenance. This individual controlled the
evolution and ensured that the work was performed in a step-by-step
manner. This practice was observed during most aspects of the seal
repair efforts.
The inspectors discussed with the workers improvements to work )ractices
for the charging pumps. One of the most noteworthy practices tlat had
been incorporated was the location change of the seal repair
maintenance. Previously. the maintenance was performed in the pump
cubicle area on the floor. The seal repair activities were moved to the
decontamination building in a more controlled and comfortable work
environment. The workers felt that this change was helpful due to the
delicate nature of seal repairs.
Foreign' Material Exclusion (FME) practices were observed and were found
'to be adequate. For the most part. FME control efforts were initially
performed, however, the inspectors identified two examples of FME
deficiencies after the work had started. The deficiencies were pointed
out to the workers who took immediate corrective action. These !
deficiencies were also discussed with the job foreman.
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The work wasc erformed in a contaminated area, therefore, full anti-
contamination clothing was required to be worn by the workers. The
inspectors checked for proper radiological practices on several
occasions and no problems were found.
l Aspects of the Maintenance Rule program were evaluated to determine if
! the program properly tracked pump performance. The Plan of the Day was
! reviewed during the course of the maintenance. The inspectors found '
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that the planning department actively considered the risk impacts of
having the pump out of service with other plant equipment unavailable.
Further the unavailability performance criteria was monitored. When
the maintenance began there were 122 hours0.00141 days <br />0.0339 hours <br />2.017196e-4 weeks <br />4.6421e-5 months <br /> of unavailability logged
against the pump. The unavailability performance criteria was 438
hours. The projected increase in unavailability was about 132
additional hours which was below the 438 hour0.00507 days <br />0.122 hours <br />7.242063e-4 weeks <br />1.66659e-4 months <br /> limit. The licensee was
effective in implementing Maintenance Rule program requirements.
The pump was returned to service on March 1. Initially, the pump seal
leaked about ten drops per minute and later decreased to less than three
drops per minute. On March 3. the inspectors observed the pump in
operation and no leakage was observed. The inspectors discussed with an
engineering supervisor what was considered acceptable leakage. The
supervisor stated that due to the design of the seal that zero leakage
was very difficult to achieve. Component engineering was in the process
of defining acceptable seal leakage and after discussions with them it
was determined that some small amount of leakage (i.e. , one to two drops
per minute) may become acceptable.
c. Conclusions
Overall maintenance activities on the Unit 1 charging pump were good.
Improved work practices associated with charging pump seal repair were
noted. The Maintenance Rule program effectively monitored charging pump
performance criteria.
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III. Enaineerin_g
El Conduct of Engineering l
El.1 Indeoendent Soent Fuel Storaae Installation (ISFSI) Construction (60853)
On March 3. the inspectors toured the ISFSI pad area and observed the
following:
. Perimeter fencing was complete along the south, east and west l
areas. The north perimeter fence was scheduled for completion in
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April 1998.
. The inner security fence was complete and security isolation zone
equipment was being installed.
- The new ISFSI roadway paving began on March 2. Use of the roadway
was scheduled for the week of March 9, 1998.
. Alarm and emergency power panels were installed and were being
prepared for wiring installation.
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Weather-related problems were not prevalent during this inspection
period: the ISFSI construction schedule was four weeks behind the
original schedule. The ISFSI activities observed by the inspectors were
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adequately performed.
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1 Manaaement of Enaineerina Workload
a. Insoection Scone (37550)
The inspectors evaluated the quality of engineering involvement in site
activities through evaluation of the management of the total engineering
work load. The inspectors evaluated the responsiveness to request for I
engineering assistance and timeliness of engineering work on safety
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significant issues.
