ML20128K059
| ML20128K059 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128K053 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-96-08, 50-338-96-8, 50-339-96-08, 50-339-96-8, NUDOCS 9610100274 | |
| Download: ML20128K059 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000338/1996008
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11 l
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Docket Nos: 50-338, 50-339 )
Report No: 50-338/96-08, 50-339/96-08
Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company
Facility: North Anna Power Station
Location: 1024 Haley Dr.
Mineral VA 23117
Dates: August 12-16, 1996
Inspectors: W. Sartor, Exercise Team Leader
K. Clark, Public Affairs Officer
E. Fox, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist ,
G. Salyers, Emergency Preparedness Specialist
Approved by: K. Barr, Chief, Plant Support Branch
Diyision of Reactor Safety
9610100274 960930 Enclosure
PDR ADOCK 05000338
G PDR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY '
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IJorth Anna Power Station ,
NRC inspection Reports 50-338, 339/96-08 !
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This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the biennial l
- emergency preparedness exercise. The exercise was an ingestion pathway exercise held in !
conjunction with emergency response demonstrations by the Commonwealth of Virginia and
several local governments. The plume exposure portion of the exercise was conducted on
- August 13, with the ingestion pathway following on August 14 and 15,1996. This report
- summarizes the observations of the four members of the NRC inspection team as they I
observed selected portions of the licensee's response in key emergency response facilities
l during the plume portion of the exercise.
j Control Room Simulator
The Shift Supervisor assumed the responsibilities as the Station Emergency Manager
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- . following his declaring the Alert. The shift properly implemented their emergency
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procedures.
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Good command and control by the Station Emergency Manager in the TSC assisted
- the SEM and his staff as they effectively mitigated the simulated accident.
Operational Support Center
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The OSC Director was effective in managing resources as directed by the TSC. The
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licensee's critique identified an issue addressing the staging of damage control teams
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i Emeroency Operations Facility
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The Recovery Manager was effective in coordinating licensee activities related to the
l emergency and providing information to Federal, State and local authorities
, responding to the radiological emergency. An exercise weakness was identified due
j to the delayed dose assessment information provided following the General ,
Emergency. l
j Joint Information Center
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This facility was effectively managed to provide timely and correct information to the
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Report Details
Summary of Exercise Events
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l This biennial emergency preparedness exercise included full participation by the l
i Commonwealth of Virginia and local governmental agencies of Carolina, Hanover, Louisa, i
! Orange, and Spotsylvania Counties. The plume exposure pathway exercise, which was
evaluated by the NRC inspection team, was held from 9:00 a.m. to 4:34 p.m., on August 13,
l 1996. The ingestion pathway portion of the exercise was evaluated by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and was conducted the following two days. Player l
critiques were conducted by the licensee players in the Emergency Response Facilities i
following termination of the plume exposure pathway exercise. The NRC exit meeting was
conducted on August 15,1996.
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VI. Plant Support
P4. Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP
P4.1 Exercise Scenario
a. Inspection Scope (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether provisions had
been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements
existing within the licensee's plan.
b. Observations and Findinas
The scenario was challenging and progressed from an Alert to a Site Area Emergency
and then to a General Emergency. The scenario fully exercised the onsite and offsite
emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the
State and local government agencies for their full participation in the exercise.
c. Conclusion
The scenario developed for this exercise was effective in testing the integrated
emergency response capability.
P4.2 Onsite Emeraency Oraanization
a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the functioning of the onsite emergency organization to
determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were defined and
whether adequate staffing was available to respond to the simulated emergency.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors noted that the responsibilities for emergency response were clearly
defined. The Shift Supervisor assumed the responsibilities of the Station Emergency
Manager (SEM), and other personnel assumed pre-established emergency
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responsibilities. The SEM classified the Alert and approved the notification message
to the offsite authorities. Following the classification of the Alert, the SEM also
directed the call-out of the emergency response organization to staff the Emergency
Response Facilities (ERFs). Sufficient trained personnel then promptiy responded to
staff and then activate the ERFs.
c. Conclusion
The initial on-duty Simulator staff and augmented call-out staff were sufficient to
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respond and perform defined emergency responsibilities.
P4.3 Emeraency Classification System
a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed selected emergency response personnel to veri'y that a
standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the
licensee.
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b. Observation and Findinas
The licensee's Emergency Plan and l.molementing Procedures provided an emergency
classification system. The Simulator statt ased it effectively to classify the off-normal
conditions as an Alert based on the Emergency Action Level of the High Range
Letdown Monitor increasing to greater than 'he Hi Alarm setpoint within 30 minutes
and remaining for at least 15 minutes. The SEM in the Technical Support Center
(TSC) declared a Site Area Emergency approximately 90 minutec later based on the
EAL for loss of reactor coolant in progress of greater than 300 gpm and pressurizer
level not maintained with two or more charging pumps in operation. Approximately
one hour later, the EALs again were effectively used by the SEM as a General
Emergency was declared based on loss of 2 of 3 barriers with potentialloss of the
3rd.
c. Conclusion
The licensee's Emergency Action Level Table was effectively used by the SEM and
his staff to properly classify the off-normal conditions.
