ML20151W762

Insp Repts 50-338/88-18 & 50-339/88-18 on 880606-10. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:External Exposure Control & Assessment,Control of Radioactive Matls, Contamination,Surveys & Monitoring & Solid Waste

ML20151W762
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	08/09/1988
From:	Hosey C, Shortridge R, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151W728	List: ML20151W724 ML20151W736 ML20151W762
References
50-338-88-18, 50-339-88-18, NUDOCS 8808250123
Download: ML20151W762 (13)

See also: IR 05000338/1988018

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UNIT ED ST ATES

,,[>R KiTug'D o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION it

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101 MARIETTA GTREET, N.W.

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Report Nos.: 50-338/88-18 and 50-339/88-18

Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company

Richmond, VA 23261

Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos.: HPF-4 and NPF-7

Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: June 6-10, 1988

Inspectors: 4 8 ("N

F. N. Wrifht' Date Signed

f&Shnrtridge 44A- '

t/sler

Date Signed

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Approved by: ,/ . M Date Signed

C. M. Hosey,' Sectiot Chief

Division of Radiaticni Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope: -This routine, unannounced inspection involved onsite Mspection in the

area of radiation protection and included: external exposure control and and

dosimetry; internal exposure control and assessment; control of radioactive

materials; contamination, surveys and monitoring; solid waste, transportation

of radioactive materials and training and qualifications.

Results: Based on the results of interviews with licensee management,

supervision, and personnel from different departments; review of records and

pertinent health physics data; inspector surveys sind health physics personnel's

knowledge of functions and responsibilities regarding department operations,

the inspectors found the Radiation Protection to be fuactioning adequately.

However, weaknesses were found in the radiation monitoring program for

equipment leaving the RCA and the release of eouipment for uncontrolled use,

Paragraph 5.a.

Within the areas inspected, the following violations were identified:

- Failure to perform adequate radiation surveys for contamination,

Paragraph 5.a.

- with requirements for entries into a high

Failure

radiationofarea, personnel to comply

Paragraph 3.b (licensee identified).

8808250123 000010 8

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REPORT CETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted ,

Licensee Employees  ;

• M. L. Bowling, Assistant Station Manager, Nuclear-Safety and Licensing

E. W. Dreyer, Supervisor, Healt', Physics

• R. F. Driscoll, Manager, Quality Assurance

• R. O. Enfinger, Assistant hatton Manager, Operations and Maintenance

• D. A. Heacock, Supervisor, Technical Services

R. R. Irwin, Supervisor, Health Physics

• M. R. Kansler, Superintendent, Maintenance

T. Peters, Assistant Supervisor, Health Physics

• J. H.-Leberstien, Engineer, Licensing

• T. L. Porter, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing

• D. E. Quarz, Associate Engineer  !

• A. H. Stafford, Superintendent, Health Physics  :

• J. A. Stall, Superintendent, Operations

• F. L. Thomasson, Supervisor, Corporate Health Physics

• W. A. Thornton, Director, Corporate Health Physics and Chemistry

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included

engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and -

administrative personnel.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• J. Caldwell, Senior Resident Inspector

L. King, Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview

2. Training and Qualification (83723)

The licensee was required by 10 CFR 19 to provide basic radiation

protection training to workers. Technical Specification (T.S.) 6.4 and

Regulatory Guides 8.13, 8.27, and 8.29 outline topics that should be

included in such training,

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a. General Employee Training

The ins 9ector reviewed quality assurance audit N-87-14 for

The audit found

non-lice.nsed personnel

that General Employee training (and qualification.GET) was administered in a

Training -

with station administrative procedure 2.3 for non-licensed personnel. ,

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No violations or deviations were identified. l

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b. Health Physic Site and Contract Technicians

To increase awareness and depth of training, a three hour course on

hot particle monitoring and control was provided to all health

physics technicians. The training included instruction on evaluation

of hot particles, contamination posting and access controls,

radiologically controlled areas and hot particles, contamination

surveys, considerations for radiation work permits, use of controls

for protective clothing, and personnel contamination monitoring and

dose assessments. In addition, a practical factors training session

was given using radioactive sources of various beta energies to

demonstrate the effects on different instrument types, shielding

material, speed of frisking, and distance of hot particles from the i

detector. Also, the problems associated with personnel hot particle

contamination and monitoring a smear from a contaminated hot particle

area were evaluated. The inspector noted that lesson plans and job

performance measures were changed to reflect the most current hot

particle detection instruction.