The following specific inspection activities were conducted:
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. Reviewed the summary of 1996 and older active (open) Request for
Engineering Assistance (REA)
- Reviewed the summary of active REAs having an assigned priority of
1 to 100 and 427 to 477 (the lowest 50)
. Reviewed the summary of all active REAs assigned to electrical
system engineers and electrical design engineers
- From the three summaries mentioned above, selected a sample of 27
potentially safety significant issues that required engineering
involvement, and requested additional information on the sample
selected to provide a complete picture of the issues and how they
were prioritized.
. Reviewed the summary of active (open) Commitment Tracking System
(CTS) items that had been extended past the original due date:
the CTS was maintained by Nuclear Licensing, and was generally
reserved for more significant external or internal commitments.
. Reviewed and evaluated the summary of currently late DRs assigned
to engineering. The program called for closure of DRs within 30
days of initiation.
I
. Reviewed and evaluated various statistical and trend data on the
number of REAs. CTS items. DRs. drawing update items, vendor
manual update items, etc.
- Reviewed recently implemented concepts and initiatives designed to
improve management of the engineering work load.
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- As an example of the licensee's performance in the area of
special programs the inspectors evaluated the Motor Operated
Valve (MOV) program from the scheduling and timeliness viewpoints.
An NRC report covering inspection of the MOV program was reviewed
to determine the quality of that program.
The basic requirement applicable to the scope of inspection was
10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Quality Assurance Criteria: especially Criterion
XVI. Corrective Action.
b. Observations and Findings
Recently implemented concepts and initiatives designed to improve
management of the engineering workload included the following:
. Creation of a consolidated data base for tracking individual work
items using more sophisticated computer software than previously
used for the multiple departmental data bases. Previously there
were 45 separate data bases. The new software had the capability
to generate reports sorted by many input fields.
. Arrangement of all REAs and design changes in order of priority.
The priorities were established by the four system engineering
supervisors. A management review team provided oversight of the
process. Previously, the REAs and design changes were approved
(or rejected) by the management review team and assigned one of
three priority codes.
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- Establishment of goals for the reduction of the engineering work
backlog.
The inspectors found that the number of CTS items granted time limit
extensions by management was small and there was no particular safety
significance associated with the extensions. All due date extensions
were approved by management. While the CTS data base had been intended
for more significant items, it also contained minor items due to the
lack of confidence in the de)artmental data bases as an effective
tracking tool. To rectify t1is situation. an " internal items" data base
was created, which was a subpart of the consolidated data base mentioned
above. It contained about 300 items.
The inspectors observed that 1593 DRs initiated in 1997 were assigned to
engineering. This exceeded the number closed by engineering in that
same time period by 109. The inspectors also observed that the number
of late DRs was small, and most of these were only a few days late.
Evaluation of the 27 active REAs selected for further review led to the
conclusion that engineering was timely with regard to resolving
regulatory issues. A similar finding was made with regard to the motor
operated valve program.
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The number of open REAs and Design' Change Packages (DCPs) dated 1996 and
older is summarized as follows:
Year A
REAS QCPg
P
1985. 0 1
1989 0 1
1991 0- 5
1992 0 4
1993 2- 6
1994 18 21
1995 32 38
.1996 145 49
The inspectors was not aware of any self-assessments in the same area as
this inspection, although as stated above. the subject had received
special management attention.
c. Cpnclusions
A review of open engineering work items indicated that the licensee was
timely in' resolving safety significant issues.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903, 92700)
E8.1 (Closed) Insoection Followuo Item (IFI) 50-338. 339/97004-04: review of
additional- controls on molded-case circuit breaker set points. The
licensee revised the applicable electrical maintenance 3rocedure to 2
include instructions on establishing the set ]oint of tie magnetic
element. The inspectors confirmed that the clange was made by review of
. procedure 0-EPM-0304-01. " Testing / Replacing 480-Volt Breaker
Assemblies." Revision 23. Steps 4.7, 6.1.4 and 6.2.4. The inspectors
. agreed that the procedure would provide an acceptable level of set point
control.