P4.4 Notification Methods and Procedures
a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the licensee's notification of State and local governmental
organizations and emergency personnel to determine whether timely and substantive
emergency information was provided in accordance with procedures.
b. Observations and Findinas
The initial emergency notification to the State and local governments was made from
the Simulator Control Room (SCR) beginning six minutes after the declaration. The
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licensee's emergency personnel were notified of the emergency conditions via an l
l emergency alarm followed by a Gai-tronics announcement. The SCR made one
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follow-up notification to State and local governments prior to transferring the '
responsibility for notifications to the emergency communicator in the Local Emergency
Operations Facility (LEOF) at 10:18 am. Twelve notifications were made from the !
LEOF, initial notifications for the Site Area Emergency and the General Emergency,
and ten follow-up notifications. Notifications to the NRC were simulated throughout i
the exercise as an earlier call had determined the NRC Operations Center did not
weh to participate in the drill activities.
c. Conclusion l
The licensee demonstrated the ability to make initial and follow-up notifications to the
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State and local govemments in a timely manner with essential information. The
licensee's onsite emergency personnel responded promptly to the notification to staff
the emergency organization.
P4.5 Emeraency Communications
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a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the flow of communications from and between the ERFs to
determine whether provisions existed for the prompt transmission of emergency l
communications. l
b. Observation and Findinas
The inspectors observed that the Insta-phone Loop for communications with State and
local governments within the Emergency Planning Zones was effective for the prompt
transmission of emergency information. Likewise, the Automatic Ringdown phones in
the ERFs, the Station Private Branch Exchange (PBX) and commercial phone lines,
and the plant Gai-tronics were used by emergency response personnel for
communicating emergency information.
c. Conclusion
Provisions existed for the prompt communications among principal response
organizations to emergency personnel, and they were effectively used during the
exercise to provide timely information and coordinate emergency response.
P4.6 Public Education and Information
a. Inspection Scope (82301)
An inspector observed how information concerning the simulated emergency was
made available to the public.
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b. Observations and Findinas
Virginia Power established a Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) in the company's
innsbrook Technical Center located in Glen Allen, Va. From this location they
provided timely and accurate information to reporters and to the public via periodic
news releases. Additionally, a company spokesman made special trips to the media
briefing area after declaration of a Site Area Emergency and of a General Emergency
to inform reporters prior to later issuance of a news release. The news releases
contained a special telephone number to provide information to the public regarding
the simulated emergency. Scripted questions had been provided to licensee
personnel to exercise the public information center that responded to telephone calls
from the public or media.
c. Conclusions
The JPIC and its staff were activated and organized in a manner that provided for the
dissemination of timely and accurate information to the public.
P4.7 Emeraency Facilities and Eauipment
a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of selected ERFs to
determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment were available and
maintained to support an emergency response.
b. Observations and Findinas
Control Room Simulator - An inspector observed that the on-shift designated crew in
the Simulator acted promptly to initiate the emergency response. The facility and
equipment supported the crew as they implemented their emergency procedures.
Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated at 10:11 a.m.,41 minutes
following the Alert declaration. The facility layout provided for good communication
between the SEM and his primary staff. The SEM and his staff interacted frequently
as plant conditions were monitored and evaluated, emergency classifications
upgraded when necessary, and accident assessment and mitigating activities were
implemented. The TSC staff also identified and prioritized the repair activities for the
Operational Support Center (OSC). In addition to the repair activities directed by the
TSC, the Shift Supervisor in the SCR could direct repair activities with his non-
licensed operators. On one occasion this resulted in a duplication of effort, as well as
creating the potential for radiation exposure to the SCR directed responders since
they were unaware of changing radiological conditions and did not have radiation
protection (RP) coverage. The licensee identified this issue in their critique process
for further evaluation.
Operational Support Center - The OSC was activated at 9:47 a.m.,27 minutes
following the Alert declaration. Following activation, damage control personnel
representing operations, electrical, and maintenance were dispatched to the HP
holding area to expedite team entry into the radiation controlled area (RCA). The
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staging of these personnelin the HP area appeared to cause unnecessary congestion
at the entrance to the RCA. Supplemental dosimetry was provided to damage control ,
personnel in the OSC. This facility was not observed by the NRC but briefly during !
the exercise.
Local Emergency Operations Faci!ity - The LEOF was staffed at 10:05 a.m. and '
i activated at 10:17 a.m.,47 minutes after the Alert declaration. As the LEOF was
being activated, the ventilation system was shifted to the Emergency Mode, dosimetry
was distributed to staff members, and periodic radiological surveys of the facility were
initiated. The facility accommodated the Recovery Manager and his staffin an
effective manner as they coordinated the status of the event with the State and local
governments. Additionally, representatives from the Commonwealth of Virginia's
i Department of Emergency Services and the Department of Health were
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accommodated in the LEOF. Besides having the primary responsibility for Protective
Action Recommendations and communicating with the offsite authorities, the LEOF
was the lead facility for performing dose projections once activated. It was in this
area of responsibility that a problem was observed. The General Emergency was
declared at 12:06 p.m., approximately the same time as the radiological release to the
environment via the ventilation system began. PARS were made with the initial
notification and a report of radiological conditions was to be provided later. However,
due to errors made when inputting to the computerized dose projection model in the
LEOF, the report of radiological conditions was not provided until 1:04 p.m. This
failure to provide a dose assessment following the initiation of a radiological release in
a timely manner was identified as an exercise weakness (IFl 50-338, 339/96008-01,
Failure to provide a timely report of radiological conditions following a release).