In addition to the HP technician specialized training, all station '

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personnel were given a one hour training session on personnel

contamination and hot particle awareness.

No violations or deviations were identified.

c. Continuing Training

-The inspector discussed continuing training with licensee

representatives. As a followup corrective action to a hot particle

skin contamination, the licensee was providing training to laundry

operators on the new automated laundry monitor. Sixteen laundry

operators were given a three day training course on new contamination ,

limits for protective clothing, precautions associated with ,

laundering and frisking protective clothing, and hot particle

contamination detection. The training session included a practical

factors session where each student operated the laundry monitor and

used a radioactive source to display the different alarm functions of

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the monitor. The inspector observed the practical factors

demonstration and noted that the material content of the session and

instruction was satisfactory.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. External Occupational Exposure Control and Dosimetry (83724)

a. Personnel Monitoring

10 CFR 20.202 requires each licensee to suoply appropriate personnel

monitoring equipment to specific individuals and require the use of '

such equipment. The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for

issuance, control and calibration of self reading dosimeters (SR0s).

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The inspector verified that the licensee drift tested and response

checked SRDs. The inspector toured the licensee's calibration

facility where SRDs were response checked. The inspector verified

that the licensee had sources and detectors (condenser R meters) that

were traceable to the National Bureau of Standards (NBS). The

inspector reviewed serial numbers and certification papers for the

standards. The licensee response checks and drift tests two batches

of SRDs which replace each other on a semi annual basis. The

inspector noted that the licensee utilized one source for response

checks of dosimeters, TLDs, and most instruments. The SRD response

calibration sheets did not have the source serial numbers recorded.

The inspector discussed the traceability of the response process and

the licensee agreed to document the source serial numbers on the SRD

response documents.

The inspettor also reviewed tl+ licensee's control procedures for

SRDs. The licensee issues SRDs to individuals entering the RCA. The

individual's Radiation Work Permit (RWP) number, SRD identification

number, and SRD reading are tracked by a computer program. Upon

exiting the RCA and a particular RWP, the licensee surveys the SRD

and records the reading in the computer. The SRD data is used to

track an individual's exposure - during each ~LD assignment. The

inspector discussed the licensee's procedure for lost SRDs. If an

individual loses a SRD, the ind;vidual's TLD is processed. This is

also done if a SRD is turned in off scale to determine current

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personnel exposure. The inspector determined that SRDs found in the

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RCA or SRDs known to have been dropped or turned in off scale were

surveyed and drift tested. The inspector discussed the need to

verify that the SRD that may have Seen damaged were response checked '

prior to reissuance. Licensee representatives agreed that

potentially dt.Kufed SRDs should receive a response check prior to

issuance to ensure proper operability. The it.:pector stated that SRD

response check criteria would be reviewed during a subsequent

inspection and would be tracked as inspector Followup Item

(IFI) 50-338/88-18-01.

The licensee has a TLD program that has been accredited by NAVLAP and

is approved until October 1, 1988. Tha licensee had recently

completed the dosimetry testing portion for recertification and the

inspector reviewed the results of the test. The licensee's TLD

program is certified in categories II, IV, V, VII and the licensee

had passed in all categories on the recertification test. The

inLpector also determined that the plant participates in a

performance test of the TLD program conducted by the corporate office

twice a year. The inspector determined that the licensee had also

passed the corporate sponsored TLD test.

