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Insp Repts 50-338/89-18 & 50-339/89-18 on 890515-19. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Areas of Inservice Insp - Observation of Work & Work Activities
	ML20244E561
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	06/06/1989
From:	Blake J, Coley J, Glasman M; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20244E538	List: ML20244E535; ML20244E552; ML20244E561;
References
	50-338-89-18, 50-339-89-18, NUDOCS 8906200391
	Download: ML20244E561 (10)
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UNITED STATES

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j 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W. )

]: 's ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-338/89-18 and'50-339/89-18

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' Licensee: Virginia. Electric and Power Company. .

f Glen Allen,.VA 23060:

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Docket Nos.: -50-338 and 50-339 License Nos.: NPF-4 and NPF-7

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. Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: .May 15-19, 1989

Inspectors: k . h. rix d -d-8I

J. LT W 1ey Q Date Signed-

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' Approved by: .

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/4.1 J #Bgk5, Sect ief

T"L Materia'Is & Pr sses Section

Engineering anch

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routin~e, unannounced inspection was- in the areas of inservice inspection

.(ISI) - Observation of Work and Work Activities.

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Results:

Management was observed performing surveillance of vendor. activities and

effectively resolving technical and human factors issues relating to

radiography, ultrasonic examination, and fire watch attentiveness. A corporate

level III examiner was also observed auditing vendor activities and resolving

technical issues in a very effective manner. However, personnel problems were

identified' by the inspectors and documented in this report pertaining to

, failure of radiographer to . reject radiographs of an unacceptable weld,

radiographs with incorrect permanent identification and a fire watch asleep on

. duty. Two violations were identified in the areas inspected. (para-

graphs 2.a. and 2.e.)

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

G. H. Flowers, Supervisor, Site Engineering Programs

L. N. Hartz, Manager, ISI/NDE Services

G. E. Kane, Station Manager

J. H. Leberstien, Licensing Engineer

P. J. Naughton, ISI Engineer

H. L. Travis, NDE Supervisor

S. Hamill, ISI Engineer

N. Gage, L-IIA Radiographic Examiner

Other licensee 1 employees contacted during this inspection included

craftsmen, engineers, technicians, and administrative personnel.

Other Organizations

Westinghouse Inspection Services:

L. Markle, Site Coordinator

D. Kurek, Level III Examiner

NRC Resident Inspectors

J. Caldwell, Senior Resident Inspector

L. King, Resident Inspector

Attended exit interview

2. Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities, Unit 1

(73753)

L The inspectors observed ISI work activities, including steam generator

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plug repair activities, to determine whether this inservice work was being

conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory requirements

and licensee commitments.

The applicable code of record for both Units 1 and 2 is the American

l' Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME B&PV)

Code,Section XI,1974 Edition with addenda through Summer 1975.

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Subparagraphs delineated below describe the work activities examined by

the inspectors, the inspection findings, requirements and observations.

a. Review of Radiographs for Augmented ISI of the Feedwater and Main

Steam System Welds at Postulated Break Locations in the Service

Building 1

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Appendix 3C of the North Anna UFSAR for Unit 1 addresses the effects

of piping system breaks outside containment. . To provide assurance

that . safety-related equipment in the service building is protected

against postulated pipe breaks, an augmented. inservice inspection

program, coupled with a leak detection system, was included in the '

-UFSAR. The basis for the inspection program is to ensure line

integrity because of the close proximity of the main steam and u

feedwater lines to safety-related equipment. -The licensee made a

commitment to conduct the examinations. required in the augmented ISI

E program to the extent practical, within the limitations of design,

geometry, and materials of construction of the components, to the

requirements in the edition of Section XI of the ASME, B&PV Code and

addenda required for the reactor coolant system (74S75). A baseline

examination, providing 100% coverage, was performed prior to

commercial operation to establish system integrity and baseline data.

Thereafter,100% volumetric inspection of all welds was performed

each period for the first 10-year interval. Fct successive

inspection intervals, the program required volumetric inspection of

one-third of the welds at the expiration of each one-third of the

inspection interval with a cumulative 100% coverage of all welds each

interval. Unit 1 is presently in the last outage of the third period

for the first interval.

