IR 05000338/1993009
| ML20056C177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1993 |
| From: | Blake J, Economos N, Samson Lee NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056C172 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-93-09, 50-338-93-9, 50-339-93-09, 50-339-93-9, NUDOCS 9303300189 | |
| Download: ML20056C177 (19) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 n
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101 MARIETT A STREET,N.W.
' C ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-338/93-09 and 50-339/93-09
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Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-338 and 50-339 License Nos.: NPF-4 and NPF-7 Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2
i Inspection C i ted-February 8-12 and February 22-25, 1993
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Inspecto s:
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Date Signed t
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.' Lee Date Signed
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Approved by. -
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. Blake, Chief Date Signed J.
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a rials Process Section
En ineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
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This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in order to observe certain
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steam generator replacement project (SGRP), activities in Unit 1, _ including:
i fitup, preheat and fabrication of field welds i.e., feedwater, steam generator (S/G), girth seam, main steam and reactor coolant loop piping; weld repairs, nondestructive examinations; review of fabrication records.
Other work effort included repair / replacement of Unit 1, main feedwater, pump-to-elbow, cracked welds on the discharge side of A, B and C pumps and cracking i
of monoball sliding restraints on the feedwater lines inside the mechanical equipment room.
Some of the information in this report included input provided by S. S. Lee on
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temporary assignment at North Anna while the SGRP is in progress. His input covers the time period between February 1st through the 25th,1993.
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- 303300189 930326 PDR ADOCK 05000338 G
PDR r
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Results:
j The SGRP was approaching the 50 percent completion point without encountering significant problems.
Project management is maintaining high visibility and
continues to pursue quality workmanship, consistent with conservation and i
safety.
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During this inspection period, activities observed in part included transport j
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and placement of the new lower steam generator assemblies, fitup and rewelding j
of reactor coolant piping to nozzles, fitup and welding of S/G girth seams,
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main steam piping and feedwater nozzle to pipe welds.
Radiographs of the
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completed welds were reviewed and found to be satisfactory.
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Two noncited violations were identified. One involved errors in
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documenting / entering appropriate information on inspection forms and signing I
line items in construction travelers. The other related to a failure to l
energize two weld rod caddies containing coated welding electrodes, see i
paragraphs 4 and 5.
Four followup items requiring additional work effort were identified. These i
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j will be pursued on subsequent inspection visits to the site.
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Feed pump discharge nozzle welds cracked, being replaced.
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2.
Monoball sliding restraints on feedwater lines
"A" and "C" in mechanical l
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equipment room found with cracked top collar and restrained in cold
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position.
Root cause evaluation and repair to be performed.
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Fire watch; coverage and personnel training require improvements l
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4.
Paint drops on RC Loop, clean up and inspect before startup.
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Within the areas inspected two noncited violations were identified. No i
i deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS l
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.1.
Persons Contacted
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i Licensee Employees I
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- R. Bayer, Engineering Supervisor, SGRP j
R. Carroll, Jr., Administrative Services Supervisor j
- L. Carter, QA Coordinator l
- G. Clark, Manager, QA
- M. Gettler, Project Manager, SGRP l
- D. Heacock, Superintendent Engineering
- G. Kane, Station Manager
- P. Kemp, Supervisor - Licensing i
- J. Leberstein, Staff Engineering-Licensing
- P. Quales, Supervisor QA
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- R. Saunders, Asst. Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- B. Shriver, Acting Assistant Station Manager i
L. Spain, Materials Engineer SGRP j
D. Spooner, level III Examiner Radiography
- J. Stall, Acting Assistant Station Manager i
H. Travis, Supervisor, NDE l
i Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included i
technical support, QA and administrative personnel.
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Other organizations l
l Bechtel Group Inc. (Bechtel)
i J. Barbee,. Welding Engineer Corporate
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L. Bennet, Welding Engineer B. Reilly, Asst. Project Manager
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T. Sarma, Project QA Manager i
J. Senecal, Welding / Mechanical QC Engineer i
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NRC Resident Inspectors j
- M. Lesser, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. Taylor, Resident. Inspector
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- Attended Exit Meeting
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2.
Facility Modification (37700)
Steam Generator Replacement Project, (SGRP), Unit I f
This inspection is a followup to that documented in Report No. 93-04 and j
was' conducted _for the purpose of observing ongoing SGRP activities
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including; removal and transport of old steam generators to onsite i
storage facility; transport and installation of replacement lower j
assemblies; fabrication and nondestructive testing of field welds
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includin g ti" ;e in the reactor coolant loop piping system, main steam, feedwate and S/G girth seams. Other areas inspected included damage to feedwate pipe whip restraints and monoball sliding restraints; replacem ent of main feedwater pump discharge nozzle welds and adjoining elbows bacause of cracking.