c. Conclusion
The ERFs were organized, equipped, and maintained in a manner that facilitated the
emergency response. However, in the LEOF, errors were made in running the
computerized dose projection software which resulted in the failure to provide a timely
report of radiological conditions to the State and county governments.
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P4.8 Protective Responses
a. Inspection Scope (82301)
l The inspectors observed the protective actions implemented for onsite personnel and
the protective action recommendations provided by the licensee to the State,
b. Observations and Findinas
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l The SEM simulated the evacuation of non-essential personnel from the plant site
following the Site Area Emergency declaration. The Recovery Manager made the
recommended offsite protective actions (PARS) to evacuate 360 degrees from 5 to 10
miles, the downwind sectors from 5 to 10 miles, and to shelter the unaffected sectors
from 5 to 10 miles.
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c. Conclusion
The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement protective measures for onsite
- personnel and to make the required PARS for the protection of the public.
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< P4.9 Exercise Critiaue
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a. Inspection Scope (82301) '
The inspectors osbserved the facility critiques immediately following the exercise and
portions of the controller / evaluator organization critique process to determine whether
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weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally
presented to licensee management.
b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors observed that the exercise participants demonstrated good ownership
and support of the emergency preparedenss program with their involvement in the
critique process. The controller / evaluator organization identified the significant areas
that created problems during the exercise. A formal presentation was provided to
lecensee management by the controller organization on August 16,1996. ,
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c. Conclusion )
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The identification and analysis of the problem areas did not seem as thorough as in i
past years when presented to management. However, future review of the
implementation of corrective actions to the identified problem areas will be required to I
determine adequacy. ,
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V. Manaaement Meetinas
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X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management
at the conclusion of the inspection on August 16,1996. The licensee acknowledged
the findings presented. No pmprietary information is contained in this report.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSON CONTACTED
Licensee
1 E. Collins, Emergency Preparedness Director
l L. Edmonds, Administrative Services Supervisor
J. Leberstien, Licensing Technical Specialist
D. Heacock, Assistant Station Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
W. Matthews, Station Manager
l B. McBride, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
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l M. McCarthy, Nuclear Oversight Director
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A. Stafford, Radiation Protection Superintendent
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 82301: Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors
IP 82302: Review of Exercise Objective and Scenarios for Power Reactors
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-338,339/96-008-01 IFl delayed report of radiological conditions following a
release
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED I
EAL Emergency Action Level
ERF Emergency Response Facility
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
gpm Gallons Per Minute
IFl Inspection Follow-up item
JPIC Joint Public Information Center
LEOF Local Emergency Operations Facility
OSC Operational Support Center
RP Radiation Protection
SCR Simulator Control Room
SEM Station Emergency Manager
Attachment (18 Pages):
Scope and Objectives, and Scenario Narrative
and Time Line
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VIRGINIA POWER
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
AUGUST 13, 14 & 15, 1996 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
EXERCISE SCOPE
The purpose of this exercise is to activate and' evaluate major
portions of the North Anna Emergency Plan, associated implementing
procedures, and selected portions of the Corporate Emergency
Response Plan in accordance with 10CFR50.47 (b) (14) , and to support
the implementation of state and local governments emergency
response plans.
This ingestion pathway exercise will be held in conjunction with
emergency response demonstrations by the Commonwealth of Virginia
and several local governments. The exercise will demonstrate that
those individuals and agencies assigned responsibilities in a
radiological emergency are capable of providing the necessary
protective measures to ensure the health and safety of the public
in the event of an acci? mt at North Anna Power Station.
The exercise will demonc. rate responses to the emergency classes,
commensurate with the stated exercise objectives, established by
NUREG-0654, Criteria for Precaration and Evaluation of Radiolocical
Emercency Response Plans and Precaredness in Succort of Nuclear
Power Plants. Free play is encouraged and controllers will be
allowed to interface with the participants to provide information.
The controllers will only alter the participants' responses if the
exercise lags behind schedule, if emergency response personnel take
inappropriate actions to carry them to the next event, or if action
is taken that would correct the expected simulated response earlier
than scheduled by the scenario.
The focus items of this exercise are:
- Use of the Emergency Response Organization Automated
Notification Systems (EROANS).
- Use of the Emergency Personnel Notification List (EPNL).
The exercise will fulfill the following drill requirements:
- Semi-annual Radiological Monitoring Drill
- Annual Medical Drill
- Annual Communications Drill
At no time will the exercise be permitted to interfere with the
safe operation of the station. Station management may, at their
discretion, suspend the exercise for any perici time necessary
to ensure this goal.
