ML20244E561
| ML20244E561 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 06/06/1989 |
| From: | Blake J, Coley J, Glasman M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20244E538 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-89-18, 50-339-89-18, NUDOCS 8906200391 | |
| Download: ML20244E561 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000338/1989018
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UNITED STATES
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- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: 50-338/89-18 and'50-339/89-18
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' Licensee: Virginia. Electric and Power Company.
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Glen Allen,.VA 23060:
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Docket Nos.: -50-338 and 50-339
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. Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: .May 15-19, 1989
Inspectors: k . h.
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J. LT W 1ey
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Date Signed-
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-Date Signed
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' Approved by:
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T"L Materia'Is & Pr
sses Section
Engineering
anch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routin~e, unannounced inspection was- in the areas of inservice inspection
.(ISI) - Observation of Work and Work Activities.
Results:
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Management was observed performing surveillance of vendor. activities and
effectively resolving technical and human factors issues relating to
radiography, ultrasonic examination, and fire watch attentiveness. A corporate
level III examiner was also observed auditing vendor activities and resolving
technical issues in a very effective manner. However, personnel problems were
identified' by the inspectors and documented in this report pertaining to
failure of radiographer
to . reject radiographs of an unacceptable weld,
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radiographs with incorrect permanent identification and a fire watch asleep on
. duty. Two violations were identified in the areas inspected.
(para-
graphs 2.a. and 2.e.)
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- G. H. Flowers, Supervisor, Site Engineering Programs
- L. N. Hartz, Manager, ISI/NDE Services
- G. E. Kane, Station Manager
- J. H. Leberstien, Licensing Engineer
- P. J. Naughton, ISI Engineer
- H. L. Travis, NDE Supervisor
S. Hamill, ISI Engineer
N. Gage, L-IIA Radiographic Examiner
Other licensee 1 employees contacted during this inspection included
craftsmen, engineers, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Other Organizations
Westinghouse Inspection Services:
L. Markle, Site Coordinator
D. Kurek, Level III Examiner
NRC Resident Inspectors
J. Caldwell, Senior Resident Inspector
- L. King, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2.
Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities, Unit 1
(73753)
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The inspectors observed ISI work activities, including steam generator
plug repair activities, to determine whether this inservice work was being
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conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory requirements
and licensee commitments.
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The applicable code of record for both Units 1 and 2 is the American
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Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME B&PV)
Code,Section XI,1974 Edition with addenda through Summer 1975.
Subparagraphs delineated below describe the work activities examined by
the inspectors, the inspection findings, requirements and observations.
Review of Radiographs for Augmented ISI of the Feedwater and Main
a.
Steam System Welds at Postulated Break Locations in the Service
Building
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Appendix 3C of the North Anna UFSAR for Unit 1 addresses the effects
of piping system breaks outside containment. . To provide assurance
that . safety-related equipment in the service building is protected
against postulated pipe breaks, an augmented. inservice inspection
program, coupled with a leak detection system, was included in the
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-UFSAR.
The basis for the inspection program is to ensure line
integrity because of the close proximity of the main steam and
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feedwater lines to safety-related equipment. -The licensee made a
commitment to conduct the examinations. required in the augmented ISI
program to the extent practical, within the limitations of design,
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geometry, and materials of construction of the components, to the
requirements in the edition of Section XI of the ASME, B&PV Code and
addenda required for the reactor coolant system (74S75). A baseline
examination, providing 100% coverage, was performed prior to
commercial operation to establish system integrity and baseline data.
Thereafter,100% volumetric inspection of all welds was performed
each period for the first 10-year interval.
Fct successive
inspection intervals, the program required volumetric inspection of
one-third of the welds at the expiration of each one-third of the
inspection interval with a cumulative 100% coverage of all welds each
interval.
Unit 1 is presently in the last outage of the third period
for the first interval.
Examinations performed in the baseline inspection and in previous
periods were conducted using the ultrasonic method of volumetric
examination.
However, the licensee has elected to perfonn the
examinations required for the last inspection period of the first
interval using the radiographic method of volumetric examination.