Examinations performed in the baseline inspection and in previous

periods were conducted using the ultrasonic method of volumetric

examination. However, the licensee has elected to perfonn the

examinations required for the last inspection period of the first

interval using the radiographic method of volumetric examination.

Eighteen welds had been examined by the licensee and reviewed for

acceptance when the inspectors arrived at the North Anna Facility.

The inspectors reviewed the film packages of the welds at break

points listed below to determine if the radiographic technique and

film evaluation was conducted in accordance with the licensee's

approved procedure (NDE-RT-101 Rev. 0).

Drawing Number on Film Pipe Diameter and

Break Point Location & Inspector Comments Wall Thickness

BPL-271 6WFPD-11-601 6" x .562"

(ID Incorrect on Film

Shouldbe10-901)

BPL-569 6WFPD-19-601 6" x .562"

BPL-873 6WFPD-11-601 6" x .719"

(ID Incorrect on Film

Should be 6WFPD-14-901)

BPL-251 6WFPD-11-601 6" x .562"

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Drawing Number on Film Pipe Dianeter and

Break Point Location & Inspector Comments Wall Thickness

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BPL-281 6WFPD-10-601 6" x .719"

(ID Incorrect on Film - ;

Should be 6WFPD-10-901) i

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BPL-582 6WFPD-19-601 6" x .719"

BPL-581 6WFPD-19-601 6" x. 719"

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BPL-551 6WFPD-19-601 6" x .562" I

BPL-875 6WFPD-14-601 6" x .719"

(ID Incorrect on Film

Should be 6WFPD-14-901)

BPL-870 6WFPD-15-601 6" x .562"

BPL-571 6WFPD-19-601 6" x .562"-

BPL-874 6WFPD-14-901 6" x .719"

BPL-282 6WFPD-10-601 6" x .719"

(ID on Film Incorrect '

Should be 6WFPD-10-901)

BPL-882 6WFPD-14-601 6" x .719"

(ID on Film Incorrect

Should be 6WFPD-14-901)

BPL-851 6WFPD-15-601 6" x .562"

BPL-269 6WFPD-11-601 6" x .562"

(ID on Film Incorrect

Should be 6WFPD-10-901)

BPL-787 16WFPD-13-601 12 " x 1"

BPL-788 16WFPD-13-601 16" x 1"

In addition to the seven film packages with incorrect permanent ID,

the inspectors also questioned the examination results at the

following breakpoints:

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BPL-269 Film Station 0-4 was rejected by the licensee because

of lack of penetration in the root. This was a

significant defect in the critical area of the weld.

The licensee was questioned by the inspectors as to

how this indication could have passed ultrasonic

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examination three times. The licensee subsequently

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re-examined this weld using the ultrasonic method and

discovered that, although this was a significant

radiographic indication, it did not produce a signal-

that reached the ultrasonic recording level.

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BPL-851 The inspectors' review revealed an area of incomplete

fusion between film stations 17 and 19. This area had

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not been rejected or noted by the Vendor's . Level III

or the licensee's Level IIA during their review. The

licensee performed parallax radiography to determine

.the location and depth of the indication and notified

the inspectors that the indication was near the

outside surface and was now listed for repair.

- BPL-882 The inspectors' review of this weld revealed a linear

indication at the weld root between film stations 18

and 20. The licensec had not noted this crea on the

evaluation report. Subsequent radiography revealed

this condition to be a high-low area on the pipe wall

inside diameter and was acceptable.

Virginia Power Radiographic Procedure No. NDE-RT-101, paragraph 2.1.3,

states, that "a system shall be used to produce permanent identifica-

tion on the radiograph traceable to the contract, component, weld or

weld seam or part numbers, as appropriate." In addition, Addendum A

of procedure, NDE-RT-101, states that " incomplete fusion is unaccep-

table." Therefore, the incorrect film identification noted above on

radiographs for seven welds and the incomplete fusion observed by the

inspectors between film stations 17 and 19 at breakpoint 851, and not ,

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previously identified by the licensee, arc examples of film

interpreters failing to follow the examination procedure for

etaluating radiographs for acceptance. This item was identified to

the licensee as violation 50-338/89-18-01, Failure to Follow

Procedure for the Evaluation of Radiographs.