IV. Plant Support-
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls
R1.1 Radiolooical Survey Maos and Hiah Radiation Area Postinos Walkdown
a. Insoection Scooe (71750)
The inspectors walked down various areas in the Radiation Control Area
(RCA) with an HP technician to ensure that posted survey maps were
accurate and that all high radiation areas were properly posted and
locked if required.
b. Observations and Findinos
On March 4'. the inspectors reviewed survey maps posted outside the main
entrance to the RCA and found that each general area in the RCA had
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updated maps with recent survey data. The inspectors selected several
areas to verify that the maps reflected actual plant conditions and no
problems were found. While reviewing the survey maps, the inspectors
noted the posting of additional color coded radiological maps for each
elevation of the auxiliary building. The combination of the survey maps
and the color coded maps was an effective means to inform workers of
radiation dose rates prior to entering the RCA.
During the walkdown the inspectors ensured that all areas designated as
high radiation areas were ]roperly posted. In addition, radiation level
surveys were taken at the )oundary of selected high radiation areas to
ensure the areas were roped off properly. No problems were found. All
locked high radiation doors were locked and posted as required. The i
ins)ectors also checked for proper control of access keys to the locked
hig1 radiation areas. The keys were controlled by the HP supervisor.
An inventory of the keys for the very high radiation areas was performed
and all keys were in place.
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There were several other practices noted during the walkdown which
informed workers of radiological conditions. The inspectors noted the
presence of multiple low dose waiting areas. These areas were marked
with a sign and a flashing green light. Surveys of the areas were taken
to ensure the radiation levels were low. The readings were less than
one millirem per hour. Also noted were radiation area " flip" signs.
The color coded signs were olaced throughout the RCA to inform workers
of radiation levels. The H) office also had a remote monitoring system
which monitored multiple area dose rates.throughout the RCA. This
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system was used. in part, to detect sudden changes in higher risk areas
such that appropriate actions could be taken.
c. Conclusions
l Survey maps used to inform workers of radiological conditions were
l accurate and were posted properly. Posting and control of high
radiation areas was appropriate. There were several other effective l
practices used to inform workers of radiological condition; !
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j S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
S2.2 Alarm Stations and Communications
a. Insoection Scoce (81700)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's alarm stations and communication
equi) ment to ensure that applicable criteria in Chapters 1-6. 8. and 9
of tle Physical Security P1an (PSP), appropriate Security Contingency l
Plan Implementing Procedures (SCPIPs) and Security Plan Implementing )
Procedures (SPIPs) were being implemented. i
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b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors verified that annunciation of protected and vital area
alarms occurred audibly and visually in tb alarm stations. The
licensee equipped both stations with communication equipment and limited
' Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) assessment capabilities. Alarms were
tamper-indicating and self-checking, and were provided with an
uninterruptable power supply. These stations were continually manned by
capable and knowledgeable security operators. The stations were
independent yet redundant in o)eration. The interior of the alarm
station was not visible from tie protected area. No single act could
remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding
to an alarm. Alarm station walls, doors, floors, ceiling and windows
were bullet-resistant.
The inspectors evaluated the provision operation, and maintenance of
internal and external security communication links, and determined that
they were adequate and appropriate for their intended function. Each
security force member could communicate with an individual in each of
the ' continuously manned alarm stations, who could call for assistance
from other security force personnel and local law enforcement agencies.
Each alarm station had the capability for continuous two-way voice
communication with the sheriff's department through radio or separate
commercial telephone service. The licensee had compensatory measures
for defective or inoperable communication equipment.
c. Conclusions
The licensee's alarm stations and communication equipment were in l
compliance with the criteria in Chapters 1-6. 8. and 9 of the Physical >
Security Plan and appropriate Security Contingency Plan Implementing
Procedures and Security Plan Implementing Procedures.
