IR 05000338/1988027

Insp Repts 50-338/88-27 & 50-339/88-27 on 880820-0916.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status,Maint, Surveillance & Operational Safety Verification,Including Reviews of Backshift Operations

ML20205Q734
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	10/24/1988
From:	Caldwell J, Cantrell F, King L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205Q733	List: IR 05000338/1988027 ML20205Q729
References
50-338-88-27, 50-339-88-27, NUDOCS 8811090331
Download: ML20205Q734 (9)

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v UNITED STATES

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'. 'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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}' e HEGION ll 3,

• j 101 MARIETTA STREET, AT LANT A, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-338/88-27 ud 50-339/88-27 Licensee: Virginia Electric & Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Locket Hos.: 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos.: NPF-4 and NFF-7 Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: August 20 - September 16, 1988 Inspectors: '$ @ d L A //g / e /4'7/J6 f J. L. 'Caldwell, SRI '// p Dat6 Srigned L. P. King, RI

. $W8 W OkWT Y Date(Signed Approved by: .

F. Cantrell, Section Mh /M 9/r P Date Si'gned Division of leactor Pro ects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection by the resident inspectors involved the following areas: plant status, maintenance, surveillance, and operational safety verificatio During the performance of this inspection, the resident inspectors conducted reviews of the licensee's backshif t operations on the following days August 23, 25, 31, September 2, 12, and 1 Results: Within the areas inspected, there was ene licensee identified violation, one unresolved item, and one 'nspector followup ite (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) '438,339/88-27-01, Procedure change to require an operator to check op:n the inlet air louvers on the start of a emergency diesel generator. (paragraph 4)

(0 pen) Licensee Identified Violation (LIV) 338,339/88-27-02, Unlocked high radiation area doors. (paragraph 5)

(0 pen) Unresolved Iten (URI) 338,339/88-27-03, Two examples of loss c7 configuration control. (paragraph 5)

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• Bowling, Assistant Station Manager J. Downs, Superintendent, Administrative Services

• R. Driscoll, Quality Control Manager R. Enfinger, Assistant Station Manager

• G. Flowers, Supervisor, Surveillance & Test G. Gordon, Electrical Supervisor L. Hartz, Instr; ment Supervisor D. Heacock, Superintendent, Technical Services G. Kane, Station Manager

• Kansler, Superintendent, Maintenance

• P. Kemp, Licensing Coordinator

• J. Leberstein, Engineer, Licensing T. Porter, Superintendent, Engineering

• D. Quarz, Associate Engineer, Licensing

• J. Stall, Superintendent, Operations

• A. Stafford, Superintendent, Health Physics F. Terminella, Quality Assurance Supervisor D. Thomas, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne * Attended exit interview NRC Management Site Visit: F. Cantrell, Chief, Reactor Projects, Section 28, visited the site on August 22 to tour the facility and to discuss items of mutual interest with licensee managemen . Plant Status Unit 1 Unit 1 began and continued throughout the inspection period operating at l approximately 100 percent powe l Unit 2 l Unit 2 began and continued throughout the inspection period operating at approximately 100 percent power, i

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Both Units The licensee notified the inspectors that the Vice President of Nuclear Operations, D. Cruden, would be retiring, effective September 1,198 The inspectors were informed that the new Vice President of Nuclear Operations would be W. Robert Cartwright, who previously held the positien of Vice President, Fossil and Hydro for VEPC0. His old posit;on of Vice President, Fossil and Hydro will be filled with E. W. Harrell, former North Anna Station Manage . Maintenance (62703)

Station maintenance activities affecting safety related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technica~1 specification On September 7, 1988, the inspector reviewed the work being performed on 1-CC-P-1A, (unit 1A component cooling water pump) per maintenance procedure entitled Inspection and Repair of Safety Related Pumps in General. The motor was being 7.-ved to allow work on the inboard seal of the pump. The inspector did not identify any problem The inspector attended a mechanical maintenance meeting which was held on August 24. During the meeting the licensee discussed open safety related work orders. Approximately 20 work orders were identified as available to work. The mechanical department corrective maintenance backlog was identified to be 495 items with a goal of 250 at a steady state leve During the course of the meeting, the licensee changed several of the work orders to be worked only with the plant shutdown (e.g., Mode 5) in lieu of Mode The inspectors will continue to monitor work order reduction effort No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance (61726)