3.
Work in Progress a.
Removal of Old Steam Generator Lower Assembly from Containment On January 31, 1993, the licensee made the initial attempt to lift the first of the three S/G(s), ("B"), from its supports up to the refueling deck level and over near the center of the containment building where it was lowered onto the down-ending pivot stand.
The S/G was subsequently down-ended onto the support carriage by simultaneously moving the polar crane and lowering the steam generator.
Following this effort, the S/G was in a horizontal
position inside the support carriage with the channel head pointing towards the equipment hatch opening. Cover plates were l
then welded onto the old S/G nozzle openings and the entire channel head was recoated with an encapsulant to minimize loose
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contamination. The entire OD surface of all three S/G(s) had been coated in this manner earlier during the project. On February 1, 1993, the inspectors observed removal of the subject S/G from
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containment out to the equipment hatch platform. This was accomplished with the aid of hydraulic jacks, rollers and a wrench
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mechanism which was used to pull the S/G out to the platform.
Pressure on the hydraulic jacks was used to determine / locate the center of gravity of the S/G as it rested horizontally between the two sets of supporting jacks.
By this method, the licensee
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determined that the center of gravity for the subject S/G was i
approximately five (5) inches away from the centerline of one set of jacks which fell short of the estimated distance by prior Bechtel analysis. To provide added stability and safety assurance
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the licensee added counter weights on the channel head of the subject S/G and proceeded with the removal operation.
(See
Inspection Report 93-04 for additional discussion on the C.G.)
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On February 2, 1993, the inspectors observed the removal of the
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old "C" steam generator lower assembly from containment.
However, j
the down-ending of the "C" steam generator was halted temporarily
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because of binding between the trunnion pick-up assembly and the
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The problem was resolved by machining off, 3/8 i
inch from the 6-inch thick link-plate' to allow for clearance.
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(See Nonconformance Report (NCR) No. 0031 and WP&IR Change ik W e
(WCN) No. WR-05.05.000-05-02).
Subsequently, the "C" steam
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generator was down-ended successfully and removed from a
containment.
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The old "C" and "A" steam generators, in that order, were removed from containment without notable difficulties. The inspectors found that the licensee provided added assurance that the old steam generators would be rigged-out and transported in a safe manner.
On February 2, 1992, the inspectors observed loading of the old S/G "B" lower assembly onto a trailer and its transport to the on-site storage facility. This facility is a concrete building outside the protected area, but inside the. owner controlled area.
An impact absorbing steel frame structure called the " welding band", was fitted over the cover plate used to seal the exposed tube bundle at the transition cone.
This device was used to minimize release of radioactive material in the unlikely event that the S/G was accidentally dropped from the trailer during transit. All three S/G(s) were transported in the same manner over a predetermined haul route which had been evaluated to ensure that grades and turning radii could safely accommodate the transporter's wheel loads, and that buried facilities / utilities would not be adversely impacted by these. loads. The haul route was approximately one mile long and it took about 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> to complete.
On February 8,1993, the inspectors noted that all three S/G(s)
had been placed inside the storage facility and observed its closure.
This was accomplished by stacking concrete slabs to seal the front and rear openings of the storage building.
Within the areas inspected violations or deviations were not identified.
b.
Pipe Whip Restraint Damage on Feedwater Piping In an effort to establish the as-found condition of piping supports prior to cutting the feedwater line for steam generator replacement, the licensee examined the supports for the feedwater line near the steam generators. The licensee found that several of the pipe whip restraints were damaged as discussed in Inspection Report 93-04.
On February 11, 1993, the inspectors met with the licensee to discuss the status of the licensee's evaluations and to address the damaged supports.
The meeting was attended by licensee's
engineering staff from the station and corporate offices and the i
licensee's contractor.
Prior to the meeting, the inspector were provided a metallurgical examination report on the feedwater nozzle indications.
(See Inspection Report 93-04 for feedwater j
nozzle indications)
The licensee discussed his investigation into the root cause of the pipe whip restrain damage.
The piping within the whip restraint was covered with mirror insulation.
Examination of the
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removed insulation showed no evidence to suggest that the restraint had impacted the insulation. Damaged feedwater pipe whip restraints was a subject of NRC Information Notice 91-38.
The industry determined that the root cause resulting in Information Notice 91-38 was the locking up of the so-called
.nonoball sliding restraints. These restraints were designed to j
permit horizontal pipe movements, but restrain the pipe from
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vertical movements. The licensee inspected the feedwater line
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monoball restraints inside containment after observing pipe whip
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restraint damage and found no evidence of monoball restraint lock-
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ups.