b. 10-year ISI of Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Welds l

The inspectors observed Westinghouse performing the 10-year reactor

vessel ultrasonic examinations of welds located in the core region of

the vessel. Data acquired during the ultrasonic examinations of

welds VRA-1-1100-02 and VRA-1-1100-03 were also reviewed by the

inspectors. The examinations were conducted in accordance with

Westinghouse's Nondestructive Examination Procedure Number

VPC-ISI-254, Rev. O. A remotely operated inspection tool with an

array of transducers scanned the welds from inside the reactor. vessel

utilizing the immersion method of examination. A Krautkramer Branson

KB 6000,16 channel ultrasonic data acquisition system acquired the

data and Dynacon's ultrasonic data recording and processing system

(UDRPS) processed and recorded the data on laser disks for subsequent

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analysis.- Data analyzed by the Westinghouse Level III Examiner and

--the inspector consisted of the following scans:

Weld,No. Transducer Angle Scan Direction

VRA-1-1100-02 45' Axial UP

.VRA-1-1100-02 45" Axial DN-

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VRA-1-1100-02- 45 Clockwise .

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VRA-1-1100-02 45 Counter. Clockwise

VRA-1-1100-02 60 Axial UP

VRA-1-1100-02 60" ' Axial DN

VRA-1-1100-02 60 Clockwise-

.VRA-1-1100-02- 60 Counter. Clockwise-

VRA-1-1100-02. O Clockwise:

C VRA-1-1100-03 45 Axial UP

VRA-1-1100-03 45 Axial DN.

VRA-1-1100-03 45 Clockwise

~V RA-1-1100-03 45 Counter Clockwise

VRA-1-1100-03 60 ' Axial UP

g " VRA-l-1100-03-- 60 Axial DN.

VRA-1-1100-03 60 Clockwise

VRA-1-1100-03 60 Counter Clockwise

VRA-1-1100-03 0 Clockwise

The . inspectors reviewed the above examinations . to -detemine if

approved procedures were being followed, specified nondestructive

examination equipment was used, examination personnel were

knowledgeable of examination method and test equipment, and

examination results were properly analyzed.

The UDRPS aystem processed, recorded, and displayed the ultrasonic

data in a very effective manner. The forged rings of the reactor

vessel and the joining welds examined by the inspectors were

extremely sound' material with only- a few low amplitude spot

indications recorded.

c. Ultrasonic Examination of Pressurizer Surge Line Welds for Thermal

Stress Cracking (NRC Bulletin No. 88-08)

The inspectors observed work activities, reviewed certification

records of NDE equipment and materials, and reviewed NDE personnel

qualifications for personnel that had been utilized during the

required ISI examinations this outage. The observations and reviews

conducted by the inspectors are documented below.

-(1) The inspectors observed calibration activities and the

in-process ultrasonic examinations being conducted on the welds

indicated below. The observations were compared with the

applicable procedures and the ASME B&PV Code in the following

areas: availability of and compliance with approved NDE

procedures; use of knowledgeable NDC personnel; use of NDE l

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personnel qualified to the proper level; type of apparatus usad;

calibration requirements; search units; beam angles; DAC curves;

reference level for monitoring discontinuities; method _ of

demonstrating penetration; extent of weld / component examination

coverage; limits of evaluating and recording indications;

recording significant indications; and acceptance limits.

Drawing No. Weld ID Component

VRA-1-4501 11 Pressurizer Surge Line

VRA-1-4501 7 Pressurizer Surge Line

The inspectors conducted an independent ultrasonic verification

examination, using Virginia Power equipment, on portions of

weld 7. This examination was performed in order to evaluate the'

technical adequacy of the ultrasonic examination procedure being

used by the licensee's contractor to perform ultrasonic

examinations and to assess the validity of the information being

reported by the ultrasonic examiners.

The verification ultrasonic examinations conducted by the

inspectors indicated that the procedure being used to conduct

the examinations was adequate and the verification examination

results compared favorably with the information being reported

by the ultrasonic examiners.

(2) The following listed ultrasonic equipment and materials certifi-

cation records were reviews:

Ultrasonic Instruments

Manufacturer /Model Serial No.