The inspectors observed / reviewed technical specificatiJn required testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met, and that any deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and resolve On August 24. the inspectors witnessed portions of the 1H emergency diesel generator (EDG) surveillance test. The test was being conducted per surveillance procedure 1-PT-82H, 1H Emergency Diesel Generator Slow Start Test Following Preplanned Preventative Maintenance. The inspector noted during the EDG operation that a great deal of smoke was coming from the _ _ _ . _ __ - - -

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exhaust manifold area of the ED The licensee informed the inspectors that this was due to lube oil which had leaked into the exhaust manifold

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prior to the star This problem of leaking lube oil into the exhaust header from the upper pistons had been experienced several times in the

past. In fact, the licensee had experienced fires on the diesels _due-to lube oil in the exhaust header. The licensee informed the inspectors that corrective actions including modifications to the diesel oil supply had been performed several years ago to prevent this problem. -One of the corrective actions involved rolling the diesel over several times with air  ;

after each diesel operation to remove any residual oil from the upper piston However, since the excessive smoke experienced during the last

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diesel operation and evidence of excessive oil getting into the other diesel _ exhaust headers, the licensee agreed to review the post roll procedure to see if it needs to be modified. The inspectors will continue '

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to monitor diesel operation Also during the diesel run, the inspector observed the operation of the f air inlet louvers behind the missile shield wall. These louvers open-under the differential pressure created by the diesel radiator fan to

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allow cooling air from outside into the diesel room to remove the heat

, from the jacket cooling water via the radiator This air is then ,

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i exhausted by the fan back to the outsid There are 12 sets of these j louvers. Each set of louvers consist of 7 slats which are tied together

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so that 2? differential pressure will open them uniformall The 1 inspector ' observed that one of the louver slats in one of the sets had '

become detached from the set and was lodged shut. The inspector notified the auxiliary operator in the diesel roon, and he dislodged the sla Since only one slat did not open, it had no effect on the operation of the EDG. The inspector requested the licensee submit a work order or ,

deficier.cy card on the louver slat so that its condition would be corrected. The inspector also requested the licensee add a step in the i EDG operating and test procedures to require the operator to check these l louvers each time the EDG is operated. This procedure change will be >

identified as Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 338, 339/88-27-0 l The inspectors witnessed the following surveillances

j August 28,1988 - 2-PT-23, Quadrt.nt Power Tilt Ratio;

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! September 13 - Unit 1, 1-PT-34.3, Unit 1 Turbine Valve Freedom Test;  ;

' September 13 - Unit 1, pT-71.1, Terry Turbine Auxiliary Feed Testi j September 1 - 2-PT-82H, Slow Start Test of 2H Emergency Diesel

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Generator; September 1 - 1-pT-63.1A, Quench Spray Pump 1A.

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4 During the performance of item c. above, the inspector noted that oil was misting from the forward labyrinth seal of. the pump aft bearing. The inspector also noted that there was.no positive means of determining oil flow to Leither the forward or af t pump bearings (e.g., there were no pressure gages or sight flow indicators). However, it appeared that plugs

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had been placed in the oil supply line where it . looked like pressure i gages had previously been installed. An inspection of the motor operated

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auxiliary feed pumps revealed that pressure gages with shutoff valves were installed in the oil supply line for these pump ,

Unit 2 auxiliary feedpumps were inspected and had the same configuration :

. as Unit 1. The inspector reviewec' the technical manual for the pump and

discovered a customer note that required 15 psi oil pressure at the inlet t a

to the bearings implying a reauirement for some means of measuring oil '

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pressur The inspector requested that the licensee investigate why 1 there was no positive means of determining oil pressure or flow to the ->

pump bearings. A review by the licensee showed that these gages did not 1 appear to have been on their instrument list. Also, the inspector was '

unable to determine when or if they had previously been _ removed. The ,

licensee has agreed to install oil- pressure gages at the inlet to the

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inboard and outboard beariigs and oil flow sight glasses in the return

line. A review of the last three surveillance tests (1-PT-71.1.1) showed that the bearing temperatures were within the acceptable range. The

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licensee agreed to take pyrometer readings on the bearings until the gages are installe '

No violations or deviations were identifie ,

Operational Safety Verification (71707) j By observations during the inspection peric I, the inspectors verified that the control room manning requirements evere being met, in addition, !

tne inspectors observed shift turnover tr /erify that continuity of system status was mainte.ined. The insper. ors periodically questioned !