In addition, the licensee indicated that the whip restraint I
gap was 3-inches which was significantly larger than the gap in the damaged restraints in IN 91-38. The licensee indicated that
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it was difficult to conceive of any credible pipe movement that would cause the observed pipe whip restraint damage.
The licensee observed that the damage did not appear to be recent. Thus, the
licensee indicated that the pipe whip restraint damage could be j
due to original construction.
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The licensee indicated that the resulting Deviation Report (Number j
N-93-135) addressing the damaged pipe whip restraints had been
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closed.
The recommended corrective action was to restore the pipe
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whip restraint to its original proper condition. The licensee was l
considering whether the restraints should be inspected during the j
next refueling outage.
In addition, the licensee was considering j
the need to inspect the feedwater pipe whip restraints on Unit 2 i
during its upcoming outage in the fall of 1993 and the need to l
implement a maintenance program for monoball restraints.
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Subsequent to the meeting, the inspectors found damaged monoball
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restraints on Unit I feedwater lines A and C outside containment
in the mechanical equipment room.
Excessive piping movement had l
caused the piping to push up against the sides of the monoball i
restraints.
(See Inspection Report 93-08).
j The licensee indicated that the monoball restraint damage was
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unrelated to the other damage on the feedwater line inside
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containment, because the containment penetration is a rigid j
support and the feedwater regulating valve provides thorough fluid j
mixing to minimize thermal stresses.
The licensee indicated that
the damaged monoball restraints would be disassembled and
inspected.
i As of February 25, 1993, the license had observed (1) cracking in
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the feedwater nozzles, (2) damage in pipe whip restraints, and (3)
damage in monoball restraints; all in the A and C loops of the
feedwater line. Because the feedwater line is susceptible to i
thermal stratification, the inspectors suspect that there may be j
thermal stresses not considered in the analysis of the feedwater
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line.
The inspectors will follow the licensee's efforts to l
evaluate the observed movements and degradation in the feedwater
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line and its supports during future inspections, j
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Within the areas inspected violations or deviations were not identified, c.
Document Control Work activities are to be performed in accordance with Bechtel's Work Plan and Inspection Records (WP&lRs). The working copy of the WP&lR in the field contains supporting drawings necessary for the work activities. Bechtel procedures require that each supporting drawing in the working copy of the WP&lR be verified to be the latest revision when the associated work is performed. The verification is documented by initialing and dating the drawings during associated work activities.
The inspector selected for review a random sample of working copies of WP&lRs that were kept inside containment.
The specific
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WP&lRs reviewed were:
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WR-06.01.00-02, "SG 'B' Steam Dome Assembly Removal /
Reinstallation"
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WR-06.01.00-03, "SG 'C' Steam Dome Assembly Removal /
Reinstallation"
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WR-07.01.00-02, " Cut / Reweld RCS Piping Loop 'B' to Allow Removal / Installation of Steam Generator" WR-07.01.00-03, " Cut / Reweld RCS Piping Loop 'C' to Allow Removal / Installation of Steam Generator" WR-07.02.00-01, " Removal / Reinstallation of Steam Generator
'A' Main Steam Piping" WR-07.02.00-02, " Removal / Reinstallation of Steam Generator
'B' Main Steam Piping The inspector reviewed the drawings kept with the working copy of the above WP&lRs. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the dates the drawings were initialed and the dates the associated work was performed.
The inspectors also reviewed the records at document control to ensure that the latest revision of.the drawing was used in the field during the associated work activities.
The specific drawings reviewed were:
FSK-C-001 FSK-M-011 N-9013-1-M-401 FSK-C-038 FSK-M-018 N-9013-1-M-402 FSK-M-002 FSK-M-020 N-9013-1-M-405 FSK-M-005 FSK-M-021 H-9013-1-M-800 FSK-M-006 FSK-M-042 N-9013-1-S-014 FSK-M-007 FSK-M-064 N-9013-1-S-015
FSK-M-009 FSK-M-074 N-9013-1-S-100 FSK-M-010 FSK-M-127
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The inspectors found that the reviewed drawings had been properly verified and were the appropriate revisions.
Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
d.
Unqualified Protective Coating Material on Primary Loop Piping
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The old S/G(s) were coated with a material /encapsulant designed to
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prevent or minimize loose contaminated particles on the S/G shell
from being released to the environment. On January 26, 1993, the
licensee issued NCR No. 0028 to report that drops of this coating i
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material had landed inadvertently on the 0D surface of reactor coolant piping.
On January 31, 1993, the inspector observed, through closed
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circuit TV, painting activities on the old S/G
"A" shell and noted l
that the primary piping had been left uncovered and therefore j
exposed to the subject coating material. On February 7, 1993, the inspectors checked the exposed surface of the primary coolant
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piping in loops
"A" and "B" and found small amounts of the subject
coating material on the OD surfaces. A similar condition was j
identified in loop "C" by the licensee.