Exercise participants will not have prior knowledge of the
simulated incident, except the exercise date.
ATTACHMENT
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VIRGINIA POWER
NO* 'E ANNA POWER STATION
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AUGUST 13, is & 15, 1996 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the adequacy of the
North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan, the Corporate Emergency
Response Plan, and associated implementing procedures.
The objectives of this emergency exercise are to demonstrate by
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actual performance a number of key emergency preparedness functions
as they relate to the North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan. The
- simulated accident will involve
- emergency classification,
notifications of company and off-site organizations, simulated
actions to correct the emergency condition, and initiation of
accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope
, with the event. The event will include a simulated off-site
radiological release to support an ingestion pathway exercise.
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As applicable to the events developed by the exercise scenario, the
North Anna Power Station and Corporate Emergency Response
Facilities (ERFs) will be activated. Each ERF staff will
j demonstrate functions described in the implementing procedures.
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Emergency response functions which are impractical to demonstrate
, will be simulated.
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The attached objectives, as numbered in the Virginia Power Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Six Year Plan, will be demonstrated as
! applicable to the schedule provisions of this plan. A matrix,
identifying the objectives and the Virginia Power emergency
response facilities / groups where they will be demonstrated, is
provided. The Contrcl Room Simulator will be used in lieu of the
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actual Station Control Room.
The following is a list of corporate and stacion emergency response
i facilities and groups with their associated acronyms:
- Control Room Simulator (CRS)
- Operational Support Center (OSC)
- Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)
- Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)
- Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
- Local Media Center (LMC)
- Health Physics (HP)
- Security (SEC)
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- Chemistry (CHEM)
- Central Emergency Operations Facility (CEOF)
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VIRGINIA POWER
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NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
AUGUST 13, 14 & 15, 1996 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
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OBJECTIVES
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The following objectives establish the scope, the extent of play
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and extent of evaluation for this exercise. Also these objectives
! ensure that required events are included in the exercise scenario.
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to analyze station conditions, assess
. Emergency Action Level (EAL) parameters, and correctly
classify the emergency.
Extent of Plav
demonstrate this objective by initiation and use of EPIP-1.01
and appropriate operational procedures.
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- Extent of Evaluation
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This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
, self-evaluation.
j 2. Demonstrate the ability to notify, mobilize, and sustain the
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1 North Anna Power Station. and Corporate Emergency Response
Organizations.
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i The CRS staff, Station Security, and Corporate Security will
notify and mobilize the ERO. Station and ERO notification will
be conducted in accordance with the Emergency Personnel
l Notification List (EPNL).
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The TSC, LEOF, CERC, and JPIC will demonstrate sustaining
continuous response capability by formulating shift relief
rosters.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
3. Demonstrate the ability to notify the state and local
governments and the NRC within established time constraints.
Extent of Plav
As appropriate to the communications process, the CRS, TSC,
and LEOF will demonstrate this objective by providing up-to-
date information to federal, state, and local governments
within required time limits.
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'a. State and Local Government Communications
An Emergency Communicator (EC) will perform initial and
i follow-up communications in accordance with EPIP-2.01.
The SEM will retain the responsibility for state and
local government communications until the LEOF is
activated. Following LEOF activation, responsibility for
communications will be transferred. to the Recovery
Manager (RM),
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b. NRC Communications
An Emergency Communicator (EC) will perform initial and
follow-up communications in accordance with EPIP-2.02.
The EC will transmit information to a phone cell or, if
the NRC participates, to the NRC. The responsibility for
NRC communications remains with the TSC ERO.
Health Physics Network (HPN) communications will be
performed in accordance with EPIP-4.33. The HPN
communicator will transmit information to a phone cell
or, if the NRC participates, to the NRC. The
responsibility for HPN communications will be with the
LEOF ERO.
The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) will be
activated in the CRS only. Plant data will not be
transmitted to the imC. l
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Extent of Evaluation l
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
4. Demonstrate the ability to conduct assembly and accountability
of personnel within the Protected Area. l
Extent of Plav j
The Station Security Staff will demonstrate this objective in
accordance with EPIP -5. 09 and EPIP-5. 03. Also, to support the
overall accountabilite process, the Assembly Area Leaders will
perform area accountsoility.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant ,
self-evaluation. l
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l S. Demonstrate the ability to assemble, dispatch, and control on-
site emergency teams to perform response activities.
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As appropriate, the CRS, TSC, and OSC staffs will demonstrate
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this objective by briefing, dispatching, and controlling teams
in response to scenario events.within the Station Protected .
Area. The CRS staff will demonstrate this objective by !
initiating applicable procedures. Following facility
activation, the TSC and OSC staffs will demonstrate this
objective by implementing EPIP-3. 02, EPIP-3. 03, and EPIP-5. 08. j
Extent of Evaluation '
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This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant !
self-evaluation. ,
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6. Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and implement !
appropriate protective measures for emergency response l
personnel, including site access control, contamination j
control, exposure control, use of protective devices and, as !
appropriate, the process for authorizing the use of potassium !
iodide (KI). I
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Extent of Plav
This objective will be demonstrated through an interf ace among
the CRS, TSC, LEOF and OSC ERO in which the TSC staff will
monitor and authorize protective measures for site access,
contamination control, and exposure control.