No vitiations or deviations were identified. ,

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b. Control of Radiological Areas

10 CFR 2.203 specifies posting, labeling and control requirements for

radiation areas, high radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas

and radioactive material areas.

T.S. 6.12.1 requires that in lieu of the "control device" or "alann

signal" required by Paragraph 20.203(c)(2) of 10 CFR 20, each high

radiation area in which the intensity of radiation is greater than

100 mrem /hr but less than 1,000 mrem /hr shall be barricaded and

conspicuously posted as a high radiation area and entrance thereto

shall be controlled by requiring issuance of a RWP. Any individua'.

or group of individuals permitted to enter such areas shall be

provided with or accompanied by one or more of the following:

(1) A radiation monitoring device which continuously indicates the

radiation dose rate in the area.

(2) A radiation monitoring device which continuously integrates the

radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a preset

integrated dose is received. Entry into such areas with this

monitoring device may be made after the dose rate level in the

area has been established and personnel have been made

knowledgeable of them.

(3) An individual qualified in radiation protection procedures who

is equipped with a radiation dose rate monitoring device. This

individual shall be responsible for providing positive control

over the activities within the area and shall perform periodic

radiation surveillance at the frequency specified by the

facility Health Physicist (HP) in the RWP.

T.S. 6.12.2 requires the areas having a dose rate in excess of

1,000 mr/hr be locked to prevent unauthorized entry in addition to

the requirements of T.S. 6.12.1.

Inspection Report Nos. 50-338/88-02 and 50-339/88-02 identified an

Unresolved item regarding a number of events of personnel

noncompliance with T.S. 6.~J. The licensee reported 12 separate

events of personnel entering high radiation areas without required

monitoring devices and/or job coverage by a health physics

technician. Prior to identificatior, of this item by the NRC, the

licensee, on January 4,1988, required each station department head

to provide a specific department action plan to improve personnel

performance in RWP compliance. Access to the high radiation areas

were administratively controlled by issuance of an RWP. The

inspector reviewed the action plans and noted that implementation of

the action plans began in January 1988. In discussions with health

physics supervision and technicians, the inspector verified that no

recurrence of failure to comply with high radiation area entry

requirements have occurred since implementation of the corrective

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actions. Failure of perscanel to wear the monitoring devices '

specified in T.S. 6.12 or to be accompanied by a qualified HP

technician was identified as an apparent violation of T.S. 6.12.

However, it was determined that the violation met this criteria

outlined in the NRC Enforcement Policy,10 CFR 2, Appendix C and

would be considered licensee identified (50-338,339/88-18-05).

During tours of the radwaste and reactor auxiliary building, the

inspector verified that areas were properly posteo.

4. Internal Exposure Control and Assessment (83725)

a. Engineering Controls

10 CFR 20.103(b)(1) requires that the licensee use process or other

engineering controls, to the extent practicable, to limit

concentrations of radioactive materials in the air to levels below

those which delimit an airborne radioactivity area as defined in

10.203(d)(1)(ii).

During plant tours, the inspector observed various engineering

controls to limit the concentrations of airborne material. These

included the use of ventilation systems equipped with high efficiency

filters and containment enclosures.

No violations or deviations were identified,

b. Respiratory Protection

The licensee was required by 10 CFR 20.103, 20.201(b), 20.401, and

20.403 to control intakes of radioactive material, assess such

intakes, and keep records of and make reports of such intakes.

The inspector verified that the licensee issues respirators for use

after verifying the users training and qualifications for the type of

respirator issued, the date of last annual medical review, the users

respirator fit testing date, and the users total maximum permissible

concentration-hours in the last seven days. The licensee hand washes

each respirator after use and verifies that there is no smearable

radioactive contamination on the respirator and there is also no

fixed radioactive material greater than 0.2 mr/hr. The inspector

determined that persons authorized to repair respirator equipment, '

such as air regulators, were trained and qualified. The inspector

toured the respirator issuance and repair areas and determined that

respirators needing repair were separated from those stored for

issue.