The inspectors notified i
the licensee of the conditions noted in loops
"A" and "B".
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Licensee responded by expanding the scope of the aforementioned l
NCR to include the condition described on the piping surfaces in
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the aforementioned loops.
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The inspectors will continue to monitor and evaluate the l
licensee's corrective actions in subsequent inspections.
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Control of Consumable Materials j
The licensee wrote NCR No. 0009 on November 6, 1992, to document
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that a rust inhibitor, trade name WD-40, had been used as a cutting lubricant on the new steam generators. Westinghouse does
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not permit the use of WD-40 on the new steam generators because of the concern that use of unqualified substances could degrade steam
generator materials.
The WD-40 was subsequently removed from the
new steam generator surfaces.
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On the evening of January 31, 1993, the inspectors observed five,
.j uncontrolled cans of WD-40, many uncapped, around the new A steam
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generator, in the new steam generator storage facility (NSGSF).
-i By interview the inspectors ascertained that craft present at the-
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NSGSF were unaware of' work activities' involving the WD-40. The
WD-40 cans had a Bechtel consumable materials evaluation color code sticker, indicating that'the subject material was acceptable
for use on carbon steel material.
Subsequent discussions with the licensee disclosed that craft had been using the WD-40 lubricant to facilitate cutting off excess i
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stock and machining the weld preps on the new S/G nozzles.
In order to resolve the apparent confusion regarding the use of this
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material, the licensee sided with Westinghouse and stopped further i
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use of the subject material on the new steam generators. All _
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surfaces exposed to this material were thoroughly cleaned. This
corrective action was used to resolve the aforementioned NCR. On l
February 2, 1993, the inspectors returned to the NSGSF and found l
no WD-40 cans in the vicinity of the new S/Gs.
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Review of Turnover Packages - completed WP&lRs l
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Work activities are to be performed in accordance with WP&lRs.
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After all work has been completed on a WP&lR, Bechtel prepares a turnover package for the WP&IR and transmits it to the licensee.
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The turnover package shows that the work' contained in the WP&IR has been completed and provides the supporting documentation.
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The inspectors reviewed the turnover package (Turnover No.
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TOP-062-32) for WP&lR No. WR-07.06.00-01, " Fabrication of SG Level
i Instrumentation Condensate Pots and Root Valve Assemblies." The
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i package consisted of 363 pages and 48 weld radiographs. The
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turnover package contained:
signed WP&lR; material traceability
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i record (piece number, heat number, purchase order number, item
'l number, and stock number); material withdrawal request; drawings;
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field welding checklist (called WR-5); and nondestructive f
examination records.
This turnover package was received by the
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licensee on February 15, 1993. This package was among the few l
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packages that had been completed at the time of inspection and was l
the first one involving welding. The inspectors found that the
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turnover package reviewed was in order.
4.
Records Review - Activities _in Progress
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During the previous inspection, documented in Report 93-04, the
inspectors had identified a weakness in the accuracy and completeness of records i.e., WP&lR(s) and certification of instruments and sundry equipment.
Discrepancies were brought to management attention.and
action was taken to preclude their recurrence.
During the current
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j inspection, the inspectors selected a sample, at random, of records
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reflecting completed production NDE activities and WP&IR(s) involving
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equipment installation. Documents were reviewed closely for l
completeness and accuracy in order to evaluate what if any improvements
had occurred since the previous inspection period. Documents WP&lR(s)
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and/or records selected for this review were as follows.
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WP&lR No i
WR-06-02.00-01 S/G "A" Modification and Weld Prep of Steam Dome i
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WR-06.02.00-02 S/G "B" Modification and Weld Prep of Steam Dome Assembly j
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WR-06.02.00-03 S/G "C" Modification and Weld Prep of Steam Dome Assembly l
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WR-07.02.00-01 Removal / Reinstallation of S/G "A" Main Steam
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Piping
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WR-07.02.00-02 Removal / Reinstallation of S/G "B" Main Steam
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Piping
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i WR-07.02.00-03 Removal / Reinstallation of S/G "C" Main Steam Piping l
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WR-05.05.00-03 j
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WR-05.05.00-04 i
WR-05.05.00-05 Rigging out Old S/G "C" Lower Assembly and Removing from_ Containment-l
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WR-05.05.00-07 Rigging out the S/G "B" Lower Assembly into f
Containment and Preliminary Set i
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Within these areas, the inspectors observed the following
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discrepancies:
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(1)
Line items in some instances had been signed off in the
field copy of the applicable WP&IR but not in the record
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(2)
In a few instances (2 or 3), line items were not signed off
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as required by the appropriate individual.