Tha t TSC organization, via the Radiation Protection Supervisor
(RPS) located in the Health Physics area, will dispatch and
direct monitoring teams within the bounds of the site property
per EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-4.02 and associated procedures to
assess radiological conditions. Protective measures,
appropriate for conditions, will be developed and/or
implemented for site emergency response personnel.
Security will implement access control measures in accordance
with EPIP-5.09 and EPIP-5.04.
The OSC Staff and other site personnel will implement any
necessary actions associated with protective equipment
requirements and in-plant access control.
If necessary, in response to scenario events, the CRS and/or
TSC and OSC staf fs will demonstrate the process for requesting
and authorizing exposure extensions, to include emergency
exposure authorization in accordance with EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-
4.04. Also, if necessary, the TSC staff .ill demonctrate the
KI authorization process per EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-5.07.
If necessary, in response to scenario events, the TSC will
demonstrate the planning and notification processes for
protective measures and evacuating non-essential personnel in
accordance with EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-5.05. Actual site
evacuation will not be demonstrated.
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This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
7. Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate Off-site
Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) based on assessment
of plant conditions and off-site dose projections and/or
measurements.
Extent of Plav
As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the SEM
from the TSC or by the RM in the LEOF by implementation of
EPIP-1.06. Additional information for PAR determination may
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be obtained from EPIP-4.07. The TSC and LEOF organizations
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may monitor plant conditions and perform off-site dose
projections to support formulation of PARS. Responsibility
for PAR development is transferred from the TSC to the LEOF
following activation of the LEOF.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
8. Demonstrate the ability to perform off-site dose assessment.
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Extent of Plav
As appropriate, this objective may be demonstrated by the TSC
l and LEOF staffs. The ability to perform initial dose
assessment will be demonstrated through the implementation of
EPIP-4.01 and associated dose assessment procedures. As
required, the CERC will act in a back-up capacity to perform
off-site dose assessment.
Field monitoring teams will be dispatched per EPIP-4.01, EPIP-
4.02, and associated procedures to support the dose assessment
effort. As appropriate, these teams will be directed by the
RPS and/or the TSC and LEOF staffs.
E2ctent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
9. As appropriate, demonstrate the ability of Health Physics and
Chemistry to conduct radiological monitoring activities,
including exposure rate surveys, sample collection, and sample
analysis.
Extent of Plav
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As required, radiological monitoring, sampling, and analysis
for in-plant and/or on-site activities will be initiated in
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' ancordance with EPIP-4.02. Any requested Post Accident
Sampling activities will be simulated in accordance with EPIP-
4.22 and EPIP-4.23.
The field monitoring teams will perform radiological
monitoring activities in accordance with EPIP-4.15'
and EPIP-
4.16.
Reactor coolant and/or containment samples will not be
obtained utilizing the High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS).
Radiological data necessary to test response and monitoring
capabilities will be provided by the controller during
simulated sample collection. Isotopic analysis data'will be i
provided following demonstration of proper sample preparation i
and upon expiration of spectrum collection and analysis times.
Extent of Evaluation j
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation. i
10. Demonstrate the ability to ef fectively activate the emergency
response facilities and associated emergency response ;
processes.
-
Extent of Plav i
Activation of facilities and emergency processes by the TSC,
OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, and the LMC, will be demonstrated in j
accordance with the appropriate procedures. l
As appropriate, activation of emergency processes will be
demonstrated by the CRS, Health Physics, Chemistry and
Security.
Extent of Evaluation
l
Thit abjective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
11. Demonstrate that facility layout and equipment support
emergency response activities in each facility.
Extent of Plav
This objective will be demonstrated in the CRS, TSC, OSC,
LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Health Physics, and
Chemistry.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant l
self-evaluation.
I
S&O-7
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9
12. Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain effective
communications.
Extent of Plav
.
The CRS, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Health
Physics, Chemistry, and Field Teams will demonstrate this
objective.
Use of back-up communications systems will be demonstrated
only if primary systems fail.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
<
13. Demonstrate the ability to maintain command and control of the
'
emergency response effort.
'
Extent of Plav
The SEM will demonstrate on-site emergency response command
and control from the CRS and TSC. The RM will demonstrate
< command and control of the emergency response effort
associated with the LEOF upon activation of that facility.
The Corporate Response Manager will demonstrate command and
control of the emergency response effort associated with the
CERC upon activation of that facility.
'
The SEM will ensure personnel within the Protected Area are
informed of emergency event status by the use of emergency
alarms and the plant paging system (Gai-tronics). Remaining
site personnel will be notified by other verbal communication
,
methods. Announcements should be preceded and terminated with
l the phrase: "This is a drill."
The CRS, TSC, and LEOF ERO will demonstrate the ability to
]
transfer appropriate command and control functions.
a. The CRS functions that will transfer to the TSC include:
(1) Notifications to the state, local governments, and
NRC.
(2) Developing and transmitting PARS to the state.
.
