IR 05000338/1985026
| ML20205F354 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1985 |
| From: | Branch M, Elrod S, Luehman J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205F345 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-85-26, 50-339-85-26, NUDOCS 8511050332 | |
| Download: ML20205F354 (10) | |
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[j'A Rtog UNITED STATES D
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
- e ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-338/85-26 and 50-339/85-26 Licensee:
Virginia Electric & Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339 Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: Sep ember 2 - October 6, 1985
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Inspectors:
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[W f M. W Bra h SRI)
Date Signed
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J. 'G.' uehinan I)
Date Signed Approved by:
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T' rod, Section Chief Date Signed
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Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection by the resident inspectors involved 187 inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee event report (LER), engineered safety features (ESF) walkdown, operational safety verification, monthly mainten-ance, monthly surveillance, spent fuel pool (SFP) reracking, preparations for refueling, and license condition verification.
Results: One violation was identified: failure to comply with the requirements of-TS 6.8.1 (Procedures), paragraph 12.
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8511050332 851025 PDR ADOCK 05000338 G
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Licensee Employees Contacted
- E. W. Harrell, Station Manager G. E. Kane, Assistant Station Manager
- E. R. Smith, Assistant Station Manager.
- R. O. Enfinger, Superintendent, Operations J. R. Harper, Superintendent, Maintenance A. H. Stafford, Superintendent, Health Physics
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- J. A. Stall, Superintendent, Technical Services G. J. Paxton, Supervisor,. Administrative Services J. R. Hayes, Operations Coordinator J. P.. Smith, Engineering Supervisor D. E. _ Thomas, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor E. C. Tuttle, Electrical Supervisor R. A. Bergquist, Instrument Supervisor
- D.' B. Roth, QA Manager R. S. Thomas, Supervisor Engineering G. H. Flowers, Nuclear Specialist
- J. H. Leberstein, Licensing Coordinator
- G. L. Pannell, Supervisor, Licensing
- J. B. Logan, Licensing, Surry
- L. Hartz, Engineering Supervisor
- D. W. Roberts, Shift Technical Advisor Other licensee employees contacted include technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 9,1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors findings.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
'4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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5.
Plant Status
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Unit 1 On September'11,1985 the main generator was taken off.the line and the reactor shutdown in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) require-ments for high identified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage.
After repairs were made, licensee personnel attempted to take the reactor critical twice on September 13, 1985.
In both instances it appeared that criticality was going to be reached below the lower boundary of the licensee's estimated critical position (ECP) calculation. During the period in which resolution of the ECP problems was being pursued, problems were encountered with maintaining main condenser vacuum which delayed the subsequent startup.
On September 16, 1985, with the condenser vacuum restored and the problems with the ECP calculations apparently resolved, licensee personnel again attempted to take the reactor critical two more times and in both cases criticality would have again been achieved below the ECP limits. After extensive evaluation, the licensee identified a number of ECP procedural-problems that explained why the actual critical position, was consisteatly below the calculated ECP. With these problems corrected the reactor was taken critical at 4:44 a.m.
on September 17, 1985.
At 10:17 a.m. on the same day the plant was placed on the line and stabilized at about 15 percent power. Because of a problem in the Rod Control System the two groups of rods in Control Bank D became misaligned.
While attempting to re-align the two groups of rods, the Group 1 rods dropped to the fully inserted position and the control room operator initiated a manual reactor / turbine trip. (The details of this event are discussed further in paragraph 13 of this report.)
On September 17, 1985 at.8:14 p.m. licensee personnel once again took the reactor critical and the main generator was subsequently placed on the line.
At 7:16 a.m. on September 18, 1985 the IJ Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
was taken out-of-service for maintenance.
The licensee entered the TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) at that time. While performing the
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post-maintenance operability run that night, the EDG tripped on high crankcase pressure.
The EDG vendor was called in and repairs were commenced. A power reduction was commenced on the morning of September 21, and the reactor was later placed in cold shutdown as required by TS when post-maintenance operability testing could not be completed within the specified time period. The problem was determined to be a cracked liner on the #10 cylinder. Additionally, the bolts that hold the cylinder liners in place were found to be loose in a number of cylinders. On recommendation from the vendor all the pistons on the EDG were replaced while the engine was apart to correct the above mentioned problems.
(The pistons were already scheduled to be replaced during the' upcoming refueling outage.)