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(3)
In many instances, completed surface examination reports
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issued by the contractors (CBI), were found to reference,
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incorrect information relative to applicable code, drawing j
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revisions and/or procedure.
In the case of liquid penetrant l
a, examination records, the inspectors found the records, in
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many instances, either recorded the material temperature as
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ambient or failed to report it at all.
Also, in some j
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instances where the temperature was recorded, the j
temperature gage serial number was not recorded.
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In reference to magnetic particle examinations the j
inspectors noted that the contractor's procedure, MT-ANSI j
B31.7 Rev. 3, paragraph 4.3.1 " Frequency of Calibration",
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required each piece of magnetizing equipment to be j
calibrated at least once a year, or after each time it had i
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been subjected to major electrical repair, periodic ove haul
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or damage.
In line with this requirement, the inspectors i
requested that CBI provide for review, a copy of the-l calibration certificate for the yoke (s) used on this l
project. However, the contractor's supervisor informed the
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inspectors that the AC yoke's lifting power was verified with a ten lb. weight, as required by code prior to each
field examination and as such the need for calibration had I
little if any value on the yoke's ability to perform.
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addition, the contractor stated that checking the yoke
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before testing had been discussed with and approved by the
licensee at the start of the project. The inspectors discussed the entire issue with the licensee focusing on the
words of the applicable code paragraph (T-746.3 Lifting Power of Yokes), which states in part that, the magnetizing
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force of yokes shall be checked at least once a year, or
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whenever a yoke has been damaged. Through the discussion i
and review of requirements it became apparent that the code i
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requirement that AC yokes have a lifting power of at least i
10 lbs at the maximum pole spacing being used was in full
compliance on this project. To eliminate confusion between code and procedural requirements, the licensee revised the
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procedure to comply with the aforementioned code
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requirements. This revision was implemented with revision 4 i
of the procedure, dated February 11, 1993.
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and Bechtel disclosed that these errors had been identified
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earlier by internal audits / surveillance and had been brought
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to the attention of CBI management. To correct the problem,
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a task group was formed to review ways of making the forms l
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more user - friendly by simplifying them and providing
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samples of completed forms for reference.
Partially
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completed forms with information generic to the project were
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made available for use in the field.
Because errors and
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omissions of a similar nature were identified in similar
documents in the previous inspection documented in Report l
93-04, the inspector concluded that a weakness continued to
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i exist in this general area. The licensee acknowledges the l
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problem and increased efforts to further reduce the i
recurrence of these errors. Because of the apparent lack of l
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safety significance associated with these errors and the'
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licensee's continued positive effort to minimize the
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frequency with which the errors occurred, this finding was
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identified as a non-cited violation, NCV 50-338/93-09-01,
(field records with incorrect entries and omissions). This
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NRC identified violation is not being cited because the
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criteria specified in Section VII.B of the NRC Enforcement
Policy were satisfied.
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Within the areas examined violations or deviations were not identified, with the exception of the non-cited violation
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identified above.
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5.
Welding IP (55050) - Girth Seam Welding Progress l
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The old S/G "B" dome was set on the new/ replacement lower assembly after welding on the primary piping had progressed enough to provide adequate stability to the lower assembly. The old S/G
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dome was weld prepped, fitted, preheated and welded to the new i
lower assembly at a point near the transition cone as-described in
the specification.
i The welding process used to fabricate the girth. weld was the
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manual shielded metal arc welding (SMAW). Minimum' preheat was set l
at 300 F.
The weld was fabricated using E8018-NM filler metal.
The weld prep was double-v open butt joint design. Welding began
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from the ID of the S/G shell and continued to a thickness of about
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one inch of weld metal deposit. At this point, the weld metal was
.i background from the OD side of the joint to remove possible root
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defects. Welding continued from both sides using a. minimum of two i
crews.
Information radiography was performed at 1/3 and 2/3 joint
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thickness.
Following these examinations, the joint was capped and.
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ground for final radiography, which was to be done after post-weld
heat treatment.
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On February 16, 1993, the inspectors observed the S/G "C" dome set i
on the new lower assembly, followed by S/G "A" dome which was set
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on the corresponding lower assembly. The information radiographs
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on all three girth welds showed no significant fabrication
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defects.
Each of the joints was welded out, and finish ground to
a smooth transition with the base metal.
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While the work effort was in progress, the inspectors observed the
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appearance of weld beads including starts and stops, bead width, j
smoothness, tie-ins between beads, arc-strikes, undercut, preheat
and interpass temperature.
Portable rod ovens were checked i
periodically to verify that they were energized and that their
contents were consistent with that' identified on the rod issue j
slips.