(3) Determining the emergency classification.
!
(4) Authorizing emergency exposures,
b. The TSC functions that will transfer to the LEOF are:
(1) Notifications to the state and local governments
and to the NRC via the HPN.
(2) Developing and transmitting PARS to the state.
S&O-8
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.
.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
14. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate preparation, review, and
release timely and accurate information to the public.
Extent of Plav
The CERC, JPIC, LEOF, and LMC staffs will demonstrate this
objective.
Press releases will be prepared and edited at the CERC and may
be transmitted to the LEOF for technical review. Following
approval by the RM and/or the Corporate Response Manager, the
process for issuing press releases will be demonstrated.
The JPIC Director will be cognizant of all press releases and j
make them available to the media in the JPIC and LMC. j
i
Extent of Evaluation
i
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
15. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control ;
functions.
Extent of Plav i
l
Public Affairs will demonstrate this objective by establishing
an emergency hotline in accordance with CPIP-2.1. Questions l
'
will be called into the Public Information Room requiring
response as part of the scenario.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
16. Demonstrate the ability to provide basic life support and to
package and transport a contaminated injured person to an off-
site medical facility. l
Extent of Plav
This objective will be demonstrated by the First Aid Team
implementing procedures appropriate for the victim's level of
injury and by Health Physics employing the necessary
radiological controls. AP-51/EPIP-5.01 and HP-1061.010 will
be implemented to remove the victim from the accident scene
and transport to the off-site medical facility.
As required, the CERC will implement CPIP-7.0.
S&O-9
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4
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An off-site rescue unit will demonstrate the avility to
respond to the station. i
The contaminated injured person will be transported to an ,
off-site medical facility. i
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Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
, self-evaluation.
1
i 17. Demonstrate the ability to respond to, control and mitigate l
the consequences of a fire. ;
l
l. Extent of Plav
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'
This objective will not be demonstrated. ,
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Extent of Evaluation
This objective will not be evaluated.
18. Demonstrate the ability to establish a Recovery Organization !
and to develop a Recovery Plan. ;
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Extent of Plav
This objective will be demonstrated by the SEM and RM by j
implementing EPIP-6.01 to develop a Recovery Organization and ;
a Recovery Plan to return the plant to a normal status.
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-Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
19. Demonstrate the ability to conduct a self-critique and to
identify areas for improvement.
Extent of Plav
The CRS, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Chemistry,
and Health Physics will conduct a self-critique to identify
weaknesses and improvement items.
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. . _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . . . - . _ - . _ - . . . . _ . . . - . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . _ _ . _ - - - - _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . . . . . _ _
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4
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION -
'
AUGUST 13, 14 & 15, 1996 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
'
OBJECTIVES DEMONSTRATION MATRIX .
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 '19 j
,
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CRS X X X X X X X X X X * I
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OSC X X X X X X X * I
i
TSC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
!
LEOF X X X X X X X X X X X X
t
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CERC X X X X X X X X X
X
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JPIC X X X X X' X
LMC X X X X X
SECURITY X X X X X X X X
HP X X X X X X X X X
a CHEMISTRY X X X X X X
,
' * Danotes objective not to be demonstrated.
S&O-11
_ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ . ___.__.._,m._ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - . _ _ _ ___m._ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _________-____________ _--___________
-- - - . - .. -. . - -- . . .
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VIRGINIA POWER
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
- AUGUST 13, 14 & 15, 1996 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
SCENARIO NARRATIVE
A full scale plume exposure and ingestion pathway exercise is ,
scheduled to be conducted at the North Anna Power Station. For l
the purposes of the exercise, Unit 1 is designated as the
affected unit.
Unit 1 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium at the end of
life. l
Unit 2 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium at the middle
of life. :
l
The exercise starts at 0900. At 0905 control rod F-14 drops and i
reactor coolant system activity begins to increase. The Hi-Hi !
alarm setpoint for 1-CH-RI-128 is exceeded at 0906. The
requirements for an ALERT classification are met at 0921. (This
time may depend upon sample validation of the 1-CH-RI-128 Hi-Hi l
alarm.
At 0933 a medical emergency is reported in the Chemistry Lab.
The victim's injuries are severe enough to require transport of
the victim to an off-site medical facility.
Containment sump pump discharge trip valve 1-TV-DA-100B fails
upon auto start of 1-DA-P-4A at 0926 (failure will probably not
be noticed). At 1055 a Reactor Coolant System leak >300 gpm
develops. This major leak warrants a site Area Emergency
classification.
The reactor will be tripped and safety injection initiated by
1101. When safety injection is initiated, the "1H" Emergency
Diesel Generator fails to start.
At 1103 a major break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) occurs in
the "C" reactor coolant loop and the amount of fuel damage
increases again. Containment pressure increases and CDA
initiates.
When CDA is initiated, 1-SW-MOV-103A fails to open. At
approximately 1155 safety injection swaps from the RWST to the
containment sump. When the swap occurs, 1-SI-P-1A trips and a
packing leak develops on 1-SI-MOV-1863B. The packing leak
results in a radiological release into the Auxiliary Building and
into the environment via the ventilation system. These events
establish conditions for a General Emergency. The source of the
release will be isolated at 1400; however, the release will
continue until approximately 1420.