Eighteen welds had been examined by the licensee and reviewed for
acceptance when the inspectors arrived at the North Anna Facility.
The inspectors reviewed the film packages of the welds at break
points listed below to determine if the radiographic technique and
film evaluation was conducted in accordance with the licensee's
approved procedure (NDE-RT-101 Rev. 0).
Drawing Number on Film
Pipe Diameter and
Break Point Location
& Inspector Comments
Wall Thickness
BPL-271
6" x .562"
(ID Incorrect on Film
Shouldbe10-901)
BPL-569
6" x .562"
BPL-873
6" x .719"
(ID Incorrect on Film
Should be 6WFPD-14-901)
BPL-251
6" x .562"
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Drawing Number on Film
Pipe Dianeter and
Break Point Location
& Inspector Comments
Wall Thickness
(cont'd)
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BPL-281
6" x .719"
(ID Incorrect on Film -
Should be 6WFPD-10-901)
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BPL-582
6" x .719"
BPL-581
6" x. 719"
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BPL-551
6" x .562"
BPL-875
6" x .719"
(ID Incorrect on Film
Should be 6WFPD-14-901)
BPL-870
6" x .562"
BPL-571
6" x .562"-
BPL-874
6" x .719"
BPL-282
6" x .719"
(ID on Film Incorrect
Should be 6WFPD-10-901)
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BPL-882
6" x .719"
(ID on Film Incorrect
Should be 6WFPD-14-901)
BPL-851
6" x .562"
BPL-269
6" x .562"
(ID on Film Incorrect
Should be 6WFPD-10-901)
BPL-787
12 " x 1"
BPL-788
16" x 1"
In addition to the seven film packages with incorrect permanent ID,
the inspectors also questioned the examination results at the
following breakpoints:
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BPL-269
Film Station 0-4 was rejected by the licensee because
of lack of penetration in the root.
This was a
significant defect in the critical area of the weld.
The licensee was questioned by the inspectors as to
how this indication could have passed ultrasonic
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examination three times.
The licensee subsequently
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re-examined this weld using the ultrasonic method and
discovered that, although this was a significant
radiographic indication, it did not produce a signal-
that reached the ultrasonic recording level.
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BPL-851
The inspectors' review revealed an area of incomplete
fusion between film stations 17 and 19. This area had
not been rejected or noted by the Vendor's . Level III
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or the licensee's Level IIA during their review. The
licensee performed parallax radiography to determine
.the location and depth of the indication and notified
the inspectors that the indication was near the
outside surface and was now listed for repair.
BPL-882
The inspectors' review of this weld revealed a linear
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indication at the weld root between film stations 18
and 20.
The licensec had not noted this crea on the
evaluation report.
Subsequent radiography revealed
this condition to be a high-low area on the pipe wall
inside diameter and was acceptable.
Virginia Power Radiographic Procedure No. NDE-RT-101, paragraph 2.1.3,
states, that "a system shall be used to produce permanent identifica-
tion on the radiograph traceable to the contract, component, weld or
weld seam or part numbers, as appropriate." In addition, Addendum A
of procedure, NDE-RT-101, states that " incomplete fusion is unaccep-
table."
Therefore, the incorrect film identification noted above on
radiographs for seven welds and the incomplete fusion observed by the
inspectors between film stations 17 and 19 at breakpoint 851, and not
previously identified by the licensee, arc examples of film
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interpreters failing to follow the examination procedure for
etaluating radiographs for acceptance.
This item was identified to
the licensee as violation 50-338/89-18-01, Failure to Follow
Procedure for the Evaluation of Radiographs.
b.
10-year ISI of Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Welds
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The inspectors observed Westinghouse performing the 10-year reactor
vessel ultrasonic examinations of welds located in the core region of
the vessel.
Data acquired during the ultrasonic examinations of
welds VRA-1-1100-02 and VRA-1-1100-03 were also reviewed by the
inspectors.
The examinations were conducted in accordance with
Nondestructive
Examination
Procedure Number
VPC-ISI-254, Rev. O.