Rod ovens in rod issue stations were checked to verify
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that the material stored was properly identified and segregated by i
type and size. Oven temperatures and calibration stickers were
checked periodically throughout this inspection.
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Within these areas the inspectors noted the _ following. On
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February 24, prior to the arrival of the night shift, the
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inspectors were inspecting the condition of partially completed l
S/G "A" girth weld.
At this time the inspectors observed two
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portable rod warmers, with substantial quantities of E8018 NM
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welding electrodes, located on the' girth weld platform of S/G "A".
Both warmers were not energized and their contents were cold.
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When the night shift crew arrived, the inspectors brought this i
finding to the attention of the foreman who immediately disposed
of the electrodes in these two warmers.
Failing to energize
portable rod warmers when in use is contrary to procedure WFMC-1 i
Rev. 7 " Welding Filler Material Control", paragraph 7.5.8.
This l
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11 paragraph states, in part, that during use, portable rod warmers shall be continuously heated or energized except during transit time.
The inspectors discussed this finding with the licensee and Bechtel who acknowledged that this was a procedural violations but indicated that this was an isolated incident as it was the only time during the life of this project that rod warmers with electrodes issued to a welder or a crew of welders had been left unplugged. Also through discussions with cognizant welding personnel and by review of the manufacturer's (ATOM ARC) published literature on the rate of moisture pick-up, the inspectors ascertained the following.
Assuming these consumable were exposed for approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or a work shift, at 70 F and 70 percent relative humidity, they would have picked-up about 0.03 percent moisture by weight. This amount of moisture content added to the 0.08 percent content, reported in the as received condition, would have resulted in a total content of about 0.11 percent noisture by weight and well below the 0.2 percent code allowable limit.
This would suggest that the subject electrodes would have been acceptable, in terms of moisture content, even if they had been exposed to the environmental conditions more severe than those existing at the work station next to S/G
"A", let alone inside the covered caddie were they were found. Discussion with the licensee and the contractor's QC personnel disclosed that this was the only time a caddie with rods was found unplugged.
Results of this investigation indicated that the finding was an isolated procedural violation with minimal or no impact on the health and safety to the public. As such, the inspectors identified this finding as a non-cited violation, (50-338/93-09-02 Welding Electrodes in unenergized caddy).
This NRC identified violation is not being cited because the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
b.
Fit Up and Welding of Primary Piping The new B steam generator lower assembly was brought inside the containment and lowered onto the steam generator supports. The B steam generator was the first steam generator to be installed.
On February 9,1993, the inspectors ' observed the setting of the new B steam generator on its supports and associated activities to achieve fit up of the primary piping to the steam generator nozzles.
On February 10, 1993, the inspectors observed the final fit up of the primary piping to the B steam generator nozzles.
The gap between the piping and the nozzles ranged from zero to 0.137 inch.
Misalignment between the piping and the nozzles was less than 1/32
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i inch.
The licensee determined that the fit-up met minimum code
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requirements and therefore was acceptable.
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Later on February 10, 1993, the inspectors observed the start of
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the narrow gap machine welding of the B hot leg steam generator
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l nozzle to primary piping. The welding process was gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW) and the groove of the weld had a five degree
I angle. The thickness of the primary loop piping is about three
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inches. The welding used two machine welding heads on the outside i
diameter (OD) of the pipe, with each head welding approximately half of the pipe circumference. The inspectors verified that the i
setting on the welding machines was within the licensee's qualified welding specification parameters.
In addition, heat input was monitored on a regular basis and upon i
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weld conpletion the licensee measured delta ferrite content on the ID of Loop "C" hot and cold legs and on the OD of all loop welds.
Results of these measurements showed that the content of delta
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ferrite in these welds exceeded by far the lower bound of 2 i
percent considered by industry as sufficient to avoid i
microfissuring.
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j c.
Welding Main Steam and Feedwater Piping
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In addition to inspection on primary piping and girth welds, the
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inspectors observed a sample of mainsteam and feedwater welds in
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i process. Welds selected for this work effort were a follows
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Steam Generator B l
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i FW-9A Elbow to flozzle 16" sch. 80 Tacked, accepted
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waiting for
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preheat before welding
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FW-65W Pipe to pipe 32" x 0.97" In Process, Weld
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Appearance i
Acceptable l
t FW-17A fiozzle to Elbow 32" X 1.00" In Process, Weld i
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Appearance
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Acceptable
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i Within these areas the inspectors observed the partially completed
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l welds for bead width, height and uniformity; bead starts and l
stops; cleanliness, arc strikes and undercut.