On September 30, 1985, with the unit at 100 percent power, the TS action statement for high RCS leakage was again entered. At 3:30 p.m. on that date a power reduction was initiated.
The reactor entered Mode 3 at 8:43 p.m.
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and Mode 4 at 6:15 a.m. on October 1.
The major sources of the leakage were identified as Motor Operated Valves 1700, 1585, and 1587.
After repairs i-i
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were completed, a startup was commenced. The reactor was taken critical at 6:59 a.m. October 2, 1985, the main generator was placed on the line at 2:29 p.m. on the same day, and full power was reach on the morning of October 3.
Unit 2-The unit was operated at or near 100% during the entire inspectior period.
6.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Follow-Up The following LERs were reviewed and closed.
The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met; causes had been identified; corrective actions appeared appropriate; that generic applicability had been con-sidered; and that the LER forms were complete. Additionally, the inspectors confirmed that no unreviewed safety questions were involved and that violations of regulations or TS conditions had been identified.
(CLOSED) LER 338/83-61 REV 0, 1, 2, 3 - High Head Safety Injection (HHSI)
Pump Out of Service Due to High Vibration. The licensee has completed the changeout of the pump shafts as committed to in the report.. The Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00) is evaluating possible generic implications of the peening methods described in the report.
(CLOSED) LER 338/85-12-Main Steamline Radiation Monitor Out of Service More Than 72 Hours. The inspectors discussed this event with licensee manage-ment.
Even though the TS was not exceeded, entering an Action Statement merely because some electrical danger tags, which could have been cleared, were not shows poor attention to detail on the part of the shift supervisor
.or the supervisor in charge of completing the work.
(CLOSED) LER 338/85-09 Seismic 4 Response Equipment Test Failures.
(CLOSED) LER 339/85-09 Late For.nal Notification of License Condition
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Completion.
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(CLOSED) LER 338/85-16-Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications Due to High RCS Identified Leakage Rate.
The specific problem the inspectors identified during this event is discussed in paragraph 12 of this report.
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Follow-up of Previously Identified Items
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Not inspected.
8.
Monthly Maintenance Station maintenance activities affecting safety related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with TS. In addition to the activities discussed in paragraphs 12 and 13, the inspectors observed C
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portions-of the repair work on the 1J EDG as well as replacement of the pump seal for outside recirculation spray pump 1-RS-P-2B (MR-029491).
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Monthly Surveillance The inspectors observed / reviewed TS required testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that LCO were met and that any deficiencies
. identified were properly reviewed and resolved.
Include.d in this month's observations was the. performance of 1-PT-82A-1H Diesel Generator Test.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
ESF System Walkdown The following selected ESF systems were verified operable by performing a walkdown of the accassible and essential portions of the systems on October 2, 1985:
Unit 1 Quench Spray (1-0P-7.4A dated September 9, 1985)
Unit-2-Quench Spray (2-0P-7.4A dated July 10, 1985)
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Routine Inspection By observations during the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the control room manning reauirements were being met.
In addition, the inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system status was maintained.
The inspectors periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions.
Through log review and plant tours, the inspectors verified compliance with
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selected TS and LCO.
During the course of the inspection, observations relative to Protected and Vital Area security were made, including access centrols, boundary integ-rity, search, escort and badgiag.
On a regular basis, radiatior work peimits (RWP) were reviewed and the specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being conducted per the RWPs.
Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency was verified.
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The inspectors kept informed, on a daily basis, of overall status of both units and of significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basis.
Selected portions of operating logs and data sheets were reviewed daily.
The inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the Control Room.
Observations included: witnessing work activities.in progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, annuciator alarms, and housekeeping.
12.
Failure to comply with the requirements of TS 6.8.1 (Procedures)
The two examples listed below are items found during the routine inspecton and are grouped together as they both represent a failure to comply with the procedure requirements described in section 6.8.1 of the North Anna Unit 1 TS.
a.
Repairs to Motor Operated Valve (MOV) 1586 (8" Loop Stop Bypass Valve)
On September 11, 1985, Unit I was shutdown to hot standby conditions-due to high identified leakage greater than 10 GPM from the packing of MOV 1586. During repairs to the valve packing, the inspectors made the following observations and identified the following concerns:
The packing leakage was ultimately isolated by energizing the motor and opening the valve to the " Backseat" position.