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shift personnel relative to their awarmess of plant conditions, i Through log review and plant tours, :ac inspectors verified compliance L with selected technical specificatwn (TS) and limiting conditions for operation [

In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of r

! various shifts of the security force was observed in the ccnduct of daily [

j activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and ,

retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory post ,

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On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWP) were reviewed and the

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specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being

, conducted per the RWFs.

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The inspectors kept informed, on a daily basis, of overall status of both units and of any significant safety matter related to plant operation Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basis. Selected portions of operating logs and data sheets were reviewed dail The inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, and annunciator alarms; and housekeepin During a review of licensee deviation reports the inspectors became aware of two health physics events involving the discovery of high radiation areas (greater than 1000 mr/hr) access doors unlocke Deviation Report 88-691 identified that on August 21, the door to the "A" gas stripper which is normally locked, was discovered unlocked. Deviation Report 88-693 identified that on August 23 a high radiation area door in the decontamination building basement was discovered unlocked. The licensee informed the inspectors that a review of personnel who had access to these areas indicated that no one received an inadvertent exposure because of the doors being unlocked, in fact, a radiation survey of the "A" gas stripper room determined that the dose rate was less than 1000 mr/hr. The licensee locked both doors and on September 2, issued a memorandum from the Station Manager, to all station personnel describing the problems and the requirements for locking high radiation door The memorandum also listed the following three corrective actions in an attempt to prevent any further violations: Effective imediately, entrance to areas with radiation levels in excess of 1000 mrem /hr will require the use of the "buddy system" whereby a minimum of two qualified individua?s maintain continuous visual and/or verbal communication while in the area. Access control shall be established to prevent unauthorized entry and/or locking of personnel within the high radiation are Both employees shall independently verify the gate is properly closed and locked upon exiting the are Each high radiation area gate will be fitted with a unique key loc Keys to the locked barricades will continue to be under the administrative control of the Health Physics Shift Supervisor. The two (2) individuals responsible for the key must sign the issue for This action will assure accountability for each are Engineering has been requested to evaluate the installation of ,

automatic door closure devices, where appropriat I

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Based on the fact that the licensee identified the violation of .12.2, which requires locked doors for radiation areas greater than 1000 mr/hr, that the licensee took what appears to be adequate corrective action and that no one received an unplanned exposure due to the doors being unlocked, these two violations of TS 6.12.2, meet the criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, for licensee identified and will be listed as a

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Licensee Identified Violation (LIV) 338,339/88-27-0 On September 1, the licensee informed the inspectors that an inadvertent ,

dilution had occurred on Unit 2 that mornin The dilution was detected ;

by the control room operator when he noticed a slight increase in Tav The operator maintained the proper boron concentration in the plant by e adding boric acid when necessary. Consequently, Tave did not vary from program by more than 0.5 degrees The licensee determined that the dilution of the volume control tank (VCT)

was caused by primary grade (PG) water leaking past a PG flush isolation valve through the letdown radiation monitor into the VCT. When opened,

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this isolation valve (2-CH-77) allows PG to flush through the letdown ,

radiation monitor (2-RM-CH-228) into the VCT to allow a reduction in the t background radiation le'!el in and around the monitor. The licensee shut a l PG valve,1-PG-117, further upstream of the Unit 2 PG isolation valve 1 (2-CH-77) and stopped PG flo" into the VCT which secured the dilutio ;

Just prior to the dilution problem, the licensee had been flushing the l Unit I letdown radiation monitor per Operating Procedure 1-0P-6 '

During the performance of the OP, the operator discovered that 1-PG-117 discussed above was shut. This valve, 1-PG-117, is the upstream PG water supply to both Unit 1 and Unit 2 radiation monitor flush lines and per  :

1-0P-62.6 and the station drawings is required to be open. The operator, '

even though the procedure he was performing did not address the valve, .

l opened 1-PG-117 to allow flushing of the Unit 1 letdown radiation  !

monito Since the operator had reviewed the PG valve lineup procedure !

and drawings which required 1-PG-117 to be open, the operator left the  !