S2.9 Indeoendent Soent Fuel Storace Installations ,
a. Insoection Scooe (81001)
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the proposed protection for the
ISFSI as addressed in Chapter 8 of the PSP.
b. Observations and Findinas
The licensee had ir!dicated in Chapter 8 of the PSP the following l
protection functions for the ISFSI: three perimeter barriers intrusion !
- detection system of the protected area barrier, assessment capabilities l
l of annunciated alarms of the isolation zones'. single vehicle access
! portal. vehicle barrier system. Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS). and a !
testing and maintenance program for the 3rotection equipment. A
memorandum of understanding concerning t1e response commitments of the ;
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licensee and the sheriff's department had not been executed at the time
of this inspection. The inspectors visited the ISFSI construction site
to evaluate installation progress of the security protection equipment.
At the time of the visit a perimeter barrier was partially in ) lace,
the UPS foundation was constructed, and electrical cabling was )eing
installed around the site.
Chapter 8 would remain in the PSP while the ISFSI was being constructed.
Once construction was completed and security systems were tested and
operational. Chapter 8 would be celeted from the PSP and established as
a separate ISFSI Security Plan.
c. Conclusions
Chapter 8 of the Physical Security Plan described an adequate security
protection plan for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
Construction implementation was appropriate.
S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation
S3.2 Security Procedures
a. Insoection Scoce (81700)
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensee's SPIPs and SCPIPs to
verify that the procedures were consistent with PSP commitments and
practices.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors reviewed five SPIPs and four SCPIPs. Procedures
implementing plan changes, which the licensee had determined not to
! decrease the effectiveness of the respective plans, were reviewed and
discussed with appropriate licensee management to verify the validity of
the determination. Also, the impact of the imp'.emented changes on the
respective plans and overall program was evaluated.
l The Security. Contingency, and Safeguards Training and Qualification
l plans were revised and reviewed in accordance with approved licensee
l procedures before changes were implemented. Changes were incorporated. l
as appropriate. into the im)lementing procedures. The changes that were
reviewed did not decrease t7e effectiveness of the respective plans.
c. Conclusions
A random sam)le of Security Plan Implementing Procedures and Security
Contingency )lan Implementing Procedures adequately met the Physical
Security Plan commitments and practices.
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S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance ,
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S4.1 Security Force Reauisite Knowledge
a. Inspection Scone (81700)
The inspectors interviewed security personnel to determine if they
possessed adequate knowledge to carry out their assigned duties and
responsibilities, including response, use of deadly force, and armed
response tactics.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors interviewed approximately 20 security personnel,
including supervisors, and witnessed approximately 30 others in the
3erformance of their duties. Members of the security force were
(nowledgeable in their duties and responsibilities, response commitments
and procedures, and armed res)onse tactics. The inspectors found that
armed response personnel had 3een instructed in the use of deadly force
as required by 10 CFR Part 73.
c. Conclusions
Security personnel possessed appropriate knowledge to carry out their
assigned duties and responsibilities, including response, use of deadly
force, and armed response tactics.
S5 Security Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification
SS.2 Trainino Records
a. Insoection Scone (81700)
The inspectors interviewed security personnel and reviewed security
personnel training and qualification records to ensure that the criteria
in the Training and Qualification Plan were met.
b. Observations and Findinos
The inspectors interviewed 12 security non-supervisory personnel and two
supervisors about the quality and timeliness of training provided.
Members of the security force were knowledgeable in their
responsibilities, plan commitments and procedures. Twelve randomly
selected training records were reviewed by the inspectors concerning
training. firearms, testing job / task performance and requalification.
Members of the security organization were requalified at least every 12
l months in the performance of their assigned tasks. both normal and
- contingency. This included the conduct of physical exercise
requirements and the completion of the firearms course. Through the
records review and interviews with security force personnel, the
I inspectors found that the requirements of 10 CFR 73. Appendix B.
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Section 1.F. concerning suitability. physical and mental qualification
data-. test results and other proficiency requirements were met.