The valve supplier,
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Rockwell Edward Engineering, provided in their general valve manual a statement to the effect that, " integral backseats provide positive isolation of packing from flow area and permits repacking under pressure".
In this case, the only barrier between the mechanics and
'the' 2235 psig - 547F reactor coolant system was the valve backseat of an energized valve that was not tagged in a required position.
Although repacking a valve on it's backseat is an industry accepted practice, the adverse consequences of a failure prompt the inspectors
.to question the practice of repacking a non-isolable valve during mode 3 conditions relying only on the valve backseat.
The inspectors also questioned licensee personnel as to why valve repacking was being performed without utilizing the tagging require-ments of Station Administrative Procedure ADM-14.0, " Tagging of Systems and/or Components".
Specifically, ADM-14.0, dated 03-31-83, states that tagging of equipment of the power station shall adhere to the policies stated in the Company Accident Prevention Manual, section III.
The Accident Prevention Manual requires in section III, that Mechanical Danger Tags shall be used in all cases where mechanical equipment or piping is removed from service for the purpose of working thereon or where the operation of such equipment could cause injury or property
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damage.
Additionally, the manual requires that when electrical switches or fuses are involved with the mechanical equipment being taken.out of service for work thereon, the Danger Hold (Electric-Red)
Tag shall be attached to the switches or fuse holders. The mechanical maintenance Procedure MMP-C-GV-1 being utilized for repairs per Work Order 5900029683 was marked as N/A for tagging requirements.
A similar comment on tagging requirements was made during the emergency exercise and is documented in inspection report 338, 339/84-42.
This failure to comply with the requirements of ADM 14.0 is the first example of a violation of TS 6.8.1 b.
Operation of The Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) System.
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During a routine plant tour on September 15, 1985, the inspector noted that the suction piping to all three AFW Pumps was very hot to -the touch. The system was aligned so that the 3B AFW pump was running per Abnormal Procedure (AP) 1-AP-22.3 and was feeding all three steam generators (SG) via the MOV header. The AFW system was being used to supply SG feed water because on September 13, 1985, while in Mode 3, the main condenser boot failed resulting in a loss of vacuum and necessitating isolation of normal feed. The 3B AFW pump was supplying very little water to the three SGs, approximately 50 GPM total, with the remainder of the water being recirculated back to the storage tank through the recirculation line.
This lineup, combined with hot (approximately 150F) tank makeup from the flash evaporator and with some return water frem the auxiliary steam drain receiver, resulted in the tank water being heated to approximately 132F. All three AFW pumps which draw suction from this tank were declared inoperable due to the
'FSAR safety analysis limiting the pump inlet temperature to 120F maximum. An additional concern was that the pump lube-oil cooler is cooled by pump discharge water. After being notified by the inspector, the plant entered the action of TS 3.7.1.2 and immediately started actions to cool down the tank by sluicing water from the 300,000 gallon condensate storage tank as well as only intermittently running the AFW pump.
The lineup described above is not the normal system lineup and should not exist during conditions for which the system was originally designed.
The licensee has committed to modify the existing plant procedures to requi-e monitoring tank temperature during abnormal system alignment as well as monitoring tank makeup water temperature.
This failure to provide adequate instructions or precautions in the abnor' mal operating procedures is the second example of failure to comply with the requirements of TS 6.8.1 which requires procedures be established implemented and maintained for activities decribed in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.
-The violations described above are identified as 338/85-26-0.
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13.
Unit 1 Rod Control System On September 17, 1985 North Anna Unit I was manually tripped from about 15 percent power after Control Bank D Group 1 rods dropped to the bottom of the core.
Prior to the trip, Unit I was stabilized at about 15 per cent power to level the two groups of rods in Control Bank D which had become mis-aligned during startup. The licensee was attempting to level the two groups of rods by opening the lift coil disconnects for the Group 1 rods and then attempting to drive Group 2 down to the same height as Group 1.
When the control room operator started to drive the Group 2 rods in, the Group 1 rods dropped. A manual reactor trip was initiated by the control room operator.
The licensee determined that the negative flux rate trip was not received because of the reactor's low power level and the core positions of the dropped rods (indicated reactor power dropped only about 1.5 percent due to the dropped group of rods.)
Subsequently, the licensee determined that the event was caused by a defective alarm circuitry card in the Rod Control System power cabinet (described in Westinghouse Full Length Rod Control System-North Anna Units 1 and 2-Volume 3).
