ML20134G797
| ML20134G797 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134G755 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-96-09, 50-338-96-9, 50-339-96-09, 50-339-96-9, NUDOCS 9611130359 | |
| Download: ML20134G797 (2) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II i
Docket Nos:
50 338, 50-339 License Nos:
NPF 4, NPF 7 l
Report Nos:
50-338/96 09, 50-339/96 09 i
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPC0) l Facility:
North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2 l
Location:
1022 Haley Drive Mineral, Virginia 23117 l
Dates:
August 11 through September 21, 1996 Inspectors:
R. McWhorter, Senior Resident Inspector D. Taylor, Resident Inspector P. VanDoorn, Senior Resident Inspector (Section 01.6)
L. Garner Project Engineer (Sections 02.2, M1.1, M1.2, M1.3, M4.1, and S1.1)
Approved by:
G. Belisle, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects l
ENCLOSURE 2 9611130359 961021 PDR ADOCK 05000338 l
e PDR
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
l North Anna Power Station. Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 338/96-09. 50 339/96 09 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six-week period of resident ins)ection: in addition, it includes the results of announced inspections )y a regional projects inspector.
Operations Daily operations were generally conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements and plant procedures (Section 01.1).
Unit 1 tripped from full power due to a rod control system electrical failure. Safety system and operator response was proper following the trip. Actions to correct the cause and operator performance during startup were appropriate. A conservative decision was made to perform rod drop timing tests prior to unit restart (Sections 01.2 and 01.3).
The licensee properly pre 3ared for and responded to severe weather caused by Tropical Storm Iran (Section 01.4).
Operator control of Unit 2 shutdown activities was good, and the licensee complied with commitments made in response to NRC Bulletin 96 01. Reactor Coolant System drain down was well coordinated and personnel exhibited a good sensitivity to risk. Refueling core off load. activities were properly conducted by operators (Sections 01.5.
01.6, and 01.7).
The Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee ensured that adequate corrective actions were completed prior to restart of Unit 1 following a reactor trip. However, several review process problems were identified during committee deliberations (Section 02.1).
Safety systems in the Unit 2 containment were in good overall condition immediately following shutdown.
Later during the refueling outage, activities inside Unit 2 containment did not promote good housekeeping practices (Section 02.2).
Five NRC notifications required by 10 CFR 50.72 were properly made by the licensee (Section 02.3).
A non-cited violation was identified for an operator's failure to follow procedures when racking in a charging pump breaker. As a result, the only available Unit 2 charging pum) was unknowingly inoperable for approximately seven hours during slutdown conditions (Section 04.1).
l The Oversight organization continued to assess station performance l
effectively (Section 07.1).
A non cited violation was identified concerning the fact that no l
licensed operator was present at the Unit 2 controls for a short time
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2 period. One unresolved item and one Licensee Event Report were closed (Sections 08.1 and 08.2).
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Maintenance The 2H emergency diesel generator post-maintenance inspections and i
testing were adequate to demonstrate that the new compression rings on j
the number seven lower piston were functioning correctly (Section M1.1).
Rod drop timing tests were properly performed following shutdown on both units.
Unit 2 control rod drag testing results were well within the acceptance criteria (Section M1.2).
An URI was identified to review anomalies in large bore snubber test data taken early in this refueling outage and during previous outages (Section M1.3).
Following a Unit 1 reactor trip, five secondary plant equipment problems occurred requiring operator compensatory actions (Section M2.1).
Leaving a valve actuator limit switch compartment unprotected with grinding and welding activities 1n the area indicated a lack of l
sensitivity to foreign material exclusion issues and represented a potential for equipment degradation (Section M4.1).
Enaineerina A violation was identified concerning an inadequate abnormal procedure e
for a fuel handling accident. The procedure did not contain direction for operators to initiate the control room bottled air system as assumed in the bases for a Technical Specifications amendment allowing refueling l
i with the ccatainment personnel hatches open (Section E2.1).
Plant Sucoort A non cited violation was identified for a Health Physics Technician's failure to follow procedures for foreign material exclusion control during refueling (Section R1).
Problems with emergency sirens due to severe weather were properly e
resolved (Section P1).
An unresolved item was identified to review occurrences of unescorted visitors (Section S1.1).
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