Rod issue slips and l
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fabrication records were reviewed to ascertain whether designated
hold points had been observed and QC inspections had been
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conducted in a timely manner. Weld procedures for these welds have been reviewed and discussed in earlier reports. Controlling codes include ASME Section IX for weld procedure and welder qualifications and ANSI B31.7 piping code for weld fabrication.
Welds and records examined were in order.
Within the areas examined violations or deviations were not identified with the exception of the non-cited violation identified above.
6.
Nondestructive Examinations a.
In-process Nondestructive Examinations
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On February-12, 1993, the inspectors observed the radiographic
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testing (RT) of the primary piping welds for the B steam generator. The RT was performed after 1/3 of the pipe thickness
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had been welded out to obtain information on the quality of the
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weld. Prior to the RT, the licensee ground the inside surface of
the weld and performed a liquid penetrant test (PT) on the inside
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surface. A linear indication was found by.PT on the hot leg weld l
root and was subsequently removed by additional grinding.
The
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inspectors examined the inside surface of the weld and observed
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that the additional grinding was minimal.
After the completion of l
the RT, the primary pipe welding continued with the addition of a l
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welding machine for welding the inside diameter (ID) of the pipe.
Another information RT was performed after approximately 2/3 of
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the pipe thickness had been welded out.
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was performed after welding had been completed.
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f The weld prep for the C primary loop piping was also being
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machined. The licensee completed the weld prep for the C primary l
piping and performed a PT on the weld prep. A linear indication
on the weld land near the inside surface of the. pipe was found by
PT on the hot leg. The licensee removed the linear indication by i
grinding. On February 11, 1993, the inspectors examined the weld i
prep after grinding. The grinding removed approximately 1/4 inch
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of the weld land for a depth of approximately 3/8 inch. The
inspectors observed the PT after the grinding and found it
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acceptable.
On February 12, 1993, the inspectors observed that.
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the new C steam generator was being set and that the
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aforementioned land had been repaired by welding and subsequent
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grinding to reconstruct the weld land was successful.
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The C and A steam generator nozzle to pipe weld fit up was accepted and welding of the C and A primary' proceeded with no significant problems.
The welds were examined ~ and found acceptable by RT. An ASME
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Section XI preservice inspection (PSI) based on ultrasonic testing
(UT) was to be performed.
On February 24 and 25, 1993, the l
inspectors observed the UT on selected RCS piping welds.
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b.
Review of Final Radiographs (IP57090)
The inspectors reviewed radiographs and associated reader sheets for selected welds in the reactor coolant loop and feedwater syst em.
The radiographs were taken in accordance with procedure RT-ASME, Rev. 3 which referenced ASME Code Section 111, 1986 Edition as the applicable code.
The film and associated records were reviewed to ascertain whether radiographic and film quality were satisfactory and whether evaluation and disposition of rejectable indications were consistent with code requirements.
These welds were as follows:
Reactor Coolant Pipe Drawing /
Weld Sketch No.
Condition loop "C" Hot Leg N-9013-M041 Rev. 4 Acceptable rounded FW-29A+R+R1 indication (porosity)
@ #8 location was not recorded in reader sheet Loop "A" Cold Leg FSK-M-004 Rev. O Loop "A" Hot Leg FSK-M-004 Rev. O Acceptable FW-4A Feedwater N-9013-1-M-403 Acceptable
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FW-5GClR3 FW-17A FSK-M-ll5, Rev. 1 Acceptable Note: Film quality, with regards to development, lacked consistency i.e, roller marks and artifacts were observed on many films.
Penetrameters were more visible in light film.
Penetrameter placement lacked consistency in that its location varied from 15/8" from the edge of the weld to being placed over the weld.
This apparent lack in consistency in film development and attention to detail was discussed with QC and management.
They indicated that they were aware of the problem and were taking steps to correct it by meeting with site supervision and company management and by refusing to accept film based on poor quality.
The inspector stated that they considered this matter as a area of weakness and that they would continue to monitor film quality more closely in future inspections.
Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie..
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7.
Fire Watch Activities The inspectors observed several apparent weaknesses in the licensee's fire watch operations during the inspection period.
The applicable procedure for this activity was the licensee fire Protection Program.
Examples of these weaknesses were a follows:
a.
While the inspectors were observing welding activities on the main steam line on top of S/G "B" dome, they noted that the fire watch was posted on the bio-shield wall approximately 10 feet above the refueling level.
From that vantage point the fire watch could not see the welding on top of the steam dome.
In addition, the fire watch was stationary and did not make rounds every ten minutes to observe activities in the fire affected area, as he should have according to the applicable procedure.
b.
On the refueling deck, the inspectors observed that a fire watch did not appear to be near a fire extinguisher.