J valve in the open position following the completion of the flush. This ,

initiated the dilution of the Unit 2 VCT because 2-CH-77 leaked by, f

t At some point prior to this event, someone had identified that 2-CH-77 leaked by and shut 1-PG-117 to stop the valve from leaking PG water into

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the VCT. The licensee is still conducting an investigation to determine i 4 when and under what circumstances 1-PG-117 was originally shut to i compensate for the leak through 2-CH-77. Even though there is no i operational problem associated with 1-PG-117 being shut other than the ,

1 procedures do not address opening the valve, the operators should not have '

shut the valve without deviating the valve line-up procedure or by hanging

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, a tag on the valve to identify it being out of position. Not only was the

, valve positioned out of its normal position, but the person who identified

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that 2-CH-77 leaked by also did not initiate a work request to get the ,

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The inspector's review of the event identified several violations of'

. licensee procedures and a loss of configuration control on valve 1-PG-11 However, the dilution event itself was very minor because the PG water flow rate into the VCT was only approximately 12.5 gpm and the operator could easily compensate by the addition of boric acid as evidenced by only a slight variation of Tave (less than 0.5 degrees F). Since the licensee still has not determined when the valve 2-CH-77 was identified to be leaking by the seat or how many times 1-PG-117 has been manupulated without being identified as out of position, this item will be identified as an Unresolved Itrm (URI) 338,339/88-27-0 Also during a review of deviation reports, the inspectors discovered another configuration control problem, associated with a boric acid storage tank sample valve which was found out of position. The Deviation Report 88-698 indicated that on August 8, the licensee discovered the "A" boric acid sample valve open, and the sample sink overflowing onto the auxiliary building floo The licensee shut the valve and has to this point been unable to determine the reason the valve was left open. This item will be identified as part of the previous unresolved item (338, 339/88-27-03) for loss of configuration control and violation of procedere pending further licensee revie The licensee informed the inspectors that in July 1988, Quality Control (QC) inspectors had identified several purchase nrders from Nelson Electric Company that were in non-conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and 10 CFR 21. The equipment obtained under these purchase orders was associated with the TS heat trace systems and was originally required to be safety-related, Class 1- Subsequent to the discovery, the licensee's Quality Assurance (QA)

Department conducted an audit of the Nelson Electric QA program and identified 14 finding As a result of the audit, the licensee determined that Nelson Electric had not effectively implemented the requirements of their QA manual and had not implemented a QA program that meet the requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and 10 CFR 21. Also, the licensee has removed Nelson Electric from their approved safety-related vendors list for safety-related material until such time that corrective actions have been properly implemente On August 8, a Justifiution for Continued Operation (JCO) was written by the licensee which made a determination, based on a review of IEEE Standard 622-1979, IEEE Recomended Practices for the Design and Installation of Electrical Pipe Heating Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, that the electrical heat trace system be downgraded to a non-safety status. The JC0 cnneluded that the North Anna heat trace system met all of the requirements of the IEEE standard and based on a rev'ew of the TS, FSAR and the performance of a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation, was acceptable to be downgraded to non-safety related. This

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l JCO, the 10 CFR 21 letter, and the licensee's QA audit report have been transmitted to the Region for further review. Based on the inspector's review, pending any problems discovered by the Region, the inspectors consider the JC0 acceptabl No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 16, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed belo The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee, item Number Description and Reference 338,339/88-27-01 Inspector Followup Item (IFI) - Require the operator

> to check open the inlet louvers on start of an emergency diesel generator 138,339/88-27-02 Licensee Identified Violation (LIV) - Unlocked high radiation area doors 338,339/88-27-03 Unresolved item (URI) - Two examples of loss of configuration control

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