A remotely operated inspection tool with an
array of transducers scanned the welds from inside the reactor. vessel
utilizing the immersion method of examination. A Krautkramer Branson
KB 6000,16 channel ultrasonic data acquisition system acquired the
data and Dynacon's ultrasonic data recording and processing system
(UDRPS) processed and recorded the data on laser disks for subsequent
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- analysis.- Data analyzed by the Westinghouse Level III Examiner and
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--the inspector consisted of the following scans:
Weld,No.
Transducer Angle
Scan Direction
VRA-1-1100-02
45'
Axial UP
.VRA-1-1100-02
45"
Axial DN-
VRA-1-1100-02-
45
Clockwise
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VRA-1-1100-02
45
Counter. Clockwise
VRA-1-1100-02
60
Axial UP
VRA-1-1100-02
60"
' Axial DN
VRA-1-1100-02
60
Clockwise-
.VRA-1-1100-02-
60
Counter. Clockwise-
VRA-1-1100-02.
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Clockwise:
C
VRA-1-1100-03
45
Axial UP
VRA-1-1100-03
45
Axial DN.
VRA-1-1100-03
45
Clockwise
~ RA-1-1100-03
45
Counter Clockwise
V
VRA-1-1100-03
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' Axial UP
" VRA-l-1100-03--
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Axial DN.
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VRA-1-1100-03
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Clockwise
VRA-1-1100-03
60
Counter Clockwise
VRA-1-1100-03
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Clockwise
The . inspectors reviewed the above examinations . to -detemine if
approved procedures were being followed, specified nondestructive
examination equipment was used, examination personnel were
knowledgeable of examination method and test equipment, and
examination results were properly analyzed.
The UDRPS aystem processed, recorded, and displayed the ultrasonic
data in a very effective manner.
The forged rings of the reactor
vessel and the joining welds examined by the inspectors were
extremely sound' material with only- a few low amplitude spot
indications recorded.
c.
Ultrasonic Examination of Pressurizer Surge Line Welds for Thermal
Stress Cracking (NRC Bulletin No. 88-08)
The inspectors observed work activities, reviewed certification
records of NDE equipment and materials, and reviewed NDE personnel
qualifications for personnel that had been utilized during the
required ISI examinations this outage.
The observations and reviews
conducted by the inspectors are documented below.
-(1) The inspectors observed calibration activities and the
in-process ultrasonic examinations being conducted on the welds
indicated below.
The observations were compared with the
applicable procedures and the ASME B&PV Code in the following
areas:
availability of and compliance with approved NDE
procedures; use of knowledgeable NDC personnel; use of NDE
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personnel qualified to the proper level; type of apparatus usad;
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calibration requirements; search units; beam angles; DAC curves;
reference level for monitoring discontinuities; method _ of
demonstrating penetration; extent of weld / component examination
coverage; limits of evaluating and recording indications;
recording significant indications; and acceptance limits.
Drawing No.
Weld ID
Component
VRA-1-4501
11
Pressurizer Surge Line
VRA-1-4501
7
Pressurizer Surge Line
The inspectors conducted an independent ultrasonic verification
examination, using Virginia Power equipment, on portions of
weld 7.
This examination was performed in order to evaluate the'
technical adequacy of the ultrasonic examination procedure being
used by the licensee's contractor to perform ultrasonic
examinations and to assess the validity of the information being
reported by the ultrasonic examiners.
The verification ultrasonic examinations conducted by the
inspectors indicated that the procedure being used to conduct
the examinations was adequate and the verification examination
results compared favorably with the information being reported
by the ultrasonic examiners.
(2) The following listed ultrasonic equipment and materials certifi-
cation records were reviews:
Ultrasonic Instruments
Manufacturer /Model
Serial No.
Sonic /MK1
01496E
Sonic /MK1
10159E
The inspectors reviewed spectrum analysis data for the
ultrasonic transducers listed below:
Serial No.
Size
Frequency
42743.