Further troubleshooting revealed that the same card in two of the other three power cabinets for Unit 1 were also defective.
The licensee and the vendor are evaluating the failures and their causes.
The alarm circuitry cards perform two functions that relate to this event.
First, they generate the Urgent Failure alarm that is normally received when trying to move rods that have their -lift coil disconnects open. Second, the cards control the application of current to the stationary and movable gripper coils that " lock up" the rods upon receipt of an Urgent Failure alarm.
Apparently, the card in this case was operating erratically, not providing signals to the movable and stationary gripper coils simultane-ously, thus allowing the rods to drop.
Two areas are presently being examined to explain the card failures:
1.
When the unit is shutdown, the Rod Control System is usually left energized in such a condition that an Urgent Failure alarm signal is always present and consequently the alarm circuitry cards are being kept continually energized. It has been suggested that constant use of this circuitry may be a contributor to the failures and the licensee is
.considering deenergizing the whole system during extended shutdowns.
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High temperatures have frequently been experienced in the area in which the Rod Control System cabinets for Unit 1 are located. The Unit 1 Rod Control System has experienced other problems. Prior to this event the licensee had a number of problems with the firing cards in the power cabinets and since the event a signal processor card has failed.
Exposure to high temperatures was a common factor and its effects appear to be worth evaluatin __
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In the past, in an effort to keep the temperatures in the area of the Rod Control System cabinets down, the licensee has opened the cabinet doors and cooled the insides directly with large floor fans. Though the fans help provide reduced temperatures, they do little to reduce the humidity. The available vendor's technical information provides 70 per cent humidity as a recommended maximum.
Without an air conditioning system, a humidity factor that low would be hard to achieve during the summer at North Anna. Additionally, the dust and dirt that the fans blow into the cabinets could also be a problem as the room directly accesses the outside.
In summa ry, a number of circuitry card failures have occurred in the North Anna Unit 1 Rod
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Control System-some resulting in events such as a dropped croup of rods.
The licensee is evaluating the problems with possible similar problems on Unit 2 as a concern.
The followup of the above items-is identified as IFI 338, 339/85-26-02.
14. Spent Fuel Storage Racks (50095)
During - this inspection period, the licensee completed most of the work associated with the replacement of the storage racks in the spent fuel pool.
The inspectors witnessed part of the disassembly and removal of the tem-porary fuel building crane, including associated decontamination activities.
Work in the area of the spent fuel pool continues but is now limited to removal of equipment, decontamination activities and housekeeping activities such as painting.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15.
Preparation for Refueling (60705)
On a number of occasions during the weeks of September 9,16, and 30,1985, the inspectors witnessed the receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel assemblies to be used in the upcoming Unit 1 and 2 refuelings. In one case the new fuel receipt inspection witnessed included two assemblies that arrived in a container with a tripped accelerometer.
In that instance, the
. inspectors witnessed the additional inspection done by the licensee and vendor personnel to ensure no damage had been done to the assemblies. On another occasion, while the inspectors were observing new fuel receipt, the vendor's operator controlling the fuel building bridge lowered an assembly for inspection from such a position that he was not looking at the assembly and had a very poor view of the bridge load cell.
The senior vendor representative present instructed the operator on proper operations of the bridge but this was after the operator had moved the assembly. The inspec-tors brought this poor operating practice to the attention of the licensee's operations staff who informed the vendor that future instances of such practices would not be tolerated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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16. Unit 2 License Conditions (CLOSED) 2.c(18); Demonstrate that examination techniques provide a reliable means of detection and evaluation of individual reactor nozzle clad cracks.
LER 339/85-09, which is closed in paragraph 6 of this report, outlines the licensee's actions on this lice.,se condition.
17.
Station Emergency Plan While observing the licensee's response to multiple ventilation radiation monitor alarms on the afternoon of October 4, 1985 the inspectors recognized an inconsistency between the count rate levels for initiating a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) in the North Anna Emergency Plan and the Abnormal Procedures (in this case 1-AP-5.2).
The problem is similar to those discussed in the beginning of paragraph 15 of inspection reports 338 and 339/85-18.
Licensee Operations and Health Physics personnel informed the inspectors that the inconsistenc1;s have been recognized and that the Abnormal Procedures are being changed to be consistent with the Emergency Plan.
This item will be tracked as part of items 338 and 339/85-18-03.
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