The interviews and training records reviewed revealed an excellent
training program due to the thoroughness of the records and dedication
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of the training personnel.
c. Conclusions
The security force was being trained in an excellent manner an in
accordance with the Training and Qualification Plan and regulatory
requirements.
S6 Security Organization and Administration
S6.3. Staffino Levels
a. Insoection Scooe (81700)
-The inspectors verified that the total number of trained security
officers and armed personnel immediately available at the facility to
fulfill response requirements met the number specified in the PSP. The-
inspectors also verified that one full-time member of the security
organization who had the authority to direct security activities did not-
' have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities.
l during an incident.
b. Qbservations and Findinos
L The licensee has an onsite physical protection system and security
l organization. Their objective was to provide assurance against an
L unreasonable risk to public health and safety. . The security
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organization and physical 3rotection system were designed to protect
against the design basis tareat of radiological sabotage as stated in
10 CFR 73.1(a). At least one full-time manager of the security
organization was always onsite and had no duties that conflicted with
the assignment to direct all activities during an incident. This
individual had the authority to direct the physical protection
activities of the organization. The inspectors reviewed four shift
rosters and interviewed security force personnel on two shifts. This
verified that the licensee had the number of trained security officers
and armed personnel immediately available to fulfill response
. requirements and commitments of the PSP.
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, c. Conclusions
. The total number of trained security officers and armed personnel
- immediately available to fulfill response requirements met Physical
Security Plan requirements. One full-time member of the security
organization who had the authority to direct security activities did not
have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities
during an incident.
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S7 ~ Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities
- 57.3 Problem Analysis
a. Insoection Scoce (81700)
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated a sample of documented problem
analyses conducted by the licensee since the last inspection.
b. Observations and Findinas
Five DRs were reviewed to verify that' the problems'were appropriately
assigned for review, appropriately analyzed. reached logical
conclusions, and prioritized for corrective action. The five DRs
reviewed were found to be adequate in the problem analysis process. The
inspectors discussed with .the licensee enhancements that would improve
the problem analysis of the DR process.
c. Conclusions
The documented problem. analyses for five security-related deviation
reports were adequate.
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V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1- Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee
management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on March 12, 1998, The
licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The. inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
the inspection should.be considered proprietary. No proprietary
information was identified. ;
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
B. Foster. Superintendent Station Engineering .
C. Funderburk. Superintendent. Outage Planning
E. Grecheck. Manager. Station Operations and Maintenance j
J. Hayes. . Director, Nuclear Oversight
D. Heacock. Manager. Station Safety and Licensing
M. Kansler Vice President. Nuclear Operations-
P. Kemp. Supervisor. Licensing
L. Lane. Superintendent. Operations ;
T. Maddy. Superintendent. Security
W. Matthews. Site Vice President
H. Royal. Superintendent. Nuclear Training
D. Schappell Superintendent. Site Services !
R. Shears. Superintendent. Maintenance
A. Stafford. Superintendent. Radiological Protection
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED )
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IP 37550: Engineering
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying. Resolving, and
Preventing Problems
IP 60853: hsite Fabrication of Components and Construction of an ISFSI
IP 60705: F aparation For Refueling
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support Activities
IP 81001: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (s)
IP 81700: Physical Security Program for Power Reactors i
IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power
Reactor Facilities
IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations
IP 92903: Followup - Engineering
ITEMS CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Closed
50-338. 339/97002-01 URI review compliance with TS 6.5.1.6 requirement
for SNSOC review of programs (Section 08.1) i
50-338/97006 LER entered TS 3.0.3 due to inoperable control rod
indicators (Section 08.2)
50-338. 339/97002-03 VIO failure to assure that control room chart i
recorders were marked (Section 08.3) l
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50-338, 339/97004-04 1F1 review of additional controls on molded-case
circuit breaker set points (Section E8.1)-
Discussed
50-338, 339/96003-05 URI review Final Safety Analysis Report
discrepancies (Section 08.4)
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