The escalation through the applicable emergency classifications
provides activities designed to exercise both on-site and off-
site response organizations. Sufficient time is permitted to
allow -he response organizations to perform the required
assessments and response actions.
._ - . - . _ _ - - - . _ _ - - - - . _ , .-
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SCENARIO NARRATIVE (continued)
1
The emergency phase of the exercise will terminate by 1430, ,
'
followed by the facility critiques and an on-site Recovery
meeting.
i
, The Bureau of Radiological Health's initial sampling plan will be ;
!
developed at the end of Day 1.
Day 2 activities will commence at 0800. Sample results of the
initial sampling plan and the results of the Aerial Monitoring
Survey (AMS) will be provided to The Bureau of Radiological J
Health at the beginning of the Day 2 activities. A revised
sample plan will be developed by approximately 1200 and the
results of the revised plan will be provided by approximately
1400.
Day 3 activities will commence at 0900. The Bureau of
Radiological Health will provide their dose assessment results
and protective action recommendations for preventative protective
actions for the impacted jurisdictions and the State of Maryland
to the Virginia Department of Emergency Services at the beginning
of the Day 3 activities. The Bureau of Radiological-Health will
be prepared at approximately 1100 to provide their dose
assessment results and any further protective action
recommendations to the Virginia Department of Emergency Services
concerning relocation, re-entry and return within the 10 EPZ.
The Virginia Department of Emergency Services and local
jurisdictions will coordinate and implement protective action
decisions based on the results of dose assessment and sample
analysis.
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ .- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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VIRGINIA POWER -
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
AUGUST 13, 14 & 15, 1996 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
.
TIME LINE
TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION ANTICIPATED RESPONSE
0800 C/O exercise day briefing. Final prep for exercise. Lead Controller
ensures all changes and questions are
addressed.
0830 Simulator Briefing. CRS Lead Controller briefs the operations shift
on the initial conditions and simulator set up.
0900 Start exercise. Simulator placed in "Run."
0905 Control Rod F-14 drops (mini-scenario Operations initiates 1-AP-1.2 and 1-PT-23. .
- 1, Dropped Control Rod F-14). Begin ramping Unit 1 down to restore the
required quadrant power tilt ratio
(approximately 20 minutes after the dropped rod
occurs).
After Containment Sump Pump Discharge Valve Operations may perform assessment of the failed
0905 1-TV-DA-100B (mini-scenario #3, 1-TV- valve and request maintenance or the TSC to
DA-100B Failure) fails upon pump auto investigate. (Due sequencing of scenario
start. events and simulator response, it is possible
this failure will not be identified.)
0906 1-CH-RI-128, Letdown Radiation Initiate 1-AP-5 to verify the radiation monitor i
Monitor, exceeds the Hi and Hi-Hi alarm. SS reviews EPIP-1.01 EALs. When the 15 :
alarm setpoints. minute time requirement is met, the SS declares
ALERT per Tab C-8. Note that the criteria for
the NOUE was alco met, but quickly passed
through to the ALERT level. Anticipate ramping i
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Unit 1 off the line.
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_ - - _ - - _ - - _ _ - - - - - - . _ _ . . - _ - _ - - . . - _ . . _ _ . . - . - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ . - - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ - - - - . - - - - - - - . _ _ _ . . - - - -
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VIRGINIA POWER -
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
AUGUST 13, 14 & 15, 1996 EMERGENCY EXERCISE ,
TIME LINE
TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION ANTICIPATED RESPONSE
0921 15 minute time met for Alert SS declares ALERT per Tab C-8 and initiates
declaration. EPIP-1.01. Callout ERO (EPNL), notify state &
locals (EPIP-2.01) and NRC (EPIP-2.02, control
cell). Activate facilities, and perform
accountability.
0933 First aid emergency occurs (mini- CRS informed of medical emergency. Gai-Tronics
scenario #2, Medical Emergency). announcement for First Aid Team to respond.
First Aid Team responds to scene, renders first
aid, packages, and transports victim to off-
site medical facility. AP-51 and potentially
EPIP-5.01 entered.
1055 RCS leak - 420 gpm begins. Radiation Operations informs the TSC and enters 1-AP-5 in
levels begin to increase in the response to any radiation alarms. Using EPIP-
containment. Letdown will be 1.01, SEM declares a Site Area Emergency per
isolated. Tab B-3 (RCS leak rate limit exceeded). Notify
state and locals (EPIP-2.01) and NRC (EPIP-
2.02, control cell). As required, HP will
perform surveys in-plant and on-site.
1100 Reactor and turbine tripped. Operations enters 1-E-0 and informs the TSC.
1101 Safety injection initiated. The "1H" Operations informs the TSC and performs
Emergency Diesel Generator fails to assessments of the failed diesel generator.
start (mini-scenario #4, Loss of "1H" TSC prioritizes and assigns task to DC Team.
EDG) DC Team to conduct investigation, assessment
and repair.