The licensee does not have a separate plant breathing air system for

use with supplied air respirators. The licensee has used supplied

air hoods with breathing air supplied by a vendor on site from a

compressor and air tube trailer, for work on steam generators. The

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vendors procedures for the setup and operation of the breathing air

system require that the breathing air meet Grade D breathing air and

conform with the Coirpressed Gas Association Specification G-7.1 for

Type 1, Class D gaseous air. The vendors procedure describes how the

diesel air compressor and backup tube trailer are operated. The

procedure also requires that the supplied air system be monitored at

all times while the system is in use; however, the detection of

carbon monoxide entering the air s'ystem is the only air quality

parameter addressed in the procedure.

The inspector reviewed a memorandum dated March 21, 1988, from the

Director of Corporate Health Physics to the licensee's purchasing

organization. The memorandum requested the certification records of

breathing air quality be supplied whenever a comprt sor for breathing

air or breathing air in cylinders were supplied to the station.

Since the licensee's vendor did not have the breathing air

certification onsite, the inspector was unable to verify that the air

used for supplied air hoods met the requirements for Grade D

breathing 41r. A review of breathing air quality certifications to

be supnl4ed by the vendor, will be examined in subsequent inspections

and is tracked as IFI 50-338/88-18-02. The inspector verified that

the pressure gauges utilized on air distribution systems for

breathing air were calibrated and treated as measuring and test

equipment.

No violations or deviations were identified,

c. Irternal Assessment

The inspector reviewed licensee procedure Whole Body Counter

Calibration-Bed /ND6620, dated October 1, 1985. The inspector

reviewed the latest calibration records. The inspector verified that

the whole body counter had been properly calibrated in accordance

with licensee procedures and reviewed the licensee's source data.

The inspector determined that two individuals had been exposed to

more than 2 MPC-hours in one day but that no individual had been

exposed to 10 MPC-hours in any seven (7) days.

No violations or deviations were identified.

. 5. Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination; Surveys and Monitoring

(83726)

a. Surveys

During plant tours, the inspector examined radiation levels outside

selected rooms and cubicles in the auxiliary building. The inspector

performed independent radiation level surveys and compared the

results with licensee survey results. The inspector's survey

readings were comparable to the licensee survey results.

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10 CFR 20.201(b) requires each licensee to make or cause to be made

such surveys as: (1) may be necessary for the licensee to comply

with the regulations in 10 CFR Part 20; and (2) are reasonable under

the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation hazards that

may be present.

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T.S. 6.8.1 requires written procedures to be established, implemented,

and maintained covering the activities reconnended in Appendix A of

Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Regulatory

Guide 1.33, Appendix A of 1978, requires written procedures for

contamination control.

Licensee procedure HP.8.0.40, Contamination Surveys, requires that

loose surface contamination on items to be released for unrestricted

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use be less than 1,000 dpm beta gamma activity and less than 20 dpm

alpha measured on a dry smear wiped over 100 centimeters square (cmr )

of a respective portion of the item's surface. The procedure also

requires that total contamination on any item (fixed plus removable

contamination ) be less than 5,000 dpm/100 cm2 and that the highest

radiation level shall not exceed 100 counts per minute above

background measured with a thin window GM detector (HP-210 or

equivalentdetectorprobe).

The information below was developed through review of records and

discussions with licensee representatives. -

On September 28, 1987, the licensee surveyed items / boxes of tools and

cutting equipment for release and shipment to the equipment's owner.

No survey record for the equipment could be produced by the licensee.