Sonic /MK1 01496E

Sonic /MK1 10159E

The inspectors reviewed spectrum analysis data for the

ultrasonic transducers listed below:

Serial No. Size Frequency

42743. .5" 2.25 MHz

M02103 .5" 2.25 MHz

17254 .375" 2.25 MHz

Ultrasonic Calibration Block: VRA-02, SCH 160

The inspectors reviewed certification documentation of the

following NDE personnel listed below:

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' Initials Method Employer

JO EPRI, IGSCC, LII VCR

UT, LII

MT, LII

n PT, LII

VT(1,2,3,4)LII

RS EPRI (GSCC, LII VCR

UT, LII

MT, LII

PT, LII

VT(1,2,3,4) LII

d. Observation of Steam Generator Plug-in-Plug Repair Activities

The. inspectors observed Westinghouse (W) personnel perform Plug-in -

Plug- (PIP) repairs of steam generator (S/G) tube plugs known, or

suspected to be susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion

cracking (IGSCC). The plugs involved are W mechanical tube plugs

fabricated from Alloy 600. A hot leg mechanical tube plug of the

same type catastrophically failed in February 1989 when the plug tip

became separated from the body of the plug and, with primary pressure

as the driving force, the plug tip was accelerated up the iength of

the S/G tube. The result was a ruptured S/G tube, and significant

primary-to-secondary leakage. The purpose of the PIP is'to limit the

amount of primary-to-secondary leakage in case a mechanical type plug

fails, and to limit primary pressure behind a plug tip should it

become separated. The PIP used to effect repairs, at the time of the

inspection, resembled a socket head cap screw with threads that mate

with the threads in the internal expander of the installed plug. The

PIP is then threaded into the S/G plug, ' torqued a predetermined

amount, and tack welded where the shoulder of the PIP contacts the

bottom of the S/G plug. The PIPS were machined from Alloy 600 bar

stock, and then thermally treated to attain a microstruc-

ture resistant to IGSCC. If at all possible, all installation

operations were done with a remote-controlled robot arm in the S/G

bowl with video observation by the equipment operators. Listed below

is a summary of the Unit 1 PIP work:

Number of Steam Generator Plug-in-Plugs Installed, Unit 1

Steam Generator A Steam Generator B Steam Generator C

114 97 188

The inspectors witnessed various work associated with the PIP

installation work, including location of S/G plugs requiring PIP

repair, calibration of the robot-arm, and tack welding of installed

PIPS. The welding process employed the tungsten inert gas process

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using W " Weld Qualification Record" #178. The PIP repair work was

covered by W procedure STD-FP-1989-4450 ' revision 0, "SM-10W

Installation for the Plug in Plug for 7/8 mech plugs)." In addition,

the inspectors observed the work activities to determine if

applicable drawings of the S/G tubesheet were available, if

independent verification of tubesheet locations was performed, if

required remote video equipment was adequate, and if standards of

tack weld quality were established and adhered to. The inspectors

observed the tack welding of the following' PIPS:

Unit 1, Steam Generator C, Hot Leg

Tube Location

Row Column

7 84

6 84

7 79

2 76

e. Firewatch Asleep While on Duty

During ongoing inspection activity in the Unit I containment, the

inspectors encountered a contractor employee sleeping while on

firewatch duty. The firewatch was required due to welding activity

taking place on work order DCP 88-11, which was taking place in the

inity of column 11, at the 262' elevation, and under Radiation Work

iW mit 1885. The inspectors informed the employee's supervisors, and

he was then awakened. North Anna's fire protection procedure, " Fire

Protection Program," Section 3.5.7 requires posting a firewatch

during welding activity, and 30 minutes after completion of the job.

The inspectors also held discussions with North Anna's Site Services

Superintendent related to this item, who indicated that the employee

was terminated from the site. This matter was identified as

Violation 338/89-18-02, "Firewatch Asleep on Duty."

Within the areas examined, violations or deviations were not identified

except as noted in paragraphs 2.a. and 2.e. above.

3. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 19,1989, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed

below. Proprietary information is not contained in this report.

Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

(0 pen) Severity Level IV Violation 50-338/89-18-01, Failure to Follow

Procedure for the Evaluation of Radiographs at Break Point 851 on the

Feedwater System, paragraph 2.a.

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(0 pen) Severity Level IV Violation 50-338/89-18 02, Fire Watch Asleep on

Duty. paragraph 2.e.

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ML20244E561

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