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-- - .-. . ~ - - . .-
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VIRGINIA POWER
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
AUGUST 13, 14 & 15, 1996 EMERGENCY EXERCISE ,
TIME LINE
TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION ANTICIPATED RESPONSE
'
1103 A major break LOCA occurs in the "C" Operations informs the TSC of the LOCA.
reactor coolant loop. Increasing Operations identifies and possibly assesses the
containment pressure causes a CDA and failed valve. TSC prioritizes and assigns task
Phase "A" and "B" isolations to occur. to DC Team. DC Team conducts investigation,
Due to a grounded electrical lead, 1- assessment and mechanically opens the valve. !
SW-MOV-103A fails to open (mini-
scenario #5, 1-SW-MOV-103A Failure).
1158 Due to a grounded motor lead, LHSI Operations identifies and possibly assesses the
Pump 1-SI-P-1A trips (mini-scenario failed pump. TSC prioritizes and assigns task ,
'
assessment and makes repairs.
1204 A major packing leak develops on 1-SI- Using EPIP-1.01, SEM declares a GENERAL
MOV-1863B (mini-scenario #7, 1-SI-MOV- EMERGENCY per Tab B-1 (loss of 2 of 3 barriers
1863B Packing Leak) resulting in a with potential loss of 3rd). Develop PAR
radiological release to environment (EPIP-1.06) and notify state and locals (EPIP-
via the ventilation system. 2.01) and NRC (EPIP-2.02, control cell). Track
plume (EPIP-4.15 & 4.16), perform dose
assessment (EPIP-4.03). The stability class is
D. The wind direction is from 22 8 (affected
sectors are JKL). The forecast is for cloudy
skies and possible showers. The PAR _should be
- 1. As required, HP will perform surveys in-
plant, on-site, and off-site. Operations
performs assessments to determine the possible
source of the leak. TSC evaluates possible
source of the leak.
After If attempts are made to cross-tie 1- Operations personnel attempt to open the valve.
1204 RS-P-2A discharge with the 1-SI-P-1A TSC prioritizes and assigns task to DC Team to
discharge, 1-RS-147 sticks shut (mini- conduct investigation and get the valve open. ,
'
scenario #8, 1-RS-147 Stuck Shut) .
I
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _____
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VIRGINIA POWER
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
AUGUST 13, 14 & 15, 1996 EMERGENCY EXERCISE ,
TIME LINE ,
TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION ANTICIPATED RESPONSE
1400 Leak from 1-SI-MOV-1863B stopped by The radiological release to the environment
getting 1-SI-P-1A back in service or continues for approximately 30 more minutes as
getting 1-RS-147 open and securing 1- the Auxiliary Building purges.
SI-P-1B.
,
1430 Terminate emergency phase of the ERO to restore the ERF's back to state of
exercise and begin the on-site readiness. Lead Controllers collect procedures
Recovery meeting. and logs used during the exercise.
Controllers and Observers conduct
preliminary review.
Conduct facility critiques. Perform Participants critique their performance and
'
in parallel with the Recovery meeting. Observers brief participants on observations.
t
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Summary:
1. A dropped control rod results in clad damage and subsequent increase in RCS activity. The
increased activity requires the declaration of an Alert.
2. A medical emergency occurs in the Chemistry Hot Lab. The medical emergency requires that the
victim be transported to an off-site medical facility.
3. A small break LOCA (420 gpm) occurs causing adverse radiological conditions in the containment.
When safety injection is initiated, the "1H" Emergency Diesel Generator fails to start. This
small break LOCA also requires the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.
!
4. A major break LOCA occurs and fuel clad damage increases. Containment Depressurization
Actuation initiates and decreases containment pressure. Service Water valve 1-SW-MOV-103A does
not open.
5. During the swap of safety injection from the RWST to containment, 1-SI-P-1A trips and the
packing on 1-SI-MOV-1863B develops a major leak. The packing leak results in a radiological ,
_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ --
_.__._____m__.. _ - _ _ . . _ _ - . _ . _____- . _ - _
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VIRGINIA POWER
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION f
AUGUST 13, 14 & 15, 1996 EMERGENCY EXERCISE '
t
TIME LINE ,
,
>
release into the Auxiliary Building and into the environment via the ventilation system. These !
events establish conditions for a General Emergency. !
i
6. Ingestion pathway sampling and protective action activities will be performed by the state on i
Day 2 and Day 3. j
r
Success Paths: :
o Respond to scenario events using the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. t
- Classify events appropriately, and issue a validate off-site PAR.
!
o Package and transport contaminated medical emergency victim to an offsite medical facility. .
!
o Establish monitoring teams and effectively assess on-site and off-site radiological conditions.
o Establish and maintain effective communications.
o Prioritize damage control evolutions and ef fectively use available manpower to ensure the -fuel'
is protected and that the radiological release is terminated.
Potential damage control evolutions:
- Repair the "1H" Emergency Diesel Generator governor
- Open 1-SW-MOV-103A ;
- Repair the 1-SI-P-1A cables
- Open 1-RS-147
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o Perform on-site Recovery planning. !
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- State perform ingestion pathway sampling and protective action activities.
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