The equipment was transferred by the licensee to the owner's

warehouse in Fredericksburg, Virginia. A box of equipment containing

Flange Facing Tools was subsequently shipped by the equipment owner

to Farley Nuclear Plant via the owner's warehouse in Atlanta,

Georgia, on October 12, 1987. The tools, a Flange Facer Arm, Drive

Motor Assembly, and a Hand Lathe Stop were backup tools for turbine .

generator work at Farley and were never used. On October 18, 1987, [

the equipment was surveyed for shipment at Farley and loose surface l '

contamination up to 2,317 dpm/100 cm2 and up to 25,000 dpm/ scan of

fixed contamination was found. On October 20, 1987, the owner's

warehouse in Atlanta was surveyed by the State of Georgia and found ,

free of contamination. On October 22, 1987, the equipment owner had

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a survey performed at the Fredericksburg, Virginia warehouse and

found 3 of 17 boxes of equipment shipped from North Anna contaminated

with up to 2,390 dpm/100 cm r removable and 5,000 dpm fixed

contamination. The three boxes of equipment were shipped as

radioactive, low specific activity, to North Anna for further

evaluation and possible decontamination. The office and warehouse l

areas were also surveyed and detennined to be free of contamination. '

Upon notification of the event by Farley plant personnel, the [

licensee requested Farley Nuclear Plant to ship the subject box of 1

contaminated tools back for further evaluation and possible t

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decontamination. The licensee listed possible causes for the

incident: (1) a thorough enough survey was not performed or the

relatively high background at the friskin cpm) may

have been a contributing factor, or (2)gthe location (250-300

equipment was not

surveyed at all due to a misunderstanding during a turnover of

technicians surveying equipment for unrestricted release. If the

survey was performed, no written documentation of the survey was

maintained, nor was it required by the licensee's procedures.

Failure to adequately survey material being released for unrestricted

use, was identified as an apparent violation of 10 CFR 20.201(b) and

T.S.6.8.1(50-338/88-18-03,50-339/88-18-03).

b. Area and Personnel Contamination

The inspector reviewed the records for personnel contaminations in

1987, and for the first half of 1988. The licensee had

1,531 personnel contamination events in 1987, and 151 for the first

half of 1988. The licensee radiologically controlled 105,400 ft.2 of

area that included the reactor auxiliary building, fuel, safeguards,

decontamination waste solids and clarifier buildings. The total area

contaminated as of June 1988, was 13.348 ft2 or 12.7%.

The inspector noted on tours of the area that the majority of

friskers were in areas with background readings of 200 to 400 counts

per minute (cpm). As an example, both the RM-14 friskers at the

truck bay and at the auxiliary building control point had backgrounds

greater than 200 cpm. The inspector discussed with licensee

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management the problem of assessing contamination levels with the

high background and the increased probability of low levels of

contamination being released from the site. The licensee stated

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i that the high background on RM-14 friskers would be reevaluated. The

inspector notified the licensee that this would be reviewed during

i subsequent inspections and would be tracked as IFl 50-338/88-18-04

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The inspector also discussed recent changes to the contamination

control program in that the licensee now requires shoe covers to be

worn when entering clean areas of the reactor auxiliary building.

This has the potential for reducing personnel contamination events

but increases the amount of laundry waste to be processed and does

not address the fundamental problem of not maintaining areas of the

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plant free of loose surface contamination to the maximum extent

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To minimize hot particle personnel contaminations and increase

personnel contamination awareness, the licensee has addressed the

! issue of hot particle contamination with all workers at the station.

Health physics technicians have been given training in detection and

I handling of hot particles and special areas have been identified

l throughout the plant as potential hot particle areas. Radiation Work

Pemits require that paper suits be worn over normal protective

clothing to minimize the transfer of hot particles when protective

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clothing is laundered. Also, protective clothing reading greater

than 50,000 dpm after laundering are discarded.

c. Postings, Labels and Controls

The inspector reviewed discrepancy report no.88-220 regarding three

rotometers (mechanical tut equipment used to measure air flow)

stored outside of radiologically controlled areas. On M Feb 7, 1988,

health physics discovered contamination on a rotometer'to be cleared

4 from the radiologically controlled area. The person witn the

rotometer informed health physics that while in the RCA the item

could not have become contaminated since it was never used or left

his hand. Upon surveying the storage location of other rotometers,

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health physics found from 1,000 dpm to 260,000 dpm fixed

contamination on two other rotometers. The rotometers were stored in

a cabinet in the technical support center, a clean area outside of

the radiologically controlled area of the plant. The licensee was

unable to determine how the contaminated rotometers were removed from

the radiologically controlled area.

