ML20134G797

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Notice of Violation from Insp on 960811-0921.Violation Noted:Procedure for Irradiated Fuel Damage While Refueling, 0-AP-30 Inadequate
ML20134G797
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 10/21/1996
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20134G755 List:
References
50-338-96-09, 50-338-96-9, 50-339-96-09, 50-339-96-9, NUDOCS 9611130359
Download: ML20134G797 (2)


Text

. . ... . . . .- . , - - . . - . . _ , . - - . - - . .- .

1 .

t U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II i Docket Nos: 50 338, 50-339 License Nos: NPF 4, NPF 7  ;

l Report Nos: 50-338/96 09, 50-339/96 09 i Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPC0) l Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2 l >

Location: 1022 Haley Drive I Mineral, Virginia 23117 l l

l Dates: August 11 through September 21, 1996 Inspectors: R. McWhorter, Senior Resident Inspector D. Taylor, Resident Inspector P. VanDoorn, Senior Resident Inspector (Section 01.6)

L. Garner Project Engineer (Sections 02.2, M1.1, M1.2, M1.3, M4.1, and S1.1)

Approved by: G. Belisle, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects l

l l

l ENCLOSURE 2 9611130359 961021 PDR ADOCK 05000338 l

e PDR _

l .

4 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

l North Anna Power Station. Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 338/96-09. 50 339/96 09 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six-week period of resident ins)ection: in addition, it includes the results of announced inspections )y a regional projects inspector.

Operations

  • Daily operations were generally conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements and plant procedures (Section 01.1).
  • Unit 1 tripped from full power due to a rod control system electrical failure. Safety system and operator response was proper following the trip. Actions to correct the cause and operator performance during startup were appropriate. A conservative decision was made to perform rod drop timing tests prior to unit restart (Sections 01.2 and 01.3).

. The licensee properly pre 3ared for and responded to severe weather caused by Tropical Storm Iran (Section 01.4).

. Operator control of Unit 2 shutdown activities was good, and the licensee complied with commitments made in response to NRC Bulletin 96 01. Reactor Coolant System drain down was well coordinated and personnel exhibited a good sensitivity to risk. Refueling core off load. activities were properly conducted by operators (Sections 01.5.

01.6, and 01.7).

  • The Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee ensured that adequate corrective actions were completed prior to restart of Unit 1 following a reactor trip. However, several review process problems were identified during committee deliberations (Section 02.1).
  • Safety systems in the Unit 2 containment were in good overall condition immediately following shutdown. Later during the refueling outage, activities inside Unit 2 containment did not promote good housekeeping practices (Section 02.2).

. Five NRC notifications required by 10 CFR 50.72 were properly made by the licensee (Section 02.3).

. A non-cited violation was identified for an operator's failure to follow procedures when racking in a charging pump breaker. As a result, the only available Unit 2 charging pum) was unknowingly inoperable for approximately seven hours during slutdown conditions (Section 04.1).

l . The Oversight organization continued to assess station performance l

effectively (Section 07.1).

  • A non cited violation was identified concerning the fact that no l licensed operator was present at the Unit 2 controls for a short time

~

l

. t 2

period. One unresolved item and one Licensee Event Report were closed (Sections 08.1 and 08.2).

l l

Maintenance

  • The 2H emergency diesel generator post-maintenance inspections and i testing were adequate to demonstrate that the new compression rings on j the number seven lower piston were functioning correctly (Section M1.1). '

. Rod drop timing tests were properly performed following shutdown on both units. Unit 2 control rod drag testing results were well within the acceptance criteria (Section M1.2).

! data taken early in this refueling outage and during previous outages (Section M1.3).

  • Following a Unit 1 reactor trip, five secondary plant equipment problems occurred requiring operator compensatory actions (Section M2.1).
  • Leaving a valve actuator limit switch compartment unprotected with grinding and welding activities 1n the area indicated a lack of l sensitivity to foreign material exclusion issues and represented a potential for equipment degradation (Section M4.1).

Enaineerina e A violation was identified concerning an inadequate abnormal procedure for a fuel handling accident. The procedure did not contain direction for operators to initiate the control room bottled air system as assumed l in the bases for a Technical Specifications amendment allowing refueling i with the ccatainment personnel hatches open (Section E2.1).  !

Plant Sucoort

  • A non cited violation was identified for a Health Physics Technician's failure to follow procedures for foreign material exclusion control during refueling (Section R1). ,

e Problems with emergency sirens due to severe weather were properly i resolved (Section P1). l l

  • An unresolved item was identified to review occurrences of unescorted i visitors (Section S1.1). 4 i

. -