When asked by the inspectors of its whereabouts, the fire watch obtained a fire extinguisher from approximately 30 feet away and 10 feet up on a scaffolding.
Later, when this fire watch was relieved, the inspectors noted that the new fire watch had the added responsibility to observe the girth weld location from his post on the bio-shield wall.
When the inspectors asked the new fire watch for the location of the fire extinguisher, he responded by pointing to the adjacent scaffolding without realizing that the previous fire watch had removed the fire extinguisher from that location.
c.
In another instance, the inspectors observed that a fire watch was posted on top of S/G
- B" dome.
There was no apparent work activities at that location.
When asked by the inspectors for the reason of his presence, the fire watch did not know the reason for being posted there. Apparently, there was nobody there when the fire watch arrived at this post.
In fact, the inspectors ascertained that they were the only people the fire watch met on the steam dome in three hours since the beginning of his fire watch assignments.
As a result of the inspectors' observations, the licensee indicated that fire watch activities would be reviewed in order to improve coverage of this activity.
The inspectors will evaluate the licensee's effort in subsequent inspections.
8.
Operational Check of Portable rod Warmers Bechtel Specification, Welding Filler Material Control, WFMC-1, Pevision 7, establishes the requirements for the receipt, storage, and disbursal of welding filler material. Covered weld rods are released to welders for use in portable rod warmers or caddies.
The portable rod warmers were of two designs: one has a cylindrical shape and holds approximately ten pounds, and the other has a square shape and could
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hold up to 50 pounds of covered electrodes.
These are primarily assigned to welders working on the S/G girth welds.
Paragraph 7.5.2 of the subject specification, states in part that, "Each portable rod warmer shall be checked for operation daily before loading, by verifying that the indicator light is illuminated." The inspectors found indicator lights on the round caddies but did not notice the presence of an indicator light on the square caddies. After the close of this inspection the inspector examined the square caddies inside containment and found no indicator light.
Without an indicator light, it was uncertain how the daily operational check as described in WFMC-1 would be performed. The inspector brought the observation to the licensee's attentien who removed all square caddies from use on the SGRP.
Although the square shaped caddies have no indicator lights, the inspectors have no reason to believe that defective caddies were issued to the field.
This position is based on the fact that the inspectors and the QC organizations of Bechtel and the licensee closely monitored field and temporary storage, distribution and use of welding consumables throughout the life of this project.
At no time did the inspectors find, at the work stations, an energized caddy with electrodes that could be handled without welding gloves.
Therefore, based on discussions with cognizant personnel and personal experience, the inspectors have concluded that even though the square caddies had no indicator lights, they were working satisfactorily when placed in service. The licensee's failure to identify and document that square caddies had no indicator lights points to a lack of attention to details and is therefore considered as a weakness in this area.
s Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
9.
Defective Welds on Main Feedwater Pump Discharge Nozzles, (Unit 1)
During the time of this inspection, the licensee performed erosion corrosion tests on the outlet reducing nozzle of the 1A feedwater pump and found an area near the elbow to nozzle weld to be below minimum wall. A search of archives made to locate the welding procedure used to f abricate this weld revealed that the pump nozzle was made from AISI 400 series ferritic stainless material.
Also, the licensee discovered that the contractor's (Stone and Webster) welding procedure used to fabricate the pump nozzle to the carbon steel (P1) elbow used carbon - moly filler metal for the root and hot passes and 1 1/2 Cr filler metal to fill the balance of the weld joint. Using this type of filler metal to weld the 400 stainless material to the carbon steel elbow is inappropriate as it is extremely sensitive to cracking.
Information radiographs taken to evaluate the integrity of the welds in question in feed pumps
"A", "B" and "C", disclosed several cracks in each of the three welds. Deviation Reports 1-fW-P-1A, -1B and 1C were issued to document the condition identified, and plans were being drawn up to consider the course of corrective action to be taken a this time.
At the exit interview, the
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inspector stated that because there is a good probability that Unit 2 pump nozzle welds will have similar tracking, the Evaluations should demonstrate that continued operation of Unit 2 does not present a safety
questien. This item was identified as an inspector follow-up itcm (50-l 338/93-09-03, Feedpump Nozzle Cracking), for tracking purposes.
l Within the areas inspected violations or deviations were not identified.
10.
Exit Interview l
The inspection scopa and results were sumniarized on February 25, 1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results
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listed below.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
l Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
a.
Closed NCV 50-338/93-09-01, Field records with Incorrect Entries and Omissions, Pcragraph 4.
I b.
Closed NCB 50-338/93-09-02, Welding Electrodes in Unenergized Caddy. Paragraph Sa.
c.
IFl 50-338/93-03 Feeapump Nozzle Cracking Paragraph 9.