Failure to properly survey and control the contaminated rotometers

was identified as a second example of an apparent violation of

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10CFR20.201(b)andT.S. 6.8.1 (50-338/88-18-03, 50-339/88-18-03).

The inspector surveyed selected areas outside of the radiologicaMy

controlled area with a RM-14/HP-210 frisker and did not locate any

contaminated material.

6. SolidWaste(84722)

10 CFR 20,311(d)(1) requires that any generating licensee who transfers

radioactive waste to a land disposal facility prepare all waste so that

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the waste is classified according to 10 CFR 61.55 and meets the waste

characteristics requirements in 10 CFR 61.56.

The inspector reviewed radioactive waste classification documentation for

selected radioactive waste shipments and determined that the waste had

been properly classified and met the waste characteristics requirements of

10 CFR 61.

The inspector discussed with licensee representatives radioactive waste

volume reduction. The licensee provides green and yellow waste containers

in the auxiliary building for sorting of potentially clean and

contaminated waste at its point or origin. Potentially clean waste was

removed from the green containers in the radiologically controlled area

and placed in the volume reduction and radwaste segregating facility. Tho

potentially clean waste was surveyed on a belt driven automatic monitor.

If the waste was clean it was placed in a bag monitor and released to the

county burial site upon meeting the survey release requirements. Yellow

trash was placed in 55 gallon drums and compacted for shipment to a vendor

with super compactor capabilities.

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The licensee has recently approved the construction of a new radioactive

waste processing facility and plans are for the facility to be operational

in 1990.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Transportation of Radioactive Material (86721)

Review of Radioactive Material Shipping Records

10 CFR 71.5 requires that licensees who transport licensed material

outside the confines of its plant or other place of use, or who deliver

licensed material to a carrier for transport to comply with the applicable

requirements of the regulations appropriate to the mode of transport of

the Department of Transportation (D0T) in 49 CFR Parts 170 through 189.

The inspector reviewed the records of selected shipments of radioactive

material performed in 1987. The shipping manifest examined were prepared

consistent with 49 CFR 170-189 requirements and the radiation and

contamination survey results were within the limits specified for the mode

of transport and shipment classification.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92701,

92702)

a. (Closed) Violation 50-338/339/87-14-01: Failure to assess whole body

dose through a tissue equivalent absorber of 300 milligram per square

centimeter (mg/cm2) or to shield the lens of the eyes with material

having a density thickness of at least 700 mg/cm2 as required on

NRC Form 5.

The inspector verified that the corrective actions in the licensee's

responte letter to the NRC dated June 29, 1988, had been implemented.

The licensee took direct measurements of the source term in the steam

generator Unit 1, on August 30, 1987, with modified TLDs. The

measurements formed the basis of a lens-of-the-eye correction factor

which was incorporated in the personnel dosimeter algorithm. The

inspector determined that the licensee has a procedure to evaluate

the dose delivered to lens of the eye. The same procedure will be

used to adjust the algorithm when the steam generators for Unit 2 are

opened. Health Physics Procedure 3.1.2.1, Whole Body Beta Dose

Response of Thermoluminescent Dosimeter Badge, was developed and

implemented to determine if adjustments to the algorithm are

necessary each time the steam generators are opened in the future,

b. (Closed) Violation 50-338,339/87-30-01: Failure to maintain

quarterly occupational exposures to individuals in restricted areas

to less than 7.5 rem to the skin of the whole body. The inspector

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verified that the licensee corrective actions in response letter to