.5"
2.25 MHz
M02103
.5"
2.25 MHz
17254
.375"
2.25 MHz
Ultrasonic Calibration Block:
VRA-02, SCH 160
The inspectors reviewed certification documentation of the
following NDE personnel listed below:
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Method
Employer
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VCR
UT, LII
MT, LII
PT, LII
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VT(1,2,3,4)LII
RS
EPRI (GSCC, LII
VCR
UT, LII
MT, LII
PT, LII
VT(1,2,3,4) LII
d.
Observation of Steam Generator Plug-in-Plug Repair Activities
The. inspectors observed Westinghouse (W) personnel perform Plug-in -
Plug- (PIP) repairs of steam generator (S/G) tube plugs known, or
suspected to be susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion
cracking (IGSCC).
The plugs involved are W mechanical tube plugs
fabricated from Alloy 600.
A hot leg mechanical tube plug of the
same type catastrophically failed in February 1989 when the plug tip
became separated from the body of the plug and, with primary pressure
as the driving force, the plug tip was accelerated up the iength of
the S/G tube.
The result was a ruptured S/G tube, and significant
primary-to-secondary leakage. The purpose of the PIP is'to limit the
amount of primary-to-secondary leakage in case a mechanical type plug
fails, and to limit primary pressure behind a plug tip should it
become separated. The PIP used to effect repairs, at the time of the
inspection, resembled a socket head cap screw with threads that mate
with the threads in the internal expander of the installed plug. The
PIP is then threaded into the S/G plug, ' torqued a predetermined
amount, and tack welded where the shoulder of the PIP contacts the
bottom of the S/G plug.
The PIPS were machined from Alloy 600 bar
stock, and then thermally treated to attain a microstruc-
ture resistant to IGSCC.
If at all possible, all installation
operations were done with a remote-controlled robot arm in the S/G
bowl with video observation by the equipment operators. Listed below
is a summary of the Unit 1 PIP work:
Number of Steam Generator Plug-in-Plugs Installed, Unit 1
114
97
188
The inspectors witnessed various work associated with the PIP
installation work, including location of S/G plugs requiring PIP
repair, calibration of the robot-arm, and tack welding of installed
PIPS.
The welding process employed the tungsten inert gas process
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using W " Weld Qualification Record" #178.
The PIP repair work was
covered by W procedure STD-FP-1989-4450 ' revision 0,
"SM-10W
Installation for the Plug in Plug for 7/8 mech plugs)." In addition,
the inspectors observed the work activities to determine if
applicable drawings of the S/G tubesheet were available, if
independent verification of tubesheet locations was performed, if
required remote video equipment was adequate, and if standards of
tack weld quality were established and adhered to.
The inspectors
observed the tack welding of the following' PIPS:
Unit 1, Steam Generator C, Hot Leg
Tube Location
Row
Column
7
84
6
84
7
79
2
76
e.
Firewatch Asleep While on Duty
During ongoing inspection activity in the Unit I containment, the
inspectors encountered a contractor employee sleeping while on
firewatch duty.
The firewatch was required due to welding activity
taking place on work order DCP 88-11, which was taking place in the
- inity of column 11, at the 262' elevation, and under Radiation Work
iW mit 1885. The inspectors informed the employee's supervisors, and
he was then awakened.
North Anna's fire protection procedure, " Fire
Protection Program," Section 3.5.7 requires posting a firewatch
during welding activity, and 30 minutes after completion of the job.
The inspectors also held discussions with North Anna's Site Services
Superintendent related to this item, who indicated that the employee
was terminated from the site.
This matter was identified as
Violation 338/89-18-02, "Firewatch Asleep on Duty."
Within the areas examined, violations or deviations were not identified
except as noted in paragraphs 2.a. and 2.e. above.
3.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 19,1989, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed
below.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
(0 pen) Severity Level IV Violation 50-338/89-18-01, Failure to Follow
Procedure for the Evaluation of Radiographs at Break Point 851 on the
Feedwater System, paragraph 2.a.
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(0 pen) Severity Level IV Violation 50-338/89-18 02, Fire Watch Asleep on
Duty. paragraph 2.e.
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