the NRC, dated November 25, 1987, had been implemented. To minimize ,

the potential for hot particle skin contaminations, the licensee

reduced the contamination limits for clothing after laundering,

installed an automatic laundry monitor, provided hot particle

awareness training to all site personnel and specific training for

health physics technicians and laundry personnel, developed a

radiological work practice for hot particle work, and developed a

cleanliness control procedure for work in open systems to contain and

minimize the spread of hot particles,

c. (Closed) Violation 50-338,339/87-30-02: Failure to adhere to

protective clothing requirements specified on RWP No. 87-2312. The

inspector verified that the corrective actions specified in the

licensee's letter to the NRC dated November 25, 1987, had been

implemented. The inspector determined that a series of meetings were

held with all station personnel regarding RWP compliance and hot

particle and contamination awareness. Health physics personnel are

required to meet the same protective clothing requirements as are the

workers. If clothing requirements are different for the health

physics technician the requirements will be specified on the RWP.

d. (Closed) Violation 50-338/339/87-30-03: Failure to perfom adequate

personal surveys. The inspector verified that the corrective actions

specified in licensee's letter dated November 25, 1987, had been

implemented. The inspector reviewed procedures and determined that

health physics procedure 6.1.40, Attachment 5 was amended to require

that all personnel, upon exiting a contaminated area, were to perform

a whole body frisk at the nearest frisker and proceed directly to the

PCM-1B monitors at the control point exit of the radiologically

controlled area. Each step-off pad has a sign posted stating to

proceed directly to the final frisk point after performing a frisk at

the nearest frisker,

e. (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-338,339/88-02-04: Discrepancy reports

regarding improper control and unauthorized personnel entry to high

radiation areas. See Paragraph 3.b.

f. (Closed) 87-FRP-01: Followup on Licensee's Pregram for

Removing / Defacing Radiation Markings on Clean / Unused Equipment

Released for Unrestricted Use. The inspector discussed the

licensee's policy for disposal of 55 gallon drums. The inspector

determined that the licensee does throw away damaged drums and sells i

some to employees. However, the licensee representatives stated that

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drums that were yellow in color were compacted when damaged and never

released for general public use.

9. IE Information Notice ('EN) (92717)

The inspector determir.ed that the following Information Notices had been

received by the licensee, reviewed for applicability, distributed to

<_______ __

. . .

.

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appropriate personnel and that action, as appropriate, was taken or

scheduled.

IEN 87-31, Blocking, Bracing and Securing of Radioactive Materials

Packages in Transportation

IEN 87-37, Control of Hot Particle Contamination at Nuclear Plants

10. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were sumarized on June 10, 1988, with

those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas

inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.

Proprietary infonnation is not contained in this report,

item Number Description and Reference

338/88-18-01 IFI - Review SRD response / calibration records to

ensure that potentially damaged SRDs are response

checked prior to reissuance.

338/88-18-02 IFI - Review breathing air quality certifications for

vendor supplied air.

338,339/88-18-03 Violation - Failure to adequately survey material

being released for unrestricted use.

338/88-18-04 IFI - Review high background on RM-14 friskers.

338,339/88-18-05 Licensee Identified Violation - High radiation area

controls

Licensee management was informed that the items discussed in Paragraph 8

were considered closed.

During a telephone conversation on July 18, 1988, between R. B. Shortridge

of the NRC, and A. H. Stafford of Virginia Electric and Power Company, the

licensee was informed that the failure to properly survey and control

contaminated rotometer would be a second example of violation

10 CFR 20.201(b) and T.S. 6.8.2(50-338,339/88-18-03).

,

During a telephone conversation on August 5, 1988, between R. B.

Shortridge of the NRC, and A. H. Stafford and M. L. Bowling, Virginia

Electric and Power Company, the licensee was informed that the apparent

violation for failure to adequate control access to high radiation areas

would be considered licensee identified.

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